THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT
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To estimate the value of the Ideas of Reason was the primary object of the Critique. For, as to the a priori Principles of the Understanding, Kant held that, in the first instance, and for themselves, they needed no deduction; and that it never would have occurred to us to ask for one, if they had not been carried beyond their proper sphere. As principles of experience, they are vindicated by their fruitfulness, by the continual advance of scientific knowledge which has been made possible by means of them. But there is that in us which leads us to apply them beyond the sphere of experience. "Our faculty of knowledge feels a higher want than merely to spell out phenomena according to their synthetic unity in order to be able to read them as experience." We seek not merely to connect phenomena, but to find an ultimate unity beneath all their difference. We are not content merely to trace back the present phenomena of the world to those that immediately precede them in the chain of causation; we desire to complete the chain and find some absolutely first principle on which it hangs. Finally, we are not satisfied even with the conception of the world as a whole of inter-connected parts, which may be apprehended by the intelligence, unless we can discover also a unity.
between it and the intelligence that apprehends it. In
this way we are haunted by the thought of a unity beneath
all the diversity of the knowable world, of a completed
whole in which all that diversity is exhausted, and finally
of a unity of the intelligence and the intelligible world.
Hence, we are apt to despise the piece-work of empirical
science in which every answer only leads to a new question,
and to grasp at any theory which seems to throw light
on the ultimate reality which is the final answer to all
inquiry; and, failing such a theory, we are constantly
tempted to use the principles, which have proved so effec-
tive in extending our knowledge in the world of experience,
—as keys to the ultimate secret. Yet, when we do attempt
thus to use them, we find that they suddenly fail us, and
give rise to confusion and contradiction: and, this con-
fusion and contradiction cannot but reflect back a doubt
upon the knowledge which we have acquired by means of
these principles, and even upon the principles themselves.
For, "if we cannot distinguish whether certain questions
are within our horizon or not, we are never sure of the
claims or the possessions of our intelligence." ¹

To solve such difficulties and remove such doubts there
was only one expedient, viz., that of discovering some still
deeper principle, which should at once vindicate and limit
the principles of pure understandings—vindicate them
within the sphere in which they are properly applicable,
and at the same time, show where that sphere terminates.
This is what has already been done in the Analytic. But
the result is only the first step towards the solution of our
problem. For we have now to ask what is the explanation
of those "obstinate questionings," which carry us beyond
the sensible objects to which the valid application of the
principles of pure understanding is limited. Why are we
tempted to use these principles beyond their proper sphere?
Whence comes the very suggestion of the existence of
objects beyond that sphere? And, if such objects exist,
and if by the Analytic we are prohibited from determining
them by the principles of the understanding, have we any
other means of doing so? Finally, if these objects are
utterly beyond the reach of our faculty of knowledge, what

¹A. 238; B. 297.
is the function performed by the Ideas of them in relation to our knowledge? Are we to suppose that these Ideas are mere phantoms of reason which lure us away from the true path of knowledge, or are they guiding principles which have a useful office to discharge in our intellectual life, and which mislead us only when that office is misconceived?

It is in the attempt to answer these questions that the originality of the Dialectic consists. The doctrine of the limitation of knowledge to experience is a common-place of philosophical Positivism, which is as old as Bacon and, indeed, much older. But, as no one till Kant clearly asked the question, "What is experience?" so no one before him attempted to show what limits experience, or whence comes the consciousness of the limitation. For, it is one thing to be limited, and another to be conscious of limitation; and the latter implies a consciousness of something beyond the limit, if it be only the idea of the subject for which the object so limited exists. The intelligence can limit its knowledge to an experience which is mediated by sense, only in so far as it derives from itself the thought of an object or objects to which the principles of its knowledge will not apply.

Now, the Analytic has already prepared us to recognise how such Ideas may arise, and, indeed, how they must arise, in relation to experience. For it has shown us that the categories and principles upon which experience and science are based, are principles for the determination of the manifold of sense in relation to the unity of the conscious self; but that the pure consciousness of self is negatively related to the objects which it thus determines. In its pure analytic unity, it is opposed to the merely synthetic unity of experience. Hence, if it is capable of finding or producing the unity of the objective world by determining the data of sense in relation to itself; if, indeed, this is the only way in which it can come to the consciousness of itself; still, on the other hand, it does not find in the objective world so determined the pure correlate of its own unity. But this very contrast must carry it beyond the objective world, and awake in it the idea of an object which does correspond to the unity of the intel-
ligence for which it is. And thus we can understand why the mind should be haunted by the idea of an object which is at once more completely determined, and more simple, than the objects of experience as we actually find them.

If Kant had proceeded in this way, he would have shown more clearly the connexion of the Analytic and the Dialectic, though he might have been somewhat embarrassed by the difficulty of deriving the three Ideas of Reason directly from the analytic judgment of self-consciousness. As it is, he apparently makes things easier for himself, by returning to the "guiding thread" of formal Logic, which he had used in the Critique. For Logic speaks not only of apprehension and judgment, but also of a process and a faculty which we have not yet considered, the process of reasoning and the faculty of Reason. Accordingly, we have now to inquire whether this faculty is merely logical and formal, or whether it is not also the source of certain a priori conceptions of objects. For, as in the case of the understanding, it is possible that the formal use of reason may guide us to the discovery of its real use.

Now, reasoning is the process of mediate inference, i.e., inference through a middle term. In a syllogism, there is, first, a general rule apprehended by the understanding; secondly, the subsumption of a conception under the condition of this rule by judgment; and lastly,—what is the peculiar work of reason,—the determination of this conception by the predicate of the rule. In other words, a syllogism is a judgment made by means of the subsumption of its condition (the middle term) under a rule. The problem of reason in its logical use is always to connect a given predicate with a given subject, and the major of the syllogism supplies the rule by which this connexion may be made. Or, starting from the conception of a subject, reason seeks to find some more general conception by means of which it may be brought under a rule; nor is its work completely finished, till it finds the most general condition under which such determination is possible. "The proposition 'Caius is mortal,' might be got by us out of experience, by means of the understanding. But, as a rational being, I seek for a conception
containing the condition under which the predicate is connected with the subject, and this I find in the conception of man. Then, having subsumed this condition, taken in all its extent, under the rule (All men are mortal), I determine the subject (Caius) accordingly.”

The major proposition or rule may, of course, be subjected to the same process, and this may be repeated again and again in a series of prosyllogisms, till we arrive at the first absolute and sufficient condition for the application of the predicate to the subject. Now this is just saying, that the aim of reason is to find a principle by which every synthesis in our knowledge may be explained, and that it can only be satisfied with a first principle. Reason is, therefore, the faculty of principles, or the faculty that gives unity to knowledge by means of principles. And if it has any real use, if there are any a priori conceptions of objects involved in the very nature of reason, we may expect that these conceptions will furnish the first principles of all our knowledge.

For the purposes of formal Logic, any general proposition, inasmuch as it can be made the major of a syllogism, may serve as a principle. But, in the narrower and proper sense of the word, we can give the name of principle only to a proposition, which forms an absolute beginning for knowledge, i.e., to a proposition which does not depend on any other proposition, and on which all other propositions depend. Now, no empirical generalisation can have this character; for in no empirical generalisation is the subject necessarily, and therefore immediately, connected with the predicate. It is always a fair question to ask, why a particular predicate is empirically connected with a subject, though not contained in it; and the answer to such a question must be given in a series of prosyllogisms by which the cause of the connexion is assigned, and the cause of that cause ad infinitum. Besides, all such propositions relating to matters of fact presuppose what we have hitherto called the a priori principles of the understanding, and, for that reason, cannot themselves be regarded as principles.

Can we then regard even the principles of the under-

1 A. 322; B. 378.

2 A. 299 seq.; B. 355 seq.
standing as principles of knowledge in this highest sense? 1 This also is impossible, if we have rightly defined their nature in the Analytic. For the principles of the understanding are not the pure categories, which in themselves have no objective meaning. It is only when we subsume the pure forms of perception under them, that the categories become principles of a priori synthesis—conditions of possible experience. As, then, it is only in relation to a given matter that the understanding is synthetic, so its principles cannot be regarded as first principles of synthesis, or absolute starting-points for knowledge. Its synthesis always has a presupposition. When, e.g., we say “Everything that happens has a cause,” the conception of what happens does not in itself involve the conception of a cause; but the principle of causality shows how we may attain a definite empirical apprehension of that which happens, i.e., by considering it as an effect. But the necessity of a conception, with a view to empirical knowledge is a different thing from the immediate necessity of a principle, which rests entirely upon itself.

It appears then that what is necessary to constitute a first principle is, that it should be a synthetical proposition based on a pure conception. Of the meaning and use of such a principle, we may find an illustration in the codification of the Law. For the aim of codification is to simplify legislation, and legislation can be simplified only by reducing the endless multiplicity of civil statutes to a unity of principle. Now, this is quite a possible thing, since the laws of civil society are in their idea only the limitation of the freedom of each member of the society to conditions which make it consistent with the freedom of all the other members. These laws, therefore, relate to that which is essentially the product of our own activity. In the region of practice, human reason has true causality, and ideas are efficient causes of existences in harmony with them. Here, therefore, truth is to be discovered, not by looking to what is, but to what ought to be. “The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an example of an idle dream of perfection; and Brucker especially

1 In German, Kant is able to use the two words Principien and Grundsätze to distinguish principles of reason and understanding.
finds a peculiar absurdity in the Platonic assertion that no prince could rule well if he did not guide himself by ideas. . . . But a constitution of the greatest possible human freedom, a constitution the laws of which are only the conditions under which the freedom of each can subsist consistently with the freedom of all, (I do not say a constitution on the greatest happiness principle, for that would at once follow as the necessary result of the other,) is at least a necessary idea of reason; and it must always be present to the true legislator, not only in the first sketch of his constitution, but in all the particular laws of his state. In considering such an idea, we must, in the first instance, abstract from all present hindrances to its realisation,—hindrances which may, perhaps, spring, not so much from the inevitable limits of humanity, as from the neglect of true ideas in legislation. For nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar spirit of deference to so-called adverse experience, when, in truth, this experience would never have existed, if at the proper time the regulations of civil society had been modelled upon the ideas of reason.”

But, while we may reasonably seek in our reason for ideas which shall form objective principles of morality and law, it is quite another thing to seek there for principles of knowledge, i.e., for principles which have their origin purely in the mind, and yet enable us to know objects not produced by the mind. Such an attempt seems, indeed, to carry absurdity on the face of it. How by means of pure thought are we to know things given independently of thought? The knowledge which we get from the pure understanding is not analogous to this; for, though its principles of synthesis precede experience, they are justified not from themselves, but as the grounds of the possibility of experience. Here, however, what is required is a knowledge of objects by a synthesis of pure thought, which is neither derived from experience nor presupposed in it, and, indeed, which neither is, nor can be, realised in experience.

However this question may be answered, (and it is the object of the Dialectic to answer it,) we can now lay down

1 A. 316; B. 372.
characters which must belong to the Ideas of Reason; we can see what is the kind of knowledge to which reason points, and which is needed to satisfy it. In the first place, it is a knowledge which is related to the knowledge which we get through the understanding, in somewhat the same way as the principles of the understanding are related to the manifold of sense. For, just as the understanding gives unity to the perceptions by bringing them under its rules, so reason seeks to give unity to the rules of the understanding by bringing them under principles. It seeks, in short, to give complete unity and universality to the work of the understanding. Hence, it does not relate itself immediately to the perceptions of sense. It presupposes the work of the understanding, and would not be possible apart from that work; but it sets before the understanding an ideal of completeness and unity which the understanding itself could never suggest.\(^1\)

In the second place, the unity and universality to which reason points is nothing less than the Unconditioned. For reason goes back by prosyllogisms from condition to condition, and can never find rest in anything but an absolute first principle, or a condition which has itself no previous condition. Thus, even in its logical use, reason seeks for the unconditioned to complete and give unity to its knowledge of the conditioned. And if in its transcendental use, it is the source of certain peculiar conceptions, which have objective value, these conceptions must be Ideas of the Unconditioned. In other words, if we assert that reason supplies out of itself a knowledge of the things which are its objects, we mean simply that, wherever the conditioned is given, there reason itself supplies the whole series of its conditions. And this is equivalent to saying that reason is the source of a consciousness of an unconditioned principle for all conditioned existence presented to us in experience.

Now, this step from conditioned to unconditioned implies a pure a priori synthesis. For though, from the conception of the conditioned, we may by analysis derive the conception of a condition, we cannot derive it from the conception of the unconditioned, except by synthesis.

\(^1\) A. 306; B. 363.
And this synthesis is transcendent, *i.e.*, it is a synthesis the object of which cannot be represented as a phenomenon, or verified in sensuous experience. For experience by its very nature is of the conditioned; it is a knowledge of objects through principles which determine phenomena only in relation to each other, *i.e.*, as conditioned by each other. The objects of reason are, therefore, objects of pure thought.

Now, what *are* the Ideas of reason, *i.e.*, what are the different forms in which this idea of the unconditioned presents itself to us? Kant answers that they must correspond to different forms of syllogism, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. Now, if we follow the regressive movement of reason according to these three forms, we are led by it to three forms of the unconditioned: "the unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject; the unconditioned of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; and the unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a systematic whole." 1

In other words, the series of prosyllogisms ends in the idea of a subject, which is no longer a predicate; in the idea of a presupposition, which has itself no presupposition; and in the idea of an aggregate of the members of a division, in which no new member is required to complete the extension of the conception. Looking, therefore, to the movement of reason toward these three goals of thought, we see that there are three ideas of the unconditioned which are set before reason by its very nature, if not as determinate objects, yet at least as problems which it must seek to solve. And thus we are driven by reason to ask, whether there really are unconditioned objects, determined in these three ways; or whether our tendency to seek such unconditioned objects has its use merely "in giving such direction to the understanding as may enable it at once to extend its researches to the utmost, and maintain the greatest unity and harmony with itself." Even if we have here a mere set of insoluble problems, mere questions without possible answers, the questions are, at least, *not arbitrary*, but forced on us by the natural exercise of our rational powers. And, therefore, the decision that

1. A. 323; B. 379.
they are insoluble, and that these ideas have no objective value,—if that should be the decision to which we are led,—will only enable us to see more clearly their value as *ideals*, or guiding principles of science.

The three Ideas of reason correspond to the three most general relations of our thoughts or ideas to existence. All our Ideas refer, on the one hand, to a subject, and, on the other hand, to objects; and these objects again may be regarded in two points of view, either as phenomena or as things in themselves. If, then, the three orders of syllogism have a reference to the three forms of the unconditioned which are implied in all knowledge, it is obvious that they must bring us (1) to an absolute subject, as the unity presupposed in all thought, (2) to an absolute unity and complete synthesis of all the conditions of phenomena, and (3) to an absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought whatsoever. But the thinking being, regarded as the absolute or unconditioned subject, is the object of the science of Rational Psychology; the complete unity of all phenomena, or things in space and time, is the object of the science of Rational Cosmology; and the absolute reality, the *ens entium*, or reality that includes and transcends all other realities, is the object of the science of Rational Theology. If, therefore, reason is able to solve all the problems which it suggests, it will enable us to establish all these sciences on a firm basis; or, if not, to find the key to the difficulties which render such sciences impossible.

In an earlier chapter, I have shown how we are to regard the transition of Kant from the old Logic to the new; how he was led to seek for conceptions corresponding to the forms of judgment, and ideas corresponding to the forms of syllogism.\(^1\) In Kant's view, the old Logic had explained the process of thought in so far as it has to deal with a content already taken into the mind and united with it, a content, therefore, which it could analyse and recombine without going beyond itself; just as in the judgment of self-consciousness, "I am I," the mind might be said to analyse itself into a subject and an object, and again to recombine the elements so separated. In thus

\(^1\)See above, Vol. I. pp. 203 seq., 298 seq.
dealing with a content conceived to be already taken into
the mind and united with the consciousness of itself, all
the mind could do was to bring the whole conception, as
a subject, under a predicate got by analysis from itself; and if any mediation or proof were required for such a
judgment, it could be attained only by a further analysis,
which should connect the predicate with the subject
through a more general conception. Thus in analytic
thought, all that syllogism could do was to bring the
identity of a conception with itself to its ultimate terms.
The new Logic, on the other hand, deals with synthesis,
in which the mind goes beyond itself either to take in a
content which has not been united with itself before, or
to combine a new content with that which has been already
so united. But how can a synthesis with the mind, of
that which is not involved in its pure consciousness of
itself, be achieved? Or how, even supposing a content
already appropriated by the mind, can a new content be
synthetically united with it? Evidently in both cases,—
in order to unite a content with itself and to unite a new
content with that which has already been so united,—the
mind must derive from itself the necessary connecting
conceptions. It must derive from its own identity the
predicates under which it brings the new content it would
appropriate. Such predication, however, in which a pure
conception derived from the mind is applied to a perception
as something given, seems always to want mediation. In
other words, the mind, conscious of the difference between
the matter which it has appropriated and the conception
it has applied to the matter, looks for some further con-
ception to explain its union with its present object.
Hence, a syllogistic regress becomes necessary. We seek
for a middle term to connect thought with its object, and
this can be found only in the conception of an object which
is already united with thought. But in relation to such
an object the same problem reappears again and again
ad infinitum.

We can now, by aid of the Analytic, give more definite-
ness to these conceptions. For we have seen that the
predicate which the understanding must use to bring
perception into relation to itself, must be the conception

The infinite regress of experience.
of an object in which the manifold of perception is combined; and that it is only in relation to, and in distinction from, an object, (or rather a world of objects,) so constituted, that the ego can be conscious of itself. But, if it is only as combined under conceptions that perceptions form part of our experience, it follows that experience is a connected consciousness in which each element is mediated for us by the others. Thus an object of experience is an object for us, not, so to speak, in its own right, but only by reason of the place it holds in the context of experience, in which it is connected with all other objects by universal laws. But this means that an object of experience can be determined as an object only in reference to another object, which again is so determined in relation to another object, and so on \textit{ad infinitum}. Once admit, therefore, that it is the connexion in which objects stand with each other in experience which determines them as objects and so enables us to combine them with self-consciousness, and every object refers us to another for its warrant; for we have, in order to determine it as object for the self, to presuppose another object already so determined, and so on \textit{ad infinitum}. The result, therefore, is that the mind in determining objects is involved in a regress which cannot find an end, and a series of middle terms, connecting object with object \textit{ad infinitum}, takes the place of the one middle term which is wanted to connect the object with the mind itself.

It may now be seen how Kant comes to regard the syllogistic process as pointing to a movement of reason, which carries us beyond the judgments of experience to a principle upon which they all rest. As the analytic judgment of thought requires syllogism to make it ”complete,” by basing it on a middle term derived from a further analysis, which discovers the most general conception that can be used to connect the predicate with the subject; so the synthetic judgment of experience, by which an object is determined for us in relation to other objects, requires an Idea to supply the final mediation, by which the object may be fixed once for all as an object in relation to the mind that knows it, without being referred back to any other object; by which, in short, it may be determined as
an object without conditions. But this seems to involve a contradiction; for it was by bringing them under such conditions that the data of sense were referred to objects at all. What is wanted, therefore, is that the ego itself should come out of its position, as a mere subject which connects given perceptions with each other, and so determines them as objective; i.e., that it should itself give rise to an object with which all the others may be connected. The idea of an intuitive understanding, an understanding which in the consciousness of itself includes the consciousness of its object, or which produces the object by the same act of thought by which it is conscious of itself, appears, therefore, as the necessary terminus or goal, toward which all our knowledge points; or, as the only kind of consciousness in which we could find a final satisfaction of the questions of our intelligence. Hence, we do not wonder to find the conception of such an understanding suggesting itself to Kant as an ideal of knowledge; though, according to his view, it is an ideal from which we are eternally divided by the sensuous conditions under which alone knowledge is possible to us.

In the preceding chapter, I attempted to explain how it is that Kant is always suspended at this point between the necessity of thinking a unity of the mind with its object (such as is expressed in the phrase "intuitive understanding") as the ideal of knowledge, and the equal necessity of denying that our knowledge can ever be brought into correspondence with that ideal. For it is the peculiar characteristic of our intelligence that in itself it is purely analytic, and that, therefore, it can be synthetic only in relation to a given matter. Kant, indeed, had already grasped a principle that might have carried him beyond this point of view, when he saw that even the analytic judgment of self-consciousness presupposes the synthetic judgment, by which the supposed foreign matter is brought together under the principles of pure understanding so as to produce the consciousness of an objective world. For, if so, then the foreign matter, as well as the principles under which it is brought, must be regarded as necessarily related to self-consciousness. And the reflexion which reveals to us this necessary relation, must lead to
a further determination of objects as not merely objects for consciousness, but objects in which there is nothing foreign to consciousness. Thus, just as science corrects our first view of phenomena as mere unconnected appearances in space and time, by the conception of the necessary relations which bind them together as objects determined by the analogies of experience, so Kant's criticism would teach us further to correct our view of them as necessarily connected objects, by showing that they can have such a connexion only in relation to a subject, which in all its consciousness of them is yet in perfect unity of thought with itself. Kant, however, as he falls back on the analytic unity of thought with itself in opposition to its synthetic determination of a given matter, can regard this further unity of experience with the subject of it only as an ideal, which is implied in experience, but which in experience there is no means of verifying.

But this ideal, as we have seen, presented itself to Kant in three forms, which he deduced from the forms of syllogism, in the same way in which he had deduced the categories from the forms of judgment. The plausibility, and at the same time the illusiveness, of this process in the latter case has been already discussed, and the same criticism applies also to Kant's treatment of the ideas of reason. It was because formal Logic, though professedly dealing with a process of mere analysis, yet contained in itself a shadow or residuum of the real synthetic process of knowledge, that the categories could be supposed to be derived from it. Hence Kant could 'deduce' the a priori conceptions from the logical account of judgment, without seeming to desert the analytic idea of thought, while yet he got the advantage of the suggestion of synthesis. For this advantage, however, he had to pay dearly. If it spared him the difficult task of developing the categories out of the unity of the understanding, it at the same time hid from him the necessity of fundamentally altering his view of thought as essentially analytical. Now, just as Kant did not ask how, on the analytic idea of thought, judgment could exist at all, but simply took it as existing, and used it to discover the categories; so

¹This, of course, refers to the metaphysical, not the transcendental deduction.
he does not ask how, on the analytic idea of thought, we can go on from judgment to syllogism, but simply takes the syllogism for granted, and examines its various forms in order to get from them a guiding-thread to the ideas of reason. Thus he takes the three ideas—of the noumenal subject, the noumenal object, and of the noumenal unity of all being—as respectively derived from the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive syllogism. We find, however, that he has to do considerable violence to the different syllogistic forms in order to connect each of them with one of the metaphysical sciences; for there is nothing in these forms which would lead us to expect that the ideas derived from them should have such a restricted application. The ostensible deduction, therefore, rather hides than reveals the real process by which Kant reaches the different ideas.

It is, however, possible to attain a truer view of the real movement of thought, which is concealed under this artificial use of Logic, if we consider how these ideas present themselves in the effort of the mind to find ultimate principles by which the judgments of experience may be mediated. For, in Kant's view, it is the peculiar and characteristic work of reason to seek for an idea which may put an end to the continual regress of empirical thought from one phenomenon to another. In other words, it is the essential aim of reason to fill up the gulf, which is still left between the subject and the predicate in the judgment of experience, and so, in combining each with the other, to combine both with the thought for which they are. And, on Kant's own showing, if thought could overcome, or reconcile, the differences between the elements which it combines in the object, it would at the same time overcome, or reconcile, the difference between itself and its object. Judgment and syllogism thus represent respectively the differentiating and the integrating movements of thought, the movement by which it goes out of its unity to that which is other than itself, and the movement by which it returns to itself again, enriched by the process through which it has gone. Now, if we adopt this point of view, we may regard pure self-consciousness as in itself a syllogism; for it involves at once
the expression, and the reconciliation, of a difference. Here, however, the two premises are, as it were, merged in the conclusion, because the moment of differentiation immediately passes into the moment of integration. The subject and the object self are distinguished only to be immediately identified. Hence, Kant generally regards self-consciousness, not as a syllogism, but rather as the simplest of analytic judgments, the "analytic unity of apperception." On the other hand, the objective consciousness may also be regarded as a syllogism, seeing that in it the endless difference of phenomena in space and time is brought back into the unity of one world. This syllogism, however, has the opposite fault to that exemplified in the syllogism of self-consciousness; for in it the two premises are so widely separated that it is impossible to unite them perfectly in the conclusion, and the effort to attain such a unity gives rise to an infinite series of prosyllogisms. For here the first premise must be regarded as expressing the difference of objects from each other, and from the one subject for which they are, while the second premise expresses their essential relation to each other and to that subject, and, therefore, their unity as elements in one world. But, in Kant's view, this unity is never realised so completely as to overcome the dualism between the mind and its object. Hence, we may fairly put the matter thus: self-consciousness is not a true syllogism, because in it the terms of the conclusion are never so widely separated as to need a middle term; while the objective consciousness is not a true syllogism, because in it they are so widely separated that no principle can be found which will unite them.

But this way of stating the case immediately receives a partial correction when we observe that these two imperfect syllogisms are necessarily connected together. Self-consciousness is possible only as a return to self through the consciousness of the object, or, in Kant's words, it is the mind's consciousness of the unity of its own action in determining its objects; and the consciousness of the objective world is possible only in relation to the unity of apperception, i.e., to a unity which can become conscious of itself. May we not, then, regard these opposite
imperfections of what we may call the subjective and the objective syllogisms as due to the abstraction which separates them from each other? May it not be just because he seeks to determine the subject in abstraction from the object that Kant is forced to conceive the unity of self-consciousness as purely analytic? And may it not be just because he abstracts from the subject in considering the relations of objects, that he is obliged to regard objective consciousness as merely synthetic, i.e., as externally uniting objects which in spite of their relation still remain external to each other? If it be so, then will not the correction of this abstraction, and the restoration of the unity of thought which it destroys, enable us to rise to a truer view of the movement of thought as neither purely analytic nor purely synthetic, but both at once? And will it not thus enable us to see that that movement corresponds to the true idea of syllogism, i.e., as a rational evolution of thought, wherein an original unity manifests itself in difference and through difference returns to itself again? Finally, does not such a movement of differentiation and integration, which Kant practically admits, correspond to that very "intuitive understanding," to which he so often refers, but which he as often rejects?

Now, without attempting directly to answer such questions, we may observe that the three Ideas of reason which Kant sets before us correspond closely to the three syllogisms of which we have spoken. In fact, Kant's criticism of Rational Psychology and Rational Cosmology exactly corresponds to the views above stated as to the subjective and objective syllogisms; while his discussion of Rational Theology shows clearly what it was that hindered him from solving the problem in the manner just indicated. In his discussion of Rational Psychology, what he shows is that the judgment of self-consciousness does not determine the subject as a thing in itself. Why? Because in it the subject-self is never given by itself, but always determined in relation to the object-self and to other objects given in sense. If, therefore, we take away all reference to objects, we can say nothing of the subject; while, if we retain such reference, we are not speaking of the pure subject in itself, and, therefore, not of the
real or absolute subject. Either, therefore, we turn an abstraction into a reality, or, if we take the concrete reality, we find that we are dealing not with a thing in itself, but simply with a phenomenon. The subject in itself collapses into an identity of which nothing can be said; or, we can define it only as an activity which attaches predicates to other objects, remaining itself undetermined. On the other hand, in dealing with Rational Cosmology, Kant has to make the opposite criticism. The external world as an object is not a res completa, or real being which can stand by itself and find its complete determination in itself. Take it in itself, and it turns into an endless chain of necessarily related phenomena, which is nowhere attached to any fixed point, and in which each link finds its determination in something beyond, and that again in something beyond and so on ad infinitum. But this means that, when we take the external world as a thing in itself, the conception of it breaks down in contradiction. We need not, however, wonder that "phenomena in their existence as phenomena should be as good as nothing at all, i.e., that they should be self-contradictory, and that, therefore, the presupposition of their existence should carry with it contradictory consequences"; for this means only that objects, conceived in abstraction from the subject for which alone they are, come into contradiction with themselves; since in this abstraction we are forced to attribute to them at once independent existence and properties which are inconsistent with such existence. The solution of the antinomy thus arising is to be found simply in treating these objects as phenomena, and so correcting the error into which we were necessarily led by the abstract point of view from which we had formerly regarded them.

Now, the result of this double reflexion upon the imperfection of the subjective and of the objective consciousness, taken separately, might be expected to be the assertion of their essential unity. For, if we cannot find any ultimate reality—i.e., any reality that does not imply a relation to something else, either in the subject without the object or in the object without the subject—where should we look for it except in the unity which embraces both? And if

Kant answers in the negative.
Rational Theology is the science that deals with this unity, is it not from it alone that we must expect to get the ultimate truth of things? Has not Kant’s exposition of the imperfect, because abstract, character of Rational Psychology and Rational Cosmology just been preparing us for such a conclusion? So at first we might expect. But at this point we find that Kant turns his weapons, and changes the direction of his criticism. While in the two former cases he had shown that the ultimate truth cannot be reached, because it would imply the separation of object and subject from each other in spite of their necessary relativity; here he argues that it cannot be attained, because it would imply the union of subject and object with each other in spite of their essential difference. This double aspect of the criticism of Kant inevitably forces us to raise the question whether the argument, by which the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology are explained and the Antinomies of Rational Cosmology are solved, does not cut away the ground from the reasonings by which the Ideal of Pure Reason is proved to be unreal or unknowable. If it is maintained that the knowledge of the ego in itself and the knowledge of the object in itself are each impossible, because we know them only in relation to each other, can it be said that we must reject the knowledge of both in their unity, because we can know them only in distinction from each other?

Now, without anticipating the special points to be discussed in the sequel, we may remark that the possibility of the negative answer to this question given by Kant in his criticism of Rational Theology, rests upon the opposition of perception and conception which is retained to the last in the Analytic. For, though the Transcendental Deduction is specially intended to show the necessary unity of perception and conception with a view to knowledge, it still falls short of a proof that they are in themselves essentially related. The object perceived is, indeed, represented as necessarily in harmony with the unity of the subject, and the subject as self-conscious only in relation to the object; yet, as it is by abstraction of the subjective process from its result that the consciousness of the self is conceived to arise, so the consciousness of self is not,
and cannot be, regarded as including or transcending the consciousness of the object, or the consciousness of the object as an element in the consciousness of self. Hence, the abstraction which opposes subject and object finally gains the victory over the idea of their relativity; and, instead of advancing to a synthesis of the consciousness of the self and the consciousness of the object in the consciousness of God, Kant falls back upon a dualism, which, opposing the two former to each other, empties the latter of all its meaning.

Before leaving the general discussion of the Ideas of Reason, it is desirable to refer to a passage in which Kant recognises that the three syllogisms or Ideas of reason form a unity, or make up one great syllogism; though, as has been already indicated, he fails to draw the inference that there is a higher process of thought, in which analysis and synthesis must be taken up as moments. "Finally," he declares, "we have to observe that there is a certain manifest connexion and unity of the transcendental ideas, and that pure reason by means of them brings all its knowledge into a system. To advance from the knowledge of the self (or the soul) to the knowledge of the world, and by means of the latter to the knowledge of God, is so natural a progress that it is comparable to the logical movement of reason from premises to conclusion. Whether there is here in reality a secret relationship of the same kind as that between the logical and the transcendental procedure is one of the questions, the answer to which we must expect in the sequel of this inquiry."\(^1\) In the note introduced in the second edition, the syllogism appears to take another order. "Metaphysic," he says, "has for the proper end of its inquiries only three ideas:—God, Freedom, and Immortality; so that the second idea united with the first must lead to the third as a necessary conclusion." The difference, however, of the order of the Ideas in this passage from that of the Critique is immediately explained as due to the special character of the latter.

"In a systematic development of these ideas this order would be the fittest as being the synthetic order, but in the critical treatment of them which must precede this,

\(^1\) A. 337; B. 394.
the analytic order will be better adapted to the end in view; since thus we advance from that which experience immediately lays to our hand, from the knowledge of the soul, to the knowledge of the world, and then lastly to the knowledge of God." In following this order, Kant is really moving from the abstract to the concrete, and thus building up experience out of its elements: or rather, he is recombining the elements which as conceived in their abstraction are self-contradictory, and which, therefore, force us in the end to conceive them as elements in a unity. The syllogism out of which the unity of knowledge is generated is, therefore, the recognition that the unity of the consciousness of self as referred to itself breaks down and, therefore, refers us to its opposite, the consciousness of the world; and that that in turn, as referred to itself, gives rise to a contradiction which forces us to refer it to the self; and finally, that this double reflexion forces us back upon an idea of the two as both essential elements in the consciousness of God.

In reality, however, the so-called synthetic syllogism must also proceed from abstract to concrete; for, if it starts with the idea of God, it must take Him not as the unity in which the abstract opposition of the ego and the world is overcome, but as the mere universal unity of thought which before was characterised as the ego; next it must pass beyond this simple unity to the world, which, however, cannot be conceived as a res completa except in so far as it rises to consciousness of itself in man, or in so far as its process is conceived as a genesis of such a self-consciousness. We have here, therefore, really the same process of reason as in the so-called analytic syllogism, a result which is concealed from Kant because he takes God as an external (äusserweltlich) Being, and not as the unity to which thought returns through the negation of the independence of the ego and the world. If we are to distinguish the two processes, all the difference will be that in the latter we shall be showing that the unity, to which, according to the former, all things return, cannot be conceived except as differentiating itself. That God cannot be a substance but only a living subject, is shown only when we have reproduced the finite world and
the finite spirit out of the unity to which, according to the first process, we were obliged to carry them back.

This line of reflexion, however, takes us much beyond Kant, and it is only by way of illustrating Kant's double syllogism of Reason, that it is necessary to refer to it here.
CHAPTER XI
RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS PARALOGISMS

The previous chapter has already shown the position which the Idea of the soul or thinking subject has in relation to the other Ideas; but we must now follow Kant in his more definite treatment of it, and in his criticism of the Rational Psychology which sought to make it an object of knowledge. We must, in other words, inquire what light the transcendental method casts upon the attempts made by metaphysicians to determine the nature of the thinking subject as a thing in itself.

Transcendental reflexion led us to recognise that the objective world is essentially an object for a thinking subject. For we know an objective world, only as we combine the data of sense by means of the categories in relation to the self. In the consciousness of this pure unity for which all objects are, we have taken a step beyond experience, though not into a transcendental region of things in themselves, but only into the transcendental consideration of the ultimate condition that makes experience possible. Hence, we are no longer dealing with an object to which we can apply the principles that enable us to explain and connect objects of experience. For the relation of objects to each other, which is mediated by the self, cannot be taken as analogous to the relation of objects to the self. This becomes still more obvious when we consider that what we have in the former case is not properly a relation of objects already given as such, but a relation of the data of sense through which they become determined as objects. If, therefore, we seek to determine the self which is the subject of knowledge, we must recog-
nise that we are going beyond experience, and dealing with something which, though implied in the objects of experience, cannot be related to them as they are to each other, or determined as an object in the same way in which they are determined—through principles which bring their manifold to a unity. To attempt in that way to determine the self would involve an obvious circle. It would put into the objective world, as one object among others, that in virtue of which, and in relation to which alone there is any knowable object or world of objects at all. It would be to treat that which is the presupposition of the existence of all objects as if it were another object different from them and externally determined by them.

Yet how natural is the illusion by which we put the self that knows into the world known, and relate it to that world as one object to another! The attitude of mind in which we usually live is one in which we abstract from the knower or rather neglect him, in our attention to the known. Hence, when we do turn our attention to the knower, nothing in our ordinary thought of the known occurs to prevent us from putting the knower side by side with other objects. As in the former case we did not reflect upon the fact that we are conscious of objects only in relation to the self, so now our attention is not called to the difference between the consciousness of other objects in relation to the self, and the consciousness of the self in relation to the self. As we did not formerly think of the relation of the circumference to the centre, so we do not now become aware of the absurdity of putting the centre at a point in its own circumference. But that is exactly the paralogism into which we fall when we bring under the categories the ego, whose function it is to determine other objects as such through the categories, and which, in truth, can be conscious of itself only as it discharges that function. If the eye, that "most pure spirit of sense," cannot see itself except in so far as it may be said to see itself in all the other things it sees,¹ how can

¹ Troilus and Cressida, Act iii. Sc. 3—

"Nor doth the eye itself,
That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself,
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed
the conscious ego know itself, except as the universal principle of knowledge which is present in all things known? "Through this 'I' or 'He' or 'It', (the thing) which thinks," Kant says, "nothing is set before our consciousness except a transcendental subject = X, which is known only through the thoughts, that are its predicates," (or more properly which it attaches as predicates to other things,) "and of which, if it is separated from other things, we cannot have the smallest conception. In attempting to grasp it, in fact, we turn round it in a continual circle, since we must always make use of it, in order to make any judgment regarding it. Here, therefore, we are brought into an awkward pass, out of which there is no escape; because the consciousness in question is not an idea which marks out for us a particular object, but a form which attaches to all ideas in so far as they are referred to objects, i.e., in so far as anything is thought through them." ¹

Men are always, in a sense, self-conscious. But this self-consciousness, so long as it is not reflective, may take very inadequate forms. At the lowest, men confuse it with a consciousness of their own bodies,—a stage of thought which survives in the ordinary metaphors by which the relation of consciousness to its object is expressed. Thus, an object is said to make an "impression" on the mind just as one material object does upon another; and even when attention has been drawn to the difference between the relation of sensation to stimulus, and that of an impression on a material substance to the object that produces it, the idea is apt to remain that the sensation is in some sense a copy of the object on the inner tablet of the soul. A further reflexion, which recognises the disparateness of these two relations, is perplexed by the opposite difficulty of getting beyond the sensations of the subject to any objective material world, but still takes the sensations as given states of an object called the soul,

Salutes each other with each other's form;
For speculation turns not to itself,
Till it hath travell'd and is mirror'd there
Where it may see itself."

¹ A. 346; B. 404.
which is affected by other, though it may be unknown, things. To this view, Kant does not deny a certain relative validity. What he points out, however, is that affections of sense cannot be recognised as states of the self as an object, apart from a determination of inner sense by the subject-self through the categories; and that this subject-self, for which all objects (including the self as object) are, cannot be got into the position of one object among others. It is the "determinable" self and not the "determining" self which can alone be known as an object, and the former escapes knowledge just because it is the unity in relation to which all objects are known. Further, as it is only in view of its identity with the determining self that the determinable self can properly be called a self at all, so the attempt to determine the ego in itself, must be an attempt to determine the pure subject-ego as such.

By this line of reflexion Kant brings us to the idea of the ego as a unity for which everything is, but to which we can give no distinctive character except as that for which everything is. But Rational Psychology was an attempt to determine the pure ego as an object. It did not, therefore, confuse the ego with the body or even with the sensitive subject, but sought to determine it in its pure nature as a thinking subject. Indeed, it was only as it attempted to do this that it could claim to be a pure a priori science. To this pure ego, then, it sought to apply the categories. As the ego is the subject implied in all consciousness, it determined the soul as a substance; as the ego is the unity in reference to which all objects are combined, it determined the soul as simple: as the ego is conscious of itself as one self through all the changes of its perceptions and thoughts, it determined the soul as a permanent identity; as the ego is that in relation to which alone we are conscious of objects as existing, it determined the soul as "the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence is an inference," but which is itself existent, so to speak, in its own right and independent of anything else. And from this view of the soul as a simple self-identical self-existent substance, it went on

1 B. 158.  
2 A. 402.
to argue to its immateriality, its indestructibleness, and its immortality. Now, Kant points out that in all this the pure ego, which, properly speaking, lies behind the categories as their source, is turned into an object before them to which they may be applied; and it is forgotten that "in truth the ego cannot be said to know itself through the categories, but rather to know the categories, and by their means all other objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself." 1 It is forgotten that "I cannot know that as an object which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (thought) is distinguished from the determinable self (the thinking subject) as knowledge from the object of it." But "the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking them, attain a conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, in order to think them, it must presuppose its own pure self-consciousness, i.e., it must presuppose the very thing it would explain. And so, in like manner, the subject in which the idea of time has its original ground, is thereby prevented from determining its own existence in time." 2 We can, indeed, explain why it should be thought possible so to determine the ego as an object. For reflexion enables us ideally to separate the ego, in reference to which the experience of objects is possible, from actual experience; and because I can make this abstraction, I naturally suppose "that I can be conscious of my existence apart from experience and its empirical conditions. But in this I am confusing the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence, with an imaginary consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking itself. I am supposing myself to know the substantial in me as the transcendental subject, when all that I have in my thought is the unity of consciousness, which is presupposed in all determination as the mere form of knowledge." 3

Descartes, in his cogito ergo sum, made this mistake. He supposed that, because I can by abstraction set the thinking ego before me apart from all determination of objects through it, I can, therefore, take it as an object existing by itself, which I can go on to determine by the

1 A. 402. 2 B. 422. 3 B. 427.
categories. He did not notice that, when I say "I think" in the sense that "I exist thinking," I really express more than the spontaneity of pure thought; I express, in fact, a determination of the subject as present to itself in perception. If, on the other hand, I concentrate my attention upon the mere logical function of thought—"the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible perception," what I have before me, is not myself "either as I am or as I appear to myself, but I am thinking of myself only as I might think of any object from the manner of the perception of which I abstract. If, then, I represent myself in this point of view as a subject of thought, or even as a ground of thinking, this does not mean that I apply to myself the categories of substance and causality; for these categories are not the bare conceptions of subject and ground, but these functions of thought as already applied to our sensuous perception. Now, such application of the categories would, indeed, be necessary if I wished to know myself as an object through them. But, ex hypothesi, I wish to be conscious of myself only as a thinking subject. I, therefore, set aside the consideration of how I am given to myself in perception (which may, indeed, present me to myself, though only as phenomenon). And thus, in the consciousness of myself in mere thought, I come back upon the being which for me underlies all being (bin ich das Wesen selbst), but which is not thereby given in such a way that thought can determine it." 2

In a sense we can say that the "I am" of self-consciousness underlies, and is presupposed in, all objective existence. But the "am" here does not express what it does when we apply the category of existence to an object; for in that case we have a definite conception of an object, and what we have to determine is "whether it is posited beyond our thought or no." In other words, when we ask whether an object exists, we are asking whether it is given in perception and determined in relation to other objects in the one context of experience in which all that is determined

1 This may explain how the categories of substance and cause (or ground) can be applied by Kant to the thing in itself as well as to the ego in itself.
2 B. 429.
as existing must be placed. But, when we ask whether the pure ego exists, we are asking whether the very possibility of objective existence exists. Hence, it is obvious that, if we define existence as existence for a self, the question of the existence of the self can get a rational meaning only if we take it as equivalent to the question whether I, who am conscious of objects, am also presented to myself as an individual object among other objects that exist for me; and to this, according to Kant, the answer is that we know ourselves as objects in inner sense. If, on the other hand, we mean to ask the question whether the ego, in reference to which all objects (myself included) are determined as existing, itself exists, we are asking whether the ultimate condition of experience has a reality independent of experience. Now, of this we can say nothing; for "the I think is always an empirical proposition," i.e., it always involves, in addition to the pure activity of thought, a matter which it determines; and apart from such activity upon a given matter, the "I" is merely the ultimate condition of the possibility of experience, and cannot realise itself in the actual "I think" of self-consciousness; for, as we have frequently had to observe, the analytic unity of self-consciousness always implies the synthetic unity of its determination of objects. When, therefore, Descartes argues, *cogito ergo sum*, he commits a paralogism: for, by mere thinking alone, I am not present to myself either as one real object among others, or even as the subject in relation to which all objects exist; but I exist for myself in the former sense only when I determine myself as present to myself as an object in inner sense; and I exist for myself in the latter sense only in so far as I am conscious of the unity of thought involved in all determination of the matter of sense. Hence, my existence cannot be inferred (as Descartes would have it) from my thinking, as if existence were involved in the mere spontaneity of thought—in which case, as Kant says, "the property of thought would make all beings that possess it necessary beings," and we should need to lay down the major premise: "All beings that think exist" (in virtue of their thinking); whereas it appears that the actuality of thought implies something
else than thought, and the "I think" can be realised only when there is something to think other than thought itself. In the "I think," accordingly, we have an empirical proposition, which is not derived from any universal such as Descartes would need to assume. All that is true is that in the "I" we have the unity in relation to which alone experience can be realised, and that, therefore, we cannot think of it as realised for any one, except under the same general conditions under which it is realised in us.

From this point of view, then, we can at once reject all the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology. For we can see at once that the determining ego cannot be taken as an object like other objects brought under the categories. If we speak of it as the subject of thought, we cannot mean thereby to determine it as a substance; for a substance can be determined as such only in relation to it. The self, no doubt, is conscious of its persistent identity in determining objects; but if we were applying to it the category of substance, we should need to treat thought as the accident of an underlying substance, whereas for aught we know that which underlies thought may change, and self-consciousness may be passed on from one substance to another, as motion is, without losing its unity. For it is not of such underlying substance that our self-consciousness speaks; but only of the identity which shows itself in our consciousness of objects, and persists as long as that consciousness persists, but of which, apart from that consciousness, we can say nothing. As a matter of fact, the quantitative intensity of that consciousness seems to increase and decrease, and why should it not perish altogether? Of this we can say nothing; all that we can say is that in all thought the ego continues to present itself as subject. But this is a merely analytical or identical proposition, and from it we can draw no inference as to the objective permanence of the thinking subject as such.

In the second place, when it is said that the ego is individual, inasmuch as it is the unity to which all the difference of perception is referred in the determination of objects, this does not authorise us to determine it as a qualitatively simple substance. To do this would be to pass from the simplicity of thought to the simplicity of the
substance in which thought is realised; and, moreover, it would be to determine that substance by a predicate which cannot be given in experience; for in experience objects can be qualitatively determined only by a synthesis in conformity with the conception of degree or intensive quantity. To say that there is no multiplicity or difference of parts in the ego as thinking, is merely to "characterise the ego transcendentally" as the unity presupposed in experience. But to say that the ego in itself is simple, apart from its activity as manifested in the thinking of objects, is to determine it, as an object of which we predicate a quality, without reference to the conditions under which alone objects can be qualitatively determined. The hollowness of this process is at once obvious when the Dogmatist goes on to base on it an argument for the immortality of the soul. For all we can say is that, as conscious, we are for ourselves simple; but this, though it excludes a division of consciousness into parts, analogous to the division of matter, does not exclude a gradual extinction of it by lessening of its intensity.

In the third place, we are consciously identical with ourselves so long as we are conscious of ourselves at all, in spite of all the changes of objects presented to us. But this is merely an analytic proposition expressing the necessary identity with itself of the subject, to which all successive phenomena are referred in order to their combination in one experience; and such a proposition, tells us nothing of the determination of the self as an object in which this consciousness realises itself. The self-maintaining identity of the self for which all objects exist, is not the permanent identity of any object for consciousness, not even of the self as an object.

Lastly, we distinguish ourselves as thinking beings from other objects outside of us, even from our own bodies. And this distinction has caused the Rational Psychologists to argue that the existence of these objects is not involved in our consciousness of self, and that, therefore, we can have no certainty of their existence, such as we have of our own existence. But to this it is to be answered that we do not know the existence of anything through the bare spontaneity of thought, but only in so far as there is a...
matter of sense which it can determine as objective. And we know the existence of ourselves as objects only in opposition, yet in relation to other \textit{i.e.}, external objects. Whether we could have any consciousness of ourselves, apart from the consciousness of external things, is a problem on which the \textit{Refutation of Idealism} has cast some light. But of this, enough has been already said; and here it is sufficient to remark that the fact that we distinguish ourselves from other things, does not prove anything as to the possibility of our separate existence, nor even of a consciousness of ourselves which should not involve any consciousness of them.

Rational Psychology thus breaks down in its attempt to determine the self as an object by means of the pure \textit{a priori} unity of Apperception. It does so because the pure "I think," although it expresses the principle by which, and in relation to which, all objects are determined as such, yet, when taken as the expression of that principle, has no value or meaning apart from such determination. On the other hand, if we take the "I think" as expressing the determination of the self as an object, it is no longer the pure thought of the ego that is in question, but the manifold of inner sense as determined by it. And it may be added that, just because of the introduction of this manifold, the determination of the objective ego can never be adequate to the pure unity of thought. Thus, if we leave out the data of sense, and look to pure thought alone, we have no object at all; and if we bring in the data of sense, we have no object corresponding to the Idea. In the one case, we have an abstract undifferentiated unity of thought which, as so isolated, does not determine itself as an object at all; in the other case, we have a manifold of sense which may be determined as an object in relation to this unity, but cannot be completely brought back to it so as to extinguish the traces of its external origin; for "the understanding in us men is no faculty of perception, nor, when this is given in sense, can it take it up \textit{into itself}, in such a way as to combine, as it were, the manifold of \textit{its own perception}." \footnote{B. 153.}

It is the former of these abstractions to which Kant
mainly directs his attention here. As was indicated in the last chapter, complete determination of an object may be regarded as a syllogism, in which the judgment which determines it is carried back to its ultimate conditions. Now, in this point of view, the unity of self-consciousness in pure thought, the "I am I," seems the very ideal of perfect determination, for in it we have the necessary difference of subject and object dissolved in perfect unity; and the "I" so determined seems to be complete in itself—a res completa in Spinoza's sense, which needs nothing extraneous on which it may be based or through which it may be determined. But, Kant finds that—so far at least as the theoretical reason is concerned—this pure self-determination of the ego is not what it pretends to be, nor what the Rational Psychologists take it to be. It is only by reflexion upon, and abstraction from, the determination of external objects, that we arrive at the judgment by which the object of inner sense is determined; and it is only by abstraction even from that object that we reach the "I am," or "I am I" of pure thought. The analytic judgment of self-consciousness in which the "I" determines itself, presupposes the synthetic judgment by which the manifold of sense is determined; and all that the analytic judgment does is to carry us back to the abstract unity presupposed in such synthetic judgment. But to regard the ego in this sense as a subject purely determined by itself, is to elevate an abstraction into the place of a res completa, and to "take the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence, for the consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self."¹ To elevate this abstraction into the consciousness of a real independent existence of the self would require, as Kant thinks, an intuitive understanding—an understanding which does not need to wait for perceptions to determine, but which, by its pure activity, produces its own perceptions. Or, failing that, there would be required some principle which should make it imperative for me to regard my own existence in this abstraction, and which should in this way give me practical assurance of the real independence of the thinking self. This last possibility,

¹B. 427.
however, we have to leave out of account in dealing with the theoretical reason.

There is, however, one aspect in which Kant admits that this "possible abstraction" has a value for theoretical reason. It is the source of an Idea, or regulative principle, which we can set before us in our empiric determination of the ego, though we know that we can never realise it. As objective principles of the determination of the self, the principles of Rational Psychology have no theoretical value; but they supply a directive ideal for Empirical Psychology. For the Idea of a "simple independent intelligence," which is "unchangeable in its self-identity as a person, but stands in community with other things without it," furnishes us "with principles of systematic unity for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul." In conformity with that Idea, therefore, I endeavour to represent all the determinations of the soul as in one single subject; I try as far as possible to deduce all its process from a single fundamental faculty; I regard all its changes as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being; and I keep all its acts entirely distinguished from phenomena in space. This simplicity of the substance of the soul, this self-identity, etc., "are, however, to be taken merely as the schematic projection of the Idea as a regulative principle, and not presupposed as the real ground for the properties of the soul. For these properties may rest on quite other grounds altogether unknown to us; and, at any rate, the assumed predicates of the soul—even if they should be supposed to be its real properties—constitute an idea which could not possibly be presented in the concrete. From such a psychological Idea, however, nothing but good can come, if we only take care not to let it pass for more than a mere idea, i.e., a principle which holds good merely in relation to the systematic use of reason in determining the phenomena of the soul." ¹

On this view of Kant it is not necessary to make any detailed criticism, after what has been said in the last four chapters. It is true that pure self-consciousness is logically posterior to the consciousness of objects, though we have

¹ A. 682; B. 710.
always to remember that the developed consciousness of objects implies it. It is true also that, as divorced from the consciousness of objects, it loses its meaning. But to take it as simply the consciousness of a unity which manifests itself in the determination of a given manifold, is a mistake. It manifests itself also in that which Kant calls the analytic judgment of self-consciousness, but which, as has already been shown, is as truly a synthetic movement of thought as that by which objects are determined. No doubt, in this opposition, the determination of the self is not merely in negative relation to the determination of the object. The conscious self implies the object to which it opposes itself; but this is not to be interpreted as if it meant that the ego is merely the abstraction of the unity for which objects exist. Rather, what it means is that neither the object nor the self for which it is can be characterised truly, so long as they are simply opposed; and that, therefore, we must go on to qualify each by its necessary relation to the other. The defect of Kant’s view lies in his misconceiving this progressive movement towards a more comprehensive unity as if it were a regressive movement upon the simple unity which is prior to all difference; or rather, as if it were that alone. For it may be admitted that the progress is at the same time a regress, in so far as it is in the last synthesis, by which the difference of consciousness of objects and self-consciousness is transcended, that the first unity presupposed in that difference is clearly brought into view. And, in truth, Kant is not faithful to the purely regressive method when he supposes that an Idea or Ideal of knowledge beyond actual knowledge arises out of the pure analytic unity of self-consciousness. Such an idea could not arise out of the mere abstraction of the unity present in the consciousness of objects; for, out of such abstraction, no idea could possibly arise which should go beyond the consciousness from which it was abstracted. It is only in so far as the unity of subject and object in self-consciousness is an idea which involves a synthesis not present in the consciousness of objects, i.e., is a consciousness which includes and goes beyond that consciousness; that it can furnish an idea in relation to which that consciousness
may be seen to be defective, or, in Kant's language, phenomenal. Kant, therefore, is inconsistent when he reduces the self to the unity implied in the consciousness of objects and at the same time makes it the source of an idea, which is more than our reflexion upon that unity. Or, he forgets that this reflexion, if in one point of view it is merely a revelation of the unity that underlay the consciousness of objects, in another point of view is the creation of a new object, the appearance of which altogether changes the consciousness of objects upon which it supervenes.
CHAPTER XII

THE ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON, AND THE CRITICISM OF RATIONAL COSMOLOGY

RATIONAL Cosmology deals with the idea of the world as a totality of phenomena in one time and space. In this world, as transcendental Logic has shown, every phenomenon is determined in relation to other phenomena. It is determined in time, by relation to preceding and coexisting phenomena; in space, by relation to coexisting phenomena; and except through such relations it could not be determined as an object at all. Yet such determination of phenomenon by phenomenon is never complete and final; for the determining phenomenon requires to be determined by another phenomenon, and that by another, and so on ad infinitum. If, then, reason demands a complete and final determination of objects in the phenomenal world, it demands something which, in this region of knowledge at least, can never be attained. For here every answer gives birth to a new question, and no conclusive answer can ever be given. Now, that reason does make such a demand, has already been shown. The hypothetical syllogism of formal Logic puts us on the track of an idea of reason which should express the completion of the empirical regress, and so enable us to comprehend the world of phenomena as a whole, bounded and limited only by itself.

Now, the peculiarity of the problems of reason which are connected with this idea is, that they immediately take the form of dilemmas. They offer us a choice of alternatives, in one or other of which, according to the law of excluded middle, truth must lie. The 'unconditioned totality of
phenomenal synthesis' must consist either in a finite or infinite series, in a series which has, or one which has not, a beginning. In the former case, we can reach totality only by discovering the unconditioned condition which forms the first member of the series; in the latter case, we can reach totality only by summing up the series of conditions, which, as infinite, is unconditioned.

Let us, then, taking those in each class of categories that give rise to a series, consider what are the different forms of dilemma that arise when we follow the regressive movement of reason from the conditioned to the unconditioned. In the first place, phenomena are extensive magnitudes, whether we regard them as in space or as in time. Now, phenomena as in time constitute a series; for a time is determined as such only by relation to a preceding time; and (as time is not perceived by itself) a phenomenon in time is determined as such only by relation to a preceding phenomenon. But totality in the synthesis of phenomena in time cannot be attained, except by tracing them back to a first phenomenon, which is determined in time in relation to no previous phenomenon; or, if this is impossible, by summing up the infinite series of times and phenomena in them. And the same, mutatis mutandis, holds good of objects in space; for though space itself is not serial, the synthesis, by which we determine phenomena in space, is serial. We can determine one space only by relation to another space, and that again by relation to another beyond it; and so also (as space is not perceived by itself), we can determine a phenomenon as in space only by reference to another, and so on ad infinitum. For totality of synthesis, therefore, we must be able either to reach a last phenomenon in space, or else to sum up the infinite series of spaces and phenomena in them.

In the second place, matter, or the object of external perception has intensive quantity; in other words, it is never simple or indivisible; for every space is made up of spaces, and every spatial phenomenon, therefore, must be regarded as made up of parts, which are the conditions of its existence as a whole. Hence, we cannot complete our knowledge of any external object unless we divide it into its ultimate parts, and enumerate them all. But to do this
would imply that we are able, either to reach simple and indivisible parts, or to sum up an infinite series of parts within parts.

In the third place, under the head of Relation, all phenomena, as objects in time, are determined as effects of causes, which, in their turn, are effects of other causes; and the totality of synthesis, according to the category of causality, cannot be attained unless we are able either to reach a cause which is not an effect, a causa sui, or to sum up an infinite series of causes.

Lastly, under the head of Modality, we have seen that all phenomena, as objects, are in themselves contingent, or only hypothetically necessary, i.e., necessary on the presupposition of the existence of something else: we cannot, therefore, reach the unconditioned totality of synthesis, unless we are able either to discover an existence which contains the conditions of its possibility in itself, i.e., an absolutely necessary Being, or to sum up an infinite series of phenomena, which are contingent in themselves, but necessary in relation to each other.¹

In all these cases we start with given phenomena, and seek for the complete conditions of their possibility; and in all, reason may be satisfied, either with an absolute beginning, or a completed infinite series. “In the latter case, the series is without limit a parte priori (without beginning), i.e., it is infinite, yet given as a whole, though the regress in it is never completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the former case, there is a first in the series; and, if we consider the time that has passed, that first is a world-beginning; if we consider space, it is a world-limit; if we consider the parts of a limited given whole, it is that which is simple; if we look to causes, it is the absolute self-activity (freedom); if we consider the existence of changeable things, it is the absolute necessity of nature.”²

Now these problems are not arbitrary; they are forced upon us by the nature of reason itself. If there is an illusion in the dilemmas upon which they drive us, it is at least a natural illusion. We cannot avoid asking the questions, for on our asking them depends all the move-

¹ A. 415; B. 442. ² A. 418; B. 446.
ment of our reason; and when we ask them, we seem inevitably to be forced to accept one or other of the alternative answers.

Yet even prior to any minute examination of the reasoning by which they are supported, we may see that both the alternative solutions of the problems of reason must be illusory. For the questions asked by reason must be answered, if answered at all, by the understanding, which alone enables us to determine any object as such; and yet no synthesis of the manifold by the principles of the understanding can possibly be adequate to the absolute unity and totality of reason. There is a hopeless see-saw between the two faculties; for if we adopt such a conception of the Unconditioned as alone is adequate to the idea of reason, we find it is too great for the synthesis of the understanding; and if we adopt such a conception of it as can be definitely apprehended by understanding, we find that it is too small for reason. The understanding cannot determine an object absolutely but only by relation to another object; hence it is impossible for it to rest in the conception of an absolute beginning; yet it is equally unable to embrace in its synthesis a series which has no beginning. The consequence, therefore, is that, in all metaphysical conflicts, the victory remains with the attacking party; and reason fluctuates between two alternatives so related, that the negation of the one seems necessarily to involve the assertion of the other, while yet either, taken by itself, involves an absurdity. The strength of Scepticism has always lain in the exhibition of this apparent self-contradiction of reason, according to which everything, which can be asserted, can, with equal reason, be denied; its weakness has lain in its incapacity for explaining the meaning of this self-contradiction. Yet if it be not explained, Scepticism destroys itself; for, like every other rational system or doctrine, Scepticism presupposes the general competence of that intelligence, whose deliverances in certain specific instance it refutes. If reason were utterly incompetent, it could not determine even its own incompetence. Criticism, on the other hand, while it shows the origin and necessity of the problems of Metaphysics, seeks to vindicate
the trustworthiness of reason and at the same time to limit it; or, in other words, to prove the subjective, at the same time that it denies the objective, validity of the Ideas of reason. In order to do so much as this, however, it must solve three problems. In the first place, it must discover the nature and extent of the antinomies of reason, and must show that they are dogmatically insoluble; or, in other words, that, whichever of the alternative solutions we adopt, we are led into absurdity and contradiction. In the second place, it must account for these antinomies, from the nature and relations of our faculties. And, lastly, it must show what is the use of the ideas of reason, supposing it to be proved that they do not enable us to determine any object that is beyond the limits of experience. For we cannot vindicate the intelligence or avoid the absurdity of absolute scepticism, if we find nothing but illusion in those ideas to which we are driven by the necessity of reason itself. No satisfactory result, therefore, will be achieved till we discover the positive meaning and value of these ideas—if not as adding to the amount of human knowledge, then at least as necessary to give aim and direction to its progress and systematic unity to its results.¹

The first of these problems has already been partially solved. For we have shown that antinomies arise in connexion with the extension, or elevation to the unconditioned, of those categories which produce a series; and we have indicated in general what are the problems of rational Cosmology that spring out of this process. All that remains under this head is, to show in detail the nature of the arguments by which the thesis and antithesis of each of these antinomies are supported.

The first Antinomy relates to the limitation of the world in time and space. The thesis is, that “the world had a beginning in time, and is also limited in space.” For this it may be argued, in regard to time, that, if there were no beginning of the world, then, at any given point of time, we must say that an eternity has passed, i.e., than an infinite series, which, ex vi termini, cannot be completed, has actually been completed. Again, if the world has no

¹A. 421; B. 449.
limits in space, it must be an infinite given whole. But a quantum can only be given by the successive synthesis of its parts; and if the whole is infinite, as in the case supposed, the synthesis cannot be completed except in an infinite time, i.e., it can never be completed. Hence the denial of either member of the thesis involves an absurdity.

For the antithesis, that 'the world had no beginning in time, and is unlimited in space,' it may be argued that, if the world had a beginning, there must have been a time when it was not. But nothing can begin to be in empty time; for "no moment of empty time has in it a distinctive condition, by reason of which a thing should be rather than not be." In other words, a relation of an event to empty time, by which its date should be determined, is impossible; for the time of one event can only be determined in relation to the time of another that precedes it. In like manner, to say that the world is limited in space, is to say that there is empty space beyond it by which its limit is determined. But a spatial relation, which is not a relation of objects in space, but a relation of objects to space, is impossible. Space, in fact, is nothing but 'the possibility of external phenomena.' 'Empirical perception is not compounded of phenomena and space' as separate elements; for space is a mere form of the relations of possible objects, and not itself an object to which other objects are related. Hence the denial of either member of the antithesis involves an absurdity.

Here, then, is an absolute Antinomy of reason, demonstrated apagogically on both sides. On the one side it is argued, that if the world is determined as having no limits in time or space, it must be so determined by an endless synthesis, which yet is completed; and, on the other side, that if the world is determined as having limits, then empty space and empty time must be regarded as actual existences, which limit other objects, and not as mere forms of the perception of objects. In other words, phenomenal objects in time and space are always related to a 'beyond,' which itself must consist of phenomenal objects; yet an endless series of phenomenal objects is impossible. Reduced to its essentials, therefore, the reasoning is, that we necessarily determine the world in space and time as
limited in extension, yet with equal necessity we remove the limit, and relate it to something beyond, which, in its turn, must be determined as limited, and related to something beyond, and so on, \textit{ad infinitum}.

The second Antinomy relates to the divisibility of matter. For the thesis, that ‘every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and that there exists nothing which is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts,’ it may be argued, that, if there be no simple parts, then you cannot annihilate all composition even in thought. But composition is, by the very idea of it, an accidental relation—a relation which you can annihilate without annihilating the substances compounded. Infinite dividedness, therefore, or composition which is not of simple parts, cannot be admitted by any one who holds that there is a substantial reality in things beneath their accidents. Therefore, \textit{the denial of the thesis involves an absurdity}.\textsuperscript{1}

For the antithesis, ‘that no composite thing consists of simple parts, and that there does not exist in the world any simple substance,’ it may be argued, that simple parts could not exist in space, for every space is made up, not of simple parts, but of spaces. As, therefore, we cannot get rid of composition in space, so we cannot get rid of it in any external object. Nay, we cannot get rid of it in any object at all, either external or internal; for such an object would have to be presented to us in a perception that does not contain a manifold; and this is impossible. The supposition that the \textit{Ego} is such an object has been sufficiently refuted in the preceding chapter. Hence \textit{the denial of the antithesis involves an absurdity}.

Here, then, is a second Antinomy of reason proved apagogically. The sum of the argument for the thesis is, that an infinitely composite substance is a contradiction; for it would be a substance entirely made up of external and accidental relations. And the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that no object of experience, as such,

\textsuperscript{1}Kant’s statement of this argument is very obscure. It is unravelled by Hegel (\textit{Werke}, III. 208). Hegel remarks that the word ‘composite’ is not in its proper place here; for it is merely tautology to say that the composite, as such, is made up of simple parts. What Kant means is rather the ‘continuous.’
can be simple. It is noticeable that the argument for the thesis is not, in this case, derived from the impossibility of completing an infinite series by division (as in the first Antinomy it was derived from the impossibility of completing an infinite series by composition), but from the metaphysical conception of the individual substance or monad, which Kant had inherited from the school of Leibniz. This inconsistency is another proof how deeply the mind of Kant had been impressed with the Individualism of his predecessors. If Kant, in dealing with the second Antinomy, had gone on the same principle as in dealing with the first Antinomy, the essentials of the reasoning would have been, that we necessarily determine the object in space as limited in division, and therefore as simple, yet with equal necessity we remove this limit, and regard it again as complex, and so on *ad infinitum*.

The *third Antinomy* relates to the possibility of a first, or free, causality. The thesis is, that "causality according to the laws of nature is not the sole causality from which the phenomena of the world as a whole are deducible, but that it is necessary for their explanation also to assume a causality by freedom." For this assertion, it may be argued, that, according to the laws of nature, we must seek for the cause of a change in some change that has gone before it; for if a cause were not a change, but something permanent, then the effect likewise would be always in existence, or would not be a change. According to the same principle, we must seek the cause of the causal change in another change, and so on *ad infinitum*. If, therefore, all happens according to the laws of nature, a cause of phenomena is always a subaltern, and never a first cause: or there is never a sufficient cause for the events that happen. And this contradicts the law of causality itself. There must, therefore, be a cause not according to the laws of nature, but according to freedom, if the law of causality is absolute: or, the denial of the thesis involves an absurdity.

For the antithesis, that "there is no such thing as freedom, but that everything happens purely according to the laws of nature," it is argued that, if a free causality exists, it must be conceived, not only as beginning the
series of causes and effects, but also as determining itself to begin it, *i.e.*, "it must make an absolute beginning, and nothing must precede it or determine its action according to permanent laws. But every beginning to act presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause, and a dynamic first beginning of action presumes a state which has no connexion of causality with the previous state of the same cause, *i.e.*, follows in no way from it." But this is inconsistent with the law of causality; it would, in fact, be the negation of the very idea of nature; for "nature and transcendental freedom are related to each other as law and lawlessness." *The denial of the antithesis, therefore, involves an absurdity.*

The sum of the argument for the thesis, then, is, that there is a spontaneity or free causality, because without it the law of causality comes into contradiction with itself, since, in that case, no sufficient cause can ever be given for anything; and the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that there is no free causality, because, if it existed, it would be uncaused, and so would contradict the law of causality. Thus the principle of causality at once posits an absolute beginning, and yet negatives an absolute beginning, and the alternate position and negation leads to an infinite series.

The *fourth Antinomy* relates to the possibility of a necessary Being. For the thesis, which declares that "there is a necessary being belonging to the world, either as its part or its cause," it is argued, that the world of experience, being a world in time, contains a series of changes, each of which is hypothetically necessary, or, in other words, made necessary by a condition that precedes it. Whatever is thus conditioned, however, presupposes a complete series of conditions up to that which is unconditioned or absolutely necessary. There is, therefore, an absolutely necessary being implied in all change. And this necessary being belongs to the world of experience, and is not outside of it. For the beginning of a series of changes in time cannot be determined, except in relation to something that has preceded it in time, or has existed in the world of experience at a time when it did not exist. To go out of the world of experience would involve a *μετάβασις εἰς*
and would lead to a different kind of necessity from that which is wanted. For our argument is from the *contingent* to the necessary. Now, the contingent, in the sense in which that word is applied to objects of experience, means that which has a cause in something other than itself, something which existed previously. But the contingent in the pure conception of it (which, of course, abstracts from the conditions of experience) is that of which the opposite is not self-contradictory. And we can never say that what is contingent in the one sense is contingent in the other. Hence, when we argue from the contingent of experience to the necessary, we must argue to a being who is necessary in an empirical sense, a necessary being in the world, and not out of it. *The denial of the thesis, therefore, involves an absurdity.*

For the antithesis, that "there is no necessary being either in the world or out of it," it is argued that, in the first place, such a necessary being cannot be *in the world.* For if so, then there must be an unconditionally necessary, *i.e.*, an uncaused, beginning of the series of cosmical changes; or, if not, then the infinite series of changes, each of which is contingent, must, as a whole, be absolutely necessary. But the former supposition is inconsistent with the dynamic law of the determination of all phenomena in time, and the latter is absurd in itself; for a multitude of things taken together cannot be necessary, if no one of them possesses necessary existence in itself. In the second place, the necessary being cannot be *out of the world*; for, as the first member of the series of causes of phenomena, the causality of the necessary being must lie in time. *The denial of the antithesis, therefore, involves an absurdity.*

The parallelism between thesis and antithesis would have been more complete, if Kant had not introduced under the former the proof that the necessary being must be in the world. Overlooking this irregularity, the sum of the argument for the thesis is, that there must be a necessary being either *in* or *out* of the world, because the contingent presupposes the necessary; and the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that there can be a necessary being neither *in* nor *out* of the world: not in the world, because
no being in the world can be absolutely necessary; and not out of the world, because no necessary being out of the world could be causally related to the contingent in the world. In short, we necessarily explain the contingent by the necessary, but every necessity we can reach is only hypothetical, i.e., contingent.

These, then, are the four antinomies of rational cosmo-
logy. They are no more and no fewer, because the number of the categories which give rise to a series are just so many. It is noticeable, however, that the solutions given of these different problems are not uncon-
nected, but that all the theses naturally gather themselves into one system of philosophy, and all the antitheses into another and opposite system. The same tone of mind, the same general interests, speculative and practical, which lead us to accept the thesis or the antithesis respectively in one case, lead us to accept it in all the other cases. In this way there arises, on the one side, a system of 'Dog-
matism of pure reason,' and, on the other side, a system of Empiricism, which often slides into a dogmatic Material-
ism. And, if for the moment we abstract from the question of the truth of these rival systems, it is easy to see that, for the maintenance of both, there are powerful motives, springing out of the most pressing needs and tendencies of our moral and intellectual nature. To believe that the world is not eternal and infinite, but that it had a begin-
ning and has a limit to its extension in space; that everything is not divisible and transitory, but that there exists an indissoluble unity of substance, if nowhere else, at least in the self-conscious intelligence; that a spiritual being is a free causality, and not like other things bound in the chains of nature and fate; and that the order of nature is not the ultimate fact to which our thoughts are limited, but that beyond the contingent world there is a necessary Being, who is its first cause—all this gives support to our moral and religious life, as well as satis-
faction to our highest intellectual cravings. If our view were limited to the phenomena of sensible experience, we could not believe in a God, or a higher destiny for our-
selves: if we conceived the law of nature to be the ultimate truth of things, we could not hold to the absoluteness of
the imperative of duty; our deepest moral experiences of repentance and change of character would have to be regarded as illusory, and, at the same time, the architectonic impulse of reason, which seeks to refer all science to one principle, would necessarily remain unsatisfied. On the other hand, Empiricism, when it bids us seek empirical conditions for every conditioned event or existence, when it refuses to admit the conceptions of an indivisible existence, a free causality, and a necessary Being, has this great recommendation, that it "keeps the understanding to its own sphere, the sphere of possible experience, by the discovery of whose laws alone it can extend without limit its certain and definite knowledge." So long as Empiricism takes its principles in this sense, as warnings not to quit the region within which definite knowledge is possible, it is strong and, indeed, unassailable. Its danger lies in this, that it is apt to become dogmatic in its turn, and to assert that no other region exists. And, when it does so, it not only sets itself in opposition to the moral and religious consciousness of men, but also lays itself open to the same objections which it brings against its adversary. For, as we have seen, the assertions, that the world is without beginning or limit, and that there is no simple substance, no free causality, and no necessary being, are not less groundless and self-contradictory than the counter-assertions of the dogmatism of pure reason.¹

We seem then to stand in this peculiar position that there are certain questions, which we are driven by our very nature to ask, and to answer in one of two ways. But if we answer them in one way, we come into collision with the principles which underlie our moral and religious life, and even with that highest ideal of knowledge which springs out of the very nature of our intelligence; and if we answer them in the other way, we confuse our understanding by mixing dreams with realities, things which we cannot, with things which we can, verify; and we are diverted from investigations that can be pursued indefinitely with ever-increasing profit, to a fruitless effort after that which always eludes us. Since, then, interests

¹A. 462 seq.; B. 490 seq.
which we cannot surrender are ranged on each side of this necessary but insoluble problem, it behoves us to consider, whether we cannot throw light upon it by a discovery of the very source of the problem in the nature of our intellectual faculties.

Now, in the first place, it may safely be asserted a priori that it is not impossible in this case to discover the cause of the difficulty. For this is one of those departments of knowledge in which we must be able to answer every question we are able to ask. The answer must come from the same sources out of which the question itself arose. In the explanation of the phenomena of nature, this is not the case; there our knowledge is often insufficient to solve the problems suggested by the phenomena we have observed. But in Ethics no problem can be insoluble; we must be able to discern what is right and wrong, for right and wrong involve responsibility, and there can be no responsibility except where there is knowledge. And so also in transcendental philosophy, "the same conception, which makes it possible to ask the question, must enable us to answer it," seeing that the object is presented only through that very conception.¹ The idea which reason gives us of the object is in fact our only reason for saying that the object exists, and therefore all possible questions as to the nature of the object are merely questions as to the contents of the idea. Hence there is no presumption in our pretending to solve the problem, nor can we escape from the obligation of solving it by alleging the limits of our intelligence.

To the questions of Rational Psychology we gave no answer, for no answer was the answer. The problem was to determine the transcendental subject as an object or thing in itself, and all that could be said by way of solution was that the transcendental subject cannot be determined as an object at all. But the case is different with the questions of Rational Cosmology; for here we have to do with ideas, of which both the object and the empirical synthesis required for its conception are given; and the questions which the reason suggests relate only to the continuation and completion of this synthesis so as to

¹ A. 477; B. 505.
embrace an absolute totality. In other words, the ideas in question do not relate to a thing in itself, which, as such, cannot be known at all, but to the objects of experience, which can be and are known. Only we must observe that the question is not, what can be given in concreto in experience, but only what lies in the idea itself; for the empirical synthesis can only approximate to the idea (but never enable us to "envisage" it in an object). "All the questions of rational Cosmology, in short, must be capable of being answered out of the idea alone; for that idea is a mere product of reason, which consequently cannot disclaim the obligation to answer questions about it, or throw the difficulty over upon the unknown object." ¹ In other words, understanding presents us with an object in relation to other objects, through the synthesis of the empirically given manifold, and reason suggests the idea of a world, an absolute totality of objects, determined by such synthesis. And as this idea relates to experience alone, and yet no object adequate to it can be given in experience, reason must determine out of itself alone its objective meaning and value. We cannot, therefore, take refuge in assertions of our ignorance, as if the idea had an object independent of itself. The object can be presented to us, if at all, only through the idea; and if it be found that the idea is inadequate to determine the object, then it is also inadequate to tell us that there is any object at all. Thus the question will be solved critically, by the discovery that the idea has only a subjective value, if it cannot be solved dogmatically, by the determination of the object in question. But in any case, critically or dogmatically, reason must answer all its own questions.

Now the consideration of the Antinomies has shown the impossibility of a dogmatic answer: it has shown us in all the cases that, if we suppose the question settled in one way, the empirical regress necessary to realise the idea of the unconditioned is too large to be accomplished by the understanding in its empirical synthesis; and that if we determine it in the other way, the empirical regress accomplished by the understanding is too small for the

¹ A. 479; B. 507.
idea of reason. In other words, when we determined the question one way, we were obliged to think of an infinite series as completely given, *i.e.*, of a finite infinite; and when we determined it the other way, we were obliged to think of a finite beyond which nothing could be given, *i.e.*, of an infinite finite. If, then, experience, which alone can give reality to any conception, altogether fails to realise this idea, it follows that it is nothing but an idea, *i.e.*, a thought without an object; and we must seek for its meaning and value somewhere else than in such an object.\(^1\)

On the other hand, Transcendental Idealism offers us a clear critical solution of the difficulty, enabling us to detect the illusion, which has led to the objective interpretation of the cosmological ideas, and at the same time to see their real subjective value. For it directs our attention to the fact, that the objects which we know in experience, are merely phenomenal, *i.e.*, that they have no existence in themselves, apart from our empirical knowledge of them. If this be true, it is obviously absurd to speak of such objects as having attributes, which, by their very nature, cannot be experienced. Space and time are mere forms of our perception, and we can say nothing whatever as to the presence or absence, in objects in space and time, of qualities that could not possibly be perceived. The questions of rational Cosmology cannot be answered, because they cannot rationally be asked. Thus, *e.g.*, it is only in a confusion between phenomena and things in themselves, that any one can ever raise, or discuss, the problem, whether the world is finite or infinite in extension. Properly speaking, it is neither the one nor the other; for the world, as an object of experience, can never be determined either way. We speak, indeed, of a phenomenon as having attributes of its own: but this does not mean that it has any predicates in itself apart from our perceptions of it; it means merely, that we (and all beings like us) under certain conditions have certain experiences. "That there may be inhabitants in the moon, though no man has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted, but this means only that in the

\(^1\) A. 490; B. 518.
possible progress of experience we might come upon them: for everything is real that stands in one context with a perception, according to the laws by which in experience we proceed from one perception to another.” But to say that a thing is real in the sense that it might be perceived, and to say that it exists apart from all perception, are quite different things. “To call a phenomenon a real thing before it is perceived, either means that, in the progress of experience, we must come upon such a perception, or it means nothing at all.” It may indeed be said that our sensibility is a receptivity, and that, when it gives us ideas, we must explain those ideas by a non-sensuous or intelligible cause that affects us; but of this cause we know nothing. We cannot perceive it as an object, and when we call it the transcendental object, this is merely “that we may have something that corresponds (as an activity) to the sensibility as a receptivity.” To this transcendental object we may, if we will, ascribe all the content of our possible perceptions, and we may speak of it as given in itself before all experience. “Thus, we may say that the real things of past time are given in the transcendental object of experience; but for us they are objects and realities of past time only in so far as we represent to ourselves, that a regressive series of perceptions would lead to them as conditions of the perceptions of the present moment.” And in like manner, when we speak of things existing, which we have not perceived, we can only mean that they are contained in a part of experience to which we may advance from the point we have already reached. “It is all one to say that, in empirical progress through space, I would come upon stars which are a hundred times farther off than the farthest I see, and to say that such stars may exist in the spaces of the universe, though no man has perceived or ever will perceive them.”

Now, as this is the case, and as the objects of experience exist only in our experience of them, it is easy to see that both the rival systems of rational Cosmology rest upon an illusion. For they both proceed upon the principle that, the conditioned being given, the whole series of

Both the rival systems of rational Cosmology rest on a confusion of phenomena with things in themselves.

1 A. 491 seq.; B. 520 seq.
conditions up to the unconditioned is given; and therefore they seek by means of the conditioned, to determine what the unconditioned is. Now this would be a correct procedure, if the things of experience had a nature, which was independent of our experience of them; for, in that case, we, who apprehend the conditioned as such, must necessarily apprehend that by which it is conditioned. But a phenomenon is nothing, apart from the perception of it. When we apprehend it as conditioned, this only means that, as an empirical object, it is connected, according to necessary laws of the understanding, with other perceptions. Nor can we know with what other perceptions it is connected, except in so far as these perceptions are actually given in sense. When, therefore, we have determined an empirical object as conditioned, (and of necessity we must thus determine it), all that we know by this means is a phenomenon, and the law of its connexion with other phenomena. But while we are thus enabled to seek out these other phenomena, and have, moreover, in the Analogies of Experience a criterion, by which we may recognise them when we find them, we cannot determine a priori what they are. On the other hand, we do know a priori, that in this process of connecting phenomenon with phenomenon, we never can come to an ultimate object, an object which has no further relation or condition. Consequently, so long as we speak of phenomena, we cannot say that the conditioned being given, the unconditioned is given with it; but only that the conditioned being given, the unconditioned is set before us as a problem to be solved. The illusion of rational Cosmology is that it takes the problem for its own solution. It is true that the mere conceptions of the conditioned and the unconditioned are necessarily related to each other, and we cannot have the one without suggestion of the other; but this does not by any means imply that, when we know the conditioned, we immediately know the whole series of its conditions, and so the unconditioned. For here the conditioned, as an object of knowledge, is not a mere conception, but an experience; i.e., a perception determined by a conception. If then we argue from the conditioned, which is given empirically,
to the unconditioned, which is not so given, we are committing a sophisma figureae dictionis; we are taking the conditioned in two senses. In the major, when we say: 'The conditioned implies the unconditioned,' we mean the mere conception of the conditioned; but in the minor, when we say: 'This phenomenon is conditioned,' we mean the conception as applied to an empirically given matter. The merely formal or logical principle, that the premises are presupposed in the conclusion, in which abstraction is made of all time-conditions, is thus changed into the material principle that one phenomenon in time being given, the totality of the regressive synthesis of phenomena is given along with it.\(^1\)

We see, then, that the real solution of the Antinomies of rational Cosmology is, that the quarrel is about nothing; or it is about the objects of experience, viewed as if they were altogether independent of experience. In spite of the apparent contradiction of the thesis and antithesis, they may be, and indeed are, both untrue; for the condition is absent, under which alone either predicate can be applied to the subject. If it be said that either a body smells well, or it does not smell well, it may be answered that there is a third possibility, viz., that it does not smell at all. So here; when it is said that the world is either finitely or infinitely extended in space, it may be answered that it is neither the one nor the other; for both alternatives presuppose that the phenomenal world exists as a thing in itself, independent of our perception. But the phenomenal world is nothing in itself; it is neither finitely nor infinitely extended, for it exists only in an experience which never is completed. At any point the regress is finite, but at no point is it terminated.\(^2\)

We have now answered two of the questions which we proposed to ourselves; we have discussed the nature and extent of the Antinomies of Reason, and we have traced them back to their origin in the nature of our faculties. It remains for us to consider the third question,—what is the function of the transcendental Ideas out of which the

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\(^1\) A. 497; B. 525.

\(^2\) This however does not, as we shall immediately see, exclude a somewhat different view in regard to the dynamical antinomies.
Antinomies spring, or what particular purpose do they fulfil in the organisation of knowledge,—seeing that they do not enable us to determine the nature either of phenomena, or of things in themselves. And to this, after what has been said, the answer is not difficult. "The principle of reason, properly speaking, is merely a rule which commands a continual regress in the series of the conditions of given phenomena, and never allows that regress to stop at any point, as if it had there reached the unconditioned." It is no constitutive but only a regulative principle. It does not enable us to anticipate what will be discovered in experience, but merely directs us continually to widen and extend our experience to the utmost. It does not tell us "what the object is, but simply how the empirical regress is to be carried out so as to arrive at the complete conception of the object."

We now proceed in the light of what has been said to solve the Antinomies of Reason. As regards the first two Antinomies, which relate to ideas of a Mathematical Transcendent, we need only repeat that both alternatives are false. The world has not a limit in time or space, nor is it given as unlimited; but the empirical regress finds at no point an absolute terminus. In other words, space and time, and the world in space and time, are to be regarded not as infinitely or finitely extended, but as infinitely (or, as Kant puts it, indefinitely 1) extensible. Again, space and matter in it are not to be regarded as actually divided into a finite or infinite number of parts, but as infinitely divisible. As regards the last two Anti-

1In the eighth section of the chapter on the Antinomy of Reason, Kant considers the use of the terms ad infinitum and ad indefinitum. The former, he says, may always be used in case of progress, as in producing a straight line; because in progress it is not required that the members should be given, but only capable of being given. In the case of regress he makes a distinction; we may say that a piece of matter is divisible ad infinitum, for here the whole to be divided is given; but of the regress to a beginning of the world in time, or a limit of it in space, we should say that it is ad indefinitum, for though another member of the series is always possible, and, therefore, we are entitled to seek for it, we cannot say that we must be able to find it. This distinction does not seem to have any rational basis, for, on Kant's theory of experience, the parts of a definite space are not actually in it as parts prior to division, any more than all previous times are actually in the present. And the potential existence is the same in both cases.
nomies, which deal with a Dynamical Transcendent, we may also say that both alternatives are false, if they be taken as relating to the world of experience. For it is certain that a free cause and a necessary being cannot be given in experience, and it is equally certain that an infinite series of causes or hypothetical necessities cannot be so given. In this sense, therefore, the solution of these Antinomies must be the same as that of the others; the series of conditions is infinitely extensible, but not infinitely extended. But there is a peculiarity of the dynamical principles which distinguishes them, in this reference, from the mathematical principles. The peculiarity is, that they express a synthesis of elements, which are not necessarily homogeneous. The mathematical synthesis necessarily proceeds from parts in space to parts in space, from events in time to events in time. Hence, when, by the aid of such synthesis, we seek to pass from the conditioned to the unconditioned, we must take the unconditioned as homogeneous with the conditioned. We must explain a quantitative finite by a quantitative infinite. And thus we are entangled in an insoluble contradiction; for we are driven to put under the conditions of experience that which cannot be made an object of experience. In this case it is evident that every possible answer to the questions of the reason must be equally false. But in the case of the dynamical principles, we may escape from such a dilemma, because the terms connected by these principles may be heterogeneous. The elements related as cause and effect, necessary and contingent, need not, so far as they are determined by these categories, have any similarity. Hence, when we pass by the aid of these categories from the conditioned to the unconditioned, we do not necessarily regard the former as in any way like the latter. While, therefore, in the former case, we had to look for the unconditioned in the sphere and under the conditions of experience, and were, therefore, necessarily forced to contradict ourselves; here we have an alternative, for we may look for the unconditioned either within or without the world of experience. And thus it becomes possible to suppose that the thesis and antithesis are both

1 A peculiarity discussed above, p. 418 seq., 477 seq.
true in different senses: the one as referring to the relations of phenomena within the world of experience, and the other as referring to the relation of the phenomenal to the noumenal or intelligible world. Here, therefore, we may regard both thesis and antithesis as true. The antithesis, that there is no free cause, and no necessary Being, is true of the phenomenal world, in the sense that the empirical regress can never bring us to a cause which is not an effect, or a necessity which is more than hypothetical. And yet the thesis, that there is a free causality and a necessary Being, may also be true, in the sense that the phenomenal world is a result of the activity of one or more free causalities in the intelligible world, and that beneath the play of contingency in the former, there is an absolutely necessary Being in the latter. It is to be observed, however, that we do not here attempt to prove the existence of a necessary Being or of a free causality, but merely to leave room for them in case they should be otherwise proved. If it can be demonstrated or made probable on other, as, for example, on moral grounds, that there is an intelligible world, a world of absolute freedom or of absolute necessity, we have shown that no objection to its existence can be based on the principles of causality and necessity. For these principles, in the sense in which they are inconsistent with such forms of the unconditioned, apply only to the world of experience. They are principles, whereby phenomena are related to each other, but they cannot be used in the same sense to determine the relation of the phenomenal to the intelligible world. And it may quite well be the case, that the phenomena of the sensible world, which, as phenomena, form part of the context of experience, and have to be explained in one way in their relation to each other, may have to be explained in a quite different way, when we consider their relation to the intelligible world. The principle of causality may, therefore, be used in two senses; in one sense, as applied to phenomena, and as determining the relations of these phenomena in time; and in another sense, as applied to the connexion of phenomena with things in themselves, which are not in

1A. 432 seq.; B. 558 seq.
time at all. For the positive proof of such a connexion we must, however, refer to another place. Here it is sufficient to have pointed out the possibility of it, or, in other words, the possibility that phenomena, and especially the phenomena produced by the action of moral beings, have an intelligible, as well as an empirical, character.

The general result of this chapter on the Cosmological Ideas is:—that, as ideas of the totality of the world of phenomena, they have no objective value, because the phenomenal world exists only in a sensible experience in which totality can never be given or realised; that both the opposite systems of philosophy, which attempt to construe this totality, end in contradiction, because they both regard objects, which have only an empirical reality, as things in themselves; that, in the case of the Mathematical Ideas, there is no escape from contradiction except in this insight into the falsity of both alternatives; while, in the case of the dynamical Ideas, it is possible to reach a somewhat more satisfactory result, by referring the predicates of the Thesis to the object, as noumenon, and those of the Antithesis to the same object, as phenomenon; and, lastly, that in relation to our knowledge of the world of experience, all four Ideas have merely a regulative, and not a constitutive, value; that is, they enable us to set up certain subjective rules, by which the greatest possible extension may be given to our empirical knowledge, but they do not supply objective principles, by which the nature, either of the objects of experience, or of things in themselves, may be determined.

In dealing with the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology Kant's main effort was to show that, if we detach the consciousness of self from its relation to the consciousness of objects, or, in other words, try to determine the self otherwise than through the activity by which it determines the matter of sense in relation to objects, the self reduces itself to an abstract unity of which nothing can be said. Hence, even the analytic judgment of self-consciousness is impossible, except as it expresses the consciousness of the unity of the subject with itself in all determination of objects. The attempt to determine the self in itself and
without reference to any object, empties it of all significance and withdraws the ground for the reduplication of the ego in the apparently tautological judgment "I am I." And, apart from this reduplication, the "I" means no more than "He" or "It." It follows, then, that Kant's question, how by a synthetic judgment we are to get out of ourselves to objects, or how we are to get beyond the analytic judgment of self-consciousness, might on his own showing, be met by another apparently absurd, but really equally reasonable, question, how we are to get into ourselves, or, in other words, how that analytic judgment itself is possible. But Kant himself has shown that the two processes are "correlative." Self-consciousness is essentially a return upon self, which implies a going out of self to an object; yet these must not be regarded as two separate stages of experience, of which one is over before the other begins, for the object is fully determined only in the return from it. The defect of Kant's view lay only in his conceiving the activity of the ego by which it determines objects as a reaction upon a manifold given from without, and hence, as a consequence, in his representing the return itself as a negative return, which gives rise to a merely analytic judgment of self-consciousness. In reality, as has been shown, the judgment of self-consciousness is not analytic, and not merely exclusive of the object. For if in it the self is at first opposed to the object, yet as this negative relation is still a relation, and even a necessary relation, the truer view is that self-consciousness includes the consciousness of objects while it goes beyond it.

In the chapter on the Antinomies, Kant is dealing with a problem which is the counterpart of that just mentioned. For, while in Rational Psychology the attempt was made to complete the circle, or, as we may express it, the syllogism of self-consciousness, and to determine the self as a res completa, a self-determined and self-contained whole, without taking account of its relation to the objective world; in Rational Cosmology, on the other hand, the relation of the self to the world is determined, and the consciousness of objects is included in the circumscription of the circle of self-consciousness.

It will be remembered that the synthetic judgment has two aspects: the transition from the subjective to the objective, and the enrichment of our consciousness of objects with new determinations. Cf. above p. 246.
hand, the converse attempt is made to complete the circle or syllogism of the objective consciousness and to determine the objective world as a *res completa*, without taking any account of its relation to the self. Hence, also, the obstacles which defeat these two different attempts to extend knowledge beyond experience, are of an opposite character. In the former case, the bare unity of the mind is found to want that difference, in virtue of which alone it could furnish a complete object for thought, or realise the idea of knowledge as a syllogism. In the latter case, thought is supposed to be brought into contact with a difference in the given matter of sense, which it is able to combine synthetically by means of the conception of an object, but which it can never completely overcome, or subordinate to its own unity. In the former case, the syllogism of knowledge fails for want of material, thus lapsing into an analytic judgment or tautology; nay, even the tautology is found to be too "synthetic" for it, when separated from all given matter. In the latter case, the matter is there, but it resists the form so much that thought can never return from it upon its own unity. Hence, the attempt to determine the object in conformity with the Idea gives rise to an endless series of prosyllogisms, which, so to speak, can never be completed in one perfect syllogism of reason. The straight line of proof upon proof extends itself indefinitely, so that the ends can never be brought together in a circle. Hence, the idea of reason appears only as the demand for a completeness of knowledge which, owing to the nature of the subject-matter, can never be realised.

The two doctrines, that thought in itself is analytic and even tautological, and that thought, as applied to the matter of sense through its forms, gives rise to contradictions which cannot be solved, are necessarily connected with each other. For, if Kant had treated thought as synthetic in itself (*i.e.*, if its unity had been taken by him as self-determining or self-differentiating), he would not have regarded it as incapable of overcoming any division between itself and its object. But tautology on the one side answers to irreconcilable contradiction on the other. It is impossible to criticise Kant in this aspect.
without reference to Hegel, whose doctrine of the unity of opposites was, and was intended to be, a solution of the exact difficulty which here presents itself. Perhaps Hegel's somewhat epigrammatic way of expressing his principles, which has given rise to so much misunderstanding, is due to his effort at once to contrast, and to connect, it with the doctrine of Kant. Briefly stated, the doctrine of Hegel, as opposed to that of Kant, consists, on the one hand, in the denial that thought in itself is ever merely analytical or tautological; and, on the other hand, in the denial that thought, as applied to the matter of sense, is ever merely synthetical,¹ i.e., that in this application it is so drawn out of its unity that it cannot return to it. In the former point of view, Hegel is continually repeating that contradiction is so far from being confined to the four Antinomies of Rational Cosmology that it is found in every object or idea that can be thought. For in every object or idea there is difference as well as unity, and when this difference is made explicit, it necessarily gives rise to an antinomy, which we must solve either by excluding one of the elements, or by finding some deeper conception which will maintain both the opposed elements in their unity. However simple or complex the object may be—be it mind or matter, be it an atom or a world, be it the conception of cause or substance, or even of bare unity or being—Hegel points out that each such object, each such conception, has at least two sides to it, and implies something else than itself. Taken in its utmost simplicity, it conceals a difference which further consideration enables us to recognise. The object of thought is always the one in the many, being in unity with, or in relation to, not-being. And wherever there is a difference, there is an implicit contradiction, which must be made explicit ere it can be overcome. Thought, then, is essentially synthetic; and that means that it is antithetic. The apparent simplicity of its first form, therefore, masks an unsolved riddle, which must be stated as a riddle ere it can be solved. The ordinary consciousness, indeed, seems to be in harmony with itself; for each thing is taken by it as a unit without difference, each

¹ I.e., externally synthetical.
idea as a simple identity on which difference is reflected only from the outside: and thus each of its assertions seems to be made without reference to any qualifying negation. Really at every step it is walking over \textit{ignes suppositos cineri doloso}, over the ashes of controversies which have died out for the moment, but are always ready to be lighted up again. A little reflexion is all that is necessary to make us realise that our simplest ideas are double-edged tools, which cut into the hand that uses them as much as into the object to which they are applied. Even the very "I am I," which, in one point of view, is the simplest of all tautologies, is found to hold in solution the deepest of all contradictions, the contradiction which it is hardest of all to reconcile. And Kant himself, indeed, practically confesses as much when he tells us at one time that the judgment of self-consciousness is purely analytic, and at another time that in it thought is brought into a more "awkward pass" (\textit{Unbequemlichkeit}) than in relation to any other object, by reason of the fact that the self there appears both as object and as subject. For what is this but to acknowledge that the purest unity of thought with itself involves at the same time the hardest of all the oppositions which thought has to overcome?

In this sense, then, we may say with Hegel that all things are full of contradiction; all perception and all conception involve difference, and every difference is an \textit{implicit} contradiction, which in the progress of thought sooner or later must become an \textit{explicit} contradiction. But this explicit contradiction must, on penalty of universal scepticism, be solved or reconciled by the discovery of a more comprehensive principle; for if thought cannot make itself self-consistent, it must ultimately fall into despair of itself and of truth. In our ordinary consciousness of the world, indeed, this necessity is hidden; many differences of thought sleep together in unbroken harmony without ever coming into active collision. Common sense cuts many a knot without even being conscious of it. In morality, \textit{e.g.}, it sees no difficulty in admitting different commands: \textit{e.g.}, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ and ‘Thou shalt not steal,’ as equally absolute; and it avoids any practical collision between the two simply by applying one principle
at one time, and another at another. Thus, while it solves the problem of ethics, it often conceals from itself even the fact that there was a problem to be solved; like the judge, who professes to be a mere interpreter of the law, while he is really adding to it. Were it not, indeed, for this healthful unconsciousness with which, at first, we take different aspects of things into our minds without being aware of the contradictions or difficulties involved in them, the first steps of knowledge would be embarrassed by an anticipation of its ultimate problems. But, on the other hand, it is certain that the problems are there, that with time and reflexion the contradictions must ripen, and that in one way or other they must be solved. And the whole history of intellectual progress is just the history of the development of a consciousness of difference into a consciousness of contradiction, and again of the consciousness of contradiction into a consciousness of the higher principle in the light of which the contradiction disappears.

If this be true, it follows, that Antinomy is not merely the accidental product of a false negative dialectic, as has been generally supposed; nor is it, as is supposed by Kant, an essential phenomenon of the intelligence merely in its application to one set of problems. On the contrary, it is the necessary law of thought in itself, from which it cannot in any region escape. The first stage of intelligence, the stage of common sense, is one in which there is an undeveloped consciousness of the unity of thought with itself through all the diversity of its application, and an equally undeveloped consciousness of the discordance and opposition of the different aspects of things which are gathered together in knowledge. The contradiction of objects with each other and with the thought that apprehends them, is not yet perceived, and hence no reconciliation is wanted. The identity is felt through the diversity, the diversity through the identity, and no more is required. At times, indeed, one aspect of things is more prominent than another. Religious emotion lifts man above the divided and fragmentary existence in which, in his secular life, he usually dwells, and makes vividly present to him a unity, which in general is but shadowy and uncertain.
But he passes through the one state of consciousness after the other, without bringing them into contact or considering whether they are consistent or inconsistent.\(^1\) For many, indeed, there never is any conscious discord, and hence there never is any effort after inward harmony. But even where the intellectual impulse is feeble, the moral difficulties of life are constantly tending to awake in us a sense of the differences and oppositions that exist in thought and things. And as the mind cannot abjure its faith in itself, it is forced by the necessity of its own development upon a choice between different elements of its life, which seem at first to contradict and exclude each other.

Kant, then, in so far as he supposes the law of thought in itself to be a law of identity, is really taking up the position of the ordinary consciousness for which identity and difference, unity and multiplicity, affirmation and negation, appear as quite independent ideas, and by which each object is regarded as a simple identity, or at least a unity of elements or qualities that stand side by side in it without affecting each other. In other words, he attributes to thought, as its absolute nature and law, that simplicity which it has only for the unsophisticated, unreflective consciousness. Hence, he is obliged to regard the synthetic or antithetic aspect of thought as due to the intrusion upon it of a foreign matter. This view is especially prominent in the chapter on what Kant calls the \textit{Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflexion}, where we find him maintaining that the system of Leibniz would be true, if the objects of our experience were things in themselves, as objects of pure understanding. If this were the case, then he thinks that, as Leibniz maintained, real opposition, \textit{i.e.}, opposition between realities, would have been impossible. For in pure thought opposition is conceivable only between a thing and its negation, the negation being merely the absence of the thing in question. But, Kant argues, this does not hold good in regard

\(^1\) Cf. Spinoza, Eth. II. 10, Schol. "Thus, while men are contemplating finite things they think of nothing less than of the divine nature; and again, when they turn to consider the divine nature, they think of nothing less than of the fictions, on which they have formerly built up the knowledge of finite things. \ldots Hence it is not wonderful that they are always contradicting themselves."
to the phenomenal objects of our experience; for these, as objects of perception in space and time, can be conceived as opposing and counteracting each other. So also he argues that, if the objects of our experience were things in themselves, objects of pure thought, the Leibnizian principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles" would hold good in regard to them. But the spatial conditions of phenomena as objects of perception, make it possible to distinguish, as in different places in space, objects which for pure thought would have been indistinguishable. On the same principle Kant admits that Leibniz had good ground to attribute "perception" to all monads, seeing that, as distinct substances, they must have an inner nature independent of their relation to each other; for pure thought is obliged to determine every object which it asserts to be real as having an existence in itself. And this, again, makes necessary the Leibnizian theory of pre-established harmony to explain the apparent real connexion of things, which, as percipient, have merely an ideal relation to each other. Finally, the Leibnizian view of space and time, as formal relations of things, which presuppose the existence of things as the matter determined by these forms, would hold good if the objects of our experience were objects of pure thought: but, as they are phenomena, the relations of form and matter are reversed; for space and time, though mere forms of relation, are presupposed in all particular objects which are perceived under these forms. Hence, from all this we arrive at the general result that, if by pure thought alone we could determine objects, and if, as would then be the case, the objects of our experience were things in themselves, the Leibnizian system would be true. Reality would be absolutely held apart from negation, unity from difference; the inner being of things would be independent of their relations, and their matter would be prior to their form. It is, therefore, only because the objects of our knowledge are given to us through sense, and therefore under its forms, that negation, difference, external relation, and form are made co-ordinate with, or even prior to, affirmation, unity, internal being, and matter. In

1 Every monad being a vis repraesentativa Universi.
other words, in each of these cases, thought is regarded as asserting itself in relation to something which is externally given, and in which it cannot find itself. Hence, the objects, which it thus determines by reaction against what is externally given, cannot have the character which they would have had if they had been determined purely by thought itself. For thought in itself is analytic, and it is only the intrusion of something foreign upon thought which brings difference, negation, relation, in short, antithesis into it; though in relation to each antithesis it is supposed to be able partially to reassert its unity and to determine the manifold as an object in relation to itself.

But, just because of the pure identity of thought in itself, the Antithetic, which thus is borne in upon it through perception, is incapable of any final solution or reconciliation. And here we come upon the second point in which Hegel sets himself in opposition to Kant. For, while Hegel finds difference and contradiction everywhere, not merely in thought as applied to perception, but even in pure thought itself, he nowhere finds a final and unconquerable difference, or a contradiction which is incapable of reconciliation. This is the side of Hegel’s doctrine which is oftenest neglected or misunderstood; but it is that which really gives importance in his own eyes to this doctrine of contradiction. For it is just because he discerns difference and contradiction everywhere that he finds nowhere an absolute contradiction. And especially, it is because he finds such difference and contradiction even in pure thought, that he believes thought to be capable of coping with all the oppositions which it meets with in its determination of perception, and indeed regards all these oppositions as steps on the way to its full development, its complete self-consciousness, and its final reconciliation with itself. Kant, on the other hand, starting with the analytic view of thought, finds no possibility of reconciling the unity of thought with the difference of perception, which by its forms of space and time seems to be marked out as the direct opposite of self-consciousness with its transparent unity. Thought, as it admits no antithetic or self-differentiating movement, is thus set over against sense with its pure forms of difference, space, and time.
At its highest, therefore, it is only the source of a demand for the realisation of unity in our knowledge of the world given under these forms, a demand which by the nature of the case must remain unsatisfied.

The Mathematical Antinomies are the expression of this contradiction. These antinomies arise out of the conception of the world in time and space as an object; and they are due to the contradictory nature of the elements involved in the ideas of time and space themselves. Thus space is necessarily conceived as a unity—as in continuity with itself; yet, on the other hand, it involves externality, and must therefore be conceived as manifold or discrete. In other words, a space, when we conceive it as a unit, has no other attribute except that of being external to another space; it is essentially a relation. One space would be an absurdity, for it would be a relation without terms. Yet, on the other hand, all space must be conceived as one: for two separate spaces, not included in one universal space, would be terms without a relation. Space, in short, as the abstraction of externality, cannot be a unity; while yet, when conceived as an object in relation to the unity of apperception, it must be a unity. And the two moments of continuity and discretion, which are equally necessary, seem to contradict or exclude each other.

Kant’s solution of this difficulty is, that objects in space are merely objects of experience, and that, therefore, we cannot speak either of them, or even of space, as actually having in them any qualities, which are not given in experience. Now, space and the world in space, as they are given in experience, are only finitely extended, and finitely divided; yet, at the same time, by reason of the necessity of reason, which forces us to determine all things in relation to the unconditioned, they are conceived both as infinitely extensible, and infinitely divisible. But, while there would be a contradiction between infinite and finite extent, or infinite and finite dividedness, there is no contradiction between finite extent and infinite extensibleness, or between finite division and infinite divisibility.

Now, with a slight alteration, we may admit this solu-
tion as valid. Space in itself, and the external world in itself, is only the abstraction of an element in experience; and contradictions must arise whenever we treat abstractions, or, in other words, elements of reality, as res completae or whole realities. Now, when we think of a spatial world as unrelated to thought, we are obliged to conceive it as complete and whole in itself, and therefore as infinite in extension and division. But the truth of the matter is that this abstraction is false, and that the world in space, as that which is essentially self-external, finds its necessary counterpart in the unity of mind, as that which is essentially in itself. The antinomy of space proves that space is necessarily related to something else than itself, and cannot be made intelligible except in this relation. To put the same thing in another way:—The world, in our first imperfect conception of it, is merely a collection of individual things and beings; and each of these, as individual, is a whole in itself; yet each again is externally related to all the others, and so constitutes one whole with them. Space is itself but the utmost abstraction of this way of viewing things, in which their individuality and their community or relativity are put side by side, without any mediation or connexion. Both elements of the idea are essential, yet the one seems to contradict the other. The reconciliation of the seeming contradiction, however, is to be found not in the idea of space itself, but in the further development of the opposite and necessarily related conceptions of individuality, and community, which here appear in their simplest, therefore apparently irreconcilable, forms. It is, indeed, true, as Kant says, that, at first, we necessarily think things as in space; but, though we begin with space, we do not end there: and the solution of the difficulties that belong to this first 'form of perception' is to be found by a deeper comprehension of the elements that are contained in it, and their relations to each other; for it is quite false to suppose, with Kant, that we must take space merely as a form of perception, and that it cannot be resolved into its elements, and brought into a higher unity of thought. It is a perception only so long

1 Cf. above, p. 375 seq.
as we are content to perceive and imagine, without thinking or knowing it.

The same remarks, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the antinomy of Time. Has the world in time, or time itself, a beginning, or has it not? Kant answers as before, that the empirical regress is always finite in extent, yet indefinitely extensible, and that any question as to time or things in time, apart from this regress, is meaningless. Time is only a form of perception, or of phenomena as given in perception, and, in terms of it, we cannot answer any question about things in themselves, simply because the question itself is irrational. This answer might be taken in a higher sense than Kant intended, as meaning that things, regarded simply as in time, are not seen in their truth. Space is the abstraction of self-externality, and, therefore, gives rise to a contradiction between the independence of things in it, and their essential relativity, or continuity; and time only contains the same elements, viewed as passing into each other. ‘Time,’ says Hegel, ‘is the first negation of space’: 1 by which is meant that, while the externality of things is not denied when we conceive them as in time, their indifference or permanence in this externality is denied. Finite things are first represented as indifferent to each other, and so as in space; but they are not so indifferent. Their existence is but the process, whereby, as separate or limited substances, they cease to be, or pass out of themselves; and time is but the abstraction of this process. Hence arise the Antinomies of Time, that already drew the attention of the Zeno, who may be called the founder of Dialectic. ‘The flying arrow rests’: it at once is, and is not, in the place through which it passes. The moments of time are external to each other, yet they exist only as they pass into each other; and thus time contains the two moments of continuous self-identity, and absolute change. Moreover, these moments appear in abstract, and therefore apparently irreconcilable, opposition to each other; and, as is always the result in such cases, they give rise to an infinite series. Hence, we no sooner consider a time as one, than we are obliged to relate it to a time before or

after it, and again we are obliged to regard these two times as one, and so on ad infinitum. No solution of this antinomy can be found in terms of time itself, or without reducing time to a moment in a higher conception, in which the elements of self-identity and relativity find a better reconciliation than they do in time.

I have said that when we conceive the world as existing in space and time, and when we try to determine such a world as either limited or unlimited in itself, we are treating an abstraction as a res completa. This means that in such abstraction we forget that, as in space and time, the world exists only for a conscious self. Descartes already took a step towards this view when he pointed out the direct contrast between the extended and the thinking substance, each of which, taken in itself, has just the characteristics which are excluded from the other. Matter is defined as that which is infinitely extended and infinitely divided, essentially inert and dependent on external force for its movement; while consciousness is an unextended and indivisible unity, absolutely active, and incapable of being determined from without. Having thus set the two in abstract opposition, he then seeks for a Deus ex machina to unite them. But a deeper reflexion would have shown him that the two worlds thus set apart are opposite counterparts of each other, and that, as so determined, they can exist only for a subject which relates to each other the terms which it distinguishes. In truth, we have in the opposition, as it is expressed by Descartes, only a provisional determination of the mind and the object in relation to each other—a first expression of the unity of the consciousness of objects with self-consciousness. But, as Descartes himself shows us, the consciousness which makes this determination of subject and object in relation to each other, is not necessarily aware of the relation it thus establishes between the opposed terms. It may, therefore, be unable to bring in their unity, except by a tour de force. Kant, however, looking at the difficulty from the transcendental point of view, calls our attention to the abstraction implied in conceiving the self and its object in space as two independent "things in themselves"; and he shows that, on the one hand, the self,
apart from its relation to the object, shrinks into an abstract unit which cannot be conscious of itself, and that, on the other hand, matter, if taken as that which is infinitely extended and divided, involves a manifest contradiction—the contradiction of an infinitely large or small quantum, i.e., a quantum which is the very negative of the idea of quantity, as that which can be increased or diminished \( ad \ infinitum \). What we have, therefore, in each of the two terms is only a half thought, which contradicts itself whenever we examine it closely, or develop the consequences of our abstraction. We can, however, restore its meaning, though with some modification, by recognising the element which it neglects. For, whenever we discover the correlativity of the determination of mind and matter, as Descartes conceived them, we see that his conception of both is imperfect. When we recognise that self-consciousness, as the return of thought upon itself, is possible only for a mind which determines the object as an external object in space, and thus characterises it as its own opposite, we are immediately led to form a new conception of each of these terms. We no longer conceive object and subject as existing apart from each other—the former as that which is essentially out of itself, constituted by \( partes \ extra \ partes \), and purely passive, and the latter as that which is essentially in itself, and purely active (confined to an analytic judgment which is no judgment at all). On the contrary, we are now made to think of the self-determination of the self as involving a going out of itself to determine that which is other than itself; as involving, in Kant's words, a synthetic judgment, or, to speak more definitely, an antithetic movement of thought, which does not stop short of the determination of the object as in space and therefore in direct contrast with the unity of the self, and which, indeed, must go the length of this absolute antithesis ere it can return upon the unity of self in the so-called analytic judgment of self-consciousness. On the other hand, the object in space cannot, from this point of view, be any longer characterised as purely inert and extended, as subsisting by itself in pure self-externality. On the contrary, in our determination of the world of objects, we must recognise a principle of unity; a
principle which manifests itself even in the movement of material bodies in reference to each other, as held together in spite of their diversity by a universal law of gravitation; but which is more clearly revealed in the way in which the material world becomes subordinated to the life of organised beings; and which finds its complete expression only in the relation of the process of nature to the self-consciousness which is developed in man.

The necessity of getting beyond the abstract antagonism of mind and matter, as expressed in the philosophy of Descartes, was already recognised by his immediate successors, though they took the one-sided method of simply denying or throwing into the back-ground one of the opposites. Spinoza, indeed, seemed to lay emphasis rather upon the unity of mind and matter, which he regards as only the parallel attributes of one substance. But he shows an inclination to interpret this parallelism in a sense which gives the preponderance to mind, when in one of his letters he opposes the Cartesian view of the absolute passivity of matter. Leibniz, following out the same line of thought, maintains that all real substances are active and self-determined; and thus he is ultimately led to deny that there are any but percipient substances, i.e., substances which are either minds or analogous to minds: Locke adopts the opposite course of assimilating mind to matter, and he often shows a tendency to explain the movement of thought in knowledge, like the motions of matter, by an external determination—a tendency which is shown still more clearly in some of his followers, and especially in the French Materialists.

The former course necessarily ended in an Atomism of mind—the so-called Monadism—which had to be supplemented by the fiction of a pre-established harmony; while the latter ended in an Atomism of matter, which had to seek for a principle of movement outside of itself. The conception of the universal attraction of matter, which was established by Newton, was at war with this atomic Materialism almost from its first appearance; though Newton refused to commit himself to any real actio in distans, and spoke of the attractive force as merely a name for the unknown cause of certain phenomena which could
not directly be explained by the immediate action of material bodies upon each other. So powerful was the prejudice which maintained the idea of the inertia of matter, except as externally determined by a power which is not in matter itself, that it for long maintained (and still maintains itself) in Newton’s school, and has led to a number of subsidiary theories (such as that of Le Sage) having for their object to explain the Newtonian law of attraction without any *actio in distans*. On the other hand, Kant, who tried to mediate between the Lockian and Leibnizian schools in his view of mind, regarding knowledge as the result of the determination of passively received data of sense by the activity of thought, maintained also, in his *Metaphysical Rudiments of Physics*, that matter is inconceivable except as the subject of an attractive force (which he conceives as an *actio in distans*) as well as of a repulsive force (which presupposes contact). He thus brings matter and mind, which with Descartes were abstract opposites, into close analogy with each other; while, at the same time, by regarding matter as a phenomenon, and by treating it as the phenomenon in opposition, yet in relation, to which mind comes to a consciousness of itself, he makes a step towards the recognition of the spiritual, as not merely negatively related to the material world, but at once implying and transcending it.

We may now see that Kant’s solution of the Antinomies, which arise in relation to objects determined as in space and time, a solution which consists simply in pointing out that these objects are phenomena, may be understood as expressing a truth. For the determination of things as in space and time is not a final determination of them, and the attempt to treat it as such must end in contradiction. This it must do, because, as Kant argues, things can be determined as in space and time only by relation to each other, and not directly by relation to space and time. In other words, time and space do not determine things in relation to each other; but things, through their relation to each other, determine their respective places and times. But this implies that, when we treat things as simply having spatial or temporal relations to each other, we are
treated them abstractly. Thus we may, if we please, leave out of account all other relations of objects, except that they coexist in different places, or occupy different parts of space, and that they exist in the same or different times; but this neglect of other determinations, whether it be the result of the deliberate abstraction of science or of the unreflecting attitude of the ordinary consciousness, necessarily hides from us the real nature of the object. And a thought that does not determine objects as they really are, is always at variance with itself. The Antinomies which arise when we attempt to give a final and complete determination of the world of objects,—while yet treating them merely as objects in space and time, and leaving out of account their necessary relations to each other and to the self,—merely show that an abstraction, when treated as the whole truth, necessarily comes into collision with itself. So long as we remain within the sphere of such an abstraction, we cannot solve the difficulties that arise out of it. We can solve them only when we take into account all the elements which are essential to the complete determination of things.

In this sense, then, we may adopt the language of Kant and say that the reason for the appearance of the Antinomy lies in the fact that we have been treating phenomena as if they were things in themselves, i.e., we have been treating objects abstractly without regard to certain of the determinations which, from the transcendental point of view, are seen to be necessary to them. Now, what are the special determinations which are left out of account when we determine objects as mere quanta, existing or coming into existence under conditions of space and time? The first answer is that objects so treated, as standing merely in relations of externality to each other in space and of coexistence or succession in time, are represented as indifferent to each other. They are connected, as Kant points out, only as homogeneous units which "do not require each other"; i.e., their relation is one of pure externality, which seems to involve no necessity of relation. That they are found together or after each other, seems to be an accident which does not affect their nature, and without which they might be just what they are. They
are parts of the experience of the same self, but this seems to be all their connexion.

When we reflect, however, on what is meant by this fact that they are elements in one experience, or the experience of one self, we are carried beyond this first determination of them. We are taught by Kant to see that they can be connected in one experience only through the Analogies of Experience, which determine each element as existing in necessary relation to all the others. If we follow the guidance of these Analogies, we have to represent the world as a system of permanent substances, which are in thorough reciprocity with each other, and have their successive phases determined in relation to each other by necessary laws of causation. For Kant, moreover, this new determination underlies the determination of objects as existent in space and as having their coexistent and successive phenomena determined in time in relation to each other. For, according to the transcendental Deduction, the former determination is presupposed in the latter, and may be seen to be so presupposed by any one who considers the conditions under which objects can be known as such in our experience. Our first determination of things, as simply coexistent and successive in space and time, is thus to be corrected by the recognition of a second determination of them as standing in necessary relations to each other in one world, i.e., in a world knowable as one by a conscious subject. Thus the world, formerly conceived as a mere aggregate of unrelated or contingently related objects, is now seen to be a connected system in which each element implies all the others; and this change of view is seen at the same time to be not a mere substitution of one idea for another, but a necessary development of our intelligence, which inevitably gains a better understanding of its objects as it progresses to a deeper consciousness of itself.

But if, in thus passing from a consciousness of the world as a contingent aggregate of isolated phenomena, related only as in space and time, to a consciousness of it as a system of objects connected according to universal laws of coexistence and succession, we have reached a truer and more consistent view of things, can it yet be said that we
have thus reached a view that is in all points satisfactory? Is this the last word of science, or is it simply a stage on the way to a still higher synthesis? Does it set things before us in their complete determination, or does it after all set them before us in a point of view which is still abstract, and which, therefore, in the end breaks down in contradiction? The answer manifestly is that we are still in the region of abstraction, in so far as we simply regard the connexion of objects with each other without considering what is involved in the fact that they are objects for a self. But, so long as we take the world as a series of related objects, each of which therefore finds its explanation in the others, we can never reach any self-sustaining point to which the series may be attached. We still stand between the opposite alternatives of an infinite series and an unconditioned member of the series, just because we have left out of view the principle in relation to which the series has its meaning. In Kantian language, we may be said to be confusing phenomena with things in themselves, because we are treating these phenomena as if they had an existence unrelated to the self.

It would not be difficult to show that from this cause antinomies arise in connexion with all the reflective categories. Kant, however, confines his view to the conceptions of causality and hypothetical necessity, which in their application to experience give rise to a regressive series, and so place us between the same alternatives of an unconditioned beginning and an infinite series of conditions, which gave rise to the mathematical antinomies. In attempting to solve these dynamical antinomies, however, Kant mentions an important difference between them and the mathematical antinomies. In seeking the unconditioned for a quantitative conditioned, we had to confine ourselves to the region of quantity. Hence, there was an absolute contradiction between the thing sought and the subject-matter in which it was sought. A quantitative unconditioned is an obvious absurdity, it is a quantum which is not a quantum, and, therefore, both thesis and antithesis had to be pronounced false. But in seeking the unconditioned for the conditioned according to the dynamical principles, we are not confined to an uncondi-
tioned which is homogeneous with the conditioned. Thus, the category of causality is the conception of a relation according to which the position of one thing is the ground of the position of another thing different from it. We may, therefore, use it not only to connect a conditioned phenomenon with the phenomenon which conditions it, but also to connect phenomena with noumena. And, however little we may be able to determine positively what this unconditioned is, there will at least be no contradiction involved in the bare conception of it. Hence, in this case the thesis and the antithesis may be taken as both true, the one expressing the endless reference of every phenomenon to a phenomenon before it as its cause, while the latter expresses the one conclusive reference of all phenomena to the noumenon.

In this remark Kant calls attention to a peculiarity which belongs to the reflective categories, namely, that they not only carry us from phenomenon to phenomenon within the sphere of experience, but suggest a transition from that sphere to another and higher sphere. In other words, the contradiction of treating the phenomenal (or, as I would rather say, the abstract) as a res completa, which was latent in the mathematical principles, becomes explicit in the dynamical principles. In the former case, this shows itself in the fact that quantity refers to quantity ad infinitum, and a whole of quantity cannot be attained. The reason why it cannot be attained is that to attain it would be to determine the finite as infinite, or, in other words, to characterise that which is only as it is related to another, as if it were complete in itself. But this reason is not explicit; so long as things are regarded simply as quanta, their essential relativity is not yet taken into account. But it is different when we determine things under the reflective categories, or, to confine ourselves to

1It may, of course, be said that here we have to interpret the category of causality simply as the relation of reason and consequent, and that that is a merely formal or analytic relation. But Kant here conceives it as a relation of different elements, in spite of it being a relation of pure thought. We have to remember, in explanation of this, what has been already said of his view of pure thought as determining objects (cf. above, Vol. I. 410). At the same time, we must regard this as one of the points in which Kant becomes inconsistent with himself in his view of pure thought as merely analytic.
Kant's own instance, under the category of causality. For, to say that a thing is an effect, is to say that it exists only in reference to something else than itself; that it has not existence, so to speak, in its own right, but only as determined to exist by something else. Under this category, therefore, the negative aspect of phenomena, as finite things which have their existence in relation to things other than themselves, is made prominent. While, therefore, the principle of causality makes us bind phenomena together as each referring beyond itself to the others, it also suggests the necessity of uniting the whole series of them to something not in the series, something that does not again refer us beyond itself to another, but is completely determined in itself. Thus the idea of what is only as it is determined by another, immediately suggests the idea of that which is determined by itself. The very category, therefore, which leads us to bind the successive phenomena of the world together as parts in one series—so that each successive state of it, undetermined in itself, finds its explanation in that which went before—awakens in us also a consciousness of the imperfection of such explanation, and makes us attack the whole series to a principle which is not a link in it. For the cause of a thing is that which fully explains it, and the only complete explanation, beyond which no further explanation is required, must be found in that which is \textit{causa sui}. Causality is thus a category which when universalised contains a contradiction: for it forces us to refer each phenomenon to another as its sufficient reason, and this again to another, and thereby precludes our ever finding a sufficient reason for anything. Hence, the ultimate truth of causality is that by its inner contradiction it carries us beyond itself to a higher category. And as this contradiction lies in the fact that the effect is set up as a separate existence while yet it is referred to something else than itself, it cannot find a solution except in that which is at once cause and effect, that which in its effect or manifestation yet remains one with itself.

This "immanent dialectic" of the category of causality may be further illustrated, if we consider the actual use of it in experience. In carrying back one phenomenon
to another as effect to cause, we are not satisfied (as Kant himself had remarked in regard to the explanation of thought by motion) if we entirely “lose the guiding thread of the causes in the effects,” \(^1\) \textit{i.e.}, we are not satisfied unless we can see in the latter the continuation of the former. We seek the effect in the cause, and are not content till we have found it there in its completeness. It is not enough for us to say motion is the cause of heat, until we can show that heat \(^2\) is motion, and until we can resolve the difference of the two kinds of motion—the motion which is heat and the motion which is not heat—into a difference of circumstances in the two cases. In this sense the cause, as the sum of all the conditions of a phenomenon, \textit{is} the effect, or, as Lewes puts it, the effect is the procession of the cause. But the moment we discern the identity, which maintains itself through the difference, we are again forced to ask, what is the reason or cause of the difference. Having shown that heat is an insensible motion, which is produced by the impact of different material substances upon each other and which continues the motion by which they were brought together, we have to ask what brings them together, \textit{i.e.}, we again are driven to seek for an identity which maintains itself in \textit{this} difference. Thus we are forced to refer back the cause to previous causes, because none of the elements of the cause explains why they are brought together in the effect. Obviously, however, such a search for cause upon cause cannot terminate, unless we can reach an identity which is self-differentiating, which is the source of the difference of elements brought together in the effect, and which remains one with itself through the whole process of differentiation and integration. Our search for causes is thus in its ultimate meaning a search for a self-determining principle, which does not pass away to make room for its effect, but which manifests and maintains itself in the whole process of change. For, while in referring an effect to a cause we discover an identity that continues to subsist through change, we do not thereby explain the change

\(^1\) A. 387.
\(^2\) Not, of course, the \textit{sensation} of heat as such, which cannot be explained apart from the living organism.
itself. This we can explain only when we have shown that there is an identity which the change itself manifests and realises.

When, therefore, Kant suggests that both sides of the Antinomy can be taken as expressing truth, only that the one will then express the relation of phenomena to each other, while the other will express the relation of phenomena to the noumenon, we are prepared to accept his statement, but only after its meaning has been slightly modified. Causality is a category which points beyond itself, or implies a relation beyond that which it expresses. The reference of each phenomenon to another, which we make in accordance with the principle of causality, enables us to bind all phenomena together as parts of one experience; but the unity of phenomenal experience is not a self-sustaining whole, and the same principle which made us give such unity to the world of experience makes us also look beyond it for its cause. The negative aspect of each object in the phenomenal world, as changing and existing only while it changes, is equally the negative aspect of the whole series of phenomenal objects, which forces us to look beyond them for a positive principle which, as self-sustaining, can serve as an ultimate support for them. As it is a general law implied in the very possibility of experience that all that happens has a cause, it follows that the causality of the cause, which itself is an event or something that has come into existence (and did not exist always), "must itself have a cause. By this reflexion the whole field of experience, however far it may extend, is turned into a collective whole of the mere natural world. But as in this way no absolute totality of conditions in causal relation can be attained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself without any other cause needing to be presupposed as determining it to action." 1 But how, we may ask, can the chain of phenomena hang upon a cause which is not in that chain or connected with it as one link of it is with the others? This difficulty Kant escapes by maintaining that, though the transition from the phenomenal to the noumenal is, in a sense, mediated by the category

1 A. 533; B. 561.
of causality, yet it is a transition which takes us beyond the region in which this or any other category can be applied so as to produce knowledge. We are thus led to think a relation, which cannot possibly be an object of knowledge, a relation not of phenomena to each other in space and time, but of phenomena in space and time to that which is neither in the one nor in the other. But as such a relation cannot possibly be schematised, the category, as thus used, reduces itself to the bare form of thought (the bare conception of reason and consequent), which is not sufficient for knowledge. Hence, after we have made the transition, we find that we are left in the dark as to the noumenon to which transition is made. We have characterised the phenomena negatively, but that does not enable us to characterise the noumenon positively; for the conception of the noumenon is merely the conception of a limit to empirical knowledge, but not of a reality present to us in any other way.

Now, the defect of this view of Kant, and the measure of truth which it contains in spite of that defect, will become manifest, if we invert his method of abstraction. For then it will be seen that the transition from phenomena to noumena, which is supposed to be made necessary by the category of causality (when that category is universalised or carried up to the unconditioned), is really a transition from that category to one that expresses a higher or more comprehensive truth. In other words, the category of causality is one in which we can find a satisfactory explanation of phenomena only so long as we take these phenomena as completely determined by their relations to each other, without reference to the self for which they are, a self which is not itself one of the phenomena so determined. When we take into account this relation, however, we have not, as Kant supposes, simply a negative qualification of the objects so determined as mere phenomena. We learn, it is true, that our former view of these objects was imperfect, so that the objects, as so determined, were not res complete, but abstractions. But we learn at the same time what is the element required to lift us above such abstraction and to determine the objects as they really are. We learn, in other words, that...
the conception of objects as standing to each other in such relations as the relation of causality, requires to be modified by taking into account their character as elements in a world which is, so to speak, bounded by self-consciousness. Thus, the relations of objects as external to each other and externally determining each other, and of events as happening after each other and successively conditioning each other in time, which are expressed in the Analogies of Experience, are relations which do not exhaust the facts; for, as related to the self, these objects and events have a unity and community in spite of their difference and externality, of which no account is taken in such determination of them.

Now, when we think of the world in this new point of view, we find the conception of it, as a congeries of things externally determined and externally determining each other, changing upon us in many important ways. In the first place, that difference in objects as perceived under the form of space, by reason of which they could, in the first instance, be only externally referred to each other, gains a new meaning when we see that it is only in relation to such difference that the consciousness of the unity of the self is possible. When the consciousness of things as thus external to each other, is seen to be necessary to the consciousness of the self for which they are, the result is not merely (as Kant supposes) to make us reflect that in spite of their externality they are necessarily related to each other. It further suggested to us that the externality itself is not absolute. Thus, it is not sufficient that we should learn from Kant that existence in space is not an externality to consciousness, but an externality for consciousness. We have to recognise further that the externality of things to each other is a form which is necessary to the manifestation of their unity with each other. For, as it is only in overcoming the utmost difference that the deepest inward unity can reveal itself, so that difference may be regarded as itself a part of the manifestation of the unity. The fact that we come to ourselves through the consciousness of an external world, makes us regard the consciousness of the externality of things as itself an element in the process of self-consciousness. Mind is thus
not only the opposite counterpart of matter, but it includes the process of matter as part of its own process. Hence, we do not reach a final determination of the object when we regard the parts of the material or external world as, in spite of their externality, necessarily related to each other; it is necessary for us also to recognise that the nature of these external objects lies just in their relations to each other; and this implies that, as external to each other, they are only different phases of one principle. Thus their unity underlies their externality, manifests itself in it as a principle of necessary connexion between them, and so finally overcomes it or subordinates it to itself. And the same principle may be applied to our consciousness of phenomena as successive in time. Their unity with each other, as combined in one consciousness in spite of their difference and the difference of times in which they present themselves, may at first seem to be sufficiently expressed when we treat them as necessarily connected according to the law of causality. But, in so far as their process, i.e., the process or objects as changing in time, is part of the process of self-consciousness, we must regard the change as not merely subordinate to a law according to which the successive phenomena are necessarily connected with each other, but as itself the manifestation of a principle which shows its unity with itself just in the process of change.

What, then, is the effect of this alteration of our point of view? We may describe it generally by saying that, in relation to objects in space, it involves the substitution of the idea of organic connexion of objects as the different correlated expressions of one principle, for the idea of necessary determination of one object by another; and that, in relation to objects as in time, it involves the substitution of the idea of organic development of one life through different phases, for the idea of a causal series of necessarily connected phenomena. We thus learn not merely to refer the chain of causality to a causa sui as its highest link, but to reinterpret the necessity of nature as itself an element in the process of freedom, an element which, for certain purposes of science, it may be convenient to isolate, but which cannot legitimately be
regarded as a res completa. In this way the Kantian conception of nature as that which exists for spirit will lead us directly to the Hegelian view that it exists only as the manifestation of spirit.

What light does such a view cast upon the Dynamical Antinomies and upon Kant’s solution of them? Kant is satisfied, as we have already seen, with saying that the causal law may be true, in one sense, if phenomena are relative to each other, and, in another sense, if phenomena are relative to noumena. Instead of this, we now say that the causal law holds good as a law of necessity for phenomena, so long as we contemplate them in relation to each other as elements in a natural system, but that it falls to the ground whenever we regard that natural system as an element in a spiritual system which includes and transcends it. The first step in the correction of the view of the world as a mechanical or necessary system may, indeed, be made without bringing in the idea of a spiritual system, by simply considering the process of the inorganic as an element in the process of the organic world. For the inorganic world, when we rise above the abstraction in which physical science considers it, must be regarded as the environment or medium in which the process of life realises itself. So considered, the serial process of the former becomes subordinated to what we may call the cyclical process of the latter. For life cannot properly be regarded merely as a succession of changes in which one phenomenon yields to another, which is its necessary consequent and equivalent; it is a process in which the identity of an individual maintains itself in change, and maintains itself just by means of the external medium or environment which makes the change necessary. The Darwinian theory has directed our attention almost wholly to the continuous process of adaptation to the environment by which animal and vegetable life is maintained and developed: it has laid less emphasis on the other and higher aspect of the facts, according to which the process is one of self-adaptation, which has self-maintenance and self-development for its end.  

1 This, no doubt, is partially, though only partially, corrected in Mr. Spencer's restatement of it.
aspect lies that which is the distinctive characteristic of organic, as opposed to inorganic change. The external environment cannot, from this point of view, be conceived merely as a limit or external determinant of the living being, but must rather be regarded as a factor in the process of its life. And we may add that, in so regarding the inorganic, we cast a higher light upon its nature than when we take it as what it is in the abstraction of physical science, which looks merely to the relation of inorganic parts or elements to each other. It was essential to the progress of physical science that final causes should be excluded; and this meant primarily the exclusion of any reference of the inorganic to the organic, as an end to itself which subordinates other things to itself as its means. Nay, the same abstraction is necessary in regard to the organic being itself, which science often treats as the resultant of the action and reaction of inorganic parts, not as if this were the whole truth, but in order by this abstraction to take the first step in the difficult task of explaining the complex reality. But this necessary simplification of the problem in both cases is to be regarded as merely provisional; and to regard it as the whole truth is, as we might express it in the language of Kant, to mistake phenomena for things in themselves, *i.e.*, to take an element or factor of the real for the real itself. In the language of another philosophy, we have to recognise that "the truth" of the inorganic is the organic; or, in other words, that we do not see the ultimate meaning of the inorganic, unless we regard it as a factor in the process of life.

But this first correction of the abstraction of the physical view of the universe is not a complete solution of the antinomies which arise out of that view. If we universalised it, we should arrive at the conception of the world as an organic system, the principle of which was some *anima mundi*. Such a view would to a certain extent free us from the difficulties of the conception of an endless external determination of one object by another in space and time; for it would set before us the idea of a self-limited or self-determined unity, which manifests itself in the outward process in which one thing seems to be merely
determined by another. Such a unity, however, does not exist for itself but only for us, i.e., it is not one with the thought for which it is. Hence we can call it a self only by a kind of metaphor; and it is only subject to this qualification that we can say that it is identical with itself through the changes of its existence, or that its environment is not an external limit to it but an element in its own life, because it makes that environment into a means for the maintenance of itself and its kind. It is only a self-conscious being, which "is for itself in all that is for it." It alone separates the principle of the unity of its life, i.e., the self, from its own individual being and from the particular circumstances which condition it; and therefore it is it alone that can find in both the manifestation of that principle. In self-consciousness, therefore, we find the only principle in relation to which, or as part of the life of which, the whole objective world can be regarded as organically connected. For, in relation to it, all the separate objects of the external world, which, from the mechanical point of view, seem to be confined to a reciprocal and external determination of each other, can, and indeed must, be regarded as the correlated manifestations of one self-determining principle; and in relation to it, the serial succession of changing phenomena, which appear as causes and effects of each other, can, and must be regarded as phases in the development of one life. Thus, the externality of the outer world as existing in space, and the continuous change of its states in time are, so to speak, brought back to an absolute unity and identity in the life of a self. The endlessness of space and time is reduced into an element in the cyclical movement of a self-centred existence. Yet, we are not to understand this as meaning that time and space are, as Kant says, merely ideal; but only that they have no reality except as elements in the process of the life of a conscious being, which cannot return to itself except as it opposes itself to an objective world in space and time, and which, therefore, must presuppose such a world as the correlate of the self. Now it is just this idea,—the idea that the world that exists for us is essentially related to the unity of self of which we become conscious only
in opposition to the world,—that lifts us above the difficulties and antinomies which meet us whenever we take the world we know as a world of things in themselves, i.e., as a world which has a complete or independent existence apart from the self.

Here we reach the highest point to which Hegel was led by the two corrections which, as we have seen, he made in the thought of Kant. Recognising the correlativeity of the opposite qualification of the self and the world as in space and time, Hegel rejected Kant’s doctrine that there is an essential contradiction between the analytic judgment of self-consciousness and the synthetic judgment of knowledge, and recognised that the consciousness of self and of the object are correlative elements in the unity of a thought which is both analytic and synthetic at once. Expressing this idea formally, we may say that truth is to Hegel a syllogism in which these two judgments form the premises. Thus, what are to Kant irreconcilable extremes, are to him abstract elements which cannot be absolutely separated without confusion and contradiction. It is for him an ultimate law of intelligence that it can realise itself, or, what is the same thing, can realise its unity with itself, only in opposition to that which seems at first to be altogether independent of it, and which has characteristics just the opposite of its own. It is as against such an object that it comes to itself; and it is just because it finds itself in the presence of such a seemingly strange object that its activity is awakened to discover the content of that which thus seems to be externally presented to it. When, however, we become conscious of the law which thus manifests itself in our experience, we are necessarily led to certain results which were hidden from Kant. In the first place, we are obliged to regard Kant’s absolute distinction of perception and conception as resting upon the supposed contradiction between the unity of thought, which is purely analytic, and the matter of sense as apprehended under the forms of time and space, which are essentially forms of difference. In the second place, when we thus reduce the difference of thought and the matter which it determines to a merely relative distinction, or distinction of correlative opposites, we are inevitably
carried on to a conception of the world as in unity with the intelligence, or as an organised system in which the intelligence is manifested. Lastly, this way of reflexion leads us to transform Kant’s view of the relation of the phenomenon to the noumenon, and to regard the former as simply a factor of the latter, though usually it is treated as if it were in itself a complete reality, both by the ordinary unreflecting consciousness and by the one-sided reflexion of science.

The contrast of these two points of view may be made more manifest, if we consider in the light of it Kant’s solution of the antinomy between freedom and the necessity of nature. In Kant’s view, the category of causality, as schematised, can only connect phenomena with phenomena, but, divested of its schema, the bare category may be used as a bridge between the phenomenal and the noumenal. In this sense, the idea of a self-determining cause may be admitted, at least problematically, without in any way interfering with the necessary causal connexion of natural phenomena. Nay, Kant thinks that in this way room may be found not only for one self-determining principle, on which the whole chain of natural causality depends, but also for a self-determining power in beings who, as empirically known, are merely finite substances determined to action from without according to necessary laws. Thus men may be considered as having at once an intelligible and an empirical character. In the former character, all their feelings, desires, and actions, are to be regarded only as links in the necessary chain of natural phenomena; while, in the latter character, all these phenomena of their existence are the results of that inner principle of freedom which belongs to them as noumena.

To this view the first objection is that, when Kant makes the category of causality express the dependence of the phenomenal on the noumenal, he is allowing the pure conception, divested of its schema, to have a significance which elsewhere he refuses to it. For, apart from the schema, the category was supposed to mean nothing but the analytic unity of thought with itself, (here the analytic unity of the consequent with a reason which already contains it,) and it was only through the reflexion
of the category upon time that it acquired the synthetic power of combining different phenomena which were not analytically connected. Here, however, the category by itself is allowed to express a synthesis not only of two different phenomena but of the two disparate worlds of noumena and phenomena. This is one of the indications that Kant, almost in spite of himself, represents the category as already different from the pure unity of analytic thought, and occupying a sort of intermediate position between it and the schema. In other words, the category already has something of a synthetic nature, though its synthesis is not supposed to have a necessary reference to a manifold given under conditions of time and space.¹

When we set aside this formal objection, however, we find it difficult to regard the transition from phenomena to noumena, and from necessity to freedom, as anything but an expression,—distorted by Kant’s method of abstraction, but still an expression,—of the truth that the externality of successive phenomena, viewed as causes and effects of each other, disappears when brought in relation to the self for which they are thus connected. What, from the abstract point of view in which phenomena are regarded as separate though necessarily connected objects, appears as the determination of one phenomenon or object by another, is recognised as a mere aspect of what is really a process of self-determination, so soon as we take account of the unity in reference to which and within which alone the change can take place. If, however, we thus interpret Kant’s language, we cannot think of the phenomenal world as something outside of the noumenal and determined by it, but must, on the contrary, regard the noumenal as the complete reality which is inadequately conceived as the phenomenal. Because he makes the noumenal more abstract than the phenomenal, Kant has been obliged to cut off the connexion between them and to reduce their relation to an external determination of the one by the other. But in this way he comes into collision with himself: for to conceive the phenomenal as externally determined by the noumenal, as one phenomenon is by another, ¹

¹ Or, indeed, to any given manifold; for the idea of a connexion between the phenomenal and the noumenal excludes any such reference.
is to forget that the former is the reality of which the latter is the appearance for us.

The absolute division which Kant makes between noumena and phenomena, and especially between man in his noumenal reality and man in his phenomenal appearance, is closely connected with another defect of his system to which attention has already been drawn. Inner experience, as we have seen, occupies a dubious place in Kant's theory. In the first edition of the Critique, it was simply regarded as part of the same connected consciousness into which outer experience also enters. In the second edition, it is seen to be posterior to outer experience and not capable of the same scientific treatment. But it is never distinctly recognised by Kant that inner experience includes outer experience and goes beyond it; or, to put it otherwise, that outer experience is simply inner experience regarded as apart from any reference to a thinking or even a feeling subject. Hence, he speaks of the defectively scientific character of Psychology, not seeing that the impossibility of satisfactorily determining mind as an object, in the same way that material objects are so determined, arises from the impossibility of making in its case the abstraction which we readily make in regard to material objects. Mind, as an object, will not submit to be treated as connected with other objects by the law of external necessity; because to treat it so, is to leave out of account that which is essentially distinctive of mind, that by reason of which it is more than a material object. But Kant, taking mind with all its phenomena as an object like other objects of experience, though one which we cannot perfectly determine, holds that its ideas, feelings, desires, etc., are to be regarded simply as states of an empirical substance, which are nothing more than links in the chain of the necessity of nature; and he allows us to regard man as free only when we take him as the subject for which he and all other objects are. But can ideas, desires, and feelings, be treated simply as states of an object of experience? Can we talk of "states of consciousness" as if they were qualities or states of a material object? Are not such "states" necessarily represented as forms of self-consciousness, which cannot be referred
to any object except that which is also a subject? In this
sense, we may allow that Kant was expressing an im-
portant truth when he spoke of the ego as standing in
its own way when it tried to represent itself as an object.
For it is impossible, in truth, to take a conscious self as
one of the objects of experience, objects which are con-
ceived as externally determining and determined by each
other, without leaving out all its distinctive characters as
a conscious being. Even an animal cannot be fully or
adequately determined from such a point of view, much
less an intelligence. We need higher categories to do
justice to life and mind; and if experience means the
determination of objects by the principle of external
necessity, we cannot have experience of such objects.
Now, it is because Kant did not observe this, because
he still tried to take the self, with all its ideas, desires,
and feelings, as an object of experience, (though he was
obliged to confess that it could not adequately be deter-
mined as such,) that he was obliged, on the other hand,
to make such an absolute division between the self as a
self-determining subject in its noumenal reality, and the
self as a known object or phenomenon. In truth, the self,
in Kant’s sense, never is presented to us as a phenomenon,
and none of what are called its states can be taken simply
as links in the chain of the necessity of nature. For, as
forms of self-consciousness, such states are already con-
ceived as expressions of a principle, the unity and identity
of which manifests itself in all their difference, in such a
way that they cannot be conceived as externally deter-
mining each other, or as externally determined by anything
else. To treat mind and its states as externally determining
each other, or as subject to an external determination by
other things, is simply to pretend to talk of mind and
really to talk of matter.
Now, as has been already stated, even matter cannot be
fully and adequately treated under the abstraction which
leaves out of account its relation to the subject; for ulti-
mately matter is merely an element in the spiritual unity
of the world. But still, it is possible to make the abstrac-
tion in question with a good result; and, indeed, it is
necessary to make it, if we would not have the first steps

This difficulty applies even to the pheno-
menal view of inorganic matter.
of science embarrassed by consideration of its ultimate problems. For, as we have seen, in speaking of inorganic matter we are speaking of the abstract opposite of mind; and we must, in the first instance, deal with it as such, under the appropriate categories, i.e., we must deal with it as a system of necessity. Ultimately, indeed, when we view such a system in the light of its necessary relation to the self that knows it, we learn that it is only an abstraction—one element in reality torn away from its necessary complement. But, as the mind must go out of itself in the consciousness of the external world, ere it can return to itself in self-consciousness, the ultimate interpretation of the world as spiritual is impossible, unless we are willing first to take it as it immediately presents itself, i.e., as a merely natural world. Or, perhaps, it would be more exactly to the point to say, that though poetic imagination may at once, in the way of immediate intuition, see the spiritual in the natural, such insight can become knowledge only through the slow process of science, which deals with nature in its abstraction as nature, and reaches the use of the higher categories only when the explanation that can be given through the lower is exhausted. It is for this reason that the mathematical explanation of the world was prior to the dynamical explanation of it; and if the dynamical explanation of it as a system of necessity has not yielded to a further explanation of it as part of a system of freedom, it is partly because the former explanation is still incomplete.

While, however, this is true, we must observe that the possibility of employing such an abstract method is limited by the nature of the object, as well as by the needs of the subject of knowledge. In dealing with the inorganic world, we can make abstraction of any law but the law of necessity; indeed, for a reason already stated, we must in the first instance do so. It is even possible, with a good result, to make the same abstraction in dealing with the physical existence of organic beings; indeed, the science of Physiology is founded on such abstraction.1

1 It has, however, been shown above, Vol. I. 596, that the need for a correction of the results of this method by higher categories, is more immediately felt here than in the physical sciences.
But what are we to make of Psychology on such a method, when the simplest determination of the life of a conscious subject as such is an idea, i.e., involves a reference to the unity of a self which can never be determined except as it determines itself? If in this case the abstraction is capable of being made, and if we can thus have what may be called a natural science of mind, it is at least obvious that such a science involves a more immediate distortion of the facts than was implied in the other cases. If it be true in any sense that in man nature comes to itself, or comes to self-consciousness, how can we pursue the science of man without reference to this return, or regard the self-consciousness which is its result merely as a phenomenon connected with other phenomena according to the analogies of experience. In this case, the confusion of a convenient scientific abstraction, with a knowledge of the object in its complete reality, will be much more dangerous; nay, without great caution, it may turn the science of mind into a systematic perversion of the facts of mind by the omission of its most distinctive characteristic. A psychology treated without reference to the unity of the self, would be the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet omitted; nor is it much better if that unity is merely named, and not used to explain any thing. Such a psychology may do some valuable service, not only in collecting and arranging the data for the science, but also in showing lines of connexion and relationship between them. But, as it must leave the central problem of mind untouched, it cannot give a final explanation of any of its phenomena. For it is impossible to find our way through that which is just the sphere of freedom by the aid of the categories of necessity. It was Kant's merit that his criticism rested from the first upon the principle, that it is impossible to apply to the subject the categories by which objects are determined as such; and that in dealing with the third antinomy, he at least reserves a place beyond the region of necessity for the freedom of man as such a subject. And that freedom he was afterwards to prove on the evidence of the moral consciousness. It is also his merit that in the second edition of the Critique, he made some steps toward a view of inner
experience, as not merely the consciousness of the self as an object among other objects, but as an outer experience freed from its abstraction, *i.e.*, regarded as the experience of a self. He thus, at least, prepared the way for a better solution of the difficulty than he has given in the abrupt opposition of man as a phenomenal object under the law of necessity, to man as a noumenal subject under the law of freedom. It is true that, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, we find little or no trace of this solution of the difficulty. Indeed throughout all Kant's ethical works his primary object seems to be rather to separate the spheres of nature and freedom; and the idea of a reconciliation between them, though not entirely absent, is kept in the background. In the *Critique of Judgment*, however, that idea again becomes prominent, and under certain reservations, the objective teleology of organic life and the subjective teleology of the feeling of beauty, are used to fill up the chasm between nature and spirit, between necessity and freedom.
CHAPTER XIII

THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON, AND THE CRITICISM OF RATIONAL THEOLOGY

HAVING considered the subjective unity of the self and the objective unity of the world as noumena or objects of reason, Kant now proceeds to consider an idea which implies the synthesis of these two terms: the Idea of God. Now, in his criticism of Rational Psychology, he had taken his stand on the formal unity of thought with itself, and had maintained that this unity cannot differentiate itself, and, therefore, cannot become object to itself: it necessarily remains in its simplicity as the pure subject presupposed in knowledge, and to treat it as an object is to deprive it of its essential characteristics. Again, in his criticism of Rational Cosmology, he had taken his stand on the essential difference of perception, and had argued that, though in experience that difference is necessarily brought under the unity of thought, yet its determination by that unity can never be completed; for a complete return of the difference of sense into the unity of thought would be a determination of the world as a whole, and the world in space and time can never be known as a whole. Now, we might expect that, having thus shown the impossibility of conceiving either the subject in itself or the object in itself as a res completa, Kant would proceed to seek for the absolute reality in the unity of subject and object. But it is not so. The two poles of Kant’s speculation are the essentially disparate character of the faculties of sense and thought when we regard them in themselves, and their necessary combination with a view to experience. Hence, while he condemns
the idea of the bare subject as empty, and the idea of the world as a whole as self-contradictory, he is equally obliged to reject the idea of the unity of the objective world with the subject that knows it, as an impossible attempt to unite two terms which can never be finally reconciled. In other words, he is obliged to treat the idea of an intuitive understanding as a 'mere idea,' the object of which can never be an object of knowledge. The result of this way of thinking is shown in the criticism of Rational Theology.

The subject naturally divides itself into two parts. In the first place, Kant considers the origin of the Ideal of pure reason, or in other words, of the Idea of God. In the second place, he examines the well-known arguments by which Rational Theology has attempted to prove the existence of a Being corresponding to that Idea.

1. How do we acquire the Idea of God? The logical law of excluded middle enables us to say that every predicate must be either affirmed or denied of every subject. We can always lay down with certainty that "A is or is not B," whatever A or B may mean. But such a dichotomy has nothing to do with the question of the reality or unreality of the thing, the conception of which is the subject of predication. The proposition "A is B" may be true or false; it tells us nothing in either case as to the existence or non-existence of A, but only what is contained in the conception of it. But beyond this merely formal principle, which shows us only how things are possible as objects of thought, i.e., what are the conditions of their determination as such objects, there is a "transcendental principle of the complete determination" of them as objects of knowledge. In other words, we claim a right to speak not only of conceptions but of things, and to say of every thing, not merely that only one of two contradictory predicates can be included in its conception, but that the thing itself must be determined, positively or negatively, in relation to every possible predicate. Now "this assertion involves more than the principle of contradiction; for it contemplates not merely the relation of two contradictory predicates of a thing, but also the relation of the thing to the whole compass of
possibility, as the sum-total of all the predicates of things." But this means that every thing that exists is completely determined, and therefore that "in order to know anything completely, I must know all that is possible, and determine the object by this knowledge, either affirmatively or negatively." Hence, we cannot think of anything as existing without putting it in relation to a whole that includes not only all that is actually given, but all that can be given. In short, we have an idea of the complete determination of objects as such, and in all our partial determination of them in experience, we are guided and stimulated by the belief that each object is completely and, indeed, individually determined; and this seems to carry with it the consequence, that every simple predicate of reality must be capable of being either affirmed or denied of every object.

Now, we may best discover the value of this principle if we ask what is its origin. It obviously contains two distinguishable elements: the idea of a totality in relation to which all objects must be determined, and the idea that that totality may be defined as the sum of positive predicates, and that therefore the only distinction between things lies in the greater or smaller number of these predicates that are negated in them. The former of these ideas is a direct consequence of the transcendental deduction, which shows that all objects, as they must be brought in relation to one self, must form part of one context of experience, and be determined in relation to all other parts of it. The latter idea follows from the law of thought, according to which positive and negative determination absolutely exclude each other, when we consider the law of thought as a law of the determination of things in themselves.

To begin with the latter of these points. It is Kant's constant presupposition that it is by pure thought that things in themselves must be determined, if they can be determined or known to us at all. And it follows from his view of the law of thought that, in this application, all positive predicates must be taken as expressing existence, and all negative predicates as expressing non-existence. In other words, there can be no unity of affirmation and
negation in the determination of things in themselves by thought, whatever may be the case with phenomena as known through perception. For, in the former case, the logical law that affirmation and negation exclude each other, gets a transcendental meaning, or is taken as a principle for the determination of objects. "Logical negation," says Kant, "which is expressed simply by the word 'Not,' is not properly attached to any conception, but only indicates the relation of one conception to another in a judgment: it is far, therefore, from being sufficient of itself to express any element in the content of a conception. To attach the predicate Not-mortal to any subject cannot enable us to recognise a mere non-existence as part of the idea of it, but leaves the content of that idea wholly unaffected. But a transcendental negation, on the other hand, signifies absolute not-being, and is the opposite of the transcendental affirmation, which, according to the essential conception of it, expresses a being or reality. Hence, through it alone, and so far as it extends, we have objects determined as things in themselves, while the opposite negation signifies a mere defect or absence of reality; and if such negation is not qualified by any affirmation, it represents the denial of any being whatever."

These principles, however, necessarily lead us to the idea of an ens realissimum, which is the sum of all positive reality to the exclusion of all negation. And, as the exclusion of all negation is the exclusion of all opposition and reciprocal limitation, this ens realissimum is necessarily conceived as one individual thing or Being. "The thing in itself is represented as containing all reality in itself, and, therefore, is completely determined. In other words, the conception of the ens realissimum is the conception of an individual Being; because it necessarily is determined by one out of every possible pair of contradictory predicates, viz., that one which involves being." Here, therefore, we have the one case in which a general idea enables us completely to determine an individual object. "This is the one proper ideal of which human reason is capable; for only in this one case have we a conception which is in itself universal, and which, never-
theless, is completely determined in itself, and is therefore recognised as the idea of an individual."

But, further, as this idea contains all reality, it contains "the material of all possibility." For no one can definitely think a negation, except on the basis of the opposite affirmation. The blind cannot know his blindness, if he has never seen the light. The ignorant cannot be conscious of his ignorance, if he has absolutely no idea of knowledge. Hence, all negative conceptions are secondary or deduced conceptions. And the conception of any finite thing or being can be nothing but the conception of the infinite with the negation of some of its predicates. Just, therefore, as in the logical process of dichotomy by contradiction, we can proceed to divide any genus into species determined by the position or negation of any other given conception, so here it seems open to us to assert that everything must be positively or negatively determined in regard to every predicate contained in the conception of the *ens realissimum*. And, as all possible affirmative predicates are so contained, it seems as if we were thus enabled to determine each particular thing, not merely by adding predicate to predicate as they are given in experience, but by limiting our *a priori* idea of the *ens realissimum*, as the unity of all positive being.

In this way the idea of the whole of existence, (*omnitudo realitatis,*), which is presupposed in the determination of all objects, is naturally and almost inevitably taken as knowledge of a thing in itself, which is the condition of everything else. And "the manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various manner of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common substratum, just as all figures are possible only as modes of limiting infinite space." We cannot, however, say that the *ens realissimum* is a mere aggregate of all the different individuals, which are determined by limitation of it. On the contrary, they presuppose it, and it must therefore be taken, like infinite space prior to division by finite figures, as simple and individual. Nor, again, can we suppose that finite things are divisions or parts of the *ens realissimum*; for that would be to introduce limitation, and so negation or non-existence, into that which is purely
affirmative, or positively existent. We must, therefore, suppose that the highest reality is the ground of the possibility of all finite things, and that they are not limits of it, but merely of its complete result or product. And thus the characteristics that belong to the world of sense, and to sense itself as finite, are not parts of the idea of the ens realissimum, though they may be regarded as belonging to the series of its effects. "If thus we hypostatise this idea of the ens realissimum, and follow it up to its legitimate development, we will be able to determine the absolute Being, through the mere conception of the highest reality, as a Being who is individual, simple, all-sufficient, eternal: in short, we can determine him in his unconditioned perfection under every category. Now, this is the idea of God in a transcendental sense, and therefore the Ideal of pure reason, as just defined, is the object of a transcendental Theology." 1

When, however, we proceed to construct such a Theology, we are forgetting the nature of the idea in question, and the necessary conditions of its use. It is true that in the determination of things, as they are given in experience, we always presuppose the idea of their complete determination in relation to the totality of possible experience. But, in the first place, in determining the objects of experience we cannot separate affirmation and negation as we do in pure thought, and, therefore, the idea of the ens realissimum does not correspond to the idea of a totality of empirical determination; and, in the second place, we have no right to suppose that the idea of the totality of empirical determination represents any objective reality. The things known in experience have no existence out of the experience in which they are known; and, from the nature of experience, their determination can never reach totality. A totality of all experience, and a determination of any individual thing in relation to that totality, is impossible; though it is the ideal of such a totality which stimulates all our successive efforts to combine our experiences. But, when we suppose that this ideal represents an actual object which is capable of being determined, we are transgressing the limits of its proper use in three ways.

1 A. 579; B. 608.
In the first place, we are turning an idea, which is the presupposition of experience, but can never be realised in it, into an actual object. In the second place, we are turning the ideal unity of experience into a real unity of things in themselves. And in the third place, we are turning the distributive conception of a totality into the individual conception of one Being, who includes all reality in himself. In short, we first realise what is merely an ideal of experience, then we treat this realised ideal of experience as an idea of the unity of all things in themselves, and, lastly, we regard this unity as separate from, yet presupposed in, all things; we conceive it as an individual, and, indeed, as a personal God.¹

From this point of view we are prepared to criticise the different supposed proofs of the Being of God. In general we may say that they are all based on the connexion which is supposed to exist between two conceptions, the conception of an ens realissimum, and the conception of a necessary Being. A necessary Being is the presupposition to which we are led by a natural and inevitable tendency of our reason. Following this natural dialectic, "we begin, not with mere conceptions, but with common experience, laying a basis for thought in actual existence. But this ground sinks beneath us if it does not rest on the immovable rock of absolute necessity. And this necessity itself would require something else to rest on, if there were any empty space beyond or beneath it, if it did not itself fill all things so as to leave no room for a question as to its cause," i.e., if it were not an infinite reality.² Where, then, are we to find the conception of a Being whom we can thus determine as absolutely necessary? Reason, when it looks about for such a conception, finds none that answers its purpose, none that has not in it something discordant with the idea of absolute necessity, except the idea of the ens realissimum. For, as the ens realissimum contains in it the condition of all that is possible, it requires itself no preceding condition, and is incapable of any. We cannot, indeed, say that only such a Being is absolutely necessary, for there is no contradiction in supposing a limited being to be necessary; but we can say

¹ A. 582; B. 610. ² A. 584; B. 612.
that only the *ens realissimum*, only a Being which contains all reality in itself, can be seen from the very idea of it to be necessary. If, therefore, we were obliged to make up our mind one way or another as to the nature of necessary Being, we should inevitably decide that it is the *ens realissimum*. But if we are not obliged to make up our mind, (and apart from practical considerations, which we have not here to consider, there seems to be no such obligation,) the fact that necessity might be possibly conjoined with finitude is enough to weaken the force of any argument which identifies the necessary Being with the *ens realissimum*.

This and other logical defects attaching to the arguments for the Being of God will, however, become obvious if we examine them in detail. "There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity on grounds of speculative reason. 1. We may start from determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense which is known in such experience; and we may rise from this, according to principles of causality, to a highest Cause," who in his works manifests his character. 2. We may start again from indeterminate experience, from the mere existence of some empirically known object, and conclude therefrom to the existence of a first cause or necessary Being. 3. Or, lastly, we may abstract from all experience, and deduce the existence of God from the *a priori* idea of him. The first is the Physico-theological, the second the Cosmological, and the third the Ontological argument. This is the natural order in which these arguments appear in the development of reason. But it is better to discuss them in the reverse order, because, as will soon appear, that is the order in which they logically presuppose each other.

The *first argument* is that because the idea of God includes existence, therefore he necessarily exists. It may be differently stated, according as the idea of perfection, or the idea of *omnitudo realitatis*, is made the middle term; but in both cases the essential point is, that what must be thought as existing necessarily exists.

Now, in the first place, if we look at this argument from the point of view of formal Logic, it is obvious that,
provided we avoid self-contradiction, we may include in any conception which we make the subject of a judgment, any marks or predicates we please; and existence may be one of these predicates. Further, if we have thus included existence in the conception of the subject, we can, of course, extract it again from that conception by analysis. If our conception of God includes existence, it would be contradictory to predicate non-existence of him, just as it would be contradictory to assert that a triangle has not three angles. But, in all such cases it is to be observed that the predicate is asserted only on condition of the assertion of the subject. If a triangle exists, it cannot but have three angles; and so if God exist, he is, in the case supposed, a necessary Being, i.e., he exists by the necessity of his nature. There is a contradiction in supposing the existence of a triangle without three angles, or the existence of a God who is not necessarily existent. There is a contradiction, in other words, in supposing the existence of the subject without the predicate; but there is no contradiction in supposing that both are non-existent, or denied together. There might be no such thing as a triangle, why should there be such a Being as God?

This objection could be met only by showing that there are objects which we cannot think away, cannot suppose to be non-existent, whose existence is pre-supposed in the thought of them. And this accordingly is what has been asserted in the present case. It has been said that God is just the one object, whom it is a contradiction to suppose non-existent. But then on what ground can this assertion be made? Is it not a contradiction to include existence in the mere conception of anything? Does not such an inclusion involve a confusion of the copula, which expresses the position of a predicate in relation to a subject, with the verb of existence, which expresses the absolute position of the subject itself? In the former sense, it is the expression of analysis, in the latter, of synthesis; for existential propositions are all synthetic. Such propositions add something to the thought of the subject, and cannot express simply what is included in that thought. It is a contradiction, therefore, to put into the thought of the subject the very predicate by which
it is determined as existing and not merely thought. In one sense, indeed, existential propositions are not synthetic, for they do not add to the contents of the conception of the subject. There is no more in the thought of a hundred actual, than there is in the thought of a hundred possible, dollars. But they are synthetic in the sense that something is added in the predicate, which is not included in the thought of the subject. I am in a different position as thinking from that in which I am as possessing a hundred dollars; for, in the one case, the object is merely an object of thought, in the other it is presented in sensible experience. To say that a thing exists, is to say that it is given through sense, and under the conditions of experience. Therefore, no proof based on conception can ever give us a right to say that anything exists.

(2.) The Ontological argument, with its strange attempt to extract being out of thought, would, probably, never have been invented but for its connexion with a second proof, which we have now to examine. The Cosmological argument takes its start, not from the conception of God, but from the contingent objects of experience. Contingent things exist—at least, I exist—and as they are not self-caused, nor can be explained as an infinite series of causes and effects, it is inferred that a necessary Being must exist. Further, this necessary Being must be the ens realissimum, the Being that includes all reality; for such a Being alone rests on itself, or has all the conditions of its existence in itself. At least, we can think of no other Being the conception of whom contains the marks of necessary existence.

The Cosmological argument is usually considered to be entirely independent of the Ontological, and to be superior to the latter, in so far as it starts with an existence of which we have experience, and not with a mere thought. Really, however, it has all the defects of the Ontological argument, with additional weaknesses of its own. It is, indeed, a 'nest of dialectical assumptions.' In the first place, it makes a transition from the things of experience to things in themselves, and that by means of the category of cause, which applies only in relation to the former. In the second place, it takes an idea of absolute necessity,
which is merely an ideal for empirical synthesis (though an ideal which empirical synthesis can never reach), as itself an object of knowledge. And, lastly, it involves or presupposes the Ontological argument; for we cannot argue from the conception of the necessary Being to that of the *ens realissimum*, unless the two conceptions are convertible; and if they are convertible, the Cosmological argument becomes unnecessary; for the Being of God is already proved from the definition of God.

We come lastly to the Physico-theological argument, the argument from design. This argument has a high popular value, as elevating our view of nature, and bringing it into accordance with the moral feelings of men; yet, regarded simply as an argument, it is even more defective than those we have already examined. "The essential points of the argument are as follows:—(1) In the world we find everywhere clear signs of an order which can only spring from design—an order realised with the greatest wisdom, and in a universe, which is indescribably varied in content, and in extent infinite. (2) This purposeful order is not in any way involved in the nature of the things of this world taken in themselves; on the contrary, it is a foreign attribute accidentally attached to them. Things different in nature could not have co-operated as they do to the attainment of definite ends, if they had not been selected and arranged in relation to those ends by a rational principle acting under the guidance of ideas. (3) There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or more than one), and this cause is not to be found in the productive energy of an all-powerful, but blindly working Nature, but in the freedom of an intelligent agent. (4) The unity of this agent may be inferred from the unity of the parts of the world in their reciprocal relations as members of an artfully compacted structure—inferred with certainty, so far as our observation goes, and beyond that with a probability based on the most obvious application of the principle of analogy." ¹

Now, it is evident, in the first place, that this argument involves the transference, to the relation between God and the world, of ideas borrowed from human art. Art deals

¹A. 625; B. 653.
with a material possessing qualities and laws of its own, and it makes use of these qualities and laws for the production of a result to which they have no necessary relation. Thus the architect, in building his house, takes advantage of the weight and other qualities of the stones; but there is nothing in these qualities which makes it necessary that the house should be built: they have only an accidental relation to the end for which they are used. In like manner, in the argument from design, we are obliged to think of God as dealing with materials which have nothing in their own nature to make it necessary that a world regulated by ends of the highest goodness should be produced out of them. Hence, the idea we reach is that of a world-architect, who is limited by the character of the material he uses, rather than the idea of a world-creator, for whom the means can have no existence apart from the end. But surely the latter alone is the true conception. How can the divine Being be conceived as creating a nature which has no reference to his purposes, in order that afterwards he may, by skilful arrangements, subject it to his purposes?

In the second place, supposing this objection waived, how can we vindicate an argument from finite order and good to infinite wisdom and goodness? The idea of God has no definiteness, unless we define it by the category of totality. For to speak of him as a being of very great power, or wisdom, or goodness, is to define him not in himself, but by relation to the mind of the observer, and the standard which that mind brings with it. And such relative greatness may indicate the lowness of the standard quite as much as the loftiness of the object judged by it. Hence God is nothing definite, if he is not all. But on the other hand, such totality is beyond the reach of our thought or experience. We cannot say what is "the relation of the greatness of the world as we have observed it, to the infinite power, or of the order of the world to perfect wisdom, or of the unity of the world, to the absolute unity of its Creator."¹ In other words we can never reach totality by an empirical process, though it is only from totality that we could get any definite idea of God.

¹ A. 628; B. 656.
There is only one way in which it is possible to supply this defect in our argument, and to justify the leap from empirical multiplicity to totality—that is, by showing that the contingent implies the necessary Being, and that the necessary Being, as such, includes in himself all reality actual and possible. But, thus stated, the argument loses its independent value, and depends for its validity on the two preceding arguments. In other words, it has in it, besides its own especial defects, the defects both of the Ontological and Cosmological arguments.

The result of this criticism of the three arguments is, that there is no possibility of a speculative use of reason in the sphere of Theology. We are thus involved in a dilemma from which there is no escape. On the one hand, the very nature of the idea of God as the omnitudo realitatis, shows us that he can be known only through pure conceptions. Yet, on the other hand, through mere conceptions no existence can be known as such. It is the Ontological argument alone which is conformable to the Idea of God; it is the Cosmological and Physico-theological arguments alone from which existence could be proved. Either, therefore, God must be thought as existing, and then he is not known as ens realissimum, i.e., as God; or he must be thought as ens realissimum, and then he cannot be proved to exist.

Since, then, it is impossible speculatively to prove the existence of God, the utmost which, in this sphere, we can attempt, is to free the idea of him from any anthropomorphic or empirical element, and to show that the proof of his non existence, equally with the proof of his existence, is beyond the power of human reason. This merely negative attitude of thought, however, leaves the way open for obtaining an assurance of God’s existence in another manner, namely, through the practical reason. For, if the absolute law of our moral life presupposes or postulates the existence of God as an absolutely powerful, wise and good Being, then the pure Ideal of reason, the conception which includes and crowns all human knowledge, will be shown to be objectively real; and Criticism, which silences the voice of speculative reason, will have precluded every objection on its part. The practical reason will thus give
assertorial value to the problematical results of theory; and "we shall find that which Archimedes did not find, a fixed point on which reason can set its lever—resting it not on a present or a future world, but on its own idea of freedom." ¹

Following the analysis we have given of this section of the Critique, we have to consider two points: First, Kant's account of the Idea of God; and, secondly, his criticism of the arguments for the Being of God.

The idea of God is, according to Kant, the Idea of the absolute Totality of Experience, represented as an individual and indeed a personal Being. As every object of perception or experience must be determined in relation to our consciousness of self, so the ideas of space and time as wholes are presupposed in the determination of any particular space and time, and the idea of the world as a whole in the determination of any special object in that world. In this sense the idea of the whole of experience, i.e., the idea of the unity of all objects with each other and with the intelligence that knows them, precedes and conditions the apprehension of all particular objects. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that in experience this idea of the whole can never be realised; for its realisation would imply that the presupposed unity of thought, the unity of self-consciousness, should itself be discovered to be the principle from which all the multiplicity of experience comes; or, in other words, that the multiplicity of the world in time and space should be discovered to be but the necessary manifestation of the unity of consciousness. But this mode of bringing back multiplicity to unity is, in Kant's view, absolutely precluded by the nature of experience and of time and space as its conditions. A totality of time and space is impossible; therefore the very conception of the multiplicity of phenomena, as conditioned by time and space, makes it impossible to determine the world of phenomena as a whole, or to find in it the unity of self-consciousness. Hence, the supposed idea of God is but the idea of a totality presupposed in experience, but which experience can never attain; it is the idea of an

¹R. I. 638; H. VI. 479.
absolute synthesis of thought and things which can never be realised, so long as the things which we know are given under the forms of sensible perception. It could be realised only by a perceptive understanding, i.e., by an intelligence in which the opposition of sense and understanding did not exist, and in which the difference of the latter and the identity of the former were subsumed under a higher unity.

From this point of view Kant accounts for the illusion on which rational Theology rests. The beginning of the illusion is, that the ideal, by which the intelligence is stimulated and guided in determining the objects of experience, is confused with an actually experienced object. This object is next treated as a thing in itself, an ens realissimum, which includes all reality; and, as it is known by pure thought, the principles of identity and contradiction are applied to it, and that, not merely in a logical, but in a transcendental sense. Now Kant, as we have seen in a previous chapter, did not object to the Leibnizian view of the determination of things by pure thought, but only denied that such determination could ever produce knowledge. He admits, therefore, that the absolute reality, if determined at all, must be determined only by pure affirmation, without any negation, and that all negative predicates must be regarded as expressing only the absence of the corresponding positive predicates. According to this principle, the infinite is to be represented simply by negating, or removing the limit from all finite existences, or in Cartesian language, by taking the affirmative predicates of the finite sensu eminentiori. Lastly, this omnitudo realitatis is conceived as an individual subject, which is not, however, like the human subject, limited by an object given to it from without, but which creates its own object, or in whose consciousness of self the existence of the object is at the same time given; it is, in the language of later philosophy, an absolute subject-object.

The idea of God, therefore, arises out of the union or confusion of three elements, which are clearly distinguishable from each other: (1) the idea of completed experience; (2) the idea of the unity of all positive predicates; and (3) the idea of the absolute subject-object, or perceptive
understanding. The first of these, taken by itself, is an ideal, which can never be completely realised, though it is always being partially realised, in experience; the second, taken by itself, is a subjective and merely logical form of thought, of whose objective reality or even possibility, we can say nothing; the third is the idea of an intelligence which transcends the dualism between the logical and real which belongs to our intelligence; but of its existence or its conditions, we know, and can know, nothing.

After what has been said elsewhere, we do not need to add much in criticism of the second of these ideas of Kant. If we deny that there is any purely analytic movement of thought, which contrasts with its synthetic movement in relation to given matter of sense, we must equally reject the Spinozistic conception of a unity of all affirmative predicates. In abstracting from the negative determination of things, we at the same time abstract from their affirmative determination; and the ultimate result at which, by this negative process, we arrive, is the mere blank notion of Being—i.e., not the absolute fulness of existence, but the absolute void. The scepticism, therefore, which Kant directs against this conception as an object of knowledge, can be turned against it as an object of pure thought.

When we have got rid of this logical spectre, and have discovered that thought is always synthetic as well as analytic, negative as well as positive, the two remaining ideas, the idea of completed experience, and the idea of the absolute subject-object, begin to approximate to each other. For, if thought is not absolutely opposed to perception, then the forms of time and space and the categories cease to be heterogeneous, and the ground of the absolute opposition between phenomena and noumena is taken away. In other words, we no longer find that insoluble contradiction between the factors of experience, which forced Kant to regard the unity of a perceptive understanding as a ‘mere idea.’ On the contrary, we now discern that, even in experience, thought transcends the

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1 See above, Vol. I. 340 seq. Kant, as we have seen, held that affirmation and negation do not exclude but imply each other in the empirical determination of objects under the conception of Degree (Vol. I. 411).
dualism which it creates between subject and object, between itself and things; though it is true that the complete reconciliation of these opposites can be achieved only in the whole process of the development of science and philosophy. While Kant, therefore, is right in regarding all our experience as springing from an ideal which is implied, but not realised, in it, he is wrong in regarding this first presupposition as a mere idea that cannot be realised. For, what is not and cannot in some way be realised, cannot be even so much as an ideal. To suppose that all experience is an effort after that, which the very nature of experience precludes us from attaining, is a conception which contains an absolute contradiction. It is possible, indeed, to suppose that, merely in terms of ordinary experience, the ultimate problem of experience cannot be solved, and that it is necessary for that solution to rise to higher categories than those of causality and reciprocity; but it is not possible to think that there is any absolute hindrance to the solution of a problem which is involved in the very idea of knowledge, and of the intelligence itself. We may turn against Kant his own remark, that if the questions of reason could not be answered, they could not be asked. The problem itself is the beginning of the solution. One insoluble contradiction would logically involve absolute scepticism, for it would throw a doubt on the very principle out of which all knowledge springs; knowledge, therefore, cannot be vindicated, even as the knowledge of phenomenal appearance, if it is absolutely severed from the knowledge of noumenal reality.

Kant conceals the contradiction involved in his view of knowledge by what is really a see-saw. He balances against each other, the first and the second of the three conceptions, which have just been mentioned, in such a way as to exclude the third. He admits the conception of a unity of all affirmatives, so far as to condemn the world of experience as merely phenomenal, because it involves real oppositions. He admits the conception of the unity of all experience through all its differences and oppositions, so far as to condemn the logical idea as merely subjective and 'empty,' because its movement is by mere identity.
And, while he thus alternates between the merely logical and the merely empirical, he never rises to a higher idea of unity; or if he does rise to it, and even goes so far as to name it 'perceptive understanding,' it is only to reject it again, because it does not contain the two previous ideas in their separation and opposition to each other. His criticism of the arguments for the Being of God (which are really different forms of expression for the transition to this higher idea of unity) is therefore little more than a reassertion of the fundamental dualism which pervades every part of the Critique.

To the Ontological argument, which in his view is presupposed in all the others, and which asserts an ultimate unity of thought and being, he opposes simply the assertion of their difference. A hundred dollars in thought are not a hundred dollars in the pocket. Being is not a proper predicate of a conception, for it expresses that which is not in conception merely but also in perception, and it is absurd to make into a part of our thought of an object the very predicate, of which the essential meaning is that the object is not merely a thought.

In this criticism there is again disclosed what we may call the connatural wound of Kant’s system. As has already been shown, there are in the Critique of Pure Reason two conflicting views of the relation of thought to existence. From one point of view, the consciousness of existence is supposed to be added by thought to perception; while, from another point of view, perception is supposed to be referred to objects by thought, which connects the manifold of sense according to the analogies of experience. This subject, however, has already been sufficiently discussed in a previous chapter, in which it was shown that Kant’s idea of an object completely determined in thought and yet merely possible, comes into collision with another idea which is essential to his system,—the idea, namely, that it is the connexion of experience which enables us to distinguish reality from illusion, or, we should rather say, to assign to each object the kind of reality that belongs to it. The source of this antinomy has also been explained. The ambiguous mixture of the psychological with the metaphysical in Kant’s transcen-
dental method, makes him confuse an account of a supposed genesis of experience out of elements supposed to exist prior to experience, with the analysis which detects in experience elements not previously recognised there: it makes him appear to be moving from the concrete to the abstract, when he is really moving from the abstract to the concrete. The idea that in some way we are conscious of perception as states of our being, prior to the act of intelligence in which we determine them by categories and refer them to objects of experience, always with Kant lurks in the background, even after he has shown that, we can be conscious of perceptions as our perceptions only in relation to the objects to which conception refers them. Thus he obscures and even denies the correlativity of perception and conception in the judgment of knowledge, and revives the old prejudice, that existence is just that which is not thought. Yet, it was the most important result of his own work to prove that that prejudice involves an absolute inversion of the truth, and that pure thought or self-consciousness is just the reflexion—the return into itself—of the consciousness of objects as such.

When this is seen, the difficulty, which made Kant, in spite of his own transcendental deduction, recur to an ultimate opposition of thought and being, is finally removed. The old dictum, nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, which was supposed to be the strongest possible statement of the principle of Sensationalism, is seen to be the corner-stone of a true Idealism. For all it can mean is, that there is no conception which is not a 'recognition' of the meaning of perception,—a doctrine which involves, on the other side, that it is only in conception that perception can be said to "come to itself," i.e., to reveal itself as that which it really is. The transcendental method, therefore, leads directly to the discovery of the relativity of the distinction between perception and conception, and, hence, to the negation of any absolute opposition between existence and thought. It teaches us to accept without reserve the principle, that there is no existence which is not an existence for thought. In fact, it makes us regard it as the main business of philosophy, to work out the consequences of that principle, and by it to
correct the abstract and imperfect views of things, which are due to a neglect of it.

This criticism of Kant’s argument does not affect it as an argumentum ad hominem against the rational Theology of his immediate predecessors. A philosopher, who takes his start with the conception of God as a given subject and, by the mere analysis of that conception attempts to prove his existence, might as naturally think to pay his debts by including the notion of existence in his thought of a hundred dollars. But it is quite a different thing, if we regard that argument as pointing to the ultimate unity of thought and Being, which is at once the presupposition and the end of all knowledge. Taken in this sense, the argument is but one example of the principle that abstract or imperfect conceptions of reality give rise to contradictions, and so force us to put them in relation to the other conceptions which complement and complete them. For pure thought cannot be conceived as dwelling in itself, but only as relating itself to existence, to a world in time and space; and it is only (1) through the opposition between itself and such a world, and (2) through the transcendence of that opposition, that it can come to the full consciousness of itself. In the language of Theology, the Ontological argument expresses the doctrine that God as a spirit is necessarily self-revealing in and to the world.

The other arguments properly express the same transition from the other side—that of the world; and to Kant’s treatment of them, therefore, the same criticism may be applied. Good as argumenta ad hominem, his objections do not touch the validity of the process of thought whereby the mind rises from the finite to the infinite. In other words, the Wolffian form of the cosmological and physical-theological arguments disappears before Kant’s objection, but not the transition of thought, which is imperfectly expressed in these arguments.

It is true, for instance, that the ordinary syllogistic argument from the world to God has the fatal defect of putting more in the conclusion than is contained in the premises. It is a pyramid of reasoning that rests not on its base, but on its apex; for, while it may be true that the world is, because God is, we cannot say conversely that
God is, because the world is. According to the rules of syllogism, even when aided by the principle of causality, we can only argue from the finite to the finite, from one part of the world to another, and not from the finite to the infinite, or from the world to God. This would be a fatal objection to the argument, if the analytic syllogism with its movement by identity, were the only movement of thought; if there were no such thing as a synthesis, by which an imperfect and inadequate idea could lead to one more perfect and adequate; if thought were always related positively, and never also negatively, to its starting point. Kant himself, however, is not altogether without the idea of another kind of argument than the syllogistic. In a remarkable passage already quoted, he tells us that the intelligence at first takes its stand upon the reality of experience, and that it is because this ground sinks beneath us, i.e., because experience itself qualifies its object as contingent, that we are forced to look deeper for a necessary Being, to communicate to the contingent, a reality which it has not in itself.\(^1\) Now, this account of the mental process only needs to be developed and freed from Kantian presuppositions, to become a true account of the immanent logic of Religion, the logic that underlies the elevation of human thought from the finite to the infinite. It is a logic not reducible to syllogistic rule, because it is synthetic and not merely analytic, because it involves difference as well as identity, because it has a negative as well as a positive side. Why do we seek in things, in the world, and in ourselves, a truth, a reality, which we do not find in their immediate aspect as phenomena of the sensible world? It is because the sensible world as such is inconsistent with itself, and thus points to a higher reality. We believe in the infinite, not because of what the finite is, but quite as much because of what the finite is not; and our first idea of the former is, therefore, simply that it is the negation of the latter. All religion springs out of the sense of the nothingness, unreality, transitoriness—in other words, of the essentially negative character of the finite world. Yet, this negative relation of the mind to

\(^1\) See above, p. 101. It might be shown that the Transcendental Deduction itself is an argument of this kind.
the finite is at the same time its first positive relation to the infinite. 'We are near waking when we dream that we dream,' and the consciousness of a limit is already at least the germinal consciousness of that which is beyond it. The extreme of despair and doubt can only exist as the obverse of the highest certitude, and is in fact necessary to it.

Now, the cosmological argument represents this transition in the simplest aspect; but if we take it in its positive form ("Because the contingent is, therefore the necessary being is"), without also observing that it might with at least equal force be expressed negatively ("Because the contingent is not, therefore the necessary being is"), it is exposed to all the objections of Kant. To argue positively from the contingency of the world to the existence of a necessary being, which is external to it and related to it only as cause to effect, is to reduce the necessary being to another contingent. For, if the world is determined only as an effect, and is conditioned by its cause, the necessary being is at the same time determined only as a cause, and is conditioned by his effect. The transition from the contingent to the necessary, from the finite to the infinite, however, is one which 'sublates,' or forces us to give a new meaning to, the category by means of which the transition is made. The first becomes last, and the last becomes first; and the finite, so far as it is regarded as still having some kind of reality, is only a mode of the infinite. This is the conscious logic of systems like that of Spinoza, as it is the unconscious logic of all those religions which have a Pantheistic basis. In such philosophical and religious systems the fundamental thought is, that 'the world of finite beings is nothing, and that God is all in all': the highest reality is determined solely by abstraction from the finite, and all the difference and change of the phenomenal world is lost or absorbed in the idea of an absolute substance, of whom we can say nothing, except that He or It is.

And in this, indeed, lies the imperfection of the argument a contingentia mundi, as well as of the Pantheistic idea of God to which it leads. It reaches the Infinite only by negation of the finite: hence, its infinite has no positive
determination except through the finite. Further, if, according to this logic, all finite existence is equally lost in God, yet it is also true that all finite existence equally is referred to God. Hence it is that Pantheism as a religion so easily associates itself with Polytheism, and the adoration of an ineffable Being who cannot be brought under any predicate whatever, passes at a stroke into a wayward idolatry that deifies anything and everything. The Being of whom we only know that He is, is yet

"As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart."

The distance of the finite from the infinite annihilates all distinctions, and all things and beings are equally near to the Absolute and equally far from it. Everything, as apart from God, is denied, yet everything, in God, is reaffirmed; and the pure abstraction of Being sinks, as in the popular religion of India, into an endless confusion of deities without definite character or relations to each other.

But the lesson to be learnt from this imperfection of the cosmological argument and of the religion that corresponds to it, is not simply, as Kant argues, that it is invalid, but that we cannot stop short with it. The idea of God as merely the infinite, or merely the necessary Being, is unsatisfactory, even self-contradictory, and that in the same way as the argument which leads us to this idea of him; but the discernment of its imperfection prepares the way for a better argument and a higher idea. What Kant refutes, therefore, is not the idea of God, the idea of a unity to which the finite and contingent are to be referred, but this form of the idea.

That the physico-theological argument grows out of the cosmological is shown by the actual development of Greek philosophy. Absolute necessity is one with freedom, for it is the necessity of self-determination. The unity of the Eleatics and the fate of Heraclitus grows into the self-determining reason of Anaxagoras. The idea of final cause which rules the Aristotelian philosophy is also the idea which underlies all monotheistic religions. Under that idea the world is reduced into a mere matter, in which God executes his purposes. As a syllogistic argument,
indeed, the argument from design is open to all the objections which Kant, following Hume, brings against it. The externality of the matter on which God acts makes God finite, and the notion of creation introduced by the Jewish religion cuts the knot instead of untying it. Further, as Kant argues, the designs which are executed in the world are finite; we cannot conclude from them to infinite, but only to very great wisdom and power. Or, to look at the objection from the other side: there is no definite connexion between the particular designs realised in the world and the nature of God. In the Aristotelian philosophy this defect is shown by the irreconcilable opposition between the pure self-consciousness of God and the finite world, which yet is declared to exist only through the divine energy. In monotheistic religions the same defect is shown in the assertion of arbitrary will as the source of all created existence. It is of God’s ‘mere good pleasure’ that all things are and subsist. The imperfection of the argument from final causes and the imperfection of monotheistic religions are, therefore, one and the same thing; and it gives rise to objections which are fatal to this particular way of conceiving that absolute unity which we call God. As, however, we cannot, without self-contradiction, avoid the assertion of the absolute unity in one form or other,—as that unity, in fact, is presupposed in all thought and experience,—no objections can force us to surrender the idea of God itself, though they may force us to give a new form to that idea. As the cosmological argument implicitly contained the physico-theological so the physico-theological argument contains the ontological. Absolute necessity was seen by Greek philosophy to be equivalent to freedom; absolute freedom again, in its turn, is found to be not mere arbitrary self-determination or will, but self-revealing spirit. Or, what is the same thing, Pantheism and Monotheism are necessary stages, through which human thought passes on its way to Christianity.

To understand this, we have only to consider that the very defects which Kant finds in the argument from design, and consequently in the idea of God as a designer, are remedied when we apply to the divine nature this higher category. God is the unity of intelligence, con-
ceived as necessarily related to, or manifested in, a world in space and time, yet through that world returning upon itself. In other words, the ontological argument—the argument from thought to being—when relieved of its imperfect syllogistic and therefore analytic form, is simply the expression of that highest unity of thought and being, which all knowledge presupposes as its beginning and seeks as its end. Idealism, in the sense that all things and beings constitute a system of relations which finds its unity in mind, that every intelligence contains in it the form of the universe, and that, therefore, all knowledge is but the discovery of that which is already our own—the awaking of a self-consciousness, which involves at the same time a consciousness of God—this Idealism is the real meaning of the ontological argument, and the only meaning in which it is defensible. It is, in fact—to repeat what has already been said—simply that idea which Kant constantly rejects, but to which he ever returns, the idea of a perceptive understanding.

The above paragraphs very shortly summarise an argument which it would require a complete treatise on Natural Theology to develop. But enough has been said to exhibit Kant's position in relation to previous as well as to subsequent philosophy. Kant's criticisms of the arguments for the being of God form an era in the history of philosophical Theology, just because they finally explode the method of dogmatism, and enable us to see what is the only point of view from which such a Theology is possible. His aim throughout is to show that the only unity of thought and being which can be known, is the unity of experience, and that this, therefore, is the only realisation of that ideal to which men have generally given the name of God; or, at least, the only realisation of it cognisable by the speculative reason. After what Kant has said, it is vain to repeat the old arguments in the old form. The only question that can now be put is, whether the unity of experience which he recognises, does not itself implicitly contain that very idea of God as a perceptive understanding, which he rejects; whether, in fact, the legitimate development of Criticism, involving as it does the final rejection of the 'thing in itself,' does not at once carry
us beyond a merely 'transcendental' Idealism. We have not, however, exhausted Kant's contribution to the discussion of this question, till we have considered how, on the basis of man's moral consciousness, he attempts to restore that theological idea, which from a theoretical point of view, he regards as merely problematical.
CHAPTER XIV

THE REGULATIVE USE OF THE IDEAS OF REASON

In various parts of the *Dialectic*, and particularly in the discussion of the Antinomies, Kant points out that the Ideas of reason, though they do not give us any knowledge of things in themselves, yet have an important function in relation to experience. But in a special section at the close, he endeavours to put this truth in a clearer light, and to determine more precisely the office of reason in the production and organisation of empirical knowledge. To this section, which sums up briefly the general lesson of the *Critique*, we must now devote a little attention.

Kant begins by saying that "everything that is grounded in the very nature of our mental powers, must have a meaning and purpose which is in harmony with the proper use of these powers."¹ And reason with its ideas cannot be an exception to this rule. Now, reason, as we have seen, never deals directly with objects as they are given in perception; but only indirectly as they are determined by the understanding. Its only function is to give direction and systematic unity to the work of the understanding. It brings with it an ideal of Unity in Totality, Totality in Unity, which it seeks to realise in knowledge; but the only weapons it can use for this purpose are conceptions and perceptions. The great aim of Criticism, therefore, is to prevent us from mistaking this idea, which is merely a principle for the *organisation* of experience, for an actual object beyond experience. "The transcendental ideas have no constitutive, but only a regulative use; in other words, their use is to direct all the operations of the under-

¹A. 642; B. 670.
standing to a certain end, to which all the rules of understanding concentrate as their point of union. This point is indeed a mere idea, or focus imaginarius, since it lies beyond the sphere of experience, and the conceptions of the understanding do not find their source in it; yet it serves to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the most extended application."¹

This will be seen more clearly if we consider the different forms in which this idea presents itself to us.

Now, in the first place, all our empirical investigations are stimulated and directed by the search for unity. The logical rule, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*, seems indeed at first to be a mere principle of economy or conciseness; but when we consider things more closely, we find that there is a transcendental principle of reason underlying it. By the very nature of our intelligence, difference and multiplicity are a problem to us; and all our attempts to explain phenomena have relation to a projected or assumed unity of principle beneath them, however little we may be able to determine the nature of this unity in particular cases. Hence it is that in Psychology we can never satisfy ourselves with the reference of the different activities of thought to so many different faculties, but are ever driven to seek for some fundamental power of which these supposed faculties are but the different forms or manifestations. Hence it is also that in Physics and Chemistry we are ever seeking for some fundamental element or force, which underlies and explains the difference of substances and the variety of their changes. In setting this ideal before us, reason does not beg the question, for it does not determine what kind or degree of unity is to be found in experience; but it certainly commands us to seek for unity, and from the duty which it thus imposes on us, no amount of unsuccessful effort can ever release us. Dependent as our reason is upon experience for all the materials with which it deals, it cannot pretend to arrive at any result by its own pure energy; yet, on the other hand, it can never admit that in all the apparent diversity of nature, there is any absolute and insoluble difference of principle, however little it may

¹A. 644; B. 672.
be able to say what is the nature of the one principle after which it seeks. To renounce the search for unity would be for reason to renounce itself.

But, in the second place, the tendency to generalisation and identity is balanced by another tendency to specification and distinction. This second tendency is necessary in order to check that levity and superficiality of thought which prematurely snatches at an abstract and empty generic unity, without having regard to the multiplicity of species and individuals included under it. And if the former, which we may term the idealistic tendency, is necessary to prompt men to the explanation of Nature, the latter, which may be designated the empirical tendency, is necessary to prevent facts from being explained away, and to bring into prominence the diversity which often underlies the superficial identity of things called by one name. Logicians, accordingly, are wont to lay down the rule, that *Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.* But "this logical law also would be without meaning or application, if it did not rest on a transcendental principle of Specification, a principle which does not indeed involve the assertion of an actual infinity of difference in the objects of our knowledge, ... but which nevertheless lays upon our understanding the obligation to seek under every species for lower species, under every difference for still finer points of distinction." ¹ And the deduction or justification of this principle is simply this; that conception can never exhaust perception, though it must continually strive to do so. We can never define the individual, yet the individual is the end, which in all definition we strive to reach. "The knowledge of phenomena in their complete determination (which is possible only through the understanding) demands an endless progress in the specification of our conception of them; and in this progress differences always remain behind, from which, in defining the species, and still more the genus, we were obliged to abstract." The individual object of perception, like the form of perception, has always a 'principle of infinity' in it; and just as we can never admit that any division of space is final, *i.e.*, is a

¹A. 656; B. 684.
division into indivisible units, so we can never admit that by any number of qualitative determinations, the whole content of any individual thing can be exhausted.

Lastly, to complete the systematic unity, we must add to these two laws the law of Affinity. This law commands us to avoid all violent leaps, alike in specification and generalisation, and to bind together without any break of continuity the highest unity with the lowest difference. As we can never admit that there is any generic difference which may not be embraced in a higher unity, nor, on the other hand, that there is any infima species which cannot be further divided; so we cannot admit any immediate transition from the one to the other. It is a logical rule always to look for links of connexion or intermediate steps, by which the path of integration or differentiation may be made more smooth and easy. And this logical rule also rests on a transcendental principle, which, though not derived from experience, guides us in the investigation of all empirical objects. As a matter of fact, indeed, we often find breaks in the chain of natural species, which our experience does not enable us to fill up; but we cannot admit such lacunae as final, and we are forced by the command of reason to seek for an order or continuous scale of forms, which shall bind them all together in one system, and exhibit the place of each in relation to all the rest.

"If we place these three principles in the order of their empirical application, we must begin with Multiplicity, proceed next to Affinity, and end with Unity. Reason presupposes the empirical knowledge of the understanding, which is immediately applied to experience, and seeks to give unity to that knowledge by means of ideas which go far beyond experience. Now, the affinity of the manifold, (as that which, in spite of its differences, falls under a principle of unity,) relates not merely to the things of experience, but still more to their qualities and forces. Thus, e.g., by a first approximation of experience, we determine the orbits of the planets as circular; and when, by subsequent observation, we discern movements inconsistent with a circular orbit, we proceed (according to the principle of Affinity) to invent suppositions which involve
the continuous variation of the circular form through an infinite number of degrees to the form that corresponds to each of these orbits. In other words, we presume that the planets will approximate more or less in their orbits to the circle, and thus we come upon the idea of an ellipse. The paths of the comets are still more eccentric, as they do not, so far as our observation goes, return on their own course: but even these we bring within the compass of the same genus, by supposing that their orbit is parabolic; for a parabola is but an ellipse with the major axis lengthened ad infinitum. Thus guided by the principle of affinity, we keep hold, in our observations, of a generic unity under all differences of orbit; and hence it is, that in the end we are able to trace all the various movements back to one common cause of all the special laws of motion, viz., gravitation. And from this point, again, we extend our conquests to all motions whatever, and endeavour to explain by the same principle all their variations and apparent deviations from that rule.”

The three principles of Homogeneity, of Specification, and of Continuity or Affinity, as is now sufficiently evident, have a peculiar position in our intellectual constitution. Their use and value is, that they enable us to organise our experience; whilst, on the other hand, experience could not exist except in the effort to realise them. Yet, in experience, they cannot be realised. “The empirical use of the reason stands in an asymptotical relation to these ideas, i.e., it can approximate to them, but it can never reach them.” Neither in experience nor beyond experience have these ideas an objective or constitutive value:—not beyond it, for, when we abstract from experience, we abstract, at the same time, from all the conditions of understanding and sense, under which alone we can determine an object as such; and not in it, because an absolute unity, a complete totality of difference, and a perfect continuity of unity and difference, are all equally impossible as objects of experience. It remains, therefore, that these principles must be considered to be purely regulative, and that if we refer them to objects, these objects must be regarded as of a purely ideal character.

1 A. 662; B. 690.
To put the same thing in another way, it is useful, and, indeed, necessary for the development of experience that we should proceed as if the ideas of reason were ideas of objects. We cannot, indeed, properly speaking, schematicise them and subject them to determination by the categories; for there can be no schema of the unconditioned. Still we can think of a maximum of homogeneity, specification, or affinity; and this is so far analogous to a schema that we can apply the categories to. Yet, we must always remember that this process is illegitimate, if regarded as determining objects for these ideas; and legitimate only in so far as it puts us in the right attitude of mind for determining other objects, viz., the objects of experience. The ideas of reason, therefore, form "merely the problematical foundation of the connexion which the mind introduces among the phenomena of the sensible world," and in their application reason is "occupied, not with any object, but with itself."

Now, the objects which reason, by means of its ideas, is supposed to be able to determine, are the soul, the world, and God; and these it has been our object in the previous chapters of the Dialectic to examine. We have seen the futility of the three supposed sciences of Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology. We have seen that the transcendental ideas do not enable us to determine any real object. Yet, this does not hinder us from acknowledging their value as setting before us ideal objects, and so enabling us "to produce systematic unity in the empirical employment of our intelligence." We cannot determine the soul as a pure self-identical unity; but this does not make it less necessary to "connect all the phenomena, all the actions and feeling presented to us in inner experience, as if the soul were a simple substance, which maintains (through life at least) its personal identity, though its states are constantly changing." We cannot determine the world of experience as an infinite whole; nay, many things make us regard it as really dependent and finite; but this does not make it less necessary, in the explanation of given phenomena of inner or outer experience, to trace them back from condition to condition, "as if they belonged to a chain which was itself
infinite.” We cannot determine God as an absolute intelligence; but this does not make it less necessary to “regard the whole connexion of possible experience as if it formed an absolute, but, at the same time, a purely dependent and conditioned unity, and yet at the same time as if the sum of all phenomena had its highest, all-sufficient ground in a self-subsistent, unconditioned, and creative reason.” ¹ For it is by setting before itself such an ideal object, and by treating all the phenomena of the world of experience ‘as if they drew their origin from such an archetype,’ that reason is enabled to give the greatest unity, extent, and system to our empirical knowledge. We must, however, distinguish most carefully between the problematical assumption of the existence of these objects, with a view to the organisation of our experience, and the simple assertion of their reality. “I may have sufficient grounds to assume, in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa), what I have no right to assume absolutely (suppositio absoluta).” ² The consciousness of the limits of experience goes along with, and implies the consciousness of that which is beyond experience; and we cannot really apprehend the meaning of the phenomenal without thinking of it as standing in relation to the noumenal. But, when we attempt to determine this relation, we can only represent it by means of analogies which we borrow from the relations of empirical objects to each other. We are obliged to conceive the relation of mind to its states on the analogy of the relation of a substance to its accidents; we are obliged to conceive of the relation of the phenomenal world to the noumenal, on the analogy of the relation of a phenomenal cause to its effect; and when we attempt to conceive of the whole finite world in relation to the unity which gives it systematic connexion, we have no other analogy by which to represent this relation, than that which is derived from the relation of an intelligent being to the effects which he produces, when he subordinates all his actions to one idea or purpose. At the same time, while we must use such analogies, we ought always to be aware that they are nothing more than analogies. “It must, e.g., be perfectly indifferent to us whether it is asserted, that divine

¹A. 672; B. 700. ²A. 676; B. 704.
wisdom has disposed all things in conformity with its highest aims; or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and at the same time, a principle which gives systematic and purposive unity to nature according to general laws, even in those cases in which we are not able to detect any manifestation of that unity. In other words, it must be quite indifferent to us whether we say: God in his wisdom has willed it to be so, or Nature has wisely arranged it. ¹

To sum up the whole matter in a word, the ideas of reason are ‘heuristic, not ostensive’: they enable us to ask a question, not to give the answer. To adopt any other view, and to suppose that, by means of the transcendental Ideas, we can have knowledge of real objects, is to put reason to sleep, or to turn its activity in a wrong direction. The dogmatist, who thinks that by pure a priori speculation, he is able to demonstrate the unity and immateriality of the soul, or the origin of all things in a supreme intelligence, is apt to lose all interest in empirical research into those phenomena of the inner or the outer life, through which alone the soul and God are revealed to our knowledge. Or, if he interests himself in either, it is not with a view to question experience according to the a priori principles of intelligence, but rather with a view to distort empirical facts till they correspond with the results of his a priori reasonings. By the external system of Teleology, which he thus imposes upon nature, he prevents himself from discovering the real nature of its unity, and his whole argument is a vicious circle, which assumes the very thing it professes to prove. In order to overthrow such artificial theories it is only necessary to point out, that the idea of final causality—the idea of nature as a system ordered by a supreme intelligence—though it inevitably springs out of the relation of mind to its object, and though it points to the true goal of science—the only goal in which thought can find an ultimate satisfaction—is merely an idea. The matter to which this idea has to be applied is so far from having any necessary relation to the idea, that we cannot be sure of its realisation even in a single instance, however manifestly that instance may present the features of design.

¹A. 699; B. 727.
For it is not safe to argue, that because a purpose is realised in certain phenomena, therefore the phenomena existed in order to realise it. All that we can say is, that from the nature of intelligence, this is the natural aim and end of all its efforts after knowledge. "The greatest systematic unity, and consequently the teleological unity of all things, is the idea upon which is based the most extensive use of human reason."

In this last section of the Dialectic, Kant expresses, perhaps with more definiteness and completeness than anywhere else, his peculiar view of the position of reason in relation to knowledge or experience. Very few, if any, of Kant's successors have preserved that exact balance between trust and distrust of reason, which is characteristic of the Critique, and which constitutes its main difficulty. Almost every subsequent writer, who has not gone beyond Kant in the direction of Idealism, has fallen back on a much simpler combination of scepticism and empiricism, and has treated the Ideas of reason as mere Idola, that stand between the mind and truth. But Kant lays equal weight on all these three points; first, on the necessity of the Ideas to direct and systematise experience; secondly, on their uselessness to determine the nature of things in themselves; and lastly, on the inadequacy of experience for their realisation. Especially in this section, which contains the final result of the Dialectic, Kant is solicitous to maintain himself on the exact razor-edge of critical orthodoxy; and he scarcely ever mentions one of these points without immediately modifying his statement by a reference to the other two.

At the point which we have now reached, little more need be said in illustration or criticism of the three principles of Homogeneity, Specification, and Affinity. The first principle, it is obvious, expresses the necessity to experience of the pure unity of thought; the second expresses the equal necessity of the manifold of perception; while the third expresses the necessity of a combination of these two elements in spite of their essential opposition. No experience is possible, unless both are present, yet their perfect synthesis is impossible. Hence (1) as there can be no conception without perception, it is impossible
to determine even the thinking subject, much less any other object, as a pure or absolute unity. And (2) as there can be no perception without conception, it is equally impossible to determine the world of objects as a complete or absolute diversity. Lastly, while experience is nothing but a search for the unity of intelligence through all the manifoldness or diversity of the world of experience, it is a search for that which, from the very nature of experience, can never be found. Experience is thus a unity of elements or factors, which for ever attract, yet for ever repel, each other. No experience could exist except through their synthesis; yet this synthesis is accomplished only in an infinite series of approximations to an ideal, which is incapable of realisation.

The only difficulty in understanding Kant's meaning at this point, is one which arises from his not tracing very clearly the connexion of the three principles of Homogeneity, Specification, and Affinity with the three ideas, of the Soul, the World, and God. The Principle of Affinity, or Continuity, indeed, seems, in the first instance, to suggest to Kant only the quantitative conception of a series of intermediate stages, a *continuum formarum*, by which the whole scale of being, from the highest genus to the lowest species, might be filled up. We must, however, remember that the tendency to look for intermediate links is only one form of the general necessity of intelligence, to seek for its own unity in all its objects. When this is understood, it becomes obvious that the teleological explanation of the universe is only a higher manifestation of the principle of affinity. Kant does not here identify the teleological idea with the idea of a perceptive understanding, which in the *Critique of Judgment* is taken as its equivalent. But this identification is implied in his assertion that the end of Supreme Intelligence can be nothing but the "realisation of its own ideas of Unity and Harmony"; *i.e.*, of itself. The result of the whole argument, therefore, is, that the idea of a perceptive understanding is the necessary *Ideal* of all intelligence, the goal of all science: though, from the nature of the case, the *reality* of experience can never correspond to it.

The ultimate decision, therefore, as to the truth of the
Kantian Criticism of Pure Reason, must turn upon the opposition of perception and conception, as factors which reciprocally imply, and yet exclude, each other. If thought in constituting knowledge or experience has to deal with something foreign to itself, something of an essentially different character from pure thought, there seems to be no escape from the Kantian paradox. Knowledge, in that case, must involve at once the assertion and the denial of unity of thought; it must be a continuous effort after the solution of an insoluble problem. It may, indeed, as Kant maintains, solve by the way many other problems; but its own problem, the problem which is involved in the very idea of knowledge, it cannot solve. It is a physician that can heal everyone's wound but its own. The answer of experience has no direct relation to the question of thought, though without the question of thought, there would be no answer of experience. When there is something incommensurable in two quantitative terms, that have to be brought into relation with each other, the only possible result is an infinite series; and, for similar reasons, the combination of thought and perception in experience can never give a final answer in terms of thought.

But, while this is true, we have to remember that the Critique of Pure Reason, after all, is only the first stage in the process of Kant's thought, and that its main value is to prepare the way for the second stage, which is contained in the Critique of Practical Reason. If knowledge of the objects of the Ideas of reason is denied by Kant to be possible, it is only to make room for faith. We can think the noumenal, and we can believe in it, though we can know only the phenomenal. And this exclusion of knowledge, if, in one aspect of it, it means the limitation of our intelligence, as capable only of understanding that which is given to it through sense, in another aspect of it, points to the infinity of our nature, as subjects who are conscious of themselves, and who, as so conscious, are not subjected to the limitations which they impose on all the objects they know. The limitation of knowledge to phenomena is thus the liberation of the noumena, and especially of the noumenal subject, from
the conditions to which all phenomenal objects are subjected. Experience is not a closed circle; for the very principles on which it rests point to something that is not included within it; and alongside of the realm of nature and necessity, or rather as an opposite counterpart to it, Kant forthwith proceeds to set up the realm of morality and freedom. And even this dualistic view of the world, by which the theoretical and the practical life are put in abstract opposition to each other, is not Kant’s last word. For, in the *Critique of Judgment*, he again attempts to bring together the two spheres of existence, which hitherto he had made it his main aim to separate and oppose. Using a form of expression borrowed from Kant himself, we might say that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is only the first premise in the great Kantian syllogism, to which the second premise is supplied in the *Critique of Practical Reason*; and that beyond both we have to look forward to the *Critique of Judgment* as the conclusion, in which Kant attempts to bring together the apparently antithetic premises, the ideas of nature and spirit, of necessity and freedom.

It is to the second of these great movements of Kant’s thought that we must now direct our attention.
We now come to that which for Kant was at once the final result of his critical investigations and the ultimate basis of his view of man’s rational life. For, as I have argued in a previous chapter, we cannot properly understand Kant’s work, unless we take it as, what it was in his first conception of it, an organic whole; and thus correct the illusory appearance of independence, which is given to parts of it by the separation of the different Critiques. Until the coping-stone is set in, the bridge does not support itself. ¹ Without considering how that reason in relation to which all objects are determined, is conceived by Kant as determining itself, we cannot fully understand the real meaning and relations of any of the parts even of the first of his Critiques.

Now, in the opening chapter of the Introduction, it was explained that philosophical criticism means the solution of an antinomy between opposite principles which seem to have equal or similar claims to our acceptance, by means of a regress upon the ultimate conditions of knowledge or thought—conditions which are presupposed in the controversy itself, and therefore in any settlement of it that may be arrived at. In Kant’s case, the necessity for such a regress arose from the collision between one

¹ "The conception of freedom constitutes the coping-stone of the whole edifice of a system of pure reason even in its speculative use." (R. VIII. 106; H. V. 3.)
set of principles, the truth of which seemed to be demonstrated by the fact that the whole of the recognised system of physical science was based upon them and had been developed by means of them, and another set of principles, which seemed to be the essential presuppositions of the moral and religious life of man. These latter principles might, indeed, be imperfectly defined: it might be that they were not distinctly brought before consciousness at all till they were attacked. But the attempt to treat the recognised principles of science as universal principles and to carry "natural law into the spiritual world," necessarily forced any other principles which claimed authority in that sphere to formulate themselves in opposition to the former. And the antinomy or controversy thus arising made it necessary for Kant by a critical regress to determine the ultimate grounds of the validity of the principles of science, and at the same time the limit of that validity, if there were any such limit.

Kant's problem, then, arose out of a great antagonism of principles, which was already making itself felt in his time, and which has not yet received its final solution, between physical science and the moral and religious consciousness. This problem was necessarily brought into view by the advance of physical science itself and by the attempt, which seemed to be a necessary result of that advance, to extend the use of its methods and principles beyond the purely material world. For such an extension seemed to mean nothing less than the inclusion of all man's life, moral as well as physical, within the realm of nature and necessity. In other words, it left no room in that life for "God, freedom and immortality," and it explained away all those religious or moral experiences, which had been connected with these ideas. It implied, at least, that such experiences should not be interpreted as they had hitherto seemed to interpret themselves in the consciousness of moral and religious men. Now, it was impossible that the convictions which thus seemed to underlie man's higher life, should be surrendered without a blow, and surrendered to what after all might be a prejudice. It became, therefore, necessary for Kant to examine the principles upon which science rests, in order
to determine whether they were absolute principles, or whether there was anything either in them or in the conditions of their application, which limited them to a particular sphere and made it impossible to apply them successfully beyond it.

Now, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant’s argument is, that we cannot show the validity of the principles of science except in a way that limits them to the sphere of phenomena. To prove that they are true of objects is to prove that those objects are not things in themselves. In Kant’s own words, we can prove that they are objectively true “only in relation to what is in itself contingent, viz., possible experience,” and this, because they are only the principles through which experience is possible. But if so, then all they can do is to enable us to “spell out phenomena according to a synthetic unity, so that we may be able to read them as experience”;¹ in other words, to give to perceptions that connexion with each other which is necessary, if we are to derive from them a knowledge of objects. As, therefore, our understanding evolves these principles from itself only in relation to a contingent matter of sense given under certain subjective forms, so it can vindicate their truth only as the means, though the necessary means, whereby such matter is determined. It justifies them in this application and limits them to it. And this limitation of their validity is further confirmed by the antinomies, into which reason falls when it attempts to apply them beyond the sphere of sensible experience; antinomies from which it can escape only by recognising the phenomenal character of the objects with which it is dealing, or what amounts to the same thing, by recognising that the thought which determines such objects is not pure thought. Hence, the ideal of knowledge, which is set before us by reason or pure thought, as it manifests itself in the pure consciousness of self, is not realised in the knowledge of objects, which we reach by the use of such principles; or, as Kant expresses it, reason and understanding are in irreconcilable opposition to each other, so that “what would satisfy reason is too much for the understanding, and what would satisfy the understand-

¹A. 314; B. 371.
ing is too little for reason.” In fact, our idea of knowledge would be satisfied only if pure thought, without going beyond itself, were at the same time the knowledge of objects; or, in other words, if pure self-consciousness and the consciousness of objects were one. Our intelligence, however, being not an intuitive or perceptive intelligence, but dependent for the matter which it determines on something else than itself, i.e., on sense-affections, is limited to the alternation between a knowledge which is not pure thought and a pure thought which is not knowledge. But, just for this reason, it is conscious of the limitation of its knowledge to phenomena, and necessarily sets up the problematic conception of a noumenon or thing in itself to mark this limitation. Yet, this conception does not enable us to go beyond the limit which it marks, and thought is like a dark lantern which defines and limits knowledge without throwing any light upon itself.

When we retrace these steps, it becomes evident that the end and the beginning of Kant’s *Critique* have close relation to each other, although in the beginning the thing in itself appears as an object which produces affections in our sensibility, whereas in the end it appears as the noumenon which the mind requires because it does not find in experience an object adequate to itself; although, in other words, it appears in the beginning as the abstractly real, and in the end as the abstractly ideal. We may say that because thought has to deal with a given matter in the affections, it does not find *itself* in the objects to which it refers that matter, but is obliged to recognise those objects as phenomenal. Or, again, we may say that because thought is in itself empty and analytic and cannot go beyond itself to determine objects, therefore any objects that are presented to it must be phenomenal. It is to be observed, however, that the last way of stating the matter, while it brings into prominence the difference between thought and knowledge, makes it impossible to see how thought in relation to knowledge should appear as a higher ideal of knowledge, as the thought of an intuitive understanding. So far as Kant makes it take the place of such an ideal, there is really involved in his words a higher conception than that which he professedly admits. In
fact, the idea of an organic unity, in which the difference of the empirical consciousness is completely overcome, is silently substituted for the idea of an identity in which no difference has arisen. This substitution is made easy for Kant, just because he confuses the abstract or analytic unity of thought with the unity of self-consciousness, which he admits to be negatively (though not positively) mediated by a consciousness of objects.

A deeper consideration of Kant’s method, however, led us to see that this ambiguity is simply the culminating instance of a fundamental mistake or confusion, which runs through the whole of Kant’s work, and which we have described by saying that he seems to himself to be moving from the concrete to the abstract, when he is really moving from the abstract to the concrete. Thus, in the Aesthetic, Kant begins the criticism and correction of the ordinary consciousness by pointing out that when we say that objects are given to us in sense, we forget that, as objects in space and time, they cannot be so given. For, even if it be admitted that sense presents us with individual objects, it presents them subject to the conditions of space and time, which are general forms of relation between objects and cannot be given in our particular sensations. Now, this is a step towards a true view of knowledge, if we take it as simply calling attention to the fact that the perception of particular objects presupposes certain general principles, which, however, are not necessarily reflected on or consciously recognised by the individual perceiving. So understood, the effect of the Aesthetic is to correct our first abstract way of thinking of objects, as if they were given as individual objects apart from any relation of them to each other, by showing that they are so given only by limitation of the one space and time which is presupposed in all of them. But, Kant’s expression of this truth is disturbed by the tacit assumption that objects, as given through the affections of the sensibility, can be only isolated individuals, and that, therefore, the forms of time and space, which compel us to apprehend them in relation to each other, stand between us and the reality. In other words, just because in perceiving objects we necessarily bring them into con-
nexion as objects in one space and time, the objects we perceive cannot correspond to the real objects which affect us. In being perceived, they have received an additional qualification, which we must take from them if we would know what they are in themselves. Thus, instead of arguing that, as the objects which we perceive are necessarily determined as in one space and time, they are not isolated individuals, Kant, argues that, because we necessarily perceive objects as in relations of time and space, we do not perceive them as they really are. Hence, in thinking of the real objects, we must necessarily abstract from the forms of space and time. In truth, such reasoning involves a recurrence to that abstract way of thinking of objects apart from their relations, which the *Aesthetic* teaches us to correct, when it shows us that it is only as determined in relation to other objects in space and time that individual objects can be perceived. And what is the reason for this recurrence? It can only be some supposed necessity of thinking objects as purely individual, or else the idea that through the affections of our sensibility, they are *perceived* as purely individual. But such a necessity of thought does not exist, or rather we should say the opposite necessity exists; for we can think individual objects only as in relation to each other. And in the mere affections of sensibility, objects are not given as individual, nor, indeed, as objects at all. Thus, neither in conception nor in perception can the mere particular be apprehended apart from the universal; and transcendental reflexion corrects our first view of objects, just because it makes us conscious of this fact, and so calls our attention to an element in our experience, which we are apt at first to overlook.

In the *Analytic*, Kant takes another step in the correction of the ordinary view of knowledge, when he shows that, even after we have allowed for the form and matter of perception, we have not taken account of all that is required for the consciousness of objects as such. It is not the case that objects are given us in perception as individual objects standing in definite relations to each other in space and time; for such determination of them implies a recognition of them as quantified and qualified.
substances, the states of which are determined in their succession and coexistence by universal laws. But such a consciousness is impossible, except through the determination of the manifold, given under forms of space and time, by the mathematical and dynamical categories in relation to the unity of self-consciousness. Thus the objects of our consciousness are not given to us as such objects through sense and its forms; for perceptions cannot refer themselves to objects, but must be so referred by the understanding, which brings them under "conceptions of objects in general." Now, the real force of this argument is that it brings to light an element in our consciousness of objects on which we did not reflect, so long as we regarded them as immediately given in sense. For thus it shows that we cannot take these objects as being what they were for us in our first consciousness of them, unless we take into account certain of their characteristics of which at first we were not aware. In other words, we must add new elements to our consciousness of objects, if we would even maintain it; or, if not, we must take away from that consciousness many of the elements formerly attributed to it. Kant, however, instead of regarding the new determination of objects as a step towards a complete and adequate consciousness of them, or, in other words, as a step towards the knowledge of them as things in themselves, regards it rather as an addition to our determination of objects as phenomena, which involves a corresponding loss to the determination of them as things in themselves. Accordingly, he now tells us that we must not only divest the thing in itself of all relations of time or space, but also of all determination by the categories: we must conceive it neither as qualified nor as quantified, neither as substance nor as cause.

In the Dialectic, finally, Kant calls attention to the fact that, even after we have allowed for the determination of objects by perception and conception, there is still an element left out of account, which, though commonly overlooked, is always present in our consciousness of them. For, in all such determination, they are necessarily conceived as elements in one objective world; and that again
means that they are referred to a "transcendental object," the consciousness of which correlates with the consciousness of one self. Hence, our consciousness of the objects of experience as necessarily connected in time and space, must be regarded as abstract, so long as we do not take into account their unity with each other as elements in one self-consciousness. This reflexion, therefore, must lead to a further addition to, and correction of, our first consciousness of things by reference to the unity which that consciousness presupposes, but on which it does not usually reflect. Accordingly, we find Kant maintaining that the complete determination of objects of experience implies their reference to Ideas, which, as we have seen, are simply conceptions of the unity of the objective world with itself and with the intelligence. At the same time, he holds that these Ideas can never be realised in experience. Hence, although our consciousness of objects is incomplete until we have related them to this higher unity, yet we can never bring them under it. And our final correction of the abstractness of the ordinary consciousness of the objects of experience is to recognise that, as such objects, they are not res completeae, but phenomena; though the noumenon to which we refer them is not itself an object of knowledge, but only an Idea.

In this conception of the relation of the phenomenal to the noumenal, Kant has made a still more curious compromise between the two methods,—the method that proceeds from abstract to concrete and that which proceeds from concrete to abstract,—than either in the Aesthetic or in the Analytic. In the first place, the conception of the noumenon or thing in itself has received a new qualification. It is no longer the conception of the object as apart from consciousness, the object which remains when we abstract from its determination by perception and by conception; for when we so abstract, nothing remains but the unity of the self in reference to which the object is so determined. Hence, the thing in itself would disappear altogether, if the thought of it did not revive in a new form in connexion with that unity. But that unity has for its correlate a "transcendental object," which is essentially different from the objects of experience; and
this is an object which we can still oppose as the noumenon or thing in itself to the object of experience as the phenomenon. Thus Kant is led to regard the noumenon, not as an object unrelated to the conscious self, an object which is the "ground" of the affections of its passivity, but as an object the idea of which is bound up with the pure unity of the self as contrasted with the synthetic unity of experience. Now, it might seem as if, on Kant's principles, such an object must be admitted to be already presented to us in an experience like ours, all the contents of which must be capable of being united with the "I think." For this would seem to involve that the truth in regard to objects of experience, the noumenon in the phenomenon, will be discovered whenever we consider these objects in their relation to the unity of the self. Kant, however, though he admits that the idea of the noumenon is bound up with the consciousness of the unity of the self which is presupposed in experience, yet does not recognise that experience can be reinterpreted in relation to that unity. The thing in itself is no longer for him an object, of which, as it is out of consciousness, nothing can be said: rather, it is an ideal projection of the unity of the conscious self, by which it thinks of an object in conformity with itself. Still, as the judgment of self-consciousness is regarded by Kant as in itself an analytic judgment, it is impossible for its unity to furnish a principle by which our empirical consciousness of the world can be reorganised or reinterpreted. Thus, the essential opposition of phenomenon to noumenon remains, though its meaning is altered. At first we were supposed to be unable to reach the noumenon, because we could only perceive or conceive an object which was relative to the self; whereas now it is argued that we cannot reach it, because all objects of experience involve an element which is not relative to the self. It is easy, however, to see that, if the judgment of self-consciousness were, as Kant asserts, a mere analytic judgment, it could not possibly be the source of ideas of objects with which the objects of experience could be compared as phenomena with noumena: and, conversely, that, if the consciousness of self is the source of ideas of objects with which the
objects of experience are compared as phenomena with noumena, it cannot at the same time be the consciousness of a bare analytic unity, in thinking which we abstract from all such objects. It is only as self-consciousness involves or includes the consciousness of objects that it can be the source of any ideal of knowledge to which that consciousness does not conform, and if in this way it transcends the empirical consciousness, it must be capable of transforming it.¹

From what has now been said it will be obvious that at each step in Kant's work, there is the possibility of a twofold interpretation of it. We may take it to be the aim of the critical regress to call attention to the elements presupposed in the determination of objects, though not explicitly present to us in our first consciousness of them; or, on the other hand, we may take its aim to be simply to determine objects as they really are, by abstracting from those elements in our first consciousness of them which hinder it from corresponding to the reality. On the latter interpretation, the removal of the subjective forms of perception and conception leaves us with the idea of a thing in itself, which can be determined by neither; and even this thing in itself is only the correlate of the consciousness of self, and we cannot regard it as more than a "problematical conception," which has no reality apart from consciousness. Thus, the thing in itself, as an object apart from consciousness, disappears altogether, and its place is taken by the idea of a problematical object corresponding to the unity of consciousness. On the former interpretation of Kant's critical process, on the other hand, the lesson of the Aesthetic and the Analytic is, that the individual object, which appears to the ordinary consciousness to be given as an isolated unit without any relations, or at least without any necessary relations, to other objects, must be conceived as a substance necessarily determined in all its states by relation to other substances in space and time. And the lesson of the Dialectic is, that this necessarily connected experience is still an inadequate knowledge of objects, till it has been reinterpreted in the light of the relation of all objects to the unity of the

¹ See above, p. 81 seq.: cf. also Vol. I. p. 599 seq.
self for which they are. Kant goes so far in this direction as to admit the necessity of viewing experience in the light of the Ideas of Reason, but the method of abstraction has such hold upon him, that he regards it as impossible that experience should ever be brought into conformity with these Ideas.

At the same time, though Kant thus ends the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the assertion of the impossibility of reconciling knowledge with thought, or of bringing experience into conformity with the ideal demand of reason, we must remember that this negative result is not for him final, but that it leaves room for a further development in the sphere of the *Practical Reason*. The ideal demand of reason is still regarded as keeping open a space beyond experience for an object or objects, which we cannot, indeed, determine as real, but the thought of which prevents us from assigning an absolute reality to the objects of experience. In thus keeping open a space for the noumenon or thing in itself, reason at least sets up a defence against the intrusion of empirical science into a region for which its methods are unsuited. It shows that the system of nature and necessity is not a closed system, and it also shows at what place in the circle the vacant place lies, through which we may escape into the region beyond it. More than this; it puts up a *ne plus ultra* just where natural science would pass beyond the objects of experience to deny God, Freedom and Immortality; in other words, from the claim of science to explain everything by its principles, it excepts just those objects in which our greatest practical interest lies. Hence, at least this much is gained, that the attack upon man’s higher religious and moral consciousness, upon that consciousness of himself, the world, and God, which underlies all his higher experiences, is for ever repelled. And, if that consciousness has any independent basis of its own, nothing that natural science can possibly discover will ever affect it, much less undermine or overthrow it. Nor does it matter that the moral or religious consciousness is unable to issue from its own stronghold to make a counter-attack upon its opponent, which remains equally strong in its own domain.
Looking at the matter in this way, we are able to see how Kant should lay such stress on the limitation of experience, and should regard the Antithetic of Reason as the bulwark of man’s moral and religious consciousness. That consciousness, in his view, is quite sufficiently strong in itself, if only the enemy cannot follow it into its own ground; and he has no hesitation in pointing out that the assertion and the denial of the truths of reason are equally incapable of proof in the sphere of science. “By the polemical use of pure reason I understand the defence of its principles against dogmatic negations of them. In such use we do not seek to show that these principles are themselves true, but only that no one can ever assert the opposite with apodictic certainty or even with a greater show of evidence. For, if this can be proved, there will be nothing precarious in our tenure of these principles, however insufficient our title to them, since we know for certain that no one can ever prove its illegality.”¹ In short, Kant’s doctrine is, that the Antithetic of Reason is due to the attempt to treat phenomena as things in themselves, i.e., the attempt to complete the synthesis of phenomena and to determine the phenomenal world as a whole, limited and bounded by itself. All, therefore, that Antithetic shows, is that phenomena, viewed as existing in themselves and so forming a closed circle, are self-contradictory. If, however, we avoid this error, and do not attempt to bring things in themselves into the sphere of phenomena, or stretch the sphere of phenomena so as to include things in themselves, the Antithetic disappears. Thus “if in Theology it could be asserted on grounds of reason that there is a Supreme Being, and at the same time there is not a Supreme Being; or if, in Psychology, it could be asserted that all beings that think have a unity which is absolutely permanent, and therefore distinct from every transitory material unity, and at the same time that the soul is not an immaterial unity, and therefore cannot be exempted from the transitoriness of things material; in such cases a real contradiction would arise. . . . In truth, however, reason has nothing to say on the negative side which could in the smallest degree

¹A. 739; B. 769.
authorise a dogmatic statement; and as to its criticism of the arguments which are urged on the positive side, we can very well admit the validity of such criticism without any surrender of the doctrines which they were intended to prove; for those doctrines have on their side an interest of reason to which those who controvert them cannot appeal.”

“I cannot indeed agree with the opinion, to which some excellent and thoughtful men, (as, e.g., Sulzer,) even while fully conscious of the weakness of all the arguments hitherto relied on, have often given expression, that we may hope some day to discover demonstrative proof of the two cardinal principles of pure reason, that there is a God and a future life; on the contrary, I am satisfied that nothing of the kind will ever be attained. For where could reason find a basis for synthetic judgments which do not refer to objects of experience and their inner possibility? But, on the other hand, it is apodictically certain that no man will ever be able to assert the opposite of these two doctrines, with the smallest degree of evidence, much less to demonstrate it. For, as such proof, if it could be found at all, must be found in pure reason, he who pretends to have discovered it must undertake to show that the existence of a Supreme Being, and also the existence of a thinking subject in us as a pure intelligence, is impossible. But whence could he derive the knowledge which would authorise him to make such synthetic judgments about things beyond all possible experience? We need not, therefore, disturb ourselves with the idea that any one will ever prove the opposite of those doctrines, or that we have need of regular scholastic proofs for their defence. Thus there is and can be nothing to prevent us from accepting principles which, while they are perfectly consistent with the speculative interest of our reason in its empirical use, are moreover the sole means whereby we can combine that use with the practical interests of the same reason. For the opponent (i.e., for him who not only criticises the proofs of those principles, but rejects the principles themselves), we have always ready our non liquet, which must infallibly put him out of court. And we need not mind his retort of the same argument upon ourselves, since we
have always in reserve a subjective maxim of reason, to which there is nothing corresponding on his side; and under its protection we can look upon all his beating of the air with composure and indifference."

The natural objection to such a view is, that there is little comfort in a mere negation. If, however, we quite realise Kant's position, we shall see that for him this negation is of the highest importance both speculatively and practically. Kant's *non liquet* is not meant merely to stop human reason from attempting to go beyond a limit which, for aught we know, may have nothing real lying beyond it. It is in his view a fixed bar, an absolute interdict, to science, which prohibits it from applying its principles to one great department of human existence, and thus leaves that department to be judged on its own merits and according to such principles as it supplies for itself. It protects the religious and moral life, not indeed from the danger of being considered illusory, but from the danger of being considered illusory on one special ground, viz., that it and its objects cannot be brought within the circle of ordinary experience and ordinary science, or determined by the categories that hold good there. Henceforth, no one is entitled on empirical principles to explain away any consciousness of ourselves which may arise when we regard ourselves, or which implies that we regard ourselves, not as objects among other objects in the world, but as subjects for which all such objects are. No one is entitled *a priori* to pronounce such consciousness illusory, because it is not explicable by our existence as an object in the natural world; or to insist on any Procrustean process by which it shall be forced to submit to such explanation. And as little can the ordinary tests of the reality of experience be applied to any consciousness of the world or of God that may arise in connexion with such consciousness of self. The fundamental principles of morality and religion are not to be taken at once as true; but, at least, they are inexpungable by such weapons. They cannot be assailed from the ground of empirical reality, for they are not based on the consciousness of empirical reality, but on a consciousness which arises only

\[1 \text{A. 741; B. 768.}\]
as we recognise the limitations of such reality, and its necessary relation to that which is not identical with it.

"Man, who knows all nature besides only through sense, knows himself not only so but also through pure apperception, and in acts and inner determinations which he cannot reckon among the impressions of sense. He is for himself a phenomenon; but he is also, in view of certain faculties, a purely intelligible object, since the action of such faculties in him cannot be attributed to the receptivity of sense. These faculties we call understanding and reason, the latter of which is properly and pre-eminently distinct from all empirically conditioned powers, as it estimates its objects solely according to Ideas and determines the understanding by these Ideas; while even the understanding itself in experience makes use of conceptions of its own, which, though applicable only to the matter of sense, are pure like the Ideas of reason." 1

We may put Kant's thought in the following way. Man has the consciousness of objects and of himself as an object among others, but this is not all; he has also a consciousness of himself in opposition to these objects in the analytic judgment of self-consciousness,—which implies the synthetic judgment, but is not identical with it. This analytic judgment is immediately connected with a demand of reason for a determination of the object, which cannot be realised by the understanding in combining the data of sense. For, it is just because the determination of the object does not conform to the unity of self-consciousness, which yet is implied in it, that an ideal of knowledge becomes opposed to our actual knowledge. Now, it would be absurd to suppose that the subject, whose self-consciousness is the source of an ideal to which the understanding in its determination of objects can never attain, should be regarded as itself falling under that determination. Experience is relative to it, but it is not limited to experience. Rather, in its consciousness of itself there is implied a reflexion which goes beyond experience, and to which experience cannot be adequate. Hence, any further development or manifestation of our rational life (beyond our theoretical consciousness of the Ideas of reason) in

1 A. 546; B. 574.
which such a self-consciousness—i.e., the consciousness of the subject-self as its own object—is implied, must be equally beyond determination by the categories, which are applied only to the objects of experience as such.

Now, in our practical life we have such a manifestation of reason. In the consciousness of ourselves as acting, the subject-self is made its own object, and that in a more explicit and definite way than in the consciousness of the Ideas of reason. Indeed, we can scarcely say that even in the consciousness of the Ideas of reason, the consciousness of the subject-self as an object is directly contained; though it is true that it is the discord of the objects of experience as such with the unity of the self, which causes us to regard them as phenomena and to refer them to noumena. It is, however, only a transcendental reflexion which shows this, and which brings into view the unity of the pure subject implied in all knowledge, as the source of the ideal which experience does not satisfy. But the practical consciousness, even apart from any such reflexion, is a consciousness of the subject-self, to which all objects are referred, determining itself as an object in relation to other objects. But the causality of the self-conscious ego, which is here implied, cannot be regarded as identical in character with the causality of phenomenal objects, which are determined as such objects only for this very self. In this case, it is not merely that I am conscious of my actual knowledge as falling short of my idea of knowledge, i.e., conscious of the objective world I know as not corresponding to the noumenal world which I think in conformity with the pure unity of self-consciousness. Here, the ideal object I think (i.e., the object which is thought as conforming to the pure unity of self-consciousness) becomes itself the principle to which I seek to bring the known world into conformity; in other words, it is set before me as an end I seek to realise. Here, therefore, we have the complement and completion of that negative movement of thought in relation to the phenomenal world which begins in the theoretical consciousness. What is implied in the theoretical, becomes explicit in the practical consciousness. In the theoretical consciousness, we are continually striving to determine the given world in conformity with the unity
of self-consciousness; but, just because it is a given world, we are never able to do so, but only to carry on an endless process of combining the data of sense by means of the categories. But in the practical consciousness, that ideal itself is the only thing that can be said to be given; it is given, moreover, only as it is one with the self to which it is given, or rather it is only that self viewed as an object or end to itself; and the known world other than this self becomes merely a material, to be altered in conformity with the idea which the self brings with it. The practical consciousness is thus, not the consciousness of the self as one object among others, which reacts as it is acted upon by them; but a consciousness of the subject for which all objects are, as acting in view of its own idea of itself, and determining itself as an object and other objects in conformity with that idea.

Is it true, then, that we have such a consciousness? Kant answers, yes. Such a consciousness of our own activity is directly involved in our consciousness of ourselves as responsible under the moral law. Now, this answer may easily be misunderstood, if we do not carefully notice its exact bearing. First, let us take the statement in the sequel of the passage just quoted. "That reason has causality, or at least that we represent it as having such causality, is clear from the imperatives which in all our practical life we set up as rules for our executive powers. The 'ought' (Sollen) expresses a kind of necessity, a kind of connexion of actions with their grounds or reasons, such as is to be found nowhere else in the whole natural world. For, of the natural world our understanding can know nothing except what is, what has been, or what will be. We cannot say that in it anything ought to be other than in fact it was, is, or will be. In fact, so long as we are considering merely the course of nature, the 'ought' has absolutely no meaning. We can as little inquire what ought to happen in nature, as we can inquire what properties a circle ought to have. In the former case, we are limited to the question what actually happens, just as, in the latter case, we are limited to the question what properties the figure in question actually has."

"Now this 'ought,' in fact, expresses a possible action
of which the ground is nothing but a conception; while of
an action which is a mere natural event the ground must
always be a phenomenon. It is true, indeed, that no action
can be required of us as a duty which is not possible under
natural conditions; but these natural conditions do not
relate to the determination of the will, but only to the effect
or consequence thereof in the phenomenal world. Let
there be ever so many natural grounds which urge me to
an act of will (Wollen), ever so many sensuous stimuli,
yet they cannot make an act one that ought to be (Sollen).
The will they can produce will have only a conditioned,
not an absolute necessity, against which reason opposes
the 'ought' as that which prescribes to it measure and end,
or even absolutely and authoritatively prohibits it. Be it
an object of mere sensuous desire (the pleasant), or be it an
object of pure reason (the good), what we have to note is,
that reason never yields to that ground which is empirically
given, that it never follows the order of things as they
present themselves in the phenomenal world, but with
perfect spontaneity creates for itself an order of its own
according to ideas, into which it fits the empiric conditions,
and according to which it declares actions to be necessary
which have not taken place, and which perhaps will never
take place. All these actions, therefore, without any
regard to the actual event, it presupposes that reason is
capable of realising; for if it did not do so, it would not
expect any effect of its ideas in the world of experience."

The full meaning of this statement we are not yet pre-
pared to explain; but one point is sufficiently clear, viz.,
that Kant directly connects the consciousness of our own
activity or self-determination with that consciousness of
Ideas of reason which enables us to limit the empirical
world and discover its phenomenal character. And we see
why he should do this, whenever we consider the relation
of the consciousness of Ideas to the consciousness of self.
For the consciousness of self, as I have already said, pre-
supposes, in Kant's view, the synthetic unity of experience,
but at the same time is negatively related to that unity;
and in this negative relation, it gives rise to the ideal of
knowledge which our actual knowledge cannot satisfy. As

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1A. 547; B. 575. The italics in the last sentence but one are mine.
such a consciousness, it involves that the self is not one object among others in the closed system of the pheno-
menal world; and therefore, if it be conceived as acting on that world, its determination to act will not be analogous
to the determination of one object by another. The prin-
ciple which determines it can be derived only from itself, i.e., from that ideal consciousness which is realised only
in the I I = of self-consciousness, and which can never be
realised in the empirical consciousness, i.e., the conscious-
ness of the objective world. Now, what Kant says is just
the converse of this, viz., that the consciousness of being
the origin of our own actions,—of actions by which we
determine the world,—comes to us along with, or as
involved in, the consciousness of an ideal order of that
world as determined by, or in accordance with, the
consciousness of self. Supposing we acted only as we were
acted on, we should be to ourselves like any other object we
observe; or we should not attribute our actions to the
self, any more than we attribute the process of digestion
to the self. We might indeed conceive of a necessarily
determined action of desire going on within us and
observed by us, as an object of inner sense; but we could
yet attribute such action to ourselves only in the sense that
we attribute to a roasting-jack the motions which it makes
after it has been wound up. It is the presence to us in
action of the self as an end, or, to express it more fully,
it is the presence to us as an end of an idea of the world as
determined by the consciousness of self, which alone can
make us attribute our actions to ourselves.\(^1\) While, there-
fore, the consciousness of the self as knowing, in relation
yet in opposition to the object known, is immediately
connected with the consciousness of an ideal which guides
our empirical synthesis, though it can never be realised by
it; the consciousness of the self as acting is immediately
connected with the consciousness of that ideal as a motive
of action. And as a motive of action the ideal is realisable
in the action itself, whether it can be realised in the world
to which the action refers or no.

On the connexion of the ideas of freedom and self-

\(^1\)The difficulty that according to this view only good actions seem to be possible
will be considered afterwards.
determination with the moral law, I shall speak more fully in the sequel. Here I wish only to point out where for Kant the ethical consciousness begins, and how it is related to the theoretical consciousness. This we can see clearly, only if we keep in view the way in which the consciousness of self is related to the consciousness of objects. The consciousness of objects is due, in Kant's view, to the determination of the forms and matter of sense by the understanding in conformity with the unity of the self, or, what is the same thing, with the possibility of self-consciousness. The consciousness of self arises in relation to the consciousness of objects, which implies their being all connected together in one world of experience; but it arises in distinction from the consciousness of that world. But, what makes possible the separation of self-consciousness from the consciousness of objects is, that the simple analytic unity of the conscious self as such contrasts with the essential difference of the world in space and time and gives rise to a demand which, in the determination of such a world can never be satisfied, though the demand itself is our stimulus and our guide in extending our knowledge of that world. In knowledge, therefore, we are always pursuing an ideal which the conditions necessarily prevent us from realising—the ideal, namely, of a unity of experience corresponding to the analytic unity of self-consciousness. The pure unity of the self, which is the presupposition of all consciousness of objects, thus turns, as it becomes conscious of itself, into an ideal which that consciousness cannot realise or find realised in the world, which it is continually seeking in the phenomenal, but can never find there. But perhaps we may say—though Kant does not say it in so many words—that just because reason cannot find its ideal realised in the world, it seeks to realise that ideal for itself. The formal or analytical unity of self-consciousness thus brings with it a motive to action, an ideal of reason by which it determines itself. In its practical use reason does not simply give rise to an idea to which, or by which, we may direct our empirical synthesis: it does not simply make a demand which it waits for experience to fulfil so far as it may. It makes a demand, in the first instance, only upon itself. Hence, it is in this
case free to develop its ideal without let or hindrance, and to represent to itself a world conformable thereto—a world organised in conformity with the unity of self-consciousness. And the question of the ideal being realisable, takes a very different aspect from that which it took in relation to the theoretical use of reason. For here, reason has primarily to do with itself; and to make the ideal realisable in the most important sense, all that is necessary is that it should be capable of being a motive of action. If we can determine ourselves to act by this ideal we have realised it, whatever may be the hindrances that prevent the effect of our action in the outward world. Such hindrances cannot come between us and our own action, however they may come between our action and the full result we seek to realise by it. Hence, the question of the possibility of the realisation of the ideal of reason in the objective world, is only a secondary question in practice, whereas in theory it must be regarded as of primary importance, if we are not to put mere ideal fictions in place of the facts of experience. "The use of pure reason in the practical sphere is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use of it... is transcendent... which is just the opposite relation to that which can be predicated of pure reason in its speculative use." 1 In other words, to speculate without regard to given experience, and guided only by Ideas of reason, is to build up a world of dreams; but to act in view of an end determined by such Ideas, though it is not, never has been, and perhaps never will be realised in experience, is to act in view of the one end which we can certainly realise, and for the attainment of which we are not dependent on anything but ourselves. Here, the truly practical man is the one who holds most firmly to the pure ideal, who lives most simply in view of the end which he necessarily prescribes to himself, and pays least attention to those who would bid him look to the teaching of experience. "For," as Kant says, "when we are dealing with nature, experience must be our rule, as it is the source of all true knowledge; but when we are dealing with morality, experience is, sad to say, the mother of illusion, and the thought is utterly to be reprobated that we should

1 R. VIII. 120; H. V. 16.
gather the laws for what we ought to do from that which is actually done, or limit the former to the latter.”

How far is this course of thought justifiable? We have already indicated where it fails in reference to the ideal of knowledge. It is true that the idea of self-consciousness contains in it the ideal of knowledge in virtue of which the consciousness of nature, as a closed system of necessarily related objects, is found wanting, and it is true that the defect is shown by the antinomies. The solution of these antinomies, however, is not to be found where Kant finds it, merely in the distinction of phenomena and things in themselves, which arises from the comparison of the unity of self-consciousness with the unity of the world of objects. It is to be found in the perception, on the one hand, of the relation of the world of objects to the unity of the self, and, on the other hand, of the way in which the consciousness of the self includes, while it transcends, the consciousness of the objective world. Kant, however, who takes the consciousness of self as purely analytic, and so negatively related to the consciousness of objects, (which yet he admits that it implies,) necessarily conceived self-consciousness as the source of an ideal to which experience remains asymptotically related; nor did he see that it was simply his own abstract opposition of the self to the object which made the ideal for him unreal. But when the synthesis involved in the “I am I” of self-consciousness was thus ignored, there could not but arise an absolute antagonism between consciousness of the self and consciousness of the object, and the solution of such antagonism could not but appear as a mere ideal. This, however, does not prevent the ideal from acquiring, in the Kantian theory of Knowledge, a significance which is quite inconsistent with the description of it as a mere formal unity of thought. Having once confused the judgment of self-consciousness with pure analysis, Kant did not find any difficulty in giving to the ideal derived from self-consciousness the characters of an intuitive understanding, i.e., of an objective consciousness in perfect unity with self-consciousness. Nor did he scruple further to interpret this consciousness as involving an idea of the

1 A. 319; B. 375.
world as a teleological whole or organic system, whose beginning and end is found in mind; though he no sooner states this idea than he immediately points out that it is a mere regulative conception, which can never become constitutive. How near he finally brings it to being constitutive we cannot see till we have considered the Critique of Judgment, which further develops the teleological conception by making reason as practical, i.e., as a self-determining principle, the ultimate unity to which we necessarily refer all the manifoldness of the world. Here, we are concerned only to notice how these various conceptions appear in the sphere of morals.

Starting, then, with the idea that the consciousness of self arises in the opposition of the subject to the object, and itself gives rise to an ideal which is not to be realised in the object, Kant is interested (1) to purify the moral consciousness from all empirical elements which can only determine it so far as it is not determined by itself, and (2) to develop the content of this pure ideal consciousness as affording a principle of complete determination for the self, which (3) involves that it should furnish a determination for the empirical consciousness and the empirical world. And the essential difficulty of his whole view of the moral life lies in the reconciliation of the first of these points with the third; of the negative movement of thought, by which the pure idea of the moral law is first reached, with the positive way in which its content is developed; and, finally, with the way in which it is conceived as determining the empirical consciousness and its objects. Various difficulties, particularly as to freedom and the Summum Bonum, will arise as we follow this movement through its various stages. And if we hold in principle to the criticisms already made upon Kant’s point of view, we shall have to consider how far Kant’s ideas can be accepted, and how far they must be remoulded when we reject his dualism, or reduce it to a relative dualism. It is clear that such a fundamental difference must affect our view of moral life at every step. For, at every step, we shall have to substitute the method that proceeds from the abstract to the concrete for that which proceeds from the concrete to the abstract. At the same time, we have always
to remember that this difference is really less important than it seems, owing to the way in which Kant confuses these two methods, and gives to the abstract and formal unity of thought a value to which strictly it is not entitled.

One further preliminary remark may be made as to the distinction of knowledge and faith, which Kant introduces in passing from the sphere of speculative to the sphere of practical reason. This distinction is apt to be misunderstood if we do not keep in mind that the most important point with Kant is not the assertion, taken by itself, that we know nothing but phenomena, and that things in themselves are unknowable, but the assertion that the moral consciousness and its objects do not come under the conditions of time and space, or under the law of necessity that holds good for all that is subjected to those conditions. To forget this would be to forget what was Kant’s object from the first, even from the period of the Dissertation, when he told Lambert that his aim was to remove sensuous-conditions from the objects of reason, in order to know them as they are.¹ It would be to forget that he sought to find the conditions of the knowledge actually attained in mathematical and physical science, with a view to determine the limits of the principles on which it was attained. It is true that one effect of this investigation was to reduce our consciousness of all objects that cannot be brought under those principles, to something which Kant will not call knowledge, because it wants the element of sensuous perception; but another effect was to show that such knowledge points beyond itself, or leads up to a region beyond itself, which is just the region occupied by the moral and religious consciousness. Call the thought that dwells in this region faith or knowledge, the important thing for Kant is that its rights are secured. On the other hand, that they are secured only for faith and not for knowledge, is due to the nature of Kant’s apparent method of abstraction, which, as we have seen, often conceals a movement of thought of a quite different kind. If, however, we make explicit that real movement from the abstract to the concrete, which in Kant is at least obscured, we shall arrive at the result that what he calls faith is not something less:

than what he means by knowledge, but something more. For knowledge, in the sense of physical science, is based on an abstraction which we transcend in referring objects to the conscious self; and by integrating the knowledge of objects with this new element we already win a higher knowledge of them, and not merely, as Kant supposes, a consciousness of the limitation of our previous knowledge. A further result is to show that the consciousness of self includes in it the consciousness of the object, to which at first in our earliest self-consciousness it appears to be opposed; and, therefore, to cast a new light upon the practical consciousness, in which the ego appears as determining the object. For a process of reflexion upon the practical consciousness, similar to that which we have applied already to the speculative, will lead us to recognise that our first view of the subject as externally determining the object is fallacious and that, as in our theoretical consciousness we are not simply taking in information about a world which is alien and external to the self, but really coming to a consciousness of the self in the object, so in our practical consciousness we are not simply forcing the self upon an external and alien world, but determining and developing the self in an element which is essentially related to it, and which, therefore, cannot resist it, except so far as that self is at war with itself. Thus, in the resistent world we only find our own divided nature and the struggle with circumstances is one with the struggle with self. The faith here set in opposition to knowledge can, therefore, only mean the correction of our first dualistic view of the relation of self and not-self. It will not be a mere escape of thought into a more abstract region where it cannot be followed by the understanding with its scales and weights: rather it is the correction and completion of the work of the understanding by the reason. Or, more simply, the whole view of man's life in which we take him as an individual reacting externally on other individuals, is necessarily transformed by the consideration that this individual is a self, and therefore not in a purely external relation to anything that affects him. And the result of this transformation, if it is the vindication of a moral and religious view of life, is not faith in any sense
in which faith is less than knowledge; but in the sense in which it is the culmination of knowledge.

To this, however, we must return at a further point of our inquiry, which must first deal with Kant's formulation of the moral law.
CHAPTER II

THE FORMULATION OF THE MORAL LAW

A great deal of criticism has been spent on Kant's view of the moral law, and especially on its formal or tautological character. It has been said that Kant's whole effort is an attempt to extract positive content from the merely negative idea of self-consistency, an attempt which is specially unfortunate for Kant as it directly traverses his own great distinction of analytic and synthetic judgments. How, it is asked, should the attempt to get difference out of bare identity, to "fertilise the barren understanding without the aid of experience," be more successful in the practical than in the speculative sphere? Does not Kant come directly under his own censures against the formal philosophy of Wolff, when he makes abstract thought generate its own determinations; and does not the whole process really involve an illicit introduction into the moral law of the very matter of desire, or of the very idea of happiness, which Kant intended and professed to exclude?

Now, that there is considerable ground for such censures it is not difficult to show, and any one who wishes to contrive an easy way of getting rid of Kant, may find much support for them in his language. But, after all, such criticisms are external, and do not quite hit the mark, because they do not disentangle the essence of Kant's thought from its form, or refute it on its own ground; which is the only kind of refutation worth giving. We can neither understand the value and depth of Kant's conception of the moral consciousness, nor the defective form in which he expressed it, if we do not trace how he
was led to put the case as he did. It would, indeed, be scarcely worth while to attempt such an investigation if it concerned Kant alone. But a little consideration enables us to see that we have in Kant's ethical works the final and most explicit expression of a view of the moral life which, in some form or other, has held the balance with Hedonism through the whole history of ethical philosophy. At all times we find the same charges of formalism and emptiness and inhumanity brought against that school of moralists of which the Stoics are the best known representatives; and we find them met by the same counter-charges against Hedonism, of degrading man's moral life by introducing sensuous motives, and subjecting the pure self-determination of reason to the externally determined movement of passion. Nominalism and Realism fight again here their apparently endless battle; and the mere particulars, unrelated and unorganised, are set against the abstract universal which determines nothing because it does not determine itself; or attempts are made on each side by compromise to heal the connatural wound of an abstract theory without admitting the claims of the opposite principle. In dealing with Kant, therefore, we are considering a vital opposition which has affected the whole history of Ethics, and in which, therefore, we may suppose each side to represent a real interest of the moral life. And it may be shown, further, that we are taking up the consideration of it at a stage at which the antagonism has reached its ultimate form, and therefore is on the way to be reconciled. For Kant, though he may be classed as belonging to one of the contending parties, though he expresses the negative view of the moral life in its relation to sense and passion in no hesitating terms, yet has continually present to him the necessity of a reconciliation, and he has put the case in behalf of his one-sided theory in such a way as to show conclusively at once all its strength and all its weakness.

In the Metaphysic of Ethics Kant takes his stand on the ordinary moral consciousness, and tries to find his way by analysis of it to the essential ideas of morals.¹ He points

¹It will be observed that there is a parallelism between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason, in so far as in the former Kant seeks for the conditions of possible experience, and in the latter for the conditions of
out that that consciousness really is based on the idea that there is nothing absolutely good except a good will. We do not call a man good because of the inward or outward advantages with which nature or fortune has enriched him, because of his talents or his wealth, or because of his firmness of resolution, his moderation or his self-command; for he may possess all these and use them for evil ends. Nor again do we call him good because of his power of realising any particular end, outside of himself, however important that end may be. On the contrary, we are ready to call him good because of his mere volition, even when, “through the special disfavour of fortune, or the grudging hand with which a step-motherly nature has bestowed her gifts,” his utmost efforts to realise that end are utterly ineffectual. It appears, therefore, that a man is called good merely because of his “good will” (by which, however, Kant warns us, is not meant a mere wish, but the putting forth of all the means in his power). What, however, we must ask, are the contents of this will to which such absolute value is attached? Kant endeavours to answer this question by analysing the idea of duty, “which involves the idea of a good will under certain limitations,” i.e., the limitations under which, as we shall presently find, it must express itself in a being such as man who is moved by sensuous desires. For these limitations do not really hide the nature of the good will, but rather set it off by contrast, and make its peculiar nature more prominent.

Now, in attempting to define the idea of duty, and to possible moral experience. But as morality is for Kant not that which is but that which ought to be, he cannot start with the actual achievement of men as moral beings, but only with the principle which is the motive and criterion of such achievement; not with the fact of man’s existence as a moral being, but with the “quasi-factum” of the moral law. The one-sided subjectivity of Kant’s conception of morals, therefore, prevents the transcendental deduction from being, as in the other case, an inquiry into the principles that make possible what is given as real, and Kant is reduced to what we might call an inquiry into the possibility of a possibility. And, as he points out, the moral law, instead of being itself deduced as a principle necessary to the possibility of an experience actually given, “becomes itself the principle for the deduction of the existence of an inscrutable faculty”—that of freedom. (R. VIII. 163; H. V. 50.)

Kant’s first business is, therefore, to purify the “quasi-factum” from which he starts from all elements that mingle with it and hide it from us in our actual experience.
mark it off even from what seems most like it, we may leave out of account all actions that are direct breaches of duty. We may also leave out cases where we do a right act which is opposed to one inclination in order to gratify another inclination; for it is easy in such a case to see that the right act has not been done because it was our duty. Thus it is the duty of the shopkeeper to deal fairly with his customers, and not to raise his prices when he has to do with inexperienced buyers. But for him honesty is so obviously the best policy, that we do not need to suppose the presence of high principle or of any special feeling of benevolence towards his customers, when he acts fairly and equally by them. More difficult is it to make a clear distinction of motives when duty and immediate inclination go together. It is our duty to preserve our lives. But the anxious care which most people give to their own preservation is not due to any sense of duty. It is only when misfortune and hopeless sorrow have taken the taste out of life so that death would be welcome, that there is a moral value in self-preservation. Again, benevolence is a duty. But there are many sympathetic souls who, without vanity or interest, are pleased to spread happiness around them; and in their case, right and pleasing as such conduct is, we cannot say that it has true moral worth, any more than we can attach such worth to the desire of honour, which often leads a man to actions that greatly benefit his neighbours. But suppose a man to be altogether without such a sympathetic temperament, or even to be constitutionally cold and indifferent in relation to the sorrows of his neighbours,—perhaps because he has a power of endurance which makes him indifferent to his own, so that he is rather inclined to presuppose and demand similar hardiness on the part of others,—and suppose such a man nevertheless, out of a sense of duty, to show himself practically benevolent, we should recognise in him a character of sterling worth, a will which not merely acts in accordance with duty, but which makes duty its motive. For the love of such an one for his neighbour would be 'practical' and not 'pathological' love, a love that implies a permanent direction of the will, and not a mere bias of inclination.
We may then lay down, in the first place, that an action has moral worth only in so far as duty is its motive as well as its content. To this we may add, in the second place, that the moral value of the action lies not in the objective result attained by it, but in the maxim or subjective principle of will which it manifests. For, as we have already seen, an act may fail of its aim or object without losing its moral character; and, on the other hand, it may attain any end you please, and yet, if the motive be not duty, it will have no moral value. It follows, then, that duty may be defined as "the necessity of an act as motivated solely by reverence for the law." Now, reverence is a feeling which cannot be felt for any object as the effect of a proposed action. For such an object I can have desire, but not reverence. Nor can I have reverence for any desire of my own or of any other person. “Only that which is united with my will as a ground of its self-determination to action, and never as an effect of such action, only that which does not serve my inclination, but outweighs it, or at least excludes it from all influence upon my decision, can be an object of reverence and therefore an imperative. But this means only the bare law taken by itself.” For, if I exclude every desire and object of desire, nothing is left to determine the will, but “objectively the law, and subjectively pure reverence for it, or, in other words, the maxim or rule laid down for myself to give effect to such a law, even to the thwarting of all my desires.” Thus, then, no expected effect can determine the moral worth of an action. For "every such effect, be it a pleasant state attained for oneself, or be it even the furtherance of the happiness of others, might be brought about by other agencies without needing the will of a rational being to produce it. And, as we have seen, it is the will alone in which the highest or unconditional good must be found. In nothing, therefore, can we recognise that surpassing good to which we apply the name of moral good, except only in the consciousness of the law in itself, (a consciousness which of course is possible only to rational beings) in so far as that consciousness, and not the expected effect, is the principle that determines the will. For that alone is a good which

1 R. VIII. 20; H. IV. 248.
is already present in the person who acts on such a motive, and does not need to be waited for as a result of his action."  

Here, as Kant contends, we have got down to the adamantine basis of the moral consciousness, which we can reach only by abstracting from the effects of action on the one hand and from the desire for such effects on the other, and by concentrating attention on the will as supplying a law, and in that law a principle of determination, for itself. But what law can the will supply when taken in this isolation? Obviously, Kant answers, there is here left nothing but the bare idea of law. "As I have deprived the will of all motives which might arise for it out of the following of any special law, there remains nothing but the universal accordance of the action with law to serve for a principle to actuate the will, i.e., I am required to act only in such a way that I can will that my maxim (or subjective principle of action) should become a universal law."  

In other words, the fitness of the maxim of an action for a place in a scheme of universal legislation is that which stamps it as a good action. This character in it is what forces me to instant reverence for it, or for the doer of it. It is true that the common consciousness does not state the matter to itself in this general way. Yet, by a little Socratic interrogation, we may easily show that this is the principle involved in all moral judgments. In this respect there is a great contrast between the speculative and the practical judgments of men in general. For if, in theoretical matters, we force the ordinary run of men beyond the range of immediate sense and experience, we find that they are absolutely at sea, the victims of every irrational whim or suggestion. But in practical matters it is different. There, if we can get them to abstract from their immediate sensuous motives, we find them developing a wonderful power of exact judgment. The use of philosophy in this sphere is therefore only to make explicit that "obscurely thought metaphysic which dwells with every man as a part of his rational capacity,"  

1 R. VIII. 21; H. IV. 249.
2 R. VIII. 22; H. IV. 250.
3 R. IX. 219; H. VII. 178.
to be brought to clear and full self-consciousness in order to defend itself against the sophistry of passion.

The above sketch of the argument of Kant in the first chapter of the *Metaphysic of Ethics* shows the method of abstraction, by which he reaches the conception of a determination of the will by itself apart from all motives of passion, as that which alone corresponds to the idea of moral self-determination. And we have to remember that will with Kant is simply reason in its practical aspect. Moral action is reason willing reason, reason acting on a motive derived entirely from itself, as opposed to action on a motive of passion, which as such necessarily comes to it from without. But, if this be true, if every motive of passion must be set aside, what is left? Nothing, it would seem, but the pure form of universality with which reason invests every matter that is brought into relation to it. Reason willing reason is reason making its own form its sole interest, irrespective of everything else.

This view is restated in the opening chapters of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The three "theorems" in relation to the practical principles of pure reason, with which that book commences, express the same thoughts, only with the additional qualification that all determination by objects is equivalent to determination by pleasure. The first theorem is, that "all practical principles which presuppose an object (a matter) of desire as a ground of determination for the will are empirical, and can yield no practical law." For, in order that the idea of an object should be a ground of action, it must please us, *i.e.*, it must affect our sensibility in a particular way. The rational being as such does not, therefore, determine an object as desirable, and so awake in himself a desire for it, but waits for the object to determine him from without. Now, when such a determination has taken place, and when once it has been experienced that a certain object produces pleasure, this may give rise in the individual to a maxim or rule of action; but, inasmuch as this maxim is based only on his subjective receptivity of pleasure and pain, it cannot have for him that objective necessity which is involved in the idea of a practical law. From this follows at once the second theorem, that "all *material* practical principles as
such are of one and the same kind, and fall under the universal principle of self-love or our own happiness."

For the pleasure in the consciousness of the existence of an object, which is implied in a material practical principle, can be felt only in so far as the object affects us and causes a pleasurable state in us. But happiness is just a continuity of such pleasurable state or states through all existence. All material practical principles, therefore, are of one kind. It is true that distinctions are often made between different kinds of desires, according to the different nature of the objects the ideas of which are bound up with pleasure and pain. In particular, the pleasurable states which have their origin in the understanding are often distinguished from the pleasures of sense, as an altogether different species. But for our purpose such a distinction has no relevancy. Pleasure in all its forms is simply a "conscio...
essential qualitative distinction between the most refined and the coarsest gratifications.

Now, every rational finite being must desire to be happy. And, as finite, he cannot find such happiness in himself alone, but must seek it without in the objects which he needs. What are the objects, however, that constitute this matter of desire, he can discover only by experience, as those objects act on his sensibility. It is impossible, therefore, that the mere desire of happiness can set before him a ground of determination which shall hold good objectively in all cases and for all rational beings. It is true, indeed, that the idea of happiness furnishes a kind of unity, under which all the different objects of desire may be brought; but it is in this point of view a mere "general title for all subjective motives of will," and does not yield any principle of determination which could give us the specific direction we require from a practical principle. Happiness is one thing for one and another thing for another, and it changes for the same subject with the changes of his feelings. Further, even if all finite rational beings thought alike in relation to the objects that give them pleasure and pain, this would be a mere accidental coincidence and could not carry with it the necessity of a law, which must be derived from a priori grounds. Or the necessity that we could find in actions as determined by such a law would be only physical and not practical, i.e., it would mean that the action is determined by desire in the same way as we yawn when we see others yawning.

From all this follows, then, the third Theorem, that "if a rational being is to think of his maxims as universal practical laws, he must think of them as principles which contain the determining ground of the will only as respects its form and not as respects its matter." For, if we think away the desires and their objects, we have nothing left but the mere form of the will, as the will of a rational being in which reason enacts or wills itself as reason. "When we separate from a law all its matter, i.e., every object of will which can determine it, nothing remains but the mere form of a universal legislation. Hence a

1 R. VIII. 134; H. V. 26.
Questions suggested by the Kantian view of the moral principle.

Distinction of the motive which arises from our consciousness of ourselves as subjects from the motives that arise from our nature as objects.

rational being cannot think of his subjective principles of action, i.e., his maxims, as at the same time constituting universal laws, unless he assumes that it is the mere form of these maxims, according to which they are fitted to be elements in a universal legislation, that by itself makes them into such practical laws." ¹

So far we have followed Kant very closely. But, before going further, it seems necessary to throw light upon the peculiar form of his exposition: first, in its negative aspect, as separating the moral consciousness from the consciousness of pleasure and pain, as well as of the objects that produce such states and of the desires which are all supposed immediately to spring from them; and, secondly, in its positive aspect, as identifying the moral consciousness with a consciousness of the form of law as a motive of action.

In regard to the former, we can appreciate Kant's whole mind on the subject only if we remember his view of the relation of the practical to the speculative consciousness. The Critique of Pure Reason showed us that objects are known to us as such in relation to the self, which, as a knowing subject, is not one of the objects known, but the unity to which as known they are all referred. This unity is to be distinguished from the physical and sensitive individuality of man, which is known like other objects in relation to that unity, though, unlike them, it is an object of inner as well as of outer sense. Now, if we regard man in this point of view as an object, we see that he has special susceptibilities of pleasure and pain on which other objects act, and which in their turn give rise to desires, whereby, if this were all, he would be fatally determined. If we could conceive such a being gifted with a reason which itself was the source of no motives, it might be able by aid of such reason to gather the objects of its desires under the general name of happiness, as the maintenance through life of that pleasurable state which is the ground and ultimate object of all desire. And with this, there would come a certain modification of the desires for special pleasures in view of the greatest quantity of pleasure. The elements in the whole thus

¹R. VIII. 136; H. V. 28.
conceived would, no doubt, be empirical, and hence nothing could be known of them except from experience; and the experience in question would be good only for the individual, and for the individual only at a particular time. The principle of happiness would afford no principle of unity to mark out the compass and articulation of a definite whole, so that every part might have its destined place. It would be merely a "general title" under which many particulars could be brought, or an indefinite aggregate of similar parts which have no essential relations, and which, therefore, form only a quantitative whole, *i.e.*, do not, properly speaking, form a whole at all. Viewing it as an end, we could not tell that any element was essential to it; and viewing action as means to its attainment, we could not say that any action would finally help or hinder it. In any case the influence of this "ideal of the imagination" ¹ would not be different in character from the influence of the desires of particular pleasures, though it might introduce some external restraint of one desire with a view to the gratification of another, or of all the desires with a view to a (doubtfully calculable) sum of gratifications. It is different, however, when we begin to consider that man to himself is not only a known object but a knowing subject, and that it is, indeed, only in this view that he can be called or call himself an "I." "I am conscious of myself—that is a thought which already involves a twofold ego, the ego as subject and the ego as object. How it is possible that I who think should be an object (of perception) to myself, and that thus I should be able to distinguish myself from myself, it is absolutely impossible to explain, though it is an undoubted fact; but it shows that there is in us a faculty raised so highly above the perceptions of sense that, as ground of the possibility of an understanding, it carries with it an absolute separation from all animals, to which we have no reason to attribute the power of saying "I" to themselves, and opens up the prospect of an infinity of self-made ideas and conceptions." ² If, however, we are able to say "I"

¹As opposed to the ideal of reason. (R. VIII. 44; H. IV. 267.)
²R. I. 500; H. VIII. 530.
of ourselves only as we are conscious subjects, and if the conscious subject is that to which all objects as such are referred, it becomes obvious that the determinations which affect us as sensitive beings, standing among the other objects in the world, cannot directly be regarded as determinations of the self. If we, as sensitive beings, fall under a law of such determination, the actions which we do in consequence will not be attributable to the ego, except in the sense in which we attribute to ourselves the processes that go on in our body, and of which our feelings make us aware. The conscious ego will stand out of the circle of such determination, and will not attribute it to itself. On the other hand, if we conceive ourselves, our ego, as determined by such affections as motives, or, in other words, if we conceive ourselves as active in view of them, it cannot be simply because we are conscious through inner sense that such stimuli affect our sensibility, and that they awake desires which impel us as sensuous beings to special actions, but because, in Kant’s language, we “take up such desires into our maxims,” or make them principles of action for ourselves. In other words, the ego must cease to be related to them as objects which it knows; it must make them what in themselves they are not, viz., motives of its own action, for we cannot suppose that the self, which determines them as objects, is determined by them as they are by each other. Adopting Kant’s premise, according to which we are conscious through inner sense of the stimulation of our own sensibility by which objects produce pain and pleasure in us, and of desires which arise in consequence,—just as we are conscious through outer sense of the facts of the external world,—it is obvious that something more is necessary before such desires can become for us motives or produce a determination of our will. It is necessary that we should combine these desires with the consciousness of the self. Or, to look at it from the other side, it is necessary that the self, for which the world is, should think of itself as realised in the satisfaction of the particular desires. Now, the possibility of this we are not yet concerned to explain, but merely the necessity of it, as involved in a practical consciousness of ourselves as deter-
mined by motives of desire. And for this it is sufficient to point out that, just as the consciousness of the self as knowing is the consciousness of the unity to which in knowledge all objects are referred, so the consciousness of the self as acting cannot simply be a consciousness of ourselves as objects, which react on their determination by other objects; nor can such reaction be referred to the subject self, unless that self by some further activity takes up into itself the determination, which primarily belongs to it only as an object. There is an element of obscurity here, due to Kant’s doctrine of inner sense, which requires further explanation. But, keeping for the present to the Kantian view, it is obvious that a consciousness of the self as active, even when its action is determined by motives of desire, cannot be accounted for directly by the stimulation of sensibility by objects and the consequent reaction of desire; for this would merely be a mere fact known to us about ourselves as objects, though it would be a fact present to us through inner sense. It would not constitute a determination of the will or of the conscious self for which objects are, except in so far as it was somehow taken up into the will of the conscious self, or made by it part of its own self-determination.

From this point of view, however, it is easy to see that such a taking up of desire into its maxims is a heteronomy of the will. In other words, the conscious self, in making an object of desire its object, is going beyond itself and determining itself by a motive got from without. The conscious self is, as it were, descending to the place of one of its own objects, or it is taking up into itself one particular as against another particular, and thereby renouncing its own universality. For, obviously and from the nature of the case, it cannot be thus brought down into the arena of conflict except by itself. Or, to put it less metaphorically, the subject for which all objects, including its own sensitive being, exist as objects, cannot be determined through the determination of the sensibility, without its own consent. And when it thus admits into its motives the determination of its sensitive being, it is submitting to a foreign yoke, and by its own activity making itself a slave. It is finding a motive in that which
is not itself, and, in so doing, it is not acting according to its nature as a self-conscious subject.

But this, again, suggests the inquiry how the ego can act according to its nature as a self-conscious subject, and even how, as a self-conscious subject, it can act at all; for action necessarily implies a descent into the particular, which seems to contradict its nature as universal, or an issuing forth of the subject as one object into the world of objects, which seems to contradict its nature as a subject. A further aspect of the same difficulty comes into view when we inquire how it is possible for it, when it thus comes forth, to take into itself a motive which is not derived from itself, but from the stimulation of the sensitive subject which it thus identifies with itself. In other words, we have the double question, how a self-consciousness can act by itself and with no motive but itself, and how it can act with any other motive.

Here we are concerned mainly with the first of these questions, viz., how a self-conscious subject, as such, can act, or how such a subject can derive a motive from its own being. Its very nature as a universal subject seems to involve the negation of any special interference by it in the world that exists for it, to all objects in which it is equally present, and from all objects from which it is equally distinguished. We may, indeed, say with Kant that, if it does so act, its motive to action must be independent of all the motives of desire; or, in other words, that its motive must not spring from the reaction of the sensitive subject on the other objects that affect it. But does not this rather lend support to Hume's doctrine that reason, as such, can never be a motive of action at all? And does not the Critique strengthen rather than weaken the position of Hume, when it lifts the conscious ego altogether out of the rank of objects, and gives it the place of the subject for which all objects are. Negatively we may easily grant to Kant that, if such a subject is to determine itself to act, it cannot be determined by any passion or object of passion; but is not this equivalent to saying that it cannot determine itself to act at all?

Kant, as we have seen, answers that the self may determine itself apart from all these motives, by the idea of
a universal legislation. In other words, the self can will itself as universal, and this, as against all particular desires, will constitute its determination of itself. The will of the universal, as against the will of the particular, appears as one particular against another, or rather as one particular against all other particulars. Now, this answer points to a truth, of which something will be said hereafter; but, in the direct and immediate sense of it, it seems to lie open to all the objections that have been alleged against Kant’s formalism. These objections have been most fully and forcibly stated by Hegel in an early essay of his on the scientific method of Jurisprudence.\footnote{Hegel’s \textit{Werke}, I. 313; cf. II. 304 seq.}

In that essay he argues, in the \textit{first} place, that out of the abstract idea of law, or, in other words, out of the idea of self-consistency, no particular rules or laws of action can be developed. Until some particular line of action has been suggested \textit{with} which we are to be consistent, we cannot say what self-consistency means. The abstract universal is barren: it does not differentiate itself. If it be true that in the sphere of theory the formal laws of identity and contradiction are merely negative criteria of truth, how can they acquire a different character in the sphere of practice? How can the bare idea of universality, in which we abstract from all particulars, enable us to reach any particular moral determination to the exclusion of all others? In truth, Kant does not attempt to show that it does so, but only that certain particulars (certain acts or courses of action) being suggested by desire, the principle enables us to determine that they are right, because capable of being universalised, while other particulars (other acts or courses of action) are wrong, because not so capable. But, if this be all, then the moral principle, which, \textit{ex hypothesi}, ought to be the sole motive of all action, cannot furnish in any case a complete motive; since it cannot of itself command us to do, or to refrain from doing, anything. If, however, we waive this objection, the difficulty returns in another form. For we have to ask, in the \textit{second} place, whether the formal principle of universality can furnish even a criterion, a means of testing rules of action otherwise suggested. Can we
regard it as a kind of touchstone which will at once determine what maxims of conduct are, and what are not, morally justifiable? Hegel maintains that it cannot, or, in other words, that reason, guided by the formal principle of universality, can as little select, as it can suggest, the particular rules of action. For, in one point of view, i.e., if we abstract from everything but itself, we can universalise any particular rule without contradiction; and Kant’s demonstration that, e.g., universal stealing is self-contradictory, involves a petitio principii. Universal stealing is indeed self-contradictory, but only because it presupposes that right of property which at the same time it denies.\(^1\) And in another point of view, i.e., when we

\(^1\) It may be argued that Kant in this case does not presuppose the right, but only the institution, of private property, as it actually exists in modern society, and that what he condemns by the aid of the principle of universality is not the denial of the rightfulness of that institution, but only special invasions of individual rights held under it. For a man does not steal from doubts as to the rightfulness of the institution of property; but, while admitting the rights of property in general, he seeks to set them aside in a particular case for his own individual advantage. And it may be said that it is just because of this that he is condemned by his own conscience, or, what is the same thing, by the idea of a universal legislation, which is the law written on every man’s heart. Now, there is a certain truth in this answer; for, beyond all controversy, the principle of morality is, and must be, a universal principle, and all action must be determined as right or wrong by reference to it. But to say this is not to admit Kant’s position that the mere formal principle of universality is of itself sufficient to enable us to select particular courses of action as right and to condemn others as wrong, or, in other words, to lay down particular rules of action as obligatory universally and without exception. If we are only able to say that whatever we will, we ought, as rational and therefore moral beings, to will universally, so that, e.g., if we acknowledge the right of private property at all, we must act in consistency with this acknowledgment in all cases,—then our moral system will be confined to the formal principle of universality, and we will not be able to develop out of it, or to connect with it, any particular rules of action whatever. But this obviously is not what Kant means. He always assumes that we can derive from the principle a system of particular rules, each of which has an absolute claim to our obedience. See especially his treatment of the question whether lying is ever justifiable, in the essay On a supposed right to tell lies from benevolent motives (R. VII. 295; H. VII. 305), where Kant argues that, if a man speaks nothing but the truth, he is not responsible for the consequences, but that if he tells a lie, whether from benevolent or any other motives, he at once makes himself answerable for every result of his falsehood, however unforeseen. In other words, Kant bids us treat this particular rule as if it were absolute, and, in obeying it, he thinks we should set aside as irrelevant all reference to any other laws or ends. In this sense we are to obey the moral law blindly in the spirit demanded by the prophet Samuel, and to think that “to obey is better than sacrifice, to hearken than the fat of rams.” Thus
regard the particular rules of action in the concrete, and therefore in their relations to each other, we find that we can universalise no such rule without contradiction. The universal principle of morality, indeed, must be capable of manifesting itself in the particular, and thus it must give rise to many special rules of action. But no such rule can ever be treated as if it were identical with the universal principle itself. Now, Kant’s way of connecting the principle with the particular rules of morality seems to involve that each such rule should be treated as in itself universal, as an absolute law which may not on any occasion be set aside. But the abstract moral rigour, which thus upholds all the particular rules of morality as absolute, necessarily leads to all the difficulties of Casuistry. For, in morality, as in the world, there can only be one Absolute. Treated as universal and without exception, even two such commands as, e.g., ‘Thou shalt not steal,’ and ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ must ultimately come into collision with each other; for, if all other interests are to be postponed to the maintenance of the rights of property, it is impossible that all other interests should also be postponed to the preservation of human life. To make either property or life an absolute end is to raise a particular into a universal, to treat a part as if it were the whole. But the true moral vindication of each particular interest cannot be found in elevating it into something universal and absolute, but only in determining its place in relation to the others in a complete system of morality. And in such a system there cannot be an absolute subordination of any one interest to another, but rather the different interests must alternately give place to each other. As in the physical organism each member in its turn is elevated into an end, and again in its turn reduced into a means to the other members, so in the moral organism, property, life, freedom, the welfare of

Kant not only holds that a moral act must be the expression of a universal principle, but that that principle is purely formal, and that, in spite of its formal character, we can deduce from it a number of particular rules, each of which has the absolute authority of the principle itself, and is, therefore, to be obeyed without regard to consequences. Against the idea of such an almost mechanical [blindgesetzlich] obedience to the particular rules of morality Jacobi raised a remarkable protest, to which reference will be made in the sequel.
the individual, and of the family, must each in its turn become an end of the one moral life which manifests itself in them all, and each in its turn must be reduced into a means to the rest. And a command to treat any one of these as an absolute end, without respect to the others, would deprive of all its meaning even the interest which it protected, by isolating it from the whole to which it essentially belongs: as, to use Aristotle’s metaphor, a hand torn from the body ceases to be truly a hand. A morality which consisted of a number of such commands would be a ‘thing of shreds and patches,’ a collection of unrelated and inconsistent elements. Kant, however, just because he takes as the universal principle of morality the merely formal principle of self-consistency, is obliged to conceive each of the moral rules as an absolute law; for the formal principle cannot be used to determine the relations of different rules which express the different interests in the moral life; but if it admits a particular rule as having any kind of obligation, it must consecrate it as an absolute law.¹

If we hold Kant strictly to the formal principle of self-consistency as the one criterion of all the maxims of action, the argument of Hegel which we have thus summarised would be more than is necessary to refute him. But such a refutation leaves out of account many statements of Kant which give a different aspect to his theory, and it does not explain the reasons which led him to adopt it. Above all, it has the fatal defect that it does not disentangle the truth hid under the inadequate statements which it attacks.

To do this we must first remember that Kant’s formal view of the moral law springs out of, or at least is directly connected with, the idea of the self as furnishing to itself its own motives to action. For reason, with Kant, is self-consciousness; and that pure reason should be practical, means that the consciousness of the self should supply the motive by which the self is determined. The formalism that appears in Kant’s view of the moral law is the

¹Cf. above, p. 61. We shall return to some of these points in the sequel. Here they are mentioned only to show the strength of the case which can be made out against Kant’s theory on the narrowest interpretation of it.
counterpart of the formalism of his view of self-consciousness, which, as he often tells us, is a pure analytic unity. We are, therefore, at liberty, from Kant's point of view, to translate self-consistency into consistency with the self: and though this, in one aspect of it, widens our conception of his error, yet, on the other hand, it makes that error intelligible and points us to the truth which underlies it. And, when we recollect that it is the unity of the consciousness of self which, in its opposition to the consciousness of objects, gives rise to the ideas of reason in view of which these objects are determined as phenomenal, we may more easily understand how it should at the same time give rise to the idea of an end by which the self can determine itself in action. To explain this fully, however, will require a somewhat lengthened statement.

In the first place, then, we must recall what was stated in the last chapter as to the relation of the speculative to the practical consciousness. According to Kant, the consciousness of self is implied in, but negatively related to, the consciousness of objects. The activity of the thinking self in knowledge, therefore, shows itself not only in the determination of an objective world in space and time by the categories of the understanding, but also in the reference of that world to an Idea to which it is not adequate. But this Idea, in its ultimate expression, is the Idea of a world determined in accordance with the pure unity of the self, or as a necessary element in its consciousness of itself. It is in such a world alone that the self could find its counterpart; in other words, it is in it only that it could find itself, or an end commensurate with itself. Now, this ideal guides and stimulates us in extending our experience of the phenomenal world, but can never enable us to reach an experience adequate to itself. And this means that in the phenomenal world we can never find the self realised. But, if we cannot find it realised, can we not ourselves realise it? Objectively we cannot, because then we must necessarily be able to find it realised (by ourselves) in the object, which we have seen to be impossible. But, subjectively, nothing prevents us from making its realisation our motive or end, i.e., from setting it before us as our aim to bring the world into accordance
with the pattern of self-consciousness, or rather with the
pattern of a world conformed to self-consciousness. We
therefore, in this region (according to a passage already
quoted) may refuse "to follow the order of things as they
present themselves in the phenomenal world," and we
may "make for ourselves with complete spontaneity an
order of our own according to Ideas into which we then
fit all empirical conditions," 1 and this ideal world may
be that in view of which we act. Thus we conceive of
"a special kind of systematic unity," 2 we have the Idea
of a world as it should be, i.e., a world which has with
itself the perfect unity of self-consciousness, and in realis-
ing which, therefore, the self-conscious being would simply
be realising himself. This gives us an ideal into which
we have to "fit the empirical conditions," and, above all,
into which we have to fit our own existence as particular
sensitive beings. This we can do only in so far as we
bring that sensitive being into accord with the idea of the
intelligible world, i.e., cease to aim at the realisation or
satisfaction of our own particular self, except so far as it
is determined in its whole existence and activity by that
Idea. In this way the Idea of an intelligible world will
become the end in view of which we determine ourselves
as objects in the empirical world, and the impulses of the
sensitive self will be allowed to determine us, only as they
are coincident with the realisation of the universal self in
a world that is its necessary counterpart.

From this point of view, the first step in the moral life
is to abstract from the immediate motives of desire. For,
in so far as we are determined by these as motives derived
from our particular sensitive being, we are not determined
by the Idea of a world in which each particular has a
place only through its accordance with the pure principle
of self-consciousness. And moral action involves that the
purpose of realising this pure principle should substitute
itself for all the motives of the sensitive life. From this
point of view, we can see how Kant should declare that
no material practical principles, i.e., no principles which
have reference to real objects of experience as such, and
to the desires that arise in consequence of the pleasurable

1A. 548; B. 576.  2A. 807; B. 835.
or painful affection of our sensibility by them, can be regarded as other than principles of self-love. In so far as we are actuated simply by such principles, we are not acting as moral beings; for we are determined by the idea of the world as it is, and not of the world as it ought to be. In order that action on such motives may be determined as *objectively* right, it must be brought to the standard of our idea of the world as it ought to be; and in order that it may be determined as *subjectively* right, this idea must substitute itself as a motive for all other motives.

Before, however, we can understand the way in which Kant expresses this thought, we need further to remember that the idea of the world as it ought to be, *i.e.*, the idea of a world which should be the counterpart of the unity of self-consciousness, is one which we cannot schematise or "envisage." The conception of such a world arises out of the opposition between self-consciousness and the world in space and time, *i.e.*, out of the impossibility of determining the world in space and time in harmony with the consciousness of self. To picture a world in space and time, as determined in accordance with such an ideal, is an impossibility. Yet, when we represent the moral end *objectively*, we have no other way of giving definiteness to it than by thinking of the world in space and time as determined by it. We can represent the intelligible world only as a natural world determined in conformity with the pure unity of reason; and we can image to ourselves the realisation of moral laws only by thinking of them as becoming laws of nature. Hence, one of the formulae which Kant uses to express the moral law is this: "Act as if the maxim of your action were by your willing it to be turned into a universal law of nature." A nature ruled by moral laws is a "type," *i.e.*, a substitute for the impossible schema, of the realised moral ideal. At the same time we are always to remember that it is not a true schema, but an objective *envisagement* of what cannot be objectively *known*. The nature of the sensible world is used here as a "type of an intelligible nature," not as though moral laws could be realised in the natural world as such, but because it is only in this
way that we can represent them as realised at all. And this will not be misleading, so long as we keep in view that the important thing is the principle in accordance with which action is to be regulated, but not the definite picture of a nature modified in conformity with it. For a nature which is at the same time an intelligible world, is an impossibility; and though the conscious subject may give body to the conception of the moral law by which he determines himself, by conceiving it as realised in nature,—and indeed can give body to it in no other way,—yet it is the law as flowing from the principle of self-consciousness which must determine him, and not the conception of an objective world in which it is realised; for this latter conception can never be more than an inadequate picture under conditions of space and time of that which is not capable of being brought under such conditions. Hence, Kant insists that in determining the good as the object of a good will, we must always base the determination of the object to be realised upon the idea of the law which commands us to act in a certain way, and not the idea of the law upon the conception of the object which is to be realised. And as he does not consider that the moral end is ever adequately represented as an object, so he cannot admit that love of such an object ought ever to become our principle of determination in place of the law. It is Schwärmerie, an enthusiasm born of self-deception, which substitutes an ideal object, determined in all the colours of an individual reality, for the moral imperative; and which thereby changes the moral temper from reverent awe to love.¹ Such love is not the

¹ The above is a paraphrase of the section on the Typic of Pure Practical Reason. (R. VIII. 189; H. V. 71.) In this chapter is contained Kant's solution of the difficulty of conceiving the bare law as itself the motive of action. For, as Green says, "action according to laws presupposes a consciousness of ends to be attained in conformity with those laws," and we cannot act except in view of some result to be realised by our action. But, in declaring the law itself to be the only purely moral motive, Kant seeks to free moral action from all the determinations which we necessarily introduce into it, when we regard its end as an end to be realised in the phenomenal world, or even in the phenomenal self. At the same time, he sees the imposibility of our setting the moral end before us in any other way; and he tries to reconcile these opposite requirements, the necessity of purity in the motive and the necessity of representing it as an end to be realised, by the idea of a type,
fulfilling of the law; rather, under the appearance of lifting us above that fear which is the beginning of wisdom, and which we feel for that which is irrevocably above us, it really reduces the moral end into an object capable of being empirically known, and lowers our will to realise it to the level of a sensuous desire, a desire which cannot be other than a form of self-love.

We see, then, how Kant is led, on the one hand, to represent moral action as involving the ideal construction of a world in conformity with the unity of the self, as the objective end which the moral law calls upon us to endeavour to realise; and yet, on the other hand, to maintain that the moral motive cannot lie in such a world, as an objective result to be aimed at, but solely in the principle, whose realisation we thus inadequately envisage. In the former point of view Kant speaks of the moral idea as “the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends,” 1 and as giving rise to “principles of the possibility of experience, i.e., of actions agreeable to moral laws which might be found realised in the history of man.” 2 In other words, while our empirically given desires have their place as determining our relations as objects to other objects in the world of experience, our consciousness of ourselves as subjects gives rise to an idea of an intelligible world conformable to itself. We, therefore, combine together all the ends of the particular desires in a new order, which is determined by the one end of self-realisation—the realisation of the self being, of course, one with the realisation of a world conformable to it. But, on the other hand, the desires which form the material brought under this principle are not manifestations of it, but only of our natural sensibility; and therefore the determination of them by the principle can only mean the limitation of their gratification to conditions in which they do not conflict with it; and their gratification under those conditions cannot be the pure realisation of the principle itself. Yet, unless the principle be realised purely and for itself, the moral end will not be attained. We can escape the which does not pretend to be a schema. Imagination is thus to be made to serve the moral idea without being allowed to compromise it.

1 A. 328; B. 384.  2 A. 807; B. 835.
necessary inference of the impossibility of realising the moral end in relation to such a material, only by observing that, while we can represent the intelligible world, which is the realisation of the moral idea, only under the image of a natural world determined by that idea, this representation contains an element which is fictitious; for the moral idea arises in connexion with a consciousness of self which is negatively related to the consciousness of the natural world, and its realisation cannot be adequately represented under the forms of that consciousness.

From this point of view, we are prepared to disentangle the truth from the error in Kant’s ethical conceptions. We shall not object to Kant’s view of the moral consciousness as a consciousness of the intelligible world, which we oppose to the natural world as that which ought to be to that which is, and, again, as a consciousness of an end and a law, which is not the end or law of mere natural impulses as such. The permanent value of Kant’s Ethics (as of the Stoic Ethics) consists mainly in the firmness with which he grasps the essential antagonism of spirit and nature in the moral life; though it may be also true that its weakness consists in its exclusive attention to that antagonism: an antagonism cannot be made absolute without losing its meaning. We have now to consider, therefore, how it is possible to retain the relative truth of this view, while connecting it with the complementary truth to which Kant has opposed it. As a first step towards this it may be observed that, as we have attempted to show in the last chapter, the defect of Kant’s view is simply a continuation of the error of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which self-consciousness is reached by abstraction from that consciousness of the world of objects which yet is presupposed in it; or of the error which is the counterpart of that, according to which the known object has an element in it which is not related to the thought that determines it. For if, in the Critique of Pure Reason, such a view of self-consciousness leads to the conclusion that in the phenomenal world we cannot find a reality in conformity with our idea of reality; in the Critique of Practical Reason, it must lead to the con-
clusion that no determination of the world by the activity of the self can make it so conformable. And the same principles, by which in the former case we endeavoured to separate the truth from the error contained in Kant's view of knowledge, must guide us in the latter case in seeking to separate the truth from the error contained in his view of moral action.

The Critique of Pure Reason is in its essence a correction of our natural view of the object as indifferent to the self that knows it, and it is defective only in that it still maintains so much of the natural dualism which it opposed. Kant sought to prove that the object we know is a phenomenon, i.e., an object relative to the self that knows it, and that the same is true of the self as object. But, in each of these cases, the object is "made but not created by the understanding," i.e., it is constructed by the ego out of data of sense according to the categories. Hence, it is impossible to regard the determination of the phenomenal self by other objects as equivalent to a determination of the ego as a subject by these objects, any more than it is possible to regard the reaction of the phenomenal self upon other objects as a self-determination of the ego, the pure subject. But, in our first conception of our own practical life, this is just what we suppose. We take the subject as simply an individual object among other objects, which is acted upon by them, and which reacts upon them according to certain impulses and desires, in conformity with which it seeks to determine them. Now, as in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant taught us partially to correct our ideas of objects as existing independently of the self for which they are, and presenting themselves to it in a process in which it is entirely passive, so here he seeks to correct our first idea of the action of the self upon objects as simply the reaction of the phenomenal subject, and not as the self-determination of the subject for which all objects are. And as, in the former case, he stops short of the result of this criticism, in so far as he still supposes that there is an element in the object which is not relative to the self, so here he supposes that there is a given element of desire, in virtue of which the reaction of the phenomenal subject remains
His partial rejection of dualism in both.

We find, then, that Kant is still following out the same kind of critical correction of our immediate dualistic consciousness of the world which he had already exemplified in the Critique of Pure Reason, but with the same kind of recoil against the complete evolution of his thought which characterised his reasonings there. The strong point in the Critique of Pure Reason was the proof of the relativity of object to subject; its weak point, its regarding self-consciousness as only negatively related to the consciousness of the object, and therefore as only making us set up an unattainable ideal for it, but not furnishing a positive principle for its interpretation. In like manner, the strong point of the Critique of Practical Reason is its view of the ego as expressing itself in the determination of the self as object, and through it of the objective world generally; its weakness is its conception of this determination as negative rather than positive, and hence as incapable of realising the goal which it sets before itself. To see the defects of Kant’s theory we have, therefore, as in the case of the Critique of Pure Reason, to follow him to the point where he stops, and to show how inevitable it is that those who adopt his principles, should advance beyond his results.

Our first consciousness of self, or, as we may call it, the sensuous self-consciousness, is a consciousness of ourselves as objects among other objects, reacting upon them according to the way in which they affect our sensibility as pleasant or painful. It is a consciousness in which the self as universal subject is not distinguished in any way from the self as an individual object; and, therefore, the immediate impulse of the sensitive being as such seems to be taken up without change into the will. There is no apparent or conscious change of the desires owing to the reference of them to a self which is, as a conscious subject, the correlate of all objects and not simply identified with any one object. Self-consciousness seems, from this point of view, to take into itself the content of a sensitive individuality without making it other than it was as such content. But it is obvious, from the
transcendental point of view, that this conception, according to which the consciousness of self is simply filled with a content which it leaves unchanged and to which it adds nothing, is inadequate and misleading. A conscious subject cannot take into itself any particular content which it does not distinguish from itself as such subject, and which again it does not connect with all the other content present to it in its objects. Thus, the self as subject, in being conscious of the desires that belong to its individual sensibility as desires that determine it as one object among others, necessarily separates itself from those desires and from itself as such an object. In other words, while it determines itself as one object among others it by that very fact ceases to be simply one object among others. In the consciousness of my desires as particular impulses which determine me as an object in relation to other objects, there is, therefore, a separation of my will from such desires; and as a consequence, a necessity for distinguishing between the simple feeling of pleasure, which comes of the satisfaction of such desires, and the consciousness that I am satisfied. In this way, transcendental reflection forces us to recognise that the conscious self as such is not in immediate identity with the natural impulses; and therefore that its yielding itself to them is always an act of self-determination. It shows us, further, that when by such self-determination the subject makes a particular object of desire its end, it gives to that object a form to which it is not adequate. For in a particular object as such, I, as universal subject, cannot be realised, and the satisfaction I get from it as an individual, is therefore mingled with dissatisfaction. Now, it is here that we find the secret of that moral division of our will against itself, which begins in the disappointment that follows the attainment of the immediate objects of desire, and develops into the consciousness of an irreconcilable discord between flesh and spirit. This discord of the universal form of reason with a content derived from the particular passions is the essential element of the truth which is contained in all ascetic systems of ethics. Such systems have their value, or at least their main value, in giving distinct expression to the idea that self-conscious-
ness, as determined by the ends of particular desires, is at variance with itself; or that the 'law of the mind' is essentially opposed to a 'law in the members.' It is, however, always to be remembered that the discord or division to which these philosophies give exclusive and one-sided expression, is implied in every consciousness which an individual can have of himself as identified with any end beyond his own sensuous individuality. For, in every such consciousness there is a more or less distinctly perceived antagonism between the immediate gratification of impulse and the realisation of the self, and so, between that which men feel inclined to do and that which they conceive they ought to do. What ascetic systems do, is to sharpen the antagonism to a point at which reason appears as just the negative of passion. So, with the Stoics, passion is said to be unnatural, i.e., it is treated as a mere foreign intruder into the man, who is essentially, in his own "nature," reason. Passion, therefore, has to be absolutely expelled, that reason may be one with itself and may determine itself by its own law and end. Kant has in common with these systems the idea of the moral law as absolutely excluding from its motives the operation of natural desire, which according to him is essentially desire for pleasure and for objects as means of pleasure; and he has in common with them also the idea of a pure self-determination of reason as the only true source of moral action; though he attempts to reintroduce the desires and their objects, as a matter to which the form of pure self-determination can be applied.

What, however, we have here to note is that, as, in the Critique of Pure Reason, pure self-consciousness appears as negatively related to the consciousness of objects, and so as giving rise to an ideal of reason which that consciousness cannot realise, so, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the moral law, the law of action which the self determines for itself, is conceived as a principle which cannot possibly be connected with the idea of any objective good to be attained. For it is argued that an objective good would involve, in the first place, the conformity of the immediate subjective individuality to a law which is present to us only as we abstract from that individuality;
and, secondly, it would involve the determination by reason of an objective world which never can be completely harmonised with the idea of reason. It appears, therefore, as if determination by self were only determination by the conscious subject as opposed to all objects and even to its own sensuous individuality. But thus, the pure law of reason becomes an abstract universal, i.e., a universal opposed to any and every particular which could be brought under it. As, however, it is only as related to the particular that the universal has any meaning, the attempt to find a content for it within itself must end in depriving it of all content. From this point of view, we see that the Kantian Ethics has the congenital fault of all merely negative systems, which forget that a negative implies a positive, and that, if we attempt to treat a negative relation as negative only, we make it cease to be a relation at all, or, indeed, to be anything.

This gulf of nothingness Kant partially escapes by the way of "Ideas." As in the Critique of Pure Reason, he makes the analytic Judgment of self-consciousness yield us an idea of the world as a teleologically determined whole, which yet has to remain a mere regulative idea, i.e., an idea which is of use to guide us in scientific investigation yet can never be realised or verified by such investigation; so in the Critique of Practical Reason, he makes it yield the idea of a kingdom of ends—an organically determined society, in which all rational beings are members and all things are determined as means to the realisation of the rational life. But this idea also is merely regulative; for such a social unity is an ideal which can never be realised in the objective world, or, as we should rather put it, can never be known as so realised, however we may determine our will by it. Our determination of the will by it must, therefore, be regarded as morally good, not because it is a means to such realisation, but because of what it is in itself. Our consciousness of the moral ideal is a consciousness of the world which we attain by using the natural world as a type of the intelligible world; but in so using it we must always remember the liberty we are taking; for, in truth, the intelligible world is present to us only
as we abstract from the natural world. The type is the necessary projection of the law of action of a self, derived from its own nature, in virtue of which it is represented as an objective end of action; but, as such projection can be accomplished only by using the material supplied by the world of nature, it must not be taken as a true determination of the end or result which such action can achieve. In short, we have no perception which could realise for us such an idea; and we are obliged to supply its place by the use of perceptions which are necessarily inadequate to it; a procedure which will not lead to mistake, so long as we remember that the point of agreement between the two worlds, which makes it possible to use the one as type of the other, is that both are systems under universal laws, and that it is this point solely to which we have to attend in thinking of the idea of a kingdom of ends as the object or end to be realised by the will.

When, therefore, we get rid of all this surplusage, the idea of a kingdom of ends sinks into the abstract idea of a system under universal laws, i.e., into the mere form of a universal legislation, and it is by this form alone that a self can be motivated to action when it is motivated by itself.

When we have got thus far, we begin to see that the difficulties of Kant's ethics arise from the negative movement, in which the law of the mind is opposed to the law of the members, being carried so far that the positive movement of determination of the latter by the former becomes impossible. The moral life is essentially the reconstitution of the natural life through its negation; and, therefore, asceticism, or a movement in which the ascetic idea is involved, may fairly be said to be the beginning of morality. When, however, this negation is conceived absolutely, the positive reconstitution of the natural life in any form becomes impossible. It may, however, throw light on this impossibility, if we observe that it is not only the positive movement of ethics which is thus made impossible; the negative movement also is itself deprived of all meaning by being made an absolute negation, which, in breaking all connexion with that which

1 R. VIII. 193; H. V. 74.
is negated, leaves the principle reached by such negative process quite indeterminate.

When we see the emptiness of a negation which is absolute, we begin to understand how it is possible to do justice to the negative aspect of morals without losing the positive. We have only to consider how it is that negative morality arises. It arises from the fact that the form of self-consciousness is at variance with the matter which in its earliest stage of development it receives into itself, and that the progress of the moral consciousness is the transformation of that matter, the negation and the reconstitution of it. Man as a 'natural spirit,' or spirit in a natural form, is in contradiction with himself. The waking of self-consciousness is the distinction of himself from his own natural individuality, and carries with it the consciousness of a good or end in which not only the desires but the self shall be satisfied; or, rather, it brings the satisfaction of desires under the form of a satisfaction of the self. Ascetic systems arise when these two elements are distinguished and opposed to each other. But, when they are so opposed, two things are apt to be forgotten, viz., that it is in relation to, if in distinction from, the determination by desire and its objects, that the very idea of determination by the self ever arises; and that the self, whose law of determination is thus opposed to determination by the particular desires, has itself no content but these desires. Kant, however, could suppose that it had: for, as he conceived self-consciousness, though only an analytic unity, in its theoretical aspect, to give rise to Ideas which enable us to direct and limit our knowledge of objects, though not to transform it; so, in its practical aspect, he could conceive it to give rise to an "Idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends," in view of which we can combine our motives of action in the phenomenal world into a system (which, however, in the phenomenal world is not capable of realisation). Now, in relation to the theoretical consciousness we were led to point out that, if we assume that self-consciousness is purely analytic, we cannot make it the source of any Ideas of noumena with which phenomenal objects may be contrasted; and if we hold it to be not merely analytic, but capable of producing

This exaggeration may be explained by the way in which the moral consciousness develops.

The opposition must be conceived as relative.
such Ideas, we cannot confine it to the production of Ideas, but must regard it as capable of transforming our consciousness of phenomenal objects. And a similar line of reasoning may be followed out in relation to the practical consciousness. For, if self-consciousness be taken as purely analytic, the only idea which we can get from it will be the idea of abstract universality, and the only criterion of moral acts will be the self-consistency of their maxims as universalised. On the other hand, if we take self-consciousness as a synthetic principle, a principle which gives rise to an ideal or law of conduct, then we must conceive it as capable by means of that ideal, not only of lifting us beyond the immediate determination of our individuality by desire in relation to the objects of experience, but also of reconstituting desire, and making its satisfaction in empirical objects one with the realisation of the self. Now, our criticism of Kant’s view of the theoretical consciousness led us to recognise, not only that the consciousness of objects is determined in conformity with the possibility of self-consciousness, and that self-consciousness is possible only in relation to the consciousness of objects, but, further, that self-consciousness includes, while it transcends, the consciousness of objects, and therefore enables us to give a new interpretation to that consciousness. We were, therefore, obliged to dispute Kant’s assertion that the ideal of knowledge to which self-consciousness gives rise, is one which is incapable of being realised. Here, in like manner, we have to correct Kant’s view of the practical consciousness, by pointing out that, though the consciousness of self as active is distinguished from, or opposed to, the consciousness of its determination by particular desires, it implies that consciousness. If, therefore, it gives rise to the idea of an end different from the objects of the desires, yet that end cannot be one incommensurable with those objects or altogether inconsistent with their attainment. In fact, the end of self-realisation or self-satisfaction can be opposed to the ends of the desires only in so far as desire in man is in contradiction with itself.

Now, it is this that Kant neglects. He describes the moral life as if, in our consciousness of the desires, we had
our own sensitive being before us as an object unchanged by self-consciousness, just as the appetites of an animal are unchanged by our knowledge of them. He speaks, in fact, as if we could be conscious of desires as moving us without our consciousness affecting these desires, and as if, on the other hand, the consciousness of the self, as giving rise to a motive which we distinguish from the desires, did not essentially involve a consciousness of the desires to which we oppose it. Only if this were the case, would it be possible to accept Kant's view of the merely natural character of the desires as in us, and of the moral consciousness as in irreconcilable opposition to them. When, however, we consider that it is in relation to the natural impulses that we become conscious of the self as the source of a motive entirely different in character from these impulses, and that, therefore, the self whose realisation we distinguish from the realisation of the desires, is only, and can be only, the unity to which they implicitly refer, we can see that the ideal, the consciousness of which arises out of this opposition, cannot be absolutely alien to the desires, any more than the knowing self can be alien to the particular objects which exist only for it. In fact, the relation in which these desires are brought to the unity of the conscious self in its being opposed to them, is already the first step in the way of making explicit the ideal involved in them; and thus the antagonism of desire and duty can only be understood in relation to a unity which is presupposed in that antagonism, and which is realising itself through it. It is a consequence of this that the mere abstract opposition of the form and the matter of the will which is involved in asceticism, is meaningless except as a moment of transition. The universal cannot be opposed to all its particulars, except in so far as the consciousness of it already contains in germ the reconstitution of those particulars out of itself. Looking at the matter historically, we are able to show that asceticism is never really the principle of an independent moral life. It appears only as a passing phase of a moral experience, in which the individual denies himself as individual that he may reassert himself as member of a family or state. And even where, as in the case of Stoicism, the negative ethics seem to
assume a certain independence, and the individual in realising his moral end is conceived as withdrawing into himself from all social life, we find indications, not obscure, that the negative is destined to merge in a higher positive. The philanthropy of the Stoics springs immediately out of their asceticism, and has in it the germ of a new conception of a universal human society. When, therefore, Kant reduces the moral idea to the mere form of universality, as opposed to the matter, he is really treating one aspect of the moral life as if it were a complete account of it. And his conception is one which is in discordance with the actual ethics of any time.

We are not, however, as we have already seen, confined to this merely historical refutation of Kant’s ethical theory; for self-consciousness must be conceived as a principle of self-determination, i.e., as in itself synthetic, if it is to have any content at all, if it is to give rise to any idea that can determine action; and when it is so conceived, it carries us beyond the opposition of the formal a priori principle to the empirical matter in which it is realised. In this respect, Kant himself has supplied us with all the ideas needed for his own correction. For, in the three formulae in which he expresses the moral law, he first carries us beyond the idea of self-consistency to the idea of consistency with the self, and from that to the idea of a kingdom of ends,—although, of course, we must always take note of the reservations which accompany these different expressions of the moral principle. The merits and defects of Kant’s statement can, however, be appreciated only by a close consideration of its details.

Kant starts with the fundamental idea that consciousness changes the relation of man to the law of his life. "Every natural object operates according to laws. Only a rational being has the faculty of acting according to the consciousness of laws, i.e., according to principles: in other words, only a rational being has a will. Further, as the deduction of acts from laws is a rational process, will is the same thing with practical reason. Now, such a will or practical reason may be the property of two different kinds of beings. We may have a being in whom reason inevitably determines the will, and in whose case, therefore, the
actions that are recognised as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary. In other words, the will in such a being will be a faculty of desiring that and that only, which reason, without any dependence upon desire, recognises as practically necessary, i.e., as good. On the other hand, we may have a being in whom reason for itself does not adequately determine the will, but the will is determined also by certain subjective conditions (i.e., certain motives) which are not in invariable agreement with its objective conditions; in a word, we may have a will which is not in itself completely accordant with reason: and this, of course, is actually the case with the will of man. In his case, then, the acts which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively accidental, and the determination of the will in accordance with objective laws takes the form of obligation (or a feeling that necessity is laid upon him, Nöthigung). In other words, the relation of the objective laws to a will which is not out and out good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being by grounds of reason to which nevertheless he is not by his nature necessarily submissive."

In this passage Kant seeks to express the idea that a law, which determines a being like man only as he is conscious of it, is essentially different in its operation from a law to which a being or thing is subjected without any such consciousness. In the former case, the law may, and indeed must, present itself as an imperative, if there be anything in the individual that resists obedience to it. But it cannot be a law of external necessity, seeing it acts only through the consciousness of the being it determines. There is, it is true, a kind of external imperative, to which as rational beings we are capable of subjecting ourselves. When we will any end, we say that, taking that end for granted, we "ought" to will the means. But such an imperative is hypothetical, for there is no necessity to will the end. There is, indeed, one end which all sensitive beings as such actually do will by the law of nature; for nature makes them desire pleasure and dislike pain, and attracts them to, or repels them from, the objects that produce these feelings. This, therefore, is the ground of

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1 R. VIII. 36; H. IV. 260.
an imperative to seek the means of happiness, as the greatest sum of pleasures with the smallest mingling of pains. But this also is still a hypothetical imperative, in so far as the means are different from the end and not willed for themselves; and the end itself, though it always is willed by us as sensitive beings, is not laid upon us by our reason as a necessary law of action. On the other hand, a categorical imperative must spring directly out of reason, without reference to any object or inclination, and must directly connect the act with the conception of the will of the rational being as such. In other words, the rational being must directly connect the act with the idea of himself as acting, without reference to any inclination to be gratified or any object in which it is to be gratified.\(^1\)

Now, supposing that there is such an imperative, what will be its content? Kant answers that a categorical imperative can contain only the law and the necessity of the subjective principle or maxim being in accord with it; and that, as such a law abstracts from all conditions, \textit{i.e.,} from all particular objects or inclinations for objects, no content can be left but "the universality of a law in general, with which the maxim of the act must agree." In other words, the conformity of the maxim of an act to the idea of law will be the sole reason why we are conscious of it as categorically commanded. The only categorical imperative possible, then, is thus expressed:—"Act in such a way that, in willing to act, you can will that the maxim of your act should become a universal law." This, however, Kant, for reasons already given, immediately translates into the form:—"Act as if by your will the maxim of your act were about to be made into a universal law of nature." For it is only by thinking of it as a law of nature that we can represent a moral law as realised. Kant then proceeds to test the maxims of immoral actions by giving them "the form of laws of nature." In considering the way in which he does this, however, we must always remember that "this comparison of the maxim of our actions with a universal law of nature is not the motive which is to determine our will to perform them. The law

\(^1\)R. VIII. 46; H. IV. 264. Here, therefore, we have a practical \textit{a priori} synthesis.
of nature serves as a type for our judgment upon the maxim according to moral principles. If the maxim is not of such a character that it can stand the test to which it is subjected in giving it the form of a law of nature, it is morally impossible."

Applying, then, this test to duties of perfect and imperfect obligation, towards ourselves and towards others, Kant attempts to show that in the case of breaches of duties of perfect obligation we have a direct contradiction when we conceive the maxims of such acts as universal laws of nature; and that, though there is no such direct contradiction in the case of breaches of duties of imperfect obligation, yet a rational being, when he represents himself as willing that the maxims of such acts should be universalised, will be divided against himself. The former of these statements is illustrated by the cases of suicide and borrowing without the possibility of repaying. An individual seeking to escape the misery of existence would like to commit suicide, but "he asks himself whether this maxim based on the principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature"; and he speedily sees that "it is impossible to conceive without contradiction a natural system in which the same feeling, the office of which is to impel men to the preservation and furtherance of life, should by a universal law of nature lead them to self-destruction." Again, suppose an individual urged by his want to borrow, under promise to repay, when he knows he will not be able to fulfil his promise, and suppose that he "changes this suggestion of self-love into a universal law of nature," he sees at once that, "the universality of a law according to which each one, when he believes himself to be in need, may promise whatever he pleases with the resolve not to keep his promise, would make impossible the promising and any end it could have in view; since no one under such a system would consider that anything was promised to him, but would laugh at all such utterances as mere silly show and hypocrisy." "

The examples of breaches of duties of imperfect obligation are the refusal to exert oneself to educate one's powers,

1 R. VIII. 192; H. V. 73.
2 R. VIII. 48; H. IV. 270.
and the refusal to assist others who are in need. A man finds that he has certain talents, but is disinclined to take pains in developing them. Trying his maxim by the prescribed test, he finds that "a nature might subsist according to such a universal law, though men allowed their talents to rust as the South Sea Islanders actually do; . . . but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or that obedience to such a law should be made instinctive. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that every faculty in himself should be developed, because they are serviceable for all sorts of ends, and have indeed been given him for the sake of these." Again, an individual is well off, and has no pleasure in assisting others, and is not disposed to take trouble in doing so; but he brings his action to a test by putting its maxim into the form of a universal law of nature, and what is the result? He finds that men might quite well continue to exist on the principle of self-help, but yet he cannot possibly will that such a principle should become a universal law of nature. "For a will which so determined would contradict itself, since many cases may occur in which the individual needs the love and sympathy of others, in which, by such a natural law springing from his own will, he would absolutely deprive himself of all hope of assistance."

The result, then, is that some immoral acts are of such a character that their maxims cannot even be thought of as universal laws of nature without contradiction, much less that one should be able to will the existence of such a nature; while in the case of other immoral acts, where we find no such impossibility of thought, yet we cannot possibly will that their maxims should be raised into laws of nature, since such a will would contradict itself. In both cases, what we really want is that the law should remain in force, but that an exception should be made in our case for the benefit of our inclinations. "Hence, if we were to weigh everything from one and the same point of view, i.e., the point of view of reason, we should in all such cases find a contradiction in our will; for it would be at once a will that a certain principle should be necessary objectively as a universal law, and at the same time a will
that subjectively it should not have the force of universal law, but admit of exceptions." ¹

In regard to the supposed contradiction in any breach of the duties of perfect obligation, Mill ² makes the remark that all Kant does show is that immoral acts would have such injurious consequences, as no one would choose to incur, Hegel, as we have seen,³ more exactly hits the mark, when he points out that the contradiction has always a presupposition. It is a contradiction to suppose the existence of a natural system in which sensitive beings form a part, beings who are urged by pleasure and pain to self-preservation, and at the same time to suppose that these impulses should also universally work to self-destruction. But the contradiction is simply that the same cause is supposed to act in two opposite ways without change of circumstances. We presuppose a certain impulse as the basis of self-preservation, and, of course, if it led to self-destruction, we should have a contradiction; but the contradiction is really with the presupposition as to the nature of sensitive beings, as beings urged to self-preservation by pleasure and pain. In the same way, universal lying would be the negation of a social system in which language was a necessary means of connecting the members with each other. Hence it is not, strictly speaking, the case that the maxim of such acts is self-contradictory when universalised, but rather that it is contradictory with a certain presupposed order in the life of rational beings. Universal lying, universal stealing, etc., are contradictory to the idea of an order based on the maintenance of truth and of private property. But then the question returns, how the duty of truth and the right of property can be derived from the moral principle. Hence we want a direct positive deduction of what is right,

¹ R. VIII. 51; II. IV. 272.

² Utilitarianism, p. 6 (eighth edition). I say in the text that Mill's objection does not exactly hit the mark, because,—though it shows the necessity Kant is under of supplementing his principle from without,—it does not show what the defect is that makes such a supplement necessary. It is because Kant's principle is merely formal, and, as formal, cannot give rise to any determination of the particular content subsumed under it, that Kant is obliged to bring in utilitarian considerations, when he attempts to get such determination from it.

³ See above, p. 173 seg.
and cannot be content with a negative deduction of it from the self-contradictory nature of wrong. Indeed the latter is possible only on the presupposition of the former.¹

When we go on to the duties of imperfect obligation, we find that Kant does not pretend here to give us even a negative deduction. The contradiction in the breach of such duties does not show itself in the impossibility of conceiving a nature organised on laws corresponding to the maxims of such acts, but in the divided will which we must suppose in the rational being who adopts such maxims. For Kant, as we have seen, contends that a rational being as such must have a will in accordance with the impartial point of view of reason, and that this impartial will is necessarily in conflict with any special will which he has for his own behoof as an individual. This reminds us of the "impartial spectator" of Hume and Adam Smith. To Kant a rational being as such is necessarily an impartial spectator. As he is a knowing self, all objects are essentially related, and equally related to him; and his own individual existence stands before him as an object like other individual existences. And, as he is a willing self, his own individuality cannot be an end for him more than the individuality of others. He has an impartial will, which is not biased by the particular character of his own desires to give their objects an undue importance in the order of ends; just as he has an impartial understanding, which is not misled by the particular character of his own sense-perceptions to give to their objects a place other than that which is due to them in the order of nature.

Now, it is not difficult to recognise the truth and the importance of this view of the moral consciousness. What, however, we have to observe is that such impartiality cannot rest on a merely negative basis; or, to put it otherwise, it cannot be made possible by a mere abstraction from all the special motives of desire; nay, such an abstraction itself is not possible except in view of a positive determination of the rational will to which it refers. A negative

¹ Observe that, as stated above, p. 174 note, it is not denied that right action must be the expression of a universal principle. What is denied is, that any particular rule can be selected as fit to be part of a universal legislation, by the mere formal principle of self-consistency.
which does not spring from a positive, and does not contain
the germ of a new positive, is an impossible abstraction.
In the speculative sphere, we have seen that the ideas which
enable us to condemn the objective world as phenomenal,
must also supply principles which will enable us to trans-
form the consciousness of that world: or, in other words,
these ideas not only determine the phenomenon as pheno-
menon, but contain at the same time the beginning of a
consciousness of the reality of which it is the phenomenon.
So also, in the practical sphere, the negation of the ends of
particular desires already implies a consciousness of a
principle, which not only condemns those ends, but which
is capable of reconstituting them on a new basis. In other
words, it involves the idea of a moral principle, which out
of itself positively determines the particular ends and the
desires relating to them; and which thus not only enables
us to regard our own individuality on equal terms with that
of others, but also to determine our own individuality in
relation to that of others, as members of a social organism
in which both equally are subordinated and both equally
are realised. It is because Kant does not recognise this,
that he falls back on the self-contradictoriness of evil, and
of the evil will as universalised, instead of showing how the
universal will can positively determine itself. But on his
principle,—that only that action is right the maxim of
which can be universalised,—all particular will as such
would be condemned, for no particular will can be uni-
versalised. As has been already shown, there cannot be
many absolute rules in the moral life; for they must limit
each other, and if any one rule were treated as an absolute
law, it would substitute itself for the principle of morals.
Hence morality necessarily involves the negation of every
particular when taken by itself, and the restoration of it
through the universal. In other words, it involves that
each element of life should be regarded merely as an
element, which owes its value to its place in an organic
whole determined by one principle; and this, of course,
involves that it is not to be willed irrespectively of the other
particular elements, but in relation to them. But Kant,
by his negative method which starts with the absolute
negation of the particular in view of the universal, has
made it impossible for himself to take up the particular again, except by a direct reassertion of it as simply identical with the universal. And he escapes the consciousness of the contradiction of this alternate negation and reassertion of the particular, by the supposition that the negation of the particular as against the universal applies only to some particulars, and the reassertion of the particular through the universal to other particulars; a supposition to which, however, he cannot strictly hold, in face of his view that the particular ought to be willed only as the universal.  

1The moral rigour that insists on the literal observance of moral rules, and thereby raises them into the place of the principle which underlies and transcends all particular rules, finds its opposite counterpart in the moral laxity that treats such rules as essentially opposed to the principle; as if the spirit of the law could be realised only when the letter is trampled under foot. A morality of mere command has its natural relief, its equally one-sided opposite, in a morality of mere sentiment. Hence we do not wonder to find Jacobi protesting with no little vehemence against Kant’s stern assertion of the categorical imperative of law in his letter to Fichte (Werke, III. 37).

“Yes, I am the Athiest, the Godless one, who, in spite of the will that wills nothing, am ready to lie as the dying Desdemona lied; to lie and deceive like Pylades, when he pretended to be Orestes; to murder like Timoleon; to break law and oath like Epaminondas, like John de Witt; to commit suicide with Otho, and sacrilege with David,—yea, to rub the ears of corn on the Sabbath day, merely because I am hungry, and because the law is made for the sake of man and not man for the sake of the law. I am that Godless one, and I deride the philosophy that calls me Godless for such reasons, both it and its Supreme Being; for with the holiest certitude which I have in me, I know that the prerogative of pardon [privilegium aggratiandis] in reference to such transgressions of the letter of the absolute law of reason, is the characteristic royal right of man, the seal of his dignity and of his divine nature.” Man, therefore, according to Jacobi, is called upon not to act “in blind obedience to the law” [blindgesetzlich]. He must call in the aid of his heart, “the peculiar faculty of Ideas,” to interpret the letter by the spirit. “This heart the Transcendental Philosophy will not be allowed to tear out of my breast, in order to set a pure impulse of Egoism in its place. I am not one to allow myself to be freed from the dependence of love, in order to have my blessedness in pride alone.”

The meaning of all this is just that Jacobi recoils from the moral severity of Kant, which asserts the absoluteness of morality only in the form of abstract laws which are to be obeyed irrespective of circumstances. Such severity, he argues, falls of its aim, just because it disregards the voice of the feelings which, in their close relation to the particular, have in them a higher reason of their own than is represented by the mere letter of the law, (for “the heart is the faculty of Ideas that are not empty,”) and because it substitutes for their guidance, either a mere abstract universality,—as Jacobi puts it, “a will that wills nothing”—or a particular rule which it elevates into a place of universal authority it
The root of Kant’s inconsistency lies in this, that, while he sees that “acting by law” is one thing and “acting from the consciousness of law” is another, he yet treats self-conscious desire as if it were not other in character than the appetite for an object which agreeably affects the sensibility. But, if the consciousness of a law makes determination by it self-determination, does not the consciousness of desire give a new character to determination by desire? In the consciousness of desire the self is withdrawn from immediate union with the desire; it has the desire before it as a motive, which stands in relation to all other motives through its relation to the self. Hence, it is impossible for it any longer to wish to satisfy that desire apart from wishing to satisfy itself, and so from wishing to satisfy other tendencies of the self. And thus desire, as well as the law, changes its character. Kant, however, though he admits that in becoming, or giving rise to, a “maxim” of will, the natural desire gets a certain generality,¹ does not see that by this operation of has no right to occupy. What, however, Jacobi does not observe is that, when appeal is thus made from the law to mere feeling, we only substitute for the abstract universal the equally abstract individual. And, if the former fails either because it has no content, or because it does not take account of the limitation of any particular content that may be given to it, the latter equally fails because it has no necessary relation to the universal principle. For it tells me nothing as to the rightness or wrongness, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any judgment or action to know that some individual is able to say, “I feel it to be right.” If, therefore, Jacobi is right in maintaining that there is something higher than the particular rules of morality, some spirit that transcends the letter of the law, yet, in his appeal to the heart, he is in danger of perverting the truth that the particular rules have their limits, into the error of an absolute denial of their validity. It is true that it is impossible to universalise any particular, and that the attempt to do so necessarily leads to a mechanical and external, rather than to a spiritual view of morality; for the particular which is thus treated as the universal, just because it is put in place of the whole, loses its value as a “moment” in the whole. In other words, it ceases to be a living element in the organic system of morality. But what is wanted to correct this defect, is not the mere elevation of feeling above reason, an appeal from the head to the heart, but that the universal of morality should be conceived as a synthetic principle, a principle which is able at once to vindicate the authority of the particular law and the value of the interest it protects, and at the same time to determine the limits of that authority by reference to the other laws or interest, which, along with it, are needed to a complete moral life. Cf. Hegel’s remarks in his essay on Jacobi (Werke, XVII. 23 seq.).

¹R. X. 25; H. VI. 118. “The freedom of the will has the quite peculiar
consciousness the desire, as well as the relation which it establishes between its object and the subject, or the law which expresses that relation, are essentially changed. Hence, he thinks that in submitting to this law, the individual is not determined by the consciousness of law, and that he is determined by the consciousness of law only when he abstracts from all the content of desire. Hence also, like the Stoics, he treats desire merely as an intruder upon the determination of the will, which must be extruded again in order that the will may be self-determined. Or he treats man as if he were made up on the one hand, of an animal, and on the other hand, of a rational being, who observes that animal, and who is in some inexplicable way united with it, so that he is under temptation to make the animal’s impulses his own. And thus it becomes impossible for him to get beyond the abstract unity of reason with itself from which all particular content is excluded, except by a new breach of logic.

It is, however, only justice to Kant when we go on to show how he makes his way, in spite of logic, to a more concrete view of ethics, which yet he persistently, by the aid of new saving clauses, identifies with the more abstract view first presented to us. This he does by the aid of two new formulae for the moral law. The first of these formulae arises from the simple consideration that what we have to do with is the will of a rational being conceived simply as such; in other words, “with the relation of the will to itself, in so far as it is determined by reason alone.” Only in a rational being can “we find a faculty of determining itself according to the consciousness of certain laws,” and these laws are necessarily the expression of the self-determination of a rational being as such; so that in determining itself by them the rational being is determining itself by its own nature, or making its own being its end. To say that such laws have an unconditioned characteristic that it cannot be determined to action by any motive, except in so far as the man has taken it up into his maxim, i.e., has made it into a universal rule upon which he intends to act: thus only can a motive, be it what it may, agree with the absolute spontaneity of the will, i.e., with freedom.”

1 R. IX. 15; H. VII. 13. “We do not get knowledge of the laws of morality by observation of ourselves, or of the animal (Die Tierheit) in us.”
authority is, therefore, the same thing as to say that the rational being as such is an end which can never be regarded as merely a means to some other end. "No object of desire has more than a conditional value; for if the desires and the wants based on them did not exist, their objects would be without value. But, again, the desires themselves as sources of such wants, cannot claim any absolute value that should cause them to be in themselves objects of desire. On the contrary, to be entirely free from such desires must be the universal wish of every rational being." It appears, then, that the value of every object that can be acquired by our actions is a conditional value. All objects, though their existence depends not on our will, but upon nature, have nevertheless, unless they are rational beings, only a relative value as means, and therefore are called things; while rational beings are called persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as beings who ought never to be used merely as means; and in relation to whom, therefore, our arbitrary will has a limit put upon it. Such beings are objects of reverence. They are not subjective ends, whose existence, as an effect of our action, has a value for us, but objective ends, i.e., beings whose existence is an end in itself, an end for which no other end can be substituted so as to reduce it to the position of means. Apart from such beings, indeed, we could find nothing of absolute value anywhere, and in the absence of all but conditioned and accidental ends there could be no highest practical principle for the reason." 2

This being the case, we get a new formula for the imperative of practical reason. "Always treat humanity, both in your own person and in the persons of others, as an end and never merely as a means." This formula may be illustrated by the same examples which have been used already. Can the action of the suicide be regarded as consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself? No. For "if a man destroys himself in order to escape from a painful position, he is really treating his own person as secondary to the maintenance of an endurable state of feeling to the end of his life." But man is no thing, to be

1 The italics are mine.  2 R. VIII. 56; H. IV. 276.
used merely as a means. Therefore "I have no right to dispose of humanity in my own person as I please, no right to maim, hurt, or destroy it." Again, if I make a deceitful promise to another man, I can see that I am using him "as a means without at the same time treating him as having an end in himself. For he whom I thus seek to use as a means for my ends, cannot possibly be supposed to be consenting to my way of proceeding towards him: in other words, he is not treated as if he contained in himself the end of the action in question." And this principle is still more obviously true in relation to actions involving any attack upon the freedom or property of another.

Again, passing to the duties of imperfect obligation, we see that a refusal to develop our own powers, if it does not involve a treatment of ourselves as means, at least involves that we are not treating ourselves as ends. "There are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which are elements in the end, which nature sets before me as a human subject; and to neglect the development of these in my own case, though it may be consistent with the mere maintenance of the existence of humanity as an end in itself, is at least inconsistent with the positive furtherance of that end." Again, "it might consist with the maintenance of the existence of humanity, that one man should not seek to contribute to another's happiness, if only he did not deliberately hinder it; but this is only a negative, not a positive, agreement with the idea of mankind as an end in itself. Such positive agreement would involve that each should seek, so far as lies in him, to further the ends of the others. For if a conscious subject be an end in himself, and if the conception of him as such is to produce its full effect in me, his ends must, so far as possible, become also my ends."

It is obvious that Kant has here taken a step towards the concrete. His criterion of action is no longer the mere consistency of its maxim with itself as universalised, but its consistency with the idea of the self as an end. He has passed from the abstract universal to the universal as realised in the individual; from the conception of legality in general to the idea of a law which expresses the nature of the rational subject, or his relation to himself. Hence,
the idea of an end, which seemed before to be excluded as identical with the idea of an object acting upon feeling and awakening desire, is now introduced. And with it comes the distinction of persons and things, i.e., of the rational being as an individual who is also a universal, as against material objects and beings not rational, as individuals which are merely particular. Here, therefore, we have a similar movement of thought to that which supplied the relative conceptions of person and thing to Roman law. We have the idea of the individual as an end in himself in so far as he is identical with reason; and we have the inference that he is always to be regarded as a subject of rights, while the particular thing as such is merely an object over which rights can be freely established. The defect, however, of this view is that, as the universal or rational nature of the individual is not seen to be necessarily related to his particular nature as a sensitive being, the determination of the particular by it seems quite arbitrary. Thus in Jurisprudence, it may fairly be argued that, as the individual is universal, his particular rights should be respected: that, in other words, his body and any particular things which he has "occupied," or "into which he has put his will," should receive the respect due to himself as rational. But it seems hard to understand how a universal personality should thus manifest itself in an individual with a particular nature, and standing in particular relations to other individuals; and it is simply taken as an empirical fact that it does so manifest itself. Again, in Ethics, the fact that the individual is universal, and so a law and an end to himself, seems to contain in it no reason for any particular duties: on the contrary, it would seem to be most natural on such a principle, to reduce all duty to the negation of the particular desires, and of the particular relations with other objects or beings which are due to such desires. Further, as the universal and individual are directly and immediately identified, the former cannot be conceived as a principle which differentiates itself, and by relations of its differences constitutes a system; but simply as a common element in all individuals. These individuals, therefore, are not conceived as organically related to each other through the principle, but simply
as an aggregate or sum of units which are indifferent to each other. It is for this reason that the Universalism of the Stoics manifests itself in a pure Individualism, which, though it supplies leading conceptions to the Jurisprudence of private rights, is unable to furnish an adequate principle of social Ethics. In this, and still more, as we shall see, under the next formula, Kant makes a praiseworthy effort to get beyond the emptiness of the abstract universal; but he is unable to conceal that, according to his own theory, the relation of the universal to the particular is immediate and external. Thus, even in relation to the duties of perfect obligation, we have in Kant a repetition of the assumption of the Stoic lawyers, that a particular will belongs to the individual in virtue of his universal nature, and that, therefore, the sacredness of that universal nature attaches itself to the particular will. But this is taken merely as a fact, though it is a fact quite inexplicable on the principles of a philosophy that identifies the individual with the universal by exclusion of the particular. "Reverence Humanity in your own person and the person of others" is a principle which might fairly be deduced from Stoicism; but as Stoicism determines passion as unnatural to the rational being, and as it regards all relations which passion establishes between the subject and particular objects as enslaving, it is difficult to see why Humanity should be interested in the particular existence and relations of the sensitive subject as such. And when we come to the duties of imperfect obligation, the paralogism becomes still more obvious: for the duty of developing our special faculties and powers seems to have no necessary relation to that pure self-determination, i.e., that self-determination in view only of one's own nature as a self, or in view of the self as an end, to which morality, on Kant's own principles, would reduce itself. And the duty of assisting others in the pursuit of that happiness, which is their end when we regard them merely as sensitive beings, seems to be no natural inference from the principles of a philosophy which teaches that men are ends in themselves only as rational. All, in fact, depends on the way in which the ethical negation of the particular is interpreted. If we take it as an absolute negation, (and
this is the natural interpretation to give to it in Kant and the Stoics,) then the universal as end in itself excludes all reference to the particular. No doubt, even then we might say that, if the particular were to be conceived as related to the universal, it could only be as a means to an end. But why should it be so related at all? If we admit it even as a means, we must give it some positive relation to the end: and this would naturally lead to the idea, that it is only when taken by themselves as ends that the particular objects of desire must be negated or rejected; while, as related to the universal, and as indeed forms of its manifestation, they become elements in the good, which is the end of all moral action.

The third formula of Kant brings us very near to a recognition of this. For in it we find him advancing to the idea of a kingdom of ends, i.e., a social community of beings, each of which is reciprocally end and means to the others. "Act in conformity with the idea that the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will." This formula, as Kant maintains, follows directly out of the other two formulae—the first of which expresses the idea that the moral law is not only universal, but that its essence lies in the form of universality, while the second tells us that the consciousness of that law is one with that consciousness of himself as an end which belongs to the rational being as such. Combining these two points, we get the idea that the rational being is subjected to a law which is universal, but which nevertheless he himself enacts. This is the principle of the Autonomy of the will, which, in Kant's opinion, had been lost sight of in all previous moral systems, owing to a very natural illusion. For, while the authors of such systems saw that man as moral is bound by duty to certain laws, they did not see that in submitting to this universal legislation, he is submitting only to himself. Thinking of him, then, only as subjected to a law, they were necessarily led to suppose that there must be some interest, either positive or negative, to connect his will with that law; and this again involved that the law did not arise out of the nature of the will itself. Those who reasoned in this way necessarily viewed the will as heteronomous. On Kant's view this is not necessary;
for the same individual, as rational, is self-legislative, who, as a sensitive being, is subjected to the law. Now, "the conception that every rational being must contemplate himself through all the maxims of his will as universally legislative, in order from this point of view to judge himself and his actions, leads to another closely connected and very fruitful conception, viz., to the conception of a kingdom of ends. By a kingdom, I here mean the systematic combination of a number of diverse rational beings under common laws. Now, such laws will determine the ends of the rational beings in question, so far as they are universally valid ends. Hence, when we abstract from all the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we get the idea of a complete and systematically connected whole of all ends (a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as of the special ends which each of them may set up for himself), i.e., a kingdom of ends such as is possible according to the principles already laid down. . . .

To this kingdom of ends every rational being belongs as a member, who, though universally legislative, is yet submitted to the laws he enacts. At the same time, he belongs to it also as a sovereign, because as legislative he is submitted to no will but his own. The rational being must always regard himself as legislative, in a kingdom of ends which is made possible by the freedom of the will. . . . Morality, therefore, is the reference of all actions to the legislation whereby alone such a kingdom is possible." ¹

This kingdom is to be represented by us on the analogy of a kingdom of nature, since it is only so that we can represent it; though we must always remember the essential difference between the self-imposed laws of reason, and the laws of external necessity which rule the natural world.

The idea of a kingdom of ends, which Kant here presents to us, involves nothing less than the organic unity of rational beings as such. It involves that the rational nature of man is not only a common element in them, in respect of which they are all alike, but a principle which determines their particular natures in relation to each

¹ R. VIII. 62; H. IV. 281.
other, and so fits them, by virtue of their reciprocally complementary characteristics, to be members in one social organism. At the same time, while Kant states this idea, he does not work it out. He could not do so without two vital changes in his theory. For, in the first place, the universal, as the principle of unity in the particulars, must cease to be merely an abstraction from the particulars. But, secondly, it must manifest itself in the particulars in such a way as to bind them together as elements which are organically related, and which, through their very distinction, constitute one whole. This idea, however, could not be worked out by Kant without retracting the principles from which he started, as to the negative relation of the universal to the particulars. And he escapes a direct contradiction only by the reservation which he has always in the background, viz., that the kingdom of ends is not capable of being represented by us, except on the inadequate analogy of a kingdom of nature. According to this view, human society can never be organic, or, what is the same thing, can never be known as organic; though the idea of it as an organism is the idea which underlies all our ethical life. Thus the kingdom of ends is possible from the point of view of the moral principle, which commands us to do our part in realising it; but we can never expect to find it actually realised in experience. On the other hand, if we reject this dualism on the grounds already adduced, we must say that society can become an organism only because it is already, by reason of the very nature of its members, potentially organic. Its divergence in particular cases, and especially in the early stages of its development, from the idea of organism, will thus have to be conceived as a divergence from its own idea, a divergence which is ultimately to be explained as itself a stage in the process of realising that idea. Thus the "ought to be" will spring out of a deeper appreciation of that which "is." Or, to put it in a more palpable way, the particular ends which Kant bids us "limit" by reference to the universal end, are never merely particular. They are already, as ends, forms of the realisation of the higher end, and, therefore, even in the individual life form a kind of system by relation to it. And, again, the individuals who
are actuated by such particular ends, in virtue of the relativity of these ends to the higher end, are already in process of being formed into the members of an organic social unity; or, at least, the principle of such a unity is already determining in some way their relations to each other.

To sum up. The strength of Kant's theory lies in his expression of the antagonism in the moral life between what is and what ought to be; between what is actually desired and what is ideally desirable; between an end determined for us by the affections of our sensibility and an end determined by our own self-conscious nature.) The weakness of his theory lies in the fact, that, in expressing this antagonism, he carries it to the point where it disappears altogether; where the negative relation ceases to be a relation at all, or where the community necessary even for antagonism disappears. On the one side he places desires for objects which affect us pleasurably, and which he considers as simply desires for pleasure. These desires exist in us as self-conscious beings; yet they are conceived to be altogether undetermined by self-consciousness, and are therefore viewed as determining the self from without. All that self-consciousness does is to gather them together as a sum under the idea of Happiness. On the other side, we have the determination of pure self-consciousness by itself, which contains nothing but the abstract idea of its identity with itself in all differences, i.e., the mere form of universal law. This form, when related to the empirically given existence of a multitude of self-conscious beings, is supposed to generate the idea of a kingdom of ends, an idea, however, which we cannot verify or find realised in actual experience. Now, we have seen that this idea of a kingdom of ends, or, more generally, the idea of a realised good, is impossible even as an Idea except by the recognition of a relation between the empirical and the ideal, which Kant does not recognise. In this view, it is noticeable that Kant continually speaks of the identity between the empirical individual and the conscious self as an inexplicable fact. That it certainly is, if the desires are to be regarded simply as determinations of the phenomenal object, which is presented to us in our
inner life, but not as in any special way determined by the self, as the subject for which they are. If this were so, they would inevitably appear, not as determining the self, but, to take Kant's own example, as processes (like our yawning when we see others yawn) of which we are conscious, but which we do not attribute to the self, but merely to a necessity of nature affecting our constitution as sensitive beings. Now, what is involved in the idea of desire being present in us as a determination of the self, and not merely as a determination of our physical being as an object? Obviously this, that desire is always for an object which presents itself as a form of the satisfaction or realisation of the self. In the satisfaction of desire there are, indeed, two moments ideally distinguishable, the satisfaction of the particular desire and the satisfaction of the self; but the former cannot exist separately in the rational being as such. For, though in the early stages of our life there may be a direct action of impulse, yet just in so far as such impulse is not dependent upon any action of self-consciousness, it is not attributable to the self at all. On the other hand, in so far as self-consciousness determines the impulse, that impulse must change its character, and take the form of a desire for an end which is not merely the satisfaction of an isolated tendency, but of the self.

Kant takes happiness, in the sense of the greatest sum of pleasure or the most pleasurable state continued through life, as a mere generalisation of the special natural impulses, which he regards as desires of particular pleasures. Now, on this we have to remark—first, that the natural impulses of a sensitive being are not desires for pleasure, though they are undoubtedly desires for objects which are pleasant, because they are desired or wanted. The sensitive being is stimulated by a felt want in tension against an object forefelt as satisfying that want. But, for such an impulse to become a desire of pleasure two things are necessary. In the first place, the consciousness of the self desiring and of the object desired must not be lost or confused in the unity of feeling; on the contrary, the self as desiring must be distinguished from, and opposed to, the object in which the desire finds satisfaction. For, only on
the ground of this distinction can the feeling of pleasure and pain be separated from the consciousness of the object as attained, and referred to the subject as attaining satisfaction of itself in it. Only on the ground of the discreteness or dualism, which arises with self-consciousness, can the pleasure of the subject by itself become an object to which desire may be directed. But, further, when the desire of pleasure thus arises, it is in us combined with a consciousness for which pleasure cannot be the sole or the ultimate end, a consciousness to which, as universal, pleasure is not an adequate end. This may be shown in various ways, the most obvious of which is to point out that pleasure must be had in some object, for which there is a desire independently of the pleasure it brings. In other words, the conscious self must identify itself with an object or end which is not pleasure, before it can attain pleasure: and if it makes pleasure an end, or identifies itself as satisfied or realised with that end, it by that very identification of itself with its own pleasure cuts off the connexion with the object from which the pleasure was derived. In other words, as a self-conscious being is conscious of itself only in relation to objects, so it can feel itself realised only in the attainment of objects, or in such a determination of objects, that they become conformed to its consciousness of itself. And the direct effort at self-realisation in the mere subject, i.e., the subject as opposed to, and separated from, the object, involves a contradiction. To put this in another point of view, pleasure is a state of the sensitive subject, of which, however, it can be conscious as distinct from the pleasant object, only as it ceases to be merely a sensitive subject, and becomes conscious of a self. But that very consciousness of the self just makes it impossible that the self should find its end or satisfaction in pleasure. For the consciousness of self is the consciousness of a subject for which the whole objective world exists; or, if it exists for itself, as an individual object, it is only as at the same time it is conceived as standing in relation to all the other objects in that world. The end must be that with which the self as subject can identify itself as satisfied, or in which it can find itself realised; and the conscious self can find itself realised only in the whole
world of objects. Pleasure, we might thus say, would be an object or end adequate to the sensitive being, were the merely sensitive being capable of having an object or end at all. On the other hand, to the self-conscious being pleasure is a possible, but not an adequate end; by itself, indeed, it cannot be made an end at all, except by a self-contradictory abstraction. Yet pleasure is necessarily involved in the attainment of any object, in so far as that is the realisation of the self in and through a sensitive consciousness; for in such a realisation the consciousness of the self as realised in the world must be also a feeling or sensitive consciousness of the harmony of our individuality with itself and with its circumstances.¹

¹This subject has been one of the most fully debated themes of philosophical controversy in this country, at least since the time of Hutcheson and Butler. I can only refer to the most recent discussion of it in the works of Mill and Green, of Professor Sidgwick and Mr. Bradley. Butler's distinction—between the particular desires, which he regards as natural tendencies prior to all reflexion, and what he calls 'rational self-love,'—the desire of the pleasures, which, as we discover by experience, are to be attained by satisfying these natural tendencies—is unsatisfactory, because it involves that all desires except the desire of pleasure, are to be regarded as immediate appetites or instincts. Thus, in a well-known sermon, Butler maintains the unselfishness of compassion and of the benevolent affections generally, on grounds which are equally applicable to the appetite of hunger. In other words, he does not recognise that all the desires, and particularly the higher social impulses, have their character as our desires determined by self-consciousness. If, therefore, we are to maintain Butler's conclusion, it must be on another ground: not that compassion or any other desire is prior to reflexion on the self, but that self-consciousness is possible only through the consciousness of objects. On this ground we may contend that we can as little realise ourselves except through the realisation of outward ends, as we can know ourselves apart from all knowledge of the external world or our fellow men. And pleasure, as the feeling of harmony with ourselves and our circumstances is, as Aristotle already maintained, the feeling that accompanies self-realisation.

In speaking, as above, of pleasure as belonging to the sensitive subject as such, it is of course not meant to deny that there are intellectual and other pleasures, which are not due to mere sense. Kant, indeed, says that an 'intellectual feeling is a contradiction,' and, as we shall see in the fourth chapter of this book, he has great difficulty in finding a place for the feeling of reverence, which implies a negation of the immediate feeling of pleasure: yet when he comes to speak of the feeling of beauty, he seems to admit a fusion of sense and intelligence which in his ethical works he seems to reject. Generally, in these works at least, he regards pleasure as the result of the action of the object on the passive subject, just as he regards the desire of an object, as the desire for the pleasure so produced. Now, in both cases we need to make the same correction. Desire cannot have for its object the pleasure of its own satisfaction, and a pleasure must always be pleasure in something other than the pleasure itself; and this some-
But if pleasure is an inadequate object or end for the self-conscious being, so also and for the same reason is happiness; seeing it only differs from pleasure as being the sum of the pleasures of an individual, who is therefore a sensitive being, or at best as a continuous state of pleasurable feeling throughout its existence. As referred to self-consciousness, however, this sensitive subject is at the same time reduced into a particular object relative to other particular objects in the world. The good for such a self-conscious subject must, therefore, necessarily involve the renunciation of its own sensitive existence as an end. It is the condition of spiritual existence that its subject must lose its natural life in order to gain it. No doubt it is also true that it does, and must gain or regain it, if the natural life ever becomes really conformed to the spiritual principle to which it surrenders itself; and, in this sense, it may be truly said that 'happiness is our being's end and aim,' or, at least, that the attainment of our being's end and aim is happiness.

But what, then, of Kant's assertion that desire for objects is, as such, desire of pleasure? We are obliged directly to contradict it. Desire for objects is never merely desire for pleasure, but always has implied in it a consciousness of a good with which such objects are practically identified, or in which they are conceived as elements,—a good which, as adequate to the self, cannot be pleasure. On the other hand, the desire of pleasure can never exist by itself, as it would involve the severance of the object in which pleasure is sought from its context in the ideal world of ends, which alone can constitute the good of a self-conscious subject, and the reference of it merely to a single feeling of the individual subject; but as so referred it could not be considered as an object or end at all. If this be true, then, we cannot oppose the realisation of the self, as Kant does, to the attainment of objects of desire; thing, which forms the content of feeling, need not itself be of a sensuous character. At the same time, in reference to what is stated in this and the following pages, we must remember that the attempt to sever pleasure as an end from all objective ends, involves the gradual expulsion from it of all content which is not purely sensuous. And, even that content, if the ideal of the pure pleasure-seeker could be realised, must lose the form which it necessarily has, as the content of the feelings of a self-conscious being.
but we must in two ways correct Kant's abstraction:—by saying, not only, as we have said, that for a self-conscious subject objects of desire as such are always determined as realisations of the self, but also that there is no realisation of the self which is not objective, and in which, therefore, there is not also a satisfaction of desire. The opposition of inclination and duty, of what is and what ought to be, on which Kant lays so great weight, is not to be denied or obliterated, but it must find room within the limits just stated. In other words, it must be made consistent with the doctrine that all our desires are, or in ultimate analysis involve, desire for the good, i.e., for an object adequate to the self; and that, therefore, the good not only ought to be, but always is being, realised. It is, indeed, only through this conception that we can understand how these opposites should be brought together in one consciousness at all. The natural man may be opposed to the spiritual, but the spiritual must, so to speak, overreach this distinction, or, more exactly, the natural, in a spiritual being, can only be the spiritual in its first imperfect form; otherwise there would be no relation between the two beings thus brought together "in one skin." An imperative of duty implies a negative relation of the 'law of the mind' to the 'law of the members'; but it implies also a unity that is deeper than that difference, if the command of reason is to be heard by the sensitive nature to which it is addressed.

Kant's idea of the "kingdom of ends," when we remove from it the merely ideal character which he gives to it as a possibility which can never be realised or known as real, throws important light on the question as to the relation of the moral to the natural, or of that which ought to be to that which is. For it then becomes an expression of the truth, that man as a moral being always is,—and is more or less definitely conscious of himself as being,—a member of a community, which, just because it subordinates him as an individual, is the sphere in which his spiritual nature is realised. This consciousness, no doubt, is very imperfectly developed at first. In purely savage life, so imperfect are the forms of such union, that it may even be denied to have any actual realisation at
all. The consciousness of a unity which is beyond the caprice of individuals, and the consequent reverence for a law or will above their own, has not yet separated itself from the submission of terror to a superior force. It shows itself not so much in the achievement of a moral order as in the restless discontent which follows caprice and slavery as its shadow, and which makes the savage life so much worse than the life of animals, just because it contains the germ of something better. But still, it is by the secret working of this idea of good which goes along with self-consciousness, that gradually out of the chaos of conflicting self-wills there arises some kind of elementary social order, which can furnish the mediation necessary to the development of a distinct moral consciousness. For we must remember always that a moral consciousness does not spring from our minds full blown and complete, without any fertilisation of them by experience. If it is the fruit of reflexion, it is the fruit of a reflexion upon relations between human beings which have long been established before they came to be reflected on. If it has its cause in reason, yet practical reason shows itself at first not as self-conscious thought, but as an unconscious power that moulds the outward laws and institutions of men, and determines their social relations; and it is only as the individual returns upon himself, and awakens to the meaning of this "objective realisation of freedom," that subjective morality arises. We become conscious of being a law to ourselves not directly, but only by recognising that the law which at first seems to come from another, is really imposed upon us by ourselves. This dependence of the moral consciousness upon a social mediation is, no doubt, hidden from us in certain crises of our moral life. The morality of reflexion always opposes itself at first to the outward reality without which, nevertheless, it could not itself have existed. But of this one-sidedness we can only say that it is an illustration of a tendency which is an accident of our moral development, the tendency to give exclusive value to the idea which is most potent at the moment: for, in absolutely opposing itself to the morality of law and custom, reflective morality only shows that it has forgotten its own origin. A moral con-
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sciousness is in reality the consciousness of an end which has realised and is always realising itself in human society. Its "ought to be," therefore, always rests on the "is"; or rather it points to a deeper "is," of which the immediate facts are only the appearance. In this sense it is true that "might is right," and that "the real is the rational": not in the sense that we can always justify the status quo, or that there are no wrongs to be redressed, but in the sense that the appearance which does not agree with its Idea or principle is merely a self-contradictory appearance, the reality of which lies not in itself, but in its being a moment of transition which prepares the way for an appearance which does so agree.1 The phenomena of history are, therefore, either the realisation of reason, or, so far as they are not so, they are self-contradictory existences, which have their value only in the process by which they destroy themselves; and so negatively they are conditions of the realisation of reason. And, on the other hand, the moral consciousness is always the con- sciousness of that which has been realised and is realising itself, though in so far as it is the latter, it contains a negative side towards that which we usually call the real. A developing being always is, and yet in a sense is not, what it ought to be; for, if the secret principle of its development is in itself, yet it is by the negation of its immediate existence that it develops. And this has special reference to the self-conscious being, which alone, strictly speaking, has the principle of development in itself. But, just for that reason, such a being must represent the end

1 Cf. above, p. 160, note. The above argument shows how we can escape from the difficulty in which Kant is landed by his denial of the reality of moral experience, and his abstract opposition of what "ought to be" to what "is." The moral consciousness is the consciousness of a law to which the individual as such is subjected; and it is his own law, the law that flows from his own nature as rational. But this rational nature reveals itself, not in an isolated consciousness of self, or in a consciousness of self in which he abstracts from all relation to objects, but in a consciousness of self in distinction from, yet in relation to, other objects who are also recognised as self-conscious beings. The not-self, the consciousness of which is necessary to the development of a moral consciousness, is another self, or rather a society of selves in which the individual is a member. The moral law is therefore primarily a social law, a law which not only ought to be but is realised. This point will be treated more fully when we come to the practical application of Kant's ethical principles.
in which it is to be realised as an end to be attained by self-renunciation.

The defect of Kant's Ethics in this point of view is that, though he goes so far as to speak of a kingdom of ends and so to recognise the social character of morality, yet, by treating that kingdom as merely ideal, he falls back into the one-sidedness of a merely subjective morality, which opposes the moral consciousness to the social mediation through which it has realised, and alone can realise itself. Like Plato, he sees that the good man must be a citizen, yet, like Plato, he regards him only as the citizen of an ideal State (a State ἐν λόγοις κειμένη). This tendency to set the ideal against the real appears in a still more abstract form in the ethics of the Stoics, which constitutes the opposite pole to that ethical spirit which characterises the social life of Greece in its healthiest period. With the Stoic the individual was divorced from the community as a law and end to himself, as a being who could realise the life of reason, which was his own, only as he excluded all foreign interference. With the ancient Greek citizen the ethical universal always took the concrete form of the law of a community, through relation to which alone the individual was lifted above his animal individuality, and made conscious of the privilege of his humanity. The good Athenian citizen saw in the State the true manifestation of the goddess Athene, the outward appearance of which she was invisible spirit, the realisation of an ideal with which in his imagination she was identified; and his obedience to the law of the State was thus identified with his worship of the divine power, which controlled his life and destiny. Hence the moral law could not for a moment appear to him as unrealised or unrealisable in the phenomenal world. On the contrary, it was present to him as realised, and it was as the reality, in contradistinction from his own transitory and imperfect existence as an individual, that it claimed his reverence. In the decay of the ancient social and political life, however, the moral universal was for the moment rent away from all particular forms of its realisation, and set over against them as an ideal which claimed to be, but was not, real; and man was thrown back, as it seemed, upon
his isolated individual being, in which he could realise that
universal only by extruding all the particular interests
still left to his life. But a nearer view of this period, and
of the modern period which is most analogous to it, lets
us see in it just that "exception which proves the rule."
The crucial instance, which seems to contradict, on a
deeper analysis really supports the view of the ethical
ideal as not only realised, but as in a sense the only
ultimate reality.

For the idea of a kingdom of ends, i.e., of a social
system in which the individual is realised by his particular
nature being subordinated to a universal end, cannot find
its true form so long as the universal and the particular
nature of man are not distinctly set against each other.
No complete reconciliation of universal and particular is
possible, till the universal is set by itself just as the uni-
versal, and the particular just as the particular. Only out
of their separation as pure abstractions could their pure
concrete unity be developed. Now, so long as the family
or nation was the highest form of social unity known, the
universal was apt to be confused with the particular, and
the bonds of spirit with the bonds of nature. Or, to put
it differently, the unity of the individual with the universal,
in virtue of which he subordinated his particular being to
the good of the whole society, was still an immediate
unity, a unity which he found, and did not constitute by
the process of his own spirit. Such a unity, therefore,
was exposed to the attacks of a destructive scepticism,
which simply needed to show that the highest universal
was still a particular, in order to cause it to lose its credit.
More simply, in the ancient State, the consciousness of
community with the other citizens was due in part to ties
of blood and custom, which are absolute for men just so
long as they are unchallenged; for, when challenged,
they have no justification in themselves to urge before the
spirit that challenges them. Such a spirit can be satisfied
only by an objective authority which is determined for it
by its own consciousness of itself; but a given or
immediate authority as such cannot meet such a demand.
It appears, then, that a domestic, civic, or national bond
fails in two ways to satisfy that idea of an ethical com-

This opposition is necessary as a stage of transition between a narrower and a more comprehensive social morality.
This transition is indicated in Stoicism by the idea of philanthropy, and in the Ethics of Kant by the idea of a Kingdom of Ends. 

munity which the consciousness of self brings with it. On the one hand, as to its matter it is particular, i.e., it is bound up with all sorts of peculiarities due to nature and circumstances, which, as such peculiarities, may have other peculiarities set against them. On the other hand, as to its form it is given and immediate, and therefore, even if it had a rational vindication, it would not be able to produce it. The conscious self, therefore, awaking in the individual to a sense of its own universality, at once rejects the authority of a social law, which now seems to it to speak only from without and not also from within. The objective world, not only the natural, but the ethical world, empties itself of its gods and loses all ideal significance; for it was in the social bond that that significance lay. It becomes a prosaic world of beings connected with each other merely by the external nexus of contract; and man looks for the universal and the divine only within himself. Nay, it even seems that it is just in centring himself in himself, and rejecting all relation to others, that the individual can realise himself as universal. He is conscious of God in himself, only as he has absolutely excluded the world.

Now, it is out of this movement of thought that the Stoic and, to a certain extent, also the Kantian ethical theory springs. The self-conscious individual appears to determine himself as universal, as a law and an end to himself, just because he abstracts from all that is particular in himself, and therefore from all relation to other particulars without him. But his individuality as rational is thus reduced to a merely formal universality: his determination or assertion of himself as universal is nothing, but his negation of himself as particular. He has a "will that wills nothing," a will which is self-contradictory. This dialectical movement of thought, however, which seems at first simply suicidal, really, when we examine it closely, gives just that transition from the individual to the social self-consciousness for want of which the earlier forms of ethics were not able to retain their hold upon the spirits of men, and which is required to restore an objective social authority, i.e., an outward authority from which the inward is not divorced. Such restoration was
possible after all immediate or natural forms of union between men were rejected, because it was then seen that the consciousness of self, in virtue of which we abstract from our own particular existence, and from all particular existences, is at the same time the consciousness of a community into which we are brought with all rational beings, a community to which that particular existence is subordinated. It is not by accident that the abstract individualism of the Stoics passes into abstract universalism, or that this again gives rise to the idea of a πολιτεία τοῦ κόσμου. Nor again is it by accident that the Kantian idea of abstract law, as united with the idea of the individual self as an end, gives rise to the idea of a kingdom of ends. It is true that to the Stoics and to Kant this idea remains a mere ideal which is not realised or realisable in the phenomenal world; yet the conception of reason as absolute finally forces both to recognise that that ideal must in some way be realised. Thus, their refusal to let the wheel "come full circle" scarcely disguises the fact that these systems end in the correction of the abstraction with which they began; or rather, we might say that that abstraction, when it comes, as in these systems, to be a definite object of reflexion, corrects itself. To the ancient moralists it seemed possible to realise the moral ideal only by an immediate and quasi-natural process, in which the individual learnt habitually to regard himself from the point of view of the family or of the state, and to treat himself as an organ of the domestic or civic life of the community. But, in the light of the Stoic or the Kantian recognition of the rational as a social life, we can conceive of the same end as achieved by a spiritual process, in which the individual becomes conscious that he can realise his own end only as he makes himself the voluntary servant of the social end, which is realising itself in the world without him. The very abstraction out of which these systems arose was itself a negative which implied a higher positive than could be realised in the ethical life of the ancients: it was the germ of a consciousness that the universal principle of morality, which realise it in man's social life, is inadequately represented by any domestic, civic, or national consciousness.
It was, in fact, just because they were beginning to discover without them, as realised or realising itself in the world, the principle of a morality wider than that of the family or the state, and thus just because they were becoming conscious of a deeper reality than they had hitherto acknowledged, that they set the ideal against the actual. Athene and Olympian Zeus lost their absolute position, because it began to be evident that the city and the nation, though universal and permanent in relation to the individual citizen, are particular and transitory in relation to the spirit of man. For that spirit, which gives them their ethical value, can take it away without ceasing to find organs for its manifestation in the world. Here, therefore, in the case even of this abstract and negative philosophy, we may see that the moral ideal has no meaning except as it expresses, not only "the spirit of the years to come yearning to mix itself with life," but also the spirit which is already mixing itself with life, and which only as it does so mix, can be present to the consciousness of men as their moral ideal.

This point, however, will require to be considered further in connexion with Kant's views of religion and of the Summum Bonum. It is here referred to only to show at once the truth and the imperfection of Kant's account of the moral consciousness, even in the highest formula for it which he reaches.

But the moral consciousness, as the consciousness of reason determining itself, or supplying its own motive, is the consciousness of freedom: and we have now to consider how far Kant has solved the difficulties involved in that conception.
CHAPTER III

THE IDEA OF FREEDOM

In the last chapter we have considered the different formulae in which Kant expresses the moral law, but we have passed over one special aspect of it, viz., that the moral law is the law of freedom. What does this mean? We can see what it means only by considering its opposite, the necessity of nature; for, as Kant says, freedom is in the first instance a negative idea.

Nature, according to Kant, is a system in which all phenomena are connected together by a law of external necessity, a system in which everything is conditioned by something else, and that again by something else \( ad \ infinitum \). It is, indeed, regarded as a system of permanent substances; but each of these substances stands in such necessary relation to other substances, that none of its determinations can be accounted for merely by its own existence. Its permanence, in fact, is nothing but the permanence of certain relations in which it stands to other substances, and which it maintains through all its changes. Its particular states are always to be explained by the action of other substances on it, and the changes of these states by the change of that action, which again presupposes previous changes \( ad \ infinitum \). The attempt, therefore, to account for any determination of a substance or any change of such determination as arising from itself alone must fail. A self-determined being, by its very definition, would be a being that could not be brought into the context of experience. In that context we can have only beings which act as they are acted on, and the particular qualities of which arise necessarily from the
particular relations into which at any given moment they are brought.

Now, the moral consciousness seems to involve that we should regard ourselves as capable of determining ourselves independently of circumstances; for it is a consciousness in which we lay down a law for our action without reference to circumstances. It sets before us an unconditioned imperative of duty. In doing so, therefore, it seems to demand that we should regard ourselves just in the way in which, as we have seen, no object of experience can be regarded as having the principle of determination in ourselves without regard to the conditions in which we are. The "ought" forces us to abstract from all our particular tendencies and the conditions that call these tendencies into activity, and to determine ourselves in view of a law which takes no account of either. It lifts us in our own view out of the order of nature, and bids us regard ourselves, not indeed as under no law or necessity, but as under no external necessity, as, in fact, only under a necessity which is one with our own freedom.

Now, in the last chapter we have seen how Kant develops the idea of the moral law as involving an abstraction from all desire, and indeed from everything but the idea of law itself; and we have seen also how from this he passes to the idea of an order according to final causes, which we substitute for the idea of the order of nature according to efficient causes, whenever we regard ourselves as moral subjects; or, in other words, how, as moral beings, we are forced to conceive ourselves as members of a kingdom of ends, which we represent as a teleologically arranged order of nature.

Here, however, we have to examine more closely how these two conceptions of ourselves are to be brought together, seeing that they seem to contradict each other; for, in thinking of ourselves as moral subjects and members of the kingdom of ends, we are called on to attribute to ourselves just those characteristics which are excluded when we regard ourselves as objects in the kingdom of nature.

Now, such a union of the "empirical" and the "intelligible characters" in the same being, such a coexistence
of necessity and freedom in the same subject, would have appeared impossible, if the *Critique of Pure Reason* had not prepared the way for it by teaching us to look at ourselves (as well as at all other objects) from two points of view. The *Critique* points out that a relation to the unity of the self is involved in all objects of experience as such. We cannot, therefore, treat *such* objects as things in themselves, which have an existence independent of their being known. It follows from this that the idea of nature as a system of objects under an external necessity must be qualified by the relation of the whole system to the ego; or, in other words, it must be recognised that it is not really a systematic whole apart from that ego. But from this two consequences follow. On the one hand, it follows that the law of external necessity cannot be taken as an absolute law, as an ultimate determination, even of the objects to which it is applied. This Kant expresses by saying that it does not determine them as things in themselves, which are regarded by him as having an existence apart from any relation to our consciousness through sensibility, if not apart from all relation to consciousness whatsoever. On the other hand, the recognition of the relation of objects as such to the self carries with it the consequence, that a conscious self cannot be taken as merely one object among others, just because in it there is realised a principle which qualifies the existence of all objects. They are determined as bound to each other by a law of external necessity only *for* a self, and therefore a self cannot be determined as bound *to* them by that law. In becoming conscious of itself in relation to them, a conscious being is not bringing them into relation to another object in the context of experience; it is bringing to consciousness a principle in relation to which alone they have their previous determination. It cannot be, therefore, that that determination which objects have only as objects for the self, should be extended to that very self.

So far the distinction seems to be quite clear. Objects of experience as such are under the law of nature and necessity, but not the self for which they are. But we are involved in a peculiar difficulty when we consider that the self appears also as *one* of the objects of experience.
and that, therefore, Kant is obliged to apply to it all the principles which he applies to other objects. The phenomenal subject, i.e., the self as an object, is regarded by him as merely one of the objects in the phenomenal world, which is determined like other objects under the law of nature and necessity. It, indeed, is distinguished from other objects, in so far as we are conscious of it as in a peculiar sense identified with the conscious subject for which it is. But, notwithstanding this, it remains for Kant an individual object in the world of experience, which is determined in all its states and changes in relation to other objects. If it acts upon them, it is only as they act upon it, and all the actions and reactions on both sides are determined by universal laws. The discovery of its necessary relation to the conscious subject, and even its identification therewith, does not, in his view, enable us to give any new determination to it any more than to any other objects: it only enables us to recognise it like other objects as phenomenal, and to refer it to a noumenon, i.e., to an Idea of it which is derived from pure thought. But that Idea, though it stimulates and directs us in the empirical determination of the self as an object, can never be satisfied in such determination. The result is that in all our knowledge of the self as an object, we can find nothing which enables us to determine it as free; though the thought that it is exempted from the law of necessity is necessarily suggested, whenever we reflect on its identity with the conscious subject for which it is.

This is the point at which, according to Kant, the theoretical consciousness leaves us. But the practical consciousness carries us a step farther, in so far as it is a consciousness of our own action, i.e., a consciousness of the ego, which is the subject of knowledge, as determining its own objective existence and the existence of other objects. In the theoretical consciousness, I do not, in the first instance, regard myself as a subject: rather, I am presented to myself as an object among other objects, determining them as I am determined by them; and if

1 An identification which is for Kant an insoluble problem. In what follows I do not refer to another view of the ego suggested in the second edition of the Critique (cf. Vol. I. 645 seq.), as Kant does not refer to it in his ethical works.
there were nothing but such a consciousness, it may be a question whether we should ever think of ourselves as subjects at all, or whether our consciousness of ourselves would not remain like that of the child who still speaks of himself in the third person. Reflexion upon the conditions of knowledge no doubt calls attention to the fact that objects can exist only for a self, which therefore is not merely one object among the others. But the "transcendental" reflexion, that reveals the relativity of objects in this sense, is not an element of the theoretical consciousness as such, which, in the first instance, is occupied with its objects and not with itself, or only with itself as an object and not as a subject. On the other hand, the practical consciousness is essentially a consciousness of the self as a subject, which determines itself as an object, and other objects through itself. In it the "I," for which other objects are, is regarded as itself the source of the determination which it gives to itself as an object. While, therefore, reflexion upon the conditions of the theoretical consciousness teaches us that the knowledge of objects is impossible, unless the self for which objects are is exempted from the law of necessity under which objects are determined as such; reflexion upon the conditions of our practical consciousness teaches us that action is impossible for us, unless the subject so exempted can find in itself a principle of self-determination. There is thus a parallelism, and at the same time a contrast, between the theoretical and the practical consciousness. The parallelism, consists in this that, just as we are conscious of ourselves as knowing only as we oppose the knowing subject to all objects, so we are conscious of ourselves as acting only as we regard the subject so opposed as determining the object. In other words, in the practical sphere we are conscious that the subject contains in itself a motive or principle of determination of itself as an object, and of other objects through itself. The contrast lies in the fact that, though knowledge of objects is not possible except in relation to a conscious self, it is, nevertheless, possible without a reflexion upon such relation; whereas, on the other hand, the action of a conscious self as such not only involves the determination of the object by the
subject, (and primarily of the object-self by the subject-self,) but it involves also the consciousness of that determination. For, only that action can be regarded as the action of a self which it attributes to itself, i.e., the action in which it is conscious of being determined by itself, and free from determination from without. It is in this sense that we have to understand Kant's assertion that "a rational being can act only under the idea of freedom," and that therefore "all the laws hold good for it which are inseparably bound up with the idea of freedom." In other words, a self-conscious being, as such, can act only as it ascribes its action to itself and not to external determining causes; and it cannot ascribe its action to itself, if it has not in itself as a subject a motive of action, if it does not derive from its consciousness of itself a principle for the determination of its actions. The reference of an action to the self is, in fact, the determination of it as not occurring by the necessity of nature, but only in virtue of our consciousness of our own being as an end and a law to itself. Only as I, the subject of knowledge, find in myself as such subject, a motive of action, can I have a consciousness that it is I who act. Now, in the last chapter, we have seen what Kant conceived to be the contents of this motive which the self-conscious subject derives from itself, or, in other words, what are the contents of the moral law. For the moral law is a law which is bound up with the consciousness of the self as a subject, in such a way that obedience to it is equivalent to making the self as subject our end. Hence, the consciousness of determination by that law is the consciousness of determination by ourselves, or, in other words, it is freedom.

So far we have not much difficulty in following Kant in the reasoning by which he connects the consciousness of freedom with the moral law. But Kant is, of course, obliged to admit that we are not always determined by the moral law, but also by passions, which he regards as determinations of the objective or phenomenal self by other objects in the phenomenal world. Hence, he has to face the question as to the possibility of such determinations being taken up into our will, so as to become the
motives of actions which we can regard as ours. How this is possible Kant does not in this connexion attempt to explain: in fact, we shall find that he finally contents himself with trying to show that such determination is necessarily inexplicable for us. But what he insists on, in the first instance, is that, as such determinations do not belong to our nature as rational or self-conscious subjects, they cannot affect our will except so far as they are taken up into it by ourselves. How a rational being should be determined by passion at all, we may not be able to discover: but what we can see is that he cannot be fatally determined by it; otherwise, when so determined, he would not be conscious of acting at all. The consciousness of the pathological affections of his being as impelling him, cannot directly yield a consciousness of himself as acting; for in action he must be conscious of the determination of himself by himself. That consciousness, however, can exist only as there is bound up with the very consciousness of self the idea of an end for which, or of a law according to which, we must act; in other words, only in so far as reason supplies a motive to the will. If, therefore, any particular end suggested by passion is "taken up" into the will—as Kant supposes it to be—it would seem that it must be in some way identified with, or subsumed under, the end set before itself by reason. For, unless it is in some way identified or combined with the idea of the end involved in the consciousness of myself, how can I be conscious of it as my motive, or how can it have anything to do with my action?

Kant's view, then, may be summed up thus. As he conceives the consciousness of the self as knowing to be possible only in opposition, though in relation, to the objective world; so he conceives the consciousness of the self as acting, to involve an opposition of the conscious self, as a subject which determines itself, to the self as an object determined by other objects; and hence an opposition of the motives which the conscious subject derives from its own being, to the motives of passion, which are derived from its objective or phenomenal existence. The latter, as they present themselves in

At least it must be so taken up by an act of self-determination.
opposition to the motive which the rational being derives from his own nature, are recognised as motives which *ought not* to determine him—except in so far as they coincide with the motive of reason; and on the other side, the motive of reason, in opposition to the motives of passion, appears as a "categorical imperative"; *i.e.*, it is accompanied with the feeling that a "moral necessity" is laid upon us to exclude all such motives from the determination of our will. How the motive of reason springing from the nature of the self can be absent in any action which we nevertheless attribute to ourselves, and how we can unite the consciousness of self-determination, *i.e.*, of determination by the self as an end or motive, with an action determined by passion, is inexplicable. But that we do so, and that, whenever we are determined by passion, it is because we have taken up the motive of passion into our maxims,—in other words, that we never are *fatally* determined by passion, but always make it our motive by our own choice,—is necessarily involved in the fact that we attribute such actions to ourselves.

The obvious difficulty of this view is, that Kant seems to connect the very idea of the will with the moral law in such a way, that it is impossible to understand how it should be affected in any way by the natural desires, or how it should be able to "take up" any of these desires as motives into itself: or, to put it otherwise, it is impossible to understand, how the subject should be able to descend from its position as subject so as to realise itself in, or unite itself with, desires, which are only determinations of its objective or phenomenal being. This difficulty is closely analogous to one which meets us in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There the pure unity of the conscious self to which objects as such are related, is supposed to make it the source of ideas of noumena in contrast with which these objects are determined as phenomenal; but it is not supposed to enable us to alter our view of the objects themselves, and to determine their noumenal reality. Here, in like manner, the pure consciousness of the self is supposed to be the source of a moral law, in contrast with which the passions are recognised as determinations of the phenomenal or objective self, deter-
minations which, therefore, ought not to become motives of the rational subject; but it is not supposed to be capable of giving a new determination to the passions, in virtue of which they may be brought into positive relation with the moral law. Thus, as in theory phenomenal objects were brought into relation with a noumenon, to which the knowledge of them could not be made conformable; so in practice the passions conceived as motives, are brought into relation with a law of freedom, with which they can never be completely harmonised. For action, so far as it is determined by the passions, involves the combination of two things which are essentially incommensurable. It involves that we should have the consciousness of being determined by ourselves (which is possible only in so far as our motive is derived from our own nature as subjects), and yet that we should admit into our motive a content which is derived from the states of our being as phenomenal objects. In other words, it involves that the matter of necessity should be brought under the form of freedom. We are, therefore, reduced by Kant to this dilemma. On the one hand, we are conscious of ourselves as acting, only as we are conscious of the motives of action as derived from the pure consciousness of self, as the subject in opposition to all objects. Hence, in order to regard an action based upon a motive of desire as our action, we must be able to subsume the particular desire under the general principle of action which is derived by reason from itself; or, in other words, to regard the end set before us by the desire, as only a particular form of the end of reason. But, on the other hand, the particular desires as such are determinations of the self as an object by other objects—determinations from which we must abstract in order to be conscious of our rational nature as a law and an end to itself. Hence, it seems impossible to conceive that their content should be subsumed, under the law of reason, or how, not being so subsumed, it should in any way be taken up into the will of a rational being.

The fundamental difficulty here suggested is for Kant, as we have said, insoluble, and it is confessed by him to be so; but he thinks that he is able to explain why Kant's solution of the difficulty by the distinction of the noumenal from the phenomenal point of view.
it should be insoluble. The union in one person of a consciousness of the self as a universal subject and of the same self as one particular object, is for him the difficulty of difficulties which no theory can cope with. But he points out that such a difficulty must arise, because we are obliged to regard ourselves, like other objects, in two points of view—as a phenomenal object and as a noumenon. For, when I look at myself as a noumenon, I necessarily abstract from the conditions of my phenomenal existence as an object in space and time; and, at the same time, I think of a possible determination of that phenomenal existence of mine, and, of course, of the world in which that existence is a part, in conformity with an ideal due to self-consciousness. To such an ideal, however, the phenomenal world must always stand in an asymptotic relation. Hence the process of determining practically, in accordance with that ideal, both myself and the world of which I as an individual am part, must be an endless process. I may determine myself and the world by actions in accordance with the ideal, but I can never find myself or it so determined as an empirical fact. If it be objected that we cannot aim at that which we know to be impossible, Kant's answer is twofold. In the first place, he points out that the objective impossibility of realising the moral ideal as an outward fact does not affect the subjective possibility of determining the will by that ideal as a motive. The action may be completed as a self-determination of the will, even though it produce no effect at all on the outward world. If it be then objected further, that this inner self-determination is with a view to the outward realisation of the ideal, and that, when the latter is found impossible, the former must also cease, Kant answers, in the second place, that, though we can express the ideal as an object only typically in terms of the phenomenal world, this does not affect its validity or reality as a law or end which is involved in the pure consciousness of ourselves. It is true that we cannot represent to ourselves

1 There is a difficulty here which we can best explain by putting before the reader the two alternative views which seem to be possible. Does Kant admit that the moral end needs an objective realisation beyond that which it has in the mere self-determination of the subject, and does the defect of our moral conscious-
any realisation of the moral end, unless we represent the phenomenal self and the phenomenal world as determined by moral laws as if they were laws of nature, *i.e.*, unless we represent the kingdom of ends as a nature conformed to the laws of the spirit; and it is true that this involves a conception of that as realised, which can never be realised, or experienced by us as realised, in the phenomenal world. But, we are to remember that this necessity of representing the law as realised in the phenomenal world comes of the general conditions that confine our knowledge to the phenomenal, and that, when we use the representation of the phenomenal self and the phenomenal world determined by moral laws as if they were laws of nature, to symbolise what we cannot otherwise express, viz., the realisation of moral laws, we are not really concerned with the particular phenomena of such a system, but only with the conception of it as a system. The natural system is the only system that we know under laws, and we use it as a type in order to think of the realisation of the moral law; but this only means that nature is at least so far analogous to the intelligible world,—which we can *think* but fail to *represent* for itself,—that it is an order determined by general laws. This analogy is all we need for our purpose. The important point, however, is that the moral law forces us to abstract from the conditions of our existence as members of the natural world, and to transfer ourselves in thought into an intelligible world; and though we are unable to represent the latter except as another, though differently constituted natural world, this theoretical inability of ours does not affect the reality of the system into which we are lifted by the moral law, as a system which is not naturally or phenomenally, but transcendentally, real. On
the contrary, the moral law, with its absolute imperative, turns the idea of freedom, which arises upon us as a possibility in connexion with the self-limitation of the theoretical reason, into an actuality or fact of reason, and thereby gives, so to speak, the casting vote in favour of the reality of the noumenal as against the phenomenal. We must conceive ourselves as members of the intelligible world in order to think of reason as practical, and we must think of reason as practical because we are obliged to think ourselves as subjected to the moral law. The moral law, in fact, forces us to think of our noumenal being as determined in itself, and as the source of all determination for our phenomenal being; and it also forces us to explain, by the limitation of our knowledge to the phenomenal, the impossibility of representing ourselves in the phenomenal world as free causes, determined purely by ourselves or by the law that is one with our self-consciousness.

All this, however, only enables us to understand how it should be impossible to represent our determination by the law of freedom, as actually realised in us as phenomenal objects in a phenomenal world, which as such is governed by the law of necessity. It enables us to see why the self-determination of a free being as such can only be typified, and not schematised as a change in ourselves or other objects, as objects of experience. But it does not do anything to explain how such a being should ever determine itself according to any other law except the law of freedom. Nor does it even "explain the inexplicableness" of such determination. Kant, however, continually speaks as if the same reason, which prevents us from comprehending the actions of a free cause as events in the phenomenal world, might also be conceived to prevent us from comprehending how such a cause should act by another law than that law of freedom. But, in the former case, the difficulty is simply to express the noumenon adequately in terms of the phenomenon; whereas, in the latter case, the difficulty is to conceive the noumenon as acting against the only law or principle under which it is determined for us as a noumenon, i.e., to conceive a free cause as such enslaving itself. And while, in the
former case, we have what is inexplicable, in the latter we seem to have what is self-contradictory.

The difficulty here stated becomes still more pressing, when we consider that Kant absolutely repudiates the idea of a freedom of indifference. Freedom is for him determination by the moral law, as the consciousness of it arises only out of the consciousness of being under that law. At the same time, as he conceives the will as capable of determining itself by other motives, which are borrowed from the natural being of the subject, he can escape the assertion of freedom of indifference only by taking refuge in the unknowable, i.e., in the impossibility of explaining the combination of the phenomenal with the noumenal consciousness of self.¹ The following passage expresses as clearly as any his view of the subject.

¹We have really two alternatives: either that all motives should be subsumed under the idea of self as an end, or that the will should arbitrarily unite itself with a motive not so subsumed. But the idea of the self as an end is equivalent with Kant to the moral law, and therefore only good actions can be so subsumed. On the other hand, an unmotivated act, by which the will unites itself to the motives of passion, is an exercise of the liberty of indifference. Kant refuses to accept the latter alternative, though his logic seems to drive him towards it; and in this he is guided by a true instinct. For, as I shall attempt to show, it is in the direction of the former that alone we can expect a solution of the difficulty. In other words, there is a sense in which the Platonic doctrine is true, that every rational being as such desires only the good, or at least desires everything which it does desire, sub ratione boni.

The reader will observe the sense in which it is admitted that Kant’s doctrine involves the idea of liberty of indifference. It is entirely owing to the way in which here, as in all other parts of his philosophy, he seems to combine two inconsistent points of view; or rather, owing to the fact that his proposed method of abstraction conceals a method of “concretion.” If we make him perfectly self-consistent in either way we escape the difficulty. If we say that the moral law is the sole motive which is derived from man’s nature as a noumenal subject, we should be driven to the conclusion that determination by any other motive is attributable to him only as a phenomenal object. As a matter of fact we find that in Kant’s treatise on Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, he does maintain that man’s fall cannot be due to motives of sensuous desire; but he still refers back the fall to an “intelligible act,” i.e., an act of man as a noumenon. On the other hand, we may say that all motives as such, even if their content be derived from sensuous passion, are necessarily determined by self-consciousness, and, therefore, brought under the idea of the good; and that it is only owing to an abstract way of looking at the desires, that they are regarded as desires of particular objects without relation to the good. And thus also we may reach a consistent view of man’s practical life. For in speaking thus, we should just be following out, in relation to practical reason, the same course of thought which
"The freedom of the will (Willkühr) cannot be defined as the capacity of choosing to act for, or against the law (libertas indifferentiae), though in will as the empirical phenomenon of freedom we find plenty of examples of this. For freedom, (as we become aware of it in the first instance through the moral law,) is known to us only by a negative characteristic in ourselves, viz., that we are not forced to action by sensuous motives. On the other hand, we cannot theoretically exhibit this characteristic in its positive aspect, as the faculty of man regarded purely as an intelligence to lay compulsion on his sensuously determined will; for this would imply our knowledge of it in its noumenal reality. While, therefore, it is true that man as an object of sense shows in experience a faculty of choosing, not only in agreement with the law, but also in opposition to it, we cannot find in this fact the means of defining that freedom which belongs to him as an intelligible being. For phenomena can throw no light on a supersensuous object such as freewill: and freedom can by no means be placed in this, that the rational subject has a power of making a choice that conflicts with his (legislative) reason, though experience often enough shows that he does so (a fact, the possibility of which we are unable to comprehend). But it is one thing to admit such a proposition to be true as expressing an empirical fact, and quite a different thing to make it the principle of explanation (for the conception of freedom) and the universal mark of distinction (between it and an arbitrium brutum s. servum); for, in the former case, we do not assert that the predicate necessarily belongs to the con-

we have already applied to theoretical reason. As in the latter case, the noumenal object was seen to be just the phenomenal in its relation to the conscious self, so here the motives of reason which determine man as a noumenal subject are seen to be not essentially different from the motives of passion which determine him as a phenomenon, but only the same motives as reinterpreted and transformed by relation to the principle which is the real source of their power over us. Now, whichever of these two views we adopt, we get rid of the idea of liberty of indifference, and we are able to arrive at a consistent view of man as free in the Kantian sense. And it is only because Kant's real progress from the abstract to the concrete, i.e., his progress towards the latter view, is concealed under an apparent movement from the concrete towards the abstract, i.e., toward the former view, that he can be accused of favouring the idea of liberty of indifference, an idea which he always condemns whenever he has directly to speak of it.
ception, while in the latter case we do. Freedom, in reference to the inner legislation of reason, alone is properly to be regarded as a faculty or power: the possibility of diverging from this law is a defect, or want of faculty (Unvermögen). How then can we expect to explain the former by the latter? A definition which goes beyond the practical conception and brings in, in addition, the action by which it is realised, as that is exhibited in experience, is a bastard definition, (definitio hybrida,) and one which puts the conception in a false light." ¹

This passage shows in a very striking way how Kant refuses to admit into the conception of freedom the idea of a possible determination by passion, while yet he asserts that, from the point of view of experience, man often appears to be so determined. But the legitimate conclusion here would be that he only appears to be so determined; or, in other words, that the imperfection of our empirical view of the facts of man's moral life, which we can know only in their phenomenal appearance, is the reason why we often seem to be determined by other motives than the moral law. But, as I have already pointed out, Kant does not use this imperfection of our phenomenal view of freedom merely to explain,—what alone it can properly explain,—why we cannot "envisage," and so understand, the acts of a free subject as the manifestation of the law of its freedom. He would further use it to explain why we cannot conceive how such a free subject should submit itself to another law, i.e., should cease to be itself. To say, as Kant here says, that this choice to act by another law which is not its own law is to be explained, not by a faculty, but by a "want or defect of faculty," is an obvious evasion. For how, consistently with Kant's fundamental principles, can a defect of freedom be produced in the subject, whose essential nature is freedom, except by the exercise of that freedom? And how in that exercise can the subject throw off a law which is identical with its consciousness of self? In fact, no solution of the difficulty is possible, so long as the empirical self and its desires are regarded as simply incommensurable with the noumenal self and its law. But if,

¹R. IX. 28; H. VI. 23.
on the other hand, the good which is the end of the self, though not simply identical with the ends of the desires, is yet capable of being brought into relation to them as a principle to which they should conform, it necessarily follows that the desires and the empirical self to which they belong are not asymptotically related to the pure self. And thus, the negative relation of desire and duty must be based upon a positive relation which is deeper than itself.

On this point enough has been said already, but there is one consequence of it which has special reference to the present subject. The desires, as we have seen, cannot be motives to our will unless they present themselves as forms of self-realisation; for it is not our desires but our self that we seek to satisfy. In other words, it is only as we regard an object or end as having a place in a totality of ends, the realisation of which is one with the realisation or satisfaction of the self, that it can be a motive to us. Hence, a mere natural impulse as such is never a motive to us. But also it must be added that, as such merely natural impulse, it cannot exist for us as a conscious impulse at all. We can be conscious of an external object without realising its relation to the self which is conscious of it, but we cannot be conscious of a desire as a desire in us and yet as merely something which we observe. In becoming conscious of it as our own impulse, we become conscious of it as having reference to an object which has its place among others in the sources of satisfaction of the self, i.e., in the ideal world correspondent to the self, which necessarily organises itself for us, as beings who will and desire, in opposition yet in relation to the real world of experience. When we are moved to its satisfaction, therefore, we are not subjecting ourselves to a natural necessity which is opposed to self-determination. Such a view of desires as determining us merely from without, may and does arise at a certain stage of our moral development; and we shall have hereafter to explain its origin and its relative justification. Here, it is sufficient to point out that it is a one-sided and indeed self-contradictory view; for it implies that the consciousness of our freedom or self-determination is present to us only through the moral law
as opposed to the consciousness of determination by passion. If, however, this opposition were absolute, it would not take the form of an opposition of motives of which we are conscious in ourselves; for where we were determined by passion, we should not be conscious of ourselves as acting at all. And on such a view it would be no exaggeration to say that in acts to which we are moved by passion, it is (not indeed 'sin') but nature that acts in us. On the other hand, if the opposition be not absolute, or in other words, if passion cannot be a motive except as its object is represented as in some way a realisation or satisfaction of the self, and therefore as a form of, or element in, the same good which is abstractly opposed to it by the Stoics and Kant, then there is no reason to deny that we are conscious of our freedom in acting on motives of passion. While, therefore, Kant is right in saying that the consciousness of freedom is necessarily a consciousness of the determination of our actions by the idea of self, (or an end which presents itself as the realisation of the self,) and while he is also right in saying that, at a particular stage of reflexion, determination by the idea of self necessarily takes on the aspect of determination by an abstract moral law, he is wrong in supposing that this is the only form of the consciousness of freedom, and, in particular, he is wrong in supposing that we have not the consciousness of freedom, i.e., of ourselves as active, when our motives are motives of passion. What is necessary to the consciousness of freedom or self-determination is simply that, immediately or mediately, the object willed should be one in the attainment of which we have the consciousness of the self as realised. For, so far as this is the case,—and it must be the case whenever we have a consciousness of self as desiring the object,—there is a consciousness of self-determination, i.e., of ourselves as acting and not as acted on. We may indeed admit that the distinct consciousness of the freedom of spirit, in opposition to the necessity of nature, first arises in connexion with that abstract opposition of reason and passion which is so fully expressed in the Stoic and Kantian philosophies. But it is the fundamental mistake of these philosophies, first to confuse the latter with the former
opposition, the opposition of reason and passion with the
opposition of subject and object; and then, as a con-
sequence of this confusion, to treat the former opposition
as absolute. Hence, in order fully to disentangle the
intricacies of this question, two things would be necessary;
first, to show how the opposition of reason and passion, as
different motives of the one conscious self, i.e., different
forms of self-determination, arises, and how it is related to
the opposition of freedom and necessity, self-determination,
and determination by another; and, secondly, to show
what are the nature and limits of the latter opposition, and
to consider whether even it can be taken as absolute. It
will, however, be more convenient to take up these ques-
tions in the opposite order, and to begin by considering
how the contrast of freedom and necessity can be traced
back to the very rise of the consciousness of self, in opposi-
yet in relation to the consciousness of objects.

The first step towards the solution of this difficulty is to
recall that it is only by a false abstraction that objects are
conceived as external to the self, in the sense of not
involving a relation to it. The principle that constitutes
our individual being as self-conscious subjects is a prin-
ciple which is implied in all objects; for it is only in
relation to it that they are objects, which together, and by
their action and reaction on each other, make up one world
of experience. But if this is true, there can be no purely
external relations between the subject and objects, such as
were supposed to exist between objects as such: nay, even
between objects, such external relations cannot be admitted
to exist, except as they are conceived in abstraction from
the principle for which they are. Or, perhaps we should
rather say, that as their externality to each other is itself a
determination which they have as objects for a self, it pre-
supposes their unity, and exists only as the means through
which the principle of that unity reveals itself. Or, to put
it more directly, their existence is not merely an existence
for a self but an existence of a self—an existence which is
essentially spiritual. It is true that as external, i.e., as in
the form of space, they appear (to use an expression of
Kant) "to detach themselves from our spirit and hover
without." But their existence in this externality is
phenomenal, i.e., as so represented, they are existences which are not self-maintaining wholes or realities, but involve an essential reference to a being different from themselves, in whose existence they are moments. Now, a self-conscious being necessarily stands to such objective or external things in a relation which is not external, or not merely external. For, in such a being, the principle, which is involved though not expressed in them, is revealed; and if, from a lower point of view, he, as self-conscious, stands apart from them, marked off from them by the greatest of all differences, yet, from a higher point of view, the difference ceases to be an absolute one; and that which, viewed in itself, is external and externally determined, becomes recognised when viewed in its relation to the conscious self, as the expression of an inward self-determining principle. Hence, we might say that in him the external world becomes self-conscious, or that in him the substance reveals itself, in relation to which external things may be regarded as accidents; he is the noumenon of which they are phenomena. Hence, if such a being stands, on the first view of him, in external relation to other beings and objects, determining them and being determined by them on equal terms, yet this merely external relation already, in becoming a conscious relation, has ceased to be external; in becoming a relation for the self-conscious being, it has ceased to be merely a relation of him. Or, in other words, the self-conscious being cannot distinguish himself from his object without relating both to a unity which is revealed only in itself and not in his object (unless that object be another self-conscious being)—a unity in relation to which all externality exists, and for which, therefore, nothing is external. The consciousness of the self is, therefore, necessarily a consciousness of freedom; for, just in so far as the self is presupposed, or presupposes itself as a subject, in all determination of the object and of itself as object, it cannot be conscious of the object as externally determining it; and though the object-self, as one object among others, might be regarded as so determined, yet, in so far as it is identified with the subject-self, the external relation of determination becomes itself a vehicle of self-determina-
tion. Or, to put it otherwise, as self-conscious it necessarily transcends its own mere existence as one object among others, and is thus capable of determining, or rather, we may say, it exists only in determining, that existence through a universal principle—a principle which is negatively related to its phenomenal existence as one object among others, and which reveals itself positively only in reconstituting that existence in view of itself as an end.

To put this in another way:—the objective world cannot externally determine a self-conscious or spiritual being, unless it is an existence external to and independent of spirit; or unless such spiritual being is imperfectly spiritual or self-conscious, so that what is really one in principle with itself comes to it as if it were external or alien: in which latter case, to say that it is determined by an external object really means that it is not in harmony with itself. Now, the former alternative is excluded by the idealistic proof that existence is of necessity existence for a self. It remains, therefore, that necessity can exist for a spiritual being only as a consequence of its imperfect development, i.e., of the fact that in it self-consciousness is inadequate to its own idea, or, in other words, that it is a self-consciousness which is in process of growth. For such a self-consciousness the world may be an external and resistant sphere of action, just because the content of self-consciousness in its case is not adequate to the form. But, then, the very necessity that fronts it as something external and so limits it, is just the means whereby that content is gradually purified and the sensuous individuality transformed into the vehicle of a higher spiritual life.

Self-consciousness is, in the first instance, a consciousness of the self in opposition to the world, and especially to other self-conscious beings. In this point of view, the self-conscious being, though a subject, is present to itself as merely one being external to others, determined by them and determining them on equal terms. The content which it has in its consciousness, the ends of action which it recognises, seem to be entirely determined by its natural individuality; and the form of consciousness, with which such content is invested, seems to leave that content altogether unchanged. But we have to remember that the
conscious self, is more than it knows; and that the opposition which it establishes between itself and its object is a negative relation which implies a positive relation. This again implies a unity in the self which does not fall under that relation, but determines it. It is this unity, involved in the consciousness of self, which makes it impossible for a rational being continuously and consistently to recognise itself as a mere object among objects; and it is this that gives a universal character to its will: or, as we should rather say, it is this that gives it a will. For only a self-conscious being, which sets its own being before it as an end, can be properly said to have a will. In other words; it has a will, because it is conscious not only of objects but of itself, and because its consciousness of self is not something different from its consciousness of objects, but rather includes and subordinates that consciousness, or, in other words, gives it a new principle of unity by a return upon the self involved in it.

What hides this nature of the will from us is the fact that the form of the will is determined by the nature of the self-consciousness out of which, or in connexion with which, it arises; and in so far as that self-consciousness is primarily negative, i.e., is a consciousness of self in opposition to other objects, it must be a selfish or exclusive will, which can assert itself only in taking away the apparent independence of objects, or in reducing them to instruments of itself. In other words, self-consciousness arises in opposition to the consciousness of objects; and though it really includes and goes beyond the consciousness in opposition to which it arises, though it is that consciousness in a further stage of development, the opposition is more prominent in the first appearance of self-consciousness than the inclusion, the negative than the positive relation. Thus self-consciousness at first seems to stand to the consciousness of the object merely as the consciousness of one object to that of another. It is not seen that what from one point of view is the process whereby we become conscious of a self in opposition to objects, is from another point of view the process whereby the principle of their existence is disclosed, the process whereby, we might even say, they become conscious of
themselves in us. And for the same reason, the content of a consciousness which is thus for itself external to its object is inadequate to its form. For the self, viewed as an individual object in opposition to other individual objects, reduces itself to the mere animal individuality; and though the content of self-consciousness can never be strictly limited to that individuality, yet neither can it distinctly rise above it, so long as the universal principle in the conscious self is not seen to establish positive relations, which are not merely external relations, between the self as object and other objects. Self-consciousness, in short, is still in the dualistic form of consciousness, and, therefore, has its content limited by that form. Yet this cannot be altogether so. Self-consciousness, as we have seen, presupposes consciousness, and contains it as an element in itself; and though the opposition in which it first arises hides this wider compass, yet it cannot but show itself indirectly, if in nothing else, at least in an assertion of the individual self which denies all rights to the not-self, or seeks to absorb it in the self. If the ego is to itself only an individual among other individuals, yet its individuality becomes, so to speak, stretched to the limits of its universal nature; or rather, as it is impossible to reach the universal without abnegation of the merely individual self, it is stretched without limit. But the addition to each other of finite particulars, conceived as materially exclusive, can never realise a universal which is not in any of them. Hence selfishness gives rise to a progressus ad infinitum, a Schlechte Unendlichkeit, which mocks the true infinite. It sets up the self as an individual object external to all the objects in which its satisfaction is supposed to lie, and can, therefore, think of that satisfaction only as an external subordination of all other individual objects to itself. But, just because such satisfaction is in what is external, it can never be complete. Carlyle’s 1 shoeblack cannot be satis-

1 Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, II. IX. "Will the whole Finance Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in joint-stock company, to make one Shoeblack happy? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two: for the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other than his Stomach; and would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more and no less: God's infinite universe altogether to himself; therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as fast as it rose. . . .
fied, because, so long as the self is to itself merely individual, the universality that belongs to it as self-conscious can show itself only as the continual unsated demand for something more. The objects which it seeks, being taken as merely finite, isolated objects, are no sooner attained than they are rejected as inadequate.

Now, this has an important bearing on the question of freedom; for freedom, as Kant shows, consists in this, that the conscious subject should determine itself in view of its own universal nature alone, and not by its particular passions or their objects. Yet such determination is impossible, unless the universal can be willed in willing the particular, with which action is always concerned. Now, in one sense we must will the universal in willing the particular; for, as I have already said, it is as the satisfaction of the self that all objects are desired and willed. But the self is not at first directly conscious of its own universality, and its will of the particular does not seem to receive anything more than an empty form from self-consciousness. The positive meaning of this form, and the inadequacy of the particular matter as such to it, are seen at first only in the reaction of our discontent with the particular as attained, or in the impossibility of satisfying ourselves in particular objects as such. The self is not realised in them; for, what such objects as merely particular can give to it, is but a momentary or partial gratification of some tendency of the sensitive subject, and in this point of view the value of the object as an end is only its pleasure-value. Though, therefore, we may say that a rational or self-conscious being always acts under the idea of freedom, inasmuch as it is always itself its own motive; yet, in so far as those objects in which it seeks to realise itself are taken by it only as particular, its realisation of its freedom is a continual enslavement of itself. The matter of its end is derived from its own sensuous individuality, in opposition to other beings, or it is found in objects only as satisfying that

Try him with half a Universe, of an Omnipotence, he sets to quarrelling with the proprietor of the other half, and declares himself the most maltreated of men.— Always there is a black spot in our sunshine, it is even, as I said, the Shadow of Ourselves."
individuality: it is, therefore, a matter which, as particular, is not adequate to the form, and which, as particular, is always externally dependent upon other particulars. In two ways, then, the self so conceived is unrealisable: as it cannot be satisfied with that which satisfies, or would otherwise satisfy, its sensuous individuality; and as that individuality is limited in its satisfaction by its relations to other objects, and is thus dependent on what, in relation to it, is a mere contingency. Its consciousness of an act as done in view of the idea of itself, or, in other words, its consciousness of the act as its own,—which is, therefore, a consciousness of freedom,—is vitiated by the content of the act, and, by the result of it; and thus the consciousness of freedom turns into a consciousness of enslavement to accidental desire and external contingency. Hence, we do not wonder that Kant should refuse to connect the idea of freedom with it at all, and should recognise that idea only in the abstraction from such contingency, which is connected with the consciousness of the pure law or of the universal self as an end. It is, however, to be remembered (1) that the consciousness of particular objects as ends of action cannot arise apart from the presentation of the self to itself as an end: and (2) that when, on account of the inadequacy of such matter to the form of self-consciousness, the division arises of a higher from a lower end,—and so of the moral consciousness from the consciousness of the self as a natural individual,—the moral consciousness does not, in the first instance, take the form of a pure idea of law, or of the pure universal self as an end. Rather, the moral end at first presents itself as the realisation of what Kant calls a kind of kingdom of ends. The individual recognises his membership in some social unity, be it the family or the clan or the nation, as the ground of a law which ought to determine his individual existence. Still, as was shown in the last chapter, the idea of such a kingdom in its widest and truest form, as embracing all rational beings as such, cannot arise till the abstraction from all particular bonds has revealed to us the pure principle of unity which lies in self-consciousness.

The consciousness of freedom or self-determination in the individual, i.e., the consciousness of his being the
author of his own actions and responsible to himself independently of all circumstances, must always appear a paradox so long as, and in so far as, the individual, in whom such a consciousness is awakened, regards any thing or being to which he is related as purely external to himself, and acting on him from without. Hence, for the individual, the consciousness of freedom must be a contradiction, unless he can regard himself as identified with a principle which, while it realises itself through his particular individuality and that of others, binds them all to each other as members of one organic whole. For it is only through such organic continuity with all other beings, and even in a sense with all other things, that the individual as such can overcome the limits of his individuality, or the limits which the individuality of others sets to him. Self-consciousness—as dissolving the limits of mere individuality, or as the consciousness of a being which finds itself only as it tends to go out of itself to the whole to which it belongs, or only as it makes the life of that whole its own,—is thus the bestower of real freedom, a freedom which is not merely the negation of limits, but of which such limits have become the expression.

Kant never quite escapes from the idea of negative freedom, and hence he is not able clearly to rise above the idea of freedom of indifference. This consequence will be seen at once if we consider that to reach freedom in the negative way, we must abolish that from which we abstract. The ego, set against the world and its own being as a particular object in the world, can determine itself freely only if, with this abstraction, all relations, including even negative relations, to that world and to his own particular existence in it, are annihilated. For, unless this is so, the particular appears outside of the universal self as still limiting it; and it may even be argued that, except as determined by this negative relation, there is no universal self at all, or, in other words, that we cannot separate its universality from this negative relation to the particular. Hence, the Stoics found it necessary to regard the passions as unnatural, and moral action as a determination by pure reason without any reference to them. And the apathy of the wise man was conceived by them, not merely as the
ascetic negation of passion, but as an absolute disappearance of passion from the presence of the pure self-determining reason. Kant accomplishes the same necessary movement by his distinction of noumena and phenomena. According to him, we are restricted to the noumenal point of view in determining the subject as free; in other words, the abstraction from the particular and objective aspect of the self is fixed as an absolute and final abstraction, and the phenomenal from which abstraction is made, is supposed absolutely to disappear in the pure self-affirmation of reason. But Kant, as we have seen, is too much concerned about the concrete content of morals to hold firmly to this point of view. He even goes so far in the opposite direction as to demand that the phenomenal self should be not merely negatively but positively determined by the noumenal. Thus the noumenon, though defined only by abstraction from the phenomenal, has after all to be realised in the phenomenal; though it is true that Kant again tries to escape the consequence of this admission, by asserting that the representation of the moral law as a law of nature gives us merely a type of the intelligible world.

We must thus meet Kant's view by a double correction. In the first place, we must point out that the abstraction from the phenomenal world and the phenomenal self cannot be an absolute separation of the two. Such separation is impossible; since it is just the relation, though the negative relation, to the particular which defines the universal for us. The subjective self, which is opposed to the objective world and the objective self, has all its characteristics determined by this opposition; and if we remove this opposition, together with the phenomenal world and phenomenal self which it implies, there is nothing left. The consciousness of a self is impossible apart from the consciousness of an objective world, in which its own particular existence is determined in relation to other particulars; nor is there any self-consciousness which is not at the same time a consciousness of the not-self. This is the truth which underlies the error of those who take the self simply as one object among others, and are thereby led into the easy way of determinism. But, in the second
place, it is not the whole truth; for we must remember that
this negation and opposition, which seems from one point
of view to presuppose the object, in another point of view
first reveals what the object is. In a true sense, therefore,
though with a paradoxical expression, we may say that it is
just the return of consciousness upon self from the object
that reveals the nature of the object from which we make
return. A consciousness which had not made such return,
could not properly be said to know what the object really
is; for what it really is can only mean what it is for a self.
Here, therefore, we find a clue to the meaning of that first
consciousness of freedom, which arises with the conscious-
ness of the self in opposition to the object, a clue which
enables us to detect at once the truth and the error con-
tained in it. The ego is really free, only as it is more than
the mere subject; or as its consciousness of itself is not
the consciousness of one object as opposed to other objects,
but of a unity in which the consciousness of all objects is
an element. But, in its first consciousness of freedom, it
attaches freedom as a predicate to the self, as external to,
and exclusive of, the objects which it really implies. The
ego in itself gets the predicates which properly belong only
to the ego as including that to which it seems to be opposed.
It, as abstracted from all objects, is credited with being
that which it is only as in its concreteness including the
object, as being the object and something more: or, as
Schelling said, as being the object in a higher power. As
thus abstracted from, the object ceases to be even so much
as an object, and the phantom of liberty of indifference, the
abstraction from all determination, substitutes itself for the
idea of self-determination. The negation of determination
by which self-consciousness arises, is not seen to include
the determination which it negates, and becoming mere
indeterminateness, it ceases to mean anything. For a self
which is determined by no motives can have no will.

Thus, liberty of indifference is an absurdity: it is the
liberty of the void. Yet we must add that in our earliest
consciousness of freedom, or of ourselves as acting, there
is something that corresponds to such liberty; something
which partly justifies the idea, that freedom is necessarily
liberty of indifference, by showing that it contains an
element of the truth. What that element is, we may briefly indicate by saying that man is never a mere creature of impulse, but always mingles in his impulsiveness an element of caprice. The consciousness of the self acting, even in the man who seems most simply to obey the stimulus of passion, always involves at least an inchoate distinction of the self from the special desires and their objects, a distinction which rests on the universality of the self. This distinction and relation brings with it a qualification of the desires in virtue of which they cease to be mere animal impulses: but it brings with it also, what at present we are more interested in observing, a tendency to set up the self as an end, in opposition to all particular ends of desire. We can best show what this tendency implies by taking it in its most developed form, in the man whom we call wilful or capricious. For what caprice shows, is that the abstract self is becoming an object of will as distinct from, or even as opposed to, all objects of desire. The will of the capricious man is one whose motive is to show the bare self as a power in the world. To him, it is more important that it is his will and not another's that is realised, than that what he wills is realised. Stat pro ratione voluntas. Such a will cannot but have some particular content, but it is not concerned with that content, and its wilfulness may even go so far as to rebel against every particular content in turn: for, to the capricious man his whole past may seem to be a constraint, and what he seeks is to get rid of constraint, or to show himself as independent of it.

Such caprice is, of course, no real freedom; and its effort after independence turns by a natural dialectic into its direct opposite. In the abstract self there is no content to set against the content from which it would free itself. And if we, from a higher point of view, can regard it as seeking to realise a universal end, yet it is conscious of no such end, and with all its contortions it merely shifts from particular to particular. The capricious man is, therefore, the plaything of circumstances and of the passing whims which they suggest. In his emptiness of substantial interests, he makes himself the slave of chance. Thus, caprice contradicts itself, and takes from the ego it seems
to exalt, the very characteristic which must be the ground of any opposition between the self as universal and the particular inclinations. It is, in fact, always a merely particular will, an inconsistent willing of this at one time and that at another; and we can understand its possibility, as opposed to a mere animal obedience to impulse, only if we regard it as the first imperfect form in which the universality of the self manifests itself as opposed to the particularity of the impulses. Caprice, we may say, is blindly seeking the universality of law; and this is often shown in practice by the fact that the capricious man tires of his "unchartered freedom," and throws himself at the feet of an outward authority that he may escape from himself. He learns by the self-contradiction of his life that *nur das Gesetz kann uns die Freiheit geben*; but, as he has not yet learnt to know himself as universal, the law which frees him from himself only enslaves him to another. The absolute fixity of external law and inviolable custom is the natural refuge of the wilful man from his own wilfulness. The breaking of wilfulness by a despotism, the subjection of a lawless caprice to capricious and arbitrary law, is the first step towards morality,—*i.e.*, towards an obedience to law which is freedom, an obedience of the rational subject to the law which as rational he lays down for himself.

Now, it is just such a consciousness of freedom which is expressed in the Stoic and Kantian philosophies, a consciousness that man is free as he obeys the law of his own being, and no other law. Such philosophies, however, could arise only after a long process of social development, in which individuals were gradually disciplined or moralised by subjection to the outward law of society; while, on the other hand, that outward law was gradually made less capricious and unfair by the reaction of the individuals subjected to it. The Stoic set the inward against the outward law: but it was only because the outward law had become to a considerable extent the expression of reason that the idea of an inward law was suggested to him. For his revolt was not against a capricious despotism, but against the comparatively rational order of the Greek or Roman State. It is not the
faults of a bad, but of a good state of things that are felt most keenly; for it is the latter alone that bring with them a standard of excellence by which they are condemned. The relative equality of Roman justice thus awoke a consciousness that the source of all authority over man is in the reason within him, which is at once the maker and the destroyer of all outward laws. At the same time, it was only natural that when it had once arisen, this first consciousness of reason as self-legislative should rapidly become one-sided and abstract; in other words, that it should become a consciousness not of the outward law as the inward, but of the inward law as opposed to the outward. Hence, in this new form of the consciousness of freedom there seemed to be a revival of the idea of self-will as opposed to any other will. The difference was that the self-will was no longer caprice, for it was no more the bare "I" that was willed, but the "I" as universal reason. The individual was viewed as independent of all that is without him, only because his consciousness of himself was one with his consciousness of an absolute law or principle, to which all things and beings, even himself as regards all his particular powers and tendencies, were subjected. Thus, the Stoic idea of freedom seems at first to be removed toto coelo from caprice. It has, however, a point in common with caprice, in so far as it separates the consciousness of self from the consciousness of the object, and therefore necessarily empties the former of all its positive contents. Its universal law is so opposed to all particulars that it cannot become a principle of order among them. On this point we need not dwell, as the merits and defects of this abstract idea of morality, especially in Kant's expression of it, have been so fully considered in the last chapter. We have seen that he was not able, after all his efforts, to correct its fatal flaw, or to discover any essential relation between the universal law and the particular matter of desire to which it is opposed. Hence, the law, which, as a law of freedom, is bound up with the consciousness of self, remains for him an empty word, a universal which has no particular contents, a "will which wills nothing." Kant, indeed, tries to supply this defect by symbolising the moral laws as laws of nature: but this,
as we shall see, makes it necessary for him to think of the moral life as a *progressus ad infinitum* towards an impossible end, an end which is fixed as impossible by the abstract opposition of the moral and the natural with which he started. Further (what is of more importance in relation to the subject of the present chapter) Kant's view of freedom, though it seems to remove some of the difficulties of the question by showing that there is a motive which reason can derive from itself, yet in the end forces him to postulate something very like that liberty of indifference which he explicitly rejects. For if, like Kant, we represent the will as owing subjection to the moral law, and yet, on the other hand, as capable of being led away from it by passion, we are forced to think of an empty ego standing between the law and the motives, and arbitrarily determining itself in one way or another.

The only way in which we can clear up the difficulties of the subject is, by showing that the consciousness of freedom under those two subordinate forms, as caprice and as obedience to abstract law, can be regarded only as anticipative of a truth which is adequately expressed in neither. For, in both these forms, freedom is claimed for the self in virtue of an abstraction from the particular content of consciousness; and the particular content must, therefore, be regarded as absolutely annulled; for, if not, we should be obliged to treat it as externally limiting and determining the self. It is, however, because the self is potentially more than is represented in either of those imperfect forms that *relative* truth can be ascribed to them. Both of these ideas of freedom, in fact, bring together the elements of that idea in a way that involves an imperfect statement of the universal, as well as the particular, side of it. Both, therefore, give rise to an antinomy or dilemma, in which the alternatives are:—on the one hand, the fatal determination of the will by the feelings and passions of the particular subjectivity; on the other hand, the negation of such determination, which can mean only the liberty of indifference. When, however, we see not merely that the self-conscious will of the individual, in virtue of its universality, opposes itself to the particular desires and their objects, but also that this universality can only be
conceived as the principle of unity in the particular, and as, therefore, bringing, with every step in the development of the consciousness of it, a new determination of the particulars, we get beyond from the alternative of a freedom which is empty, and a determination which is necessary and external, (both of which alternatives would be equally fatal to the moral consciousness). For, from this point of view, we perceive that all the moments by which the consciousness of self is determined, are really its own moments; though in its imperfect development they are necessarily presented as external to it and to each other. In other words, this apparent externality is itself one of the phases through which it must pass in virtue of the law of its own development,—though it is a phase which has its value only as a moment of transition.

But it is the truth only "which is the index of itself and of the error it corrects." It is only from the highest point of view, or in reference to its own completed development, that the undeveloped consciousness becomes intelligible, or receives a relative justification. It is only when we get beyond the abstract antagonism of the universal to the particular will, only when we reach the idea of a kingdom of ends in which the particular nature of each becomes the means to the realisation of the one universal principle or end which inspires all, that we can understand the relative value of this and all other imperfect conceptions of the moral life. We can do justice to the truth contained in the inadequate, and in themselves contradictory, forms of the consciousness of freedom, only when we regard them as stages in the development of a higher idea of it. For it must be acknowledged that, if there had been nothing latent in these forms beyond that which was explicitly present to consciousness, there would have been an absolute contradiction between the different elements contained in them. Equally in the idea of freedom as caprice, and in the idea of freedom as obedience to the moral law, the consciousness of the will as containing its own motive is combined with the consciousness of the will as having a particular content. But in neither do we discover the unity that holds these two opposite factors together. But from the point of view which we have now reached, we are able
to see that the self-contradiction of the consciousness of freedom in those earlier stages of its development, is the very means by which it is developed to a form in which the contradiction disappears. We are enabled, in fact, to regard them as necessary, because the elements of that consciousness must be divided, and even opposed to each other, before they can be truly and conclusively united.
CHAPTER IV

MORAL FEELING

THERE are two aspects of Kant’s moral theory which have not yet been directly discussed, though they have been referred to, viz., (1) the way in which the feelings of the subject are determined by the moral idea, and, (2) the nature of the Chief Good as at once the ideal or end which is set before us by our rational nature, and the ultimate reality from which all else that is real derives its existence. The former of these topics will be treated in this chapter, the latter in the chapter following.

I have already referred to Kant’s distinction between motives which are based upon feelings of pleasure and pain and which, therefore, are dependent on the action of objects on our sensibility, and motives which are derived from our consciousness of ourselves as rational subjects. The consciousness of the moral law is at the same time a consciousness of freedom, because it forces us to abstract from all the motives of desire, and to regard ourselves as capable of determination by the unconditioned imperative of duty, without any regard to the circumstances of our individual life, or to the particular nature of the feelings of pleasure and pain which are excited thereby. It thus produces a negative effect on our sensibility—a feeling which is like pain\(^1\) because it comes into collision with the

\(^1\) Kant (R. VIII. 197; H. V. 77) says that it is “a feeling which may be called pain,” and (R. VIII. 255; H. V. 123) that it is “scarcely an analogon of pleasure”; but even this latter phrase, and still more, the whole account of the way in which the feeling is produced, shows that he conceives it as a pleasure reached through pain, a satisfaction of the higher nature reached through the negation of the lower, but still a satisfaction. Kant shrinks from calling it pleasure, only because he confines that word to the immediate satisfaction of the
immediate movement of natural desire in us. When we stand face to face with the moral law, we cannot feel that we have any value or merit in ourselves apart from it. Our natural vanity or inclination to be satisfied with ourselves is absolutely set aside and extinguished. And the self-love which would lead us to make our own happiness our end is, though not extinguished, yet limited to conditions of agreement with the law. On the other hand, this negative effect of the law is not final; for, whenever we lay aside our vanity, and submit our self-love to such limitation by the law, whenever we reverently bow before the law and accept its censure, we find that "what humiliates us on the sensuous side, on the intellectual side elevates us." 1 For the law is a law arising out of our own rational nature; it is a law which we impose upon ourselves as self-conscious or rational beings. Reverence for such a law throws us down in order to raise us up: if it makes "our mortal nature tremble like a guilty thing surprised" before the awful legislation of reason, it enables us at the same time to feel that our mortal nature is not our inmost self. When we identify ourselves with the very law that humiliates us, we find that it gains such power of attraction, that "we can never satisfy ourselves with gazing upon it." "The soul believes itself to be exalted, just in the measure in which it recognises the elevation of the holy law above itself and the frailty of its own nature." 2

Hence, we cannot class this feeling of reverence either with pleasure simply or with pain simply. We might best describe it as a positive feeling reached through negation; for the moral law, while it makes us abstract from our own nature as sensuous beings,—as particular objects like other particular objects in the world we know,—at the same time makes us feel that we can determine ourselves by our universal nature as rational subjects. Reverence, in short, is the appearance of the moral consciousness in the region original impulses. He does not recognise that these impulses, as they appear in a self-conscious being, have already ceased to be mere appetites; or in other words, have been reconstituted through the negation of their immediate natural form: though, of course, this process has not itself been conscious, as it is in the case of the moral feeling.

1 R. VIII. 204; H. V. 83. 2 R. VIII. 203; H. V. 82.
of sensuous feeling, in which it must appear if it is to realise itself in finite beings like us. "Reverence before the law is not a motive to morality, it is morality itself viewed subjectively as a motive; for our pure practical reason, by setting aside all the claims of self-love that conflict with itself, procures for the law, to which alone it leaves any influence, an absolute authority."¹ It is, so to speak, the "Word made flesh," reason speaking the language of feeling, a language which it necessarily must speak in every finite or sensitive being.

Reverence is a feeling which is felt primarily for the law itself, and secondarily for persons who are believed to have realised it in themselves. Such persons we are obliged to reverence: "our spirit bows before them, whether we bow our heads or no." But, as we can never know even in our own case, much less in the case of others, how far any act is done purely from a regard to duty, so there never can be, strictly speaking, any empirical proof of the possibility of realising the moral law. "In moral action imitation has no place." It is because his life awakes a consciousness of the true archetype, the moral law which is bound up with our consciousness of ourselves, that even "the Holy One of the Gospels"² can be set before us as an example; and the text, "Why callest thou me good? There is no one good but God," may be cited as reminding us of this. The ultimate appeal is always to the law within, and it is through conformity to it alone that any person can claim our respect. Hence, it is the sole determinant of the end for which we should act.

Reverence at once repels us from, and identifies us with, that towards which it is felt. And it is the essential characteristic of the Kantian view of morals that it carries us as far as reverence, but no farther. Kant denies the rational possibility of the love that casts out fear. If man tries to rise above reverence; he will, Kant thinks, inevitably fall beneath it. For he could change reverence into love only by substituting an object to which he is attracted by desire, and in seeking which he is, therefore, externally determined by an object, for that law which springs out of his own being and in obedience to which alone he can be

¹ R. VIII. 200; H. V. 80. ² R. VIII. 31; H. IV. 256.
"The characteristic grade of moral life at which man (and so far as we can see every rational creature) stands is that of reverence for the moral law. The temper of mind which ought to bind him to obey it is a sense of duty, and not a spontaneous impulse such as might lead one to undertake a task to which he had no call of obligation. The highest moral state in which he can maintain himself is virtue, i.e., a goodness which continually maintains itself in effort and conflict; and not holiness, which would involve the attainment of perfect purity of mind and will. It is nothing but moral fanaticism and an exaltation of vanity, that we are likely to produce, when we urge men to do certain acts because they are “noble,” "lofty," and "magnanimous." For by such exhortations we set aside the plain motive of duty, i.e., of reverence for the law, whose yoke (though in a sense easy, as it is laid on us by reason itself) is one to which we are not merely permitted, but obliged, however unwillingly, to submit ourselves, and in submitting to which, therefore, we have to humble ourselves and give up all claims of merit. The harm of acting on such principles is that it does not satisfy the spirit of the law, which demands an inward temper of obedience and not a mere outward conformity of action; and that it substitutes the pathological motives of sympathy or self-love for the moral motive which lies in the law itself. More than this, it gives rise to a windy, extravagant and fantastic habit of mind, in which we "lay the flatteringunction to our souls" as though we were in possession of a spontaneous goodness which needs neither spur nor rein, and forget our duty in the vain idea of our merit. It may, indeed, be allowable to speak of actions of others which have cost great personal sacrifices, as noble or grand, though we must so speak only if we have good reason to believe that such actions have been done entirely from regard to duty and not from mere impulses of the heart. But, if we set up such actions as models for imitation, we must be careful to lay the whole weight on the motive of reverence for the law, which alone constitutes genuine moral feeling. For so only will the holy and earnest prescription of duty keep us from deluding ourselves with pathological impulses which are, at best, analogous to
moral principles, and from pluming ourselves on our own merits. . . . If fanaticism, in the most general sense of the word, is the endeavour, made on express principle, to transcend the limits of human reason, moral fanaticism may be defined as the effort to transcend the limits which pure practical reason sets to humanity, when it commands that the subjective motives of moral action should be found nowhere but in the law itself, and that the habit of mind shown in our maxims should be one of pure reverence for the law.”¹ On these principles, Kant rejects Stoicism as a form of moral fanaticism, and maintains that the Christian commandment to love God above all and our neighbour as ourselves, requires of us practical but not pathological love. “Love to God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for God is no object of sense; and love to man, though possible, cannot be imperative; for it is impossible to love another merely at command. It is, therefore, practical love that is meant in that kernel of all laws. To love God is gladly to obey his commands; to love our neighbour is gladly to do all our duties to him. But the law that makes this our rule of action cannot be a command to have this temper of mind in acting, but only to strive after it: a command to do something gladly would be a contradiction.” Just in so far as we do a thing with pleasure, no command is necessary. “The Christian principle is, therefore, to be regarded as setting the true moral habit of mind before us as an ideal of perfection which can be attained by no created being; though it is the antitype to which we should endeavour to assimilate ourselves in an uninterrupted but endless progress.”²

It is easy to see that this view of the true moral attitude of mind is a consequence of Kant’s conception of the relation of the will to the desires. For, according to that conception, our desires are excited only by objects which affect our empirical subjectivity from without; and, on the other hand, as conscious of a self, we are conscious of a universal principle which determines us as pure subjects, and causes us to view ourselves as independent of all the action of other objects upon us. But just as we pass from the negative to the positive in our consciousness of our-

¹ R. VIII. 211; H. V. 89. ² R. VIII. 210; H. V. 87.
selves, when we determine ourselves as not under the law of our members but under the law of our mind: so from the negative feeling produced in us in so far as we abstract from our sensitive individuality, we immediately pass into the positive feeling arising from the consciousness of the identity of the self with the principle that made such abstraction possible. We have, therefore, a feeling which implies the negation of immediate feeling in view of the positive determination of the will by the law. As, however, with Kant the law remains abstract, and so opposed to the matter which alone can realise or particularise it, so the feeling which arises from a consciousness of the law cannot become, in the full sense of the word, positive. In both cases Kant remains, as it were, fixed at the point where the negative turns to the positive, without being able to get beyond that point. Hence, he cannot admit the possibility of a complete transformation of the natural desires which have been negated, in view of the positive principle which sets them aside. He believed, indeed, that in his principle of morals he had a principle of selection among the contents of the immediate desires. Hence, he supposed that desire might be brought into increasing conformity, though never into perfect conformity, with duty. But, from his own point of view, both these steps are illogical. The contents of particular desires as such cannot be brought into unity with the universal principle of morality, so long as that principle is conceived in an abstract way. The particular cannot be directly identified with the universal, and therefore on this method it cannot be brought under it at all. Hence, there can be no gradual process by which the content of desire is brought into harmony with the principle of morality. Thus, not one single step can logically be made in that transition from the negative to the positive which is implied in Kant’s view of reverence. On the other hand, if we do advance from the negative towards the positive, as Kant seeks to do in his successive interpretations of the moral principle, we cannot deny the possibility of a complete reconstitution of the particular through the universal which in the first instance was opposed to it.¹

¹ It may be said that, for Kant, the gradual transformation of desire by which it
The feeling of reverence of which Kant speaks, is a feeling appropriate to one particular stage in our moral life, the stage in which the division of the natural and the spiritual is most marked, and in which, therefore, the consciousness of finitude and imperfection prevails so far as to throw into the background the consciousness that the law which condemns us is our own law, the law which we enact for ourselves. Yet, though thus thrown into the background, the consciousness that that before which we bow is not an alien principle must still be present to us, otherwise reverence would sink into slavish fear. What we condemn in ourselves, moreover, must be essentially related to that in view of which we condemn it, else the condemnation itself would be impossible. To bring it, with Kant, so far into relation with the law that it is condemned thereby, yet not so far that it can be assimilated thereto, or to leave such a dualism between the two terms that the attempt to unite them gives rise to a progressus ad infinitum, is illogical. If we go so far, we must go further, and recognise an ultimate unity between the natural and the spiritual, in spite of the antagonism into which they are brought at this stage of our moral experience.

We may perhaps express the truth of the matter thus. Kant’s reverence is a positive feeling reached through negation; hence for him it stands in direct contrast to the immediately positive tendencies of nature. But are there any such positive tendencies possible to a self-conscious being? To ask this is to ask a question which we have already answered in the negative, viz., the question is made conformable to the law, is merely the way in which we typically represent moral advance. But Kant, when he speaks of “complete conformity of our whole temper of mind (der Gesinnungen) to the moral law, as the highest condition of the Chief Good,” (R. VIII. 261; H. V. 146) and when he asserts the necessity of an endless progress to realise it, owing to the fact that desire as such always recalcitrates against the law of reason, puts us in a similar difficulty to that which we have already met with in the case of freedom. Are we to say that the noumenal is the reality, and that the phenomenal is merely an appearance? In that case the process towards assimilation of the lower to the higher nature can have no meaning? Or, are we to admit the reality of that process and of the relation of the two forms of the consciousness of ourselves which it involves? Then, we cannot take passion as standing in that asymptotic relation to the moral law, which makes the progressus ad infinitum necessary.
whether there are any appetites or instincts in man which are not changed by self-consciousness. If there were such appetites, indeed, they could not be referred to the self in any sense that would make the man responsible for them. They would be, to use Kant’s own example, like the tendency which we have to yawn when we see others yawning. They would be tendencies which we observe in their working in our sensuous nature, but which we do not regard as expressing anything of our mind or will. But if this be true, and if even our simplest appetites, in so far as we attribute them to the self at all,\(^1\) are determined by self-consciousness, so that in yielding to them, we seek to satisfy or realise ourselves, it follows that the gratification of such appetites cannot be abstractly opposed to the realisation of the self. It is true that till the consciousness of the universality of the self is developed, the union of the idea of the self as an end with the idea of the object of a particular passion, may take a form which conceals in it a contradiction. The satisfaction of the self may be sought in the particular object of a particular passion, in such a way as to exclude due regard to other elements of our life. But one particular object as such cannot be the good in which the self in the universality of its nature can find its realisation. Hence, the negation of the desire for the particular object, taken by itself as a mere particular, has already begun, as soon as the desire appears as an element in the life of a self-conscious being, as soon as the object of desire is set before him as an end, so that in Kant’s language it becomes a “maxim” of his will to seek it. The very introduction of the particular object as an element into self-consciousness—and it must be so introduced if represented as an end for me—involves that it is subjected to a kind of unconscious criticism, in which it is compared with the idea of good. This criticism manifests itself in a partial or complete dissatisfaction with the particular object when it has been attained. Of course, such a sense of the disparateness of the particular and the universal, showing itself merely in a dissatisfaction with the former, is unable to understand itself; for, as yet, the two have not been discriminated, and no conception of the Good as different

\(^1\) As we must do in regarding them as even possible motives.
from particular objects has yet been formed. It may show itself, therefore, only in the tendency to pass from particular to particular in search of something which is never found anywhere. But the true relation of particular and universal is not to be discovered or established till they have first been distinctly separated and even opposed to each other. Such a separation, however, is realised even in the earliest forms of social morality, in which the selfishness of desire is curbed by relation to the claims of the community in which the individual is a member, and natural egoism is brought under the control of what may be called a natural altruism. For in such a community, even if it be of the most elementary form, even if it be confined to the simplest domestic or tribal ties, there is a beginning of that separation of the natural from, and its subordination to, the spiritual, of which the highest moral life can be nothing more than the development. Thus the objects of particular desires cease to be taken as immediately identical with the Good, and a kind of conscience makes its appearance which recognises them as good only when they further, or at least do not hinder, the general life of the community. It was Kant’s weakness that he did not recognise the moral sentiment, except in the form of reverence before an abstract and purely inward law. But the law is reverenced as an outward command or divinely imposed custom, long before men become conscious of it as an inward principle. And even

1It may be said that Kant had not to do with the way in which the moral consciousness has been developed, but only with what it is when developed. But this only makes necessary a change of the form of the objection stated above. We may in a special sense distinguish the moral from the ethical consciousness, i.e., if we confine the word ‘moral’ to that reflective consciousness, which separates the inward from the outward law. In this sense a man becomes moral only when he is conscious of being a law and an end to himself. But the error of such a subjective view (which is philosophically represented by the Stoic and Kantian philosophers), is just that it separates the inward from, and opposes it to, the outward law, and does not recognise that the former is simply the reflexion of the latter into itself. In this sense we may say that the defect of the Kantian Ethics is just that he separates Morality from Ethics, the consciousness of a universal law involved in the consciousness of self, from the consciousness of a social law that binds men to each other. This latter idea appears only in the shape of the conception of a possible kingdom of ends, which is not of course conceived as actually realised or realising itself in the social life of man, though it may be typified as an ideal society.
before any consciousness of distinct law, the moral sentiment appears as a sense of shame or reverence for each other in those who are members of the same society. In this sense we find a frequent appeal made to what we may call the moral sentiment in Homer, though it is the moral sentiment in a simple naturalistic form and with scarcely any element of reflexion. "Be men, my friends," says the Greek leader as he rallies his troops, "and have reverence (or shame) before each other in the fiercest of the fight." The feeling which the Greeks termed alòs may be said ultimately to resolve itself into that reverence of man's lower before his higher nature, which Kant analyses. But at first it takes the form of a shame before others, wherein the feeling, for which men expect to find the sympathy of their fellows in the same society, asserts itself as higher than any individual impulse. In such shame we have moral principle masking itself in the guise of natural feeling: or we might say, we have in it an ethical but not yet a moral feeling. The advance of reflexion is shown in Plato, who takes it as a reverence for the laws which hold society together. It is, as he defines it, "that ever-present awe which springs out of the habit of obeying the laws, an awe to which the good man is a willing servant, and from which the meaner sort of men are apt to emancipate themselves." ¹ With Plato, however, the conception that it is the laws of an actual society, which constitute the true object of reverence is already disappearing. The philosopher has already withdrawn from the politics of the world, that he may model his life according to the laws of the ideal State, and it is to the laws of that State that his homage is directed. But this State exists, like the Kantian kingdom of ends, in thought only, and, like that kingdom, it cannot be found realised in the outward world. In other words, in Plato we already find the beginning of that division of natural from spiritual, the outer from the inner law, which finds its completed expression in Kant, when he reduces moral feeling to a sense of reverence before the inner law of reason, as apart from any actual state or society. In Plato it was a first indication of that disruption of the ethical harmony of man's life, which marked

¹Laws, 699.
the close of Greek history and which led to the rise of the individualistic theories of the Epicureans and Stoics. In Kant, the last heir of the subjective spirit of Protestantism, with whom that spirit is already beginning to turn against itself, the same conception reappears, though already on the way to transform itself into a higher conception. Yet with him, in spite of his idea of a kingdom of ends, reverence before the abstract law is still treated as the essential and necessary form of moral sentiment. And, in a sense, we may admit that it is a necessary form of such feeling though only as characteristic of a special stage in our moral development; for desire and duty, as has already been said, must be put in absolute contrast, before their reunion can take its highest form. But to make it the permanent or essential form of moral feeling is a mistake. For it is only as the abstract universal is kept abstract, and prevented from turning into a positive principle of unity in the particulars from which it is distinguished, that reverence and awe, the shrinking of the flesh before the spirit, the fear that is not cast out by love, can remain the characteristic note of moral feeling. The importance of a philosophy which takes such a view of the moral life lies in this, that, by purifying the universal of all elements of the particular, it for the first time makes it possible to show the true relation of the particular to the universal. For it is only as thus separated that the universal and the particular can show that dialectical movement by which they pass into each other. So long as the moral principle manifested itself only as the principle of union in a particular domestic or national society, the natural and the moral, the particular impulses and the universal law of reason, were necessarily confused together, and reverence for the social order was not yet the reverence of man for that which makes him man, but partly a reverence for that which distinguishes some men from others. But, when the individual, conscious of himself as universal reason, breaks away from the control of all special domestic or national societies and transfers his reverence from their law to the law that he finds within himself, he is on the way to a consciousness of the true spiritual society or "kingdom of ends" in which all men are members. And in so far as
the consciousness that reason is *in itself* social is developed, the negative aspect of morals begins to pass into the positive, and awe before the law into the consciousness of unity with it, as a law which not only *ought* to be realised within us, but which *is* realising and necessarily must realise itself in the whole progressive movement of human history.
CHAPTER V

THE SUMMUM BONUM

It is characteristic of Kant's way of philosophising that beginning with the dualistic opposition of the phenomenal and the noumenal, of necessity and freedom, of happiness and virtue, he seeks to reconcile them as it were at a higher level, which, however, is in one sense lower, as it is the level of faith and not of knowledge. The logical principle implied in this movement of thought is that a truth or reality which we reach by abstraction, is defined in relation to that from which we abstract; and that it must be conceived as limited by that in relation to which it is defined, unless in some way it can be seen to reproduce out of itself the element excluded. Thus, if we say that the truth or reality of that which is accidental is the substance, and that the accidents as such are illusory existences while the substance alone is real, the objection immediately presents itself that the substance receives its character by opposition to the accidents abstracted from, and must, therefore, be conceived as dividing existence with them, or, if not, it must itself disappear along with the accidents which it negates. In this way freedom, which was in the first instance defined by Kant merely as the negation of the necessity of nature, has to be represented by him, not merely as blank self-determination but as a self-determination which determines also the necessity of nature. Otherwise, the negation of the necessity of nature would directly carry with itself the negation of a freedom which was defined only in opposition to it.

This dialectical movement is not itself present to Kant's mind; but it governs him in the development of his system,
and forces him, we might say almost against the grain, to retrace the steps whereby he had first separated the spiritual from the natural world. It forces him, in spite of his conception of the moral law as a merely formal requirement of universality (springing out of the judgment of self-identity, the "I am I" by which the self determines itself as one with itself in opposition to all that is objective), to typify the realisation of the moral law by a natural system which in all its particularity is governed by that law, i.e., to give synthetic meaning to the merely formal principle in reference to that very nature to which it, as a law of freedom, was opposed. In like manner, after having declared that moral action is not action with a view to happiness,—or, what (according to him) is the same thing, to the realisation of any object as such,—but that the end of moral action is already achieved in the subjective determination of the will, Kant is driven by the necessity of his thought, to allow that there is a kind of reference to the objective realisation of the good which must be included in the motives, and that the Summum Bonum must be conceived as involving not only moral virtue but also happiness.

"The conception of that which is highest involves an ambiguity, which may occasion unnecessary controversy if it is not attended to; for the highest may mean that which is chief (supremum) or that which is complete (consummatum). In the former sense it is applied to a condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e., subordinated to no other condition (originarium). In the latter sense it designates a whole which is not part of a greater whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). That virtue (as desert of happiness) is the highest condition of all that may appear to us desirable and so of all our efforts after happiness, and that, therefore, it is to be regarded as the chief Good, has been already shown. But this does not involve that it is the whole and complete Good which rational beings of finite nature desire to obtain; for to be the totality of Good, it would require to have happiness added to it. Further, it would require this addition, not merely in the partial eyes of an individual who makes himself his own end, but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which must regard all
persons as ends in themselves. For that a creature should have the need of happiness, should be worthy of it, but yet should not participate in it, cannot consist with the perfect will of an omnipotent rational being, if, even hypothetically, we suppose such a being to exist.”¹ In other words, the *Summum Bonum*, if it be taken as meaning the complete or perfect Good, involves the combination of perfect goodness with perfect happiness—the former, however, being the condition to which the latter is attached. Further, in so far as man’s will is not virtuous by nature and necessity, but only capable of becoming so by an endless process, it follows that the *Summum Bonum*, from this point of view, will be the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to goodness.

In dealing with this subject Kant discusses *three* questions: (1) What must be the nature of the connexion between virtue and happiness supposing such a connexion to be established? (2) What are the conditions on which such a connexion is dependent, and what grounds have we for asserting that these conditions are actually fulfilled?—with which, finally, is connected the question, (3) How far may the *Summum Bonum* as such constitute or form a part of our motive of action?

As to the first question, Kant points out that there are only two ways in which the terms in question can be connected—*analytically* and *synthetically*. In other words, the idea of happiness may be treated as containing, or as contained in, the idea of goodness, so that the one can be extracted from the other by simple analysis; or, failing this, one of the two terms may be regarded as representing the cause to which the other is attached as effect.

Now, Kant contends that the former solution must necessarily be rejected, as an attempt to identify conceptions which of all others are most disparate. It was the error both of the Stoics and of the Epicureans to say that virtue and happiness are the same thing, though each of the two schools started from a different term. The conception of virtue, according to the Epicureans, was already involved in the maxim of advancing one’s happiness; while the feeling of happiness was already, according to the

¹R. VIII. 246; H. V. 116.
Stoics, contained in the consciousness of virtuous action. Such attempts to simplify the question as to the possibility of the highest Good, by the mere coalescence of elements which are essentially disparate, can only be regarded as evasions of the problem. Recognising, therefore, that a synthesis is necessary, we must ask which element is to be taken as the cause of the other.

Now, at first sight, it seems impossible to connect virtue with happiness, either as its effect or as its cause. It is impossible to take the desire of happiness as the cause of virtue; for there is no moral character whatever in that desire. And it seems equally impossible to take virtue as the cause of happiness; for, if I seek to secure that conformity of circumstances to my wishes which is implied in happiness, my success will be proportioned, not to the moral state of my will, but to my knowledge of the laws of nature, and my power of using its resources in accordance with these laws so as to further my own ends. There is, at least, no necessary or direct connexion of the latter with the former. Here, therefore, we have an antinomy of practical reason, which arises whenever we try to think of the *Summum Bonum* as actually realised. It is an antinomy that can be solved, however, by the same distinction between phenomena and noumena which enabled us, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to get over the antinomy between natural necessity and freedom. The *thesis*, that virtue is the necessary consequence of pleasure or happiness, we must at once reject as absolutely false. But the *antithesis*, that happiness is the necessary consequence of virtue, we may either accept or reject, according to the point of view we adopt. For, if we look merely to the connexion of events with each other as phenomena in the world of sense, we must recognise that there is no necessary connexion between the virtuous will, as manifesting itself in certain actions in the phenomenal world, and happiness as a resulting state. But if we think of ourselves as noumena in an intelligible world, and of the relation of our noumenal to our phenomenal existence, we can conceive that the virtuous will, "if not immediately, yet mediately (through an intelligible Author of nature) may be necessarily combined with happiness as an effect in the world
of sense,"¹ though this combination would be quite accidental if we looked to the world of sense alone. It appears, therefore, that the antinomy which arises when we try to connect virtue and happiness, (such a connexion being necessary for the realisation of the *Summum Bonum*, but not necessary according to natural laws,) "is due to a confusion between the relations of phenomena to each other and the relation of things in themselves to these phenomena."²

When we go on to ask what are the conditions upon which we can conceive the *Summum Bonum*, the union of virtue and happiness, to be realised, we are met with a twofold difficulty: *first*, as to the possibility of the realisation of perfect virtue in beings constituted as we are, and *secondly*, as to the combination of happiness with virtue. As to the former of these difficulties, we have to observe that the moral imperative implies the possibility of perfectly realising virtue; for a command to do what is impossible would be meaningless. On the other hand, as we are sensuous beings, it seems equally impossible that the law of reason should be our sole actuating motive, to the exclusion of all influences of desire. The difficulty can be solved only by the idea of a *progressus ad infinitum*, in which a continual approximation is made to the conformity of our sensuous nature with the moral law. "For a rational but finite being there is possible only a *progressus ad infinitum* from lower to higher grades of moral perfection."³ But, nevertheless, from the divine point of view we can suppose this infinite series to be summed up. "The infinite Being, for whom the condition of time does not exist, sees in that which is for us an infinite series the summed up totality of conformity to the moral law; and in one single intellectual intuition or perception of the whole existence of a rational being, he has present to him that holiness which his command inexorably requires, in order that any one consistently with divine justice should have a share in the highest Good." But, as such an intellectual intuition can never be communicated to any finite creature, what corresponds on our part

¹ R. VIII. 252; H. V. 121. ² R. VIII. 253; H. V. 121. ³ R. VIII. 262; H. V. 129.
to the divine knowledge can only be an assured hope of continued progress, based upon a firmly fixed habit of mind which has been the result of past faithfulness.\footnote{R. VIII. 263; H. V. 129.}

This solution of the difficulty is, in Kant’s view, the only one which can enable us to escape the dilemma between two opposite alternatives equally fatal to the moral life. For, if we look to the impossibility of realising in this life the ideal of perfect holiness, we are tempted to admit a relaxation of the severity of the moral law, and to suppose that only so much is demanded by it as we are likely to attain in this life. If, on the other hand, we maintain the law in the full severity of its demands, we are apt to be led into “theosophic dreams” of possible perfection, which contradict all that we know of ourselves as ever falling short of these demands; and to imagine that we are near attaining, or that we have attained, what must always be for us an unattainable ideal.

Behind this rises the other difficulty which we have already pointed out. Supposing virtue to be more or less perfectly attained, how can we have any rational ground for thinking that happiness in due proportion must be united with it? “Happiness is that state of a rational being in the world in which he finds everything in the whole of his existence ordered in conformity with his wish and will.”\footnote{R. VIII. 264; H. V. 130.} But the motives of moral action, being derived entirely from the moral law, “are quite irrespective of nature and its conformity with our wishes”; nor is there “in the moral law the slightest ground for a necessary connexion between morality and the proportionate happiness of a being who belongs to the world as a part of it, and who is, therefore, dependent on it, and not by his will the cause of its being what it is.”\footnote{R. VIII. 265; H. V. 130.}

On the other hand, if it is our duty to pursue the highest Good, it must be possible for it to be realised; and the condition of its realisation must be found, if not within then without, us. Hence, we must postulate “the existence of a Being who is quite distinct from nature, and at the same time the cause of it, and who contains in himself the ground of this realisation, \textit{i.e.}, of the realisation of the combination

\footnote{Kant answers by the postulate of immortality.}

\footnote{How is happiness to be combined with virtue? Kant answers by the postulate of God.}
of happiness with goodness." ¹ Now, this combination means "not merely the agreement of nature with the law of the will of rational beings, but also its agreement with the consciousness of that law itself, in so far as such beings place it before themselves as the supreme motive of their will. . . . Hence, the highest Good is possible in the world, only in so far as there is assumed to be a highest cause of nature which has its causality conformed to morality. Now, a being which is capable of acting according to the consciousness of laws is a \textit{rational being}, and the causality of such a being according to this consciousness of laws is a \textit{will}. Hence, the supreme cause of nature, so far as it must be presupposed with a view to the highest Good, is a being who, through his intelligence and his will, is cause or author of nature, \textit{i.e., God}. Hence, the postulate of the possibility of the highest \textit{derived Good (i.e., of the best of possible worlds)} is at the same time the postulate of the highest \textit{original Good}, \textit{i.e., of the existence of God}. Now, we saw that it was our duty to further the highest (derived) Good: hence we are not merely permitted but compelled by a necessity which is bound up as a requirement with the idea of duty, to presuppose the possibility of the highest Good, which can be secured only under condition of the existence of God; \textit{i.e., it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God}.” ²

On the other hand, it is to be observed that "this moral necessity is \textit{subjective}, \textit{i.e., it is a need or requirement of our moral consciousness, and not objective, \textit{i.e., it is not itself a duty. For there cannot be a duty to assume the existence of any thing or being},” ³ which can only be a matter of theoretic conviction, and not of practical obligation. Nor, again, can the assumption of the existence of God be made the basis of our obligation to obey the moral law, which necessarily is itself the only basis of obligation. The place of this assumption is determined only by its necessity as involved in the possibility of the realisation of the Good which the moral law commands us to realise. It has, therefore, the value of an hypothesis necessary to explain the possibility of the existence of a

¹ R. VIII. 265; H. V. 130. ² \textit{Id.} ³ R. VIII. 266; H. V. 131.
certain object; but, inasmuch as the object in question is one which is set before us by our own rational nature as that which should be attained, we may call it more appropriately "a faith, and indeed a faith of reason."

This deduction enables us to see why the Greek schools were unable to solve the problem of the practical possibility of the highest Good. They tried to deal with it directly, and to treat the highest Good as realisable through the will of the finite moral subject, not seeing the necessity of the postulate of the existence of God. Hence, the Epicureans were led to lower their ideas of happiness to what is attainable by man through his own endeavours, and the Stoics to exclude from consideration any happiness which is separable from goodness. Christianity, on the other hand, connects happiness with goodness by the idea of a "Kingdom of God, in which nature and moral excellence are united together in a harmony, which is not necessitated by the conception of either taken by itself, but established by a holy Being, the Creator of all, who makes the highest derivative Good possible." ¹ At the same time, the Christian principle of morals is "not theological, not the heteronomy, but the autonomy of pure practical reason; for Christianity does not make the knowledge of God or of His will the ground of the law," ² or place the motive to fulfil that law in any consequences attached by the divine Being to obedience. On the contrary, it maintains the idea of duty, as the only true motive of action, and also the ground of our belief in God. Now, this gives us the true idea of Religion; for Religion is not obedience to a will that is foreign and alien to our own, in view of certain sanctions which that will has attached to its arbitrary decrees: it is a consciousness of our own will as one with the will of God, and hence as directed to an end which not only may, but must, be capable of realisation.

We have, then, three postulates of practical reason, which are closely related to the three Ideas of theoretical reason. These Ideas reason in its theoretical use set before itself as problems to be solved; but it was unable to supply the solution. Thus, the attempt to prove theoreti-

¹ R. VIII. 270; H. V. 134. ² R. VIII. 270; H. V. 134.
cally the permanence of the thinking subject led only to a paralogism; for it involved a confusion of the subject presupposed in all knowledge of objects, and only in that point of view permanent, with an object known under the category of substance. But now, we find that a faith of reason in the endless existence of the self-conscious subject is bound up with the possibility of his fulfilling the moral law. Again, the attempt speculatively to determine the world as a system complete in itself landed us in an antinomy which we were able to escape only by the distinction of the phenomenal from the intelligible world—a distinction which theoretic reason suggested, but which it could not verify. But now, the moral law forces us to think ourselves as free, and therefore as belonging to an intelligible world, which we are further obliged to treat as the reality of which the phenomenal world is the appearance. Lastly, the absolute Being was to theoretic reason a mere ideal which knowledge could not realise; but now His existence is certified to us as the necessary condition of the possibility of the object of a will determined by the moral law. Thus, through practical reason we gain a conviction of the reality of objects corresponding to the three Ideas of pure reason! We do not, indeed, acquire what is properly to be called knowledge of these objects. We only change the problematic conception of them into an assertion of their real existence: but as we are not able to bring any perception under such Ideas, so we are unable to make any synthetic judgment regarding the objects the existence of which we assert. With this limitation, however, it is true that, in the sphere of practice, the Ideas which to theory were transcendent and without objects, become immanent and constitutive. "For they contain the grounds of the possibility of realising the necessary object of practical reason (the highest Good), whereas theoretical reason finds in them merely regulative principles, which have their value in furthering the exercise of the intelligence in experience, but not in enabling us to gain any certitude as to the existence of any object beyond experience. When, however, by the moral consciousness we are once put in possession of this new certitude, reason as a speculative faculty comes in
(though properly only to protect its practical use), and goes to work with these Ideas in a negative way, i.e., not to extend but to elucidate them; and so to exclude, on the one hand, Anthropomorphism as the source of a superstition which pretends to enlarge our knowledge by a fictitious experience, and on the other hand, Fanaticism, which pretends to a similar enlargement of knowledge not by experience, but by means of supersensuous intuition or feeling. For, both these equally are hindrances of the practical use of reason, and the exclusion of them may be regarded as an extension of our knowledge in a practical point of view.¹

"When these Ideas of God, of an intelligible world, and of immortality, are determined by predicates which are taken from our own nature, we must regard this determination neither as a sensualising of these pure Ideas (Anthropomorphism), nor as a transcendent knowledge of supersensible objects; for the predicates we use are only understanding and will, and, indeed, these regarded only in that relation to each other in which we are required by the moral law to regard them. All other psychological characteristics of our understanding and will, which we empirically observe in the exercise of those faculties (as, e.g., that our understanding is discursive and not intuitive, that our ideas follow each other in time, that our will is dependent for its satisfaction on the existence of its object, etc.—all characteristics, in short, which cannot be attributed to the understanding and will of the Supreme Being) we necessarily leave out of account. There remains, therefore, of all the conceptions through which we think of a pure intelligence only those which are necessary to the possibility of a moral law: in other words, we have a knowledge of God solely from a practical point of view. If, on the other hand, we attempt to go beyond this, or to enlarge it to a theoretical knowledge of God, how must we think of Him? We must attribute to Him an understanding which does not merely think but perceive, and a will which is directed to objects on the existence of which its satisfaction is not at all dependent, (not to mention such transcendental predicates as that

¹R. VIII. 279; H. V. 141.
His existence must have a quantity, i.e., a duration, which yet is not in time, though time is the sole means whereby we can represent existence as a quantity). Now, of these attributes we can form no conception which can give us real knowledge of the object, or enable us theoretically to explain the existence of supersensuous beings, but only such a conception as is sufficient for practical purposes.” ¹

We are thus obliged to content ourselves “with the conception of a relation of understanding to will which the practical law determines a priori, and to which the same practical law secures objective reality.” ² This, however, is sufficient to enable us to determine God, as an allwise, allgood, allpowerful Being, and so to mediate a transition from the finite world to the infinite; whereas theoretical reason, even if it could be permitted to ascend from the finite world to its first cause, could never authorise us to attribute to that cause more than is given in the effect. We postulate God as that which we require him to be, just as we postulate freedom and immortality; so that “the righteous man may say: I will that there should be a God; I will that, though in this natural world, I should not be of it, but should also belong to a purely intelligible world; finally, I will that my duration should be endless. I insist upon this, and will not let this conviction be taken from me.” ³ Yet this is not a case in which a mere subjective wish deludes us into the assumption of the existence of its object. It is the one case where the “I will that a thing shall be” is equivalent to the assertion that “it is.” “It is the sole case in which my interest, because I have no right to surrender or limit it, inevitably determines my judgment.” ⁴ There is, therefore, no force in the criticism of Wizenmann, who compared this conviction to the dream of a lover, who believes in the objective reality of an idea of beauty existing nowhere except in his own head. “I entirely concur with him in all cases where the feeling of want is due to mere inclination or natural desire. Such a want cannot postulate the existence of the object wanted even for him who feels it; much less can it be the ground of a demand or postulate which is

¹ R. VIII. 280; H. V. 143. ² R. VIII. 282; H. V. 144. ³ R. VIII. 289; H. V. 149. ⁴ Id.
universal. In this case, however, we have a want of Reason, springing not from the subjective ground of our wishes, but from an objective motive of the will, which binds every rational being, and hence authorises him a priori to presuppose the existence in nature of the conditions necessary for its satisfaction.”

In the above statement we have followed Kant very closely; we have now to consider what must be said in the way of criticism.

In the first place, then, we have to observe that Kant’s doctrine of the Summum Bonum marks the farthest point which he reaches in a positive determination of the moral life, the farthest point to which he conceives himself entitled to go consistently with the negative conception of its principle with which he starts. Here, therefore, we are called upon especially to press the question which we have had so often to consider, viz., whether consistently with Kant’s starting point he is entitled to go so far as he does, and whether, if he goes so far, he is not logically obliged to go further.

In this point of view, it is important to observe how he deals with the question of the connexion of virtue and happiness. To him there are only two alternatives: either that happiness and goodness should be so related that by logical analysis of the one we can at once find the other; or that they should be combined by an external synthesis as two things which are not essentially connected, but which are brought together by means of some third thing that mediates between them. In other words, he puts before us the alternatives of a movement of thought by external synthesis and a movement by bare identity. Now, it has been part of our general criticism of Kant to maintain that this opposition involves a separation of two phases of thought which cannot logically be separated: that, in fact, thought is always synthetic, but never purely external in its synthesis. And here, as elsewhere, we can show that Kant himself is pointing towards the very principle by which the defects of his philosophy may be corrected, and even may be said to have been the discoverer of that principle. For, as in the theoretical sphere,

\[ \text{R. VIII. 290 note; H. V. 149.} \]
the identity of thought, though conceived as purely analytic, yet showed itself as a principle of unity in the manifold of sense, and ultimately as the source of an ideal of knowledge not realised in experience; so here, in the practical sphere, the moral law, though represented as formal and subjective, becomes the source of an idea of objective Good, the realisation of which involves the synthetic unity of goodness and happiness. What Kant at first put as it were on one side, thus over-reaches, and brings under it, the side opposed to it; and what he at first regarded as an external synthesis, which, therefore, requires a tertium quid to make it possible, is now seen to need nothing for its mediation except that which can be derived from one of the elements to be connected. Of course, the endeavour to extract this view from Kant is embarrassed by the fixity of the distinctions with which he at first started. But it is no less true that he has practically surrendered the merely formal and analytic conception of the law, when he makes it a ground for the assertion of an objective Good, which not only must be capable of realisation, but even, we may say, must already be realised.

Kant, as we have seen, takes a double view of the Summum Bonum; as the chief Good which is realised in the determination of will even if it should produce no outward result, or as the perfect Good which includes such a result. This distinction forces him to deal with the problem of the realisation of the good in two ways. In the former sense, the moral consciousness is supposed directly and immediately to carry with it the possibility of its realisation in the inner experience of the individual, i.e., of the complete harmonising of the feelings and desires of the empirical subject with it. And this realisation of the moral Good in the individual, because of the inherent opposition of the two terms brought together, can be conceived to be attained only by a progressus ad infinitum. On the other hand, in relation to the combination of happiness in due proportion with goodness, the moral principle enables us to postulate not only the possible but the actual realisation of the end; but, because here we have to go beyond the self-determination of the
individual, it enables us to make this postulate only indirectly, by means of the idea of God.

Now, these two postulates illustrate two different, but equally imperfect, methods of solving the difficulties caused by dualism, the progressus ad infinitum and the Deus ex machina. Of the former idea we may remark that it is the very negation of that attainment of the moral end which it is regarded as expressing. If passion, as passion, is essentially at variance with the law of reason, so that a progressus ad infinitum requires to be resorted to as the only way of realising the latter in the former, that means that the realisation can never be attained; for infinite time is not enough for an impossible task. But it means also that the task cannot even be begun; for not a single step can be taken towards the reconciliation of absolute opposites. If, on the other hand, there is no such essential opposition, the progressus ad infinitum is unnecessary. Nor does it help to say, with Kant, that God sees the infinite series as a unity, and that for Him, therefore, endless progress is equivalent to the attainment of the end. For this is at once to assert and to deny the conditions of time; it is to say not only that what for God is eternity is for us endless time, but that in an actual experience we have to traverse that time in order to realise the moral law in ourselves. But this would involve both that time is, and that it is not a mere form of our perception. For if it is such a mere form, then what Kant should say is that, though we can represent the realisation of morality in ourselves only as an endless progress, yet, for God, i.e., in reality, it is (eternally) realised in everyone who wills its realisation. But, if we put it in this way immortality ceases to be a postulate of reason, except as the way in which we are obliged to represent something which we cannot properly think, viz., the eternal realisation of goodness in the will of the rational being who determines himself according to the law of reason.

The other postulate entangles us in equal difficulties: for while, according to Kant, the realisation of the moral law is completely attained in the character of a rational being whose will is directed to its fulfilment, without reference to the attainment of any external result, and
hence without happiness, it is yet conceived as desert of happiness. And from this arises a necessity for a God, as a deus ex machina, to realise the combination of the two terms, virtue and happiness, which are indifferent to each other,—a combination which, therefore, must be merely external. Here again we seem to be between the horns of a dilemma; for, if the Good as the end which moral action is to realise, lies merely in the inner act of will, then all that is necessary for its realisation is that the individual should act virtuously and have a character confirmed in virtue, and not that he should also attain a corresponding happiness. If, on the other hand, the realisation of the Good is to be taken as involving the production of an outward order of things in which happiness goes with goodness, then the principle that obligation implies possibility, or that "I can because I ought," seems to involve that the individual by his will can produce such an order, and not merely that he has a right to postulate God as a power that produces it.¹ What Kant's postulate really involves, is that the moral consciousness has a "Primacy" over the theoretical consciousness, in a higher sense than he admits. For, as was shown in a former chapter, the moral consciousness is the consciousness of the self for which all objects are, as containing in

¹ In the Critique of Pure Reason (A. 809; B. 837) Kant says:—"In thinking of an intelligible world, i.e., of the moral world, in which we abstract from all the hindrances to morality, it is allowable for us to regard as necessary the systematic combination of happiness in due proportion with goodness. For in such a world, freedom, as partly impelled and partly restrained by the moral law, would of itself be the cause of universal happiness; and therefore rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would themselves be the authors of their own permanent happiness, and at the same time of that of others. But this system of self-rewarding morality is only an Idea, the realisation of which is dependent on every one doing what he ought to do, i.e., on all the actions of rational beings being so performed, as if they sprang from one supreme will, which comprehended in itself or under itself all private wills. As, however, the obligation of the moral law continues binding upon every one in every use of his freedom, even though others do not conform to that law, it is obvious that neither the nature of things in this world, nor the causality of the actions themselves and their relation to morality, can determine in what relation the consequences of these actions will stand to happiness. If, therefore, we take our stand upon mere nature, it is impossible rationally to establish a necessary connexion between the hope of happiness and the persistent endeavour to make ourselves worthy of it. We can cherish such a hope based on such a foundation, only if we presuppose that a
itself a principle for the determination of itself as an object, and of other objects through itself. And this means that it is a consciousness of God, the prius of all existence, the unity to which all things and beings are referred, as revealed in the consciousness of self. For, if all objects are referred to the self, then in the self-conscious being the world of objects may be said to come to self-consciousness. Hence, such a being necessarily regards its own objective existence, in distinction from other forms of such existence, as an organ by which the one principle of life, which is working in all things and beings, comes to expression. In so far, therefore, as man is determined by the law of his own being, he is not determined by a merely subjective principle, which other things and beings may resist on equal terms, in virtue of the subjective principle of their existence. Rather, he is determined by a principle of freedom, which underlies all the necessity of nature, and which, therefore, nature cannot resist. Man is a microcosm, in which the world first shows its meaning or returns to its principle; and, therefore, the world is to be regarded only as the means which that principle has prepared for the manifestation of itself. The world cannot resist him if he is true to himself; for, in being true to himself, he is true to it. This is the secret of the religious certitude, the absolute faith in which the moral highest Reason, which rules according to moral laws, is at the same time the cause of nature."

There are two things which prevent Kant from admitting that moral action can realise the complete good: first, the division between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of freedom; and, secondly, the isolation of each rational being in his moral life from all his fellows. The former, even if all men were morally good, would prevent him from concluding that all men must necessarily be happy. But, if this difficulty were got over, and it were allowed that universal goodness would lead to the establishment of a system in which happiness was joined with goodness in perfect proportion, the latter would still hinder him from conceiving the establishment of such a system as within the reach of the individual; for it would hinder him from admitting that there is any necessary connexion between the goodness of one individual and that of other individuals. Thus, even if the difficulty arising from the dualistic opposition of the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds were removed, still the Individualism of Kant would not allow him to entertain any conception of the Good as realised in a systematic or organic way in the life of man. As we have already seen, Kant wants the idea of the social nature of morality, or brings it in only in the form of conception of a "possible kingdom of ends."
consciousness culminates. It is the consciousness that that which "ought to be" rests on a deeper "is," than that which "ought not to be." The faith in the infinite power of goodness is a faith which springs up in the mind of the good man naturally and spontaneously; because it is simply an intuitive anticipation of the truth that in the moral self-consciousness an ideal is revealed, which is not only our ideal but the principle to which the reality of our own and of all existence must be referred.

Kant's two postulates of immortality and God can, therefore, be regarded as valid, only if we take them as pointing to a kind of synthetic unity between the two terms opposed which he is never able fully to admit or to state, because to do so he would need to have cast himself loose from his dualistic starting point. The first postulate takes its peculiar form as a progressus ad infinitum from the abstract way in which the passions are conceived, as elements united with our consciousness of self and yet not determined by it. But on the defectiveness of this view enough has already been said. Kant speaks as if in man the natural movement of impulse still remained what it is in a being not self-conscious. He holds, indeed, that in such a subject it is further characterised by distinction from the law of the self, but that otherwise it remains a mere indifferent material which is determined as bad or good according as it is, or is not, subsumed under the moral law. But, as we have seen, an impulse cannot become my impulse, and therefore cannot acquire any moral character, unless it takes the form of what Aristotle called βουλησι, that is of desire or will of the Good as an end with which the self is identified; and if it has taken this form, its particular matter cannot be essentially incapable of assimilation, and even of perfect assimilation, by the self. For if the will, as a will for the realisation of the self, is present in all the particular desires, the opposition of passion and reason must be explained as a merely relative opposition which arises at a particular stage in the development of the moral consciousness. Even at such a stage, it never actually takes the abstract form which it has in the Stoical and Kantian
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theories.\(^1\) The moral life, therefore, can never have the form of a movement towards an external end, such that all the previous stages of it should have value only in reference to that end. Even the life of an animal cannot be conceived in that way, as Kant himself showed;\(^2\) for it is a continual self-production or self-reproduction, and therefore a continual realisation, as well as a means to the further realisation, of itself as an end. Hence, it has at every stage a reference to what is past and what is future: it may even be said in every stage to contain the past and be pregnant with the future, and therefore to have a value which is not measured by time. Still less can we separate any end attained in human life from the process of its attainment and the possibility of further progress. Yet, although the value of one stage in our life cannot be estimated apart from its relation to the other stages, the particular stage must not, on this account, be regarded as merely making a contribution to an aggregate which is valuable only as "summed up" in a whole, or a step to an end which is outside of the process towards the attainment of it. On the contrary, just through this relation to the whole, it is in a sense complete in itself. The throb of religious emotion in the humblest breast has, as Hegel has said, nothing less than an infinite value; because it is, and in so far as it is the gathering up into one consciousness of the whole meaning of life.\(^3\) The moral force which at supreme moments of life seems sometimes to give a man the command of himself, of others, and of circumstances, needs nothing to be added to it to give it a supreme ethical value; for it is the concentrated expression of that principle which alone gives value to anything. If, however, we have a right to say that, though that principle is bound up with our very consciousness of self, yet no time can fully exhaust or realise all that is contained in it; and if, further, we are entitled to base on this an argument for immortality—because "man is immortal till his work is done," and it never can be done,—we must shape this argument in a way which is the very reverse of Kant's. We must not infer that we

\(^1\) See above, p. 238 seq.
\(^2\) In the Critique of Judgment.
\(^3\) Hegel's Werke, IX. 46.
shall live for ever because there is an irreducible surd in the passions, which it will take endless time to eliminate; but because the principle of morality is universal and therefore contains in it an exhaustless spring of life. Kant conceives the moral end as the goal of a perfect harmony of desire and duty, which cannot be attained, because its attainment would be the union of elements which he defines at the outset as essentially different, and the difference of which constitutes our finitude: so that the end, if attained, would be the annihilation of finitude and humanity. But, while it is impossible to annihilate the difference of the particular from the universal, because each disappears with the disappearance of its distinction from the other, it is, owing to that very relation, true that the attainment of any goal of the moral life is at once an end and a new beginning. The Scripture metaphor of a well of water "springing up to everlasting life" is nearer to the truth than any conception of the moral ideal as a goal to be attained, and in the attainment of which we should find a final satisfaction. And the faith of immortality which arises in connexion with the moral life must be a consciousness of the infinite possibilities that are contained in the very principle of that life as it is already present in the moral subject, and not, as Kant makes it, a feeling of the defect that separates us from the attainment of the moral ideal. Kant, in fact, attributes the belief in immortality to exactly that aspect or element of the moral life to which it cannot be attached,—to the consciousness of our weakness and imperfection in face of the demands of the moral law; and not to the consciousness of a principle within us, which reaches beyond all such weakness and imperfection and is the earnest, and even in a sense the realisation, of triumph over it. But, if it is only in the consciousness of a power with which we as self-conscious beings are identified, and which in us as well as without us is working towards the absolute Good, that we can find a valid basis for the belief in immortality, we have at the same time to remember that such a consciousness is primarily rather a consciousness of what we have already attained, than of what lies before us. To connect the idea of immortality with the con-
consciousness that we have not attained, still more with the consciousness that we cannot attain, that which yet is our end, is to treat the reason for unbelief as if it were the reason for belief.1

The criticism of Kant’s view of the Summum Bonum, in the second of the two senses which he distinguishes, cannot be completed till we have considered the attempt which he makes to mediate between religion and morality, in his treatise on Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason. Here we need only observe that God is brought in only to mediate the connexion of happiness with goodness, and not to explain the development of goodness itself. If such a view be taken, it is difficult to regard religion as other than an external and somewhat precarious support to morality. At any rate, religion cannot in consistency with this view be regarded as the essential spring of man’s inner life; for, in that life, man is conceived to be alone with himself and the moral law, to the exclusion of all extraneous influence even of God. To admit religion into the primary place would, as Kant thinks, be to mix a dubious alloy with man’s moral life, which must be one of pure self-determination. In one place2 Kant discusses the consistency of man’s relation to God as his Creator with his freedom as a moral agent; and argues that God cannot be viewed as the Creator of phenomena, but only of things in themselves, and that he cannot, therefore, be supposed to cause the actions of men as phenomena in the world of sense. This answer is so far admissible as it rejects the application of the category of cause to the relation of God, as Creator, to His creatures. But with the exclusion of this category as expressing the relation in question Kant stops; nor does he attempt to trace any positive relation between the

1 No doubt, it might fairly be said, that what Kant rests upon is the belief that we must be able to attain, and that the fact that we cannot attain is not the basis of our belief in immortality, but merely limits it to the form of a progressus ad infinitum. But, if we look at it in this way, we must rather say that it is because we are limited to the forms of sense in representing anything to ourselves, that we are obliged to represent the realisation of morality as such a progressus. And thus the belief in immortality will be reduced to a faith in something which we can represent only as immortality, but which is not adequately or truly so represented.

2 R. VIII. 234; H. IV. 107.
consciousness of God and the consciousness of self as under the moral law. God, therefore, appears only as the executor of that law, who connects rewards or punishments with obedience or disobedience to it. But, as has been already indicated, the consciousness of the possibility of the realisation of the law, whether within or without us, cannot exist except in so far as we discern that all that appears to resist our moral life is necessarily subordinated to it, because we are rational beings in a world, which in its ultimate reality must be regarded as the manifestation of reason. Such a consciousness might find its appropriate expression in Kant's "I can because I ought."

"So nigh is grandeur to our dust,  
So near is God to man,  
When duty whispers low, 'Thou must,'  
The youth replies, 'I can.'"

But this "I can because I ought" must be taken as involving a negation of the resistance without as well as within us, which reduces it to something "phenomenal," i.e., to something which exists only as a factor in that very life which it seems to oppose. It is the expression of the consciousness that "morality is the nature of things," the ultimate reality even of sense and matter. And this, on the other side, means that the consciousness of self involves the consciousness of God. The consciousness of right is the consciousness of might, in so far as it is the consciousness of unity with the absolute principle, to which all things are to be referred, even those that seem to resist it; and in this view, it matters not whether the hindrances to the realisation of the good are outward or inward: they exist only to be overcome. Or, looking at the matter from another side, they are hindrances only in so far as the principle, which they resist, is taken in too abstract a way, and has not yet developed its full meaning. At the same time, we are to observe that the consciousness of the universality of the principle, and hence of its being capable of overcoming all resistance, and turning all resistance into a means of its own manifestation, is not dependent on the full development of its meaning. It is thus only that we can explain how the
religious should arise out of the moral consciousness, i.e.,
that the consciousness of the moral ideal as at the same
time the absolute reality, should exist even when the moral
ideal is itself very imperfectly developed. That "the
Rational is the Real," that the practical consciousness
which sets before us the good as that which ought to be,
is at the same time a manifestation of that which is, is
a conviction which may be felt in its utmost strength while
as yet our ideas of what is rational and good are far from
adequate: just as we may be able to see that existence is
necessarily existence for a self, while yet we are unable
to work out in detail an idealistic view of the world.
Hence, we can justify the power of religious faith over the
minds of men, under the most imperfect forms of religion.

Kant draws a wide distinction between faith and know-
ledge; for faith in his view is essentially a consciousness,
the object of which is present to us as a general idea that
does not admit of being particularised, or represented as
a fact under conditions of space and time. Now, there
is a sense in which we can accept this distinction, and a
sense in which we cannot. We cannot treat this ultimate
universal as if it were one particular among all the other
particulars which it conditions. We cannot, therefore,
have it for our object at all, if we take objects in the way
in which science takes them, as external to each other
and indifferent to the self for which they are; for it is
just with the correction of this abstract way of looking
at things that the ultimate universal comes into view as
presupposed in the particulars. But again, when the
universal principle is thus brought into view, it appears
as a principle, which not only qualifies and determines
the particulars known, but reaches beyond them, and
makes us regard them as elements in a system which they
imperfectly represent to us. Hence, our knowledge of
the universal, and of the particulars in relation to it, is
always accompanied by a consciousness of defect, which
we may express by saying that it is the object of a rational
faith and not of knowledge. But we need not interpret
this as Kant does, as if faith were less than knowledge.
If we confine the name of knowledge to our consciousness
of objects as particulars, and of their relations as in time
and space, without reference to the conscious subject for which they are, such a faith is more than such knowledge. But, in so far as this faith has for its object a principle which, though present in all the particulars, is not exhausted by them; and in so far as that principle enables us, as it were, to describe the outline of a circle within which all things must fall, but which for us is filled up only to a limited extent, we are obliged to admit that it cannot be verified, as a definite scientific law can be verified. For a scientific law is a hypothetical judgment, in which we abstract from all but definite conditions; whereas the principle of which we are speaking is a universal principle, in asserting which we do not abstract from anything. In expressing the faith of reason, we are laying down propositions as to the totality of things, and this we can do only in so far as we apprehend in its universality the principle to which that totality is related.

Now, the moral consciousness sets before us as the motive of action the realisation of a kingdom of ends—a world in harmony with the principle of self-consciousness. But that realisation would be an impossibility, if the world in which this kingdom is to be realised, were not already determined as phenomenal, in the sense of not having an existence which is independent of the principle of self-consciousness. Out of the combination of these two thoughts we get the idea that the moral consciousness sets before us, as an end to be realised in the world, that very principle through which the world exists. But, in opposition to that principle, the world can be regarded only as a phenomenal appearance, and can, therefore, be conceived only as making such resistance as is necessary for the development of the principle which is resisted. The faith that the moral ideal will be realised is thus one with the faith in it as the absolute reality. It ought to be realised, because it can be realised, and even because, in a sense, it is realised already, at least for one who can discern the deepest meaning of the facts before him. In this last movement of Idealism, however, Kant refuses to follow it; for, by him, the antagonism of universal and particular is stated in such a way as to involve, not merely that in our particular experience there is never a final realisation
of the universal, but in the sense that in it there cannot be a realisation of the universal at all, *i.e.*, not merely that there is a continually reproduced opposition between the universal and the particular in which it realises itself, but that the universal is a principle to which the particulars are externally referred, to which, therefore, they can never become adequate—if it is even allowable for us to regard them as an *inadequate* realisation of it. Now, this gulf is fixed between the universal and the particular by Kant's imperfect view of the universal, which for him has no contents. Yet, even while he so conceived it, he was obliged by the very nature of the universal to postulate the possibility of transcending the division he had made; for the universal would not be universal, if it did not transcend its own distinction from the particular. He is obliged, in other words, to find room for the universality of the principle, in spite of the fact that he had conceived it in a way which does not correspond to its character as universal. But, if we take from his theory the idea of an irreconcilable opposition of particular and universal, and substitute for it the conception of the universal as synthetic, no objection can be taken to the definition of the religious consciousness as a faith of reason; the *Summum Bonum* is never realised as a matter of sight, just because it always is realising itself. It is an object, we may say, not of *sight*, but of *insight*, and therefore of faith.
CHAPTER VI

APPLIED ETHICS: THE PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE

The application of the moral idea to the legal and ethical relations of men, is for Kant encompassed with many difficulties, owing to the abstract way in which those principles are conceived by him. Yet it is at the same time a test of his intellectual sincerity and comprehensive insight, which force him to make room at any cost for the facts of the moral life, and to advance to what is really a new point of view, in order to find principles that will embrace and explain them. In no part of Kant's work, therefore, can we more manifestly see at once the defects of his professed theory, that is, of the theory with which he starts, and the anticipative insight by which he already suggests a theory better than his own.

We have already seen how it was that Kant was led to fix and deepen the antagonism between nature and spirit, and how at the same time, he was forced, almost in spite of himself, to point to their reconciliation as the necessary terminus ad quem both of man's life and of the life of the world. The absolute antagonism of spirit to nature seemed to him inevitable; because the subject becomes conscious of itself only in opposition to the object, and because the judgment of self-consciousness is an analytic judgment, in direct contrast with the synthetic judgments of knowledge. Hence, even in the theoretic consciousness, the actuality of knowledge is asymptotically related to the ideal suggested by self-consciousness, and experience vainly reaches after a completeness which, from its essential conditions, it cannot attain. In the practical consciousness the parts are inverted: self-consciousness
becomes prior to the consciousness of objects, and the ideal which it brings with it takes the place of the absolute reality to which the phenomenal must in some way accommodate itself. The moral law is, therefore, conceived as pointing, not to an unattainable ideal, but to that which can be, and so, in a sense, to that which must be, because it ought to be. We find, indeed, that we cannot schematise or represent as realised in the phenomenal that which the law forces us to think as realised, but this inadequacy, while it reduces our belief in the realisation of the law into the form of a postulate, does not make it less certain. A faith of reason is not knowledge, but in a sense it is something more; for knowledge is of phenomena, while the faith though inadequate in form, yet grasps the noumenon or absolute reality. We know only the shadows of our cave, but in the light of the moral law we see, though as it were in distant outline, the real nature of the world and of ourselves.

Thus, by means of his Postulates, Kant, as it were, overreaches and reconciles the antagonism, which, as he stated it at first, seemed to be irreconcilable. The law, which by its abstractness had been emptied of meaning, was re-filled by the use of the phenomenal world (under a law of nature identical with the moral law) as a type of its realisation; and the two postulates of immortality and God were brought in to make intelligible the sub-ordination of passion to reason within, and of nature to spirit without. Thus, within us, the moral law at first presents itself as the negative or opposite of passion, and so as competing with passion for the rule of our lives, which it can secure only as it drives out passion. Yet, on the other hand, that law has no contents except through the passion, to which it opposes itself, and it can be realised only if it absolutely subjugates passion and turns it into an instrument of its own manifestation. Caught between these two opposite tendencies of thought, Kant escapes absolute self-contradiction by placing the law in the foreground with its abstract command, which we obey with the conviction that its realisation is possible, though this realisation can be represented by us only as an infinite series of approximations to an unattainable end. Again,
when we look without us, the law forces us to abstract from all objects of desire, and hence from happiness as an end; and no connexion can be traced between the conformity of the individual in his desires and feelings to the moral law, and the conformity of the outer conditions of life with these desires and feelings; i.e., between goodness and happiness. Yet, inasmuch as the consciousness of self, (from which the moral law has its origin,) is, after all, the consciousness of the principle of unity to which the objective world is referred, the conformity of our actions to the moral law must be at the same time their conformity to the law of the universe, and the unity of man with himself in his self-determination must be at the same time the harmony of the world with his desires. The consciousness, therefore, that the moral law is an absolute law that binds us as noumena carries with it the sense that all things "work together for good" to those that obey it; and the postulate of God (the almighty Law-giver who binds happiness to goodness) is, for Kant, the necessary form of the conviction that the ideal, which appears at first as negative relatively to that which is phenomenally real, is, after all, the reality of which the phenomenal is only the appearance.

In applied Ethics, upon which we are now entering, the same difficulties appear in a slightly different shape. The moral law is not merely the object of a theoretical consciousness, whether of knowledge or of faith. The consciousness of it is not merely the knowledge or belief that something is realised or realisable, but a consciousness that we are imperatively called upon, that "necessity is laid upon us," to realise it. We must seek to mould, and we must be able to mould, the nature within us and the nature without us into conformity with the law of reason; and the postulates of immortality and of God come in only in the second place, to assure us of the direct possibility of the former, and the indirect possibility of the latter. How, then, are we to conceive of the process in which inner and outer nature are made the means of the realisation of man's moral life?

Man is a self-conscious subject, and yet a particular object in the world; and the problem of his life is to
determine himself as a particular object in all his relations to other subjects who, like himself, are particular objects; and also, so far as may be, to determine them in their relations to him, in conformity with the universal law of reason, which springs from their common nature as subjects. We may add, as a subordinate point, that it is his duty to determine the outward world in such a way as to make it the fitting medium of the relations of self-conscious beings to each other, in conformity with the law that binds them all as rational or self-conscious. In short, man has to conform his particular to his universal nature; and this involves the double task of establishing within himself a harmony of the particular desires to reason, and of conforming his relations as one individual with other individuals, to the same reason regarded as a principle of social unity. Or, more simply, he has to bring himself as an animal into harmony with himself as a rational being, and in doing so he has to work out, so far as lies in him, the harmony of all beings and things with each other under the principle of reason. Kant expresses this by saying that man is presented to himself in two ways, in outer and inner sense, and that his acts, therefore, have a twofold aspect, as external manifestations of his will, and as determinations of his will by motives. In the former aspect, he is brought into relation to outward things and to other beings like himself, while in the latter he is, at least primarily, alone with himself. In the former aspect his acts are considered by Law, in the latter by Morals. Not, indeed, that morality excludes the consideration of actions as outward facts, but it views them in relation to their motives, with which law does not concern itself. In truth, here as always inner sense implies outer sense; for it is only a reflexion by which we go beyond the immediate consideration of the action to consider its motive. Hence, morality presupposes law; though it is also true that, in another point of view, it is prior to law, in so far as it discloses the principle on which law rests. In beginning with Jurisprudence and proceeding to Morals, Kant is, therefore, proceeding from the abstract to the concrete, (though it is true that his abstract way of opposing outer and inner, as if they were
two independent forms of experience, is apt to hide this from us, and may be said sometimes even to have hid it from himself). We are able to consider acts as external expressions of the will of rational beings, and to determine when they are conformable to reason, without asking any question as to the motives of these acts; but the opposite abstraction of motives from the acts they determine is illegitimate and misleading. Hence, the application of the moral principle properly begins with *Jurisprudence*, or the doctrine of Law.

Now, the doctrine of Law, as has already been indicated, presupposes the existence of conscious or rational subjects as particular beings in an outward world. As existing in such a world, our acts are not mere determinations of ourselves, but may affect the outer existence of others, who are also self-conscious beings. Hence, in our action we are limited by the moral law which calls upon us to treat all self-conscious beings as ends, and never merely as means. Out of this law, as applied to beings existing in one outward world, there arises a seeming contradiction. For, as such beings, self-conscious subjects have a particular existence which is limited by the particular existence of others; while, as being each of them an end in himself, they are not capable of being so limited. Hence, the great problem of Jurisprudence is to keep self-conscious beings from collision with each other, to secure that each should exercise his freedom in a way that is consistent with the freedom of all the others, who are equally to be regarded as ends in themselves. And this, again, is impossible unless the self-conscious being by *his own action* imposes upon himself the limit as regards others, which he is required to respect. For the freedom of a subject disappears, if he is limited by any one but himself. The possibility of such self-limitation becomes visible, when we consider that for the rational being to act in conformity with his nature is for him to act on a maxim which he at the same time thinks as universal law, and therefore as a law which binds himself as well as others. If, therefore, his act is such as to establish any special relation of others to himself, it must at the same time establish an identical relation of himself to others. If it is a claim of right against them, it must
be at the same time a vindication of right in them as against him. For at every step, the rational being is legislating at once for himself and for all others, and his freedom belongs to him just on condition that he does so legislate. In this sense "nur das Gesetz kann uns die Freiheit geben." Our freedom is essentially self-limiting, as it is realised only in acts in which we give on the one side whatever we take on the other; and thus reciprocally determine our particular existence in relation to the existence of others, and their particular existence in relation to ourselves.

"The idea of right, in so far as it implies an obligation corresponding to it, has to do in the first place only with the external, and at the same time practical, relations of one person to another, in so far as their actions as facts can have influence (directly or indirectly) on each other. But, secondly, a right signifies the relation, not of the will of the one to the wishes of another, and so to his mere wants, (as in acts of philanthropy or the opposite,) but only to his will. Thirdly, in this reciprocal relation of wills, what is taken into account is not the matter willed, i.e., the end which each has in view in the object which he wills, ... but only the form of the relation of wills, regarded as on both sides a relation of freedom; and the question is only whether the act of the one can be brought into union with the freedom of the other according to a universal law. Legal right is, therefore, just the whole compass of the conditions on which the independent will of the one can be united with the independent will of another according to a universal law of freedom." ¹

When it is said above that the great problem of law is "to keep self-conscious beings in their acts from coming into collision with each other," and that such a collision is avoidable so far only as their acts are in accordance with rules that can be universalised, it is implied that all acts of a self-conscious or rational subject which do not correspond with such rules—all acts in doing which he does not at the same time leave it open to all others to do the like—are self-contradictory, i.e., they are acts in which the agent is not in harmony with himself as a rational subject. They

¹R. IX. 32; H. VII. 27.
are acts which bring such subjects into collision with each other, because, being contradictory to the rational nature of the agents which they pretend to express, they are at variance also with the conditions on which these agents can live together as free. From this it follows that it is in accordance with the law of freedom, that such acts should be restrained or annulled. Hence we get the idea of a compulsion which is not opposed to freedom, because it is the negation of a compulsion or violence done upon freedom. "When a certain use of freedom is a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws, the compulsion which is opposed to it, as the hindering of a hindrance to freedom, itself agrees with freedom according to universal laws." ¹

Now, in Jurisprudence, we are content if the action, as an outward fact, agrees with the law, and we do not ask whether the motive does so or not; and, in like manner, if the act as an outward fact does not agree with the law, we are content that it should be outwardly annulled or counteracted. It is, therefore, obvious that Jurisprudence, in the strict sense of the word, reaches so far as, and no farther than, the possibility of compulsion: or, in other words, that that alone is my right, in a strict legal sense, which it is possible that others should be compelled to respect; and that that only is a wrong, in the strict legal sense, which can be annulled or done away with by an opposite act. "A right, in the strict sense of the word, is therefore an altogether external thing. It is grounded, it is true, on the consciousness of the obligation of each one according to the law; but in order to determine the will accordingly, legal right is not authorised to appeal to that consciousness as a motive, but must base itself firmly on the principle of the possibility of an external compulsion which is consistent with the freedom of every one according to universal laws. When, therefore, it is said, that a creditor has the right of exacting payment from his debtor, this does not mean that he can put it to the conscience of the debtor that he ought to pay. It means that a compulsion to pay in such a case can be applied consistently with every one's freedom; consistently, therefore, with the debtor's own

¹ R. IX. 34; H. VII. 28.
freedom, according to a universal external law. Right and claim to apply compulsion are therefore the same thing. Hence, we can construct something like an *a priori* intuition corresponding to the principle of universal freedom by the aid of the analogy of the law of the equality of action and reaction between bodies in motion, *i.e.*, we can bring it before ourselves in intuitive presentment, as a law of reciprocal compulsion, which agrees with every one's freedom. We can thus represent a society of self-conscious individuals, who are also particular beings in space, as held apart from each other in independence by a reciprocal compulsion, which, so to speak, annuls by reaction any compulsion which any one of them may exert upon another. This close association of claim to compel with right, in Kant's view, excludes from the sphere of law two cases where the ideas are divorced; the case of what is called *equitable right*, and the case of what is called the *right of necessity*. An equitable right is a right which is not armed with a compulsory power, because the conditions are wanting which a judge would need in order to determine the amount and character of the satisfaction required. When the currency in which it is covenanted that a debt should be paid, has become depreciated in the interval between the covenant and the payment, the creditor may have an equitable claim to be reimbursed; but it is impossible that a judge should enforce it, seeing the creditor has got that for which he bargained, and nothing was said in the contract of such a contingency. *Summum jus* may in this case be *summa injuria* before the court of conscience, but it is an *injuria* that cannot be pleaded before a court of Law. In what is called the "right of necessity," we have the converse of this. It is sometimes alleged that an individual has a *right* to preserve his own life by sacrificing that of another, where one only can be saved, *e.g.*, when two shipwrecked men are grasping at a plank which can support only one of them. But this is true only in the sense that the wrong thus done by the one to the other cannot be treated as a legal wrong, and that in this sense "necessity has no law." You cannot punish the individual for sacrificing the other's life rather

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1 R. IX. 55; H. VII. 29.
than his own, since your punishment could not outweigh the danger. But it is obvious that the act is not, therefore, to be regarded as guiltless; for the "subjective impossibility of punishment is not to be confused with an objective agreement with the law." Here, therefore, we have an unpunishable wrong, as in the former case we had a right which is incapable of being asserted. In both cases, the judge cannot have the conditions given him for decision in the case of the right which is in dispute, and, neither, therefore, can be brought under the head of Jus in the strict sense of the word.

What, then, is implied in Jurisprudence, in the strictest acceptation of the term? We start, as is already obvious, with freedom as the original or innate right upon which every acquired right is based. Freedom here means independence of compulsion by another will; and, on the other hand, it implies that no limit shall be put upon the action of the one except by the similar freedom of another. Such freedom carries with it equality; for one who is thus free cannot have an obligation laid upon him by others, except where he in turn can lay a similar obligation upon them; while, on the other hand, he can act towards them in any way he pleases which does not exclude a similar liberty of action towards him on their part.

Now, how does this freedom realise itself in the outward world? what acquired rights can be built upon it? and what limits does it impose on such acquisitions? The answer to these questions must start from the principle, that it is only the freedom of one rational or self-conscious being which can limit the freedom of another. Rights are inherent in persons and not in things, which can be only the objects over which rights are established, but never the subjects to which they belong. The outward world cannot, speaking from the point of view of law, resist the will of a person: it is essentially a means, or a possible means, to that will. In the second place, rights are always in one person as against another, or against all others. They always imply reference of one will to another; for right on one side is always obligation on the other. Finally, the relation between persons must always be reciprocal; it can

1 R. IX. 40; H. VII.
never justly be one in which all duties are on the one side and all rights on the other, as in the case of slavery.

Now, in working out our conception of the rights which are founded on these principles, it is convenient to think of man as in an ideal state of nature, prior to the founding of any social community. The actual state of nature, if we mean by that his first state, is indeed, a state of violence and wrong, in which no rights are respected, because there is no authority armed with force to compel respect for them. It is a state in which right does not realise itself; for the realisation of right is not possible except by a reciprocal compulsion, by which each is confined to the acts that are consistent with the freedom of all the others; and this reciprocal compulsion cannot be carried out except by a power which acts in the name of all. It is useful, however, in the first instance, to abstract from this process which makes right real, and look simply at the rights which it exists to realise; and it is in this sense that we can properly speak of natural rights, or rights determined by the *Jus Naturale*, and of an ideal state of nature.

The basis of all right is the freedom of the individual person, a freedom which makes him inviolable to other persons. But this inviolable personality reveals itself in a physical existence, and in acts which establish relations between that existence and other external objects, especially acts by which these objects are submitted to his uses. Each personality may be regarded as expressing itself also in the objects into which he has put his will, and which thus have come to partake of his own inviolableness. In this way, liberty implies or gives rise to property, the *ego* and the *tu* to the distinction of *meum* and *tuum*. What is *mine* "is that with which I am so bound up that the use which another should make of it without my consent would be a wrong to me." ¹ Each person is thus viewed as dominating by his personality a certain circle of material things, in such a way that to interfere with them is to interfere with him. Hence, such interference cannot be consistent with the freedom of each and all according to universal laws.

Now, such a connexion of objects with my personality

¹*R. IX. 51; H. VII. 43.*
as makes them "mine," in the sense just mentioned, is obviously something different from physical possession. It is a kind of possession which attaches them to the me within the me, making them parts of our "intelligible" existence, and communicating its sacredness to them. We may, therefore, call it "intelligible possession," to indicate that it is independent of actual physical contact. The thing that is mine in this sense, remains mine when I am not there to assert my claim; because it is attached to me, not by a sensible, but by an ideal bond. Now, to say that he who interferes with a thing violates me, when I actually hold it in my physical possession, is a mere analytic judgment; but to say that he wrongs me who interferes with the thing, when I do not actually hold it, is a synthetic judgment, and indeed a synthetic judgment a priori. For in it the thing is claimed as mine to the exclusion of all other possessors, while at the same time abstraction is made of all the "conditions of empirical possession in time and space." And if we ask how this is possible, the answer is that in bringing the thing into relation to the ego as mine, I necessarily abstract from such conditions. My act, as the expression of the will of a self-conscious being, establishes a relation between me and the object, which is independent of the immediate physical existence of either. For, if we denied the possibility of such a relation, then we should practically be denying the possibility of the personal will manifesting itself in act, so as to subject external objects to its uses. If it does so manifest itself, it must be able to establish an intelligible relation between the object as a permanent object and its own permanent personality, and so to give to a physical act a universal or ideal meaning: for only in this way can all other personal wills be excluded from the object. And as a "thing" cannot be a subject of rights, it follows that this permanent relation can only be one by which it is made mine, or appropriated to my use.

We are, then, to conceive the external world as, in the first instance, open to appropriation: i.e., we are to conceive it as a common possession of the race, which, however, can only be realised by the personal appropriation of individuals. This does not mean that there was an original
community of property; it means that the common possession of the earth by all is the ideal presupposition of its appropriation by each; seeing that each can establish a claim to a part of it, only in so far as he grants an equal liberty of others to establish an exclusive possession against him. The ideal community of possession can thus be realised, in the first instance, only by the exclusive appropriation of individuals; and if an actual communism is introduced, it must be by means of a further step, in which each gives up his private right. In this way prior occupation must be regarded as establishing an exclusive right as against all who come after, so that they cannot interfere with the objects appropriated without injuring the person of the proprietor. We may, therefore, define right in a thing as the right to the private use of an object of which I am in common possession with all others; for I exclude them from the use of the thing only in virtue of a common right in it which belongs to all as persons.

So far we are speaking of the Jus in rem, the right of persons in things, a right which primarily refers to the soil as the basis of all other possessions. Such right is, it will be observed, the right of a person in a thing, not irrespective of other persons, but as exclusive of them: it is, in other words, a right to bind other persons to refrain from the use of a thing, which otherwise they would be free to use. It is a right the recognition of which is necessary to prevent the wills of persons from coming into a collision which would imply that each was externally limited by the other and therefore not free. Such collisions are to be avoided if, and only so far as, each asserts the limiting right of all others in asserting his own, and excludes himself from their property at the same time that he claims his own. In this way, each individual, in virtue of his freedom, is self-limited, and each manifests his freedom in acts which are consistent with the like freedom in all. Thus all collision of personal wills is excluded; for the only limit of freedom admitted is the ideal limit, which is one with the freedom it limits.

A real right is a right to which others are bound to assent even apart from civil society; as it is based on a manifestation of the freedom of one that does not trench
upon the freedom of others. But it does not necessarily imply the actual assent of others. It may be described as a "right against that moral personality which is nothing but the idea of the will of all as a priori in unity with each other." ¹ It is different with personal rights: rights of one person to an object first possessed by another person, or to some service which that other can perform for us. Here we have an extension of the mine, which necessarily implies the actual assent of another. Such a right cannot be acquired by my act, nor even by my act coupled with the neglect of another; but it implies a direct act of transfer of that which is primarily his, to me. Hence, "in every contract there are two preparatory and two constitutive acts of will." ² There is the offer and expression of willingness to receive it, and again there is the promise and the acceptance of it. For an offer cannot turn into a promise, till it is known that the promisee is willing to accept it. These acts on each side are, of course, successive in time in their performance; but we are to remember that properly they must proceed from the united will of both parties in one moment; or rather we should say that the relation is one in which abstraction is made of the conditions of time, as it is not the actual but the intelligible possession of the object which is transferred from the one to the other. By contract the right established is only a jus in personam not in rem, i.e., a right not as against all but as against one particular person, on whose causality or will we are entitled to work. It is thus a right to be set in possession of a thing by, or to exact some service from, another person; but, in the latter case, the service in question must be definitely limited in extent and character, otherwise the jus in personam would amount to slavery, and so become self-contradictory. For, though contract brings in the notion of a common will, and by this means allows the inviolable spheres of the separate personalities, so to speak, to touch each other; yet this coincidence is limited to things that are external, or special services which can be detached from the personality of the individuals who render them, and do not compromise their independence.

¹ R. IX. 86; H. VII. 73. ² R. IX. 83; H. VII. 71.
It is, however, different when we come to a third set of relations which Kant still includes as private right, relations which involve the very personality of the individuals concerned, and in which, therefore, a person becomes not only the subject but the object of a right. It is difficult to see how Kant could for a moment admit such a negation of his fundamental idea of personality as essentially independent and self-determined. The idea of a *jus realiter personale*, of a right over a person as if he were a thing, carries with it a confusion of the primary categories of the *Jus Privatum*, the categories of "Person" and "Thing," which we can define only by their opposition to each other. But Kant has, at whatever cost, to make room for the relations of the family, and he reconciles himself to the necessity by the idea that, where the right of each person in the other as a thing is reciprocal, it is not inconsistent with the idea of freedom. On this we shall afterwards have to make some remarks.

In marriage one individual acquires a kind of right over the person of another, which seems to contradict the right of humanity in his or her person. But we have here, as Kant holds, the one condition under which such a relation is possible, viz., that, while the one person is thus acquired by the other like a thing, that other person acquires a similar right over him in return; for so she again recovers herself and restores her personality, which would otherwise be lost. Hence follows the exclusion, as wrongful, of all kinds of polygamy or polyandry, as well as of irregular unions of all sorts. The relation of parents and children is another relation in which the usual independence of persons is annulled; though, in this case, apart from any special act of contract between the persons concerned. But, as the child is brought into the world without his own consent, a right is thereby given to him against his parents to be supported and educated; and, on the other hand, with this goes a right on the part of the parents to govern and direct the child while its powers are yet immature, in a way that would be otherwise a violation of the rights of persons. To this Kant, curiously yielding to old-fashioned usages, adds a right of the head of the household over his children, if they choose to remain as
his servants after they have reached their majority; and over other servants who may have covenanted to give him their services in the household. Kant points to the fact that such a householder is invested with the right to bring back his servants if they run away, but otherwise does not show any reason why the case should be distinguished from one of ordinary contract.

These are the main points in the determination of the *Jus Privatum* which is also conceived by Kant as the *Jus Naturale*. It has, however, been already observed, that this *Jus Naturale* does not refer to any state of nature prior to the civil state, in which such rights and obligations as have been above described, are actually realised. On the contrary, Kant holds that it is "possible for persons to have outward things as their property only in a civil society," 1 i.e., under a public authority with power to enforce the laws it enacts. What is meant by speaking of rights and obligations as natural is, therefore, that these rights and obligations flow from that rational principle which is in every man, and which determines his relation to the others. In virtue of this principle, there is an "original community of possession" and this is the presupposition of all private property, which means only a claim that others should withhold from the use of a thing which I have appropriated; a claim which is balanced by concession of similar rights to them. But this merely ideal community gives no security that any individual will be allowed to enjoy the rights in question. In order that there may be such security, it must realise itself in an actual political power which renders each man's right effective at the same time that it limits it by reference to the right and freedom of others. Until such a power is established, each man is, even apart from any actual act of injustice, a standing menace to the rights and freedom of the rest, against which they are at liberty to protect themselves as best they can. "I am not bound to leave inviolate the property of another, if the others do not make me secure that they will refrain from mine on the same principle. And this reciprocal securing of each other's rights does not require a special legal act, but is

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1 R. IX. 64; H. VII. 54.
involved already in the conception of an external legal obligation on account of the universality of that obligation; for a universal obligation as such is reciprocal. Now, the one-sided will cannot be intrusted with a compulsory power which is to be exercised against every one alike; for that would not be consistent with a freedom which is to be enjoyed under universal laws. Therefore, a will which binds every one equally, a collectively universal will armed with absolute power, is that which alone can give security to each and all. Now, the state of those who are under a universal external legislature armed with power, is the civil state. Hence, it is in the civil state alone that there can be an external mine and thine." ¹ Till such a state is entered upon, rights of property are merely "provisional"; it is in it alone that they become "peremptory." It has been already stated that, according to the Jus Naturale, violence is justified only to neutralise an opposite violence, to annul an act which is legally null, as being an exercise of freedom which does not consort with the freedom of all according to a universal law. But there is one exception which we may say "proves the rule." We have a right to compel others to abandon the state of nature and enter with us into that state in which alone there is security for right. For the state of anarchy is a state of potential violence to all; and in view of it, any violence which is necessary to establish a civil society is a violence which counteracts violence, and so is consistent with freedom.

Now, "the act whereby a people constitutes itself into a State, or, we should properly say, that act the idea of which is presupposed in the State as rightfully constituted, is the original contract, by which all (omnes et singuli) members of the people give up their freedom, in order to take it up again as members of a commonwealth, i.e., of a people regarded as a State (universi). We are not therefore to say that man in the State has sacrificed a part of his innate external freedom to secure an end; we are to say that he has surrendered the whole of his wild and lawless freedom in order to find it all again undiminished in a dependence regulated by law. For such

¹ R. IX. 64; H. VII. 54.
dependence springs out of his own legislative will, and therefore is one with freedom." ¹

The social contract is no fact of history, but an Idea of reason, which is presupposed in the conception of a State as a rightful institution, i.e., as an expression of the universal or rational nature of all men, which determines their rightful relations to each other. It is, in short, a way of expressing the fact that the State is founded, not on the enslavement of men to a foreign yoke, but on the subordination of the particular nature of individual men to their own self-legislative reason, and that it exists in order to the realisation of the latter in the former. The State is a means to free the individual from himself, as well as to protect him against the possibility of enslavement to others; and only in so far as it discharges this function, does it correspond to its Idea. But in Kant's view, it can discharge this function only as the outward minister of justice which "forces men to be free," which uses its power to "hinder the hindrance of freedom"; and it is going beyond its office if it attempts to do more. And, confined as it is to the outward acts of men, its excellence depends on the degree in which it realises the idea of a power springing from the people, who unite in order to govern themselves, and to exercise upon themselves their own justice.

The process by which a people becomes a State is a process which is necessary to the realisation of justice, and therefore violence may be used to further it; but, on the other hand, it involves an act upon which men can never rightfully go back, which they can never rightfully reconsider; for to do so would be to outrage justice itself. Hence, if we call it a contract, we must add that it is a contract men are bound to make, which it is no outrage to force them to make, and which, when made, may never be broken, but constitutes an absolutely sacred and inviolable relation between them. A right of revolution, of breaking up the State to fashion it anew, would be the negation of all right. "The origin of the highest power is for the people, in a practical point of view, inscrutable; i.e., the subject of a State ought not to raise

¹ R. IX. 161; H. VII. 133.
subtle questions as to its origin, or treat its right to his obedience as a *jus controversum* which he is free to question. For, as the people, in order to have a rightful authority to judge the highest power in the State, (*summum imperium*) must be viewed as already united under a universal legislative will, it can and ought not to judge otherwise than as its present supreme governor (*summus imperans*) wills. To ask whether originally it was an actual contract which led to its subordination under that supreme power (*pactum subjectionis civilis*) or whether violence came first and law only followed after, is for a people which already stands under civil law an aimless question; and yet it is one that may be fraught with danger to the State. For, if the subject who has found historical proof that the latter of these hypotheses is the truth, were to proceed on the ground of his discovery to resist the established authority, he would, according to its laws, and that means with perfect justice, be destroyed or expelled as an outlaw. Now, a law which is holy and inviolable, so that *practically* even to question it, or for a moment to suspend its execution, is already a crime, is usually represented as one which has come not from man, but from some higher immaculate lawgiver. And this is the force of the dictum that "all the powers that be are ordained of God,"—which is not meant to express the *historical basis* of the civil constitution, but an *Idea* which is a practical principle of reason, that we ought to obey the existing legislative power, be its origin what it may."  

Kant thus so far agrees with Hobbes, that he regards the institution of a State as the realisation of a universal will, in relation to which the will of the individual "has no rights, but only duties." However imperfect the form of the State, individuals as such can never have a right to rebel against it; for the social contract cannot contain a clause for its own abrogation, and to go back into the state of nature is to renounce the very principle of justice itself, a principle the maintenance of which cannot be weighed against any possible suffering from bad government. Rebellion, therefore, can never be just, and to

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1 R. IX. 164; H. VII. 163.
consecrate the principle of rebellion by judging and executing the sovereign himself, as was done in the case of Charles I. and Louis XVI., is something far worse than simply to murder him. It is to bring justice into collision with its own idea, and to make transgression of the law a maxim of action. It is thus an "immortal and unexpiable guilt, like the sin against the Holy Ghost spoken of by theologians, which can be forgiven neither in this world nor the next." Maybe, however, we should say that such a making of evil itself into the maxim of his conduct is impossible to man; and that such crimes were after all not intended, as they seemed to be, to strike at the very idea of sovereignty,—the idea of the State as a highest power lifted above the arbitrary will of the subjects as individuals,—but were really precautionary measures against the vengeance of a particular sovereign; i.e., that here, as in other cases of yielding to temptation, the transgression was thought of as an exception to the law, which in itself was revered by the transgressor and which he did not wish to abrogate.

While Kant thus thinks of the highest power of the State as sacred and inviolable, independently of the special form of the political society, and regards rebellion or revolution as absolutely unauthorised, we must, on the other hand, observe first, that he holds the true or ideal form of the State to be Republican: and, secondly, that he declares it to be an obligation incumbent upon the sovereign power gradually to bring the relations of the State into harmony with that ideal form of government. A State, indeed, even under the lowest form, is still a State; it is an order in which a universal will is maintained against the particular wills of the subjects; and it is an absolute duty to support this order and not to let society relapse into a state of nature. In one passage only Kant so far relaxes the rigour of his absolute prohibition of revolution, as to admit that this return to the state of nature may begin with the sovereign himself, who acts merely as an individual; "for, if the question comes to be not one of right but of force, the people also might claim to use its own, even though they would thus

1 R. IX. 168; H. VII. 139.
destroy the stability of any constitution based on right." ¹ But this is merely introduced in the course of an argument to show that governments should base their claims upon right, and not upon expediency. While, however, Kant thus maintains the inviolable sanctity of the State order, he yet asserts that the Ideal State is one in which the supreme legislative power is exercised by the representatives of the people. In the way in which he reaches this result there is a curious combination of Rousseau's idea of a social contract with the semi-historical theories of Montesquieu. Kant starts with the conception of free, equal, and independent citizens, each of whom is to be regarded not only as a subject, but as a ruler; i.e., as under a law which he himself enacts. From this it would seem to follow that only the wills of all can constitute that universal will (volonté générale) to which each and all must submit. And so at first Kant states it. "The legislative power can belong only to the united will of the people. For, as from it all justice must proceed, it must by its law be incapable of doing wrong to any one. Now, if one has to lay down the law for another, it is possible that he should do injustice; but it is not possible that anyone should do injustice in that which he determines for himself (since volenti non fit injuria). Therefore, only the agreeing and united will of all, in so far as each determines the same for all, and all for each, i.e., only the united will of the people, can institute legislation." ² Kant, however, partly evades the natural meaning of this by two limitations. In the first place, he recognises a distinction of active and passive citizens—the latter including not only women and children, but also house servants and even day labourers, i.e., all who sell their services and not their work; for all these are regarded, as we said, as falling under a kind of tutelage (jus realiter personale) of their employer. All these are, it appears, legitimately deprived of their votes, and treated as potential and not actual citizens; though they are never to be deprived of their natural freedom and equality, or brought under laws which shall render it impossible for them to work their way up from passive to active citizenship.

¹ R. VII. 210; H. VI. 338. ² R. IX. 158; H. VII. 131.
But, in the second place, he holds that a Republic must be a representative system, and that the people must not themselves take in hand the legislative power, but only elect deputies to do so. The reason given for this is, that it is only under a representative system that it is possible to separate the legislative from the executive power; which separation he considers to be so important that he even makes it an essential characteristic of the true State. "Every form of Government which is not representative is the very negation of constitutional form, (eine Uniform) because the lawgiver may then be in one and the same person the executor of his own will, (which is as if the major premise, which expresses the general rule, should at the same time be the minor premise which subsumes the particular under it). Now, though the autocratic and aristocratic forms of government are defective in that they admit such a confusion, yet in them it is still possible that the spirit of a representative system should be maintained, the spirit which was at least professed by Frederic the Great, when he said, 'I am merely the highest servant of the State.' But in a democratic State this is impossible, for there every one seeks to be a master." ¹

It appears, then, according to these principles, that the ideal or universal will of the people can never, properly speaking, find its organ in the united wills of each and all of the citizens. To use Rousseau's language, the will that ought to rule is not the "volonté de tous," but the "volonté générale." But this "volonté générale" is not the will of all individual men as such. It is the will of reason which, though it is the nature of all men, and is, indeed, that which constitutes them self-conscious individuals, yet cannot possibly show itself in practice as a collective will of all. To get the true universal will, even in the most advanced republican State, we have, according to Kant, to leave out certain classes; and further, we have to introduce a representative system with a view to the establishment of a division of the three powers, executive, legislative, and judicial. Thus only can the enactment of the general laws be separated from the determination of particular cases that fall under them; and thus only

¹R. VII. 244; H. VI. 419.
can security be taken that each of the three great powers of the State shall be free from the causes of error to which it is most exposed. The legislative power, therefore, should spring from the whole body of the people; and it should be confined to dealing with laws which are to affect every one equally, in order that it may not be tempted to partiality, or to the enactment of decrees with regard to particular cases. The Regent or executive should ultimately be under the control of the legislative power, which should even be able to dismiss him from his office; but so long as he holds it, he may be, and ought to be, held irresponsible, and so protected from its direct influence. And the jury by which justice is administered ought to be selected from the people themselves, in order that the people may as far as possible execute justice on themselves; and also in order that the separate interests of the regent or his subordinates may not be allowed to interfere with the course of justice.

These securities make a republican constitution the best, if it can be attained, and in any case make it the ideal after which we should strive; but Kant confesses that men, while yet rude and uncivilised, may be neither willing to adopt such a constitution, nor capable of living under it. Nor, even among men who are comparatively civilised, can it be said that these securities are absolute; or that, even in a republican constitution, the "volonté générale," the will which is one with reason, must necessarily realise itself. We can only say that with the advance of civilisation and of morality, an approximation will be made to this form of constitution, and at the same time men will become capable of living under it and drawing from it all its advantages. Hence, Kant is not so careful to separate the real from the ideal in the case of the republican constitution as in the other cases.

That ideal is based, as we might expect, on the principle of universality. In fact, the social contract theory, as Kant accepted it, is just that principle in its application to Politics. The social contract "is a mere Idea of reason, which, however, has its indubitable (practical) reality in that it binds every legislator to enact no laws but such as might have arisen from the united will of a whole
people, and in that it regards every subject in so far as he claims to be a citizen, as if he had given his personal assent to such a will. For this is the criterion of the justice of a law of the state. If any law is of such a character that a whole people could not possibly give its assent to it (as e.g., the law that a certain class of subjects should have the supreme authority in the state secured to them by inheritance) then it is not just. If, however, it is even possible that a whole people should agree to the law, it is a duty to regard it as just, even though at the moment, the people be in such a position or temper, that if they were asked, they would probably not yield their assent." ¹

On this principle, which is only Kant's principle of morals in a new form, all laws are just which the citizen can be conceived as enacting for all, including himself. And Kant, in the usual way, tries to deduce from it the injustice of all privileges of birth, of all right of inheritance in offices of State, and of an established church, especially an established church with a fixed creed. In the same spirit he reduces all corporate institutions, for education or charity, or any other public purpose whatever, to a position of direct subordination to the state, which has the right, at any time, to interfere with their property or abolish them without being liable to the charge of confiscation. On the other hand, he contends for the right of free speech and publication, as the inviolable right of the citizens; for, as they are expected to assume that no law enacted by the sovereign is intended to wrong them, but on the contrary, that every law is intended to be such as might flow from their united will, they must be allowed to criticise freely what the sovereign has done. "To deny to them such freedom, is not only (with Hobbes) to take away from them all claim of right in relation to the sovereign, but to withdraw from the sovereign—who issues commands to his subjects as citizens—only because he represents the universal will of the people, all knowledge of wrongs which he would redress if he were properly informed, and so to bring him into contradiction with himself." ²

¹ R. VII. 207; H. VI. 329. ² R. VII. 216; H. VI. 336.
against that of Hobbes. He agrees with Hobbes that, in one sense, the sovereign has only rights, and not duties, towards his subjects, i.e., he admits that the subjects have no rights against the sovereign, in the strict sense of the word in which a right is a right to compel. But he maintains that this does not imply that, in a wider sense, the sovereign has no duties or the subject no rights. On the contrary, the sovereign is bound to enact every law that is needed for the maintenance of justice, and no law which is not so needed. For, it is the right of the citizen to seek his happiness in his own way, and according to his own judgment; and it is despotism, it is going beyond the due province of government, if the ruler seeks to make his subjects happy according to his own judgment. "If the sovereign power ever enacts laws which primarily are directed by Hedonistic principles, (intended to secure the comfort of the citizens, the encouragement and restraint of population, and the like,) this cannot be justified directly on the ground that happiness is an end of the State, but only as a means to secure law and order, especially against external enemies of the people. The sovereign must be authorised to judge alone, and on his own responsibility, whether such steps are required to secure the strength and stability of the State within and without; but he must not seek to make the people happy, as it were, against its own will, for his business is merely to maintain its existence as a commonwealth." ¹ It is this reference to happiness, as if it were the primary consideration, which is the cause of all mistakes as to the right of rebellion on the one side, and the right of undue interference on the other. "The sovereign wishes to make the people happy according to his own conceptions of their happiness, and he becomes a tyrant; the people refuse to submit to anything that interferes with the general claim of man to have happiness in his own way, and they become rebels." ² On the other hand, when the sovereign limits himself to his proper task of maintaining the State as an institution for the administration of justice, and interferes with the welfare and happiness of the citizens only so far as is necessary to secure this end; and when, on the

¹ R. VII. 209; H. VI. 330. ² R. VII. 214; H. VI. 334.
other hand, the citizens are allowed freely to criticise the acts of the government, but never seek to resist it—then we have that union of the spirit of freedom with obedience to the law and loyalty to the State, which is the political ideal. And this may be attained even when the form of the State is autocratic, if the sovereign, like Frederick, recognises himself to be only the highest servant of the State. For, in such a State it is really the law that rules and not a man, and, therefore, other men in submitting are still free. At the same time, a constitution which is in form as well as in essence Republican, brings with it a kind of objective security for that which in other constitutions depends on the character of an individual or a class. Hence, it is a duty laid upon those who have authority to work towards this ideal, and gradually to abolish all institutions that stand in its way. And, indeed, just as Kant had said that all individual rights in the state of nature are provisional, so here he regards all other constitutions as provisional forms, which find their ultimate justification only in the fact that they prepare the way for the Republican form of government. "The (lower) forms of the State are only the letter of the original legislation, and, therefore, they may remain so long as, through old and long custom, they are held to be necessary to the machinery of the constitution. But the spirit of the original contract (anima pacti originarii) contains the obligation of the constitutive power to adapt its manner of governing to the Idea of the State; or, if this cannot be done once for all, yet to make gradual and continual changes, till in effect the government is in harmony with the one rightful constitution, to wit, that of a pure Republic; and till all empiric forms which served only to secure the subjection of the people, give place to that rational form which alone makes freedom the principle and the condition of all compulsion. In this way the letter will finally be accommodated to the spirit."¹

It is, then, only in the highest form of constitution, in a Republic, or in a State which is in effect a Republic, that we can expect to see the idea of the State, as Kant has described it, realised. In earlier times, the subjection

¹R. IX. 192; H. VII. 158.
of the citizens to law and the checking of violence and anarchy is so important that political freedom must be postponed till these ends are secured. Thus Kant admits a provisional justification for many institutions, which yet he condemns as essentially inconsistent with the freedom and equality of the citizens,—for a hereditary nobility, for corporate property, for an established church, and generally for the interference of the State with the liberty of the individual citizen to seek his happiness in his own way. It is true that, while such institutions remain, the Idea of the State and its reality will be in opposition; the letter of the social contract will not be conformed to its spirit. But the latter works silently under the former, and must ultimately mould it into harmony with itself.

We have now said enough to show the principles upon which Kant deals with all questions of Politics. It is obvious that his ideal State is what has been called a Rechtsstaat, a State in which the laws are only the expression of the abstract idea of justice, and the regent or magistracy is merely the executor of these laws. Kant's tendency to conceive the Sovereign as a mere executive and to deprive him, so far as possible, of all individuality, is shown among other things in his doctrine that the regent should possess no private property in land. He is to be the over-lord of the whole country, but he must own no special domain which would put him in opposition to other proprietors. "Of such a landlord we may say that 'he possesses nothing' (of his own), except himself; for if he had anything of his own, and so stood alongside of others in the State, a dispute between him and them would be possible and there would be no judge who could be called in to settle it. But we may also say that 'he possesses everything'; for, (in order that he may secure to every one his own) he has the right of supreme command over the people to whom all external things belong." 1 He lays taxes on all with a view to the public service and he is the source of all dignity and authority, but just for that reason he is in no way to be set in opposition to others. We shall not anticipate the criticism of this view, but only observe that, in so far as the consti-

1 R. IX. 171; H. VII. 142.
tution takes one of the inferior forms, it is impossible to avoid the confusion between private and State property which Kant here seeks to avoid. In so far as it takes the republican form, however, the confusion is avoided; for, in a Republic, all will be under the law, and no person or persons will be confused or identified with the sovereign power.

The most characteristic part of Kant's Politics is perhaps his treatment of penal justice. For in it we see most definitely his resolve to confine the State to the function of the maintenance of justice, and to prevent it from taking any account of happiness. "Legal penalty" (poena forensis) he declares, "as distinct from the natural penalties (poena naturalis) by which vice punishes itself, and of which the legislature takes no account, can never be regarded simply as a means to secure any other good either for the transgressor himself or for society, but must always be imposed upon him because of the transgression he has committed. For a man may never be employed merely as a means to the end of another, or confused with things which are mere objects of right. He is protected against this by his own inborn personality, which he cannot be condemned to lose like his citizenship in the State. He must therefore be found deserving of punishment, ere we can begin to think about any use of punishment to himself or his fellow citizens. The penal law is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who creeps through tortuous paths of Eudaemonism, seeking something which, by the advantage it promises, may free him from punishment or from that degree of punishment which the law of justice requires. Such an one may use for his defence the Pharisaic saying, 'It is better that one man should die than that the whole people perish'—but he must be met with the answer that, if justice perishes there is no longer any value in the existence of men upon earth." ¹ Further, the principle on which this punishment should be inflicted, is the principle of equality. "The unmerited evil which thou inflictest on another, thou by that very act inflictest on thyself. If thou doest outrage to the good name of another, thou doest outrage to thine-

¹R. IX. 180; H. VII. 149.
own; if thou robbest another thou robbest thyself, if thou slayest another, thou slayest thyself." 1 In every case, the return of the deed upon the doer, must be made manifest. This principle of equality, indeed, is in some cases incapable of being literally carried out; still it can be always carried out in spirit, and we ought to avoid punishments which are incommensurable with the transgression, such as e.g., a fine for an insult. In the most important case of all, the punishment of death for murder must be strictly exacted; for there is nothing but death that is commensurable with death. "Even if civil society were on the point of being dissolved with the consent of all its members, (as e.g., if a people dwelling on an island, should resolve to separate and scatter to all parts of the world,) they would be bound first of all to execute the last murderer in their prisons, that each one may meet with that fate which his deeds deserve, and that the guilt of blood may not rest upon the people." 2

Yet, after this remarkable declaration of the principle of the lex talionis, Kant goes on to say that in certain cases, where the accomplices in deeds of murderous violence are so numerous that their punishment according to state law might cause a revolt of feeling against all penal justice, the sovereign by a Macht-spruch may order some other kind of punishment. Further, Kant maintains the general right of pardon in the sovereign, though only in cases where he is personally wronged, and not in cases where one citizen has wronged another. And he admits that the lex talionis cannot be applied in the case of a duel forced upon a soldier by the public opinion of his class, so long as the common barbarous ideas of honour prevail; nor, again, in the case of the murder of a child not born in wedlock by its mother. This last exception he bases upon the strange ground that the illegitimate child is born without the law, and is not, therefore, entitled to its protection.

In arguing for death as the necessary punishment for murder, Kant mentions the objection of the Italian jurist, Beccaria, who maintained the injustice of the death-penalty on the ground that it could not be contained in the original

1 R. IX. 181; H. VII. 150.  
2 R. IX. 183; H. VII. 151
social contract; for no one would dispose of his own life, or give assent to his being slain in the event of his murdering another. Kant answers that in willing his crime, the individual has willed his punishment. It is true that "I, as with others the author of the law which attaches punishments to crime, am in a sense not the same person, who, as a subject, is punished according to the law; for, as a criminal, I can have no voice in the laying down of the law." But "when I lay down a penal law against myself as a criminal, it is the pure legislative reason in me, which subjects me to the law as one who is capable of crime. I, therefore, (as homo noumenon) subject myself under a different persona (as homo phenomenon), along with all the other members of the same civil society, to the penal law." ¹ Thus the difficulty is solved by reference to the two characters in which each man appears, as a universal subject, who, as such, is the source of the law which finds its outward expression in the State, and as an individual, externally related to others, and subjected along with them to the law of the State. Owing to this double character, it is his own justice to which the man is subjected, and by which, as a criminal, he is condemned, whenever he breaks the law of the State by assailing the rights of his neighbours.

From the law of the State, Kant passes on to international law, the Jus Gentium in the modern sense, and asks on what principles it is based. Obviously, he answers, on the same principle as the Jus Civile. If it was the duty of individual men to put an end to the state of nature, and to combine with each other in a civil state, and even to use force to produce such a combination, it seems reasonable that the same principles should be applied to States, which, as regards each other, are in a state of nature, in so far as they recognise no supreme authority above themselves? Must not the primary duty, here as in the other case, be to establish a Universal State, in which an end is put to the continual menace of war under which each State lies in relation to all the others? Kant acknowledges that the two cases are similar, seeing that no mere league or treaty can be relied on permanently

¹ R. IX. 185; H. VII. 153.
to secure nations from war with each other. At the same time, he sees so vividly the practical difficulties in the way of realising such a Universal State or Community of all States, that he seems to regard it rather as an *Ideal* which we must aim at, than as an end which we can ever completely attain. "As the state of nature between peoples, like the state of nature between individual men, is a state which they ought to leave in order to enter into a state of union regulated by law, all the law of nations, and all the outward rights of States which are acquired or maintained by war must be regarded as *provisional*, and can only become *peremptory*, or, in other words, can only be finally secured, by a universal *Union of States*, analogous to that by which a people becomes a State. But, as the too great extension of such a Polity of peoples over wide regions must finally render the government of it, or, in other words, the protection of each member of it, impossible, while, on the other hand, the existence of a number of separate communities necessarily carries with it a state of war, it follows that an ever-lasting *peace* is an ideal that cannot be realised. Nevertheless, the political principles which point to such a peace as their end, the principles which prescribe that such agreements should be entered into between States as may serve to cause a continual *approximation* to this Idea, are not incapable of being acted on; but, on the contrary, they give rise to a practical problem, which is necessarily bound up with the duty, and therefore also with the rights of men and States, and which it must be possible to solve." ¹

In an essay, in which he seeks to refute the doctrine that "*that may be right in theory which does not hold good in practice,*" Kant speaks in a somewhat more confident tone. "I, for my part, put my trust in that theory which is based on the principle of right, and which determines on that principle what the relations between men and States *ought to be*, laying it as a duty on the gods of this world to conduct their warfare in such a manner as to pave the way for a universal State of all nations, and to assume that such a State is possible because it ought to exist. I have faith also in the nature of things,

¹ R. IX. 203; H. VII. 168.
which comes to the aid of justice, and forces men to advance toward a goal which they do not seek of their own accord (Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt). In this I am mainly calculating upon human nature itself, in which the reverence for right and duty has never yet died out, and which I cannot and will not hold to be so deeply sunk in evil that practical reason, which is the source of our moral ideas, shall not, after many failures, at length gain the victory over it, and bring it into a beautiful harmony with itself. 1 We are, in fact, here brought into the same alternative between moral necessity and impossibility, which in morals gave rise to the idea of a progressus ad infinitum.

In the treatise On the Possibility and Means of attaining to a Lasting Peace, we have a further development of the same thesis. In Kant’s view, the whole of the Jus Gentium is summed up in the principle to avoid everything which could make the state of nature, the state of actual or possible war, permanent; and on the other hand, to act, even in the state of nature, on those maxims out of which a lasting peace is most likely to spring, even if we are not yet able definitively to secure it. With this view he lays down certain preliminary articles, which he would have adopted into the Law of Nations by general agreement, and which might lead on to a lasting peace. These preliminary articles prescribe that no treaty of peace shall be made with the secret reservation of causes of quarrel, which might furnish material for another war; that no State shall be treated as the patrimony of an individual, or transferred from hand to hand by inheritance or gift; that no public debts shall be contracted with a view to war, or in preparation for it; that no State shall interfere with the constitution or administration of another; that no State shall use in war such means of injuring the enemy as must make impossible that reciprocal trust which is necessary for peaceful relations in the future, and that on this ground all recourse to the weapons of assassination and poisoning shall be proscribed, and at the same time, all breaches of capitulation or attempts to make use of treachery among the enemy. For such

1 R. VII. 228; H. VI. 346.
means of war, as they destroy all that trust in the enemy, which is based on our common humanity, and which ought to subsist even in war, tend to produce a war of extermination, which could bring about a lasting peace only in the "great churchyard of the human race." Some of these articles admit of no delay in their application, as for instance, the last; for the acts which they proscribe are direct violations of the fundamental principles of justice. Others, as e.g., the article that prohibits all inheritance or sale of States, may be carried out as regards the future; but it may not be expedient to go back upon past arrangements, in so far as these were regarded as allowable at the times when they were practised.

At the same time, these articles are to be regarded as merely preparatory, and something more is required for a definite bond which would give security of peace. It would require, first, that a republican constitution, i.e., a constitution such as we have described, based on the freedom and equality of the citizens, should be established in every State. For, as it is the great body of the people who suffer from war, and not the king or governing aristocracy, a decisive step will be made towards lasting peace only when the power of declaring war is transferred from the latter to the former. "The objective reality or practicability of a Federation, which shall gradually extend over all States, may be exhibited in this way. When fortune so wills it, that a mighty and enlightened people can shape itself into a Republic (which by its very nature must be inclined to lasting peace), this will furnish a nucleus for the federative union of other States, to which they can attach themselves in order to secure that freedom of States which is in harmony with the idea of the Jus Gentium; and thus, by various alliances of this kind, the federative unity may gradually be extended in ever widening circles." \(^1\) It is true that such a federative alliance will not absolutely put an end to the state of nature, the state of lawlessness and war, which can be finally abolished only by the establishment of a Republic that includes all nations. But, so long as the different States are not willing to give up their independence, "in

\(^1\) R. VII. 250; H. VI. 423.
place of the positive idea of a *World-Republic*, we must be satisfied with the *negative* substitute of a continually advancing *league* of States to prevent war; and this may be of sufficient avail to resist the pressure of lawless passions, though it cannot secure us decisively against the danger of their breaking loose.”¹ In such a league, one special article should be to secure the rights of each citizen in the contracting States as a “citizen of the world”; that is, to secure to him the freedom of visitation and trade in other countries than his own. For the earth (which, as Kant remarks, is a sphere, and therefore does not permit men to disperse themselves indefinitely) must, from the point of view of right, be regarded as the common possession of all; and the title of each man and nation to their own appropriations is based on this common right. The fact that men at the present day are so far sensible of their community, that “a violation of right in one place is felt everywhere,” makes this idea of citizenship of the world no longer a mere dream of philosophical enthusiasts but a thing after which practical efforts may be made.

Finally, the essential principle on which we are to go in all Politics is that the practicable is to be measured by the right, and not the right by the practicable. For what is right is ascertainable, what is practicable according to the laws of nature is beyond calculation. Hence, the need of calling in the philosopher to assist the statesman—not, indeed, in the way of realising Plato’s dream that philosophers should be made kings, but in the way of allowing philosophers freely to discuss the principles on which States are and ought to be based. Thus we will gradually learn to say in Politics as well as in Morals, that what ought to be done can be done. Nay further, a deeper study of nature may give us ground to believe that the opposition of the practicable to the right is a superficial appearance, and that “a design may be traced in the mechanical course of nature itself, out of the very discord of men, even against their wills, to elicit concord.”² To exhibit this aspect of the Kantian theory, however, would

¹ R. VII. 251; H. VI. 424.
² R. VII. 257; H. VI. 427.
carry us beyond the limits of the philosophy of Jurisprudence, and it must be postponed for the present.

We have now to criticise the view of Jurisprudence which has been explained. We must, however, confine ourselves mainly to the general principles on which it is based.

In the first place, it is easy to see that Kant has to begin the application of his principles by what he calls a *salto mortale* from the *a priori* to the empirical. We have to assume it as a fact that in the particular individual in the outward world the universal principle of reason is realised; and that he stands, therefore, in outward relations to other individuals in whom also the same principle is realised, as well as to objects animate or inanimate, in whom it is not realised. This being presupposed, we have to consider that each of these individuals as rational is an end and a law to himself; and we have to find out how the outward relations, in which, as natural beings, they limit and come into collision with each other, may be brought into conformity with the conception of them as rational beings or 'Persons,' who cannot be externally limited. It is obvious, as has been already indicated, that this reconciliation of necessity and freedom, external limitation and pure self-determination, can take place only according to the principle of *self-limitation*, which again flows from the universality that attaches to the determinations of a rational being. Such a being by his very nature must in his action abstract from his own existence as one particular being opposed to others; or, if he determines anything for himself as against others, he can do so consistently with his rational nature, only if he also determines the same thing for others as against himself. What he claims for himself, he claims in principle for all; what he takes, he at the same time must give. Now, this idea, as applied to a phenomenal world in which persons appear as exclusive individuals who are externally related to each other, cannot mean that different individuals should form one personality, (which would make the individual cease to be an end in himself); nor can it mean that they should have common property in the same individual things; for
where one individual will manifests itself, another individual will is excluded. It can only mean that any exclusive claim set up on one side, is at the same time an admission of the right to establish a similar exclusive claim on the other. In this way each personality, whenever it manifests itself, excludes all others, who, for their part, equally exclude it. But yet there is no limitation of each by the others: for, in the first place, there is perfect reciprocity of exclusion; and secondly, this reciprocity is not like a physical action and reaction of bodies in which each meets with an external obstacle in the other. Here each person is limited by himself in relation to the other; in other words, each, in virtue of the universality that attaches itself to his determination, excludes himself from the sphere of the others in the very act of defining his own. And, conversely, each would renounce his own right, if he invaded the right of another.

From these premises we can easily see, that it is possible that there should be a force or compulsion which is in perfect consistency with freedom; the force, namely, which confines each person within the physical sphere to which his rights extend, and which annuls or reserves all acts of invasion by one personality on the sphere of right dominated by another personality. Such force is not violence, or it is a violence directed against violence; as Kant expresses it, it is a hindrance of the hindrances to freedom. In other words, it is a negation of the negation of freedom, which is therefore one with the affirmation of it. As a mere natural being, I may, and probably will, have the tendency to disregard the limits marked for me by my practical reason or ideal personality, and to invade the sphere dominated by the personality of another. But, in doing so, I at once lose the inviolable sacredness, the absolute right to exclude extraneous force, which belongs to me in virtue of my nature as a 'Person.' I have reduced myself, so to speak, to a natural being, and I fall under the law of nature. I have made myself a physical hindrance to the realisation of spiritual laws, and so subjected myself to a physical reaction. The text, "He that takes the sword shall perish by the sword," may be taken to express the idea that, in an act which is con-
demned by the law and justified merely by natural impulse, the person can no longer carry with him the claim to be treated as free, and unlimited in his freedom by anything external to himself. He has come down into the region of outward compulsion and violence, and he may therefore be legitimately compelled and violated. He has appealed to nature against reason, and to nature he must go.

When, however, we put the matter in this way, we see how Kant is led on to assert the necessity, with a view to the maintenance of freedom, of a State Power armed with irresistible force. Such a State Power is necessary, because otherwise there would be no organ of freedom, as distinct from the competing wills of individuals; and the law of freedom would not necessarily be realised. The outward existence of freedom can be maintained only by an outward power, which is able to "compel men to be free," i.e., to respect the limits in which the freedom of each shall be consistent with the freedom of all the others. Otherwise, we will have a state of things in which "a random right redresses a random wrong"; or, rather, in which every vindication of right is at the same time a new wrong; as e.g., in the blood-feuds of clans we have a succession of crimes followed by punishments which are themselves new crimes, and which, therefore, demand punishment in their turn; so that the infinite series of revenges is never summed up in a final act of penal justice. Hence Kant maintains that there is one kind of violence which needs no violence to precede it in order to make it justifiable, viz., the violence by which men force others to unite with them in one civil society for the maintenance of outward justice, i.e., a society in which the freedom of each is restrained to the conditions in which it shall be consistent with the freedom of all.

Here, however, we are met by a difficulty, the discussion of which may throw considerable light upon the defects of the Kantian view of the relations of persons as such. For the very idea of the Person, as a law and an end to himself, with which Kant starts, seems to come into collision with the conditions of its own realisation. We must establish an absolute power over all persons in order that their
freedom may be externally realised. But in whom is this power to be lodged? If we say, in a person, that person will no longer be related, according to the law of freedom, to the other persons who are subjected to his jurisdiction; but, rather, in relation to him they will be slaves. This contradiction reveals itself almost naively in Roman law, which was in the main a transcript of Stoic ideas as to the *Jus Naturale*, analogous to those of Kant. Roman law was based on the idea of the independence of persons who in relation to each other were free and equal, sacred in themselves and in their property, and therefore, in Kant’s language, always to be treated as ends and never as means. Yet, in relation to the Emperor, the one executor of the law, these persons were no longer persons, but things, and he was their *Dominus* or proprietor. The law of freedom thus had slavery for its instrument, because, as a mere ideal law of men’s outward relations to each other, it could not execute itself.

Now, Kant tries to escape this contradiction, at least in regard to the ideal form of the State, to which in the process of history the actual State is supposed to be continually approximating. In the Republic, which alone realises the true idea of the State, the supreme legislative power is in the hand of representatives of the people, and thus the people is governed by itself. It is, however, obvious that, even if we overlook the fact that this form is only reached through a long process of development, Kant’s solution of the contradiction above mentioned is insufficient. For, in the first place, the sovereignty of the State cannot be justified on the principle on which the rights of persons as against each other are based. No doubt the State is externally required (as a *Deus ex machina*) to secure that the freedom of each shall be exercised in a way consistent with the freedom of all. But the idea of the State as a compulsive power, which represents the universal or rational nature of man as against the particular wills of individuals, cannot be justified from the principle on which the rights of individuals as independent persons are based. For that principle is, that the individuals, as self-conscious beings, are law and end to themselves *apart* from all relation to others. In other words, they are
supposed to realise, in their isolated individual life, the universal or rational nature which belongs to them as men; and they are not conceived as having any substantial or necessary relations to each other. Law, therefore, seeks simply to keep them from collision with each other. But, if it be maintained that the united will of all persons in a society can constitute, and ought to constitute, a power in virtue of which each individual is secured in his rights at the same time that he is confined to them, then it is implied that there is a positive relation of self-conscious beings to each other prior to the negative relation which they have as individual persons. But, if this be admitted, the community of men with each other becomes the pre-condition of their independence in relation to each other; and this means that in the individual person as such the universal or rational life is not realised; or, in other words, that as isolated from others, the individual is not a law and an end to himself. We are therefore in a dilemma. If we adhere to the idea that the individual as such is a law and an end to himself, in the sense that in him, as an individual, the moral end is realised, or capable of being realised, then society can have no essential relation to the individual; it is an accident that other individuals exist with whom he stands in external relation of reciprocal right and obligation; and this accident brings with it the further result that a power, separate from these individuals, must be brought in to maintain by force their reciprocal rights. But, if the power which maintains right and obligation be thus extraneous, the subordination of persons to it is slavery; or the relation of subjects to the sovereign cannot be brought under the general principle on which the rights of persons rest. On the other hand, if we try to escape this consequence by deriving the sovereign power from the will of all, as is done in the social contract theory, we imply that by an act of will, which is done by the individual person only in virtue of his personality (i.e., of his being a law and an end to himself,) he in one particular relation (in relation to the power constituted by the will of all,) gives up his personality and all its rights. But such a surrender must be illegitimate, unless there be something prior to the individual personality, i.e., unless it be denied
that the individual, apart from the social relations, is a law and an end to himself.

The difficulty we are now considering, is one which showed itself very prominently in the discussion as to the Social Contract which was started by Rousseau, and which had so much influence upon Kant. Rousseau's primary conception of man is, in a sense, individualistic, i.e., it is individualistic in the sense of the Stoics, in which the claims of the individual are based on the fact that he is in himself a *universal*. Thus, there is a *raison commune* which is or can be realised in each individual as a thinking being; a *volonté générale* which he can execute, and which he is bound to execute, apart from any social constraint or organised social relations. Hence, when extraneous circumstances, especially the increase of population in a limited area, force men together, the problem is how men are to aid without enslaving each other—"to find a form of association, which shall protect with the whole common force the person and property of each associate, and in virtue of which every one, while uniting himself to all, shall only obey himself and remain as free as before."  

According to this view, the social power has only to reinforce and not to limit the individual will, except in so far as it is *already* self-limited apart from society. Society brings no obligations to the individual which he had not apart from it; it only brings, or at least should only bring, new means whereby he may realise an end which is his already, apart from the social relation. Man is not essentially social; and the constitution of society is only an arbitrary act in which the individual avails himself of a means, which owing to external circumstances has become necessary, to realise his natural end. But it is obvious that to use such means cannot be his *duty*, in the same sense that it is his duty to seek the end. It must be free to him to enter or not to enter into the social contract as he sees best, and consequently the social contract can be valid only if it is agreed to by all. The *volonté générale* of the society must arise from the *volonté de tous*; and it cannot legitimately contain anything which is not in the *volonté de tous* from which it arises. The *volonté générale*, in

Kant's language, is constituted by an analytic judgment, which merely leaves out that in which the wills of the individuals differ. For, as Kant, following Rousseau, does not hesitate to say, "only the agreeing and united will of all, in so far as each determines the same for all and all for each, can be legislative." But, if so, an actual social contract of all with all would seem to be necessary as the only legitimate basis of social union and social authority: nay, it would seem as if even such a contract could not be valid, unless it were continually repeating itself; and Beccaria's objection to penal justice—that it cannot have the assent of the criminal—would seem to be unanswerable. For, in order to answer it, we must either stretch the idea of contract so as to admit a contract which once made cannot be annulled; or we must suppose the idea of a social contract to be nothing more than the figurative expression for a law to which man is bound to submit, irrespective of his own consent to it. But if we adopt the latter alternative, the volonté générale once for all detaches itself from the volonté de tous, and we are forced to admit that the social unity of man is ideally prior to their individual rights.

Now, this last alternative is virtually accepted by Kant. With Rousseau, indeed, the volonté générale is still not distinctly separated from the will of a unanimous assembly; and his influence upon Kant is shown in the conception of the Republic as the only form of government which ultimately is legitimate. But, when Kant speaks of the entrance into civil society as obligatory, in the sense that we are entitled to force others to unite with us in forming such a society, and that it is our absolute duty to respect the order of such a society once formed, even if the form of government established be despotic, he takes up a quite different point of view. For thus the volonté générale is regarded as the will of reason, to which the will of the individual ought to conform. It is, as he expresses it, in speaking of Beccaria's theory, the will of the Homo Noumenon—to which the Homo Phenomenon ought to submit, whether he does so or not—that connects penalty with transgression. Hence, the social power is authorised

1 R. IX. 158; H. VI. 132.
to punish irrespective of the individual consenting, or having ever consented, to the law by which he is condemned; though not irrespective of the fact that the law is his law, a law that springs from his nature as a rational being. This, however, while it shows that the punishment of the individual is just, still leaves it obscure why the social authority should be justified in punishing him, or in acting as the representative of the Homo Noumenon of the individual; and on this point Kant gives us no explanation. None, in fact, can be given, except on the assumption that the social relation is in such wise essential to the individual that, apart from it, he is not himself, i.e., apart from it he has no personality, (in the sense in which personality is the basis of right) and is not properly to be regarded as a law or end to himself. Thus civil society is the organ of the volonté générale, to which the individual, in his particular will, is subordinated, and it is only in and through society that the individual has a volonté générale developed in him. The obedience of the lower to the higher nature of man is at the same time necessarily his submission to a social law, in which that higher nature is in the first instance embodied. This is, in a sense, admitted by Kant, in so far as he maintains that there is an idéal community of possession of the whole world prior to the adverse possession or appropriation of special objects in it by individuals, and treats the latter as only the realisation of the former. But Kant is careful to point out that this original community of property is not an actual communism, and that an actual communism can only be reached by the surrender of all individual possessions into a common stock. Now, this merely ideal character of the original community can be maintained only if we suppose that the primary relation of men to each other, as moral beings realising an end, is a negative relation. If, on the other hand, it is only through the unity of men in society, and on the presupposition of it, that they stand related to each other as persons having independent rights,—if they are a law and an end to themselves only as social beings whose ends are identified:—then individual right can be realised only on the basis of an already realised social unity; as, in fact, we find has been the case historically.
In truth, the conception of the individual as a law and an end to himself, appeared, and could only appear, historically, in the breaking up of a civil society, in which the individual had been made the organ of social ends, and thus had gained a consciousness of the individual worth. That the higher self-consciousness so developed finally became a consciousness of possibilities which could not be realised in such forms of society, nor in anything but a universal society of mankind, was the natural course of development. Thus arose the Stoic individualism which, conceiving man in his universal capacity, and abstracting from the social relations through which alone that capacity could be developed, represented the individual man as in his isolation an end and a law to himself, and reduced society into a mere extraneous condition of his life. And the same inversion of the relations of the individual and society which finds expression in the Stoic philosophy, was in a later time repeated by Kant on similar grounds; though, as usual, Kant stretches his theory up to its limits, and so prepares the way for a transition to that conception of the social union which he seems to exclude.

The difficulty that lies in Kant's individualistic conceptions, and the pressure under which he has to put them to find room for the facts of man's social life, is further illustrated by his strange conception of a *jus realiter personale*, a right in a person *as in a thing*. Such a conception as has already been indicated is an inversion of the fundamental categories of the *Jus Naturale*, which divided the world into two exhaustive classes of persons and things, and refused to recognise any middle term. It is true that Roman law, and Kant following it, recognised a *jus in personam*, a right as against particular persons, as distinct from the *jus in rem*, which was a right as against all persons. But this *jus in personam* was merely a right, based upon contract, to some "thing" which was in the hands of another, or, at most, to some service—some use of the other's powers; and such use was necessarily limited in time and kind, so that in covenancting to give it there might be no subjection of a man's personality as a whole to the will of another. If this strict division of persons and things be maintained, a *jus realiter personale* will be
a contradiction in terms. It is interesting to notice how Kant gets out of his difficulty by introducing the supplementary principle that a right over a person, as if he were a thing, does not involve slavery, if it is reciprocal, e.g., if the husband's right over the wife is correlative with the right of the wife over the husband. By this principle all forms of concubinage which degrade the woman into a chattel of the man, over whom she has no counter-balancing rights, are condemned, as involving the treatment of a human being merely as a means and not an end. But what Kant does not notice is, that by the introduction of this idea of a unity or community in which two persons are reciprocally means and ends to each other, he has quite risen above the idea of right with which he started. For what is involved in such a community is that the individual person, without ceasing to be free, can lose himself in the higher personality of the family union, in which he becomes a constituent member. But, if it be possible, still more if it be necessary, to the completion or full development of the individual, that he should thus lose himself as an individual to find himself again as the member of the family, then Kant's whole view of the person as an end in himself, who may not be made a means either by himself or by anyone else, must be abandoned. On the contrary, it appears that it is in being made, and in making himself, a means to social ends, that alone he can realise himself as an end. And when we go on to consider the *jus realiter personale* of parents and children in each other, we find that to such a relation it is not even necessary that it should be constituted by the will of the individual person. For child and parent are by the mere fact of their natural connection put into a moral relation, in which each is reciprocally means and end to the other.

Now, if this idea be once admitted in relation to the family, we cannot well escape the necessity of extending it

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1 If we keep strictly to the category of reciprocity, and refuse to go on to the higher category of organic community, each person would have to be regarded as means to the other, and neither as end. This would answer to the case of a sensual indulgence in which each individual was a means to the pleasure of the other, and no higher end was sought on either side. But Kant really points to a higher social relation in which each individual loses himself to find himself again in the common life to which he contributes.
to the State. For the necessity of the social contract theory, according to which the *volonté de tous* is the only legitimate source and basis of the *volonté générale* as expressed in the State, lay in the conception of isolated personality as a law and an end to itself. In fact, it was an illogical attempt to stretch the individualistic idea, so as to cover a social unity, which is the negation of individualism. If, however, it is admitted that a relation of persons may be established in which they are not as ends exclusive of each other, or in which each, as so exclusive, is only a means, the strict opposition of things and persons, means and ends, disappears in a higher category. We pass, so to speak, from the external teleology of mere design to the higher teleology of organic unity; and just because we do so, we are able to get over the abstract antagonism of means and ends, which holds good so long as we confine ourselves to the former point of view. Under this new category, it becomes possible to understand that man can be an end, only as he is a member of a kingdom of ends to which he makes himself a means: just as a member of the physical body maintains itself by the very activity in which it subserves the whole organism. On the other hand, if such an idea be not admitted it is more logical to fall back upon the ordinary conceptions of the *Jus Privatum*, with the result that the State, as in Rome, is regarded as an external force that comes to the aid of right, and marriage is treated as an ordinary contract. Even in Kant we may see the lingering influence of this view in his somewhat coarse conception of marriage. And the way in which the Roman Jurists treat it, either as the enslavement of the wife, or, if that alternative be rejected, simply as an ordinary contract, shows what is the true consequence of the individualistic principle when scruples from another source do not interfere with its logic.

When we reach this new view of the domestic and the political relation as, in the sense just described, organic, other consequences will follow, which we have now to consider. In the first place, the so-called *Jus Naturale*, the law determining the rights and obligations of men as individual persons,—which Kant regards as prior to the *Jus Civile*,—will be seen to be posterior to it in the order of
thought as well as in time; and in the second place, the opposition of law and morality as dealing respectively with the actions of men as outward facts, and with the same actions as the determinations of the will by motives, will be subordinated to this unity.

(1) What is involved in the conception that men are organically related, and that, therefore, their reciprocal action and reaction is not to be represented, as Kant suggests, on the analogy of a mechanical reciprocity, but rather on the analogy of the connexion of the different members of the living body? In order to interpret this analogy rightly, we must remember that the consciousness of self implies not only the consciousness of the not-self, but of the not-self in the form of other selves. For it is only what we see without that we can find within; or,—to state the matter more accurately,—the consciousness of self as a rational will grows up in essential distinction from, but at the same time in essential relation to, the consciousness of others with whom we are combined in one society. Man’s self-consciousness may thus be termed, in spite of the apparent contradiction of the phrase, a social self-consciousness. His opposition to his fellows rests on the basis and presupposition of his unity with them, and, if it could go so far as to destroy this basis, it would at the same time be fatal to itself. As a subjective idealism which turns objects into states of the consciousness of the subject, at the same time that it withdraws reality from the object, takes away the ground of the possibility of self-consciousness; so, in like manner, the consciousness of an antagonism to other persons, which is purely negative and not limited by a deeper community, would make the consciousness of self as a person impossible. But if so, then the conception of the person as a law and end to himself, who therefore stands only in negative relations to others, cannot be an ultimate conception. It can be so taken only from an abstract point of view, which may, indeed, have its relative justification, (just as the scientific view of objects apart from their relation to the subject has its relative justification,) but which must ultimately be subordinated to a higher truth. In other words, it may be right that, in dealing with the private relations of indi-
individual persons, Jurisprudence should at first simplify its work by abstracting from the community which binds them together as members of one political society, but this abstraction should not be regarded as more than a scientific expedient; for it is with a view to the social community, that all individual rights must be regarded as subsisting. We must not, therefore, begin with the conception of individual right, and regard the State merely as a means of maintaining it. We must begin with the conception of the social unity, as that in and through which men realise the rational nature, in virtue of which they are ends to themselves and to each other; and we must, therefore, consider the investment of individuals with private rights as part of the necessary differentiation of the members of the social unity,—which makes each individual, in a sense, an end in himself,—even while we regard such differentiation ultimately as only a means through which the higher organic completeness of the social body is to be realised. When we conceive it in this way, we can understand why the conception of individual right in history has been so slowly developed; for its development could take place only in the dawn of a deeper and wider conception of the social unity of men, and must be regarded as a step towards the realisation of that conception. Hence, also, we can understand why the assertion of individual right is always disintegrating in its effect, except in so far as it is the indication that men are becoming ripe for a wider community than they have previously realised. Thus the abstract proclamation of such right in Stoicism (from which it found its way into Roman law) was coincident with the establishment of mere force as the only bond of the empire. But it is to be observed that the Stoic Idea of cosmopolitanism already pointed to that principle which alone could at once supply the true justification for the private rights of individuals in all their extent, and, at the same time, limit them in view of the community of all men with each other.

A very complex problem is suggested in modern times by the fact that, while the legal and moral principles of Cosmopolitanism, mainly by the agency of the Roman law and of Christianity, have become universal, the World-
Republic in which alone such principles could find their final realisation is still an ideal, and the actual national State has thus become the executor of principles which reach beyond its compass, or for which it is not the appropriate organisation and embodiment. But the discussion of this subject must be postponed till we have considered the second point to which reference has been made, viz., the relation of morality to law, and their ultimate unity.

(2) Law, according to Kant's view, has to do with actions as external manifestations of the will, which, in order to be legally right, must be such that no one in the exercise of his freedom, is brought into collision with the freedom of others. Law, indeed, takes cognisance of intention (for, if not intentional, an action cannot be attributed to an individual at all), but it does not regard the motive or end which the individual sets before himself. Morality, on the other hand, has to do with the action as a determination of the will, which, to be morally right, must not only agree with the law, but must have the law itself for its motive. This opposition is for Kant absolute; for, in his view, as in that of the Stoics, the inner is disjoined from the outer life, and has no necessary reference to it. The moral struggle between the law of the mind and the law of the members goes on entirely within the man. It is purely a struggle for harmony with himself, in which he may succeed or fail without any reference to his success or failure in bringing the outward conditions of his existence into harmony with his will. For, in his relations to nature and to other men, he is dealing with things that do not entirely depend upon him, and to which the "Thou canst because thou oughtst," does not apply. If, in this relation also, he can cherish the hope of the realisation of that which he calls the Good, if he expects to see that prevail as an external law which he recognises as the law of his own inner being, it must be on the ground of a faith of reason, which postulates a God to realise it. Even so, the realisation postulated is conceived, not as the realisation of universal goodness, but merely of an order of things in which happiness is attached to goodness wherever it is found; for goodness itself must be realised by each moral
subject for himself by his own self-determination, else it
would not be moral goodness at all. In this faith the
individual has the duty of working towards the realisation
of a well-ordered Republic and ultimately, of a World-
Republic, which he must regard as possible and even
necessary; i.e., he must seek to establish a legal order of
things based upon the abstract law of right, in the belief
that nature will somehow conspire with his effort, and (as
we shall see in considering more fully Kant's treatment
of Morals), he must also, subject to the establishment
and maintenance of this order, endeavour to further the
happiness of all other men. But he is not called upon to
endeavour to make them good, because it is not within
his power, any more than it is within their power to make
him good; for no one can be or become good except
through his own self-determination. From the moral point
of view, therefore, we have to consider mankind as a mere
collective aggregate of individuals, who, indeed, in their
outward fortunes are united by the unity of the natural
world, as well as by the unity of that moral power which is
believed to be working through the order of the natural
world; but each of whom has to work out his own moral
destiny in the loneliness of an inner life, into which no
other can intrude. We cannot even say that the individual
is alone with God, unless God be used as another word for
the moral law which is the law of his will; for God himself
is not immediately present to our consciousness, but only
inferred, in so far as the postulate of his existence is
necessary to connect the outward with the inward life, to
unite happiness in due proportion with goodness.

We shall, in the sequel, have to consider the ways in
which Kant seeks to modify this conception, and to bring
the religious consciousness of union and communion with
God, into connexion with the moral self-determination of
the individual. Here we are directly concerned only with
the relation of man to man, which is implied in his absolute
severance of Law from Morality. In order to see the
defect of Kant's ethical theory in this respect, we have
only to develop what has been already said of the way in
which he subordinates the Jus Civile to the Jus Naturale.
If individual right presupposes social unity, if the rights
and obligations of persons in relation to each other, i.e., of persons who, as individuals, are conceived to be exclusive of each other, can only exist upon the basis of a common social or political life, it is impossible that men should be regarded as absolutely separated in their moral development any more than in their legal rights. It is true that, as each one has the consciousness of an exclusive self, so he lives an inner life of his own into which no other can intrude. Hence, it has been a main objection to the application of the organic idea to society that society has not an individual self-consciousness. But the question is, how has the individual such a self-consciousness developed in him? Could it exist in him as isolated from his fellows, and if not, in what sense is it an individual self-consciousness? Is it other than, or separable from, a consciousness of relations to other selves? Are not men as self-conscious beings so related that they recognise each other as different, only as they are, at the same time, conscious of their unity? If it is said that, after all, a self-conscious being is alone with himself, and that, to use Schopenhauer's phrase, for each individual "the world is only his own idea," may we not answer that the world is his idea only because, and in so far as, his consciousness of it is something which does not belong to him as a mere individual? If so, then to say that we can be conscious of a world of objects, is the same thing as to say that these objects become conscious of themselves in us. If the conception of a world which is not relative to a self is meaningless, equally so is the conception of a self-consciousness which is not consciousness of anything but its own states. When we have rejected the former conception, we must not think that we have thereby taken away the reality of the world, of which we are conscious,—as if it had now become merely our idea, in the same sense in which a passing imagination is contrasted as our idea with a reality outside of us. The distinction of these two things remains in all its force; only it is a distinction of which we could not be conscious, unless as knowing subjects we could apprehend something else than the self to which we refer "our ideas"; and unless we had a thought which is not in this sense exclusively ours—a thought, therefore, to which we neces-
sarily conceive the object as related, a thought, indeed, with which the reality of the object is essentially bound up. The difficulty of such a consistent Idealism seems to reach its highest point when we consider the relations of self-conscious beings. For here we have, as it would seem, inner lives on both sides, which are reciprocally manifested only through an external medium, and which are not, therefore, in any direct contact with each other. How can we say that in any sense there is in such lives a unity which transcends and subordinates their difference? Do we not doubtfully infer the inner life of another from what he lets us see outwardly, which may be more or less deceptive, and which we may more or less skilfully interpret? And how can our communion in such circumstances be so intimate as to constitute a common moral life? Is it not the case that we get knowledge of the life of others by interpreting the outward manifestations of that life on the analogy of our own? And, if so, must we not first experience in ourselves all that we can discover in them?

Now, in a sense it is true that the inner life is the only key to the outer. We cannot find without us, that to which we have not the key within us. But it is not true that we discern our own thoughts and feelings prior to our knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others. The supposition that we look outward to see matter, and inward to see mind, and that, if we see mind without, it is only by an inference, in which we interpret the material expression of the thoughts and feelings of others on the analogy of our own, looks at first very plausible; but it is based upon a fundamental mistake. For, in the first place, the process by which the feelings of the sensitive self are referred to a material object, is not essentially distinguished from the process by which they are referred to an object which is also a self-conscious subject. In both cases equally, there must be a process of interpretation, in which, in Kant's language, we go beyond what is given, and bind together passing data of sense under the conception of an object. In both cases, the elements given in sense are by an act of thought taken out of their immediate existence in feeling, and connected together in a relation which is independent of time. In this view, it is as untrue to say and that, therefore, individuals are separated in their moral life.

We know spirit on the same terms as we know matter.
that a permanent material object is given to us without a process of interpretation, as that a spiritual object is so given; all that can be said is that, in the latter case, the process is much more complex than in the former. It is altogether an illusion by which we take the body of a man as at once given in perception, and his soul as reached by inference from that body. Such an illusion may naturally arise from our habitual dualistic way of conceiving soul and body as two quite independent existences, which is apt to obliterate or conceal the continuity of the process of interpretation, by which all objects come to be known to us.

In this respect the advance of scientific thought, which teaches men to distinguish one form of reality from another, is apt to make them lose hold of a truth which was contained in their primitive anthropomorphic view of the world. For, in that view, every thing and being was taken as at once material and spiritual, at once as an object in space and time, and as a being gifted with life and will. Or, perhaps, we should rather say that man's earliest consciousness confuses all the grades of being together, and that it is a later development of thought which distinguishes these grades from each other, and even hardens the distinction between them till the sense of their relationship is almost lost. In so far, then, as any object is known by a process of interpretation or inference, all objects are so known; and from this point of view, it may be said (though with an inaccuracy which we shall presently notice) that in all our knowledge that which is inward is used as a key to that which is outward. For the categories are just elements in the idea of self-consciousness, which we use to unlock the secrets of the world; and we are quite as much going beyond our inner self and using the analogy of what is within to interpret that which is without, when we refer our perceptions to inorganic substances acting on each other in space and time, as when we see in them the manifestation of the thought and will of self-conscious beings like ourselves.

In both cases, we are equally unconscious of inference; for certain perceptions seem to be as immediately and intuitively referred to objects which are living or conscious,
as certain others are interpreted as referring to objects which are neither living nor conscious: indeed, as already indicated, it is only by reflexion that we learn to distinguish the two cases, and to separate the inorganic from the organic, and, again, the merely sentient from the self-conscious. In truth, whenever we discern that the categories of substance or cause are but fragments of the idea of self-consciousness, we can easily see how the mind should in the first instance find it easier to give its whole nature to the object, than to give a part of it.

But this leads me further to say that the very idea of interpretation or inference, as it is employed in the above statement, involves an inaccuracy. It supposes consciousness to be in complete possession of itself, and then, by aid of what it finds in itself, to proceed to interpret the object. But, whenever we analyse this idea, whenever we consider that what is to be interpreted is not, in the first instance, an object given as such, but can only be a sensation; and further that it is the interpretation itself which first makes the object exist for us, we see that the very word interpretation has a false suggestion in it, the suggestion, viz., that the subject is already conscious of an object, as possessing certain definite characteristics, and that it merely seeks to discover a further meaning in it. But a sensation as such is not something separate from the feeling subject, for the feeling subject has not yet separated itself from it. The beginning of such separation is the transition from a feeling into the consciousness of an object felt; and this transition is, on the other side, the beginning of the existence of the subject, as a subject which in distinction from and relation to such an object has become conscious of itself. From this it follows that self-consciousness, though in its dawn it cannot be separated from consciousness of the object, is ideally posterior to that consciousness; and, further, that it can only grow with the consciousness of the object, and is always a return into self from it. Thus, though an object can only exist for a subject, yet self-consciousness is limited by the consciousness of the object. Hence it may be truly said that we find ourselves in others before we find ourselves in ourselves, and that the full conscious-
ness of self comes only through the consciousness of beings without us who are also selves. Self-consciousness in one is kindled by self-consciousness in another, and a social community of life is presupposed in our first consciousness of ourselves as individual persons. It is true, indeed, that in his first return upon self, the individual is conscious rather of opposition to, than of community with, the other selves to whom he finds himself in relation. Social community is the presupposition of the individuality of the self-conscious being, but just for that reason it is not at first present to him as an object of thought. Hence the independence of the individual, though rooted in his dependence, takes, in the first instance, a form which seems to exclude dependence. But we should not be misled by the self-seeking and self-will, which are the first manifestations of selfhood, so as to forget that the individual's consciousness of himself as an independent self is essentially a return upon self from the consciousness of other selves which it implies; or to lose sight of the fact that, in denying the social unity with others out of which it springs, self-consciousness becomes self-contradictory. For, that consciousness of independence of other beings and things, which comes with the rise of self-consciousness, is a consequence of the fact, not that the self really has an existence in itself apart from the object, but rather contrariwise that the self has found itself in the object, and, therefore, is not really limited by it. This fact, however, is naturally misinterpreted in the first instance by the subject, who is conscious of himself in his distinction from the world, and especially from other self-conscious beings with whom he is socially united, but does not reflect on the relativity by which this independent selfhood is mediated, and especially on the social unity which it presupposes; and who, therefore, can see no claim which other beings and things have upon him to be used otherwise than as means to his own ends.

Now there are three different points of view, which arise from a more or less perfect comprehension of the idea thus suggested, as to the relation of self-conscious beings as such. There is the point of view which Hobbes takes up in describing the state of nature, in which the social
unity of men as self-conscious is entirely left out of consider-
ation; a point of view which involves the negation of both law and morality, or allows them to come in merely as the result of an external power which suppresses the egoism of individuals. There is, secondly, the point of view adopted by Kant, in which society appears as an aggregate of independent moral beings, who have rights and obligations towards each other—in which, therefore, both law and morality are recognised, but are kept entirely apart from each other as the separate spheres of the inner and the outer life. And there is, finally, the point of view of what the Germans call Sittlichkeit, in which the social unity is recognised as prior to the independent personality of its members, and in which, therefore, morality and law are regarded as springing from a common root, and capable only of a relative distinction.

Hobbes, in his conception of the state of nature, accurately represents the first of these points of view. His description of the natural "right to all things," which springs out of the infinite character of the 'desire for gain and glory,' and which, in a finite world, can only produce a bellum omnium in omnes, corresponds to the account given above of the natural egoism which marks the earliest stage of man's consciousness of social relations. The theory of Hobbes, in fact, shows the essential contradiction which lies in the very nature of egoism; for the ego, in its return upon self from the objective world, is at first negatively related to that from which the return is made. Hence it is at once absolute in its sense of independence, and universal in its claims. The "war of all against all" is thus just the expression of the contradiction of the natural selfism of man as in his finitude directly claiming the infinite for himself, i.e., claiming the infinite for himself as negatively related to that, in unity with which alone he can escape his finitude. From the point of view of Kant, as we have seen, this purely negative relation of individuals passes into a reciprocity of limitation, which at the same time is regarded as self-limitation, and therefore as reconcileable with the freedom or unlimited self-determination of each individual. Each,

1 Cf. p. 213 seq.
as unlimited, as *homo noumenon*, is thus regarded as laying down the limits for himself and for all others as *phenomena*. Or, each in his *inner* life is purely self-determined, and in his *outer* life determines himself as limited by others. Thus, in the *outer* life the principle of self-determination shows itself only in a negative way, for these individuals are conceived as standing in external relation to each other. But, in the *inner* life, the principle of self-determination can show itself positively, for there each one is alone with himself. In the inner life men cannot come into conflict, because they do not come into contact at all; each, therefore, can by his own activity establish a perfect harmony of his particular with his universal nature. But, in the outer life, such conflict is inevitable, and no one can secure even his rights as an individual, except by uniting with other individuals to establish a power armed with force to protect them from each other.

We have seen the difficulties which arise when we think of this power as established either without the will, or by the will, of the individuals who are submitted to it.\(^1\) In the former case, we are obliged to have recourse to political slavery as our only security for freedom; in the latter case, we are obliged to regard as the only rightful source of government, a unity of individual wills which could only be an empirical coincidence, and which is practically impossible. We are driven, therefore, of necessity to view the State as the manifestation of a *volonté générale*, which is not, and never can be, the conscious *volonté de tous*, but which determines the limits of the conscious will of each and all. But to admit this, is to admit that, by virtue of their consciousness of themselves as individual persons responsible to themselves, or even as the very condition of the possibility of such a self-consciousness, men stand in a social relation to each other; it is to admit that the consciousness of being a law to themselves can be developed in them only on the basis of their conscious-ness of a social law, to which as individuals they are all subjected. In this point of view, therefore, the inward and the outward life can no longer be separated; but

\(^1\) See above, p. 330.
rather the former grows up in relation to the latter, and must speedily empty itself of all meaning, if it is not kept in continual connection therewith. The individual is a law to himself, just because he is conscious of himself as a member of a society whose law is his law; and, if he withdraws into himself so as to lose consciousness of this relation, his inner life and its inner law are emptied of their meaning. Reason, as the law of a merely individual or subjective life, rules in an empty house; for, with the separation of the subjective from the objective, the former sinks into the bare tautology of self-consciousness, a pure analytic judgment; and even that, as Kant himself admits, is possible only in relation to the synthetic judgment of the objective consciousness.

Now, this does not mean that the movement of reflexion, by which subjective morality arises, has no value. If the inward law springs from the outward and returns to it, yet it does not return without change. The simple self-identification of the citizen with his State, which was characteristic of ancient patriotism,—a self-identification in which there was no thought of the difference of inner and outer law,—involved a confusion of the accidental with the necessary in morality. But these different elements had to be separated, when it was recognised that the law to which man is subjected derives its authority from his own reason. It was, therefore, by this reflexion that the special ties of family and nation were separated from, and subordinated to, the universal bond of humanity. At the same time, though morality may draw back to its source in the self-consciousness which constitutes our nature as men, this regress of thought can be conceived only as a movement of transition: nor can we see the full meaning of the transition, unless we follow it to the point where a higher social life springs out of the self-abnegation of the individual as such. For the emptiness of a purely inner moral life, which asserts itself as absolutely self-determined and complete in itself against all external law and all social constraint, contains a contradiction, which cannot be solved till what was condemned as external,—the external world and especially the external organism of society,—are seen to be not external to our inner life, but
rather to be that in which the principle of it can alone be realised. The Christian doctrine of self-sacrifice and devotion to humanity is but the necessary complement and completion of the Stoic self-sufficiency and self-determination.

The result then is, that the Legal and the Moral, like the outward and the inward, cannot be abstractly separated from each other. Their separation is only a part of that differentiation of the ethical life of man into various spheres of activity, which, however, both presuppose as their basis, and anticipate as their end, their organic unity as manifestations of a life which is determined by one principle. Thus, while the separation of right and duty holds good in the system of what is called the *Jus Privatum*, so that one man’s private rights correspond to the duties or obligations of another, and *vice versa*; and while therefore, in this sphere, both right and duty are the result of the reciprocal limitation of persons, who, within these limits, live an independent life; the case is quite different when we come to the substantial relations of the State or the Family, wherein the individual is made the organ of a social principle which is above his individual will, as well as above the will of the others to whom he stands in relation. Here right and duty become coincident, as, *e.g.*, the magistrate’s right is to administer the law, which he is bound to administer, and the citizen’s duty is to serve the State, which therefore protects his right to all the liberties or privileges of his special office. Here, therefore, we may say that the right of the individual is only to his sphere of duty; and the right of the community over the individual is to have from him a service which is the whole content of his individual life. In fact, just in so far as either the State or the Family is that form of the union of men which is presupposed in their differences and relations as individual persons,—*i.e.*, just in so far as either of these forms is the ultimate social universal,—it is that as against which the individuals have no right, but rather that from which all their rights are derived; because it is the source of all the duties in view of which alone they have rights. In modern times, however, neither the State nor the Family any longer repre-
sents the highest moral unity of which we can conceive; although, as a matter of fact, no higher unity has yet taken an organised form. But the very anticipation of such a unity, however vague, leads to a kind of emancipation of the individual from the State and the Family, and so causes an apparent separation of Law from Morals.

Connected with this separation in Kant is the way in which penal justice is represented as pure retribution, without reference either to the improvement of the culprit or the well-being of the society. Kant's rejection of the preventative and educational theories of punishment directly connects itself with his abstract opposition of right, as the manifestation of the universal principle in man, to happiness as the satisfaction of his particular desires. Penalty is viewed as the recoil of wrong upon the transgressor, the manifestation of the contradiction that lies in a wrong as the action of a rational being; and thus it is absolutely dissociated from any end except the vindication of right. But, if we conceive that the right of individuals as persons springs from their relation to the social unity of which they are organs, we cannot separate the vindication of right from the maintenance of the social unity against the caprice of individuals, or the maintenance of the social unity from the education of the individual members of it. Such an educative punishment is not, indeed, to be conceived as consisting in the mere check upon the inclination to do certain illegal acts which is produced by terror of the consequences. For the highest educational result of punishment is to awake a consciousness, not simply that the crime gets or will get punishment, but that it is worthy of punishment. It is to make men fear the guilt, and not the penalty. On the other hand, when we regard individuals, in the particular life for which their special capacities and desires fit them, as organs of the ethical principle which expresses itself in society, we can no longer dissociate their happiness—which lies just in the realisation of themselves as beings with these capacities and desires—from their realisation of the ethical end. The abstract rigour of Kant is the effect of his dualism, and must share the fate of that dualism. If we cannot divide man into an animal and a
rational self-consciousness, neither can we absolutely separate the gratification of the desires from the attainment of the moral end. The subject, however, cannot be fully discussed until we have considered Kant's *Doctrine of Virtue*. 
CHAPTER VII

APPLIED ETHICS. THE SYSTEM OF MORAL VIRTUES

Kant's conception of Morals, like his conception of Virtue and duty. Law, involves constraint or compulsion, but it is a compulsion exercised not upon others, but upon one's self; i.e., a compulsion of one's own inclinations and desires as a natural being, which is rendered possible by the consciousness of law derived from our rational nature. Such self-compulsion involves an effort and struggle which is expressed in the word virtue or moral fortitude; though when we regard the absoluteness of the law, and the fact that it is laid upon us by no foreign power but only by our own reason, we are inclined rather to use the word duty.

Now, in considering legal obligations, we saw that they were obligations of which, because they concern outward acts, it is possible to compel the fulfilment. Moral obligations, on the other hand, we cannot be compelled by others to fulfil, for they concern the motives or ends of our action. No one can make me have an end except myself, but I can compel myself to have certain ends; and, indeed, I am under obligation so to compel myself, because these ends are fixed for me by my own reason. Such self-compulsion, therefore, is consistent with freedom, and we may say that "the less a man is capable of physical compulsion and the more he is capable of moral compulsion, the more free is he." 1

I can compel myself to have an end, and I am bound so to compel myself, i.e., there is an end or ends which it is my duty to have,—this is the conception on which

1 R. IX. 225 note; H. VII. 185.
the whole doctrine of Virtue is based. To see what this conception involves, we must observe that *ends* are always self-chosen. "Every act has its end, and as no one can have an end without himself choosing it, so it is always by an act of *freedom*, and never by a result of *nature*, that we have any end in our actions."\(^1\) At the same time there are objects, which are set before us by our sensuous nature, and which, therefore, as natural beings all men are inclined to choose as their ends; but these are not ends which we are bound to choose, not ends which are duties. How, then, do we reach the conceptions of those latter ends? It is obvious, according to the principles already laid down, that such ends cannot be directly and immediately presented to us as objects. For, when the maxim of our conduct is determined by any object, we have not the autonomy but the heteronomy of the will. In Law, indeed, where we have to do only with the *outward* aspect of action, the ends of action are supposed to be left to every one to choose as he pleases, and the law only binds him to realise these ends in such a way as is consistent with the freedom of others; but in Morals, not merely the action, but the motive, must be consistent with the law. We must, therefore, in this case, determine what the objective *ends* are to be from a consideration of the *maxims* or subjective principles of action, according to which the law binds us to act. We must develop the ideas of the ends, which it is a duty to pursue, from the idea of duty itself: or, if this be impossible, we must at least determine the ends we ought to pursue in accordance with that idea.

There is, therefore, one *principle* of duty, though there may be many obligations or "duties of virtue," corresponding to the different objects which as ends can be brought under the moral principle; as also there are many "obligations or duties of right" which correspond to the different relations into which persons may be brought to each other.

What, then, are the ends which it is a duty to have? These, Kant answers, are *our own perfection and the happiness of others*. We may not say, our own happiness

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\(^1\) R. IX. 229; H. VII. 188.
or the perfection of others. Not our own happiness, for happiness is an end which all men have by reason of the impulse of nature within them; and "what everyone inevitably wills of himself cannot be brought under the idea of duty; for duty involves a necessity laid upon us to choose an end which we do not immediately wish for." And not the perfection of others; for "the perfection of another man, as a person, consists in this, that he is able to select his ends for himself according to his own ideas of duty; and it is a contradiction to demand or require of me as a duty that I should do something for him which none but himself can do." ¹

Now, perfection is an ambiguous word, which is sometimes used for the unity of all the elements implied in the constitution of a thing, and sometimes for the agreement of all the qualities of a thing with an end. In the former sense, there can be only one perfection in a thing: in the latter, there may be more than one, as a thing may be regarded in relation to more than one end. It is with the latter kind of perfection that we have especially to do here, though in a sense the former comes into connexion with it: for man's characteristic is not to abide by what is given to him by nature, but to set ends to himself, and further to be subject as regards all these ends, to the limiting conditions of the moral law, the realisation of which is the highest end of all. His duty to himself, to strive after his own perfection, implies therefore, first, the development of all his faculties; so that, as far as may be, he may "rise above the rudeness of nature and at the expense of the animal in him develop the humanity, whereby alone he is capable of choosing ends for himself"; ² and, secondly, the cultivation of the purity of his will, till he arrives at a purely virtuous temper of mind, i.e., till he attains the power of making the law itself the motive as well as the guide of his conduct. This is sometimes spoken of with doubtful propriety as the culture of the moral sense; for the word "sense" would rather suggest a feeling that precedes and gives rise to the consciousness of moral law, than one that follows from it.

Our duty to others, on the other hand, is to seek their

¹ R. IX. 230; H. VII. 189. ² R. IX. 232; H. VII. 190.
happiness, nor can we balance against that any duty to seek our own happiness; though indirectly it may be our duty to do what furthers our own happiness, in so far as the elements of well-being are necessary to us in order to enable us to do our duty. On the other hand, our duty to others does not always mean that we are to do for them what they think for their happiness; often it may be our duty to refuse them what they desire, if we think it would do them harm. Not, indeed, that we are to make their perfection an end; for, as already said, no one can secure that for another. In a negative way, however, we are bound to aim not only at their physical but at their moral well-being, in so far as to avoid everything that might put a stumbling-block in their way, or, in other words, everything that would be likely, "the nature of man being what it is, to mislead them into actions for which their conscience might afterwards give them pain." ¹

In both these cases, we have an end which is a duty, and which is set before us by the law itself, which commands us, on the one hand, to do for ourselves all that we would will that others should do for themselves; and, on the other hand, to do for others all that we would wish them to do for us.

We have, however, to observe here a special distinction between the "obligations of right" and the "obligations of virtue." The former are obligations to do, or refrain from, certain definite actions, while the latter are only obligations to be guided in our actions by certain maxims. Hence the former are said to be of narrower or stricter obligation, and the latter of wider or less strict obligation. By this is meant that, in the latter case, there is more room left for the play of freewill; for, while we lay down absolutely a priori that it is our duty to have a certain end in view, we cannot definitely determine in what way we should seek that end, and how far we should go in action with reference to it. We cannot, indeed, allow ourselves to make exceptions to the law, or to regard the end as one which we need not always have in view; but it may often be a question how far, in the pursuit of one of the ends which it is our duty to pursue, we should be

¹ R. IX. 240; H. VII. 197.
limited by the others, how far, *e.g.*, philanthropy should take precedence of domestic duties. Hence, it is here that there is a place for Casuistry to weigh one duty against another, and determine which is the more important. In general, we can only say that "the more indeterminate the duty and the more imperfect the obligation of a man to an action, and the nearer, nevertheless, he brings the measure of its observance (in his temper of mind) to the *strict* obligation (of Law), the more perfectly virtuous is his action." ¹

It follows from this that we can speak of *merit* as a *positive* quantity, only in relation to the imperfect duties or obligations of virtue. Regarding them in this light, "the fulfilment of them is $\text{merit} = +a$; but the transgression of them is not $\text{deme}r\text{it}$, or guilt $= -a$, but merely absence of merit $= 0$.—unless, indeed, the subject has adopted it as a principle to disregard such duties." ² Between virtue and vice we thus have moral weakness. To fulfil the obligations which correspond to the legal rights of others involves in itself no merit; but, if they are fulfilled from reverence from the law, there is merit in such reverence. We may add that in the case of meritorious acts there is "a subjective principle of ethical reward"; since the pleasure we have in doing them is something over and above the self-contentment which comes of doing our strict duty. This feeling of pleasure, however, is weakened when, in seeking for the well-being of others, we have to disregard their wishes, while it is enhanced when we seek their happiness according to their own views of what it is.³

Kant calls attention to three general principles of the metaphysic of Ethics, which may be laid down for our guidance in the treatment of the doctrine of virtue.⁴ The first is that for each duty there cannot be more than one ground of obligation. This follows from the fact that moral proofs are based on conceptions, and not on *a priori* perceptions, which, as we see in the case of Mathematics, enable us to approach the conclusion we seek in many ways. To enforce the moral duty of truth by arguing,

¹ R. IX. 236; H. VII. 194. ² R. IX. 236; H. VII. 194. ³ R. IX. 237; H. VII. 194. ⁴ R. IX. 251; H. VII. 206.
first, from the injury the lie does to others, and then, again, from the worthlessness of the liar and his loss of self-respect, is to confuse the duty of truth with the duty of beneficence. To add bad reasons to good, is only to weaken the latter. In the second place, the difference of virtue and vice must never be treated as one of degree, but always as one of kind. To say that virtue is the mean between two vices, e.g., that good husbandry or thrift is the mean between avarice and prodigality, is to make it appear as if by a gradual lessening or increase of expense, we could always change our conduct from virtuous to vicious or from vicious to virtuous. But the guilt of prodigality is that all the means of well-being are sought with a view to the mere enjoyment which is found in the use of them; and the guilt of avarice is that they are sought and retained with a view to the mere enjoyment which is found in the possession of them; whereas the virtue of good husbandry is that we use, or refrain from using, them with reference to the ends of our life as natural and also moral beings. Lastly, we must not estimate our ethical duties by our capacity to satisfy the law, but our capacity by our duties. We must not look to our empirical knowledge of ourselves or of men in general, and say “this is all that can be expected of us”: we must look to the idea of Humanity and the Categorical Imperative of duty, as fixing the standard below which we ought not to fall.

Virtue may be described as a habit of action, but we must be careful to note that it is a “free habit.” For the word habit by itself rather suggests the idea of a tendency to act in a certain definite way, which is the mere product of repetition, and which as such would have no moral character. Virtue, on the contrary, is a “habit of determining ourselves in action by the idea of the law.” 1

Hence, we may say that “virtue is always advancing, and yet always beginning again from the beginning; the former because, objectively considered, it is an unattainable ideal, to which nevertheless it is always our duty to be approximating: the latter because, subjectively considered, its basis is found in the nature of man, which is subject to desires and impulses, and which cannot, so

1 R. IX. 256; H. VII. 211.
long as it is influenced by them, be brought to the perfect rest and equilibrium of a virtue which adheres steadfastly to the maxims it has once adopted. For when human nature is not rising, it is sinking, because moral maxims cannot, like technical maxims, become grounded in habit; indeed, if the acts of virtue ever did become habitual, the subject would lose all freedom in the choice of his maxims, and thus his actions would cease to have the character of duty."

Duties, as we have already seen, are divided into duties to ourselves and to other men. Duties to God and to beings lower than men, are excluded; for, as we shall see more fully in the sequel, all duties are, in a certain sense, duties to God, regarded as the Legislator whose will is one with the moral law; but, for the same reason, there are no special duties toward Him. On the other hand, what are called our duties toward the animals are really duties toward ourselves. For, "cruel treatment of animals deadens our sympathy in their suffering, and weakens and gradually destroys a natural predisposition which is very serviceable to morality in our relations to other men. On the other hand, the swift painless slaughter of animals, or the exaction from them of labours which are not beyond their capacity, is quite within the rights of man over them; though not their subjection to painful experiments, for mere behoof of speculation." ¹ In a similar spirit Kant answers that it is part of our duty to ourselves not to destroy beautiful objects; because to do so "weakens or destroys a feeling in man which, though not for itself moral, yet does much to promote a feeling of sensibility in harmony with morality." ²

In considering our duties to ourselves, Kant comes again upon the difficulty of conceiving how the same thing can be subject and object of obligation: and, as before, he solves it by pointing out that man contemplates himself in two characters, as a being whose nature is sense, an animal among the other animals; and, again, "as a being whose nature is reason, (i.e., not merely a rational being; for the theoretical faculty of reason might be the property of a mere animal), a being, therefore, whose nature cannot

¹ R. IX. 300; H. VII. 250. ² R. id.
be measured by sense, but can be understood only when we look at it in its morally practical relations, in which the incomprehensible property of freedom reveals itself by the influence of reason upon the inner legislation of the will.”¹ Man, therefore, as a natural being or phenomenon, is subjected to obligations towards humanity in his own person, towards the homo noumenon in him, which we may divide into negative and positive obligations. The former are confined to the preservation of moral health (ad esse), while the latter point to moral improvement (ad melius esse). We may further divide these according to another principle, into duties of man towards himself as an animal who is also a moral being, and duties to himself purely as a moral being.

Kant first treats of man’s negative (or perfect) duties to himself as an animal. These correspond to the three impulses, which lead to self-preservation, to the maintenance of the species, and to the maintenance of his faculty for the purposeful use of his powers, and for the animal enjoyment of life: to which are opposed the vices of suicide, unnatural sensual indulgence, and inordinate enjoyment of the pleasures of the table. In the treatment of these virtues and vices, Kant simply follows out the principle that man must regard his physical life as a means to his existence as a person. The Stoic assumption of a right of suicide, or withdrawal from existence, was based on a true principle; “but that very courage and strength of soul which made them rise superior to the fear of death in the consciousness that there is something in man which he must esteem higher than life, should have been a motive to refrain from destroying a being endowed with such power of surmounting even the strongest sensuous impulses.” For, “to extinguish the subject of morality in our own person is as good as to extinguish, so far as in us lies, the existence of morality itself.”² In like manner, an excess in eating and drinking, which deadens our faculties, is to be regarded as subjection of the man in us to the animal.

The negative duties of man to himself as a moral being, are the opposites of the three vices of lying, avarice, and

¹ R. IX. 268; H. VII. 222. ² R. IX. 274; H. VII. 228.
false humility. The first of these is the greatest outrage
upon the dignity of man in our own person. "A man
who does not believe what he himself says to another,
even if it were a mere ideal person) has even less worth
than if he were a mere thing; for a good use can be
made of the qualities of a thing; but to communicate
one’s thoughts to another through words which (intention-
ally) contain the opposite of that which the speaker thinks,
is to make language realise an end directly opposed to
the natural design of our faculty of communication, and
so to cast contempt upon our own personality: for the
liar exhibits himself as a mere semblance of humanity,
and not as a true man at all." 1 In like manner, avarice
is not merely mistaken thrift, but the slavish subjection
of ourselves to the goods of fortune. And false humility
is a forgetfulness of the truth that, however humble a man
ought to be when he compares himself with the moral
law, he is yet as a person above all price, and, therefore,
ought not to crouch before his fellows as if he were only
fit to be their instrument, and had no self-centred life of
his own. "He who makes himself into a worm, cannot
complain if others trample upon him." Even extreme
demonstrations of religious awe, such as the prostrations
of Eastern devotees, involve a sacrifice of human dignity;
and the same is true of the invocation of the divine in
images set before our eyes. "For in such a worship we
humiliate ourselves, not before an ideal which our reason
sets up for us, but before an idol which we have made
for ourselves." 2

Finally, under this division of his subject, Kant remarks
that the duties of man all rest on his being the "born
judge of himself," a conception which he may help out
by the conception of God as an ideal judge who speaks
within him, and so by regarding his duties as divine
commands. The first of all duties towards ourselves is,
therefore, that which is expressed in the Socratic maxim
"Know thyself," which is to be understood morally in
the sense of a command to search our hearts, and listen
to the voice of conscience. For only "descent into the
hell of self-knowledge is the way to the heaven of divine

1 R. IX. 283; H. VII. 235.  2 R. IX. 292; H. VII. 243.
excellence." *Nur die Höllen-fahrt der Selbstverwirklichung bahnt den Weg zur Vergötterung*).  

The positive duties of man to himself are simply the duties of developing his bodily and mental powers, and, above all, seeking to increase the purity of his moral consciousness—obligations to which we have already referred.  

Our duties to others may be divided into those the discharge of which gives rise to an obligation on the part of others, and those the discharge of which gives rise to no such obligation. The former are accompanied by the feeling of love, the latter by that of respect. These feelings may be separated: we may love without respecting, or respect without loving; but "normally they are essentially united as in one duty, though in such a way that sometimes the one and sometimes the other may constitute the subjective principle to which the other is attached as accessory."  

Using a physical analogy we may regard ourselves as the denizens of a moral world, in which the due combination of rational beings is produced by the combined action of attractive and repulsive forces. "By means of the principle of *mutual love*, men are called on reciprocally to approach each other, while by the principle of the *respect* which they owe to each other, they are called on to preserve a certain distance from each other." If either of these great moral forces were to fail, then, to use the words of Heller, "the void (of immorality) would be opened wide, to swallow up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water."  

We cannot, however, say that love or respect as mere feelings are duties; it is the *maxim* of benevolence, of which well-doing is the consequence, that is obligatory, and in like manner it is the *maxim* of respect, *i.e.*, of limiting our self-estimation by regard to the dignity of humanity in another person, which we are bound to act upon. The latter is a negative duty, and so has something of that strict character which belongs to the "*duties of right*"; for it simply bids us *not* to treat others as means, while the former has rather the character of an imperfect obligation, seeing it commands us positively to

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1 R. IX. 297; H. VII. 248.  
2 See above, p. 353 seq.  
3 R. IX. 307; H. VII. 257.  
4 R. IX. 308; H. VII. 257.
regard them as ends, and to adopt their aims as our own, so far as they are not immoral.

The maxim of benevolence is based on the moral principle of universality, which permits us practically to wish well to ourselves, only on the condition that we wish well to every other; for “so alone is our maxim qualified for a place in a universal legislation.” The duties that fall under it are the duties of beneficence, of gratitude, and of sympathy. Of these, Kant dwells with special force on the duty of gratitude. “Thankfulness,” he says, “is specially to be called a holy duty, i.e., one the violation of which (as by a scandalous example) may annihilate the moral motive to beneficence in its very principle. For ‘holy’ is a term applied to that moral object in respect of which our obligation can never be fully satisfied by any act proportioned to it.... But we can never by any return fully acquit ourselves of the obligation of a benevolent act of which we have been the object; for the receiver of a benefit in such a case cannot take away the advantage which the giver has, as having made the first step in beneficence.”

On the duty of sympathy Kant again calls our attention to the fact that it is a practical sympathy which is required of us; since a mere passive sympathy with the woes of others felt by one who could do nothing to relieve them, would simply double the evil suffered. In this view, Kant expresses approval of the Stoic who sought to have a friend rather than that he might give than that he might receive help from him, but who, nevertheless, when he found that friend suffering under a calamity, from which nothing could be done to relieve him, said, “What does it matter to me?”

After a few remarks which have no special importance, as to the vices opposed to these virtues, i.e., the vices of envy, unthankfulness, and delight in the suffering of another, (Schadenfreude) Kant goes on to the duties of respect, which arise from “the recognition in other men of a worth for which there is no price or equivalent.”

We are bound to respect the dignity of Humanity even in the degraded and vicious; and, therefore, we must condemn all punishment by mutilations which “not only

1 R. IX. 316; H. VII. 263.
dishonour the criminal, but make the spectator also to blush for the shame of belonging to a species which one can venture to treat in such a fashion." 1 We are bound for the same reason to show respect for the understanding of others, and to take care, even in correcting their errors, to bring to light the element of truth in that which misled them. The vices opposed to due respect for humanity are pride, evil-speaking, and readiness to mock and insult. Pride desires from others an honour it refuses to them, and shows, therefore, a spirit which is really abject and mean; "for the proud man would not claim that others should hold themselves cheap before himself, if he had not a secret feeling that, if fortune reversed their relations, he would not find it hard to crouch before others, and to expect no respect from them." 2 Evil-speaking, as a persistent tendency to invent or spread caluminous reports, is a lowering of the respect for humanity; "for he who practises it must finally cast a shadow of unworthiness upon the species itself." In like manner, a tendency to scoff bitterly at others, and to rejoice over their error or calamity, has something devilish about it, and betrays an extreme want of respect for the dignity of man.

Kant then refers to the duties which are obligatory, not by reason of the general relations of man to man, but by reason of special relations of individuals, as determined by age, sex, or circumstances; but they are beyond the scope of a science that deals with the metaphysical basis of morals, since they cannot be determined upon a priori principles. At the utmost they can be brought into such a science only "as an application of the pure principles of duty to empirical cases, which are employed as it were to schematise these principles, and so to fit them for practical usefulness." 3 He confines himself, therefore, to a few remarks upon friendship, as "a union of two persons by reciprocal love and esteem, in which each is equally loved and esteemed by the other." "A perfect friendship is a mere Idea through a practically necessary Idea"; 4 for, how can we expect an exact equipoise of the two feelings which are the indispensable elements of such a relation,

1 R. IX. 326; H. VII. 272.  
2 R. IX. 329; H. VII. 274.  
3 R. IX. 332; H. VII. 276.  
4 R. IX. 334; H. VII. 279.
to be attained or preserved in all the varied circumstances of human life; or, in other words, that the two friends should never either repel each other into coldness, or make themselves too common to each other? Man is a "being destined for Society, but yet an unsocial being": he feels the need to open himself to others "so that he may not be left alone, as in a prison, with his own thoughts"; yet he is driven to shut himself up in himself, for fear of the advantage which might be taken of his openness. Hence a moral friendship, in which there is a perfect trust of two persons in the reciprocal communication of their secret judgments and feelings, so far as that is possible consistently with reciprocal esteem, is an immense gain; though, on account of the difficulty of mutual understanding and trust between men, it is a rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cycno: but the black swan is sometimes found. Apart, however, from such special ties, "it is the duty of man, both to himself and to others, to carry on a kind of commerce in moral perfection with them (officium commercii, sociabilitas), i.e., not to isolate himself (separistam agere); but, while he makes for the sphere of his life an inviolable centre of principle, yet to regard the sphere which he thus draws round himself as part of an all-embracing circle of cosmopolitan sympathy; and that not only with the view of furthering the good of the world as an end, but of cultivating all the means that indirectly lead to it, the pleasures and social charities which manifest themselves in courtesy and propriety of manners, in reciprocal love and respect, and so of associating virtue with the Graces." ¹

In the Methodology of Ethics, Kant dwells on the necessity of inculcating ethical lessons in such a way as to develop the pure morality of principle apart from any mixture of lower motives; and he also speaks of the relation of Religion to Ethics. The value of Religion arises from our inability imaginatively to represent or envisage moral obligation without thinking of another Being than ourselves, whose will is expressed by the legislative reason within us; i.e., of a divine Being. Its

¹R. IX. 339; H. VII. 284.
danger is that we should represent this divine Being as a will, to which we stand in a relation similar to those in which we stand to other men; for with this comes the idea that we have obligations to Him, which are not included in the moral law, and which even take the precedence of the moral law. The full consideration of this idea must, however, be postponed till we come to deal with Kant's special treatise on the subject of Religion.

Our criticism of Kant's *Doctrine of Virtue* must follow substantially the same lines which guided our criticism of the *Doctrine of Law*. The moral subject is conceived by Kant as, primarily at least, alone with himself; but as so isolated, he is yet, as it were, two beings in one. As Kant phrases it, he is at once a *Sinnenwesen* and *Vernunftwesen*, a *homo phenomenon* and a *homo noumenon*; and the problem of his life is that he is called to make the former conformable to the latter. More simply, he is bound to bring his passions into harmony with his reason. Now, as his passions attach him to beings and things without him, or make him open to influences from them, while his reason or self-consciousness is one with itself to the exclusion of all foreign influences, the subjection of passion to reason means the negation of all determination from without, in favour of a pure self-determination from within. In other words, it means the attainment of moral freedom.

But here we are met by a difficulty. If we rigidly hold to the conception of morality as the pure self-determination of reason, *either* we must suppose that passion is to be altogether excluded by reason, *or* we must suppose that the opposition of reason and passion is merely a relative opposition, and that there is some point of view in which reason over-reaches it; *i.e.*, some point of view from which passion can be seen to be itself implicitly rational and capable of becoming so explicitly. And to say that passion is rational or capable of becoming so, is to say also that the objects to which passion points are capable of being considered, not as external objects, to seek which is to make reason a means to something else than itself, but as objects which are themselves already manifestations
of reason, or which at least are presupposed by reason as means of its realisation.

Now, the former of these solutions is that which is adopted by Stoicism, which, therefore, regards the passions as irrational and makes it a duty to seek apathy by asceticism. Asceticism, indeed, is not regarded by the Stoics as an end in itself; it is conceived as the means whereby the reason is to be delivered from a foreign yoke, and made capable of acting freely by its own self-determination. Unfortunately, the freedom so attained is the freedom of the void. The reason that abstracts from the contents of the passions has no contents of its own to supply its place. On Kant's own view, the analytic self-consciousness is possible only in relation to the synthetic consciousness of the self as the unity to which all objects as objects in one world are referred; and, in like manner, pure self-determination or self-realisation is possible, only if the determination of the self can be regarded as the principle of unity in an ideal system, in which all the aims of desire are embraced. Apart from such reference, the duality-in-unity of the self-determining will, like the duality-in-unity of self-consciousness, would disappear in simple identity.

Now, Kant accepts the Stoic idea of apathy as essential to virtue, and tells that "affections always belong to the sensibility, whatever be the objects by which they are excited," 1 and that the "true strength of virtue implies that the mind should be in perfect peace, so that, by a well considered and fixed resolve, it may act according to its own law." But he does not regard the passions as in themselves immoral. On the contrary, he holds that in themselves they have no moral character, but get such a character only as they are "taken up into the maxims of the will." Further, he holds that the contents of passion may be taken up into the maxims in such a way as to be in harmony with the law of reason; though he admits that, as passion, it always retains an element of antagonism to the law, and that consequently we are obliged to conceive the process of combining its gratification with the realisation of the law as a "progressus in infinitum." Hence, in

1 R. IX. 258; H. VII. 213.
the end he has to fall back upon the postulate that the conformity of passion to reason must be realisable, because it ought to be realised.

But further, as the passions or desires have necessary relation to objects as ends, the conformity of the passions to the moral law necessarily involves, on the one hand, a new determination of the immediate ends of passion by which they become ends of reason, and, on the other hand, a development of the principle of morality from the mere abstract form of a law into that of an end, or rather a system of ends. Reason must by a synthetic process go beyond itself to produce a synthetic idea of an objective world of ends; and on the other hand, the objects of the passions, which immediately are ends indifferent to reason, —ends in seeking which reason is heteronomous,—must be so transformed by being brought under the conception of such a system of ends, that in willing them, reason is only willing it.

In a former chapter, it was explained how Kant, by the aid of the different formulas for the moral law (which he regards simply as different expressions of the same idea), found himself able to pass from the conception of self-consistency to that of consistency with the self, and from that again to the conception of a kingdom of ends. In the treatise we are now examining, we have the same transition in a slightly different form. The individual subject finds himself existing in a world in which there are other rational subjects, as well as irrational beings and things; and in relation to such a world the abstract law of acting always on maxims that can be universalised, develops into the principle that we should treat every other rational being as an end, just as we are bound to treat ourselves as an end. In so far, therefore, it would appear that there is an object different from ourselves, in seeking which we are not enslaving ourselves to something external; for in making ourselves the instruments of the life of others, we are still supposed to be realising our own end as rational beings. No sooner, however, has Kant admitted this than he is checked by the thought that each individual, as a moral or rational being, is alone with himself, and that it is only through his sensuous or outward life that he comes
in contact with others. The recognition which each rational subject gives to the others, therefore, cannot go so far as that their moral life should become a common life, or that each should bear the burden of the moral destiny of the others. The assistance each can give to the others is outward, and therefore it can affect the lower end of happiness, but not the higher end of perfection. Or, in other words, each can have, as part of the moral end of his own life, only the natural end of his brother’s life; while, as regards the properly moral end of his own life, each must achieve it entirely for himself. Hence the social organism necessarily falls short of being in the highest sense organic. For, though in society every member is means and end to all the others, each is an end to the life of others in another respect from that in which he is an end to himself, and the common life of all is not the highest life of each member. The moral life is withdrawn from that community which is possible to men only as regards their natural life. Each may seek the happiness of all: but it is not in respect of happiness that each is an end in himself, but in respect of perfection, and especially of moral perfection. Aristotle tells us that the good man is the true self-lover; he keeps the best for himself, even when he gives every outward advantage to others; for he keeps to himself the noble action of which they receive the passive profit.\footnote{Ethics, IX.} So with Kant, the ‘better part’ is incommunicable, for in moral excellence each individual must win and lose everything for himself without aid from any other; and what he can give to others is only that worser part, happiness, which for himself he is bound to contemn and sacrifice, whenever it stands in the way of his moral improvement.

Can we thus separate moral and natural good, or admit the communicableness of the latter, but not of the former? Are we unable to give our best to others or to receive of their best from them? Are men shut up in themselves, so that they must each fight his own battle alone, like the separate duels of the amphitheatre; and are there no common charges and retreats, common victories and defeats, as in regular warfare? Does freedom necessarily

\footnote{Ethics, IX.}
mean isolation, and can we not receive help from each other in the highest things? Or must such help, so far as it is given, immediately take away the moral value of the end which we are aided by it to secure?

Now, we find that Kant himself is obliged somewhat to modify his first statement, when he comes to speak of the ways in which we can contribute to the happiness of others. We may, he then says, not only give to others that immediate happiness which comes of the satisfaction of their desires, but we may even contribute to their having that kind of happiness which arises from a good conscience, or, what comes to the same thing, we may prevent their having that kind of misery which arises from a bad conscience. This we may do so far as we avoid doing anything, which, "the nature of man being what it is, might be a temptation to another to do that which would afterwards cause his conscience to give him pain." ¹

When we come to discuss Kant's view of the Church as a Tugendbund, or society for mutual aid in the moral life, without the establishment of which we may be regarded as morally in a "state of nature," we shall find that Kant does not very strictly confine his conception of men's moral aid to each other within the negative limits here laid down. But, even according to the statements already quoted, he only escapes self-contradiction by a very illusive distinction. It is, it appears, each man's "own business to take care that he should not deserve the inner reproof of conscience"; but we know by experience that certain conduct on our part will put a temptation in the way of other men, to which, "human nature being what it is," it is likely that they will succumb, and which will thus entail upon them the pain of remorse. We also, it may be added, know by experience that certain conduct on our part will give to others a certain stimulus to good by which "human nature, being what it is," they will be likely moved to actions which their conscience will give them pleasure by approving. How can we distinguish such aid to others from helping them in their moral life? And, if we cannot, is it not our duty to give such help? That the help we give must be mediated by freedom and cannot be simply

¹ R. IX. 240; H. VII. 197.
communicated to them as a gift, without an act of spiritual appropriation of it on their own part, does not alter the case, unless we introduce into our conception of the free subject, as such, the idea of an isolated self-sufficiency; *i.e.*, unless we conceive that a self-determining being must be one who has no necessary relations to others, no social relations which form part of his consciousness of himself.

In the passage just quoted, Kant acknowledges that, empirically viewed, the moral life of a man is no isolated self-realisation of each apart from the others, any more than his physical life; but that, on the contrary, there is a constant reciprocal influence between the different members of society. And he could escape from the necessary inference, only by falling back upon the idea that the consciousness we have of ourselves as bound to act in accordance with an absolute moral law, must be regarded as a consciousness of ourselves as noumena, and, therefore, as a consciousness against which the empirical consciousness of ourselves as objects has no weight. To this, however, it has to be answered, that conscience, as is perhaps indicated by the word itself, is in its primary form a consciousness of one self as standing in social relations to others. We are *knowing* subjects only as we transcend our own individual existence, and regard it as an object among others in the one world, an object which, therefore, we are able to regard from a universal point of view, and to measure by the same standards which we apply to other objects. In like manner, we are *practical* or *moral* subjects only as we are conscious of ourselves as members along with others of one society, and are able, therefore, to view ourselves like them, impartially, with reference to the ends of the society. Nay, as our relation to the society is given along with the consciousness of ourselves in distinction from other members of it, we cannot *but* measure ourselves by the standard of the society to which we belong. This does not mean that we necessarily measure ourselves by the expressed opinion of our neighbours; it means rather that we necessarily measure ourselves by the unexpressed presuppositions on which their and our common life rests, by the social standard which has been forming in us from the earliest years. Morality, in fact, springs out of the in-
evitable mediation of the consciousness of self by the consciousness of our relations to others, and the consequent necessity of judging ourselves from a social point of view, whether it be the point of view of the family, or of the nation, or whatever be the society to which we thus relate ourselves. And if, subsequently, the moral law can be conceived in its abstraction as a law resting on the consciousness of the individual of an inner life, in which he is alone with himself, yet this conception can only be the result of an individualistic return upon the self, which involves a reaction against social forms that have become insufficient, and is a step in the transition towards the development of a higher social consciousness. Kant, however, elevating this transitional divorce of the inner from the outer law into a permanent fact, of human nature, and ignoring the relation of the consciousness of self as a moral being to the consciousness of social unity, is obliged to regard the social tie as something extraneous, and the moral influence of individuals upon each other as something indirect, or even impossible, in consistency with the unconditional supremacy of the moral law. Hence, a community of moral life seems to him to be irreconcilable with the moral freedom and responsibility of the individual. In truth, however, moral freedom rests on the consciousness that the law to which we are subjected is no foreign yoke, but own own law—the law that we become conscious of by the same process by which we become conscious of ourselves as subjects; and, therefore, the fact that it comes to us at first as a social law, revealing itself in an external order of common life, in no way affects our freedom under it.

Kant's curious combination of Egoism and Altruism, according to which we are bound to seek our own perfection and the happiness of others, our own spiritual Good and the natural Good of others, suggests another criticism. According to Kant's principle, we are bound to be purely altruistic as regards happiness, but purely egoistic as respects goodness; or, in other words, we are bound to sacrifice our happiness to the happiness of others, except so far as such sacrifice may interfere indirectly with our moral perfection. Kant, indeed, rather says that we are bound to
seek the happiness of others so far as is consistent with the moral law. But strictly speaking we cannot understand this as meaning that we are not to seek their happiness when such happiness might impair their moral character, but only that we are not to seek it when it involves an act that might injure our own moral character. Thus the egoistic motive is the ultimate one. Yet, Kant sees that in itself the egoistic pursuit of perfection, especially of moral perfection, is a contradiction; it is to pursue egoistically the negation of egoism. If, however, this negation of egoism is in view of an abstract law, and not of a social consciousness, it still retains a tinge of egoism about it. It is only when we see that the universal law is not abstract, but must be conceived as a principle of community; or, when—what comes to the same thing—we shall see that the self-conscious subject can realise itself only by giving up its separate life to a life which it has in unity with others, that this tinge of egoism disappears. The law is not a law with which I am alone in my inner life, even though it is true that I must sacrifice my immediate self to it. It is a law by which the shell of self-hood is, as it were, broken; and, it takes the form of a law that speaks to me from without, only because it is through the negation of the separate self that the consciousness of community is developed. It is the miracle of the dissolution of the limits of individuality, which yet is not a miracle, because the force and power of the individuality of a self is based on universality, and can grow only by continual return to it. The secret of the possibility of knowledge, as involving that we go beyond our own sensations to objects, still more the secret of the possibility of moral life, as involving the continual surrender of immediate desire to social ends, lies in the principle that a self-conscious individuality only exists and maintains itself by a continual self-abnegation, and so by a continual return to the universal life. In this respect we might say that morality is "Altruism"; but the word Altruism rather suggests the merging of our life in the life of other individuals as such, the giving up of our own happiness in order to secure on their part a happiness of exactly the same nature as that which we give up for ourselves. If
morality were merely Altruism, the perfect moral society would be one in which there was a struggle of all and each to surrender to each other the finite goods of life, instead of a struggle to retain them. But neither a struggle to give, nor a struggle to take, such finite goods, would really lift us out of the sphere of the finite. It would only substitute an effort to satisfy each other's selfishness for an effort to gratify our own; it would not take us beyond the negation of our immediate selves to the conception of a higher common self in which we are really united. We see as a fact, sometimes in the relations of men to men, and oftener in the relations of women to men, that an unreasoning eagerness to surrender all to the will of another, tends to manufacture a gigantic self in the individual to whom the surrender is made. Now, when Kant tells us that we should seek the happiness of others, and not their perfection, he is giving countenance to this error: an error which in practice makes the self-sacrifice of the individual unavailing, just in so far as it is only a self-sacrifice of individual to individual, and not at the same time the sacrifice of the individual to the universal. For in such sacrifice there is no real deliverance from the prison of individuality. To Kant, indeed, there is no such escape possible, at least so far as the relations of individuals in society are concerned. Each remains permanently external to the other; and though all may surrender themselves to the law, this only produces a similar life in each, but not a community of the same life in all. But the true moral self-surrender is not simply the surrender of one self to another, but of all to the universal principle which, working in society, gives back to each his own individual life transformed into an organ of itself. What gives its moral value to the social life, is that it not merely limits the self-seeking of each in reference to the self-seeking of the rest, nor even that it involves a reciprocal sacrifice of each to the others; but that a higher spirit takes possession of each and all, and makes them its organs, turning the natural tendencies and powers of each of the members of the society into the means of realising some special function necessary to the organic complete-

1 Cf. Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics, p. 225 (Third Edition).
ness of its life. A social relation, say the relation of husband and wife, would be an unsanctified unity of repellant atoms through desires which turn them into external means of each other's life, if those who participate in it were not, by the fact of their union, brought into the conscious presence of something higher than their individuality. In fact, in this most direct union of individuals, nature generally takes care of this, by awaking affections, which make the interests of the children (who represent the continued unity of the family), predominant over the separate interests of the heads of the family. Hence, we need not wonder that the first worships of men concentrated round the family sacra, and that the desire to keep up the continuity of these sacra, as a worship of the family god, became the great determining ideal influence of early morality. The surrender of the individual as a natural being, and his recovery of his life as an organ dedicated to a special social function, is the essential dialectic of morals, which repeats itself in every form of society. It is the "logic of facts," which redeems man's life from egoism by giving him a higher alter ego, which yet is not the ego of another individual as such. Holding by this logic, we can see what is the value and defect of both Hedonistic and anti-Hedonistic theories. Hedonism fails, because it either treats the individual as an end to himself, or if it goes beyond this, and becomes universalistic Hedonism, still the universal is to it merely a sum of individuals. To this Nominalism, which puts an aggregate of atoms instead of an organic unity, Stoicism opposes a Realism whose universal is the mere negation of the individuals, a will which, in emptying itself of particular impulses, has become an absolute void, a "will that wills nothing." Kant avoids this extreme by thinking of the universal as a common element in the particulars to be subsumed under it. He thus makes a kind of combination of universalistic Hedonism with the abstract universalism of the Stoics. But the result is no real unity of the two principles, but a syncretism which is logically less reasonable than either. The separation of moral and natural good makes the former empty of content, and the latter an incoherent mass of particulars without unity.
For the natural desires can be brought to a unity, only if the separate gratification of each of them ceases to be conceived as an end in itself, and if it is sought as an end only in so far as in it the principle of our rational life can reveal itself. Thus the immediate satisfaction of the desires cannot be the realisation of the self, which can realise itself only as it makes itself the organ of social ends. Yet, on the other hand, the Hedonist may point out that the social aim is realised only through the individual to whom it gives special functions; and that the ordering of the life of the individual in relation to his special function involves the recognition of his desires as having a special satisfaction, in attaining which he, at the same time, contributes to the realisation of the end.

This consideration enables us also to criticise Kant's division of duties into duties to ourselves, and duties to others. All duties are, in fact, both at once. Self-realisation and realisation of the common good are not separated or separable, unless we conceive the common good as directly consisting in pleasures, which as such cannot be had in common. But, according to the organic view of the social union, the distribution of special pleasures or gains to individuals, is dependent on the distribution to them of special functions in the one life which is the common good. In truth, Kant admits (what is obvious on his principles) that all duties are duties to ourselves, when he argues that, if there are no duties to ourselves, there can be no duties to others, since the law, in virtue of which we are bound to such duties, is derived from our own practical reason.¹ The converse of this, that all duties to ourselves are duties to others, he is hindered from admitting by the great defect of his theory, the divorce of the universal or rational from the social nature of men.

The other peculiarities of Kant's theory, the rigour with which he maintains the separation of the moral motive from the motives of desire, which he always regards as desire of pleasure, have been sufficiently commented on in previous chapters. Nor need I do more than mention the casuistical questions which he adds to the discussion of

¹ R. IX. 268; H. VII. 222.
each virtue. Casuistry, as has been shown above, is the necessary result of Kant's conception of morality as consisting in a number of laws, each of which is universally valid. In this view, Kant maintains that each duty flows from one principle with which no other must be mingled, and he complains of those who would connect the duty of speaking the truth with the harm done to society by lying, and not merely with the duty of treating ourselves as ends. In truth, in so far as our moral life is organic, each action touches nearly or remotely every one of its interests or functions, and may therefore be subsumed under many different rules. Such rules cannot, however, be regarded as unlimited or universal. Either, one rule of duty must be made predominant over all the others, or, if not, every moral decision becomes a "case of conscience," which we may decide in any way we please, according to the rule we choose to bring into operation. Nor, from Kant's point of view, can any higher principle be brought in to decide which rule is to give way, seeing it is assumed that there is never a real but only an apparent collision of rules. In truth, under the hand of the Casuist, the moral rules become absolutely pliant, just because they are assumed in the beginning to be absolutely fixed and without exception. Their inflexibleness allows him to do what he pleases with them; or if it is not so, it is because the arbitrary application of them is checked by the social consciousness of a particular nation or time, which fixes the place of each function of the social life in its connection with, and yet in its distinction from, the other functions.

1 Cf. p. 175.
Kant's Critique of Judgment cannot be said, in the same sense as his Critique of Practical Reason, to be part of the original plan of his critical investigations. This is evident from a note in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where he speaks of Baumgarten's attempt to "base the critical judgment of the Beautiful on principles of reason," and declares that such an attempt must be fruitless because "the rules or criteria in question are, in their source, purely empirical, and can never be taken for a priori principles, by which our judgments of taste may be guided." In the second edition of the Critique, significant alterations were introduced into the wording of this passage,¹ and in the same year in which that edition of the Critique was published, Kant, in writing to Reinhold, tells him that in the course of his inquiries he has been led to recognise the existence of a new department of Critical Philosophy, of which he had before taken no notice, but which has brought to him a fresh confirmation of the truth of his fundamental principles. "I may now assert, without making myself liable to the charge of conceit, that the further I proceed in my course, the less apprehensive do I become that I shall be obliged to

¹ There we read that these rules "are in their main sources empirical, and cannot be taken for definite a priori principles." Kr. A. 21; B. 36.
renounce, or, to any important extent, to modify my system. This is an inward conviction, which grows upon me as, in my progress to new investigations, I find it not only maintaining its harmony with itself, but also suggesting ways of dealing with any difficulty that may arise. For, when at times I am in doubt as to the method of enquiry in regard to an object, I only need to cast back a glance upon my general list of the elements of knowledge, and of the faculties of mind implied therein, in order to get new light upon my procedure. Thus, I am at present engaged in a Critique of Taste, and have been in this way led to the discovery of another kind of a priori principles than I had formerly recognised. For the faculties of the mind are three; the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the will. I have discovered a priori principles for the first of these in the Critique of Pure Reason, and for the third, in the Critique of Practical Reason; but my search for similar principles for the second seemed at first fruitless. Finally, however, the systematic connexion, which the analysis of the theoretical and practical reason has enabled me to discover in the human mind,—a systematic connexion which it will be sufficient employment for the rest of my days to admire, and where possible, to explain,—put me on the right track; so that now I recognise three parts of Philosophy, each of which has its own a priori principles. We can now, therefore, securely determine the compass of knowledge, which is possible in this way, as including the three departments of Theoretical Philosophy, Teleology, and Practical Philosophy, of which, it is true, the second will be found the poorest in a priori grounds of determination. I hope by Easter to be ready with this part of Philosophy, under the name of the Critique of Taste, which is already in writing, but not quite prepared for the press.”

It was not till three years after this letter that Kant actually issued the treatise in question, which meantime had extended much beyond the scope which he here gives it, and had become not merely a Critique of Taste, but a Critique of Judgment. The reason of this change it is not difficult to discern, and it is implied in the two words which

1R. XI. 86; H. VIII. 738.
he uses in the above letter to designate the same part of Philosophy, viz., "Critique of Taste" and "Teleology." It was in the idea of a final cause or end, that Kant had found the key to the consciousness of the Beautiful and the Sublime; but it was impossible for him to recognise its presence in that consciousness without being led to consider other applications of the same principle. The Critique of Pure Reason had, in fact, already pointed to the use of the idea of final cause as a means of guiding our general investigations into nature; but the aims of that Critique had not permitted a full treatment of the subject.\(^1\)

And there were especially two considerations which might lead Kant to think that further discussion was necessary. In the first place, the facts of animal and vegetable life seemed to require a "constitutive" use of the category of final cause, different from that "regulative" employment of it which had been vindicated in the Critique of Pure Reason. And in the second place, the Critique of Practical Reason had led him to the conception of a Summum Bonum or objective end, which man is bound to seek to realise, and which he is entitled to postulate as capable of realisation; nay, which he must conceive as necessary to be realised through the mediation of God. But this Summum Bonum, which is the combination of goodness with proportionate happiness, involves a conformity of nature to the law of reason, which nothing in the conception of nature enables us to anticipate; it involves, in fact, that nature must ultimately be thought of as a teleological system, for which the final cause is determined by the same practical reason which determines the ends of human action. In this way the regulative use of the idea of design, which was admitted for theoretical reason, has connected with it a practical use of the same idea, in which, moreover, the end is no longer left undetermined, but fixed by reason itself. And though it is thus fixed only for faith and not for knowledge, yet the new view of the world, and especially of the relation of nature to freedom which is thus suggested, would seem to call for a reconsideration of the results of the Critique of Pure Reason.

In this way, then, Kant was led to enlarge the scope of

\(^{1}\) Cf. above, p. 128 seg.
his inquiry, so as to cover the whole field of Teleology; and to make the third Critique, which had at first been designed merely as an explanation of the sources of our pleasure in the Beautiful and the Sublime, into a final exposition of his theory which should bind together the Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason into one great whole or systematic unity. In truth, we find in the Critique of Judgment a certain return of Kant's system upon itself, for which the way had been prepared by his previous works, but which yet was, in a sense, a reversal of the line of thought followed out in them. For Kant, as it may be remembered, had begun his critical inquiries in the effort to separate the apparent from the real, the element in our ideas or knowledge which is peculiar to us as finite subjects whose reason works through sense, from that element which we apprehend in virtue of pure reason itself. He had endeavoured, in short, to get down by abstraction to the pure residuum of truth, which is left when we take away all that is relative to our peculiar nature as men. It was in this view that he was led, first, to treat the forms of space and time as subjective, and then to apply the same measure to those conceptions of the understanding under which in experience the matter given under these forms is brought. By this regress of abstraction he was finally brought back to the pure consciousness of self, as containing in its empty analytic unity the only residuum of absolute truth that remains to us. This analytic consciousness, indeed, in relation to the imperfect synthetic unity of knowledge, gave rise only to an ideal which knowledge cannot realise; but in relation to practice, it took on a new meaning as a moral law, which we are imperatively called upon to realise, because it is the inmost reality of our being, or the only mirror in which that reality is presented to us. Thus, at the ultimate point of abstraction the movement of thought was reversed. The abstract unity, in which everything had seemed to be lost, began itself to show signs of life, and to develop out of itself a fresh content. Nature, which had been rejected as phenomenal, got a new meaning as the material in which the law of reason is to be realised; and the broad gulf opened up between self-consciousness and the consciousness of objects.
as such, began to be bridged over by the ‘Primacy of Practical Reason’; which, as we have seen, means that self-consciousness includes and subordinates the consciousness of objects. We have sufficiently shown in previous chapters into what difficulties Kant was brought, even in the Critique of Practical Reason, by this necessary return upon himself: for, what he was attempting to do was to subsume nature under the Idea of freedom, an Idea which, in the first instance, presented itself as the simple negation of nature. Thus, he could not treat nature as real without changing the point of view from which he had regarded it as phenomenal; and the ὅδες ἀνω could not be a simple reversal of the ὅδες κάτω. Hence, the distinctions of knowledge and faith, of the speculative and the practical consciousness, had to be emphasized, till the unity of the intelligence seemed to be lost; and Kant gradually became conscious of a desire to find some mediating principle which should bring together the two worlds without, and the two selves within. Indeed, the same impulse, which in the Critique of Pure Reason made him bring in imagination to mediate between understanding and sense, impelled him also to fill up the gulf between the two earlier Critiques by the Critique of Judgment, and to mediate the antagonism of necessity and freedom by the idea of Design.

When this desire arose in Kant, the lines of thought which he had followed in his previous works necessarily determined in what way he should seek to satisfy it. In the first place, taking the question in its subjective aspect, the faculty to which he had to look for the mediating work required was necessarily Judgment, i.e., the faculty of subsuming the particular under the universal. Judgment, indeed, had already been introduced as the faculty by which the general conceptions of the understanding are brought into connexion with the conditions of time and space, so as to give rise to what Kant called the principles of pure understanding. But the determination of objects reached by this subsumption was still abstract; it related only to those general laws which were necessary to their determination as objects in the one world of experience. An endless variation of the detail of experience was still possible consistently with the determination of its objects
and their general relations by these laws. Nay, the objects
given might be so manifold and their similarity so slight
that the effort to subsume them under these laws might
altogether fail. In supposing that knowledge is possible,
therefore, we are supposing, not only that objects as per-
ceived are confined to the general conditions under which
they are known as objects, but that, in their detail they are
not infinitely varied, but have a certain similarity and
continuity through all their difference, which makes it
possible for the intellect to get a hold upon them. Now
the Dialectic shewed us that reason in its regulative use
gives rise to certain principles of investigation, which
reach beyond the laws of the understanding, and both
incite and guide us in the application of these laws.
These principles are especially the principles of the
"homogeneity, specification and continuity" of the natural
forms of things; principles the meaning of which, sum-
marily expressed, is that nature is a system, whose
systematic order is discoverable by our intelligence. If
these principles are assumed, we are able not only to say
that all objects as such fall under the laws of pure under-
standing, but that the intelligence acting through these
laws, may by their means expect to be always advancing in
the discovery of systematic unity in the world—more and
more definitely to see unity under all its diversity, diversity
flowing out of its unity, and diversity and unity more and
more closely knit together by continuous steps of transi-
tion. To say this, however, is to say that nature is relative
to the intelligence, not only as a system determined by law,
but as a system in which the laws themselves have an order
of subordination, ultimately pointing to the unity of the
intelligence as their source; or, in other words, that the
world has in it such a unity as it would have, if it had been
arranged with a view to its being comprehended by our
intelligence. Now, when we say that the world is in this
sense intelligible, or, in other words, that it can be sub-
sumed under the unity of the intelligence itself, we are
saying that there is a further legitimate exercise of Judg-
ment, besides that in which we subsume all the matter of
sense through its forms under the categories. Or, as we
may otherwise express it, the mind in subsuming the
matter of experience under the categories, is guided by a further aim, viz., to subsume the objects so determined under its own unity. This latter subsumption, indeed, is not, and can never be complete; for, while the mind's impulse to bring all the objects of the world under its own unity, is a continual stimulus to it to add to its experiences and to connect them together more closely, the laws of the understanding, which are its instruments in effecting this purpose, are not such as to permit of its perfect attainment. At the same time, experience is a continual process kept up in view of this ideal; and, as such a process, it involves that we are constantly approximating to the ideal, though in a line by which we can never come into coincidence with it. We may, therefore, use the ideal as a means of investigation, with the certainty that by its aid we shall always be advancing in our understanding of the empirical world, even though we can never promise ourselves to understand it completely.  

Difficulty has been found in the fact that Kant here refers to Judgment those principles which he had in the Critique of Pure Reason referred to Reason. But, if we consider for a moment the relation of these faculties, we may easily see that this difference arises from the difference of the points of view from which these principles are regarded in the two Critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant deals with the reason as the source of certain Ideas which go beyond the possibility of experience. These Ideas are conceived as arising out of the unity of self-consciousness in its contrast with the consciousness of objects; hence they are regarded mainly as giving rise to an absolute opposition between noumena (or objects as they are thought in conformity with that unity), and phenomena (or objects as they are known in conformity with the principles of understanding). Incidentally, at the end of the Critique, Kant goes on to point out that the Ideas of noumena, if taken merely as regulative, have a value in relation to our experience, which in this sense is continually being subsumed under them. In other words, the assumption that experience can be brought under them, is implied in all our effort after knowledge, and the attain-

1 Introduction, §§ 4, 5.
ment of knowledge is always of the nature of a partial success in this subsumption. Now, this second aspect of the Ideas of reason is that which is brought into prominence in the Critique of Judgment, where, therefore, the Ideas are regarded as principles of Judgment, with reference to the main use that is to be made of them.

To this it may be objected that, though the Ideas of reason are principles under which in judging we bring the objects of experience, this does not imply that they are themselves principles of Judgment. It is still Reason from which they spring, though it is Judgment in which they are applied. Why, then, should the fact that they are so used lead us to attribute them to a separate faculty?

The answer to this question will give us at once a deeper insight into the nature of the principles in question, and also into the meaning of Kant's psychological distinction of the faculties. Reason, in Kant's language, is the faculty that manifests itself in pure thought, in so far as such thought returns upon itself, or has for its object only its unity with itself. Hence, it is revealed in pure self-consciousness, and in the moral consciousness, in so far as that consciousness has for its object only itself or the law in which it finds its own universal nature mirrored. On the other hand, if self-consciousness is capable of including under itself or subordinating to itself the consciousness of objects, it must be in virtue of an Idea which is not simply universal as opposed to the particular, but which is at once universal and particular. The universal must be conceived as a principle which particularises itself, ere it can be applied to the particular. It must be a principle which, if it is distinguished from the particular, yet overreaches this difference and brings together the two terms in a more comprehensive unity. Now, in this view of the matter, Judgment cannot be regarded as merely applying a universal, which it receives from the hands of Reason, to the determination of a given particular; it must be conceived as itself reason and something more, i.e., as reason going

1 R. VIII. 140; H. V. 31. "Are freedom and unconditioned practical law really different? Or is not rather an unconditional law merely the self-consciousness of a pure practical reason, and is not this again entirely identical with the positive conception of freedom?"
beyond its abstract unity with itself to the determination of that which it distinguishes from itself. Hence, when the Ideas of reason are conceived, not merely as determining objects for reason itself, but as capable of giving a new determination to our consciousness of the objects of experience, they are regarded as principles of judgment.

Another way of stating the same view is to say that, when we regard the Ideas of reason as capable of application to, or of revealing themselves in, objective reality, we necessarily give a new significance to the Ideas themselves. Viewed in themselves these Ideas reduce themselves to different expressions of the unity of consciousness with itself. But, when we regard them as capable of application to objects, we think of that unity as differentiating itself, yet in its differences still maintaining unity with itself. Hence, the Idea which Kant declares to underlie the process of judgment is the Idea of (Zweckmässigkeit) adaptation or design. Design is a characteristic which belongs to phenomena when they not only conspire to a result, but when the result is such that we cannot account for it by the separate phenomena or the laws of their relations, without supposing that an intelligence, or some principle kindred with intelligence, has been using these phenomena and laws in view of the result; in other words, without supposing that an ideal principle has been making the material elements and their laws its instruments in realising itself. The idea of design, therefore, implies a thought, which goes beyond itself and applies itself to, or manifests itself in, the manifold differences and relations of objects, yet subordinates all these differences and relations to its own unity. While, therefore, reason as practical is conceived by Kant as an end to itself, i.e., as finding an end in its own universality, reason, manifesting itself as judgment, must represent all things as means to this end, or at least as in themselves merely means, though in relation to it or as part of its self-realisation, they may be regarded as ends.

The Critique of Judgment thus comes with Kant to be equivalent to a discussion of the validity of the Teleological Idea; because design is the a priori principle which underlies the activity of Judgment, as the intermediary
between Reason and Understanding. Thus the pure activity of Reason shows itself in the unity of self-consciousness: the activity of the Understanding shows itself in the determination of objects in the context of experience; and the activity of Judgment shows itself in relating the former to the latter, in establishing the unity of the consciousness of objects with the consciousness of self. The ruling idea of the consciousness of objects is the idea of the necessary connexion, or connexion, according to necessary laws, of things or elements which are different from each other; the ruling idea of the consciousness of self (manifesting itself as will,) is the idea of that self as an end to itself; while the ruling idea of the consciousness which relates the manifold of objects to the unity of self, is design or the subjectation of the necessary connexion of different objects to the unity of self-consciousness. Kant, therefore, can regard Understanding, Judgment and Reason as faculties which correspond to the ideas of connexion according to law (Gesetzmässigkeit) adaptation or design (Zweckmässigkeit), and end or final cause (Endzweck.) Now, if Understanding shows its power in establishing that necessary connexion of things we call nature, and if Reason reveals its supremacy in the idea of freedom which it sets up for us as self-conscious and therefore moral subjects, Judgment must exhibit its mediating character in bridging the chasm between nature and freedom, and enabling us to subsume the former under the latter. But how is such mediation possible? The whole region of knowledge is dominated by the Understanding; the whole region of practice is dominated by Reason; what region is left for Judgment? In the aspects of things which they present to Understanding, we deal with them as phenomena; in the aspect of things which they present to Reason, we deal with them as things in themselves; in what other aspect can we deal with them? To the former of these questions, Kant answers that besides knowledge and will, there is in us a capacity of feeling: to the latter he answers that we can discover a third aspect of things, when we relate our knowledge of them as phenomena to our consciousness of them as things in themselves. This answer implies that we can...
feel what we can neither know nor will; and that, through this feeling, we have the consciousness of a relation between the phenomenal and the real, which yet is neither the knowledge we have of the former, nor the faith of reason which goes along with our thought of the latter. Now, according to Kant, the feeling or consciousness which is thus possible, is the feeling or consciousness of the Beautiful, which finds its expression in Art. The teleological conception has thus no proper objective sphere in which it reigns; it rules neither in the world of consciousness, nor in that of self-consciousness. We cannot find design without us in nature, nor can we outwardly realise what the moral law presents to us as the end of action, in such a way as to turn nature into a kingdom of ends; though we must ever seek to realise that end, and we may have the faith that it is being realised, whatever appearances there may be to the contrary. But to bring together our faith and our knowledge is impossible, so long as we cannot lift the latter into the region of noumena, or carry the former down into the region of phenomena; or, in other words, so long as we cannot discern the working of a deeper reality through the veil of the phenomenal, or realise in the phenomenal world the noumenal law of freedom. We can, however, feel what we cannot know nor think; i.e., we can be conscious of objects in the phenomenal world as calling forth a certain harmony of our faculties, of our natural and our moral consciousness, of our sensibility with our understanding, and so of both with our reason; and this consciousness is what we have in the feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime. The feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime are different forms of the consciousness of a purposive quality in things, which, however, we are not able to interpret objectively, but only subjectively—that is, that as a harmonious working of the different powers which determine our inner life, in which they cease to hamper and limit, and seem rather to support and stimulate each other. At the same time, we cannot but credit the object that gives us this feeling with a certain teleological value, in so far as in removing the consciousness that our powers are cramped by each other, it, at the same
time, removes the consciousness of the opposition between ourselves and nature. The consciousness of objects no longer appears to be opposed to the consciousness of self when our perception, our understanding, and our reason, or any two of these powers cease to limit each other. On the other hand, when we attempt to treat this subjective teleology of our faculties as an objective determination of things, or, in other words, when we seek to find in things as known the realisation of the pure unity of thought with itself, our success is not great. We find, indeed, in the organic world certain objects, which we are unable to explain in a purely mechanical way,—as combinations of elements externally acting and reacting on each other,—and which, therefore, we can make intelligible to ourselves only by referring their existence to an ideal principle of unity. We are able to construe the facts of organic life only by regarding the animal or plant on the analogy of the conscious self, which is determined by the idea of itself as an end. But this objective use of the idea is problematical, and based upon ignorance rather than knowledge, even in relation to the organic world; and, when we go beyond the sphere of the organic, we find that the Idea of the world as a teleological system is only an Idea, a principle of investigation by which our effort to extend our view of nature is stimulated and guided, but which, in itself, supplies us with no particular determinations of things as objects. It will, however, be desirable to examine more carefully these applications of the teleological Idea, after we have considered the more immediate subject of our inquiries, the feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.1

In the above, I have given the substance of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. I have, indeed, made some slight changes in the order of Kant's statements, with a view of bringing out certain connexions of ideas which ruled his thoughts, but which he does not always fully express. His exposition has a certain enigmatic character, from the way in which he abruptly advances from point to point, without showing the inner connexion of his thoughts. I think, however, that the

1 Introduction, especially §§ 3, 7, 8, 9.
above summary represents the real reasons why Kant gives the place and the meaning which he does give, to the consciousness of the Beautiful and the Sublime, and also why he connects his account of that consciousness with an examination into the general application of the teleological Idea, which may be regarded as a supplement to the Critique of Pure Reason.

Generally we may put Kant's fundamental ideas thus: We know, we think, and we feel. Our knowledge is of phenomena as connected by necessary laws; but we can think, and, indeed, as self-conscious beings, we cannot but think, the idea of freedom; for the idea of freedom is implied in that consciousness of ourselves as the authors of our own actions, which is bound up with the consciousness of the moral law. But this double consciousness of ourselves makes us denizens of two worlds, between which there seems to be no connexion, except that we necessarily represent ourselves as belonging to the one world when we look at ourselves as objects, and to the other when we look at ourselves as subjects, and that, as moral beings, we are bound to determine ourselves as phenomenal objects by that inner law by which yet we can never empirically know ourselves to be determined. Still, however, there remains the fact that these two forms of the consciousness of ourselves are parts of one self-consciousness, whose unity must manifest itself in some way. But, excluding knowing and thinking, there is nothing left but feeling, the immediate consciousness of harmony or disharmony with ourselves,—of the harmony or disharmony of the consciousness of objects with the consciousness of self, or again, of the harmony or disharmony of the different powers which divide our self-consciousness with each other. Into this last retreat of feeling we are forced to penetrate in the search for a consciousness of the unity of the two worlds, to both of which man belongs, seeing that we cannot give to it either the necessity of knowledge or of pure thought.

It will be better to postpone any special criticism of these ideas, till we have considered the special development which Kant gives to them in the second part of the Critique of Judgment.
CHAPTER II

THE CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT:—THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME

THE consciousness of the Beautiful and the Sublime is treated by Kant according to his usual method; i.e., it is first analysed so as to detect the *a priori* element present in it; then it is *deduced*, i.e., the judgments of taste are justified as having that universal validity which they claim; and, finally, the antinomies which arise from the contrast between the universality and the subjectivity of such judgments are considered. It will not be necessary to follow Kant from point to point in a discussion which involves many repetitions, but only to give the general purport of his thoughts.

I have already indicated how the sense of beauty is connected by Kant with the reference of the phenomenal to the noumenal world, and how this reference involves the idea of adaptation or design, in so far as the ideal unity of thought is regarded as determining the external connexion of phenomena. I have further pointed out, how it is that, for Kant, this reference must take the form of a judgment which expresses the subjective feeling of the harmony of the different faculties in their inward activity, as excited by the presence of an object; since it cannot take the form of a judgment expressing the objective unity of the phenomenal with the noumenal. Lastly, I have shown that the judgment so made is to be regarded as an evidence of the harmony of the objects with the self-consciousness of the subject, grounded in that har-
monious action of the faculties of the subject which the beautiful object occasions. These ideas will gain further precision and evidence as we follow Kant's analysis of the consciousness of beauty.

What is the purport of the judgment that a given object is beautiful? Like all judgments, we may regard this one from the four points of view of quality, quantity, relation, and modality. (1) Its quality we may see, if we consider, in the first place, that it is not a judgment about objects in their relation to each other, but about objects in relation to our feelings of pleasure and pain. We pronounce the object beautiful, because, when it is brought in relation to our minds, the consciousness of ourselves as having the idea of it is a source of satisfaction. Further, this subjective satisfaction is disinterested, and so is distinguished from the satisfaction which we find either in the pleasant, or in the good. The Pleasant is what satisfies us as sensuous beings by the immediate feeling it excites, an affection in which we are passive and dependent on the object; it is, therefore, immediately connected with an interest in the existence of that object, and a desire for it. A beautiful object, on the contrary, is one the mere idea of which is accompanied with satisfaction, apart altogether from a desire for it; because, "in so naming it, I am thinking not of that in which I depend on the existence of the object, but of what in myself I make out of it." ¹ Our satisfaction arises from a reflexion which makes us dwell upon the idea of the object once excited in our mind, not with a view to make efforts after the possession of it, but rather to penetrate into its meaning. We must also distinguish the Beautiful from the Good. The Good is that which satisfies us as rational beings, because it is determined either as an end in itself, or as a means to that end. We must, therefore, already have a definite conception of the object, which we subsume under the conception of the good. "With the Beautiful, this is not necessary. Flowers, free drawings, outlines woven with each other into a network without any design, have no definite meaning, and are brought under no definite conception; yet they please us

¹R. IV. 47; H. V. 209, § 2.
as beautiful objects,"¹ because the mind dwells upon them, seeking for some conception, it knows not what, which "half reveals and half conceals" itself. Only in such contemplative delight is the mind free and disinterested in respect of its object, because busied only with itself; whereas, both in respect to the Pleasant and the Good, it is interested, and in some way under constraint; for pleasure subjects us as rational to an object which appeals to sense, and the Good subjects us as sensuous to an object which appeals to reason.

(2) Quantitatively, the Judgment of Taste is universal, in the sense that it puts forth a claim to universal acceptance; but its universality is not based on any conception, to which we can appeal as a reason for calling upon others to agree with us. What is pleasant is, we say, a matter of taste, and de gustibus non est disputandum; but what we declare beautiful, we at the same time call upon everyone to recognise as such; though, if any one refuses to do so, we are not able to give him any reason why he should agree with us. We speak of the beautiful as if it had some objective quality which was the same for all, and on which our pleasure was based; yet, when we are asked to say why we call a thing beautiful, we can only say that it pleases us, and that with our pleasure, in this case, goes a judgment that it should please everyone. Hence, also, the judgment of taste is always logically singular, i.e., it is always an individual object that we pronounce beautiful; though, of course, we may generalise such judgments in an empirical way, as when we say that "all roses are beautiful." Such generalised judgments, however, are never universal; for, as we cannot tell what it is in the particular rose that makes us call it beautiful, we cannot properly attach the predicate of beauty to the genus, or combine it with the definition of that genus: we can only pronounce upon each individual rose as it presents itself. Our satisfaction in the object, therefore, must be conceived not as preceding our consciousness of the universality of that satisfaction, but rather as consequent upon it. But how is this possible? How can the consciousness of our satisfaction in the object

¹ R. IV. 51; H. V. 211, § 4.
be attached to it like a universal predicate, while yet it is not a quality of the object apart from its relation to our subjective capacity of pleasure and pain. The only explanation possible is that the object is pronounced beautiful on subjective grounds which yet are universal. "As the subject in judging a thing to be beautiful, does not rest on any inclination or interest of his own, but feels himself quite free in regard to the approval he gives to it, so he cannot find the grounds of his approval in any private conditions connected with his own subjectivity, but must regard his judgment as based upon something which he may equally presuppose as existing in other minds." ¹ But the only subjective grounds which are universal are those which lie in the harmony of the different faculties of man, which are brought into play in the contemplation of the object. "If the ground of our judgment as to the universal communicableness of our feelings of pleasure in the object is subjective in the sense that it does not lie in any conception of the object, it can be nothing but the state of mind, which goes along with the relation of our faculties to each other, when we refer our consciousness of an object to knowledge in general. The powers exercised in knowing, which are set in motion by such a consciousness, will be in free play with each other, because no definite conception limits them down to a special rule of knowledge. Hence, along with the consciousness of the object, we will have a feeling of the free play of the faculties which points to knowledge in general. Now, in order to get knowledge out of the idea of a given object, we require, on the one side, imagina-
tion to put together the manifold of its perception, and, on the other side, understanding to supply the unity of the conception which connects the elements of the idea. If, therefore, the idea of a given object gives rise to this free play of the faculties out of which knowledge arises, the state of feeling thereby produced must be as uni-
versally communicable." ² as is the knowledge which is its result. It appears, then, that the judgment as to the agreement of the idea of an object with the conditions of knowledge goes before our pleasure in it, and is the

¹ R. IV. 55; H. V. 215, § 6.    ² R. IV. 63; H. V. 222, § 9.
ground of it, and in that judgment is involved the consciousness of its universal communicableness. At the same time, we must not suppose that this means that we are "intellectually conscious of the purposive activity of our faculties"; for this would imply that we had a definite conception of the end to which they are tending; i.e., a definite conception of what the object is. What we have in our minds is only a feeling, in connexion with the consciousness of the object, of "the excitement of our imagination and our understanding to indeterminate, but yet harmonious activity; viz., that kind of activity which leads to knowledge." "An idea which, as individual and independent of all comparison with others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of universality which it is the business of the understanding to apply, brings our faculties of knowledge into that accord with each other (proportionirte Stimmung) which is required for knowledge, and which, therefore, we expect to be produced by it in every being who requires the combination of understanding and sense in order to make judgments regarding objects; i.e., in every man."¹ In short, Kant holds that we have a consciousness, apart from any definite knowledge of the object, of the agreement of the idea of the object with the conditions of knowledge because, and in so far as, we have an immediate feeling of pleasure in the harmonious movement of the faculties produced by the idea of the object. The judgment that a thing is beautiful expresses this feeling, i.e., it expresses merely a relation of the subject to the object, and not any relation of the object to other objects, or of the manifold elements of an object to each other. And it takes the form of a judgment about the object, only because it is the consciousness of that relation of the object to the subject out of which the consciousness of the relation of objects (or of the elements of an object) to each other is wont to spring. We must here remember that objectivity with Kant depends upon universality, i.e., the consciousness of objects as such is the consciousness of relations which hold good for all subjects or "for consciousness in general." Hence the consciousness of universal communi-

¹ R. IV. 65; H. V. 223, § 9.
cableness and the consciousness of objectivity are, for Kant, closely akin, and, indeed, except in this one instance, identical.

(3) The relation \(^1\) expressed in such judgments, it follows from what has just been said, is one of adaptation to an end, yet without reference to any definite design. "Purposiveness without purpose" (if, in order to bring out Kant's antithesis, we may so translate it) is what we attribute to an object when we are not obliged to suppose that the conception of an end has been the cause of it, though we find it impossible to make the object intelligible to ourselves in any other way. Now, we do not call an object beautiful, because it subserves any end, either subjective or objective: not the former, for we do not judge the object beautiful because it pleases us, but it pleases us because we judge it beautiful; yet not the latter, for the predicate 'beautiful' is not the conception of any quality in the object by reason of which we might subsume it under the idea of the Good as an end in itself or as a means to that end, but merely an expression of our consciousness that our faculties work harmoniously in regard to it. For the object we contemplate is in harmony with our intelligence, and therefore it puts us in harmony with ourselves, without our being able to say why it does so, i.e., without our being able to assign the conception of the object, by reason of which we thus find ourselves at home with it. "The relation of our faculties which is implied in the determination of an object as beautiful, is bound up with a feeling of pleasure, and this pleasure by the judgment of taste is declared to be valid for every one; hence neither the pleasure that accompanies the consciousness of the object, nor our satisfaction with the perfection of the object as falling under the conception of the Good, can be the ground of that judgment. It can, therefore, only be a subjective adaptation in the idea of an object without any purpose or end, either objective or subjective, i.e., it can only be the mere form of purpose in the idea by which the object is given, which constitutes that satisfaction which, in the judgment of taste and pleasure, we deter-

\(^1\) Which we take up next in the order of the categories.
mine, without a conception, to be universally communicable." 1

If we compare the moral with the aesthetic judgment, we find that, in both cases, a feeling of pleasure is the result, and that, in both cases, that feeling is determined by a priori grounds. In the former case, we have the idea of the moral law determining the will, and "the state of mind which accompanies any determination of the will, is in itself a feeling of pleasure," 2 i.e., we do not begin with the conception of the moral end as a good which therefore is pleasant, (for how could we infer that a priori, before experience of the object?) but we assert that, because the law determines the will to seek an object, a pleasure is necessarily involved in the attainment of the object and even in the very consciousness of the determination of the will in view of it. In the same way, the consciousness of a merely formal adaptation of the faculties to each other, as stirred to action by the idea of an object, carries with it, or is itself a pleasure—as it "determines the activity of the subject by stirring up his faculties in view of knowledge in general." The pleasure, however, in this case is not practical, though "it has a causality in itself to maintain the state of contemplation in the subject, i.e., to keep the faculties engaged upon the object without any further end. We linger over the contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself:" and this is analogous to, though not identical with, the way in which a feeling of pleasure excited by the idea of an object repeatedly calls our attention to it. We are pleased with the beautiful because it is beautiful, just as with the good because it is good; but in the latter case the pleasure is the result of self-determination to realise an object, while in the former case the self-determination is merely to maintain the idea.

The purely formal or subjective adaptation of the object termed beautiful may easily be lost sight of, if we confuse with its beauty either, on the one hand, its power to excite and move us, or, on the other hand, its objective perfection as a specimen of its kind. These different qualities are,

1 R. IV. 68; H. V. 226, § 11. 2 R. IV. 69; H. V. 226, § 12.
however, so often associated with beauty, that it seems necessary to call special attention to the distinction. As to the former, Kant remarks that “it is a barbaric taste which requires a mixture of what charms our senses or stirs our emotions (Reiz und Rührung) with the Beautiful in order to satisfy it; still more if it makes these the measure of its satisfaction.”¹ Thus a mere colour or sound, the green of the grass, a musical tone as distinguished from a noise, e.g., the tone of a violin, are generally called beautiful; though they have for their basis merely the matter of ideas, and the pleasure we have in them is due to mere sensation. But strictly speaking, isolated sensations of colour and tone “can be regarded as beautiful only in respect of their purity, which is a kind of formal determination of them. This, besides, is the sole element in them which is universally communicable; for we cannot assume that the quality of the sensations is for all subjects the same, or that preference is adjudged to one colour before another, or to the tone of one musical instrument before that of another, in the same way by every one.”² If, indeed, we adopt the theory that colours and tones are constituted by successive vibrations or pulsations of ether, and that we not only perceive by sense their effect in stirring the organs to activity but also apprehend by reflexion the regular play of our impressions,” then we should be obliged to recognise in colour or tone, “not merely sensations, but the formal determination of the unity of a manifold of sensations,” and on this ground we might regard them as in themselves beautiful. Otherwise, we should be obliged to find beauty only “in the form of objects of sense; i.e., in their figure, or in their play with each other, which again may be either play of figures, as in dancing, or play of feelings, as in music.” On this view, pleasant colours or tones furnish merely the matter brought under the form of beauty, which may be part of the charm or attractiveness (Reiz) of objects, but strictly speaking, has nothing to do with their beauty. Again the power of objects to move us (Rührung) is often confused with beauty. But emotion, as a pleasure produced by a

¹ R. IV. 70; H. V. 228, § 13. ² R. IV. 71; H. V. 229, § 14.
"momentary check upon the forces of life succeeded by a more powerful outflow of them," is something quite distinct from beauty; though it is, as we shall see, closely connected with the Sublime.

Equally careful must we be not to confuse beauty with perfection, or, according to the ideas of Wolff, with perfection thought indistinctly. Perfection implies always objective adaptation to an end; either to an outward end (when the object is merely useful, and not properly called perfect), or to an inward end, i.e., an end determined by the nature of the object which is called perfect. In this latter case, we must know what kind of thing it is we are dealing with, i.e., we must have the conception of it, ere we can say whether it is perfect or not. A judgment, therefore, in which an object is said to be beautiful under the condition of a definite conception, is not a pure judgment of taste. Hence, we cannot make such pure judgments, except in cases where we can escape the necessity of referring the object to a definite class, as is the case with the free beauties of nature. We do not need, e.g., to think of the ends of nature in flowers and birds; still less do we need to think of any definite end in the designs of wall papers and carpets; hence, in these cases, we can make pure judgments of taste. Our imagination plays about such objects with a consciousness of multiplicity in unity, but without binding itself by any definite conception. But the beauty of a man, a woman, a child, cannot be thus treated; nor again the beauty of a house, or a church. In these cases we begin by thinking of the object as one of a kind, and our judgment as to its perfection, with reference to the needs or uses of its kind, anticipates our judgment as to its beauty. Here, therefore, beauty must be a secondary consideration (pulchritudo adhaerens), something that is bound up with perfection, but does not constitute it. "Now, it is true that taste wins by this combination of aesthetic with intellectual satisfaction, inasmuch as it becomes fixed; and though it be not universal, yet in reference to certain purposively determined objects it becomes possible to lay down rules for it. These, however, are not rules of taste, but rules for the combination of taste with reason, i.e.,
of the Beautiful with the Good, by which the former is
turned into an instrument of the latter. Thus, that tone
of feeling which is self-maintaining and subjectively
universal in its validity, is subordinated to that way of
thinking which can be maintained only by painful resolve,
but which is objectively universal in its validity. It is
ture that, strictly speaking, perfection gains nothing by
beauty, nor beauty by perfection; but, when we compare
an idea by which an object is given with the conception
of the object as it should be, we cannot avoid bringing
it at the same time into relation with the feeling of the
subject; and by this relation, when the two states of mind
are in harmony, our whole faculty for ideas gains.”¹

This combination of the idea of the Good with that of
the Beautiful is especially important in the case of what
is called the Ideal of Beauty. An ideal is the realisation
of an Idea in all the fulness of individual reality. But
the mere consciousness of beauty cannot realise itself in
this way, except in reference to an object determined by
a conception. We must have an object perfect in its
kind to supply a centre to which beauty may attach itself.
Nay, further, we must have for this purpose an object
which is an end in itself, and which in no sense is means
to a further end. Now, the only being who has the end
of his existence in himself is man; he only can determine
his ends by reason, or, where he is obliged to receive
them from external perception, yet can bring them into
relation to essential and universal ends; and he only can
make aesthetic judgments as to such agreement of par-
ticular with universal ends. Hence, it is only man of all
objects in the world who is capable of an ideal of beauty,
as it is only humanity in his person which is capable of
the ideal of perfection.”²

To reach this ideal of beauty, we must first ascertain
the normal idea of man by an empirical process of imagi-
nation, in which the forms of many men are combined,
and the average result selected. Then, having got this
normal idea, we must so mould and modify it, as to make
it the expression of the highest in man, i.e., his moral
nature. “The visible expression of moral ideas which

¹ R. IV. 80; H. V. 236, § 16. ² R. IV. 83; H. V. 239, § 17.
rule man inwardly, can indeed only be got from experience; but to connect it in the Idea of the highest design with everything that our reason recognises as morally good, with benevolence, purity, strength, and peace, and to make all this, as it were, visible in bodily manifestation, requires a union of the pure Ideas of reason with the greatest force of imagination, even in him who would discern, still more in him who would express it, in artistic form."

(4) Kant finally analyses the judgment of taste in regard to its modality; and in doing so he finds occasion to place the results already reached in a slightly different light. The Beautiful has a necessary relation to satisfaction: "but this necessity is not a theoretic objective necessity which can be discovered a priori; for I cannot know a priori that others will feel the same delight in the object I call beautiful; nor is it a practical necessity, which would mean that the conception of a purely rational will which serves as a rule for all freely acting beings, makes us regard this satisfaction as the necessary consequence of an objective law; for such satisfaction only indicates that we are bound to act in a certain way without any further aim. It remains that the necessity which is thought of in connexion with a determination of taste, is that which can only be called exemplary, i.e., the necessity of the agreement of all with a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule, which rule, however, we cannot state.”

There is, therefore, an important difference between this and the other kinds of necessary judgments, to which we are forced, and can force others, to yield assent on definite grounds which can be stated. For, we can only say that they ought to agree with us, if we have rightly subsumed the object under the rule, under which we subsume it in calling it beautiful. But, as we cannot state the rule, we can never bring the correctness of our procedure in this respect to any definite test. The peculiarity of this case may perhaps be best stated, if we say that it rests on the idea of men having a communis sensus. The term “common sense” is, indeed, usually employed to express what would be

1 R. IV. 86; H. V. 241, § 17. 2 R. IV. 88; H. V. 243, § 18.
more correctly designated as the common understanding; but the understanding always determines its objects through conceptions, and therefore is not appropriately called "sense." When, however, we say that certain objects are beautiful, we imply that we have a faculty of making judgments, in which we can call upon others to agree with us, while yet we are not able to base them on any distinct conception. And such a faculty for immediate judgments on particular objects may fairly be called a sense; though, as it carries with it a reference to a latent working of understanding in sense, we must add that it is a common sense. Now, our possession of such a sense may be proved by the nature and conditions of knowledge. Knowledge is essentially communicable; it is what holds good for every subject equally, what is true for consciousness in general, and therefore what is true of the object. And knowledge depends on the agency of imagination and understanding, working together in a certain harmonious way: the former combining the manifold of sense, the latter bringing the manifold so combined under the unity of thought. Now, there is, in the case of each different object, a certain proportion or balance of these faculties which is most suitable for knowledge, and which we are capable of feeling as a stimulus to their activity. And this feeling must be as communicable as the knowledge which is the result of such activity.

We may sum up the results at which we have arrived by saying that "Taste or the sense of beauty is a faculty for judging an object in relation to that free agreement with law which is characteristic of the imagination." Freedom and subjection to law seem, indeed, to be directly opposed to each other, and we should be inclined at first to say that imagination can be free only when it produces its object, while it is necessarily subject to law, when it reproduces an object given to it from without. But by the imagination being in free agreement with law is meant that the object, as it presents itself, stirs the imagination to combine its various elements, in the same way in which it would combine them if it were left to produce its object spontaneously. But this implies that imagination is not

1 R. IV. 93; H. V. 246.
guided and limited in its work by any definite conception; though it follows a course which is in harmony with the laws of the understanding, and which, therefore, naturally leads to such a conception. The movement of imagination is thus in accordance with law, though it is not determined by the consciousness of law. Hence, we do not ascribe beauty to a regular figure, such as a geometrical diagram, which thrusts upon us a definite conception of the law of its construction, and so brings the imagination under visible restraint. We recognise beauty only in forms in which there is an appearance of free play, and yet a secret order with which we are pleased though we cannot define it.

The Sublime is partly similar to the Beautiful, but partly contrasted with it; and the contrast will throw light upon both. They agree, in so far as both are pleasing in themselves apart from any interest, and in so far as both presupposes "judgments of reflexion and not judgments of perception or of logical determination," 1 i.e., judgments in which the object is brought under a definite conception. Our satisfaction with the Sublime, as with the Beautiful, is not satisfaction with an object as producing a feeling of pleasure in us; nor is it satisfaction with an object, the conception of which is subsumed under the idea of the Good: it is satisfaction in an object as suggesting an indeterminate conception by the way in which it excites the activity of our imagination. Hence, in both cases the judgment of taste is a singular judgment, which yet puts forth a claim to universal assent; and that in spite of the fact that what it calls others to participate is not the knowledge of an object, but merely a feeling of pleasure in it. But with all this there are important differences between the Sublime and the Beautiful. For beauty implies form and limitation, whereas the Sublime may be found in an object which is formless and unlimited, or which we picture to ourselves as unlimited, provided only that it calls up the thought of a self-limited whole, which we do not and cannot picture to ourselves at all, but only think. Hence, also, the indeterminate conception which the beautiful object suggests, or which

1 R. IV. 97; H. V. 251, § 23.
the understanding; while the indeterminate conception which is suggested by the object we call sublime, is an Idea of the reason. In the former case our satisfaction was due to the quality of the object presented to us, in the latter to its quantity. Finally, the Beautiful is directly pleasant to us, i.e., it is immediately connected with a feeling of the furtherance or reinforcement of life within us, while the Sublime is only indirectly pleasant: for it involves the feeling of a momentary check upon the forces of life within us, followed by a more vehement outflow of these forces. Hence, the former easily connects itself with that which charms the senses, and it is of the nature of play; while the latter is necessarily bound up with emotional excitement, and gives rise to an earnest frame of mind, which excludes all sensuous charm, and is closely akin to the reverential awe produced by the moral law.

The most important of all the differences between the Beautiful and the Sublime is, however, that, while the former, as we find it in nature, has a "purposive form whereby the object seems to be, as it were, preadapted to our judgment, the latter may appear by its form to thwart the purposes of our judgment, to baffle our faculty of representation, and, as it were, to do violence to our imagination; and yet it may be judged to be only the more sublime."¹ What this shows, however, is that it is not really the object which is properly called sublime, but only an Idea of reason, "which can never be objectively realised, or at least be adequately realised by the sensuous imagination, but the consciousness of which is stirred up within us by the very failure of such realisation." To ask when an object is to be called sublime, is really to ask what are the objects of sense which, by their very failure in design, force our minds "to forsake the sensible altogether, and busy themselves with Ideas which bear in themselves a higher design." The Beautiful makes us rest in nature with the anticipation of finding purpose or design in it: "it widens, not indeed our actual knowledge of natural objects, but our conception of nature; so that we regard it not as mere mechanism, but as a

¹ R. IV. 98; H. V. 252, § 23.
kind of art." But the Sublime makes us regard nature as incomplete and aimless in itself, but yet as presenting to us certain phenomena, which "may be used to awake the feeling of a higher design in ourselves that is quite independent of nature." ¹

Now, there are two forms of the Sublime, corresponding to the two ways in which Ideas present themselves in relation to our faculties of knowing and of acting, the Mathematically Sublime and the Dynamically Sublime. The former is connected with the quantity or magnitude of the objects of sense. Quantity is a relative conception, for we can only say how great a thing is by relation to another quantum as unity. We estimate quantity either mathematically or aesthetically, and the former must always ultimately be referred back to the latter; for, in order to apply numbers, we must assume that the quantum, which we take as unit of measurement, is given in a perception; otherwise we should need to go on ad infinitum explaining that quantum by reference to other units of measurement. Now, for mathematical synthesis nothing is too great; we can go on multiplying and adding ad infinitum. But for the aesthetic estimate of quantity there is a limit, owing to the conditions of the imaginative representation of objects. For, in order to represent an object, we must first go through its various elements successively, and then reversing our course, we must gather it into the unity of one image. But, as we advance and take into our mental view more and more of these elements, it becomes more and more difficult to combine them into one image; until finally we reach a point where we cannot take in any new elements except by letting go some of those we have already apprehended. A sensible object, therefore, may by its magnitude strain and tax our imagination till it fails, and "in its effort to widen itself, falls back upon itself." ² Now, it is such an object that gives us the feeling of sublimity. Why? Just because, behind the failing imagination, there is a power which stimulates its ineffectual efforts by the thought of an absolute totality, viz., reason. Hence the very failure of imagination awakes the consciousness of

¹ R. V. 100; H. V. 253, § 23. ² R. IV. 107; H. V. 289, § 26.
a faculty in ourselves to which all the powers of sense and imagination are inadequate: the Idea of a greatness in ourselves before which all objects of sense shrink to nothing, and in thinking of which we triumph over our own weakness to represent it in sense or imagination. "The infinite is not only comparatively but absolutely great. Compared with it everything else (in the same order of quanta) is small. And what is most impressive about it is that, even to think it as a whole shows us to possess a faculty of mind which surpasses every measure of sense. For, to represent it sensibly would require what is obviously impossible, i.e., a combination of the manifold of sense in one image, which taken as unit should have a numerically expressible relation to the infinite. Nevertheless, even to be able to think of this infinite without contradiction, man must have in his soul a supersensible faculty. For it is only by this faculty and its Idea of a Noumenon, which cannot itself become an imaged or perceived object, but which yet furnishes the substratum for our perception of the phenomenal world, that the infinite of this world of sense is completely embraced as one whole under a conception; and thus we make a purely intellectual estimate of a magnitude which can never be mathematically estimated by means of numbers." 1 For "the true unchangeable measure of Nature is the absolute Totality of it. But, as this fundamental measure involves a contradiction (on account of the impossibility of reaching the absolute by an endless progress), that magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination spends in vain its whole faculty of synthesis, must carry our thought of nature to its supersensible substratum (which lies at its basis, and also at the basis of our faculty of thought). As this, however, is beyond all sensible measure, we should recognise as sublime, not so much the object as our own state of mind in regard to it." 2 "Thus, the feeling of the Sublime in nature is a kind of reverence for our own character as rational beings, which by a certain subreption we transfer to an object of nature." 3

The Dynamically Sublime is found in the forces of

1 R. IV. 110; H. V. 262, § 26. 2 R. IV. 111; H. V. 263.
3 R. IV. 113; H. V. 265, § 27.

(9) The Dynamically Sublime.
nature. Such forces are sublime, when we recognise their greatness, and at the same time feel that they cannot overpower us. Now, the power of a force can be aesthetically judged only by the greatness of the resistance it can overcome; and, as we ultimately carry back all our estimates to ourselves, we count that force great which we can do nothing to resist, and which, therefore, is naturally an object of fear to us. At the same time we may regard a force as fearful, without being afraid of it, even although we recognise that any resistance we might make to it, would be in vain. "Thus the virtuous man fears God, but is not afraid of Him"; since he does not wish to disobey his commands, but yet sees how he would have to be afraid if he did incline to do so. He who fears cannot see sublimity in the force he fears, any more than he who is driven by appetite is in a condition to feel the beauties of the object he desires. But, in the presence of any of the mighty forces of nature, in relation to which the physical strength of man is as nothing, we become conscious that we can fall back upon a "power of resistance of a quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature." 1 Thus, the irresistible violence of natural forces breaks down our consciousness of physical capacity for resistance, only to make us conscious of a power in us, which nature cannot overcome; nay, which can treat the apparent infinity of nature as a unit in relation to its own real infinity. The true Sublime, therefore, lies within and not without; though by a "subreption" similar to that formerly described, we transfer it to the object. Here, however, the veil is thinner; and often it is on the point of disappearing, in so far as we recognise the true Sublime to be spiritual and not material; e.g., when we see sublimity in the composure of the soldier amid the most fearful dangers of war. It may seem opposed to this that we are wont to recognise God's anger in the storm or the earthquake, which makes us conscious of our weakness. Such phenomena, however, cannot be felt as sublime when they produce fear and trembling, but only when we are raised above the fear of them by

1 R. IV. 119; H. V. 269, § 28.
the sense of moral harmony with the will of God. "Sub-
limity, therefore, lies not in any product of nature, but
only in our minds, in so far as we can become conscious
that we are lifted above nature within, and therefore also
above nature without us." 1

This feeling is less common than the feeling of beauty,
because it implies greater culture. It implies in fact a
capacity for Ideas, which is called out by the very inade-
quacy of nature to these Ideas, and which "puts imagina-
tion on the strain to use nature as a schema for them." 2
He whose moral nature is rude and undeveloped will find
the destructive powers of nature merely terrible. Hence
we cannot calculate on such a ready response in the
generality of men to the feeling of the Sublime, although
it rests, like the feeling for the Beautiful, on grounds
which are universal. "We can directly call upon others
to respond to the judgment of taste, because in it the
imagination is referred merely to the understanding, the
faculty of conceptions; but we can call upon others to
respond to our feeling for the Sublime only under the
subjective condition that moral feeling has been developed
in them, a condition, however, which we believe ourselves
authorised to require of everyone." 3

A consequence of this analysis is that, while both the
feeling for the Beautiful and the feeling for the Sublime
may be regarded (as merely sensuous feelings cannot be
regarded) as aids to the moral life of man, yet this
assistance is more direct in the case of the feeling of the
Sublime. Aesthetic feeling always tends to exclude inter-
ested motives, and to favour a certain liberality of mind,
_i.e._, a certain independence of mere sensuous satisfactions.
But the feeling of the Sublime is not only independent
of sensuous interests: it is negatively directed against
such interests, and, therefore, prepares the way for the
higher moral interest. In this way it assists that process
of abstraction, which is necessary to make the moral law
exert its full power over us. The Jewish religion, the
religion of sublimity par excellence, was also the religion
in which moral ideas were most powerful. For we are

1 R. IV 122; H. V. 272. 2 R. IV. 123; H. V. 273, § 29. 3 R. IV. 124; H. V. 274.
not to suppose that, when we strip the moral Idea of all that can recommend it to sense, we make it less inspiring; on the contrary, there is a danger rather that in relation to that Idea the true moral temper of apathy should be overbalanced and that it should give way to enthusiasm which in spite of its nobility always retains some of the blindness of sense.

Kant next proceeds, on the same plan as in the Critique of Pure Reason, to the Deduction of the aesthetic judgments. For the sense of the Sublime, indeed, he holds that no deduction beyond the simple exposition of it is necessary. For, as we have seen, that feeling only finds in the formlessness or absence of purpose in nature something that calls forth the consciousness of a higher force and purpose in ourselves. In this case, it is at once evident that the adaptation found in the object which is judged to be sublime, is attached to it only by the subjective movement of man's spirit, and does not belong to it simply as an object. In the case of the sense of beauty, however, the form of the object is apprehended as purposive with reference to the harmonious activity of our faculties; and, therefore, it requires to be shown how judgments of taste are possible—judgments which lay claim to necessity and therefore to a subjective universality, while yet they are not judgments of knowledge. In other words, we have to explain "the universal validity of a singular judgment, which expresses the adaptation to the subject of an empiric consciousness of the form of an object." ¹ Such universality cannot be based upon an agreement in the opinions of individual subjects which we discover empirically: it implies "a kind of autonomy in the subject, which pronounces judgment in regard to the feeling of pleasure attached to an idea." Yet this autonomy cannot be explained by conceptions. For the judgment of taste has the twofold peculiarity, that, while determining its object in view of the satisfaction of the individual subject, it yet makes a claim on every one's agreement as if it were an objective judgment; nevertheless it is as incapable of proof as if it were merely subjective. We may, therefore, bring our problem to a head in the

¹ R. IV. 142; H. V. 289, § 31.
form of the question:—"How is a judgment possible, by which, merely from our own feeling of pleasure in an object, independent of its conception, we judge, a priori, that this pleasure is connected with the consciousness of the same object in every other subject and that without waiting for any expression of such agreement?" ¹ The judgment of taste, however, is always about an individual object; hence the question is only how we are authorised to assert the universality of aesthetic pleasure, or to regard the connexion of pleasure with the object as universally valid, as a rule of judgment for every one? The answer is that we can do so in so far as "our satisfaction is merely in the form of the object as subjectively purposive in relation to our faculty of judgment." ² For then, though our judgment has reference to the feeling of the subject, it is to a feeling based "on subjective conditions which we have a right to presuppose in all men as they are required for the possibility of knowledge." For, if an idea corresponds with the relation of the faculties of understanding and imagination, which is required for knowledge in one mind, it will necessarily correspond with that relation in every mind. As, however, we here subsume the idea, not under a conception but "under a relation of imagination and understanding which can only be felt," our claim for the agreement of others can always be resisted on the ground of a possible error in subsumption.

The judgment of taste is, as we have seen, without interest in the existence of its object. Still there are two ways in which an interest in that existence may become attached to it. Empirically, an interest may become attached to it through the social character of the pleasure which it gives. The social tendency of man leads to "feelings being held to be of value just in proportion as they are universally communicable:" ³ a criterion which immediately lifts the aesthetic pleasures above the pleasures of sense. While, therefore, the solitary would not adorn his person or his dwelling, he is led to do so in society, as a means of recommending himself in the eyes of his neighbours; and this again turns the aesthetic

¹ R. IV. 152; H. V. 297, § 36. ² R. IV. 154; H. V. 298, § 38. ³ R. IV. 163; H. V. 307, § 41.
feeling into an impulse to appropriate beautiful objects, i.e., it connects an interest with the disinterested feeling of beauty. There is, however, a higher intellectual interest in the existence of the Beautiful, which is confined to natural beauty. For "it interests our reason that the Ideas (for which in moral feeling it excites an immediate interest) should have also objective reality; i.e., that nature should at least show a trace or give an indication that it contains in itself some ground for the assumption of a regular agreement of its products with our disinterested satisfaction, (seeing that we recognise that satisfaction a priori as a law for all men, though we cannot base our belief that it is so upon proofs). Hence reason must take an interest in every manifestation of such an agreement in nature. We cannot, therefore, reflect upon the beauty of nature without being interested therein. This interest is akin to our interest in that which is morally good. Therefore, when we find a man immediately interested in the beauty of nature, we have cause to believe that there is in him at least a basis for a good moral character."¹ This, however, holds good only of the beauties of nature. From a similar interest in the existence of beautiful objects of art, we cannot draw any such favourable inferences as to character. For, in this case, we have the gratification of pure aesthetic feeling by itself, without any suggestion of a harmony between nature and the spirit of man. Hence, imitations of nature,—say of the song of a nightingale,—generally lose their power to charm us whenever we discover that they are merely imitations. For then they cease to have the value they had "as a language in which nature expresses to us a higher meaning."

Kant next goes on to consider Art and the Artist. Fine art is an appeal to the sense of beauty; and, as that sense can only be appealed to by an adaptation which is without definite design, so in the products of art all the traces of conscious design must be removed. "The adaptation in the form of the object of art must seem as free from the control of all arbitrary rules as if it were the product of mere nature."² Hence, "while nature is beautiful, because it looks like art, art can only be called beautiful

¹ R. IV. 167; H. V. 310, § 42. ² R. IV. 175; H. V. 316, § 46.
if we are conscious of it as art while yet it looks like nature." Further, as no rules can be laid down to determine what is beautiful, so no rules can be laid down to produce it. Hence we call the faculty for art genius, as a gift of which nature is the source. Genius produces works which are exemplary, and from which rules may be abstracted; but those rules will never enable any one to produce new exemplary works.

The artist must be guided by the nature which manifests itself in him to produce a product which may itself be the source of rules. This marks an essential distinction of art from science. In science the greatest discoverer is distinguished from the most plodding imitator and pupil only in degree; but he who has received from nature the gift for pure art, is distinguished in kind from those who merely imitate him. The former is conscious, and follows a method the rules of which can be fully explained to every one; while the latter, though there is a mechanical element in his work which he like others has to learn, yet precisely in that which makes him an artist, shows a faculty of free construction which cannot be fully explained.

This element in genius is what we call Geist as distinguished from Taste. Taste is shown by the artist when he finds the fit form in which a conception may be expressed; for, of course, the artist is not like the observer, who does not need to have a conception of the nature of the thing, which he pronounces beautiful. But Geist is the faculty of giving expression to Aesthetic Ideas. "Now, by an Aesthetic Idea I mean an Idea of imagination which gives occasion to much thought, but to which no definite conception is adequate; which consequently can be fully compassed and made intelligible, by no language of explanation. Such an Aesthetic Idea is the counterpart of an Idea of reason; which is a pure conception to which no perception of sense or image of imagination can be adequate."

"For imagination as a productive faculty is powerful to create, as it were, another nature out of the matter which actual nature supplies. By its aid, when ordinary experience becomes commonplace, we frame to ourselves a new world, which, though subjected to laws analogous to those
of the natural world, yet is constructed on principles that occupy a higher place in our reason. . . . Thus we are delivered from the yoke of association which limits our empirical use of imagination, and are enabled to work up the materials supplied by nature into something which goes entirely beyond nature. Such products of creative imagination we may call Ideas: partly because they at least strive after something which lies beyond the limit of experience, and seek to approximate to an imaginative presentment of the Ideas of reason, thus giving to the latter an appearance of objective reality,—but mainly because no conception can be quite adequate to them as inner perceptions. The poet ventures to give sensuous realisation to ideas of invisible things, the Realm of the Blessed, Heaven, Hell, Eternity, Creation, etc.; or, if he represents that which is exemplified in experience, as e.g., death, envy, love, fame, yet, imitating by imagination the boundlessness of reason, he seeks to give to them a complete sensuous realisation for which nature does not furnish a parallel. . . . He who in this way can give to the expression of a conception of an object, an imaginative form which awakes more thought than can possibly be gathered into that or any other definite conception, and thus widens the conception itself in an unlimited way, is possessed of creative imagination.”¹ "Thus it is the peculiar work of poetic genius to bring to expression that in our state of mind in apprehending a special idea, which is beyond all definite names, and to make it universally communicable";² in other words, to give to that which is supersensuous a sensuous presence, and to that which is above time and space, a local habitation and a name.

Kant refers especially to what, in the technical language of art, are sometimes called the attributes of an object; as, e.g., the eagle with the lightning in its claws which is sometimes set beside the figure of Jupiter. "Such a symbolic figure does not, like a logical attribute, directly express that which is contained in our conceptions of the sublimity and majesty of creation; but it sets before us another object which gives the imagination occasion to extend itself over a multitude of kindred ideas, and so to

¹ R. IV. 184; H. V. 323, § 49. ² R. IV. 189; H. V. 327.
embrace in its view more than any one conception defined by words would convey. It is an aesthetic Idea which supplies a substitute for the impossible logical definition of an Idea of reason, and which thus stirs our mind to a higher life by opening up for it an outlook into an immeasurable field of kindred thoughts." 1 And this is the general use and value of poetic metaphor and symbol. They emancipate our mind from the definite conception of the special object, and thus make it into a kind of type of the infinite. 2 Hence, in artistic production there is a kind of opposition between taste and genius, in so far as the former is concerned with the appropriate expression of the conception of an object, while the latter rather seeks to widen the object and make it an image of the universe; yet these two factors must work together in every great work of art. Taste is the more indispensable; yet by itself it is quite insufficient for fine art, and many a breach of its rules may be pardoned to genius. Hence, also, there is always something in the manner of genius which it would be misleading to imitate, and which indeed is in itself faulty, though it may be used by the great poet or painter "to catch a grace beyond the reach of art."

Kant next goes on to give a division of the fine arts according as they express themselves in language, in outward form and gesture, or in tones; and to make some remarks on the special arts, which however have nothing that is worthy of special mention. We may, therefore, pass on at once to the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Judgment.

The antinomy of Taste is expressed thus:—"(1) Thesis. The Judgment of Taste is not based upon conceptions; for otherwise it would be a matter of controversy which might be decided by such conceptions. (2) Antithesis. The Judgment of Taste is based upon conceptions; for otherwise we could not contend with each other about it, as we do when we claim that others should necessarily agree with

1 R. IV. 186; H. V. 325.

2 Cf. what Kant says of Poetry (R. VIII. 200; H. V. 337, § 53) "while it causes the mind to feel in itself a free creative power which is independent of all the necessity of nature, it strengthens it to consider and judge nature as a phenomenon from a point of view in which in experience it never presents itself either to sense or to understanding, and to use it as a kind of schema for the supersensible."
us in that judgment."^1 The key to this antinomy is to be found in the fact that the word "conception" in the thesis and antithesis is taken in different senses. "The judgment of taste must refer to some kind of conception, otherwise there would be no meaning in the claim which it makes to universal validity. But this does not involve that it is capable of being proved from a conception; for a conception may be either determinable, or in itself undetermined and undeterminable. The conceptions of the understanding are of the former kind; they are determinable through predicates of sensible perception which may correspond to them; but the transcendental conception of reason, the Idea of the supersensible, which is at the basis of all that is sensibly perceived, is of the latter kind, and cannot be determined. Now, the judgment of taste has reference to objects of sense, but not with a view to the determination of the conception of these objects for the understanding; for it is no judgment of knowledge. It is only a private judgment, in which a single perceived or imaginatively represented object is referred to the feeling of pleasure. It cannot, therefore, have any authority except for the subject that makes it; for that which pleases me need not please any one else, and every one has his own taste. Yet, undoubtedly, there is contained in the judgment of taste a relation of the idea of the object (as well as of the subject) which reaches beyond the relation of the individual thing to this individual subject; for we count such judgments necessarily valid for all subjects. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that they are based upon a conception; though upon a conception which cannot be determined by perception. Hence, no object can be known through the conception, nor can it be used as a basis of proof for the judgment of taste. Such a conception is the pure Idea of the supersensible reality which underlies the phenomenal object of sense, (and also the subject who judges it) as objects of sense. . . . Thus all contradiction disappears when I say that the judgment of taste is based on a conception, viz., (a conception of the ground for the subjective adaptation of nature to our faculty of judging); from which, however, nothing can be known or proved in

^1 R. IV. 214; H. V. 350, § 56.
relation to the object, because it is in itself undeterminable and useless for purposes of knowledge. Yet, for all that, the judgment has validity for everyone (though of course only as a singular judgment which immediately accompanies perception); because its determining ground lies in the conception of that which may be regarded as the supersensible substratum of humanity.”

Hence, both thesis and antithesis may be true, if we interpret the thesis as meaning that the judgment of taste is not based on any definite conception of a phenomenal object, and the antithesis as meaning that it is based on an indefinite conception of the supersensible substratum of such objects; whereas both would be false, if the former meant that, as a singular judgment, the judgment of taste must be based on individual pleasure, and the latter, that, as a judgment claiming universal validity, it must be based on the conception of perfection. Here, therefore, as in the case of the theoretical antinomies solved in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the practical antinomies solved in the Critique of Practical Reason, the apparent contradiction has a value as making us “look beyond the sensible, and seek in the supersensible the point of union for all our faculties of a priori determination; because no other expedient is left to bring our reason into harmony with itself.”

We have already seen that the aesthetic Ideas are described by Kant as the opposite “counterparts of Ideas of Reason”: the former being Ideas of imagination which are incapable of exposition or conceptual analysis, the latter being conceptions of reason which are incapable of demonstration (using the word demonstration in its etymological sense, as when we speak of the demonstration of an anatomist, for that exhibition of the object by which objective reality is secured to a conception). As little as the imagination with its images can attain to the idea of reason, so little can the understanding with its conceptions attain to an aesthetic Idea. Now, this throws a new light upon the nature of genius, which was before explained as the “faculty of aesthetic Ideas.” For, “as the Beautiful is not to be determined as such by conceptions, but only by a consciousness of the imagination being attuned to one

1 R. IV. 216; H. V. 351, § 57. 2 R. IV. 218; H. V. 352.
accord with the faculty of conceptions, so it is not rules and prescriptions, but only the very nature of the subject, i.e., the supersensible substratum of all his faculties (to which it is the last end of our being to bring all our faculties into accord)—that can serve in fine art as the subjective standard of that unconditioned aesthetic adaptation, which can justly claim to be the object of necessary approval to every one.”

Our doctrine, however, it must be observed, is not a doctrine of the Realism but of the Idealism of the adaptation of nature to the principle of the judgment of Taste. In other words, we do not contend that agreement with our faculty of judgment is a design of nature, but merely that there is a purposive coincidence with the needs of our faculty, such as would exist if there were such a design. The realistic view would seem to be suggested by the manifold harmonies of form and colour found in the organic world, to which for other reasons we are led to apply the notion of design; as will be more fully explained in the second part of the Critique of Judgment. But, as against this presumption, we have to observe that even in inorganic nature we find “a mechanical tendency to the production of forms which look as if they were made expressly for our aesthetic satisfaction”; and yet inorganic nature “gives us no ground to suspect that more than mechanism is needed for their production.” Thus, the formation of crystals, e.g., in the change of water into ice, seems to take place purely according to the general laws of the affinity of matter. And if it be so, why should we necessarily suppose that more is needed to produce beautiful forms among plants and animals.

The final proof of the “Ideality” of beauty, however, lies in the fact that the aesthetic judgment lays down the law a priori in reference to it, which would not be possible if we had to learn from nature itself what is beautiful. “The property of nature which gives us occasion to perceive an inner adaptation of our faculties to each other in judging certain of its products, an adaptation, the necessity and universal validity of which makes us to trace it back to a supersensuous source, cannot be an end of nature

1 R. IV. 220; H. V. 355.
2 R. IV. 225; H. V. 359, § 58.
itself, or be judged by us as such; for, otherwise, that judgment of taste would involve the heteronomy, and not, as is required by a judgment of taste, the autonomy, of the mind.”¹ In the fine arts this ideality of beauty may be even more clearly recognised; for our satisfaction in aesthetic Ideas is not, as in the mechanical arts, dependent on the attainment of certain ends: indeed, it is exclusive of such ends. Hence, also, the creations of art are due not to the deliberate working of understanding and sense, but only to genius, which is guided not by purpose but by nature.

The reference of beauty to the Idea of the supersensible may prepare us for the conclusion that it is the symbol of moral Ideas. To understand this we have to distinguish symbol from schema. A schema is the adequate exhibition or sensible envisagement of a conception, which, therefore, can only be a conception of the understanding. On the other hand, an Idea of reason is not capable of being adequately schematised. Hence, we are driven to symbolise it, i.e., to bring under it a perception or image which is not adequate to it, but the relation of which to the conception under which it falls can be analogically used to give reality to the Idea. Thus, we symbolically represent a monarchical state by a living body, when it is governed under rational laws, and by a mere machine, when it is subjected to a despotic will; not that there is any likeness between a despotic state and a machine, but that there is in the two cases a similar causal relation. Language is full of such symbols, as when we talk of substance, of a logical ground, of a consequence as flowing from a reason, etc. Now, all our knowledge of God and the supersensible must be symbolic and not schematic, and, if we take it as schematic, we fall into anthropomorphism. On the other hand, if we reject all the service of symbols in realising our ideas, we must fall into Deism, and reduce God to a mere caput mortuum of abstraction, by means of which we cannot think anything even in a practical point of view.

“Now, I say the Beautiful is the symbol of the morally Good, and that it is only in this reference. . . . that it gives us a pleasure with which we call upon every one to

¹R. IV. 228; H. V. 362.
sympathise; awakening in us the consciousness of something which lifts us above the mere feeling of pleasure received through sense, and making us estimate the dignity of others as consisting in their capacity for a similar satisfaction. For the intelligible character of our being to which taste looks, is that with which all our higher faculties of knowledge are in accord.” Thus “in the exercise of this power the judgment is not, as in its empiric use, subjected to a heteronomy of empirical laws; rather it gives the law to itself in feeling such pleasure, just as reason gives the law to itself in willing. Hence, both on account of this inner possibility in the subject, and of the external possibility of a nature that agrees with it, it must be referred to something within the subject as well as without him, something which is neither nature nor freedom, but which yet is connected with the supersensible ground of the latter. In this supersensible ground, therefore, the theoretical faculty is bound together with the practical, in a way that it is not possible for us to comprehend, though it is experienced by all of us.” Hence, “taste makes possible a transition, without any violent leap, from the allurements of sense to a habitual interest in what is morally good; as it shows us that the imagination in its freedom is capable of being determined in adaptation to the understanding, and teaches us even in the objects of sense to find a free satisfaction which is irrespective of sensuous pleasure.”

Finally, Kant points out that there is no Doctrine of Method in relation to taste. “The propaedeutic to fine art lies, not in rules, but in a culture of the mind which is to be got from those kinds of knowledge commonly called humaniora: on the ground that humanity lies, on the one hand, in the general feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, in the faculty of communicating our inmost thoughts and feelings. For these two qualities taken together constitute that social spirit, which is characteristic of human nature, and by which it frees itself from the limitations of animal life. The age and nation, in which that impulse towards that regular social life by which a people becomes a community, contended successfully with the great and

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1 R. IV. 232; H. V. 364, § 59.
difficult task of uniting freedom (and equality) with a compulsion (springing from reverence and loyalty rather than fear)—such an age and such a nation were naturally the discoverers of the art of reciprocal communication of ideas between the cultured and the less cultured classes; an art by which the large-mindedness and refinement characteristic of the former, is united with the simplicity and originality characteristic of the latter. And, when once discovered, this middle term between the higher culture and bare nature furnished that true standard for taste, as a sense common to all men, which no general rules can supply. Hardly will it be possible for any later age to dispense with the types of excellence in art and literature which were then produced: for a later age must stand less close to nature, and without permanent patterns to copy, it would be apt to lose the very idea of that happy union of the selfrestraint of culture with the force and truth of free nature, which were then found in one and the same people.”

1 R. IV. 235; H. V. 367, § 60.
CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF KANT’S VIEW OF THE FACULTY OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

Kant’s theory of the Beautiful and the Sublime derives its value from the place which it occupies in relation to his other theories. In it he seeks to reunite what it was the main tendency of his previous works to divide; or rather, perhaps we should say that in it the tendency to unite which worked in the background in the previous writings, now comes to the front. For, as has been shown in previous chapters, under the movement of abstraction by which Kant seemed to reach his results, there was, even from the first, concealed a movement from the abstract to the concrete, which made the real result of his work very different from the apparent result. Thus, Kant’s attempt to free man’s consciousness of the ultimate reality of things from the elements of illusion that clings to his consciousness of the phenomenal world, really proved that the consciousness of the phenomenal is imperfect just because it ignores an element which yet it implies, viz., the unity of the self. And his account of man’s practical consciousness of the real, though it at first made him set the abstract self under its own law in opposition to all known, and therefore phenomenal objects, yet could not but betray the relation of the consciousness of self to the consciousness of objects, seeing that in moral action the subject must go beyond itself to determine the object. The practical consciousness was thus regarded as bringing together the world and the self, the outward and the inward; though still only in the external determination of the former in conformity with the latter. Further, the
realisation of the moral end had to be typified or made palpable to the imagination under the guise of a natural world determined by the laws of reason; though the caution was immediately added, that this representation must be taken as merely symbolic of that which cannot be represented adequately in any image of perception. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant advances a step further, and discovers a principle working in nature which is analogous to, or identical with reason; or, at least, he admits that, from a certain point of view which we have a right to take up, nature may be regarded as revealing to us such a principle. It is true that, in the end, he recoils from this admission, and determines as subjective the very Ideas by which the opposition of objective and subjective seemed to be broken down. But this reversion to Dualism, by which he maintains his self-consistency, should not conceal from us the real tendency of his thought, which in the Critique of Judgment has all but come full circle, and returned to the unity which it began by breaking up. To see this, however, we must look more closely at the points set before us in the above outline.

The first thing that strikes us in Kant's analysis of the Beautiful is that, at every step, it seems to involve the denial of the absoluteness of some distinction which Kant seemed to have previously regarded as absolute. This may be seen, if we rapidly review the characteristics by which the Beautiful and the consciousness of it are determined. The first characteristic of the Beautiful is, that it pleases us without an interest. Now, according to the Critique of Practical Reason, there are two sources of interest. Either an object affects us as sensitive beings with pleasure or pain, and therefore the realisation of it is an interest to us as a means to produce a pleasant, or remove a painful state of feeling. In this case, the object is an end to us, not for itself, but on account of the want in us which it satisfies. Or, again, the object is one to the realisation of which we are determined by the moral law, the law of our own nature as rational or self-conscious beings; and the realisation of it is an interest to us because it is subsumed under the idea of the Good. In both cases, the object has its value in relation to a want or defect in

The quality of aesthetic judgment breaks down the distinction between sensuous pleasure and moral satisfaction.
the subject which it supplies, and, therefore, our satisfaction in it is interested. But the interest, in the one case, is simply that the object should exist and be brought in relation to the want it supplies; while, in the other case, the interest of the object is given to it, only by the will that realises itself in it; in other words, the mere existence of the object is not what interests, but only its existence as the objective realisation of the moral Good, _i.e._, of the will as determined by its own law. Hence, in the one case, we will it because it interests us, and in the other it interests us because we will it. In the former case, we have an interest which is enslaving, in so far as the object for itself exercises a power over us, and thus our interest binds us to it and makes us dependent upon it. In the latter case, we have an _interest of freedom_; for we seek the object only as the realisation of our own will, and even though the external effect we had hoped to produce may fail, still our will is already realised in being determined in its action by its own law. In the _Critique of Practical Reason_ these distinctions are stated in such a way as to exclude any middle term. If objects please us apart from the realisation of our own will in them, we have an interest of desire in their existence, and this of itself constitutes a heteronomy of the will. If objects interest or please us in a way consistent with freedom or the autonomy of the will, it must be because the will as rational, and therefore formal, is realised in them. But, in the _Critique of Judgment_, this opposition breaks down as regards the beautiful. A beautiful object affects us pleasurably from without, yet our relation to it is a _free relation_, a relation in which we are not subjected to the yoke of desire, and in which there is no heteronomy of the will. This is what Kant expresses by saying that the beautiful pleases us without interest, or is the object of disinterested satisfaction. In other words, the will does not come into play at all in this case; we have a contemplative pleasure in an object, which is not the result of our self-determination by the moral principle, nor yet the satisfaction of a desire. But how is this possible? Only, it would seem, if the external object can come to us, not as merely _external_, but as one in which we find ourselves,—or the Ideas of our reason,—already
realised. But it was proved in the Critique of Pure Reason, that the Ideas of reason cannot be found realised in the world by us as knowing subjects; and this led in the Critique of Practical Reason, to the conclusion that they can be realities for us only as we ourselves realise them. In this analysis of the consciousness of the Beautiful, Kant, therefore, seems to bring together elements which he has hitherto kept carefully apart, and even opposed to each other. For the object of a disinterested satisfaction can only be an object in which, as an object, we are satisfied apart from any relation to desire or will,—apart from our seeing in it the realisation of our moral self-determination, yet apart also from our using it as an instrument to supply a sensuous want. We find our self realised in it, or we find in it an existence in which we can rest, because it is not alien to the consciousness of self. But what can this mean except that we find the noumenal in the phenomenal, i.e., just where we were never to find it? The beautiful object can be the object of a merely contemplative, and therefore disinterested delight, only in so far as in it the antagonism of theoretical and practical reason is transcended, in so far as we find in it an object which yet is in conformity with the consciousness of self.

The second characteristic of the Beautiful is, that it is regarded as the object of universal satisfaction, yet without being determined as such by its conception. When we say that an object is beautiful, we are not expressing a relation of the object to a taste of our own, which others may or may not sympathise with. We seem, on the contrary, to be assigning a predicate to an object which it has in itself, or, what is the same thing, which it has for consciousness in general, and which, therefore, we can expect every conscious being to recognise. But what is the predicate? All we can say is that it expresses a characteristic in the object, in virtue of which we expect all to be satisfied with it. Now, the only intelligible ground of universal satisfaction, the only ground on which we can demand that all rational beings should be pleased with anything, is that it is the realisation of reason. And to determine anything as the realisation of reason is to bring it under the idea of the Good. But, in order to do so, we
must determine the conception of it, and then subsume it, in virtue of that conception, under the idea of the Good. Where there is no such process, where a thing pleases us at once, and apart from any such subsumption of its conception under the idea of the Good, it would seem that the reason why it pleases us can only be that it pleasantly affects our sensibility; or, in other words, its pleasantness must rest on grounds which we have no right to universalise. How can a pleasure in the consciousness of an object, irrespective of any conception of it which enables us to subsume it under the idea of the Good, be yet attached to the object a priori? This question Kant can answer only by breaking through the opposition of understanding and sense,—and at the same time, as we shall see, through the opposition of reason and understanding,—with which he started. The former he does when he tells us that, apart from the definite reference of a particular object to a conception, we may have a consciousness of it as stirring the faculties to that harmonious activity of which knowledge of the object is the natural result. Now, knowledge results from an activity of the understanding, which, in the manifold brought together by imagination, recognises the unity of a definite conception. To say, therefore, that we have a consciousness of the harmony of these activities, is to say that, prior to the judgment in which particular and universal,—image of perception, and general conception,—are distinguished and referred to each other, we have a consciousness which cannot be said to be distinctly either perception or conception, yet which contains both implicitly in one; a consciousness of the particular as yet undivided from the consciousness of the universal. The judgment of taste thus issues out of an immediate consciousness of the object, which is not mere perception, but has the universality of the conception involved in it. Now, we know how Kant repudiated the idea of a "perceptive understanding," in which the difference of conception and perception either does not exist, or is entirely transcended and reconciled; and we have before seen what difficulties he had to contend with in reference to the priority of perception or conception. We have seen, indeed, that he alternately makes each prior to the
other, and so really implies that neither can exist, in the
definite character which he assigns to it, except in relation
to the other. But the dualism with which he starts does
not permit him to recognise the "common root" of which
he speaks in the Introduction to the Critique of Pure
Reason. Here, however, we find the "common root"
appearing as a consciousness of the particular, which is in
itself universal; or of the universal, yet as not separated
from a particular object. That we call upon everyone to
share this consciousness of the object, yet without being
able to give a reason for our demand, i.e., without being
able to define the object, which we regard as capable of
affecting everyone as it affects ourselves, is another aspect
of the same thing. It may be observed that Kant brings
in here the idea of a Common Sense, i.e., a sense which is
the negative of the idea of sense, as a mere consciousness
of the particular, or a particular state of the subject which
is not common with or communicable to others. In truth,
the defect of Kant's statement in this point of view is
rather that he still keeps up the appearance of division
between the faculties, and speaks of them as working
"harmoniously," i.e., as in external agreement or accord
with each other. In consequence of this, he is obliged to
seek for the unity further back, in a feeling subject, i.e., a
subject which feels them working harmoniously. If, how-
ever, we remark that this feeling subject is the same which
shows itself in the activity of the faculties of imagination
and understanding, and that they are not divided for it as
feeling, but only for us, when we consider the difference
of subject and predicate in the judgment of knowledge,
we see that this is just another instance in which a "third
something," plays for Kant the part of the unity which is
prior to the division, and which manifests itself in it. In
truth, a sense which is merely of the particular, like an
understanding which is merely of the universal, cannot
exist. In so far as these faculties are not distinguished,
what exists is just the common root in which they are
both implicitly contained, and in so far as they are dis-
tinguished, they are necessarily related to each other.

There is, however, a considerable difficulty presented by
the fact that Kant here speaks of the harmony of the
understanding and sense, and not of the harmony of either or both with reason. If we go back to the unity which is prior to the distinction of understanding and sense, we seem to be reduced to mere animal sensation, which no doubt, in a sense, contains implicitly both understanding and perception; inasmuch as it is at once the self-feeling of the animal and the feeling produced in it by a particular object, though these elements are not yet separated from each other. Further, animal sensation seems to be immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure and pain, as the feeling of harmony or disharmony between itself and the particular sensation; wherefore in the animal there is almost no division between the theoretical and the practical consciousness. But the consciousness of beauty is more than the simple sensation, as the feeling of aesthetic delight is more than the simple feeling of pleasure. When, therefore, Kant says that a consciousness of the harmonious working of understanding and sense, such as is necessary to knowledge, is implied in the sense of beauty; and that this consciousness is immediately accompanied by a feeling of aesthetic pleasure, he would seem to be going back to a unity which is too simple for the effect required. The sense of the beautiful is, no doubt, connected with an anticipated feeling of the agreement of the object of perception with a universal under which it is not logically brought. But the universal required seems to be one which is higher than the categories needed for the determination of an object as such. There is no aesthetic joy in the determination of an object in relation to other objects in the context of experience; why should there be aesthetic joy in the working of the faculties which prepares the way for such determination? Aesthetic delight is felt rather in a consciousness that takes the individual object out of the limits of the context of experience, in which it is only a partial existence essentially related to other partial existences, and makes it into a complete whole by itself: an object conceived apart from its limit or determination by other objects as a kind of microcosm or little world in itself. But this seems to involve not merely that the object is anticipatively harmonised with a conception of the understanding, but also
that it is anticipatively harmonised with an Idea of reason. Or, putting the same thought from the subjective side, in relation to the idea of the object judged to be beautiful we are conscious of the harmonious working of our lower faculties of understanding and sense with the reason, i.e., we are conscious of the faculties which give us our knowledge of phenomenal objects, as working in unity with the faculties which give us a consciousness of the same objects as noumena. Now, it is to be observed that in the Dialectic (of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment) Kant himself seems to adopt this view. For he solves the antinomy which arises when we consider that the judgment of taste is universal, and yet cannot be proved from any conception, by saying that it refers to a conception which is not determinable in perception, and through which, therefore, nothing can be known; i.e., it refers to the undetermined Idea of supersensible in us. An aesthetic Idea is an object, which, as presented in perception or imagination, forces us to think of more than can be brought under a conception of understanding. Either we are altogether foiled in attempting to reach the conception of the object, or, even if we have such a conception, the intuitive presentment of it breaks through its limits, and awakes in us a consciousness of that which is without any limit, which is whole and complete in itself. In this way the aesthetic Idea is, as Kant says, the counterpart of the Idea of reason; for, while the latter is "a conception which cannot be demonstrated or exhibited in concreto in perception"; the former is an "Idea of imagination which cannot be brought under a definite conception." If, however, this view be accepted, we must consider the beautiful object as an object which gives sensuous expression to reason, or, putting the thing subjectively, as an object the contemplation of which causes the harmonious action of sense and reason, rather than of sense and understanding.

We may find the key to this difference of view which Kant leaves unexplained, if we consider the nature of the opposition of perception and conception, or sense and understanding. It is part of Kant’s machinery, as we may call it, to distinguish absolutely between understanding and reason, but the understanding is so distinguished
mainly because it does not rise to the idea of an end, or of adaptation to an end; at best, it can think only of an external purpose or end which does not contain its means in itself. And, just for this reason, just because of its want of this Idea, understanding is essentially opposed to sense. The categories attributed to the understanding presuppose a given matter, a given "manifold," which is external to the categories themselves, and the elements which they bring into relative unity. Dualism, difference, externality of space and time in the perception, is thus the counterpart of the unity of the conception; and the one has meaning only in relation to, though in distinction from, the other. Or, to put it otherwise, the highest thought to which understanding can rise is the idea of law, i.e., of the necessary connexion of things essentially distinguished, the distinction of which, however, is presupposed, and not accounted for. Hence it is that a "perceptive understanding" appears as an impossibility; for understanding, while it relates itself to perception, yet repels perception from itself, or presupposes it as different. Its function is to subsume the data of sense under a unity which is not the source of the diversity subsumed. A unity of understanding and sense can be reached, only in so far as understanding turns into reason; or, in other words, in so far as thought passes beyond the category of law or necessary connexion to the category of design or adaptation to an end. To determine a thing as purposive, might, indeed, at first, seem merely to be the introduction of a new predicate in the judgment of the understanding; but this predicate by its very nature stands in an altered relation to the subject, and turns the judgment of the understanding into a judgment of reason. For the idea of adaptation involves that the diversity which is subsumed under the unity of thought, itself pre-supposes and is evolved from that unity. Even, indeed, when means are external, the end is conceived as prior to them; and in the idea of inner adaptation, (of which we shall have to give a further account in relation to the other part of the Critique of Judgment), it is involved that the differences flow from the unity which realises itself by their means. If, therefore, we conceive the judgment of adaptation, (as Kant
generally conceives the judgment of knowledge), as one in which the subject is furnished by the perception and the predicate by the conception, yet we cannot think of the "manifold" of the former as external to the unity brought to it by the latter; rather we must conceive the predicate as a universal, which, through the differences of the subject, expresses only its unity with itself. Or subject and predicate, perception and thought, are here seen as one with each other through their difference.

Now, we have already seen how the idea of adaptation to an end, is conceived by Kant as an ideal towards which knowledge directs its efforts, but which cannot be realised in knowledge. It thus furnishes a *terminus ad quem* to the activity of the understanding,—a *terminus* in which, if it could be attained, the understanding would make up its quarrel with sense by carrying back the difference of the particulars to the universal as their source, and not merely bringing them in relation to it as the law under which they are subsumed. If this goal could be attained, understanding, becoming a "perceptive understanding," would cease to be distinguished from reason. Now, to this perceptive understanding (as the conscious or *thought* unity of reason with itself in its object, in which the differences of understanding and sense would disappear,) will correspond at the other extreme the unconscious or merely *felt* unity of reason with itself in its object, in so far as the difference of understanding and sense has not yet been developed. And this feeling may, in Kant's language, be interpreted as a feeling due to the adaptation of the object to the harmonious action of the faculties, not indeed with a view to the knowledge of the understanding, but of the reason—or, in other words, not with a view to the determination of the phenomenal in its connexion with the phenomenal, but with a view to the determination of the phenomenal in its connexion with the noumenal. Further, we may say that this is due to the harmonious action of understanding and sense, in so far as, prior to the opposition of understanding and sense, there is yet no distinction of understanding from reason. The beautiful object is one in contemplation of which the reason, whose organ is as yet feeling, is conscious of
harmony with itself. In contemplating it, reason is not forced to relate the object, and therefore itself, to anything which is not present in perception; and the object, therefore, is to it the objective presentment of its own infinity and unity with itself. Such an anticipation of reason by feeling is intelligible, if we remember that sense in a self-conscious being is not a mere consciousness of the particular as such, but a form of self-consciousness; and that, just for this reason, the particular object in perception may present itself as a microcosm in which the ego finds itself realised. The consciousness of beauty will thus be a feeling of harmony of consciousness with itself, in contemplating an object which at first presents itself as external; and, because it is such a feeling, it will cause us to dwell on the object, or, in other words, to rest satisfied in it, without any wish either to change it in accordance with the law of the will, or to appropriate it as a means to the satisfaction of desire:—not the former, because it already is for us the realisation of our higher self; and not the latter, because as such realisation it is already pleasurable.

What has been said partly explains the third characteristic of the beautiful to which Kant proceeds, that it is that which is perceived as having the form of adaptation to an end, though not actually referred to an end. That, in Kant's language, has the form of adaptation, which we cannot explain except as the product of a will acting with a view to an end, (though we need not actually assert that it is the product of such a will). Now, the feeling of pleasure in beauty is due to a consciousness of harmony with ourselves in contemplating it, or of the harmony of our perception of it with our reason and its Ideas. We do not consider the object as a means which we can relate to an end to be realised in it by our will, or to a pleasant state of feeling, which may be produced in ourselves by it. The adaptation of the object lies entirely in its unity with itself, without reference to anything beyond it; or, rather, it lies in our unity with ourselves in apprehending it. This harmony we cannot explain, except by supposing that a will acting like our own in view of an end, has accommodated the object to our reason; yet to assert the
The reality of such adaptation is to go beyond the facts, which do not present to us any such external designing mind, but merely a connexion of phenomena, the diversity of which seems to presuppose their unity, and to be dominated by it, as in the living body the parts in all their diversity presuppose the unity of the whole. The unity of the object we call beautiful, or rather the harmony of the intelligence with itself in contemplating it, is such, that all thought of a further end separate from the means is excluded; and for the same reason there is excluded also all thought of a designer, who has used these means to secure an end. At the same time, the thought of design is forced on us by the fact that the different elements brought together in the object do not seem to be externally determined by anything beyond them, but to rest upon and express a unity which lies deeper than their difference.

The reason, then, why Kant declares that there is a form of adaptation in the beautiful object is, that it does not present itself to us as an external combination of otherwise unrelated parts, but as a unity of parts in which one Idea is manifested; and this again is subjectively explained as due to the harmony of our mind with itself in contemplating it. Thus, the reason why Kant sees in it merely a form of adaptation is that, though the unity is the presupposition of the difference and not the differences of the unity, yet we can nowhere find, either in ourselves or without us, the evidence of a willing subject which is separate from the means and which has used them to produce the result. It is for the same reason that, in the second part of the Critique of Judgment, Kant denies that we have the right to assert the existence of an objective final cause or end in organic beings; and we shall have to criticise his view more fully in reference to that part. For the present, it may be sufficient to point out that, in both cases, we are dealing with the same idea of an organic unity, in which there is no separation of means or end, of ideal and real; but that that idea is here taken as having no objective value whatever, not even the limited objective value which is there conceded to it. It is not the beautiful object as such that is purposive, but the state of mind which it awakens in us. But
by a natural subreption the predicate of beauty is transferred to the object, because it is a state of mind which is universally communicable, or, in other words, because it rests on subjective grounds which are common to all men, as beings who are at once sensitive and rational. The object is beautiful, because it moves the double nature of man to an activity in which he is conscious of unity with himself; and not because there is any such unity in the object, as known. Indeed, there cannot be; for, as known, the object reduces itself to a collection of elements connected by necessary laws with each other, and with the further context of experience; though it may be true that in experience there are certain objects which seem to require a more definite use of the category of final causality to explain them. With this, however, we do not concern ourselves here; for beautiful objects are not necessarily organic.

What Kant means by the subjectivity of the Beautiful, or of the purpose manifested in it, may be better seen if we consider from what point of view the Beautiful is a fiction and an illusion, and from what point of view it is truth. The beautiful object, as it is necessarily present to sense or the sensuous imagination, is always a partial or finite object, which, for ordinary knowledge working according to the categories of causality and reciprocity, is only a link or series of links in the manifold connexion of experience; yet it is not taken as such a link or a series of links. Rather, it is taken as complete in itself apart from all relation to other objects. We rest in it with joy as an end in itself, just because for us it is neither a part of a greater whole, which we have to explain through its connexions with the other parts, nor an externally connected system of parts, which the mind therefore opposes to itself, as an object in which it does not find its own unity. The object as beautiful is complete in itself; it has its dependency and modality, as it were, erased; it is as a microcosm which has absorbed the macrocosm. Thus, the Greek Gods as objects of art are fixed in immortal youth. They are what Aristotle called Plato’s ideas, αὐτὸν αἰσθητόν, sensuous presences from which, nevertheless, all traces of time and change and mortality
or decay are removed. And, as they have thus no dependency to limit them from without, so they have no conflict of antagonistic powers within, which, by their contradiction, could bring them to an end. The beautiful object as such is one with itself, in the sense that its differences are only the necessary expression of its harmony with itself. Now all this, from the point of view of the ordinary understanding and of ordinary knowledge, is an illusion; for the finite object as it really exists is essentially dependent: it is essentially related to other objects without it, and it has within it a struggle of forces which will in the end be fatal to it. Or if, from a higher point of view, it may be recognised that individual objects are in a sense microcosms, in so far as they are organic, or even have something analogous to the organic in them; yet this does not entitle them to be recognised as having the completeness with which imagination invests them; for they are always, after all, parts of a greater organism. Art and Science, imagination and reason, may thus be contrasted as subjective and objective: though in so far as Science always exists for us in a more or less abstract form, the poetic consciousness of the whole as present in the part must be regarded as an anticipative grasp of a truth which is beyond ordinary knowledge, and of which philosophy is a continual but never completed verification. In this sense it is more than a jest to say that Science is a fiction which looks like truth, while Art is a truth that looks like fiction. If in one place Kant asserts that in recognising beauty in the object the mind is conscious only of its own subjective harmony with itself, we must remember that in another place he speaks of it as involving a reference of the phenomenal object to its noumenal reality. But the noumenal reality of the individual phenomenal object lies just in the fact that potentially it involves the whole world, and so is a kind of world in itself. And the illusion lies only in this, that to Art it seems complete in itself without regard to these relations. Its mere subjectivity could be asserted, only if the judgments of ordinary knowledge or of science were taken as absolute truth.

Kant goes on in this section to speak of pure and impure
judgments of taste. Such judgments may be impure in two ways; in so far as the beauty of the object is connected with its sensuous charms, *i.e.*, with the adaptation of the object to our sensibility, or in so far as it presupposes a definite conception of the object as of a particular kind or species. In the latter case, the judgment that a thing is more or less perfect of its kind becomes the primary determinant of our satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it, and the judgment of taste becomes secondary. The perfection of an object may lie either, as in the case of an house, in its relation to an external purpose, or, as with organic beings and men, in its relation to an ideal determined by its own inner nature; but, in either case, the thought of such perfection, whenever it comes into view, becomes paramount over the consciousness of beauty; so that we cannot well regard the object as beautiful unless it fulfils its end, though it may fulfil its end without being beautiful. Hence a *pure* judgment of beauty can hardly be made, except in relation to inorganic things which have no special use, or in relation to organisms of a lower kind such as plants, where our conception of the design of the parts is not predominant. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to call a man beautiful by reason of his appearance, without thinking whether that appearance expresses his agreement with the higher ends of his life. But, just for that reason, we can speak of an *ideal* of beauty in reference to man; for the conception of man, as a being who proposes ends to himself and who ultimately refers all particular ends to an end determined by his own reason, gives a point of attachment to the perception of beauty of form, and brings the disinterestedness characteristic of the aesthetic judgment, into subordination to the highest of all interests.

In this connexion, Kant dwells especially on the possibility of uniting moral expressiveness with beauty, in a way that probably suggested the leading thought of Schiller's Essay *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. For what Schiller attempts in that Essay is to carry out the idea that it is the function of the Beautiful to mediate between nature and freedom—an idea which is derived from Kant, but which he could not fully develop without
breaking down the dualism with which he started. In truth, the sense of the harmony of the subject with himself in contemplation of the object, to which Kant reduces the idea of beauty, and the consciousness of the realisation of the self in the object, which alone can give to it the character of goodness, are different forms of one consciousness. Kant, however, is limited in his recognition of this by the necessity of his theory, according to which the object as such must be conceived as subjected to the law of necessity, and therefore, as foreign to the self which is under the law of freedom. For this presupposition, while it prevents him from admitting that the outward effect of our action in the objective world can ever, in the strict sense of the word, be recognised as good,—i.e., as the realisation of freedom,—makes it still less possible for him to regard the outward object, as it is immediately given independent of our moral activity, as already containing such realisation. In the former case, he allows us to typify the realised good as a natural world subjected to moral laws, but bids us regard this type merely as a device of practical reason to give objective meaning to the Idea of its end, an Idea for which we can never find an adequate object. And it is only consistent with this, that, in the latter case, he should look upon the ‘purpose’ manifested in the beautiful object, as consisting merely in the subjective harmony of our faculties of which it makes us conscious. If, however, we reject the absolute opposition of the consciousness of objects to self-consciousness, i.e., if we work out the consequences of that relativity of the object to the subject which Kant was the first to show, and free it from the inconsistencies that still cling to his statement of it, we are led to correct his view both of the Good and the Beautiful. To say that the objective as such is under the law of necessity, can mean for us only that it is so when we take it in abstraction from the unity of the self to which it is relative; but that, when we regard it as essentially related to that unity, we see in it the natural or necessary means for the realisation of freedom. The self to which the object is relative, cannot find in the object an absolute resistance but only a necessary precondition of its own activity. Thus, we
must regard the unity of the self as itself determining that
nature of the object in which it seems to find resistance;
or, looking at it on the other side, we must regard the
object as coming to self-consciousness in the self that
seems at first to come to it from without. In this way,
the realisation of spirit and freedom is only the culmination
of the realisation of nature and necessity. It is as the
instrument of self-conscious will, determined by its own
law or by the idea of self-consciousness, that the object
first reveals its true character. The subjective Good may
and must be realised, because it is only in its realisation
that the inner principle of the objective world in which
it is realised can become manifest. Now, on this view,
the Beautiful will be simply the revelation to sense and
in a particular object, of that which is the inmost reality
or meaning of things. It will be partly an illusion: for
that meaning can be seen in its fulness only in the whole
world as it exists for an intelligence, which apprehends
the universal as such and sees the particular through it.
But, on the other hand, in so far as the world is organic,
not only as a whole but in all its parts, i.e., in so far as
the universal is not merely a common element in things
or a law of their relation, but a principle that realises
itself in each and all of them, the illusion will lift us to
a higher level of truth than that science which regards
the part merely as a part, or as a finite thing externally
related to other finite things. And Art, when it frees
the particular object from the entanglements of ordinary
reality, will not thereby be carrying us away from the
truth, but rather for the first time revealing it; though it
may do so at the expense of the immediate truth of appear-
ance. This, it is true, is a defect; indeed, it is the essential
defect in Art; for the higher truth itself suffers loss when
it is realised at the expense of the lower, and when it does
not do justice to such lower truth, even in overcoming it.

It is not necessary to dwell on Kant's last characteristic
of beauty—that "without a conception, it is recognised
as the object of a necessary satisfaction," as it merely
repeats in a different form what has been said under the
second characteristic. The universality and the necessity
of the judgment of beauty are the same thing in slightly
different aspects. For the necessity referred to is but the compulsion under which he who admits the universal has placed himself in regard to the particular. In so far, however, as we have here no mere external subsumption, but a unity of the universal and particular as different aspects of the same identity,—which is really the relation implied in the category of "inner adaptation,"—necessity and freedom are not distinguished. To put it less technically, necessity properly is a relation of things which, though bound together, are essentially different; while freedom implies that that which determines is one with that which is determined. Now, the harmony with itself in difference which characterises the beautiful object, or, according to Kant's way of expressing it, characterises our state of mind in reflecting on it, is a form of freedom in the sense above described. For it lies in this, that in the particular object all external relativity is lost sight of and it is seen as simply one with the universal; or, putting it subjectively, that in the special perception of sense the reason, or faculty of Ideas, is satisfied. Through the particular object the pure consciousness returns upon itself without hindrance, and enjoys its subjective unity with itself.

After the Beautiful, Kant proceeds to treat of the Sublime, which he contrasts with it as negative with positive. The beautiful acts by its form, the Sublime by its want or negation of form. In contemplating the Beautiful, the mind is conscious of unity with its immediate self; while in contemplating the Sublime, the mind is put into disunion with the immediate self, and only recovers unity by rising above the object to a higher consciousness of self. In the one case, the objective world seems to meet and favour the essential effort of intelligence, which is always seeking to find its own unity in the object; whereas, in the other case, the objective world seems to repel the effort of the mind to find itself in things, and to force it to fall back upon that subjective unity, which it thinks through the Ideas of reason as in itself objective and real. Or, if we take the other form of the Sublime which is related to the will, the overpowering forces of nature, in relation to which we are made conscious of our depen-
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dence, by their very negation of any consciousness of ourselves as free in our objective physical existence, make us fall back on that consciousness of ourselves as free which we have through the moral law.

In all this there is little to object to. But some of Kant's ways of expressing the contrast bring again before us a certain inconsistency in his view of beauty, to which we have already referred. In passing from the Beautiful to the Sublime, he takes the former as that in contemplating which we are conscious of the harmony of the imagination with the understanding, not with the reason; while it is the Sublime that is supposed to carry us up into the region of reason. Thus, we are supposed to become conscious of the mind's pure unity with itself only by negation of that consciousness of objects which we have through the working of the understanding. This view is, no doubt, in close agreement with Kant's general doctrine as to the relation of the understanding and the reason, of the consciousness of objects and the consciousness of self. For, according to that view, the accord of things to the understanding to which beauty points, is merely that imperfect harmony which is achieved in ordinary knowledge, in which they are linked together as forming one context of experience. The consciousness of the Beautiful thus does not reach beyond the consciousness of phenomenal objects as such, but is rather a preparation for it. It is true that when the knowledge of phenomenal objects, under the law of their necessary connexion, has been reached, it is no final satisfaction of the mind; because the unity of objects as so connected does not correspond to the pure unity of self-consciousness. But the consciousness of that pure unity can only arise through the negation or condemnation of the objective consciousness as unsatisfactory; and a sensuous anticipation of that unity must take the form of a feeling of the Sublime. In this point of view, the Sublime, just because of its negative character, stands higher than the Beautiful.

A different view however, is, as we have seen, suggested by the Dialectic, where beauty itself is regarded as an "aesthetic Idea," as a presentation of sense or imagination
which cannot be brought under a conception of the understanding, and so is in harmony with an Idea of the reason. If this view be taken, the consciousness of beauty must be regarded as an aesthetic anticipation, not of that lower kind of connexion among objects to which Kant confines the name of knowledge, but of a consciousness of the perfect unity of the object with itself, which at the same time is a consciousness of its unity with self-consciousness. It is an indication of the direction in which Kant was continually, though with hesitating steps, advancing, that this new idea should appear towards the end of his treatment of the aesthetic judgments. If he had fully realised what it meant, he would have been carried altogether beyond the distinctions of his earlier philosophy; and he would have recognised the possibility of a rational consciousness which should have been also a consciousness of objects. Beauty would have taken its place above the Sublime, and the "faculty of aesthetic Ideas" would have been recognised as a form of "perceptive understanding." As it is, we have to observe how nearly Kant has come to an absolute emancipation from the limits of his own theories. For, if in the Beautiful the intelligence finds the positive counterpart of its unity with itself, and so enjoys the realisation of its own ideal unity in the object and not in the negation of the object, it is obvious that the absolute opposition of the consciousness of self to the consciousness of objects, and with it the absolute opposition of the noumenal to the phenomenal disappears. It is indeed only in this point of view that the Critique of Judgment can be regarded as revealing to us a principle which mediates between nature and freedom.

With this is closely connected Kant's view of genius as a "faculty for the expression of aesthetic Ideas," which uses nature itself as a symbol of something higher than nature; which in its creations pays respect to the general laws of the natural world as a connected order of experience, but yet works "according to principles that have a higher place in our reason" than these laws. It thus produces imaginative forms which "give us more to think of than can be gathered into one conception," and which therefore can only be taken as the embodiments of the
Ideas of reason. As it does not work by conception, this faculty is, of course, above rules; and that which guides it is not conscious plan but nature, which here means reason showing itself in the form of sense. "For, as the Beautiful cannot be judged by conceptions, but only by the purposive attuning of imagination to agreement with the faculty of conception, so it is not rules and prescriptions that can guide the man of genius in producing works of art, but only that in him which is nature, and cannot be brought under rules or conceptions; i.e., the supersensible substratum of all his faculties. In other words, only that to which it is the last aim of our intelligence to harmonise all our powers of knowledge can furnish the subjective standard of that aesthetic but unconditioned adaptation in fine Art, which can rightly claim to satisfy every one." ¹ It is, in fact, the "supersensible" in man, which in genius shows itself capable of expressing itself in sensible forms, that can claim to be recognised intuitively by all whose nature rests on the same supersensible basis. It is reason speaking the language of sense, which appeals to the sensuous feeling of all who are rational. Such an appeal, and the response to it, however, are intelligible, only if we suppose that reason is not merely negatively related to sense, but from a higher point of view over-reaches or includes it.

Kant has some interesting reflexions on the degree to which the feeling for the Beautiful is connected with moral goodness. He contends that where there is a keen feeling for the beauties of Nature we may safely conclude to a certain moral elevation of mind, if not to goodness of character; but that the same cannot be said of a taste for the Fine Arts. The reason he gives is, that in the former case, besides the disinterested feeling of beauty, there is an interest of reason in the existence of an object. For, in a beautiful object in nature we find a trace or indication that nature is not merely external and indifferent to the ends of our spirits, but that it is itself "an objective realisation of ideas," i.e., of that same unity of self-consciousness with itself which otherwise expresses itself in the moral law. Such an interest cannot accompany the

¹ R. IV. 220; H. V. 355.
Beautiful in Art; for the work of art is not a found, but an arbitrarily produced harmony of the object with the spirit of man. To this it may fairly be answered that if, as Kant himself contends, it is reason, working as nature in man, that produces the objects of fine art, it should interest reason at least as much to find a sensuous expression of itself in the natural world as remoulded by the spirit, as to find it in mere nature. In Kant’s view we may see an evidence of his tendency to hold apart the spheres of nature and freedom, even while he seeks to find a harmony between them. For, if the principle of nature is that which more fully manifests itself in human life, the art which “mends nature” will be recognised as itself a higher nature. Indeed, Kant seems to acknowledge this in that account of genius which we have just referred to. We may here discern a trace of the influence of Rousseau, who first fully expressed that interest in natural beauty for itself, which has been the theme of so much of modern poetry. In truth, the love of beauty in nature is only more closely associated with moral goodness in so far as such beauty appeals less to human passion, and the joy in it is, therefore, necessarily a pure delight in beauty for itself. The moral dangers of the love of beauty which is satisfied in Art, lie mainly in the fact that the Beautiful is essentially sensuous, but also to some extent in that very disinterestedness, which makes it shrink from that which is directly moral. But, on the other hand, the higher the Art, the greater must be the converse of the mind with elevating ideas, which are only not moral in a narrower sense, because, like Religion, they lift us beyond the region of the moral antagonism of flesh and spirit. It is, therefore, a question which confines us to a somewhat inadequate point of view, when we ask whether the effect of the Beautiful is favourable, or not favourable, to morality. It is favourable to it, just in so far as it carries us into a region where the question becomes unnecessary. If it does not carry us into that region, it is or may easily become immoral, just in proportion to the importance of the interest with which it meddles.

The great, the infinite value of the Beautiful, and especially of the beautiful Art, lies in this, that it appeals
to the whole man, and, so to speak, keeps him whole. It produces, in the form of immediate feeling, the consciousness of the accord of the outward world with our spirits, and of our spirits with themselves; and so frees us from the sense of being limited and straitened in ourselves and in our circumstances. It liberates us from the narrowing consciousness of the antagonism of the inner to the outer life, and of the antagonism of the inner life with itself; or at least it gives us such a foretaste of freedom as prevents that antagonism from becoming fixed. For the prosaic consciousness, each finite object stands apart from the others and is limited by them; or if it be connected with them, still the connexion remains outward. For Art, the lines of limitation vanish, and the differences speak only of unity. For, in it, thought and feeling are joined together, nature and spirit "kiss each other." Hence Schiller says that "life is earnest, art is bright and gladsome." (Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst.) The earnestness of life he is speaking of is that which comes of devotion to extraneous ends, of the effort to bind together one finite with another by external bonds of connexion, of the endless struggle to satisfy ever-recurring wants. And the "brightness" of Art is just that it takes us out of this region of labour into the region of an activity which is its own end. The value of Art cannot, therefore, be exhausted by reference to a moral or any other outward standard; we can only compare it with the other forms of our consciousness of that ultimate unity of man's life which is presupposed in all its differences, i.e., with Religion and Philosophy.
CHAPTER IV

THE CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT: APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF DESIGN OR FINAL CAUSE TO NATURE

Problem of the Critique of Teleological Judgment.

How far are we authorised to apply the Idea of Final Cause to Nature? This is the question which Kant asks in the Critique of Teleological Judgment. In the Introduction he had spoken of a formal adaptation to the intelligence, which we assume in nature in so far as we take it to be an intelligible system, and a system intelligible to us. For this implies not only that it is a system in which particular phenomena are determined and connected according to necessary principles of the understanding, but that, further, these particular phenomena are so limited in the manifoldness of their nature and of their relations to each other, that we can find our way among them by aid of the said principles. So far, therefore, we must regard the world as if it were determined by a rational designer to suit the requirements of our intelligence. And we may quite fairly use this conception as a help to our investigations into nature.

It is, however, one thing to guide our reflexion in this way by an Idea of the intelligible unity of nature, and quite a different thing to say that nature is a teleological system, the possibility of which must be explained by a designing cause, i.e., a cause which works according to a pre-conception of the effect, and adopts means to secure it, just as we do ourselves when we seek to secure any end. We cannot prove that this is so a priori; for our a priori conception of nature is the conception of an order of connexion according to efficient, and not according to final, causes. Nay, rather, in applying the idea of final
cause, we always begin by showing that the result attained, say in an organised being,—the unity of its co-operating parts as the organs of one life,—is not necessary but accidental, so far as the mechanism of nature is concerned. We point out that "nature, viewed as mere mechanism, might have shaped and connected the parts in a thousand other ways, without stumbling upon the unity which such a principle demands"; ¹ and, therefore, that we can find the explanation of such a unity only outside of the conception of nature. Only a unity of elements which is accidental according to the order of nature, can require design to account for it. On what ground, then, whether a priori or a posteriori, can we introduce such a principle, not merely as a principle of investigation and reflexion, but of the objective determination of things?

It is obvious that such a ground cannot be found merely in the fact that we are able to solve many mathematical problems by one and the same principle; though the discovery that we can do so often gives us a kind of satisfaction, like that which comes from the discovery that things which have no necessary relation to an end, conspire to secure it. Such an adaptation mathematicians are continually discovering, e.g., in the properties of certain geometrical figures. "In so simple a figure as a circle there lies the key to a multitude of problems, each of which taken by itself would be very complex and difficult; whereas their solution offers itself at once, and as it were of its own accord, as flowing from one of the many interesting properties of that figure. Thus, if we wish to construct a triangle for which the base and an angle opposite to it are given, the problem is indeterminate, i.e., it may be solved in an infinite number of ways. But the circle embraces them all, as the geometrical locus for all triangles which agree with this condition." ² Hence the delight with which the ancient Greeks followed out the properties of Conic Sections, rejoicing in the adaptation they thus discovered in the nature of things; though they could not anticipate the physical, and especially the astronomical, applications which later science was to give to their discovery of the properties, e.g., of the Ellipse and the

¹ R. IV. 240; H. V. 372, § 61. ² R. IV. 242; H. V. 374, § 62.
Parabola. It was this also that led Plato to attach such value to Geometry as a propædeutic to philosophy. "For in the necessity of that which is purposive and is endowed with such properties that it seems as if it were intentionally so arranged for our use, while it nevertheless belongs to the original essence of things without reference to that use," he found a confirmation of his view as to a "community between our intelligence and the origin of all things." ¹

This adaptation we explain by the fact that such figures are constructions in space, which is the one a priori form of external perception. Here, therefore, we have not a material adaptation of things independent of us, which yet conspire to subserve our ends, but merely the formal adaptation which must belong to things as perceived by us. Our wonder at the harmony of things with the a priori determination of them in Geometry, is justified; but what it should lead us to recognise is that space is not "a property of things outside of me, but a way of representing them in me." It is true that this still leaves an inexplicable difficulty as to the union of that form of sensuous perceptions which we call space, with the faculty of conceptions; "and this widens our views to suspect that there is something lying beyond these sensible ideas, in which, unknown as it is to us, the last ground of that agreement is to be found." ² But we do not need to know anything about this ground, in order to recognise the formally purposive character of geometrical ideas.

What kind of experience, then, will legitimately give occasion to the application of the idea of a purpose which is not formal and subjective, but material and objective? We cannot call a thing purposive in this latter sense because its conception is possible under the conditions of our perception; but only because its existence cannot be explained except on the supposition that the idea of the effect is already present in the cause. Such a view of outward objects is adopted when we take them immediately as products of Art, and, again, when we regard them as material provided by one Being for the use of other beings with a view to certain ends. In the latter

¹R. IV. 244; H. V. 375. ²R. IV. 246; H. V. 377.
point of view, we might regard all the natural objects for which man finds a use as "purposive," if we supposed that God or nature had produced them with a view to such use. If man was to exist, a place and means of existence had to be provided for him; and starting with his existence as an end, we might follow events backwards through the whole succession of phenomena, to the first beginning of the world, regarding them all as means to his existence. But if we begin with the things as given, we can find nothing in their nature which should lead us to reason forwards, or to connect them with man as their end. "Such external adaptation (instrumentality of one thing to others) can be regarded as an external end of nature, only under the condition that the existence of that being, to which the others are more or less directly instrumental, is itself independently determined to be an end of nature." 1 To say that such and such things must be, if man is to live, can have no meaning unless it is shown that man himself must live. But how can we show that?

To say that a thing is possible only as an end, involves, to begin with, that "its form is not possible according to mere natural laws, i.e., laws which can be known by us through the understanding alone as applied to objects of sense, but that even the empirical knowledge of it as regards its cause and effect, presupposes conceptions of reason. For, when a knowledge of all the natural laws that determine an object leaves its form unexplained and therefore accidental, then reason, which must regard every form of a product of nature as necessary, in order to the comprehension even of the conditions of its genesis, is driven by the absence of natural necessity to regard the object as if it were possible only through the causality of reason itself. In other words, it is driven to refer the production of the object to a cause that acts by ends, i.e., a will." 2

A geometrical figure found inscribed on the sand of the shore, may be taken as an example of cases, in which the impossibility of accounting for the result by mechanical or natural causes, would instantly lead to the reference of the result to design, i.e., to the working of a will. In

1 R. IV. 250; H. V. 381, § 61.  2 R. IV. 252; H. V. 382, § 64.
such a case, the purposive activity is not in the object, but in another being who acts upon it. There is, however, a case in which we are led to refer the purposive activity to the object itself or to nature, viz., where the thing presents itself as at once cause and effect of itself. In this sense all organised beings are ends of nature. To take an example, a tree may, in three different ways be recognised as an end to itself: “For, in the first place, it produces another tree according to known laws; but the tree produced is of the same genus. The tree, therefore, produces itself generically: for in the genus it, as effect, is continually produced by itself; and as cause, it continually maintains its generic existence by repeated self-production. In the second place, a tree produces itself individually. It is true that we call this kind of production growth; but growth is quite distinct from every kind of increase according to mechanical laws, and is just generation under another name. In adding to its bulk, the tree first communicates to the new matter, which it absorbs, a characteristic quality which cannot be bestowed by the mechanism of nature without it; and thus the tree develops itself by aid of a material which, as to its mode of composition, is its own product. For though, as respects the constituents got from nature without, such material must be regarded as having merely a derived existence, yet the division and re-combination of it is carried on in an original way, which art cannot attempt to cope with. . . . In the third place, the parts of the tree produce each other in such a way, that the maintenance of the one depends reciprocally on the maintenance of the others. The bud or scion of one tree grafted on another, produces in the alien stock a plant of its own kind. Hence, we may regard every twig or leaf in a tree as merely grafted on it, and so as an independent tree which attaches itself to another, and periodically nourishes itself therefrom. At the same time, while the leaves are products of the tree, they likewise in turn give support to it; for the repeated defoliation of a tree would kill it, and its growth thus depends on the reaction of the leaves upon the stem. I shall only mention in passing the self-help of nature, by which, after the injury or removal of a part of an organism that is
necessary for the maintenance of the rest, it is restored or its place is supplied by them; and the abortions or malformations in growth, in which certain parts, on account of casual defects or hindrances, form themselves in a new way to maintain what exists, and so produce an anomalous creature; though these are phenomena which exhibit the most wonderful properties of organised beings.”

In view of the characteristics just stated, we say that the organised being is cause and effect of itself. This, indeed, is a somewhat improper expression, for causes and effects form a linear series which is always directed forward from the former to the latter, and never returns upon itself. But “we can think a casual connexion of phenomena according to a conception of reason (of ends) which, regarded as a series, would lead both forwards and backwards,” in so far as the conception of the effect must itself be regarded as the cause. Now in an “end of nature” such as we have described, there are the following characteristics. First, as in a work of Art, the parts are in their existence and their form conditioned by their relation to the whole, a thing which we can think as possible only by supposing that the organised being is the product of a rational cause, whose causality, in bringing the parts together and connecting them, is determined by the idea of the whole. But, in the second place, in an “end of nature,” in distinction from a work of Art, the parts are so united in the whole, that they are reciprocally causes and effects of each other’s form, and that each part is, in relation to the other parts, a productive organ. An “end of nature” is, therefore, an “organised and self-organising being,” whereas in a work of Art each part is there because of the others, but not by means of them. But, though in this case the idea of the whole determinates for us the form and connexion of the parts, it determines them not as their cause, but merely as their ground of knowledge. On the other hand, in order to think an end of nature, we are obliged to represent the idea of the whole as prior to the parts, and as determining them to be what they are; yet the object does not send

¹R. IV. 252; H. V. 383.
us beyond itself to seek for its unity, but seems to contain it in itself and to manifest it in the relation of its parts, as at once causes and effects, means and ends of each other. Hence, we seem to be suspended between the alternatives of a *Hylozoism* which assigns to matter a property that contradicts its very nature as inert and lifeless, and a *Dualism* which, on the analogy of Art, refers the phenomena of organisation to an alien principle, a soul which is externally combined with the body,—a hypothesis which explains nothing. "In truth, the organisation of nature has in it nothing analogous to any causality we know" (except perhaps that which reveals itself in the organisation of human society). While, therefore, we are obliged to use the idea of the purposive activity of Art, as a guide to our reflexions on these phenomena of life which we are not able to explain by mechanical laws, we must be careful to remember that, in doing so, we are not determining objectively what is the real cause of the phenomena. "The conception of a thing, as in itself an end of nature, is no constitutive conception of reason or of understanding; but it can furnish a regulative conception for reflective judgment. In other words, we may use it to guide our investigations into the nature of objects of this kind by a distant analogy with our own causality according to ends, and also to enable us to reflect upon their ultimate ground. As to the latter use, however, we must remember that its value is not in reference to the knowledge of nature or of its ultimate ground of existence, but rather to the exercise of that practical faculty of reason in us, by the analogy of which we are guided in thinking of the cause of the design manifested in nature." 1

In using this principle of judgment then, we regard "an organised product of nature as one in which all parts are reciprocally ends and means of each other." We assume that there is "nothing in vain," nothing purposeless in it, *i.e.*, nothing which is not determined by the idea of the whole. This is a way of regarding nature which is forced upon us by an *a priori* necessity, as a principle, not indeed of determination, but of investigation. And we "can as little free ourselves from this

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1 R. IV. 259; H. V. 388, § 65.
special teleological principle as from the universal physical principle; for as, without the latter, we could have no experience, so, without the former, we could have no guiding thread for the observation of a particular species of natural objects." This conception, however, we have to observe, carries us into "quite a different order of things from that of the mere mechanism of nature;" for it makes us treat the unity of the conception of the object as prior to the difference of those parts or elements, which, according to the mechanism of nature, we should regard as determining each other externally. It follows that we must not mix the two disparate principles, or regard the one as limited by the other, which would only lead to confusion; but, when we think by the teleological principle, we must regard everything as determined by it. "It may be that, e.g., in an animal body many parts can be understood as combined together according to merely mechanical laws (as the hide, the bones, the hair); yet the cause which brings together the required matter, modifies and forms it, and puts it in its appropriate place, must always be estimated teleologically. In the organised being, everything must be regarded as organised and everything again, in a certain relation to the thing itself, as an organ."

But in what relation shall we regard these "ends of nature" as standing to other things? It has been already said that the "external adaptation" or relative usefulness of an object, gives no ground for the application of the idea of an end of nature to it, or the explanation of it by that idea. "If we have no reason to regard a thing as in itself an end, we can only hypothetically judge its external relations to be purposive;" i.e., only on the hypothesis that something else is independently determined as an end. But, then, are not organised beings as "ends of nature" so determined? To this question Kant answers that "to judge a thing by reason of its inner form as an end of nature, is not to hold that it is an end of nature, that that thing should exist," and that, therefore, other things are to be explained as determined purposively with a view to its existence. Whenever we

1 R. IV. 261; H. V. 389.  
2 R. IV. 262; H. V. 390, § 67.

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go beyond the relation of the parts of the organism to each other, and consider the relation of the organism to the environment, we raise the question as to the final end of nature; a question which reaches beyond all our teleological knowledge of nature, since the end of nature cannot be found in nature itself. When we look at a blade of grass in itself, we are forced to bring it under the conception of an end of nature; but, when we ask whether it was made for the cow to eat it, we are obliged to ask, Is then the cow the ultimate end of nature? If we say: No; the cow is intended for the subsistence of man, we only raise the further question, Why should man exist?—a question which we cannot answer without going beyond the system of nature in which man is merely an externally conditioned, externally conditioning, member, like the other animals. In this way, therefore, "we reach no categorical end; but rather, all such teleological reference of one existence to another rests on a further condition, which, as unconditioned, lies entirely outside of the range of a physical teleology."¹

It is, therefore, only the inner organisation of a living being that gives us the idea of an end of nature. At the same time, this conception being once suggested, we are necessarily led to apply it to the whole of nature, and to think of nature as a teleological system, to which all the mechanism of efficient causation is subordinated. "By the example that nature gives us in its organic products, we are justified, nay called upon, to expect of it and its laws nothing that is not purposive." For "the former idea carries us already far beyond the world of sense; and the unity of the supersensible principle must be regarded as holding good, not merely for a certain species of natural beings, but for the system of nature as a whole." In taking such a view however, we find ourselves obliged to look beyond the system of nature, and not merely into it, in order to find the final end to which we may refer it; and, even when we have got the idea of such a final end of nature, we have to regard it as a mere guide to our reflexions upon nature, and not as a determining principle; for nature as a whole is not given as an organism,

¹R. IV. 266; H. V. 293.
but rather its phenomena present themselves as an endless series in which there is neither finality nor even any return upon itself, such as we find in the case of a living being. For similar reasons we have to keep our natural teleology separate from Theology, and to remember always that the idea of God as a designer is excluded from our reflexion upon nature, except as a way of expressing to ourselves the fact that there are existences in the world which we cannot explain except under the idea of an end. Even in regard to organised beings, however, we must use the idea without any attempt to decide whether the ends of nature are really intended or unintended, i.e., whether they are results of a principle which works with a consciousness of ends, or not.

We are now in a position to understand the nature of the antinomy which arises in connexion with the application of the idea of final causation, and to anticipate its solution. On the one side, we have the doctrine that the production of material things is possible only according to mechanical laws, seeing that such laws alone agree with the principles on which experience is possible. On the other side, we have the doctrine, that certain products of nature are not possible according to mechanical laws, but require a principle that works according to ends for their production. This antinomy is due to a confusion of the different points of view, from which we are obliged to consider things and make judgments regarding them, with different objective determinations of their nature. If we say that everything can be completely explained on mechanical principles, we contradict the doctrine that there are existences which require another kind of explanation. But, if we say that we are obliged to seek to explain all phenomena of nature according to mechanical laws, and that this is the only way in which scientific knowledge of them is possible, this does not contradict the assertion that there are certain of these phenomena which, in this way, we can never fully explain, but which we are obliged to account for on teleological principles. For, however far we go in following out the series of mechanical causes, we get no light on the ultimate reason for the specific form of an organism as an end of nature. But in asserting our need for this addi-
tional mode of explanation, we do not pretend to settle the question whether "in the unknown inner ground of nature, the physico-mechanical connexion of things and the organic connexion of their nature as ends, may be united in one principle; we only say that our reason is unable so to unite them." ¹ For "we cannot see into the first inner ground of the infinite multiplicity of the particular laws of nature which are only empirically known to us, so as to detect the inner all-sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature, a principle which lies in the supersensible. Whether, therefore, the productive power of nature is sufficient also for that which we judge to be formed and connected according to the idea of ends, as well as for that which we conceive to require only mechanical causes to account for it; or, whether for things which we necessarily regard as ends of nature, there is indeed a quite different kind of original causality, which cannot be contained in material nature or in its intelligible substratum, viz., an architectonic understanding,—this is a question to which, owing to the narrow limitations of our reason in the a priori determination of objects as causes, we can give no answer whatever." ² But this does not alter the fact that we need another principle to supplement the deficiency of mechanical causes, though only as a principle of reflexion and not of determination.

This view of the matter enables us to throw new light upon the controversies which have taken place in relation to the existence of final causes in nature. On this subject four views have been maintained by dogmatic philosophy. Two of these involve what we may call the Ideality of Design in nature, i.e., they maintain that the purposive form of certain natural products is to be explained away as due to a subjective illusion; while two of them hold to the Reality of Design in nature, but suggest different conceptions of it. As Idealists in this sense, we have first Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining the system of Causality, which entirely denies that there is anything in nature which is not mechanically caused. This system reduces all our teleological judgments to illusion, but it omits to give any explanation whatever of the illusion, or

¹ R. IV. 275; H. V. 400, § 69. ² Id. 70.
of the facts which give rise to it. Next comes Spinoza, who maintains the system of Fatality, and points to the unity of the subject or substratum of all natural things as the ground of their apparent adaptation to each other. But though unity of ground is required to explain adaptation, it is not in itself sufficient to explain it. For the unity of purpose is different from the unity of blind necessity, and requires not only one cause, but a designing, that is, an intelligent cause.

The Realists are either Hylozoists, who find the ground of design in nature in the conception of matter as living, i.e., as animated by what is called a world-soul, or Theists who believe in a rational being, a God, as the cause of all things. The explanation of the former involves an obvious circle, for they seek to deduce the purpose which seems to belong to the nature of organised beings from the life of matter, which life we know only in organised beings. Theism, on the other hand, supplies us with an adequate cause for the appearance of design in nature; but it errs in dogmatically asserting that, because we cannot account for that appearance of design by mechanical causes, it is therefore objectively impossible to do so; and, on the other hand, in maintaining that, because we are forced to use the idea of a designing reason to account for organised beings, there is no other way of explaining them. But we cannot prove the objective reality of our conception of an end of nature, much less of an understanding acting according to ends as the cause of nature. For the idea of an end of nature requires us to regard an object as the product of nature, and therefore as subject to the necessity of nature; and yet, at the same time, to view its purposive form as accidental in view of the laws of nature. To make this intelligible, we should require to discover, not only "a ground for the possibility of the object in nature, but also a ground for the possibility of nature itself, which would enable us to refer it to something which is beyond nature, and therefore unknowable." Now, "the conception of a causality through ends (of Art) has objective reality, and also the conception of a causality according to the mechanism of nature. But the conception of a causality of nature according to the rule of ends, still more of a
Being, such as cannot be given in experience—a Being who according to the rule of ends is cause of nature,—though it is thinkable without contradiction, is not to be dogmatically asserted, for it is neither derived from experience, nor necessary to the possibility of experience. Hence its objective reality cannot be securely established by any evidence. Even if it could, however, how can I number among the products of nature, things which are definitely viewed as products of divine art, when it is just the incapacity of nature according to its own laws to produce such things, which made it necessary to call in the aid of a different cause?" ¹ In short, the conception of an end of nature seems at once to confine us to nature and to force us to go beyond it. It confines us to nature, because it is in the case of organised beings which are objects of experience that we find ourselves constrained to apply the idea of design or purpose; yet it carries us beyond nature, because we cannot conceive of such things as produced by mechanical action and reaction, but only by a cause that works according to ends, i.e., a rational cause. No Newton, we can say with certainty, will ever arise to make intelligible to us, according to mechanical causes, the germination of one blade of grass. Hence we are driven to guide our reflexion upon such an organism according to the idea of purpose. But how can we be sure "that in nature, if we could only penetrate to the principle by which it specifies the universal laws, known to us through the pure understanding, there may not lie a sufficient ground of the possibility of organised beings, without any necessity for attributing their production to any purpose whatever?" ²

This last remark really brings us to the ultimate source of the difficulty in the inmost nature of our faculties. Our reason is a faculty of principles, which proceeds in its ultimate demands to the unconditioned. But our understanding cannot keep pace with our reason; for it always acts under a certain condition which must be given. In other words, our understanding is not perceptive, but requires perceptions to be supplied to it through sense. Hence, there is for us a necessary distinction between the

¹ R. IV. 286; H. V. 409, § 74. ² R. IV. 290; H. V. 413, § 75.
possible and the actual, and "the former only expresses the position of the idea of a thing in relation to our conception and our faculty of thinking, while the latter implies the position of the thing in itself." But, though the proposition that things may be possible without being actual, holds good for our intelligence, we are not to assume that there is any such distinction in things in themselves. That there need be none, is clear "from the inevitable demand of reason, that we should assume something (viz., the ultimate ground of all) as necessarily existing,—a something in which possibility and actuality are no longer distinguishable." For this idea, indeed, our understanding has no conception, i.e., it can discover no way of determining such a thing, or its manner of existence. For when we think an object, we represent it merely as possible; and it is only when the object is given in perception that we are conscious of it as actual. Hence the idea of an absolutely Necessary Being is for the human understanding an unattainable problematic Idea. It is, in fact, one with the Idea of a perceptive understanding, that is, an understanding for which the distinction of thinking and perceiving does not exist, and for which, therefore, all objects of consciousness are actual. In other words, such an understanding could have no conception of a possibility of objects which do not exist, or of anything accidental in the existence of those that do exist; nor could it have any idea of the kind of necessity which contrasts with such accidental existence. Again, turning to the practical reason, we find another consequence of the same effect. For "as in our theoretic contemplation of nature, reason obliges us to assume the unconditioned necessity of its ground, so, in our practical contemplation of it, we are obliged by our consciousness of the moral law to presuppose our own unconditioned causality, i.e., our freedom. But, as the objective necessity of the act as duty is opposed to that necessity, which as an event it would have, if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom, and as, therefore, the act which is morally necessary, is viewed as physically accidental (i.e., so that that which necessarily ought to happen, does often not happen) it is clear that it is entirely due to the subjective character of our practical faculty that
the moral laws have to be represented as commands. This 
necessity, therefore, is represented by us not by an "is" 
but by an "ought to be," which would not be the case, if 
reason were regarded as in its causality independent of 
sensibility (as that in which lies the subjective condition of 
its application to objects of nature) and so as cause in an 
intelligible world which was entirely conformed to the 
moral law. Though, therefore, the idea of an intelligible 
world in which everything would be actual because (as 
something good) it is possible, along with the idea of 
freedom as its formal condition, is a transcendent concep-
tion, which cannot be taken as a constitutive principle to 
determine objects and their reality; yet, as is required 
by our sensuous nature, it takes the place of a universal 
regulative principle, and, though it does not determine 
freedom objectively as a form of causality, yet it makes the 
rule of action according to that idea, as obligatory as if 
it did."

These distinctions have an important bearing on the 
present case; for the reason why we distinguish between 
mechanism of nature and design in nature is, that our 
understanding proceeds from the universal to the particular 
in determining objects. For the particulars as such have 
in them something which is accidental in relation to the 
universal, while yet our reason requires unity and law in 
the combination of the particular laws of nature. Now, 
the conformity of the accidental to law is its adaptation to 
an end; hence the idea of a design of nature in its products 
is necessary to us, not as a conception which determines 
objects, but as a principle to regulate our reflexion upon 
them. Our reason thus makes us conscious of the defect 
of our understanding, which is merely discursive and, 
therefore, obliged to proceed in knowledge from the 
analytic universal to the particular; and it gives rise to 
the Idea of an understanding altogether different from 
ours, which should proceed to the particular from a syn-
thetic universal, and for which, therefore, there would be 
no accidental character in the particulars. While, there-
fore, our understanding is obliged to conceive a real whole 
as the effect of concurrently working forces of its parts, an

intuitive understanding would see the possibility of the parts as dependent on the whole. The only way, however, in which we can realise for ourselves such an Idea, is by thinking of the form and connexion of the parts as dependent on the conception of the whole. Looking at it in this way, we can understand how it is that our reason compels us to use the idea of design to bridge over the gulf between the particular and the universal; while at the same time we recognise that in doing so it is acting on a subjective principle, a principle which need not hold good for all intelligence, but only for an intelligence similar to ours.

From this it is obvious that the two principles cannot be united as both objectively determining nature or any natural object; for the one way of explaining excludes the other. But, when we regard them subjectively, both ways have a relative value; though the idea that would make it possible to combine them, carries us to something that is beyond both, i.e., to the supersensible. To this, however, we can only point; we cannot make it an object of definite knowledge. Hence we must be careful not to confuse the two principles. We must regard the working of efficient causes as subordinate to that of the final cause; yet we must recognise that this subordination cannot authorise a transition from the one to the other; for the two aspects or points of view absolutely refuse to coalesce for us; their point of union lies in the supersensible substratum of nature, which is beyond our reach. All that we can do is to use the principle that everything has an end or purpose, as suggesting continual inquiries into the relations of the parts of organisms to each other; and, in a secondary way, into the relations of different organisms to each other, and of the organic world to the inorganic. But the answers to such questions cannot be reached by developing the principle of design, but only by discovering new relations of things as efficient causes which may be subsumed under it. The conception of design is thus only a "heuristic" principle, a principle by aid of which we put questions to nature. But the answers that we reach are never complete answers to the question we ask; for to give an adequate answer to that question, we should need to bring together two ways of contemplating things, the
mechanical and the teleological way, which for us are quite incommensurable.

In the Methodology of the Critique of Teleological Judgment Kant goes on to determine the place of teleological conceptions with reference to Natural Science on the one hand, and Theology on the other, in conformity with the results already arrived at. The idea of design in nature may be of use to Theology, and we shall afterwards see of what use it is; but immediately, it is a conception which is forced upon us by certain products of nature, which we cannot sufficiently explain by mechanical causes, and in considering which we are therefore obliged to employ another principle,—not, indeed, to determine the object, but to guide our reflections upon it. Yet, we cannot say that Theology is a part of Natural Science; for Natural Science means the determination of phenomena according to the laws of their mechanical or physical connexion, and to this the idea of design contributes nothing. Its value is only that it furnishes a principle which directs us in looking for efficient causes. "Teleology, therefore, belongs to no doctrine, but only to criticism, and indeed to the criticism of the one special faculty of judgment." In other words, the especial question of teleology is not one as to the objective determination of things, but as to the uses of the principle of design, either as supplying a regulative principle for Natural Science, or as shewing us how the consideration of nature may prepare the way for Theology.¹

To see this double relation of the idea of design we need only follow out the considerations already suggested. We are authorised and bound in natural science to aim at and endeavour after the mechanical explanation of all products of nature; but our power of attaining such explanation is limited by the nature of our understanding, not only in the sense that we can never complete the explanation of things by physical causes, but in the sense that its completion would involve an impossibility. For the idea of an organic unity, a unity in which the whole is prior to the parts, is incommensurable with the idea of a mechanical whole which is constituted by the action and reaction of

¹R. IV. 310; H. V. 430, § 79.
the parts. However far, therefore, we may carry our mechanical explanations, we cannot by means of them explain such a unity. Hence, "if the naturalist would not waste his labour, in his examination into the nature of objects which have to be conceived as ends of nature or organisms, he will be obliged always to start with the presupposition of an original organic principle, which uses the mechanism of nature to produce new organised forms, or to develop the organic forms already attained into new shapes."

"It is praiseworthy when Comparative Anatomy goes through all the great kingdom of organised beings, searching whether there is discoverable in it any trace of system, which points to a common principle of production. For, otherwise, we should be obliged to be content to use the idea of design merely as a principle of reflective judgment, and to abandon all hope of insight into the productive processes of nature. When we consider the agreement of so many genera of animals in a certain common schema of structure, which seems to manifest itself not only in their skeletons but in the disposition of all their parts, so that, while there is a wonderful simplicity in the original plan, an immense variety of species are produced by the shortening of one member and the lengthening of another, by the involution of one part and the evolution of another, we cannot but be visited with some, though it may be faint beams of hope that, by the aid of the principle of the mechanism of nature (which is the sole basis of natural science) we may do something to explain the origin of species. This analogy of forms, which in all their differences seem to be produced according to a common type, strengthens our suspicion that there is here a real relation due to descent from a common parent, when we consider the gradual approximation of one species of animals to another, from that in which the principle of design seems to be most decisively exhibited, i.e., from man, down to the polyp, and again from this down to mosses and algae and finally to the lowest stage of nature which we can observe, viz., to crude matter. If we follow such indications, we will be inclined to regard the whole purposive order of nature (the difficulty of understanding which in the case of
organic beings, made us set up the hypothesis that they are due to another principle of production,) as nevertheless developed out of matter and its forms according to mechanical laws, (like those which produce the forms of chrysalids). In this way it becomes the task of the Archaeologist of Nature to go back to the remaining traces of its earliest revolutions, and, according to known or supposed mechanical laws, to trace the genesis of that great family of creatures. Thus, he can suppose that the bosom of mother earth as she first passed out of her chaotic state (like a great animal) gave birth to creatures of less pur- posive form, and that these again became the parents of others which were formed in greater adaptation to their place of birth and their relations to each other; until her all-productive womb becoming fixed and ossified, she at last restricted her birth to definite species incapable of any farther modification, and the manifoldness of nature became permanent in the shape it had taken when the operation of her free formative power came to an end." 

But all this does not enable us to explain away the difference between organic and inorganic, or to reduce design to mechanism; for, "ultimately, we are still obliged to attribute to this universal mother an organisation which is adapted for the production and maintenance of all these creatures; otherwise we should be unable to explain the possibility of the purposive form of the products of the animal and vegetable kingdom. We have, therefore, only pushed back the ground of explanation a stage further; nor can we pretend to have made the genesis of these two kingdoms intelligible without resorting to final causes. Even as respects the alterations to which certain individuals of the organised genera have accidentally been subjected, and which we find to have been taken up into the process of generation and to have become hereditary, we cannot judge otherwise than that they are the occasional development or purposive possibilities, that were originally present in the species with a view to the preservation of the race. For, considering the complete inner adaptation of an organic being, the generation of its like is clearly bound up with the condition that nothing shall be taken

1 K. IV. 314; H. V. 433.
up into the generating forces which does not belong, in such a system of ends, to one or other of their undeveloped original capacities." 1 Indeed, if we do not suppose the design in organic beings to be universal, we altogether lose our guiding principle of judgment, viz., that nothing in the organised being is to be regarded as purposeless.

Thus, however far we stretch the series of mechanical causation, we are obliged, ultimately, to regard it as subordinated to the service of final causes, or as limited in all its actions by such causes,—if we are to explain the existence of organised beings. And we cannot think of any existence determined by final causes, except by referring it to an understanding as its cause. Against this, Hume has brought the objection that, if the presence of design in the world makes it necessary to refer it to an architectonic understanding, the various powers which are implied in such an understanding would seem to require another understanding as the cause of their combination. But this objection is really meaningless; for the necessity which drives us to explain the organised being by a creative understanding lies in the fact that, while that being has manifold parts outside of each other, it yet has a unity that cannot be explained by their reciprocal action and reaction. It is the accidental nature of the unity as referred to mere mechanical laws, which forces us to look beyond it for a cause different from itself; but no such necessity exists in reference to an understanding, which is one with itself in all its action, and does not need something else to make it one. The inadequate attempt of Spinoza to get over this difficulty, by supposing a mere unity of substance in all natural objects, has already been referred to.

The teleological point of view, then, is necessary. On the other hand, we must conceive design as realising itself through mechanical causes as its means, otherwise we could not regard the organised being as the product of nature. Different systems have been suggested to unite the two. There is first the system of *Occasional Causes*, which supposes a constantly repeated miracle at every birth. "If we assume the occasionalism of the production

1 *Id.*
of organised beings, all nature is lost, and all exercise of reason in judging of the possibility of such products becomes vain; hence we may assume that no one will adopt this system who has any interest in philosophy."  
1 The other system, that of Pre-established Harmony, presents itself in two forms; as the system of Evolution or Individual Preformation, and the system of Epigenesis, or, as it might be called, of Generic Preformation. The former only differs from Occasionalism so far as it supposes the embryos of all individuals to exist in the first parents; and the hyperphysical explanations to which its supporters are reduced to account for the existence of abortions and hybrids, as well as for the preservation of the germs of individual life through all the successive generations up to the time of their development, are sufficient grounds for rejecting it. Much more reasonable is the system of Epigenesis, which permits us to hold that the ultimate possibility of organised beings implies final causes, but, nevertheless, regards nature as itself productive in the descent of these beings from each other; and "so, with the least expense of the supernatural, leaves to nature all that follows after the first beginning (without determining anything about that beginning itself, which physical theory necessarily fails to explain, however it may lengthen the chain of its causes)."  
2 We have already seen that there is a great difference between external and internal design or adaptation. It is only in relation to beings which are ends in themselves, that things which can be accounted for by mechanical causes can be regarded as outwardly purposive. The question of purpose would not arise in regard to such things taken by themselves. But, when an organised being has suggested to us the idea of an understanding as its cause, we naturally go on to ask whether this being is itself a final end, or whether it is to be regarded as a means to a further end. There is, indeed, "one external adaptation which is so connected with the inner purpose of organisation" that it is at once subsumed under it, viz., the adaptation of the two sexes with regard to the continuance of the species by means of each other. Here

1R. IV. 317; H. V. 436.  
2R. IV. 319; H. V. 437.
the question, to what end? is at once answered by saying
that "the two sexes together first constitute an organised
whole, though not an organised whole in one body." 1
When we go beyond this, and ask for a final end of all
organisms, we find that nature gives us no answer.
Nature, as such, has no last end. Man, indeed, might
claim to be the final end of nature, for whose use all things
are made in so far as he is "the sole being upon earth
who has a conception of an end, and who can by his reason
make out of an aggregate of purposively framed things
a system of ends." But nature does not subordinate other
things and beings to man, or exempt him from its own
destructive forces. If he is able to use other beings for
his purposes, his existence often becomes an instrument
to theirs. In truth, nature is in itself an endless series
in which there is no last link; and all that we can say
is that certain of its creatures cannot be accounted for as
mere links in the chain, and point, therefore, to a super-
sensible principle, as the necessary explanation of their
existence. As to man, we can only add that, when the
question as to a final end is suggested by the nature of
organic beings, he is the being who alone seems capable
of filling the place of such an end; but that nature does
not appear, on the first aspect of it, to treat him as
filling it.

We have, however, to distinguish two points of view
from which man might be considered as end to nature,
in reference to his happiness and in reference to his
culture; for, it may be that that which in nature appears
at first as not purposive in relation to the former, may
be purposive in relation to the latter. Now, that the
system of nature is not adapted to secure man's happiness
may easily be shown. Happiness is, indeed, a very vague
idea, which can afford no fixed law to determine man's
efforts. "Man projects his ideal of happiness in such
different ways, according to the bias his understanding
gets from imagination and sense, and he changes it so
often, that nature, even if it were entirely subjected to
his will, could nevertheless receive from that will no
definite, fixed and universal law." 2 to which it could be

1 R. IV. 321; H. V. 439, § 82. 2 R. IV. 327; H. V. 443, § 83.
accommodated. And, if we try to get over this difficulty by reducing happiness to the true wants of nature in which all agree, or by supposing his power of reaching his ends to be indefinitely increased, yet we could not suppose it possible that this ultimate natural aim of his life should be attained by him; for "he is not so constituted as to rest and be satisfied in any possession or enjoyment whatever." Finally, nature, as we have already said, does not treat him as a favourite, and, if she did, his own passions would have spoiled her work. In fact, looking to nature both within and without us, we find ourselves only links in a chain of conditioned beings, none of which can be regarded as an absolute end. It is only when we look upon man in another point of view, and ask how he represents himself as an unconditioned end to himself, that we can regard him as an end to other beings. In this point of view, we may ask what nature "can do for man, to prepare him for that which he must do for himself in order to be a final end." 1 When we put it in this way, we find that there are only two ways in which nature can help man:—in so far as it increases his power of setting ends to himself, and his capacity to make out of his life an ordered whole; or, again, in so far as it favours the development in him of that highest principle with reference to which his powers and capacity should be directed. These two aims may be expressed as culture and moral discipline. Now nature can only indirectly aid him to attain the latter of these two ends; for morality is essentially a matter of self-determination. At the same time, it may be shown that the very natural conditions, which are unfavourable to man's happiness, contribute to the culture of his powers and the discipline of his passions. Nothing can be more pessimistic than Kant's view of man's life from the point of view of happiness, and nothing more decided than his reversion to a kind of optimism from the point of view of culture and morality. "The abilities of the human species cannot be developed except by means of their inequality, an inequality which condemns the great majority of men to a life of mechanical drudgery, and makes them subservient to the comfort and

1 R. IV. 328; H. V. 444.
leisure of others, who attend to the less necessary elements of culture, science, and art"; so that it is only after many ages of servile labour and sparing enjoyment, that the culture of the higher class spreads to the lower. Hence it is that we see the extreme of want on one side balanced by the extreme of luxury on the other; and suffering from the unjust violence on the one part, compensated only by inner discontent with self on the other. Yet "this splendid misery is bound up with the development of the natural capacities of mankind, and the end of nature, though not our end, is thereby attained." Men are driven by their continual conflicts to establish a civil society, and finally by the conflicts of States, to establish "a complete civil community of the world, or a system of all States," and the whole process of the struggle is a continual education of man's powers. In like manner, as regards the discipline of our passions, there is an evident "purposive striving of nature towards a development of humanity, which may make us receptive of higher ends than nature herself can reach." 1 It is true that even the refinement of taste and the advance of science tend to awaken a host of new needs and creeds in us, but the rudeness and violence of passion gets tamed. The improvement in manners, even when it is not also an improvement in morals, yet breaks the tyranny of sense, and prepares men for the rule of reason. In this way, the very pressure of nature, which destroys man's happiness, and seems to rouse to the utmost the evil passions within him, becomes subservient to the realisation of his higher destiny; and the very absence of adaptation from the point of view of happiness, proves to be a wise adaptation when we measure man's life by the standard of culture and moral discipline. "The value of life for us, if we estimate it by that which we enjoy, (by the natural end of all our desires which is happiness) is easy to reckon. It is less than nothing (Er sinkt unter Null); for who would accept a repetition of life under the same conditions? who even would accept its repetition according to a self-chosen plan, (which should keep within the ordinary course of nature) if it was directed merely to enjoyment?" The

1 R. IV. 331; H. V. 455, § 83.
true value of life is "that which we give to it by that which we do, and which we do with a purpose so independent of nature, that it is only under condition of its subserving that purpose that we can consider the existence of nature itself to be desirable."  

It is, then, in this point of view, and in this point of view alone, that man can be considered as end to himself and to all things. He is such an end only because it is in him alone that there is a "teleological causality," i.e., he alone sets ends before him, and he alone "represents the law according to which he has to determine ends, as independent of all natural conditions." "Without him there would be no ultimate point in nature, to which the chain of subordinate ends could be attached. At the same time, it is not as a natural, but as a moral being that they are attached even to him."  

How, then, do these conceptions affect Theology? To see that, we have to distinguish Physico-Theology from Moral-Theology, the first of which prepares the way for the second, in so far as it is the existence of ends in nature that makes it reasonable for us to seek for a final end or principle, with a view to which all nature is produced or determined. Physico-theology, however, can tell us nothing about the final end of creation, and would not even of itself suggest the enquiry about one. It is true that we cannot account for an organism or end of nature, except by an intelligent cause; but nothing in nature would enable us to say that such a cause must be absolutely perfect, or even that it must be one. So far, Polytheism is not less rational than Monotheism. Still less can we derive from nature the idea of a moral Being, determined by the idea of a highest end; or find any grounds in it to prefer that conception of God to the idea of "an understanding determined by the mere necessity of its nature to the production of certain forms (according to the analogy of what we call the art-instincts in animals ").

On the other hand, as the Critique of Practical Reason proves, the principle of moral determination in man carries with it the Idea of a highest end, after which he should

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1 R. IV. 332; H. V. 447.  
2 R. IV. 334; H. V. 449.  
3 R. IV. 341; H. V. 455.
strive: in other words, the Idea of a system in which all rational beings realise their happiness through their moral perfection, and in proportion to it. But such realisation of happiness through morality, is no natural sequence of effect on cause; for there is nothing in the connexion of physical causes that has any relation to such an end. We are forced, therefore, by the same moral necessity which makes us set before us such an end, to postulate outside of nature a Cause that determines nature so as finally to secure this result; and from this follows necessarily the idea of an all-wise, all-powerful, all-righteous, all-merciful God. We have a "pure moral need" for the existence of such a Being; and our moral needs differ from physical needs in that they have an absolute claim to satisfaction. We must, however, be careful to maintain the proper order of our ideas, and to reach the assertion of God's existence entirely through its moral necessity, otherwise our religion will be fatal to our morality. We must not say that it is necessary to assume the existence of God, in order to the validity of the moral law, and that, therefore, he who cannot convince himself of the former, may exempt himself from the obligation of the latter. All that would flow from a denial of the existence of God would be, that we should be deprived of the faith in the final attainment of the happiness of the world through moral action. Our morality would become hopeless, for we would not see any possibility of securing that which in it we necessarily make our objective aim. We would see in such action an effort not favoured by the nature of things; and we should regard man as a being who, after all his efforts to raise himself above nature, is finally subjected to its necessity, and thus thrown back like the other animals into the "aimless chaos of matter."

Furthermore, we are to remember that the principle which leads us to postulate God is a practical principle, which does not give us, strictly speaking, a knowledge of God, but only of a special relation in which he stands to us and to nature. While, therefore, in order to find in God the principle which realises the highest good, we are obliged to represent him as a rational Being, who is
guided by the idea of an end and who uses nature as means to it, we are to remember that this conception is based on an imperfect analogy. For such a separation of means and ends holds good only from a human point of view. "Though in us the morally-practical reason is essentially different from the technically-practical reason, we cannot assume that it must be likewise in the highest world-cause, or that the divine intelligence, in subordinating nature to the final end, needs to exert a special kind of causality, different from that which it exerts in producing those natural things which are ends to themselves. While, therefore, we have a moral ground to assume an end of the creation as an effect of moral action, we have not in the same sense a ground to assume a moral Being as the source of creation. All we can say is, that, consistently with the nature of our intelligence, we cannot make intelligible to ourselves the possibility of such an adaptation of nature to the moral law and its object, as is involved in the final end which the moral law commands us to aim at, except by assuming the existence of a Creator and Governor of the world, who is also its moral Legislator." 1

It is essential for us, therefore, to remember that there are no proofs of God's being which give us even the faintest theoretical grasp of his existence as a moral Governor of the world. We cannot logically prove the infinite from the finite, as if the latter were the more comprehensive idea; nor can we construe the relation of God to the world by the analogy of Art, an analogy which fails just in the very point where it should help us. We cannot speak even of grounds of probability in such a case; for the empirical cannot take us even a step in the direction of proving that which is quite beyond experience. Nor can we say that the existence of God is a legitimate hypothesis that will explain the facts; for of a scientific hypothesis we must be able at least to show the possibility. We are reduced, therefore, to a practical faith, which is based on the fact of the moral law, our necessary subjection to which enables us to postulate all conditions for its realisation, however little we may be able to determine

1 R. IV. 358; H. V. 469, § 88.
them as objects of knowledge. Such a faith is a "free acceptance of something as true," not because we are compelled by theoretical proof, or because we hold ourselves bound to accept it, but because it is grounded in reason, as necessary for its self-determined ends. For, without such a faith, our moral consciousness and the requirement of our theoretical reason for proof, would make us "waver between a practical imperative and a theoretic doubt." ¹ At the same time, while we must thus hold to the distinction of the practical and the theoretical, it is allowable to point out that the great effectiveness of the argument from design, really arises from the way in which it brings the moral idea of God into connexion with the general suggestion of purpose received from nature.

¹R. IV. 380; H. V. 487, § 91.
CHAPTER V

CRITICISM OF THE CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

WHEN I was seeking, if not to penetrate into the Kantian doctrine, at least to make the best use of it possible to me, I was often inclined to think that that excellent man had woven a certain element of sly irony into his method. For, while at one time he seemed to be bent on limiting our faculties of knowledge in the narrowest way, at another time, he pointed, as it were with a side gesture, beyond the limits which he himself had drawn. He may probably have remarked the presumptuous way in which men, armed with little experience, proceed to lay out their unconsidered reflexions and prematurely to fasten upon objects any whim that passes through their heads. Hence it is that our master limits us to a reflective discursive judgment, and entirely refuses to us a judgment that determines its object. But, after he has thus driven us into a corner, yea, reduced us to despair, we suddenly find him employing the most liberal expressions, and conceding to us a freedom of which he leaves us to make what use we please. In this sense the following passage was very significant to me:—‘We can think of an understanding, which, because it is not, like ours, discursive but intuitive, proceeds from the synthetic universal, the intuition of a whole as such, to the particular; i.e., from the whole to the parts.... In this reference it is not necessary to prove that such an archetypal intelligence is possible, but only that, when we bring before our minds the conditions of our own discursive understanding, which requires images to be supplied to it from without (intellectus ectypus), and
consider that this characteristic of its action is not a necessary one, we are led to that idea of an *intellectus archetypus*, and that there is no contradiction in such an idea.

"Now, it is true that Kant seems here to be speaking of the divine understanding, but if in morality it is our duty to elevate ourselves, through belief in God, Freedom and Immortality, to a higher region, surely it may be presumed that in the intellectual life also we can make ourselves worthy, by the intuition of an ever-creative nature, to participate spiritually in its products. Now, as, at first, by an unconscious inward impulse, I had unceasingly sought for that in nature which is archetypal, and as I had soon succeeded in finding for myself a fitting expression of it, nothing could hinder me any longer from boldly undertaking what our patriarch of Königsberg calls the *adventure of reason*."  

There are obvious objections to this as an exact interpretation of Kant; and, indeed, Goethe does not present it to us as such. At the same time, we cannot wonder that the thought that Kant restores, as it were at a higher level, the liberty which at a lower level he refuses to the spirit of man, should suggest itself to Goethe in connection with the *Critique of Judgment*. Kant, indeed, never accepted the idea of such a restoration; he is always careful in all he says of the archetypal intelligence, which we can "think," but of which we cannot "form a conception" to preserve a retreat for himself within the limits he had set up in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He never forgets the opposition of *regulative* and *constitutive* Ideas, or, what answers to it in the *Critique of Judgment*, the opposition of *reflective* and *determinant* judgment, *i.e.*, the opposition between a judgment which is *subjectively* valid,—though, as conforming perfectly to the unity of self-consciousness (the pure unity of thought with itself), it points to an absolute or supersensible reality, and a judgment which is *objectively* valid,—though, as based on a synthesis of a given manifold, it relates only to the sensible or phenomenal. Yet, these oppositions are no-

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1Goethe's *Werke, Zur Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen: Anschauende Urtheilskraft.*
where put under so severe a strain as in the *Critique of Judgment*. Nowhere, in fact, does it become so evident that Kant's negative conceals a higher positive, and that the removal of the logical scaffolding of his work must show a new Idealism rising in the place of the old dogmatic philosophy.

In discussing the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, I have already indicated the general conception of mediation upon which it turns, a conception which is expressed in different ways. Thus, the idea of adaptation or design appears as a principle of mediation between the idea of a final end and the idea of conformity to law; and, in like manner, the process of judgment is regarded as mediating between understanding and reason. Again, both those mediating principles connect themselves in Kant's mind with the *feeling* of beauty, as the middle term between the intellectual consciousness of the objects and the practical consciousness of self; between the faculty of knowledge, in relation to which we are determined from without, and the will which carries its principle of determination in itself. A few words, however, seem to be necessary to recapitulate the results already reached, and also to show how, by an after-thought, the Teleological Idea, which at first was used by Kant only as the key to the sense of beauty, came to be considered also in its application to nature.

The sense of beauty is, for Kant, the *feeling of a harmony between the object and the subject*; or, in other words, between the consciousness of the object and the consciousness of self. As such, it seems already to break down the most fixed distinctions of the Kantian philosophy. For the object, as empirically given, never can be in harmony with the pure consciousness of self, or with the idea of a noumenal reality which arises in connection with that pure consciousness. Hence, also, the feeling of pleasure or pain excited in us by the consciousness of the object, can indicate only its harmony or disharmony with our sensitive subjectivity. A feeling of pleasure in the object as conforming to Ideas of reason, would thus seem to be an impossibility; for the object is given in sense, and it is through sense that it awakes the feelings
of pleasure and pain. Hence, also, practical determination by such feelings is necessarily excluded in moral action; for moral self-determination is the determination of the conscious self by the law that flows from its own rational nature. This self-determination is, indeed, at the same time the determination of the objective world by our acts; and, in this point of view, it might seem possible for us to have a pleasure in the object, in so far as it is determined by our own moral activity. We are, however, to remember that, though we may determine the object in accordance with the moral law, and though all moral action involves such a determination of it, yet we can never be conscious of such determination as *realised* in the object; for a phenomenal world ordered according to the Ideas of reason is an impossibility, though the imagination of it may serve as a *type* of the realisation of those Ideas.

Now, from this it would seem to follow that we cannot possibly rejoice in the objective world as realising the Ideas of reason. For we cannot know that it does so realise them, and what we cannot know, how is it possible that we should feel? Such a feeling,—such a sense that a particular object in the sensible world is in harmony with the pure consciousness of self, and that, in that object, so to speak, we are at home with ourselves,—if it could possibly arise,—would be an illusion, which would disappear so soon as we had really determined what the object is. But, moreover, it would be an unaccountable illusion; seeing that the nature of sense precludes any determination of its data by Ideas of reason, and admits only of their determination by the categories of the understanding. Or, looking at it from the subjective side, it would seem impossible that the feeling of pleasure caused by an object of sense, should stand in any but a negative relation to the pure consciousness of self. A forefelt harmony of the particular with the highest universal of reason would seem, therefore, to be as impossible as an intellectual reconciliation of them.

Now, Kant so far seems to admit this, as he maintains that the effect of the *ideal* consciousness upon feeling is always in the first instance, negative. Moral feeling is the shrinking awe of nature before spirit. It is a reverence which apprehends a unity of the noumenal and the phenomenal.
for the law, "before which our moral nature doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised." It reaches, as Kant admits, a kind of positive through this negative, but never so as to overpower its primarily negative character. It is a dangerous Schwarmerei to say that love can cast out fear. With this it agrees that Kant makes the feeling of the Sublime arise from the objects of sense only in a negative way. The feeling of the Sublime is an anticipatory feeling of the harmony of our nature with itself, which arises out of the consciousness of the immediate disharmony of the object with our intelligence or will. In other words, it is in the recoil upon the consciousness of self, in opposition to the empirical consciousness of the object, that this feeling arises; and if it is a joy, it is a joy which springs out of the negation of the immediate feeling of pleasure. But, then, if we take this view, a forefetl harmony of the object with the subject cannot be a harmony of the object with our pure self-consciousness, nor with the ideal consciousness herewith connected. It can only refer to that imperfect combination of the object with the conscious self, which we call knowledge or experience. Accordingly, as we have seen, Kant at first seems to confine the sense of beauty to this. It is, according to this view of it, a feeling of that purposive working of imagination and understanding, out of which knowledge springs whenever the synthesis of perceptive imagination is brought in relation to the conscious unity of the conception. But to this view, as we have seen, Kant does not adhere when he speaks of "Aesthetic Ideas" as involving, not merely a harmony of perception or imagination with conception, but a consciousness that a perception or imagination gives us "too much to think of" to be brought under any conception. Adopting this view, the feeling of beauty implies that its object is felt to transcend the understanding, and to call reason into action, as truly as does the feeling for the Sublime. But there is this difference in the two cases, that, whereas the ideal consciousness excited by the Sublime, is negatively related to the image of sense or phantasy by which it is awakened, in the case of beauty the ideal consciousness is positively related to the image. In other words, in the former case it is the
recoil of self-consciousness from the sensible object upon itself which makes it rise into the world of Ideas; while, in the latter case, we are conscious of the ideal as realised in the sensible appearance, or at least we have a feeling which points to such realisation. The spirit rejoices to find itself, or an analogon of itself, in the world of sense: or, in the case of Art, it rejoices to realise itself there.

I have spoken of an anticipative feeling, or a forefelt harmony. Kant's expressions authorise us to do this, though he is considerably embarrassed by the sharp way in which he has originally opposed sense and thought. In truth, we cannot well vindicate such expressions without substituting for Kant's way of looking at thought and sense as externally related to each other, the conception of their development out of an original unity, out of which they arise only as necessarily connected correlatives. The reason why we feel pleasure in an object as beautiful is, that the divided consciousness carries with it always an element of effort and pain; it is necessarily engaged in a struggle for unity, and the Beautiful object is "pur-posive," as it points to this unity. Our joy in beauty is the greeting of the spirit to the object that ceases to appear to it as a limit, a greeting, however, which comes not in the way of a distinct conscious recognition of the object as the realisation of an Idea under which it is subsumed, but as a feeling of harmony. But, as it is out of the unity of feeling that the duality of thought and sense, or of self-consciousness and consciousness, arises, so it is in feeling that their unity must be first perceptible to us.

Why Kant, in his discussion of the adaptation of nature to our intelligence, at first confined his view to the feeling of beauty, and how he was afterwards led to speak of an adaptation which can be thought as well as felt, may perhaps be explained in the following way. Strictly speaking, on Kant's fundamental principles, a real adaptation of objects of experience as such to the pure consciousness of self, i.e., a correspondence of these objects with Ideas, must be illusory. And, on the other hand, a consciousness of their correspondence to the conceptions of the understanding (such as is supplied in knowledge), would rather separate them from, than unite them with
our consciousness of ourselves. It may, indeed, be said that the ultimate explanation of the effort of the mind after knowledge, and consequently of its effort to determine sense by thought, is that it seeks to find its own unity in the object; and that, though in the way of knowledge we can never find such unity, yet, before knowledge has been attained, and while the faculties of perception and conception are working together in a way that is favourable to its attainment, there is a joy in their harmonious movement as at least a movement towards unity—a joy which ceases when knowledge has been attained, because the consciousness of the object as known is seen to be still opposed to the consciousness of self. But this would be only another way of saying that the sense of beauty is the illusive suggestion of an infinity in the object, which must disappear so soon as it is defined. If it were so, however, objects could not be permanently beautiful to us; and Kant is obviously right in saying that objects are beautiful only so far as they have something that can never be defined at all, or reduced under a definite conception of the understanding; in other words, they are beautiful only in so far as they need an Idea of reason to interpret them.

So soon, however, as Kant had admitted that the consciousness of an object can, even in subjective feeling, be positively connected with our ideal consciousness, and so with the pure consciousness of self, he was naturally led to reconsider his whole theory of the connexion of the consciousness of the object with self-consciousness; or, what is the same thing in another aspect of it, of nature with freedom. Hence, the question ceased to relate merely to a fore-feeling of the unity of the two, and became a question of the possible conscious recognition of the two as united. Here, however, Kant was obviously and directly limited by the doctrines laid down in two previous Critiques; and he was, therefore, forced to move more warily, and draw back whenever he came into danger of self-contradiction. And, especially, he had to take care not to admit any use of Ideas which goes beyond the limits laid down at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason.

We may, perhaps, best throw light on the point by
considering what different senses may be given to the idea of adaptation or design, as attributed to objects in relation to the intelligence. These are mainly two. Objects, as such, are relative to the self for which they are; and if, with Kant, we think of sense as supplying a matter which by the synthesis of the mind is determined in relation to the self, we may say that our sense perceptions are formally purposive, in so far as they are such that they can be brought under the conceptions of the understanding with a view to knowledge. That the "given" should be such that it can be known, such that it can furnish materials for an empirical knowledge of objects, is in one way an accident; yet, in another way, it is a necessary accident; for its non-occurrence would be the negation of all consciousness of objects, and hence also of self-consciousness. But, further, this reference of perceptions to the possibility of knowledge implies, not only that phenomena should be such that they can be brought under the principles of understanding, but such that there may be a continual progress towards the realisation of the Ideas which guide us in applying these principles. And this means that the manifold data of sense, which have to be determined by the principles of the understanding, are not infinitely varied and changeful; but such that, by applying these principles to them, thought is continually finding its way towards a more definite and a more fully articulated system of knowledge. Now, this is not necessarily implied in the conditions of experience, as conditions without which objects could not be determined as such; but it is necessary, in so far as in the determination of objects we are stimulated and guided by Ideas of reason. For we would not seek scientific knowledge, if it were not that our intelligence is driven by the very principle of its own life to seek unity and system in objects. So far, then, as objects are a priori determined as necessarily conforming to a subjective necessity of our reason, which goes beyond their necessary conformity to the principles of the pure understanding, we can say that they have a formal adaptation to our intelligence. But there is another adaptation which might be found in objects, i.e., if they were determined not only so as to be capable of relation to the
intelligence, but so that the intelligence might be able to find itself realised in them; if, in other words, they were not only determined as objects for a subject, but as objects produced by the self-determination of a subject. Or, putting it in another way, objects might not only be such that the consciousness of them is capable of being connected with the consciousness of self, but they also might be such that the consciousness of them was necessarily involved in that consciousness. In that case we should be able to say that they are not only formally but materially purposive in relation to the intelligence for which they are. Such objects, indeed, could not properly be said to be "given" to the self; they would rather be elements in the process of self-consciousness. They would be not only objects for the spirit, but essentially spiritual objects. There would be nothing in them which was simply "given." Or, if we still permitted ourselves to say that such objects were given to us from without, it would in that case be only another way of stating that self-consciousness in relation to them was imperfect and undeveloped. It would only be because we, though spiritual beings, are spiritual beings whose inner life is yet inchoate and unknown even to ourselves, that the world would come to us as a stranger; while, on the other hand, all our discoveries of the nature of the objective world would be ultimately discoveries, not of something external, but of ourselves.

We have, then, two ideas of the adaptation of nature to our intelligence. According to one of these views, nature, being necessarily related as an object to the conscious self, must be "given" in ways that make it possible for us to know it. According to the other view, nature is a revelation to us of that which is also the principle of our own being, in such wise that in and through it we become conscious of ourselves or of our own nature: though, to preclude misunderstanding, it must be added that it is only in and through it that we can become so conscious. How does Kant deal with each of these views?

His treatment of the former alternative is little more than a repetition of the doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason: for, as already stated, the distinction of deter-
minant and reflective judgment corresponds almost exactly to the distinction between constitutive and regulative thought; or, in other words, between thought that is guided by the conceptions of the understanding and thought that is guided by the Ideas of reason. In determinant judgment, we think the particular by means of a presupposed universal: in reflective judgment, we seek the universal under which we have to bring the given particular. But, in the last case, we must know what we seek, and, therefore, judgment must bring with it a guiding principle or Idea. This Idea is simply the Idea of a universal which is an ultimate principle of unity in all particulars. This is what Kant means when he tells us that the particulars of experience are merely subsumed under the principles of pure understanding, but left undetermined in all their special characteristics beyond their agreement with these principles. But if, in knowledge, we are to find our way through the manifold particularity which is thus left undetermined by the principles of the understanding, we must assume that it, too, has such a relation to the conscious self that it can be brought under its unity. "As the universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature, (though only as respects the general conception of it as nature), so the particular empirical laws of nature, so far as they have in them much that is left undetermined by these universal laws, must be considered in the light of that kind of unity which they would have if an understanding (though not our understanding) had fixed them with a view to our faculty of knowledge, so as to make possible for us the systematising of experience in all its particular laws. Not as if, in this way, such an understanding must be assumed really to exist: for it is only our reflective judgment to which this Idea serves as a guide; or, in other words, it is a guide to us only in reflecting on the object, but not in determining it. Thus, our faculty of judgment gives the law to itself and not to nature." 1

1 R. IV. 18; H. V. 186; Introd. IV.
as determinations of objects give us no knowledge, yet furnish principles of the unity, multiplicity, and affinity of the forms of nature which fix the goal for all the efforts of our understanding, and direct us on what lines we should proceed in order to advance towards that goal. The goal, in fact, is simply that which Kant finds expressed in the unum, verum, bonum of the old Meta-

physicians: it is the ideal of absolute unity of principle, complete development of all differences of fact, and perfect connexion of the two; such that the principle is seen not only to subsume the facts, but to find nothing but its own expression and realisation in them, and so to bind them into perfect unity with each other and with itself. The phrase "organic system" would therefore express Kant's Idea; and this is the same Idea, which in the Critique of Judgment, he expresses by the phrase "adaptation to our intelligence." We must look on the world as if an intelligence had arranged it so that our intelligence might find its way to the understanding of it. We must regard it as intelligible, and intelligible by us: and this it can be only if it is such a system.¹

At the same time, this is only an "Idea," not a con-

ception; only a principle for reflexion not for determina-

tion; for, owing to the nature of our knowledge, we can never realise it. It furnishes a goal to which knowledge is always asymptotically related. For, the goal fixed for knowledge is to bring the consciousness of objects to the unity of the pure consciousness of self, to see (as in the case of that consciousness) the difference springing from and returning to the unity; and this is an impossible goal, owing to the fundamental nature of our conscious-

ness of objects. For Kant, indeed, it is doubly impossible; for (1) the given manifold, given as it is under the forms of space and time, can only be brought to a synthetic unity, i.e., to a unity which presupposes differences and externally unites them; and (2) the categories, which are used to combine the manifold, are of such a character that they presuppose in that manifold the given differences which they relate to the unity of thought. In a conscious-

¹ It is easy to see how readily, in this point of view, a transition may be made from the formal adaptation of nature to its material adaptation.
ness so constituted, it is impossible to reach absolute unity of principle, or to complete the synthesis of difference, still more to bring the unity and the difference together in an organic system. But it is always possible to strive to lessen the number of laws by carrying them up to higher laws, and to detect new differences by close observation of facts; as it is always possible to trace out more carefully the connecting links between the differences, so as in their continuity to detect the working of one principle.

The *Critique of Judgment* brings before us, in a still more definite way, this relation of knowledge to the Idea which knowledge seeks to realise, by telling us that it corresponds to the opposition of *mechanical to final* causes. Nature can be known by us only as a mechanism, as a unity of parts which externally determine and are determined by each other; or else as a linear series of phenomena which are related to each other as causes and effects, in such a way that the one always disappears as the other comes. It cannot be known to us as a unity of parts which are limited and determined by the whole; or as a succession of phenomena, which yet is not merely the passing away of one state of things to make room for another, but a continuous process of self-determination. It seems, indeed, as if in organic nature we had such objects actually presented to us; for we cannot give any account of living beings in their distinction from inorganic things, except one involving the idea of an individuality, which through the difference of its parts and their changes remains one with itself; and such an individuality cannot be explained as a whole constituted by an aggregate of parts, or by their external influence upon each other. But Kant maintains that all that is implied in this, is that, in relation of the phenomena of life, there is a failure in the only explanation which the understanding can give of the things of Nature, and that we are, therefore, obliged to supply its place by the analogy of Art. In other words, finding ourselves unable to reduce the phenomena of life to effects of matter upon matter—because in this case the parts are not conceivable as prior to the whole, nor the changes as externally determined—we fall back on the

We know objects only as mechanically caused, though we are forced to think of organic objects under the idea of final cause.
hypothetical that, as in our own action, it is the Idea of the whole which precedes and determines the parts; or, in other words, that it is the Idea which uses the physical actions and reactions of the parts to realise an end which is beyond them, and to which they have no necessary relation. As, however, in this case, there is no artist presented to us in experience, no being to whom we can transfer our own inner consciousness and will in order to explain the result, but, on the contrary, the living being seems to be a causa sui, and so at once means and end to itself, the analogy of Art which we thus apply expresses only our ignorance; or it shows only that, in our ignorance, we take refuge in the one cause we know which seems capable of producing the effect in question, and that in spite of marked differences in the two cases. For, in truth, "the organisation of nature has nothing analogous to any causality we know."

There are two things specially noticeable here: (1) the sharp line drawn between the categories of physical and of final causation in their application to nature: and (2) the way in which the organic object is treated as a sort of middle term between nature and art, which we cannot explain at all, because it cannot be reduced either to the one or the other.

As to the first of these points, Kant bases his doctrine upon the principle that, while the categories of causality and reciprocity are necessary to the general conception of nature or to the determination of objects as such, the category of final cause is one which is not involved in the bare idea of the object or of nature as such. In fact, Kant contends that, just because we are not forced to apply this category in order to determine objects as such, we are not authorised to represent it as a determination of the object at all. It is an additional category brought in, because there is something in the object that is not explained by the categories which determine it as an object. For reason, as it cannot be content with mere chance as an explanation of anything, is obliged to look for another kind of necessity that gives to the object these mechanically inexplicable characteristics. The idea of final causality is thus used as a key to the 'order of the accidental'
(Gesetzmässigkeit des Zufälligen), i.e., as the means of expressing a higher necessity which, while it acts through mechanical laws, yet gives to the world and especially to some beings in it, a kind of unity which, according to these laws alone, could not belong to it. For, though all natural objects are once for all determined under the principles of pure understanding,—because otherwise they could not be the objects of our experience,—yet this by no means explains why objects have such relations to each other as are necessary in order that the world should be intelligible to us, even as a system under mechanical laws; still less why certain of the objects in it should be wholes of such a character that they cannot be explained by such laws.

Kant, then, maintains that the general relation of nature to our intelligence, and the special relation of the organic being to itself, both force us to resort for their explanation to another principle than that of mechanical causation, a principle derived from the sphere of spirit and not of mere nature. But he maintains also that this principle must be taken, not as supplying us with a new objective determination of the facts, but merely as a guide to the investigation of them; and that in fact the use of it enables the understanding to lay down the law not to nature, but only to itself. Let us consider each of these points successively.

(1) In regard to the general formal adaptation of nature to our intelligence, it is obvious that Kant by this phrase means to express what is otherwise spoken of as the general "principle of Induction." Nature, it is said, must "agree with itself;" it must be regarded as a system under "unchangeable laws;" a general "uniformity" must be assumed to exist in all its processes. Under such expressions are commonly united two ideas which Kant distinguishes, viz., the conformity of phenomena to the principles of the understanding, and their relation to the regulative Ideas of reason; or adopting the language of the Critique of Judgment, their subsumption by determinant judgment under mechanical laws, and their reference by reflective judgment to the idea of formal purpose. Thus, these two are practically identified by Mill, when he regards the "uniformity of nature" as the same thing with
the law of causation and supposes both to be reached by an *inductio per enumerationem simplicem*. In truth, it is not altogether easy to separate them, so long as attention is not directed to the *limits* of the intelligibility of nature through the laws of mechanical causation. Nor can the nature of these limits well be understood, until critical reflexion has made us look upon the object as necessarily determined in relation to a subject, and, therefore, as imperfectly known, so long as that relation is left out of account. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, by directing attention to the relations of objects, as determined by the necessity of nature, to the unity of the conscious self, could not but bring with it the consciousness that such determination is not final. For, if nature and necessity only exists for a consciousness that is not subjected to it, a new light is thrown upon the nature of that which is so subjected—even if we agree with Kant that the unity of thought to which phenomena are thus related, cannot itself be made an object of knowledge, and that, consequently, the Idea of it cannot be *positively* used to correct our first view of the phenomena of nature.

Kant puts the matter as follows:—All our knowledge of objects is the determination of them under laws which specify the general conception of nature, as a system of substances externally determining each other in space and time. That conception is necessary, in so far as without it there would be for us no connected experience, and, therefore, no experience of objects such as could be united with the "I think." For, only as connected by the principles of the understanding can the manifold data of sense under the forms of time and space, be brought in relation to the unity of the self. Even when brought in relation to that unity, the manifold, or rather the objects for which that manifold furnishes the material, are necessarily opposed to the unity to which they are related; and this opposition shows itself in the antinomies, which arise whenever we attempt to determine the object as a thing in itself. These antinomies Kant solves by the idea of the *phenomenal* character of the object. But the term "phenomenal" really conveys a double meaning; for the object would cease to be phenomenal, *either*, if we could
suppose the mind to go out of itself so as to identify itself with an object given quite independently of it, or, if we could suppose the existence of the object to be absorbed in its relativity to consciousness. The former alternative is obviously impossible; but the latter would be possible, if we could admit the thought of an "intuitive understanding." If for us thought were synthetic and not analytic, that is, if it determined out of itself the manifold to which it applies its categories; or, in other words, if these categories themselves brought with them the complete determination of the particulars which they subsume, the object would cease to be phenomenal, it would be known as it is. As this, in Kant’s opinion, is not the case, as the manifold of sense is supposed to be given externally to thought, and the categories to be only of such a nature as to connect given differences, we have merely the problematic conception of such an understanding, and of the noumenon which would be its object. For the categories, because they are "species of the unity of Apperception," forms which the unity of thought takes in relation to a given manifold, cannot produce the manifold they determine; nor can they so transform it that the consciousness of it shall become one with the consciousness of the unity of thought to which it is opposed. Reason is thus harassed with an ideal which it cannot realise, yet which is presupposed in the objective consciousness which it does realise. In the very necessity of nature, to which in experience it is confined, it finds a measureless contingency. For that necessity is merely a connexion of particular with particular; it never reaches any final particular on which the others can rest as their basis, or which is itself determined out of the thought that grasps it. To say that everything is hypothetically necessary, is to say that ultimately everything is contingent, i.e., that no object has necessary connexion with the consciousness for which it is, and which so far makes it its own by subsuming it under its own unity. This being the case, however, the fact that by the application of the categories the mind can go so far to make this matter its own, presupposes a certain harmony of the matter not only with the categories, but with the unity of which they are an imperfect expression.
"For," Kant argues, "we might easily suppose that, in spite of all the uniformity of natural things according to those universal laws which constitute the form necessary to our empirical knowledge, the specific differences of the empirical laws of nature, with all the effects of their operation, might yet be so great that it would be impossible for our understanding to detect in nature an intelligible order, to divide its products into genera and species in such a way, that we could use the principles of explanation that hold good for one to throw light on the others. And if this were the case, it would be impossible for us out of so confused a matter—(or properly we should say out of such an infinitely varied, and, for our intelligence, incomprehensible, matter)—to make a connected experience." ¹ It appears, then, that for the intelligibleness of nature, more is needed than its simple conformity to the general principles of understanding. It is required also that the manifold determinations of the particular which are left free by these principles, should yet be so limited in the variety of their forms, and should present such continuity of transition through all their differences, that our understanding, in dealing with them according to its principles, can continually make them more and more intelligible, i.e., can in dealing with them advance towards its own ideal of systematic unity. In this way, it may be said that, while our intelligence constructs a systematic explanation of the universe in accordance with mechanical principles, it discovers in the world something that goes beyond mechanism, viz., a certain unity in the forms of its mechanism and a certain homogeneity and gradation between them so far as they are different, which makes one thing throw light on another; and thus our progress in knowledge is a continual progress towards systematic completeness and unity. Without this, indeed, we should be continually trying to connect different phenomena according to the laws of causation and reciprocity; but we should not be able to make any real advance towards an intelligible view of the world as a whole. We should always be beginning our investigations again, without our first experiences throwing light upon those that follow;

¹ Introduction, § 5; R. IV. 24; H. V. 191.
and the scientific impulse which arises when we begin to see how, through a thousand different forms, the same force or law reveals itself, would never be awakened. It is, therefore, a principle which we can assume a priori, and which we do so assume in treating nature as intelligible, that "she specifies her universal laws to particular empirical laws in accordance with the form of a logical system, so as to adapt herself to our power of judgment." In assuming this, we are, in fact, simply assuming that the laws by which we connect the manifold of perception so as to produce a consciousness of objects, not only enable us once for all to bring that manifold in relation to the unity of the intelligence, but also continually to bring it into closer connexion therewith. Yet, this progress toward finding the unity of the intelligence in the world is, as already indicated, a progressus ad infinitum, which can never completely realise the ideal it continually strives after. Our continual progress to find the one in the many, and to carry back the many to the one,—to find unity, variety, and affinity in the natural world,—can never go so far as to reduce it to an organic whole. The world, after all, remains for us mechanical, because our process is a synthesis of given differences, which cannot be brought into perfect correspondence with the transparent unity-in-difference of thought or self-consciousness. And the adaptation of the world to the intelligence remains after all a mere unexplained fact, which we cannot show to be necessary from the nature of the world itself as a mechanical system, but only with reference to the comprehension of the world by us.

We can, then, easily see how it is that the relation of the world to the mind remains, for Kant, a case of external adaptation or design which, because it is external, we cannot verify as an objective fact. We necessarily look upon the world "as if an understanding, though not our own, had arranged it with reference to the needs of our powers of knowledge, so as to make possible for us a system of experience according to particular laws of nature." But we cannot be sure of the cause, but only of the effect; we cannot know that such an arranging intelligence has determined the world-order, though we can
see that without it our understanding would not find the world intelligible. It remains, therefore, an accident, though for us a necessary accident, that the world is so constituted. But, though the only way in which we can explain to ourselves such a necessary accident is by supposing the existence of a designing Intelligence, this may be merely the result of an incapacity on our part, and not of the nature of things. For us, the "order of the accidental" can be nothing but design, but it need not be so in reality; for we can think without logical contradiction of an intelligence to which objects are not externally given, but which produces them by the very consciousness for which they exist. We can think of an intuitive understanding, for which there is no division between conception and perception; and we can see that, for such an understanding, there would be no separation of accidental and necessary, particular and universal, but both would be united in the actual. We cannot, indeed, realise the possibility of an understanding, so different from our own; but the thought of it is forced upon us, so soon as criticism makes us conscious of the limitation of our own understanding; and with the thought of it comes the consciousness that the form of an externally determined design or purpose, under which we necessarily think the relation of the world to our minds, may not correspond with the reality.

This thought is further borne in upon us by two things:—by the Beautiful and the Organic. The Beautiful, as we have seen, is that which causes us to feel the unity of the mind with itself. The sense of it is the greeting which the spirit gives to an object which does not resist its claims, an object which, by its harmony with itself, makes the mind conscious of its own harmony. Our joy in the Beautiful is thus analogous to the joy we have in a scientific discovery which brings into unity facts that before lay apart from each other in apparent independence. There is, however, this difference, that the latter is a case of conscious subsumption, while the former is a case in which universal and particular are not separated but felt as one; and we may add, after what has been said above, there is the further difference that the scientific discovery
reveals to us only a new mechanical connexion, which, if it is an approximation to the goal of unity of the world with the mind, is yet an asymptotic approximation to it as an unattainable ideal: while, on the other hand, in the consciousness of beauty, the ideal is for feeling attained, since the consciousness of the particular is in immediate unity with the consciousness of the universal. Kant, however, falls back, with his stubborn Dualism, upon the idea that the Beautiful is an accidental agreement of the object with the consciousness of the subject, or that it accidentally produces a feeling of unity with himself in that subject. Indeed, in his primary analysis of beauty, he regards it merely as an anticipation of that unity which is realised in the scientific discovery, and not of that higher unity of the empirical with the ideal to which he afterwards points.

The case of the Organic seems more difficult to explain in this subjective fashion; for in it, as Kant confesses, the universal and particular are inseparably combined; and the parts are constituted as parts only through the whole, and do not constitute it by their combination. Do we not then find in the Organic, as an objective fact, that unity which we are elsewhere taught to regard only as an ideal? Kant stubbornly answers, No. It is not there, or at least it is not there for us. What we have in the Organic is an objective connexion of phenomena, which, as a connexion of phenomena, we can explain only by mechanical causes; though we have also a unity manifesting itself in this connexion, which is quite accidental if we regard merely such causes. And we can make this unity intelligible to ourselves only by bringing in a designing intelligence similar to our own; while, at the same time, we confess that such an hypothesis only indicates our incapacity to explain the facts in any other way, and not a necessity that they should be explained in this way. Thus, on the analogy of Art, we think of an intelligence arranging a given matter, in accordance with the mechanical relations of its parts, with a view to the realisation of an end; though we are obliged to acknowledge that the difference of the matter from the design to be realised in it, would not exist for a creative intelligence. For, such an intelligence would not first
create a mechanically determined material, and then subject it to an ideal purpose, to which it had no necessary relation. On the contrary, in relation to such an intelligence, matter and form would be but opposite aspects of an inseparable unity.

It is strange to see how Kant names and explains the Idea of an organic unity, and also of an intelligence which should apprehend the world as an organic unity, while yet he absolutely refuses to recognise that our own intelligence can attain to more than an external union of elements which, though not logically contradictory, yet are essentially irreconcilable. He supposes, in fact, that our consciousness of our own limitations enables us to think of such an intelligence and its object as a possibility, or, perhaps we should rather say, to recognise that our own inability to conceive it does not necessarily involve the denial of its existence. But here he stops. We can conceive an external connexion of things as acting upon each other; we can conceive a determination of that external connexion by an intelligent being which uses it to realise some purpose or end; but we cannot, according to Kant, form any definite conception of that, which yet seems to be set before us as a fact in organic beings, viz., of a unity which produces the differences of its parts and reveals itself in their determination by each other. In short, we cannot think of a unity that reveals itself in difference except as an intelligence; and if we think of it as an intelligence, we cannot think of it as itself the source of the differences which it apprehends and on which it superinduces its unity, but only as an artist working with a given material.

Now, it is easy to see that here again Kant is influenced by that absolute opposition of analysis and synthesis which was his fundamental prejudice. The unity of self-consciousness appears to him always as formal or analytic, and, therefore, as essentially opposed to the synthetic unity of the consciousness of objects, for which it can only provide an unattainable ideal. For, as the consciousness of objects has an element in it which can by no possibility be brought into self-consciousness, the unity of the two, though necessary, is yet a unity in which the elements stand permanently in a negative relation to each other.
Taking his stand on these pre-suppositions, Kant is unable to regard the Idea of organic unity,—the Idea of a unity of the universal and particular, or of a unity of thought and reality,—as anything but an abstract and empty ideal, a mere "thought of which we have no conception," a consciousness of something which we think only by abstracting from the conditions of our own understanding; though it is also a something which we are obliged to think in so far as we recognise these conditions as limits.

On this, in the first place, we have to observe that the pure idea of self-consciousness in itself gives us a unity which is at once analytic and synthetic, a transparent difference which is, at the same time, the necessary differentiation through which the unity of self can alone be realised. Here, therefore, we have before us, not, as Kant says, a mere X—a something to which we can attach no predicate, though the consciousness of it is presupposed in every other consciousness. On the contrary, we have here a real organic unity of the intelligence with itself, which, therefore, must be for it the type of the intelligible. So far, therefore, from its being true that an organic unity is something which we cannot understand, it would be nearer the truth to say that we can, understanding nothing else; that in everything else we must necessarily find an unintelligible element, a contradiction which forces us to ask for a further explanation. While, therefore, it is true, that it is the unity of the intelligence with itself which it seeks in the world, and which, in so far as it assumes the world to be intelligible, it presumes it will find there; and, while it is also true that for that reason a mechanical explanation of the world can never be finally satisfactory, but, however far it may be carried, must always, as a mechanical explanation, be asymptotically related to the requirements of thought; yet, we must not suppose that such opposition between the consciousness of objects and the consciousness of self is an absolute opposition, though it undoubtedly would be so if the unity of self-consciousness were reducible to a merely analytic unity or simple identity. The consciousness of self is, as we have seen, in itself an organic unity, a unity which has difference in it, and which, therefore, has in it already—in a form which is
transparently clear and explicable—the very element which appears as inexplicable so long as we seek to interpret the world only by means of mechanical laws. Even, therefore, if we confine our view to the pure idea of self-consciousness, we find that it reaches beyond the bare identity which Kant sees in it, and enables us to make a first step towards the filling up of the gulf which he leaves open between object and subject. What, perhaps, is of more importance, our supposed incapacity to conceive of an organic unity, except as the determination by a designing mind of a matter subjected to mechanical laws, disappears whenever we cease to view self-consciousness as in itself a bare identity, which is only drawn out into difference by the foreign matter to which it is applied. For, in self-consciousness, we have no foreign matter on the difference of which an external unity has to be superinduced, but, on the contrary, an ego which only through difference realises its unity with itself. To a conscious self, therefore, in so far as it draws from itself its idea of knowledge, the object must be intelligible just in proportion to the ease with which such a unity can be detected in it. Hence the organic by itself will, in the first instance, be to it less of a problem than the inorganic by itself, as determined by merely mechanical laws. Or, at least, the organic can seem more difficult to explain than the inorganic, only in so far as its nearness in form to the intelligence brings into prominence its still remaining difference: whereas, when we have once learnt to abstract from the unity of thought so as to take the inorganic as such for our object, we are not so continually haunted by the sense of that which is still wanting to the object as an intelligible reality.

But there is another aspect, in which we are taught by Kant himself to consider the matter. The object, as determined under the categories, is an object for a conscious self; as such, it has relations to the unity of self which are not expressed by the categories as principles of the understanding: for these can only determine the relation of the various elements in an object or the relation of one object to another. Hence, the consciousness of the relations of the object to the self gives us a new view of the nature of the object. It enables us to discern that the

In calling attention to the relation of objects to the unity ofapperception, Kant implicitly acknowledges the above principle.
object under mechanical laws exists by an abstraction, which we must correct ere we can know what that object really is. It is true that this abstraction is natural, in so far as our consciousness begins with the division of the not-self from the self, of the object from the subject for which it is an object. And it is true also that it is only a late reflexion that enables us to discern the relation of the object to the subject, and to detect the categories that underlie our recognition of the object as such. When such reflexion comes, however, it not only discovers to us the categories which we have used in determining the object, but also brings with it new categories by which that determination must be corrected or remoulded. For, so soon as the categories are regarded as "species of pure apprehension," and so as means of relating the elements of the manifold to each other, and of determining objects as such, it becomes clear that these categories cannot give us the whole truth as to objects, unless they are viewed in relation to the unity of self-consciousness which they partly express. This reflexion is indicated by Kant when he says that the determination of objects by such categories, is necessarily relative to consciousness, and that, therefore, the objects so determined are mere phenomena, i.e., objects for us. This way of putting the matter, however, carries with it the false suggestion that the object in itself is not relative to any intelligence, which is only partly corrected by Kant when he introduces the idea of an intuitive understanding, which knows the object as it is in itself. If, however, we follow out the thought that objects are mechanically determined only for a conscious self, we see that their mechanical determination cannot be their ultimate determination. In other words, the mechanical is the real only for one who does not see that such reality is relative to something that is not under mechanical laws; and it can be taken as a complete reality or thing in itself only by an abstraction. As mechanically explained, an object is fixed in an external relation to other things and even to itself, in which no object really exists. Above all, as mechanically explained, an object seems to have an independence of the thought for which it is, which, if it were a real independence, would make the object inac-
cessible to the intelligence. In truth, the categories by which things are determined as mechanically related, are categories of the relations of things which are represented in the externality of space, as *partes extra partes* towards each other and towards themselves. But space itself is only the *first* form of relation under which objects exist for us, a form which arises with the dawn of consciousness, as it separates object from subject, and thus, as it were, breaks the bond between the unity of thought and the object whose manifold it combines. Thus the object is referred to itself in its difference, *as if* that difference had no necessary unity presupposed in it. But this presupposed unity comes into view, whenever we reflect that the object cannot be external *to* the self, since, it is external or in space, only *for* the self. Such a reflexion, however, is not made by the ordinary, or even by the scientific consciousness, to which the unity of that which is thus externally related only appears in the form of a necessary connexion, or necessary external action and reaction between its elements. Hence the mind, seeking its own unity in the object, is bound down by the terms of the presupposed difference with which it begins, to conceive of that unity only under the form of *necessity*, as a law which externally binds objects that, in the first instance, are given as separate and independent of each other. For, so far as we take external perception as a fixed basis, we are by the nature of space, which is the form of such perception, limited to such an idea of the unity of things with each other as is consistent with their essential difference. It is, however, easy, from our present point of view, to see that such a conception of the nature of things can hold good only so long as we leave out of account the consciousness *for* which the object is external; and reflexion, when it directs attention to this consciousness, necessarily leads to an effort, not merely to discover the relations which constitute the external or mechanical unity of things as influencing each other, but also to see beneath this externality,—as the source, and also as the limit of it,—the unity of the intelligence. The problem of Philosophy, as distinguished from that of Science, is, therefore, the problem of bringing the consciousness of the object to
the form of self-consciousness; and also, what is the converse of this, the problem of explaining how it is that self-consciousness can realise itself only through the consciousness of an objective world. Now this is a problem which is essentially different from the problem of Science, and in dealing with it Philosophy does not, in any way, come into collision with Science, as would necessarily be the case if Science and Philosophy were two different solutions for the same problem. On the contrary, the problem of Philosophy is one the successful treatment of which must to a great extent depend on the previous solution of the problem of Science, and which, therefore, with the advance of Science becomes every day more pressing. For, just in proportion to the success of Science, it becomes clear that its results afford no final satisfaction to the intelligence.

To sum up what has been said—In our criticism of Kant, we have concluded that we are not, by the conditions of knowledge, confined to the alternative of an explanation of objects by mechanical causes and an explanation by external design; but that the idea of a unity which determines and differentiates itself, and does not merely stamp the unity of its thought on a foreign matter, is given us in self-consciousness in its pure relation to itself. It is true, indeed, that, as Kant maintains, self-consciousness implies the consciousness of objects; but, as, on the other hand, objects imply the unity of the self, the unity of self-consciousness and the consciousness of the objective world cannot be taken as external, but only as an organic unity, i.e., as a unity which reveals itself in differences, and not merely in the synthesis of differences given from without. The idea of such a unity is necessarily forced upon us by the theory of knowledge, although it may be admitted that the complete verification of it would be the highest result of Philosophy. But, if this be true, the organic cannot be regarded as that which is least accessible to our intelligence. Rather, we must look upon it as that which is most intelligible, and ultimately as that which alone is intelligible. We do not, therefore, require to resort to the idea of an external intelligence working upon a given mechanically determined matter, in order to explain it;
although, no doubt, if we were thus compelled, we should be obliged, with Kant, to admit that such an explanation is only a resource of ignorance.

At the same time, as has been already admitted, the organic world generally presents a problem to us which may seem harder to solve than any problem relating to the inorganic; inasmuch as the same kind of unity which self-consciousness has with itself in all its differences, is here presented to us in a being which is not self-conscious. Kant speaks in the Critique of Pure Reason of the necessity of our “transferring our own consciousness to other things, which only thus we can represent as thinking beings,” ¹ i.e., he holds that we can only understand other conscious beings by transferring to them in thought our own consciousness of self and of the world; and the same view might be applied to the animals, in so far as they have a kind of consciousness which is analogous to ours. But, if we try to think of animals in this way, we can hardly avoid applying the same principle to plants, which also have something in them that is analogous to the unity of self-consciousness, in so far as in a plant the parts presuppose the whole. It is in some such way as this that Leibniz follows the idea of the monads downwards from self-consciousness to the lowest forms of the organic being, and even to the inorganic, still maintaining the idea of a unity whose differences are its own determinations. But, the further we go in this direction, the harder it becomes to maintain the idea of a unity which has the essential characteristics of a self or ego, yet without being such a self. And, in this point of view, it seems equally difficult to admit and to deny the essential difference of the inorganic and the organic. Indeed, so long as we suppose the inorganic to be externally given to us without any necessity for such a “transfer of our own consciousness” as is necessary in the other cases mentioned, the problem is insoluble. When, however, we recollect that it is only by virtue of categories which are partial expressions of the unity of self-consciousness, that any object exists for us as such, the difficulty begins to disappear. To say that the categories are “species of pure apperception,” suggests the thought

¹A. 347; B. 405.
that the intelligence can determine nothing as an object, except by bestowing on it part of its own nature. Even such categories as, e.g., cause and effect, or reciprocity, are partial expressions of the unity of self-consciousness, i.e., they express the transition from the subjective to the objective self, from the self that is conscious to the self of which it is conscious, or they express their relation to each other as reciprocally determined, without expressing at the same time the essential unity of the movements thus opposed. Hence the mechanical determination of things may rightly be described as a "transfer of our own consciousness" to them. That organised beings carry us a step further, and necessitate for their understanding the transfer to them of the pure unity of self-consciousness (though as yet in an undeveloped form), is no special difficulty. On the contrary, it makes such existences more intelligible than inorganic things, i.e., it makes it easier to think of them as complete realities or things in themselves. If there seems to be a greater difficulty in this case, it is only because here the unity of thought is at once suggested by the nature of the object, with which we are dealing; whereas in the other case, it was suggested through a reflection on the relation of the object to the thinking subject. Thus the organised being, as it is in some sense a res completa,—a unity which is determined by itself, a subject as well as an object,—calls for a kind of explanation that seemed not to be required in the case of the inorganic. And, as the idea of such an organic unity can find an adequate realisation only in a self-consciousness, so there is an inclination to escape from the difficulty of attributing, or not attributing, such unity to the animal, either by denying that the animal or plant is a true organism, or by referring its organic character to an external designing intelligence. But there is no greater, and indeed no other, difficulty in the existence of lower forms of the organic, than in the existence of the inorganic. Both are in one sense incomplete manifestations of that Idea which is implied in all reality, and both, therefore, must ultimately be explained, not as absolutely real in themselves, but as elements in a higher reality.

Notwithstanding all this we must admit the relative
truth of Kant’s view, in so far as it confines Science to the sphere of external necessity, and views the Idea of adaptation or design,—whether we take it in the sense of internal or external adaptation,—as valuable merely as an Idea or subjective principle of investigation: a principle which at once guides and limits the inquiries of Science. The intelligibility of the world is the presumption which underlies the application of the scientific method, though it is true that that method, even in its most successful application, can never make the world completely intelligible. But, on the other hand, it is equally true that that method must be applied, and applied with the utmost strictness, to the exclusion of all “anticipations of nature;” otherwise the higher explanation will never be realised. The Baconian denunciation of final causes, as barren in the explanation of nature, is from the point of view of Science entirely just; for the objective world must be seen in its difference from the intelligence, before the unity of the intelligence can be seen in it. Or, to put it in another way, it is as true in the intellectual, as in the moral life, that the spirit develops by a self-abnegation, in which it seems to renounce all independent movement of its own, and to regulate itself entirely by what is given to it from without. To renounce all subjective whims and prejudices, to take the facts as they are, to give up “hypothesis,” is the first lesson of Science; and this means especially the surrender of the great idolon tribus, the tendency to find the explanation of things in their immediate instrumentality to our own life. Until the intelligence finds itself as universal, it cannot find itself in the world; and it cannot find itself as universal till it has learnt to identify itself with, or give itself up to, an object that appears as foreign and alien to itself. The object, therefore, must be taken as an external object, which, as such, is determined in itself without relation to the subject. When we so take it, we find that it discloses itself as not merely external, but necessarily related to other objects; and in tracing out these necessary relations, Science finds its sole field of activity. It is the very condition of its existence to guard against the ignava ratio of teleology. It is true that what Kant calls the formal
adaptation of nature to the intelligence, is tacitly assumed by Science in all its investigations. It is its own unity that the intelligence is always seeking in the object, and it is an unconscious reference to this that gives its interest to scientific research. Science is the effort of thought in the outwardsness of nature to find the inwardsness of thought itself. Driven by this impulse, it is forced to refer the particular external thing, which as a mere external object does not explain itself, to another particular thing; and so to pass from the mere unrelated manifoldness of observation, to the necessarily related manifoldness of science. But this seeking questioning impulse, for which nothing explains itself, but each object must find its explanation in something different from itself, has in it a latent contradiction, which we may best describe in Kantian language by saying, that the question we ask is too large for any possible answer that can in this way be given; for it is reason that asks the question, and it is the understanding that gives the answer. Further, we must recognise that Kant is right, when he goes on in the Critique of Judgment to recognise that the source of the difficulty is that the question involves an idea of design,—in the relation of the different parts or phenomena of the natural world to each other and to the intelligence,—while the answer is in terms of an external necessity. On the other hand, there is a true sense in Kant’s caution that in Science we must guard against giving the answers in any other terms, or against treating the design we seem to perceive in nature as objective. For, to admit the idea of design into Science would mean an attempt immediately to relate the facts,—in their externality and before their necessary connexion has been discovered,—to an end which, so taken, could only be an external end or design, which could not, therefore, be their design or end. The inner design, or organic unity of nature, can only appear after the idea of outer design has entirely yielded to that of law and external causation.

It might seem that we should be freed from this limitation in the case of organic beings, which cannot be conceived except as ends to themselves. For, in them, as Kant himself acknowledges, we find a unity that we cannot
explain by the concurrence of physical causes, and which, therefore, in relation to them, is an accident. Now, we have already seen that in this case some of Kant’s objections to the recognition of a real or objective unity are invalid. It cannot be said that such a unity, given us in the very consciousness of self is “one of the possibility of which we can form no conception.” On the contrary, it might rather be said that ultimately we can form a conception of no other possibility. At the same time, there is some truth in Kant’s assertion that the idea of design is only a subjective principle of reflexion, and not an objective principle of determination of the phenomena, a guide in the search for efficient causes and not a substitute for them. It is so for Science. In this sense, we may answer the question which has often been raised as to the Darwinian view of the origin of species; the question whether that view involves the conception of design. In one point of view it certainly is directed against that conception. For it is an effort (1) to explain the adaptation of the environment to the organism, without the supposition of any external and artificial accommodation of the former to the latter; and (2) to explain the existence of the great variety of species, and especially the wonderful organic development of the highest species, by means of the action and reaction between the environment and the simplest organic forms. According to the Darwinian Theory, the double adaptation shown in organisms and especially in the highest organisms, in the relation of their parts and changes to each other and to the environment, is explained as the result of the fact that each organism reproduces itself with slight variations in its offspring; that the animals which vary in the direction of further adaptation to the environment, are preserved in the struggle for existence; and that those that are thus preserved again reproduce their own type with slight variations which give rise to a similar struggle and a similar result in the next generation. This theory seems to exclude the idea of design, because all the special connexions of the phenomena of which it speaks are relations of things as external to each other, and externally influencing each other. It takes for granted, indeed, the tendency or impulse of the
animal to maintain itself both individually and generically, and also the variation of the special parts of the animal and its offspring in consistency with this self-maintenance. But it explains the strange adaptation of the environment to the organism as really an adaptation of the organism to the environment; and it seems to empty this latter adaptation of all design or purpose, in so far as it does not suppose the animal or plant to be confined by anything in its own nature to adaptive or purposive variations, but also admits the existence of "impurposive variations," which are destroyed by external influences. All that the theory involves, therefore, seems to be merely an extension of the law of external determination to a new region; and this certainly excludes the idea of any external design, any external fitting of one thing to another by a designing hand. But, while in this way the idea of external adaptation is banished, we are, as Kant indicates in a passage quoted above, only thrown back upon the original wonder that out of elements originally different, or at least not essentially related, such a 'purposive' result should be produced, and that merely by means of their external action and reaction upon each other. For, the further we carry our view backwards, the lower we go in the scale of being,—tracing back the origin of the organic to the simplest forms of vegetable life, nay, even tracing back these to the inorganic, and it, in turn, to a simple first homogeneous material substance—the less do we find in that state of things with which we start, any necessity that the powers of change should be just such as to produce the complex organic structure and system which we now find in existence, and the more are we impressed with the contingency of the result according to the natural laws. And this, if it does not drive us back to the idea of an external Designer, who has regulated the original matter with a view to such action and reaction as is necessary to produce life and mind,—a thought that more and more disappears before the idea of necessary law,—yet forces us to treat the multiplicity of independent material elements with which we have to begin as itself a problem, which can only be satisfied if we can regard that multiplicity as the expres-
sion of a prior unity. Indeed, we are driven to this conclusion (as has been already indicated) by the very conception of the material elements themselves, which have no other nature than their relations to each other, and which, therefore, involve the negation of their own multiplicity. Thus we are led to think of one principle underlying all differences, and which, through the difference and apparent external determination of different material elements by each other, is working toward the realisation of itself. Darwinism, indeed, does not go so far; but it, at least, presents to us a conception of development in which the environment is so opposed, and yet so harmonised, to the simple forms of organic life with which we start, that both its opposition and its harmony are the means to an evolution of beings, who realise more and more completely the idea of organic unity and completeness. Thus its clear exposition of the necessary relations which have determined the evolution, only makes the direction of that evolution towards the higher forms of organic life less and less intelligible, unless we can discover, concealed under the external necessity, the unity of a principle which reveals itself, both in the organism and in its environment. In truth, the further we go in explaining the unity of the world as an external necessity, the more do we reduce it to an unexplained accident that things should concur to such a result; unless we refer the difference of things to a unity of principle in which the result was implicitly contained. Thus, we may say that the idea of design is the beginning and end of Biological Science; it is its beginning, in so far as the adaptation of the environment to the organism and of one part of the organism to another, is the great problem it seeks to solve; yet just so far as it solves that problem by exhibiting the necessary relations of these different elements, and forces us to give up the idea of an arbitrary external adaptation, it also negates the independence or mere externality of the elements, and makes it impossible to think that the meeting or ‘concourse’ of them, by which a certain result is necessarily brought about, is itself purely accidental. But, if it is not accidental, we are forced finally to ask, what is the unity out of which arises
the difference of these necessarily related elements? This question, however, is the end of Biological Science, and, indeed, of all Science; for, to ask for such a unity is to try to raise knowledge from the form of consciousness into the form of self-consciousness. In other words, it is to ask not merely how, from elements supposed to be given in difference, we can by action and reaction according to mechanical laws explain a certain result; it is to ask to what unity we are to trace back that difference,—a question which necessarily suggests itself to us, because the unity of the self is presupposed in the determination of the external object as a manifold, still more as a manifold of related elements. This is the intellectual want, which is satisfied in a rough and ready way in the ordinary consciousness by the idea of an external Teleology. But, in its proper form, it is the problem of Philosophy as distinguished from Science, in so far as Philosophy makes us reflect on the fact that the unity of the self is presupposed in all consciousness of the objective world, and, as a necessary consequence, forces us to think the objective world as a system which is the manifestation of a similar unity. Kant has the merit of first perceiving this connection; in other words, he first recognised that the relation of the consciousness of objects to self-consciousness carries with it the demand for a unity in the world which cannot be found in it according to the methods of Science, and which, indeed, Science by the very conditions of its existence, is prohibited from attempting to satisfy. His error is (1) that, as he conceives the unity of self-consciousness as a bare analytic unity which is not related to the manifold except externally, so he necessarily treats the ideal of knowledge which is derived from that unity as a mere ideal which cannot be realised: and (2) that he therefore confines what he calls knowledge to the form of consciousness as opposed to self-consciousness, at the same time that he recognises that, because it is so confined, knowledge is only of phenomenal objects. While, however, we try to correct this one-sidedness, we must keep in view that truth which Kant really established, viz., that Philosophy cannot be either a substitute for Science, or a new Science added to the rest; for it does
not work in the same region, or, so to speak, on the same plane. Teleological observations are out of place in Science, because Science presupposes the externality of the object, the relation of which, or of the parts of which, it explains; for on this presupposition, the Teleological Idea can only take the form of an external adaptation of independent things, an adaptation which therefore excludes necessary relation. Teleology, in this sense, is an ignava ratio standing directly in the way of the scientific impulse, which seeks, on the hypothesis of the externality of things to each other, to bring into view their necessary relations. But, just in so far as the problem of Science has been solved, the externality which it provisionally assumes becomes itself a difficulty, and the problem of Philosophy comes to the front—the problem of finding the unity presupposed in that diversity of elements, the necessary relations of which have been detected by Science. And it would be as irrelevant for Philosophy to bring in mechanical causation as a satisfactory answer to this problem, as it was for Science to bring in teleological explanations of the relations of objects. In both cases, such a course would imply an ignoratio elenchi, or the fallacy of escaping from the problem before us into a different region of thought.

Is the problem of Philosophy a legitimate one? Is Philosophy, as Hegel asks, a mere attempt, once in a way, to stand on our heads, or to paint our faces, in order to escape from the weariness of our every day appearance? Or is it because the scientific way of knowing does not satisfy all the demands of our intelligence, that we are driven to reconsider on a new principle the results which Science has attained and in its own way proved?¹ To ask this, is, as Kant shows, to ask whether we can reach a teleological as opposed to a mechanical explanation of things; and his answer is (1) that we are entitled to assume a formal adaptation of things to our intelligence though only with a view to the discovery of mechanical causes; and that (2) in the consideration of organised beings we may also assume their material adaptation to a design involved in their own existence; in other words,

¹ Hegel Works, vii. 1. 18, § 246.
we are entitled to go on the principle that every part of such a being has a purposive meaning in relation to the whole. Even in this latter case, however, our object must be merely to inquire by what means the purpose in question has been achieved: and this at once carries us from final to efficient causes. We may also (3) use the same principle (in a way afterwards to be considered) in the case of the world as a whole, when we contemplate it in relation to man; though the world as a whole is not given us as an organism. But we are always to remember that the teleological principle is a heuristic, and not a determinant principle. Hence Philosophy, while it fixes the limits of the mechanical explanation by determining its objects as phenomena, is bound to treat the teleological explanation, (apart from its heuristic use), merely as a subjective substitute for the unattainable objective determination of things in themselves, though a substitute which is made necessary by the demands of practical reason. To understand this last point, however, we need to consider more carefully the way in which Kant extends the teleological conception from the organic to the world in general.

According to Kant, it is only by the facts of the organic world that we find ourselves immediately driven to the use of the Idea of an end; for it is only the organic which we cannot explain by the action and reaction of parts which are prior to the whole. But, in relation to an organism we naturally regard other things as outward means, and the same is the case with organisms in relation to each other. At the same time, except in the case of the relation of the two sexes, this outward adaptation does not carry with it even a subjective necessity to force us beyond the idea of efficient causation; for it does not imply that the whole is prior to the parts, so that we can determine their unity through it. The world as a whole is not, therefore, given to us as an organism, but merely as an aggregate of externally determined things, some of which are organisms. And, while all organisms find in other things and beings the conditions of their existence, there is no one organism to which all the others are tributary as means, and which does not in its turn become
the means to the life of the others. This is as true of man as of other animals; for, though he makes himself his own end, nature does not treat him, at least in his natural being, as if he were her end. "The chain holds on, and where it ends unknown;" \(^1\) and the beings which he treats as means to his own existence, treat him in turn as a means to theirs. He is thus, if an end to nature and in a sense its highest end, (as he is an organic being, and the most complex and organic of all natural beings), yet by no means the _final_ end of nature. In this respect he is, after all, but one link in the endless chain, one thread in the infinitely extending network of phenomenal causation.

But, if we thus, on the one hand, exclude the reference of all natural ends to one highest end, and, on the other hand, reject the idea that nature as a whole constitutes an organism,—because neither of these conceptions of the world under the idea of final cause finds itself supported by experience,—are we not forced to give up the supposition that there is _any_ unity to which the differences in the world can be referred as their source, and their end? Must we not deny altogether the possibility of Philosophy, in so far as Philosophy seeks for such a unity? Are we not compelled to say that the last attainable result of human inquiry is to trace back nature to its primary contingency, from which, by action and reaction of its constituent elements according to mechanical laws, everything has been evolved; and when that explanation has been worked out as far as possible, must we not stop with a confession of the limits of human knowledge?

To this Kant answers, in the first place, that all this hypothetically necessary, and therefore ultimately contingent, world is determined as such only in relation to the self, which opposes to it the ideal of a world which is an organic unity, and of an intuitive understanding, for which, and in unity with which, such a world exists. In the second place, Kant answers that, while this theoretic

\(^1\) Pope's _Essay on Man_, iii. 25.

"All served, all serving, nothing stands alone;
The chain holds on, and where it ends, unknown."
projection of the unity of self-consciousness upon the world gives rise to a merely problematic Idea, to which experience can never be brought into conformity, we have also to consider that, through the moral law which self-consciousness brings with it, the self is determined as an unconditioned self-realising principle. While, therefore, when we look at man objectively, we are obliged to think of him as one being among others, conditioning them and conditioned by them, and, in this point of view, to recognise that nature finds no principle of unity and determination in man any more than in other beings or things, it is different when we look upon ourselves as subjects, the law of whose being determines them as free, i.e., as unconditioned causes of their own actions. From this point of view, we are obliged to regard ourselves as ends to ourselves, and, therefore, as ends to all nature. For, in moral action, the self to which all nature as phenomenal is relative, determines the phenomenal self, as one object among others in nature, with absolute freedom. As nothing within us can resist such determination (for "we can because we ought"), so neither can it find any resistance in what is without us; for, as an expression of an absolute principle, the moral law cannot find anywhere what is not its own manifestation. This idea is implied by Kant when he says that the highest good combines happiness as well as goodness, and that, as we are bound to seek to realise it, the conditions of its realisation must be present. The moral law must, therefore, be the nature of God, the absolute Being, and must reveal itself without us as well as within us. From this point of view, therefore, man is forced to regard himself as the end of all things; and the fact that he does not seem to be treated by nature as an end, must be explained by the distinction of the happiness which is his end as a natural being, from the moral perfection which is his end as a spiritual being. Nature cannot treat him as an end except so far as he is an end to himself; and he is not an end to himself simply as a natural being, but only as a natural being in whom a moral life is being realised. The Dysteleology of the world in relation to him in the former aspect is, therefore, consistent with its teleology
in the latter aspect. Nature is at war with him, because he is at war with himself. And the very discord of the environment with the natural man may become the means whereby the spiritual man is developed. Thus, when we view the world as a mere natural system, it has no end,—seeing it is not an organism (in which case it would be at once means and end to itself),—nor again is there any one organism in it in relation to which all the rest may be viewed as means: but we may arrive at a different result if we regard man as a being in whom the spiritual principle which underlies nature comes to self-consciousness. For, just in so far as that spiritual principle is developed in man, he finds nature subservient to him; and if, so far as that principle is not developed in him, he finds nature resistent, it is only with a view to his own development.

This conception, which is briefly illustrated in the Critique of Judgment, is more fully developed in a little treatise on the "Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Point of View," in which Kant tries to show that we can regard all history as a unity, only if we consider its end to be the development of all the powers of man, as a rational being in subordination to the law of reason. Thus the weakness of man as an animal, his want of directing instincts, and the very limited provision which nature makes for his satisfaction apart from his own efforts, are all comprehensible, if we conceive that man is intended by nature "to produce everything, that goes beyond the mechanical order of his animal existence, entirely out of himself, and to participate in no other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself, independently of instinct, by his own reason." 1 "It seems as if nature cared not at all that he should live happily, but only that he should so far discipline and develop himself, as by his conduct to make himself worthy of happiness. With all this, there is no doubt something very surprising in the course of history, in which earlier generations seem to carry on their thankless efforts only on account of those that follow, labouring, as it were, to prepare a stage on which they can raise to

1 VII. 320; H. IV. 145.
a higher point the edifice designed by nature; so that only the latest comers can have the good fortune of inhabiting the dwelling which the long series of their predecessors have toiled, though without any conscious intent, to build up. But, perplexing as this may be, it is necessary, if we once assume it was intended that a species of animals endowed with reason should exist, and that, as a species (which is immortal, though all individuals in it die), they were to attain to the full development of all their capacities.”  

1 In other words, Kant allows that, in order to give rational meaning to the history of man, we are obliged to take the point of view of humanity, and treat the whole life of the race as if it were the continuous development of one immortal being, who could realise its “Idea” as a being endowed with reason, “only in the species and not in the individual;” but he maintains that, if we take this point of view, it is possible to regard the whole of History as a process towards an end, determined by the “Idea of Man.” Even more striking is the way in which Kant works out this conception in the following section:—

“The means which nature uses to bring about the development of all the capacities she has given to man, is the antagonism of these very capacities as they are manifested in society, an antagonism which in the end is turned into a means for the establishment of social order. By this antagonism I mean the unsocial sociableness of men, i.e., their inclination to enter into society, which yet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens constantly to break up the society so formed. Men have manifestly an inclination to associate themselves; for in a social state, they are more definitely conscious of themselves as men, i.e., of the development of their natural capacities. But they have also a great inclination to isolate themselves; for they find in themselves at the same time the unsocial characteristic, that each wishes to regulate everything to his own pleasure without reference to others, and therefore, expects resistance on every side, as he is conscious that for himself he is inclined to resist others. Now, it is just this

1 R. VII. 321; H. IV. 146.
resistance which awakens man's powers, which induces him to overcome his tendency to idleness, and which drives him, in the lust for honour, for power, for riches, to win for himself a rank among his fellow men, with whom he cannot live at peace, yet without whom he cannot live at all. In this way, the first steps are taken out of rudeness into civilisation; for civilisation properly lies in that which gives social value to men. In this way all talents are gradually developed, taste is formed, and by the continued progress of enlightenment the first foundations are laid of that habit of mind by which the rude natural capacity for moral distinctions is changed with time into definite practical principles; and the pathologically forced conformity of the individual to society gives place to the harmony of a moral organism. Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities which set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his selfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men would have lived on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect harmony, contentment, and mutual love; but all their talents would forever have remained hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the sheep they tended, they would scarcely have given to their existence a greater value than that of their cattle. And the place among the ends of creation which was left for the development of rational beings would not have been filled. Thanks be to nature for the unsociableness, for the spiteful competition of vanity, for the insatiate desires of gain and power! Without these, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity would have slumbered undeveloped. Man's will is for harmony; but nature knows better what is good for his species: her will is for dissension. He would like a life of comfort and satisfaction, but nature wills that he should be dragged out of idleness and inactive content and plunged into labour and trouble, in order that he may be made to seek in his own prudence for the means of again delivering himself from them. The natural impulses which prompt this effort,—the causes of unsociableness and mutual conflict, out of which so many evils spring,—are also in turn the spurs which drive him to the development of his powers. Thus, they really
betray the providence of a wise Creator, and not the interference of some evil spirit which has meddled with the world which God had nobly planned, and enviously overthrown its order.”

Kant then goes on, in a way with which we are already familiar, to show how men, by the struggle with each other for being and well-being, are gradually driven to "the solution of the greatest problem which nature has set for them; the attainment of a civil society in which a universal rule of justice shall be secured.” For "it is only in a society in which there is the greatest freedom and therefore a thorough antagonism of all the members, and at the same time the most exact determination and secure maintenance of the limit of this freedom in each, so that it may consist with equal freedom in all the rest, that the highest end of nature in man, i.e., the full development of all his natural capacities can be attained.” But "what compels men in spite of their love for unrestricted freedom to enter into such a civil society, is necessity, and especially the greatest of all necessities, viz., that which they put upon each other; since their passions make it impossible for them to subsist alongside of each other in savage freedom.” The greatness of this problem is, however, only to be seen when we consider that "man is a beast who needs a master, to break his natural self-will, and compel him to obey that universal will, under which all can be free.” Yet the only master he can find is a man. “The highest sovereign must himself be just, and yet he must be a man. This problem is the hardest of all; yea, it is impossible to solve it perfectly: for out of the warped wood from which man is made, no carpenter can produce a thing that is quite straight. Only an approximation to this Idea is laid upon us as our highest duty.” We must also remember that the same necessity which makes the individual submit to the rules of law in one society, is working to drive all societies into an alliance, and that ultimately it points to the idea of a Universal Civil Society, by which alone a perfect equilibrium of man’s impulses,—of his impulse toward unity and his impulse toward liberty,—can be secured. “Till

1 R. VII. 323; H. IV. 146.
this last step is taken, the human race endures the hardest evils under an illusive show of external wellbeing; and Rousseau perhaps was not so far wrong as it has been supposed, when he preferred the savage state to the state of civilisation, provided always we leave out of account the last stage to which our species is yet destined to rise. We are already in a high degree cultivated by Art and Science. We are civilised, even to excess, in all kinds of social elegancies and decencies. But much is wanting ere we can call ourselves moralised. Now, the idea of morality is necessary to culture; whereas civilisation is only such a realisation of that idea as is implied in the love of honour, and a feeling for outward propriety. But as long as States spend all their powers in vain and violent efforts at aggrandisement, and thus ceaselessly hinder the slow toil of the education of the inner life of their citizens, instead of giving to it all the outward support it needs, nothing of this kind can be expected; for the culture of the citizen in this highest point of view must depend on a long process of effort by the community to secure such inner development. Meanwhile, all good that is not based on the highest moral principle is nothing but empty appearance and splendid misery.”

In this Essay, Kant purposes only to set up the guiding Idea for a universal history, an Idea which is suggested by the conception of the highest good as an end which must ultimately realise itself within and without us. By aid of it, the student of history is to reflect on the facts and investigate the laws of their connexion. We cannot expect human history empirically to prove its truth, but only to give some partial indications of it; if it were only because the process of history is not ended. Its value is as a leading thread put into our hands by the conception that the world is an intelligible system, which therefore stands in a necessary relation to the absolute law of self-realisation under which man as a rational being is placed. It is not to supersede an “empirically composed history;” but, amid the infinite detail of facts, it supplies a clue which may lead to the detection of those elements which alone give to history its permanent

1 R. VII. 329; H. IV. 152.
interest. And we are to observe that the problem, which
is thus set before us by the Idea of an end of history
determined by the nature of man, is to be solved only
in the usual method of science, by considering the way
in which men have actually acted and reacted on each
other in the past; or, in so far as prophecy of the future
is concerned, by following out to their ultimate results
the working of the same laws that have acted hitherto.

The ideas expressed in this little treatise form the natural
culmination to the conceptions of the Critique of Judg-
ment, and involve a further modification of Kant’s idea
of man as a moral being. For, in the first place, we find
it to be his view that the end of man, even his moral end,
is realised not in the individual, but in the race. The
individual is regarded not as determining himself in isola-
tion by the law of his own being, but as dependent for
his culture on the society to which he belongs, and on
the place which that society holds in the long process of
the development of the great social organism of humanity.
And, in the second place, in the conception of this process,
nature and spirit are brought into close relation; for Kant
does not here speak of the natural passions and desires
as requiring to be superseded in the moral life by a
principle entirely foreign to them; but, under the very
working of these passions, he detects the operation of a
principle by which they are converted to the service of
the moral life which they seem to hinder. On another
occasion he had declared 1 that the maxim: Fiat justitia
percat mundus, is not the expression of a real possibility;
for “moral evil has attached to it by nature the inseparable
characteristic that in its aims it is self-contradictory and
self-destructive, and, therefore, though by a very slow
course of progress, it is destined to make room for the
moral principle of the Good.” 2 But evil cannot make
room for good, unless, in that which we call evil, there
is a principle at work which is at war with its immediate
form as evil. In other words, the passions and desires
as they appear in man are, after all, determined by that
self-consciousness to the abstract law of which they seem
to be opposed. Their opposition to it, as Kant himself

1R. VII. 281; H. VI. 446. 2R. VII. 282.
Such, and i< on from r,.

This is implied in what Kant says of the shepherd life of harmony and peace in which men might have lived, if their passions had not awakened them to antagonism with themselves and with each other. This idyllic life is not the moral ideal; on the contrary, as Kant maintains, it would have brought with it the perpetual slumber of all man's higher powers. But if so,—if the mere absence of the selfism of natural passion is not virtue,—it follows that something is gained by the development of such selfism; and that, while moral excellence implies a negation of selfism, it is a negation in which it is not at all destroyed, but survives in a higher form, in the energetic individualism of a life in which nature has become the expression of spirit.

Such a conception involves something very different from the external addition to morality of a happiness not involved in it, of which Kant generally speaks. It involves the thought that, as happiness or the immediate satisfaction of man's desires is impossible, not by any defect of outward arrangements, but by reason of his own nature (a truth which Kant often acknowledges), so again it cannot by outward arrangement be attached to virtue, and does not need any outward arrangement so to attach it. For, when we look at man as a social being, who realises his moral end only through a long discipline, in which his misery or imperfect happiness arises from his own unsocial passions, and in which this very misery is the means of the development of a higher social state, it becomes obvious that, with the attainment of that state and the moral development which it brings, the main sources of misery and of evil will be removed. The external conditions of happiness are contained in the constitution of the ideal civil society, whenever man's nature is conformed to its laws. Nor is there any need for an external World-Governor to fasten to virtue the appropriate rewards which nature has failed to supply. The problem of the connexion of virtue with happiness ceases to trouble us, whenever, in the spirit of this treatise,
we are raised above the point of view of the individual life, so as, in Goethe's words, "to regard the natural world as a great immortal Individual, which unerringly realises that which is necessary, and thereby makes itself master of the accidental." For the seeming injustice, which makes individuals and generations of men the servants of an end which they never enjoy, and which indeed they could not enjoy because the capacity for it is imperfectly developed in them, at once disappears, if we are authorised to regard the individual as having a right to happiness, only so far as he realises or prepares for the realisation of a capacity which can only be manifested in the whole history of the man.

The effect of Kant's view, then, is to point to a wider Teleology, which includes and subordinates the Dysteleology of nature and human nature; an Optimism which, as it were, absorbs and does away with an immediate Pessimism. We cannot deny the fact that outward nature is not purposive with relation to man as a natural being; on the contrary, in spite of all the higher faculties with which she has endowed him, she treats him as a link, like any other link in the endless chain of conditioned beings. Nor, again, can we deny the fact that men are not purposive in regard to each other as natural beings; i.e., that they are rivals to each other in the pursuit of the natural end of happiness, and that consequently each has to submit to be treated in turn as a means to the other. But these facts are both to be interpreted in the light of the idea that nature as a system of objects is relative to the subject, who, in his consciousness of himself, contains an absolute principle of self-determination and also of the determination of nature. So far, Kant had already gone in the Critique of Practical Reason; now, he adds that the resistance of nature and of other men to our desires may itself be regarded as the means, which enable the higher principle within us to realise itself. Nature resists our immediate wishes, only that we may be driven to conform our wishes to our rational will. Other men are our rivals, their immediate selfism and their natural passions come into collision with ours, that, through the thwarting of both, the highest self may be developed in all, and the
passions may be made the organs, not of nature, but of spirit. Thus, in the first place, man can conquer the resistance of outward nature, not by direct force but by obedience to its laws; and to obey them he must discover them. But this again involves that, subjectively, he must get beyond his immediate impressions and the prejudices they awaken; and that, objectively, he must rise above particular phenomena to the universal principles by which they are determined. In other words, he can make nature his instrument in so far, and in so far only, as his mind and will frees itself from what is merely subjective and individual and makes itself one with the force that already acts in nature. His conquest of nature is, therefore, also a conquest of self, as it is a subordination of his immediate impressions and desires to the higher power of reason that is in him. And, in the second place, this partial self-conquest and self-development is immediately connected with the still higher discipline and education which he receives through his relation to his fellowmen. For, in this relation, the very collision of selfishness works towards the development of the better self which sets all men at one; nor would it be well for man that he should find anything but resistance from other men, until, in the language of Rousseau, his will is at one with the "volonté générale"; in other words, so long as it is at variance with the will of reason, which underlies the particular wills of all rational beings, and is alone capable of uniting them. When Kant speaks of the rational, which is also the moral nature of man, as developed only in the race and through the evolution of the civil society, and when he suggests that in this way the hiatus between the working of natural laws in human history and the teleological principle may be filled up, he practically abandons the merely subjective principle of morals, and with it the absolute opposition of nature to reason or spirit. The social well-being of Humanity is, on this view, an outward end, the realisation of which cannot be separated from the inward realisation of the moral principle in the subject; and the resistance of nature and human nature to the former is necessary to the complete purification and development of the latter. The existence of an enemy without is an indication that the foe
within has not been conquered; and our struggle with the
former is an essential step towards our victory over the
latter.

In the *Critique of Judgment*, then, we find that Kant
reaches the furthest point in that life-long effort of his, on
the one hand, to vindicate the universal principles of
reason as against those who would reduce the universal to
a general name for the particulars, and, on the other hand,
to develop the universal as a principle of determination of
the particulars. Kant was never able to bring these two
tendencies of his philosophy to a unity. They seem rather
to alternate in their influence over him. But, in the
*Critique of Judgment* and in the little treatise *On the Idea
for a Universal History*, he gives expression to the one
principle which makes their reconciliation possible. It is
the same principle which afterwards received such develop-
ment in the Idealistic philosophy of Kant’s successors, the
principle that, while the universal in one point of view may
be described, (as Kant describes it,) as the negation of the
particulars, yet that, when thus taken as their mere nega-
tion, it presupposes them, and that, therefore, its negation
of them cannot be absolute. It can only be a step towards
that transformation of the particulars, in which they first
reveal their true character and relation to the universal.
In order, therefore, to give the full exposition of this prin-
ciple, we have, first, to think of the universal as expressing
itself in particulars, which stand opposed to it as inde-
pendent existences; and, in the next place, we have to
regard this opposition as the beginning of a process, which
we may describe either as a conflict of particulars by which
they destroy each other and leave the universal to rule
alone, or again as a conflict of the particulars with the
universal, and the negation of the former by the latter.
Lastly, we have to recognise that what is removed by this
conflict and this negation is only the independence of the
particulars and the abstractness of the universal; and that
what is realised is the manifestation of the universal as a
principle which, in giving rise to the particulars and in
overcoming their opposition, never ceases to be one with
itself. Expressed in such abstract language, this principle
no doubt has an enigmatic appearance. It becomes more
intelligible when we consider it in the form of "organic unity," i.e., as a unity in which the whole is prior to the parts and reveals itself in a tension of the parts against each other and the whole, which tension is yet the very means whereby the unity of the whole is maintained. A still better illustration of it, we may say the fundamental illustration, is found in self-consciousness—both in itself and in its unity with the consciousness of objects. In the former aspect, it is easy to see that the ego as one with itself, presupposes a dualism, which at the same time it denies, and which, in denying, it reinstates as the essential manifestation of its unity. In the latter aspect, the consciousness of objects is the presupposition of the consciousness of self, but it is its negative presupposition. This point of view determines the main characteristics of the philosophy of Descartes, when, starting with the consciousness of objects, he arrives by abstraction at the consciousness of self, as that which cannot be abstracted from. But Descartes omits to notice that this abstraction contains in it a negative relation, which yet is a necessary relation, between the object and the subject,—a necessary relation which is betrayed by the way in which these two extremes are treated by Descartes himself, as opposite counterparts of each other. For, with him, the form of the subject is directly contrasted with the form of the object, the former being viewed as in perfect unity with itself and purely self-determined, while the latter is regarded as essentially external to itself (being not only infinitely divisible, but infinitely divided), and determined from without. The unity and freedom of spirit and the disunity and inertness of matter are, however, really determined in relation to each other; and Descartes, when he attempts to rise to God as the bond of union between the two, is simply expressing the fact that the former is mediated by the latter, self-consciousness by consciousness of the external world. This idea, however, does not become explicit till we reach the philosophy of Kant, for whom, on the one hand, the object in its difference only exists in relation to the unity of the self; while yet, on the other hand, the consciousness of self is possible only through the consciousness of the object, though in negative relation to it.
Out of this negative relation, which is yet a necessary relation, springs the practical requirement that the subject, in determining itself, should determine the object in accordance with itself,—a requirement which ultimately leads Kant to assert, that the *Summum Bonum* is the unity of goodness and happiness; and that this involves a determination of the outward world, according to the same principle by which the subject is bound to determine himself. The various difficulties in Kant’s philosophy to which these conflicting movements of thought give rise, have been already discussed. The important point for us here, however, is to observe how the successors of Kant, and especially Hegel, detected the dialectical movement by which in all his alternations of thought Kant was guided. In fact, it would not be too much to say that Hegel’s great achievement was, that he brought the unconscious dialectic of Kant to light. Thus, he pointed out that the negative relation of the consciousness of self to the consciousness of the object, being a necessary relation, must conceal a positive relation. Both must be regarded ultimately as forms or expressions of one principle; nay, their difference and opposition must itself be regarded as a necessary phase in the realisation of that principle; for it is necessary that they should stand opposed and indifferent to each other, as separate existences, in order that their unity may be realised. But, just because they are one in the ultimate principle of their being, the apparent determination of the one by the other to which their division gives rise, will ultimately show itself to result neither in the annihilation of the one by the other, nor even in the subordination of the one to the other; but in the full manifestation of the principle, which is present in both, and which has given rise to their difference. Hence, the process of knowledge, in which at first the subject seems merely to submit itself to be determined by the object, will be really the process by which the subject becomes conscious of itself in and through the object; and the process of moral activity,—in which at first the subject seems to determine the object to an end, which is not given in the object itself, but in the nature of the self to which it is made subservient,—will really be the process by which the objective world first
reveals the spirituality of the principle which works in it, the end to which it is determined by its own nature. In this way, freedom and nature will both find their ultimate explanation in the unity that underlies their difference from the first, but which can only reveal itself fully in the attainment of an end in which, as Kant says "perfect art again becomes nature." ¹

To such an Idea Kant ultimately points, nor can we do justice to him without showing that he does so point; though we must also admit that, just because of his original separation of positive and negative, and his refusal to treat a negative relation as involving any objective connexion, he is unable to bring together the end and the beginning of his speculation. But he has got very near to this result, when he regards the struggle of men for existence, for being and well-being, with all its unlovely accidents, as the very means by which the highest social realisation of morality is being brought about. For, what is this but to say that in the struggles of man with nature and with his fellows, the principle of unity, which underlies the difference of man from man as well as the difference of men from nature, is already manifesting itself; and that, therefore, the further progress of that struggle must have just the opposite effect to that which it seems by nature destined to bring about? The freedom that struggles against social necessity, must ultimately discover that it is only in the social organism that the individual can be really free. Men "find their profit in losing of their prayers;" because the prayer for a particular Good, as it is the prayer of a self, intends the universal Good and can find satisfaction only in the universal Good. And the struggle for particular Good is the very means by which this lesson is learnt.

The working of such a thought in Kant's mind could not but influence in some degree his view of Religion; for Religion is concerned with the realisation of that connexion between the moral and the natural world which is the *Summum Bonum*, and which seems to be excluded by the opposition of the principles which rule in these different worlds. Kant could not, without entirely retrac-

¹R. VII. 376; H. IV. 324.
ing his course, give up his fundamental contrast; and in
the end of the Critique of Judgment, he repeats his caution
as to the necessity of proceeding from morality to religion,
and not from religion to morality, if we would not fall into
all those kinds of superstition which arise, when the will of
God is separated from the moral law, and when morality
is viewed as a means to happiness. At the same time, as
we have seen, Kant had come to think of the natural
process of man's life as, by the contradiction which belongs
to it (as the natural life of a spiritual being), giving oppor
tunity for the development of the spiritual principle in
him, and even, when seen from the highest point of view,
as itself constituting that development. And this thought
could not but lead to a mitigation of the harshness with
which the difference of morality and religion, and the
subordination of the latter to the former, was insisted on.
He who had discovered in the natural impulses, even in
the evil impulses, of a spiritual being a power that works
towards the realisation of the highest Good, could hardly
avoid admitting that impulse in its highest forms has
something in it kindred with moral principle. And the
somewhat grudging admission that "love as the free
reception of the will of another into our maxims, is an
indispensable complement to the imperfection of human
nature, which otherwise would only be impelled by a moral
necessity to obey that law which reason prescribes,"¹—at
least indicates a desire on Kant's part to connect his moral
principles more closely with the Religion of Love. The
endeavour to satisfy this desire gave birth to the Treatise
on Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason, which
we may regard as his last effort to bring to a unity the
different principles of his philosophy.

¹R. VII. 424; H. VI. 370.
BOOK IV

KANT'S TREATISE ON RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF MERE REASON

CHAPTER I

KANT'S VIEW OF THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO NATURAL RELIGION

RELIGION, according to Kant's principles, can only come after morality: it must not determine morality, but be determined by it, for the Idea of God arises only in connexion with the Idea of the Chief Good, in which happiness has to be combined with goodness. For this implies a determination of the course of nature in conformity with the law of freedom,—a determination which, as it is not in any way capable of being explained by natural causes, must be referred to the action of the highest moral Legislator, who is also the Author of nature. But in relation to us, such a conformity of nature to freedom, such a connexion of happiness with goodness, is only a finis in consequentiam veniens, of which we are obliged to take account, because we are unable to make the law that determines how we should act our motive, without considering to what result such act must lead. For "it is one of the unavoidable limitations of man, and especially of his practical faculty, in all his actions to look to the consequence in order to find in it something that can serve as end for him,"—"something that he can love." ¹ Hence we get "the Idea of a Good which combines in itself the

¹ R. X. 8; H. VI. 101.
formal condition of all ends, as we ought to have them (duty), and at the same time all that agrees with this condition in the conditioned ends which we naturally have, (the happiness which corresponds to our faithfulness in duty)."  

This is an idea which "does not increase the number of our duties, but only supplies a central point of reference which enables us to bring all our ends into unity with each other;" and " to connect the purpose shown in nature with the ends of freedom."  

We cannot, indeed, base morality upon it, but on the contrary, must base it on morality; yet as moral beings, we must wish it to be realised, and we must strive after its realisation; and we are therefore entitled to postulate God as the condition of its possibility.

So far we may fairly say that Kant keeps God outside of the moral life of man, or brings him in, only as a Deus ex machina, to connect the inward life with the outward. This view coheres with the individualistic theory according to which each man as a spiritual being lives his moral life in isolated self-determination, without any but external relations to other men, and a fortiori without any but external relations to nature. For it is because the individual man's relations to other men and to nature are external, that God—who represents the ultimate unity to which all in their differences must be referred—becomes an external Creator and Law-giver; and, just in proportion as the individual draws near to his fellows and to nature, God ceases to be a transcendent, and becomes an immanent principle in both. To Nominalism, there can exist, if a God at all, only an external God; while Realism on the other hand, by every step which it takes to make the individual subordinate to the unity of the race or of the universe, is approximating at the same time to a Pantheism which makes God all in all. Kant, starting with an individualistic idea of morality, could not logically admit of any but a transcendent Judaic God, who stands related as an isolated individual to all other individuals, though he is the absolute Author and Maintainer of their being. On the other hand, as he advanced in his speculation, Kant was prompted to make continual attempts to bridge over the chasm between man and man, and between nature and

1 R. X. 5; H. VI. 99.  
2 R. X. 6; H. VI. 99.
man; and in the same spirit, he could not but endeavour
also to draw down God into relations with his creatures,
and to conceive him as a principle working in them as
well as upon them. The steps which he takes in this
direction, however, are never other than tentative and
cautious, and he always seems, so to speak, to keep one
foot on what to him is the solid rock of the independent
moral personality of man, and to be ready to draw back
the other whenever the sand sinks beneath it.

The question as to the possibility of bringing religion
into closer relation to morality, and the question as to
the possibility of conceiving the moral life in a less indi-
vidualistic way, are very closely connected: for, once
admit that moral aid and moral hindrance may come to us
from other men or from nature, and God appears as a
Being who is at once within and without us, and whose
determination of us can be reconciled with our freedom.
Now, while Christianity is primarily a moral religion, a
religion which makes the moral conflict of supreme impor-
tance, and, indeed, finds in it the ultimate meaning of every
other conflict or antagonism in man’s life; yet at the same
time, it regards men as members of a race and involved in
its fortunes, and, therefore, as beings whose originally
pure nature has already, prior to any independent act of
the individual, received a bias in the direction of evil, and
who can again be restored to good only by a power which
is higher than, and independent of, the individual will.
Further, it regards his connexion with his race as at once
the source of this evil bias in him, and the means through
which the influences reach him that alone can enable him
to overcome it. For “as in Adam all die, so in Christ
all are to be made alive.” Hence also, Christianity real-
ises itself through a Church; for it is the Church that
furnishes the social medium through which the individual
receives his moral life, and in which he can be active to
communicate the same life to others. While, therefore,
in Christian doctrine the freedom and responsibility of the
individual are constantly asserted, they are not conceived
as excluding all influence from other men, even influences
which reach his very inmost life, influences manifesting
themselves in him as an Evil which he did not produce
and which he cannot cure, and a Good which he did not originate and which he cannot by his own strength develop.

In the present treatise, Kant sets himself to consider how far, from his own point of view, he can appropriate these fundamental conceptions of the Christian religion, or, at least, give them an interpretation in harmony with his own ideas; and also, though in a less direct and conscious way, how far he can stretch or modify his own ideas so as to admit new elements from Christianity.

The first book discusses the doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin. Kant agrees with the scriptural doctrine that "there is none righteous, no not one." The bias to evil is traceable in our earliest years; we find it already developed in us as soon as we are conscious of ourselves. Neither in those who are nearest to the state of nature, nor in those who are furthest from it, neither in the savage nor in the civilised, do we find any exception. Yet this evil we cannot take as something "given," as a natural characteristic which we have no responsibility for causing and which we cannot change. We are conscious of it, as that which ought not to be, and, therefore, as that which we could have hindered from being. Here, therefore, there seems to be an inconsistency between the consciousness of guilt and responsibility, which we feel when we look at ourselves in relation to the law of freedom, and the fact that the origin of our evil bias goes back beyond any conscious effort of our own, and seems to be a tendency inherited from our ancestors.

First, Kant asks us to consider exactly what constitutes the evil bias in us. It does not lie in our sensuous impulses as such, which are neither good nor bad, and for which we cannot be in any way responsible; nor does it lie in a corruption of our practical reason, by which we have lost the idea of moral obligation; for, without that idea, we would be neither guilty nor conscious of guilt. To explain moral evil in man, his sensuous nature contains too little; for if we regard it alone, and leave out of account the motives which arise out of freedom, we reduce man to a mere animal. On the other hand, an evil reason, (or absolutely evil will,) which should declare itself free of
the moral law, contains too much; for in such a will, opposition to the law would itself be the motive of action, and the subject would thus become neither more nor less than a devil."¹ But, if the bias to evil lies neither in the sensuous nor in the rational nature of man, where can it lie? "The distinction whether a man is good or bad cannot lie in the difference of the motives which he takes up into his maxims (i.e., not in the matter of such motives) but only in their relative subordination (i.e., in their form). The question is simply which of the two kinds of motives he makes the condition of the other. Man, even the best man, is bad only because he perverts the moral order of the motives in taking them up into his maxims, and ... makes the motives of selfism the condition of obedience to the moral law, whereas the latter ought to be made the universal maxim of will as the highest condition of the satisfaction of the former."² Under this perversion the idea of happiness, which is only the generalisation of the ends of desire, takes that central place which properly belongs to the moral law, as the principle of unity for all our maxims.

Now, as we are obliged to trace back this perversion to a time prior to all empirical determinations of our will, it might seem necessary that we should refer its origin to that which is not our own action. This, however, is impossible, for that which is not due to a misuse of freedom cannot be moral evil. We must, therefore, carry it back to an act which precedes every act of ours as an event in time, to an "intelligible act which we can know only through reason, and not as empirically given in sense under conditions of time."³ In fact, there is a contradiction in the very thought of knowing an act of freedom under conditions of time; for whatever is conceived as occurring under these conditions, must be referred to some other event that precedes it as its cause. On the other hand, the moral law forces us to regard every act as done by an original use of freedom, and not as determined by any previous act. "Every evil act, if we look to the intelligible origin of it, must be regarded as if the man

¹ R. X. 39; H. VI. 129. ² R. X. 40; H. VI. 130. ³ R. X. 34; H. VI. 125.
fled into it out of the state of innocence”;¹ for reason, with its “Thou canst because thou oughtest,” cannot admit any excuse which would refer the evil act back to what was done before. On the other hand, if we ask how out of the state of innocence man can ever have fallen into evil, we can find no answer; the origin of evil is unsearchable. All we can say is that we see why it is unsearchable. The Biblical narrative seems to express this when it makes temptation come from without, from an evil spirit; though, in truth, it is impossible to see how a temptation from without could act on a being who was pure within. In a similar spirit we have to interpret the doctrine that the sin is inherited from our first parents, viz., as an expression of the truth that sin is due to an act of freedom. In this case, the first in time simply does duty for that which is prior to time itself. Otherwise, the first man’s sin could only be ours in the sense that we recognise that we would have acted as he is said to have acted. Equally incomprehensible is the possibility of a free being turning again from evil to good, which also the moral law forces us to believe. We need not, indeed, exclude the possibility that some “supernatural co-operation with our will may be needed to remove hindrances, if not to give positive help; but if such co-operation be possible, we must first make ourselves worthy to receive it,”² and, so to speak, open our wills to receive it by our own free action. To suppose that we can be made good by using some “means of grace,” some way of getting favour with God other than good action, e.g., that a supernatural influence can be got by doing nothing but praying, “which before an all-seeing Being is nothing but wishing,” is superstition.

On these principles, we may adopt the Stoic doctrine, according to which evil and good are sharply set against each other without any mediation, and conversion from the one to the other can only take place by an instantaneous act, provided only we are careful to remember the distinction between the homo noumenon and the homo pheno-

¹ R. X. 46; H. VI. 135. ² R. X. 51; H. VI. 139.
new creation. But the "new man," which is created by this change of principle, can realise that change in his life as a phenomenal or sensuous being, only by a progressus in infinitum from worse to better; and it is only for God, whose intelligence is not limited by the form of time, that this infinite series becomes a unity. For us it never can be so; hence the best we can have is only a relative confidence in the change of principle within us, a confidence however which may grow with our experience of the stability and gradual improvement of our character in time.

This, however, brings us to the subject of Kant's second book: "The conflict of the good and the evil principle for supremacy in man." The word virtus, or fortitude, which is used by the Stoics, suggests that goodness is a result of warfare; but "these worthy men mistook their true enemy" when they supposed that our moral warfare is with passion, and not with the perverted maxim of the will, by which it has made passion its primary motive. The Apostle was wiser when he said that our "warfare is not with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers," i.e., with evil spirits; only we must remember that this last expression points not to an external, but to an internal, spirit of evil. Now, the spiritual power of evil in us can be combated only by aid of another spiritual power, which Christianity has also personified in a way that corresponds to its true idea. For, "that which alone can make a world the object of the divine decree and the end of the creation, is Humanity (the rational being as such) in its complete moral perfection, from which, as highest condition, happiness must follow as a necessary consequence in the will of the Supreme Being." ¹ In this point of view, humanity may be fitly represented as the only begotten Son of God and the express image of his Person: as the Word "through which all things were made," in whom "God has loved the world," and who gives "power to those who receive him to become sons of God." As this principle is in us, and yet we are not its authors, we may fairly say that it has come down from heaven and taken our nature that it may elevate us, who

¹ R. X. 69; H. VI. 155.
are by nature evil, to itself. And, as we can form an idea of a force only by considering it as overcoming resistance, so we can image to ourselves the power of this ideal of God-pleasing Humanity, only by thinking of a man who has borne the greatest suffering and death itself for the good of men and even of his enemies. It may also, in a true sense, be said that it is only through practical belief in this Son of God, that man can hope to be pleasing to God. On the other hand, we must remember that, if an actual example of perfect goodness were externally presented to us, it could not, as merely an example, have such power over us, except in so far as it awakened in us a consciousness of the ideal of our own nature. And if, on the other hand, we were to identify a good man with the ideal, and so to take him for a being exempt from human weakness, the value of his example would be lost. If we overlook this difficulty,—which arises from the impossibility of combining in one the conceptions of a moral ideal and an example,—we can see how such a being as we have spoken of might call upon men to see their ideal in him, as the blameless Son of God, ("which of you convinceth me of sin?") and to regard devotion to him as the highest duty. Again, the realisation of the moral life in us is only by a continual advance, which always leaves us far short of the ideal; and it is only to God, who sees the heart and views our life sub specie aeternitatis, that this infinite progress can appear as a completed whole. But this difference between the human and the divine point of view may enable us to find a meaning in those expressions of scripture in which we are led to think of Christ as our substitute, and of God as imputing his merit to us and seeing us in him. For while, looking to our own individual lives, we can never have objective proof of our inward conformity to the divine law, and therefore must "work out our salvation with fear and trembling;” yet in so far as we are conscious of continued purity of will, we may rise, in the sense of our unity with the ideal, to a foretaste of the joy which we cannot but associate with an unalterable will for the Good. This joy we may fitly represent as an eternal bliss of heaven, secured to us through unity with our divinely human Lord; while its
opposite sorrow will appear to us as an endless Hell, through identification with the spirit of evil. Lastly, the same system of conceptions may serve to free us from a difficulty which arises out of our moral consciousness, as to the possibility of an Atonement to the violated law for our past guilt. Such an Atonement seems impossible, when we consider that our present obedience is imperfect, and that even if it were perfect, it could not afford a surplus of merit to make up for the past; while, on the other hand, our past guilt seems infinite, both because of the infinity of the highest Lawgiver against whom we sin, and because our guilt lies not merely in special sins, but in the adoption of an evil principle, which contains in itself an endless possibility of evil. It would seem, therefore, that an infinite punishment alone could neutralise this infinite sin; and it would seem, further, that this punishment must be borne at the instant of change, in order to do away with the old life of the individual and open to him a new life. This difficulty Kant meets in the following way: "The change of mind which man passes through, is at once a coming out of evil and an entrance upon good, a putting off of the old, and a putting on of the new man, in which the spirit dies to sin (and so to all inclinations that lead to sin) and lives to righteousness. In this change, however, as an intellectual determination, there are not two separate moral acts, but only one; for the abandonment of evil is possible, only through presence of the will for good which initiates a good life, and vice versa. The good principle is, therefore, contained in the abandonment of evil, as well as in the adoption of good as the motive of the will; and the pain, which rightly accompanies the former, springs entirely out of the latter. The change from the corrupt to the good mind ("dying to the old man, crucifying the flesh") already involves the sacrifice of self and the acceptance of a long series of the evils of life, which the new man takes upon himself in the spirit of the Son of God; i.e., merely for the sake of the Good; evils which, however, properly should have fallen upon the old man (who is morally another) in the shape of punishment. Though, therefore, physically, (viewed in his empirical character as sensible being), he is the same
punishable man, and, as such, must be condemned before a moral court of justice, and therefore by himself, yet in his mind (as an intelligible being) he appears before a divine Judge as morally another. It is, then, this new personality as the guiltless Son of God, which bears the penalty of sin; or, (if we personify the Idea) the Son of God, as Substitute for him and for all who (practically) believe on Himself, bears the guilt of sin; as their Redeemer, makes satisfaction to the highest justice for it by suffering and death; and, as their Representative, secures to them the hope of appearing as justified before their Judge. Thus, (according to this way of representa-
tion) that suffering which the new man must continually 
take upon himself in life while he dies to the old man, is 
regarded as a death suffered once for all by the Representa-
tive of mankind. Here, therefore, we find that surplus of 
merit, beyond that of our own works, which was desider-
ated, and which, by the grace of God, can be imputed to us."

This "Deduction of Justification" shows us the method 
in which Kant proceeds to find a meaning for the Christian 
doctrine of Atonement, while obliterating from it all ideas 
of external substitution and transference. Conversion 
from sin to goodness involves a sorrow for sin which is an 
atonement for it, but which, in the instant it is felt, ceases 
to be a punishment: seeing that the old man who deserves 
punishment has ceased to be. It may, therefore, be 
regarded as a punishment borne by the new man for the 
old, and objectively envisaged as the suffering of the Son 
of God in the place of sinful man, which is appropriated 
to the individual by faith and carries with it the forgiveness 
of sins.

Kant goes on in the same spirit to deal with another 
scriptural conception which is closely connected with the 
idea of Atonement, viz., the conception that the evil prin-
ciple had by the Fall gained a rule over man's original 
inheritance, and had become the "Prince of this world."

1 There is a curious similarity between Kant's way of interpreting Christian 
doctrine and that adopted by the late Dr. McLeod Campbell, in his book on The 
Nature of the Atonement—a book which might be regarded as the euthanasia of 
Scottish Calvinism. R. X. 86; H. VI. 169.
but that this dominion has been overthrown by the virgin-born Son of God, as one in whom the Prince of this world had no part. The evil principle, indeed, tries to tempt this holy Being, who seems to be merely human, to an acknowledgment of his own authority, and failing, he raises a persecution against him, which ends in his death; but this physical victory of the Evil One over the Son of God is a moral defeat. For the conflict is really an inner conflict of principles, which takes place, not in the kingdom of nature, but in that of freedom; in which, therefore, death itself becomes the exhibition of the triumph of the good principle, and the beginning of a like triumph for all that follow its guidance. In this way all the dogmas of Christianity may be interpreted as an expression of the moral revolution whereby the bias of man to evil is overthrown; and, if so, it is well for us to "continue to pay reverence to the outward vesture, that has served to bring into general acceptance a doctrine which really rests upon an authority within the soul of every man, and which, therefore, needs no miracle to commend it to mankind." ¹ It is true that in the outward form in which this Gospel was first presented, not as an expression of principles, but as a record of facts of experience, it seemed to call for the supernatural evidence of miracles; but whether these miracles really took place or not, we need not now concern ourselves. At any rate, they were useful only at the first introduction of the Christian faith, and even then only by reason of the inadequate form in which it was so introduced; and the belief in continued miracles would no longer serve any good purpose, but would rather prevent the necessary transition from the outward form to the inner meaning of it. Hence it was a step in the right direction, when the belief in miracles was confined to the past; and a wise teacher will seek more and more to dissociate the moral doctrine of the necessity for a change of character, from all such external scaffolding.

The third book of Kant's treatise goes on to discuss the conditions of the complete victory of the good principle, and of the foundation of a kingdom of God on earth. For, so far, we have only considered the way in which the

¹ R. X. 100; H. VI. 181.
new principle had to be introduced into the world. The death of Christ, indeed, is regarded by Christianity as already a victory in which "all is finished;" yet, in another sense, it is only the beginning of a struggle which has to be carried on by the Church, the society founded by Christ, till it ends in a complete victory over the world. In his view of the Church Kant is involved in very great difficulties, in so far as his moral principles seem to exclude a social realisation of morality. He begins by pointing out that the great hindrance to the triumph of good in the individual, lies not "in his own rude nature, in so far as he stands isolated by himself, but in his relations to, and connexions with other men." ¹ For the violent passions of envy, ambition, and avarice, which make men reciprocally corrupt each other, grow not out of their immediate wants, but out of their rivalry and conflict with each other in society; and such social evils must be met by a social remedy, "a union of men to guard against evil and to further good, a permanent ever-extending society for the maintenance of morality." "The idea of such an ethical community or empire of virtue, has its objective reality well grounded in reason." ² Now, just as it was the duty of mankind to abandon the legal state of nature, and to enter into a political union for the maintenance of justice, so we may also say that it is their duty to leave the ethical state of nature and combine into a Church for the furtherance of moral virtue. And, as it is only a universal Republic which can finally put an end to war, and fully realise the idea of the legal unity of men; so it is only a universal Church which can realise the moral unity of men, so that they shall cease to be hindrances and become helpers to each other's virtue; and "any partial society is to be regarded only as a schema or approximate representation of the absolute ethical whole" ³ after which we should strive. Such a universal Republic according to laws of virtue, however, differs from the civil society in this, that force can be no instrument in its realisation; for violence can do nothing to secure a moral end. Hence, also the lawgiver in such a society cannot be an outward

¹ R. X. 109; H. VI. 189. ² R. X. III.; H. VI. 191. ³ R. X. 113; H. VI. 193.
sovereign, but only the Being whose will is one with the moral law; nor can such a society have any laws but the moral law itself.

This lofty Idea, however,—how can it be realised? It is no object of possible experience, for it implies a union of men which is universal, as being independent of all accidental differences of opinion, which separate men from each other; absolutely pure, as regards the motives by which the members of it are actuated; free, both in the relation of these members to each other and to the community as a whole; and unchangeable, as regards the principles of its constitution, though in its administration it may be adapted to the circumstances of men in different times and places. Such a union of men would best be compared, not to any form of State, whether monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical, but rather to a "great Family under a common though invisible moral Father, acting through his Son who knows his will, and who at the same time is bound to all the other members of the Family by ties of blood."¹

Now, an actual Church cannot be founded on such a pure creed, for it must have a historical basis; and with this is necessarily connected a certain confusion of the statutory with the moral law, and a partial substitution of a ceremonial service of God for that true service which consists in moral action alone. So far as this is the case, a book-revelation will be put in the place of reason, and a priesthood in the place of the teachers of morality. Thus faith in an external authority tends to substitute itself for faith in the inner law, and what is called "divine service" for the real moral service of God. But this tendency may be counteracted, and ultimately overcome. It is not necessary that the accidents of the outward institution should produce any permanent opposition between it and the moral purpose it is destined to subserve. On the contrary, we find that it has been the case with all book-revelations, and the beliefs therewith connected, that the better teachers of the people "subjected them to a process of interpretation, by which their essential content was gradually brought into agreement with the universal principles of a

¹R. X. 121; H. VI. 200.
moral faith.”¹ And this method of interpretation ought now to be adopted on principle. Indeed, we have a right to say that only that church can be considered a true one, whose faith “carries with it a principle which makes it continually approximate to the pure faith of religion;”² so that finally the leading-strings of historic belief may be dispensed with, and the element of slavish, or mercenary service be removed.

The difficulty, which arises in connection with the historical form in which the truth of religion has to be conveyed to us, may be thus stated:—There are two conditions “under which what is called saving faith brings our hopes of future blessedness; one in relation to what we cannot do, and what, therefore, it would seem, we must have done for us, viz., the legal annulling of our former actions in the sight of a divine judge: the other in relation to what we can do and ought to do for ourselves, viz., the regulation of our future life by the law of duty.”³ Thus we need at once a faith in a satisfaction made for sin by which we are already reconciled with God, and a faith that by a good life in future we can become pleasing to God. These two elements must be united. But the difficulty is to see which of the two we should make the condition of the other; whether we are to ground our faith in the pardon of sin on a good moral life, or vice versa; for either view would seem to involve absurd consequences. If you say that satisfaction has been made for the sins of men, and that we only need to believe in this in order to see our guilt removed, and the very root of it so destroyed that henceforth a good life will be the necessary consequence of this faith, you are maintaining that there is an incomprehensible transference of merit from Christ to us, and that it produces a result with which it has no intelligible connexion. And as such a faith could not be awakened in us by any intelligible process, we must suppose it to be directly inspired by some supernatural influence; whereby the moral life that ensues is deprived of its whole meaning as a process of moral self-determination. If, on the other hand, you say that man, corrupt as he is by nature, is to

¹R. X. 131; H. VI. 208. 
²R. X. 137; H. VI. 213. 
³R. X. 138; H. VI. 213.
make himself into a being pleasing to God without any extraneous aid, how is the possibility of such a process to be made comprehensible? "If he is not to regard the Justice, which he has made his adversary, as reconciled by a satisfaction made for him by another, if he is not to view himself as in a manner born again by this faith, so that, by reason of the union thus formed between him and the good principle, he can now enter upon a new life, on what is he to base the hope of becoming a man well-pleasing to God?" ¹ Now, we cannot theoretically explain the cause of goodness and badness, because both involve the mystery of freedom; but the practical key to the difficulty is, that "the living faith in the ideal of God-pleasing humanity, (in the Son of God), is in itself referred to a moral Idea of Reason, which serves not only as the rule of right conduct, but also as the all-sufficient motive to such conduct. Hence, it is one and the same thing to begin with such a rational faith and with the principle of a good life. On the other hand, the faith in that ideal in its phenomenal form, i.e., the empirical faith in the Christ of history, is not the same thing with the principle of a good life (which must be entirely rational); nor could we begin with such a faith and deduce the good life from it. So taken, the two propositions stated above would be contradictory. But we must remember that in the phenomenal appearance of the God-man, it is not that which falls under the senses, or can be known by experience, but the ideal of our own reason (which we see exemplified or embodied in it), that is, properly speaking, the object of saving faith. And so far as this is the case, faith in the God-man is one with the principle of a good life." ² It is, therefore, one and the same practical Idea which Christians really have before them in these two forms; and, so long as this is the case, the difficulty does not exist. It arises only when this historical fact is detached from its moral meaning, and viewed as a mere fact; and when, as such fact, it is invested with a mystic or a magic influence to produce a moral change in him who believes in it, and who, indeed, is supposed to believe in it by a supernatural and arbitrarily communicated influence. If this were the

¹ R. X. 140; H. VI. 215. ² R. X. 142; H. VI. 217.
truth, we should be reduced to say "that God has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth: a text which, taken literally, is the salto mortale of human reason."

"It is, therefore, a necessary consequence of the union of a physical with a moral capacity in us—the latter of which is the basis and interpreter of all religion—that religion is finally to be detached from its empirical basis, from all statutes which rest on history, and which by means of a church-faith provisionally unite men for the furtherance of the Good; and that thus a pure religion of reason is finally to gain the supremacy, so that "God may be all in all." "The coverings under which the embryo first formed itself to man, must be taken away if the man himself is to come out in the light of day." 1

The leading strings of authority, with the distinctions of clergy and laity, as well as all mere ritual or ceremonial institutions, must give away; till gradually, not by a violent revolution, but by the silent progress of thought, the pure religion of reason shall be established. "We may say, however, that 'the kingdom of God has come to us'—so soon as even the principle of the gradual transition from Church-faith to the pure religion of reason, the principle of a (divine) ethical State on earth, has been anywhere recognised as a fundamental principle, however far off may be the actual realisation of such a State. . . . For there is in man a capacity of recognising, and by living sympathy appropriating that which is good and true, which, therefore, owing to its affinity with his own moral nature, cannot be prevented from gradually gaining power over him so soon as it has once become public property." 2

The Church-faith, in short, is a "useful vehicle" for conveying to men a truth which, finally, by a true enlightenment, will be freed from the need of any such assistance.

According to this view, the history of religion will find its main interest in the constant conflict between the religion of "divine service" and the religion of "morality," and especially in the progress whereby the latter gains more and more the mastery of the former. Such a history

1 R. X. 145; H. VI. 219. 2 R. X. 146; H. VI. 220.
can have a real unity only if we limit it to the record of that part of the human race in which the Idea of a universal Church has been promulgated, and in which, therefore, the question as to the difference of a rational and a historical faith is brought before the public, and its decision is made the greatest of moral concerns. Hence Church History begins with Christianity; for Judaism, at least in its oldest form, was, though a theocracy, rather political than religious; and it was merely an exigency of the time that led the earliest teachers of Christianity to try to connect their faith so closely with the previous beliefs of the Jews. This is evident from the exclusion of the idea of immortality from the Jewish Scriptures; "for without a belief in a future life no religion can be conceived." 1 We may, indeed, trace in the later Judaism of the prophets, the beginning of a higher moral teaching. But the moral idea first clearly detaches itself from Judaism in the life of Christ, who, at the very outset, announced himself as a heaven-sent teacher who had come to free the moral commandment—"to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect,"—from all ritualistic additions, and to declare the faith that is based on this command to be the sole saving faith; and who crowned a life, devoted to the teaching of this doctrine in opposition to the slavish faith in outward ceremonies, by an undeserved death, thus making himself the manifestation of the ideal of Humanity: and who, finally, after this finished work, is represented as returning to the heaven whence he came, leaving to his disciples the promise that he would in spirit be with them even to the end of the world. This heaven-sent individual is further represented as evidencing his supernatural mission by miracles which, by another miracle, are handed down to us in the inspired books of Scripture.

Now, the historical facts of the history of the Founder of the Christian religion and also of his first successors, are to a certain extent hidden from us; because no learned or scientific public existed at that time, which could critically observe them. In later times, when the Christian religion does come within the view of scientific history, it presents itself to us in the form of a priestly and ceremonial cultus;

1 R. X. 151; H. VI. 225.
and the crimes and calamities, the divisions and wars which have attended its development, would throw a very unfavourable light on its real character, if we were not able to account for them "by an evil tendency of human nature," which has caused the merely accidental elements attached to Christianity by the circumstances of its origin in a particular time and place, and especially by the necessity of an accommodation to minds accustomed to an old historical faith, "to be regarded as the essential basis of a religion for the world." ¹

The best time we really know of in the history of Christianity is the present time; for the hindrances that in earlier times prevented the seed of moral truth from developing, have been now for the most part removed, and we are able to see that the visible Church with its historical faith, can only be the schema of an invisible Church whose unity is based on the religion of reason. Two principles especially we can now regard as established by the critically enlightened reason of modern times; first, what we may call "the principle of reasonable modesty with regard to all that is called Revelation. . . . For, as we cannot deny the possibility of the divine origin of a book which in a practical point of view contains nothing but divine truth; . . . as it seems impossible that, without a sacred book, and a church-faith grounded on it, a religious union of men can be formed and maintained; and as we cannot expect in the state of enlightenment we have now reached that a new revelation should be introduced with new miracles, it is best to take the book which we find generally recognised as sacred, and make it the foundation of the teaching of the Church." ² But, while in this view we should not weaken the influence of that Book by useless attacks, so, on the other hand, we should not try to enforce the belief in it or its historical character as necessary to salvation; a policy which would be fatal to the purpose we have in view. We must, therefore, add as a second principle, that the sacred history must be interpreted as having its sole value in an exhibition of God-pleasing Humanity, and not as an account of historical facts, which a man may or may not believe without its making his moral state

¹ R. X. 158; H. VI. 230. ² R. X. 159; H. VI. 231.
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better or worse. And we may welcome in this point of view the representation which the book contains of an end of the world, a final triumph of good over evil, and an entrance of the good into a blessed immortality, as a prophecy which is accordant with reason, though it carries us beyond all possible history. We must, however, remember that all this has only a symbolic significance, and that the "kingdom of God cometh not with observation" but is "within us."

The mysteries of religion also, the church doctrine as to the nature of God and his relation to man, if we take them as showing us, not what God absolutely is, but what he is for us as moral beings, will have a useful meaning. Their mysteriousness really consists in this, that we cannot give a rational meaning to them except in a practical point of view. We are obliged to conceive God as the Creator of the world and the holy Legislator of the moral law, the Preserver of the human race, its good Governor and moral Protector, and as its just Judge; and we may speak of Him as a threefold personality, in order to protect ourselves against the Anthropomorphism which refuses to keep these attributes distinct. But the doctrines of Creation, Redemption and Election represent only different aspects of the same mystery; they are theological answers to the questions: how it is possible for God to create a free being, how it is possible for Him to give such a being when corrupted, the power to return to good: and, finally, how this change should be produced in some and not in others. In regard to such questions, our view is confined to the moral relations of our own being, and all we can say is, that, if there is anything necessary for the moral change and improvement beyond the determination of our own will, that something, we may believe, will be supplied by God. In this sense, we may adopt the doctrine of the Trinity as the formula of our faith. For as the highest, never perfectly attainable perfection of Humanity consists in the love of the law, and as a first principle of religious faith is that "God is love;" it is reasonable to reverence God as the Father who loves men, with the love of moral complacency, in so far as they are conformable to his law. In like manner, we can reverence him as the Son,
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in so far as he reveals himself in the all-embracing ideal of humanity, which is begotten and loved by him from all eternity; and we can reverence him, finally, as the Holy Spirit, in so far as he limits his love to the condition of the agreement of man with the law, or in other words, in so far as his love is grounded in wisdom.

The fourth and last book of Kant's Treatise deals with the nature of the true, religious service of God, which consists in the obedience to the moral law, and its distinction from the priestly and ritual service of the Church, which grows out of the historical conditions under which religion has been established. "It is already the beginning of the victory of the good principle and a sign that 'the Kingdom of God is coming to us,' but even the principles of the constitution of such a Kingdom should be publicly recognised: for, in the intelligible world that may be regarded as already realised, the grounds of the realisation of which have taken firm root in the general consciousness; though the perfect development of its manifestation in the world of sense may yet lie in the far future." ¹ Now we have seen that it is a moral duty to work towards the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth, and that that Kingdom, in the first instance, must take the form of a Church, a special organisation on the basis of a historical creed and with a definite order of administration; and we have seen further, that there are special dangers that the historical form may fail to be used as the vehicle of the truth of reason for which it exists. Natural Religion is the consciousness of all our duties as divine commands, not the consciousness of any special duty to God. But Revealed Religion, while it presents these duties as outward commands, and therefore as positive or arbitrary in form, is apt to introduce other commands which are positive and arbitrary in matter, and even to raise them to a place of higher importance than the precepts of morality. In this way, Revealed Religion may pervert and add to the religion of morality; it may substitute a learned religion, i.e., a religion based on special historical facts and evidences of which only a

¹ R. X. 181; H. VI. 249.
learned class can judge, for the universal religion of reason, which finds its evidence in the consciousness of every one, and thus is universally communicable. Every religion necessarily contains elements of this Natural Religion, for otherwise it could not exist as a religion at all; but the true religion will be one which contains nothing more, or as little more as possible. It will be a Revealed Religion only in the sense that the truth which ultimately is to find its evidence in the minds of those who receive it, comes in the first instance as an external communication. Now, the Christianity of the Gospels is so far identical with Natural Religion, as it teaches that only moral goodness is pleasing to God; as it demands inner as well as outward purity; as it rejects the idea of making up for immoral conduct by religious practices; as it condemns revenge and hate, and teaches forgiveness of injuries, and as it summons up the law in the command to love God above all and our neighbour as ourselves. Finally, while it holds out the hope of future bliss and the fear of future woe, to the good and bad respectively, yet it demands a free obedience to law for the love of it, not a slavish submission prompted by hope and fear. At the same time, Christianity is in a sense a learned religion, in so far as it rests on a historical basis, which cannot be accepted on internal evidence by any one, and of which the external evidence is accessible only to the learned. Here, therefore, lies the danger. The value of a historical belief received on authority is, that it is a vehicle or means to the teaching of Natural Religion. But this relation of means and end may easily be inverted, and the historical faith may be regarded as that which is most important, or even as that, which is the ultimate basis of moral principles; and when this is the case, the teachers of it are at once elevated into priests, who speak with authority, instead of "commending themselves to every one's conscience in the sight of God;" and the outward service of the Church takes the place of the moral life as the main way of pleasing God.

The first step in this degradation of religion is to attach Christianity closely to that Judaism out of which it sprung, and thus to turn the Christian " into a Jew whose Messiah
has come.”¹ In this way the whole Jewish Scriptures are raised to divine authority as expressing that which holds good universally; and the learning of the teacher who expounds a difficult book relating to a far past age, becomes the basis of a religion for all time. The division of laity and clergy is thus made fixed and permanent, and an outward divine service is put in the place of the inner service of morality. God is anthropomorphically conceived as a Lord whom we have to satisfy by evidences of external submission, and therefore by acts which are in themselves useless, by sacrifices and sufferings which lead to no moral result. But “everything outside of a good life by which man supposes he can make himself pleasing to God, is superstition.”² It may, indeed, be true that there is something beyond our power which God can do, and which he must do to supplement our weak efforts after goodness. But what that something is we cannot know; and it is dangerous to teach that the belief in any doctrine about supernatural aid, or the acknowledgment of such belief, is of value in the sight of God as a substitute for, or complement of, moral action. Reason allows us to believe that the divine goodness will supply in some way whatever may be lacking to our moral service, if we are really doing our best; though we cannot determine in what way such aid can be given, and it may “indeed, be of so mysterious a nature, that God can reveal it to us only in a symbolic representation, of which we can understand nothing but its practical significance.”³ If, therefore, any Church asserts that it knows definitely the way in which the moral defect of mankind is supplemented by God, and demands our belief in its assertion as a condition of salvation, we must utterly reject its claims. For the smallest concession to them would open the door for that degrading superstition which is ready to bring every offering to God except a good moral character. And if a “mechanical method of serving God” be once substituted for morality, there is no real difference in principle between the prayer-mill of the Buddhist of Thibet, and the Protestant faith in the efficacy of church attendance.

¹ R. X. 199; H. VI. 264. ² R. X. 205; H. VI. 270. ³ R. X. 207; H. VI. 271.
A very deceptive distinction is sometimes drawn between 
*Nature* and *Grace*, under the former of which are included 
all kinds of moral action, while the latter is supposed to 
consist in some heavenly influence which lies altogether 
outside of our own moral self-determination. In some 
such influence we may be allowed to believe; but, if we 
pretend to have conscious experience of it in ourselves, 
we are yielding to a dangerous illusion: for we may soon 
come to regard such passively received experiences as 
higher than the moral determination of the will which we 
can produce for ourselves. Such a superstitious belief is 
even worse than a faith in the efficiency of outward 
r ritualistic practices; for the latter may be used as a means 
to an end beyond themselves, while the former is "the 
moral death of reason, without which there can be no 
religion, for religion, like morality, must be based on 
principle."¹ In general, however, we may say that he 
is on the wrong road who supposes that he can be well-
pleasing to God by doing or experiencing anything, which 
he can do or experience without becoming a good man.

It is the indication of an advance in the right direction 
when a temple-service such as that which was maintained 
by the Jews, passes into a church-service which may be 
regarded as a provisional means for the support and 
furtherance of a true religious faith. But, as already said, 
the principle in both remains the same, so long as any 
religious value whatsoever is attached to practices which 
are not moral acts. In every form, the belief that we can 
please God and induce Him to accomplish our wishes by 
non-moral acts, involves the superstitious idea that 
"natural means can bring about supernatural effects."² 
Now, this is neither more nor less than Magic, or, (as 
the word Magic is specially associated with the idea of 
dealing with evil spirits), it is Fetish-making. For the 
Fetish-maker is one who "supposes that he can work 
upon God, and so use God as a means to produce some 
result in the world, which the power and insight of man 
cannot of themselves compass, even though they be in 
complete accordance with the divine will."³ It is not 
to be denied that Church observances may have a good

¹ R. X. 211; H. VI. 274. ² R. X. 214; H. VI. 277. ³ Id.
effect, if they are used to develop the moral life of man and so indirectly to make him well-pleasing to God. But everything depends upon the order or relative place which morality and the outward service of God take in our minds. If the so-called "divine service" comes first and virtue is made secondary, it shows that we are thinking of God as an Idol to be propitiated by prayers and flattery; and this necessarily brings in its train priest-craft and fetish-worship. But "piety is not a substitute for virtue which enables us to dispense with it; it is the completion of virtue which crowns it with the hope of the final realisation of all our good ends." All the services of the Church may be of use as means of cultivating piety; but they may all easily be perverted into superstitious rites. Thus Baptism, as the solemn reception of new members into the Church,—the community of those who are combined in the cultivation of virtue,—and the Lord's Supper, as the celebration of their continued union in one body, have a relative value, as they help towards the development of pure moral habit of mind in those who partake in them; but to suppose them to be of any worth in themselves, apart from such influence, is to make them into fetishes. And so it is also with private and public prayer; for true prayer is, not a petition for natural or even spiritual blessing, "but that resolve to lead a good life, which, combined with a consciousness of our frailty, involves a constant desire to be a worthy member of the divine kingdom."¹ And such prayer is always heard; for it produces the Good for which it prays. All the so-called "means of grace" are to be viewed in the same spirit, not as ways in which we may work upon God for our own ends, but rather as ways in which we may work upon ourselves by means of the Idea of God—an Idea which, when it springs out of our moral consciousness, has no little power to quicken and confirm it. But we must always remember that "the right way is not from the divine grace to virtue, but from virtue to the divine grace."²

¹ R. X. 236; H. VI. 295. ² R. X. 244; H. VI. 301.
CHAPTER II

CRITICISM OF KANT'S VIEW OF THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO NATURAL RELIGION

The Treatise on Religion within the bounds of Mere Reason, shows, perhaps more decisively than any other of Kant's works, the strength and the weakness of his position; for in it he seeks to compare the view of religion to which his own principles lead him, with the facts of man's religious history, and in particular of the history of Christianity. He is thus obliged to realise how far he can go in admitting the ideas which underlie the religious life of humanity, and how far his principles force him to reject them as illusory. He is obliged to consider what kind of religion he can consistently accept as genuine, and what he must regard as spurious or imperfect; and, on the other hand, how far he can bridge over the gulf that separates his own abstract conception from the actual religion of his time, either by a critical reinterpretation of popular conceptions, or by a new development or expansion of his own principles. Such a comparison was necessarily the severest of all tests to which the Kantian philosophy could be subjected, and we may, therefore, say that in applying its criteria to Christianity that philosophy criticised itself. Its power of explaining the greatest fact of man's spiritual history furnishes a good measure of its success in penetrating to the principle of man's spiritual life.

The severity of the test in this case, is due partly to the abstract character of the Kantian philosophy, which takes its stand on the moral Idea as the ultimate truth of man's life, and which reduces that Idea to the con-
sciouness of a universal law of reason, to which the individual as such is immediately and absolutely subjected. Now, as was pointed out at the beginning of the previous chapter, this means that the individual in his inner moral life is isolated from all relations to other men and things without him. The absolute law, to which as a rational subject he owns subjection, breaks the bonds of nature, in which, as an individual object among other objects, he is bound; and it sets him alone with himself and with it. He is thus cut off from all except an outward community of existence with his fellowmen. His highest life is solitary and incommunicable; for he can help others and receive help from them only as regards his and their happiness, and not, at least directly, as regards his and their moral perfection. Still more definitely is he cut off in his moral life from nature, which, as it is merely an object, cannot have any right over him or claim upon him as a subject. Now, religion involves a relation to a Being who is conceived as the ultimate source of all beings and things, and as the principle of their unity with each other; but, just in so far as they are conceived as isolated from, or external to each other, that principle of unity must itself be external to them. Now, Kant's assertion of the autonomy of the moral life means that it is an inner life with which neither man nor nature can directly interfere; it means, therefore, that there is no point above their separation at which where spiritual beings, or, a fortiori, spiritual and material beings, can unite with each other. In the inmost secret of their being moral persons are atomic individuals who resist all fusion, and even, beyond a definite limit, repel all approximation; and the principle which unites them and keeps them united must therefore be not within, but without them. On such a theory, God, as the principle of unity, cannot be conceived as manifesting or realising Himself in the life of man and of nature, but only as an external Creator and Governor who at their creation lets them go from his hand, as independent beings to whom he abandons the care of their own destiny, controlling them merely by an external rule. It would seem, therefore, that in his religious conceptions Kant is limited to a kind of Judaism; and that
his God must be merely a great "Not-ourselves, that works for the righteousness" of his creatures by rewards and punishments, and not a divine indwelling Spirit, the consciousness of which is immediately bound up with the consciousness of themselves. Religion could come in only as a kind of second thought or external supplement to morality, (which is necessary because, after all man lives an outward as well as an inward life, and the two lives must be somehow connected together); it could not be regarded as the principle from which the inner life itself springs or in which it centres.

It appears, then, that Kant's subjective view of morality limits and distorts his conception of religion, as we have seen that it limited and distorted his conception of the social and political life. Yet, as usual, his strenuous efforts to deal with the facts and to face all the difficulties of his subject, lead him to make concessions and to suggest mediating ideas, which, if they do not amount to a transformation of his original theory, yet give us considerable help in seeing where its defect lies, and how it should be supplemented. And it is highly instructive to see how much new light he is thus able to throw upon the whole process of man's life in all its stages and aspects — upon his fall and moral corruption, upon his repentance and moral recovery, upon the social mediation by which the growth of the spiritual life in the individual and the world is promoted, and upon the relation of the outward service of religion to the inner life,—while still maintaining that opposition of nature and spirit which is essential to his moral theory. Whether, in the alternation of concession and recoil, admissions and reservations, in which he has involved himself, Kant has not strained his principles to the breaking point, will be hereafter considered.

In attempting in his own way to appropriate the Biblical doctrine, Kant finds himself forced, in the first place, to deal with the Pauline conceptions of the fall of humanity in Adam, and its restoration in Christ. But these conceptions are essentially connected with the idea of mankind as an organism, in which evil or good cannot be confined to one member, but, if set up in one, must necessarily
pervade all the others. Any force which tends to disorganise and destroy the natural body must diffuse itself from one member to another till the whole body is infected; unless at some point in the organism a greater force working towards restoration is set up to absorb and overcome it. So, according to the Pauline doctrine, the fatal inheritance of sin derived from Adam is conceived as passing on from generation to generation, ever extending and deepening its effects; and “the Law” is supposed only to make men conscious of the evil power that has taken hold upon them, without enabling them to resist it, or throw it off. Finally, Christ is regarded as the source of a new regenerative principle, the action of which is as pure an expression of good as the fall was an expression of evil,—a principle of endless life, which by its transcendent power overcomes the disintegrating force of evil, and restores the whole organism to more than its original moral health and energy. And in the proleptic language of thought,—treating that as already completely realised the principle of which only has come into existence,—St. Paul declares that all men have died in Adam, and that in Christ all are again made alive.

It might seem, at first, as if Kant had no point of contact with such language, every word of which implies a kind of “solidarity” of mankind, which he altogether repudiates. One who regards each man as centred in himself, moving in the self-determined sphere of an inner life into which no other can intrude, could scarcely be expected to find much satisfaction in the idea of Humanity as a corporate body, which “moveth altogether, if it move at all”; so that the life of each individual is regarded as only a factor in the life of the whole, and his fate as depending not on himself, but on the issue of the general struggle between the powers of good and evil in the whole organism. The individual, indeed, must recognise that he is one with the universal, in such a sense that he cannot realise the end of his own being except by realising it. But with Kant the universal of morality takes the form, not of a principle working in the social life of humanity, but of an abstract law, which speaks only to the individual from within. If the law commands him to act in con-
formity with the "Idea of a kingdom of ends," yet that kingdom is merely possible, and it can never, on Kantian principles, be more than an Idea. It appears, therefore, as if any appropriation by Kant to the formulæ of Christian doctrine must be a mere Procrustean attempt to force a moral Individualism into the language of a creed which is nothing if not social, or even socialistic.

There is, however, one point at which Kant is compelled by his own rigour as a moralist to admit ideas kindred to those of St. Paul. For, while the moral law presupposes in man an absolute power of self-determination, for which it supplies the all-sufficient motive, or at least the motive to which all the impulses of natural passion are to be subordinated in being admitted as motives at all, our actual moral experience seems to show that there is not one individual among men in whom this normal relation of the law of reason to the desires is maintained. From the very beginning of his earthly experience, there is in man an "evil bias," a perversion of the true order of his life, according to which the principle of the natural life, "the law of the members," should be subjected to the principle of the spiritual life, the "law of the mind." In all men the particular desires assert their claims without waiting for the law to determine the conditions of their gratification; and even in the best of men the virtuous life is a continual struggle to restore the balance of nature, i.e., to restore such subordination of passion to reason that it shall never act except on the presupposition of the law, and to raise themselves above the immoral attitude of mind, in which passion speaks first and the law only comes in in the second instance to limit it. As things are at present, all our good acts seem to be partial efforts to put the particular impulses of passion in their due relation to the law, efforts which never alter the fundamental disorganisation in the relation of reason and passion. Hence the moral life appears as a processus in infinitum, a series of approximations to a goal that can never be attained. Yet, in spite of all this, the identity of the law with the self who is conscious of it appears in the fact that that law is an absolute imperative; or, in other words, reason presents its law not as a motive,
but as the motive, which excludes all motives independent of it, and even refuses to make any allowance for them, obliging us to regard every evil act "as if by it we had fallen out of a state of innocence." The moral law does not admit the evil bias which we have inherited with our natural life as an excuse for our failings, but rather treats this evil state as the worst part of our guilt; and, on the other hand, it commands us not merely to act rightly in particular cases, but to exterminate the evil principle within us, and to "be perfect as our Father in Heaven is perfect," just as if we could elevate ourselves at one stroke above the necessity for further struggle.

Now, what are we to say of this antinomy between the moral consciousness, which forces us, on the one hand, to abstract from all our empirically determined individuality, and to feel guilty for an evil which we cannot trace back to any empirical act of our own; and, on the other hand, to regard ourselves as bound at once not only to give up all evil action, but to root out its source in our nature, while yet we are well aware that empirically it will be an endless task to subdue the recalcitrant impulses which have been let loose within us? Kant's answer is that the consciousness of guilt for the evil bias (original sin) can only be explained by referring that bias to an "intelligible act," by which the impulses of nature were taken up into our maxims or made into independent motives competing with the moral law, the only motive that springs out of reason. This intelligible act is the source of a bias from which in our particular volitions we cannot free ourselves; and its effects can be neutralised only by another intelligible act, which restores the moral law to its original supremacy as a motive. Empirically, indeed, the effect of the first act manifests itself in a long series of acts, in which particular pleasures, or happiness as the sum of pleasures, are sought without regard to the limitations of the moral law; and, empirically, the second act reduces itself to a long series of acts, in which the pursuit of particular pleasures or of happiness in general is limited and subordinated to the realisation of that law. But, as it is the peculiar characteristic of man as a rational being "that he can be determined to action
by no motive except so far as he has taken it up into his maxim, or made it a universal rule of his action," the struggle of passion with the consciousness of duty in particular cases is always to be regarded as a phenomenon, of which the noumenon is a struggle of principles; and one of these principles must possess the man wholly to the exclusion of the other. Hence the Stoic theory, according to which wisdom and folly are absolutely opposed to each other, and change from one to the other as possible only by an instantaneous conversion, a complete revolution of the whole character, must be regarded as expressing the ultimate truth as to the process of man's spiritual life. At the same time, we must remember that, in order to bring this truth into relation with our experience as empirical subjects, we are obliged to think of the intelligible act by which man becomes evil as realising itself in a long series of acts, by which character becomes gradually deteriorated (though without ever losing the consciousness that in doing evil it is at war with itself); and of the intelligible act by which we turn to good, as a long series of acts by which the evil bias is gradually overcome. But for God, who sees man's life, not under conditions of time, but *sub specie aeternitatis*, the whole series of evil acts sums itself up in the one act whereby the principle of evil is "taken up into our maxims;" and, in like manner, the infinite series of acts of progressive virtue sums itself up in the one act by which the moral law is restored to its place as the one all-sufficient motive. Hence it is a fair inference from Kant's view to say, that original sin is the one great sin we have to repent of, and that when it is repented of, all other sins are atoned for and done away.

Now, it is easy to see how, on these principles, the Pauline doctrine of the Fall and Redemption can be reinterpreted in a Kantian sense. Kant cannot admit that moral evil or moral good are to be referred to anything which lies beyond the individual will. Adam's sin cannot become our sin, nor Christ's goodness our goodness. But there is a sense in which the corruption and the restoration of the individual will is due to something beyond itself; for its intelligible lies beyond its empirical character. The
root of all the moral failure or deterioration, which shows itself in the long series of his acts in time, lies in an intelligible act of choice by which the principle of evil is brought into the will; and the possibility of recovery also must lie in a timeless act by which the principle of good is again restored to its place; an act which cannot be objectively known, because, as objectively known, it must translate itself into a long series of acts, each of which is only relatively good. In this sense, it may be said that the homo phenomenon is neither lost nor saved, neither falls nor is redeemed, by his own act, but only by the acts of the homo noumenon. And the whole language of Christian theology as to imputed guilt and imputed righteousness, can be accepted as the Vorstellung, the natural symbol for the truth. Indeed, if we are to express the higher consciousness which man has of himself as a moral subject, in the forms of the empirical consciousness which we have of ourselves and others as objects, we cannot avoid using some such language as that which actually is used in Christian theology. We must speak of that as an event or a series of events in time, which is really a timeless act, because otherwise we could not speak of it at all; and we must speak of it as done for us by another—by a man who has realised the ideal of Humanity,—in order to distinguish it from particular empirical acts. Nor is there any harm in such language, provided we do not press it beyond the point, up to which the analogy of the natural and the spiritual world holds good. It is, however, the office of Critical Philosophy, to keep us from supposing that we can know or objectively realise, that which we can only think, and which we cannot even think without abstracting from all the conditions of such objective realisation. And it is its office also to prevent us from transferring the necessary imperfections belonging to the symbolic form, in which alone we can express the truth, to the truth expressed.

The important point here is to observe what elements in the doctrine of Christianity Kant considers as belonging merely to the symbolic form in which the truth is objectively expressed, and what, therefore, he bids us set aside when we rise in thought from the symbol to the thing
represented by it. In the first place, and as a matter of course, he bids us reject all that belongs to the form of the representation of objects as in space and time, \textit{i.e.}, all that makes us conceive of the spiritual as another natural world, existing side by side with the world of nature and, occasionally at least, interfering with it. He thus regards all miraculous interference with the course of nature without, and equally all miraculous influences upon the course of our mental life within,—all miracles and all supernatural grace or illumination,—as illusory. He will not, indeed, deny the possibility of such interferences, especially of a divine grace which supplements our own efforts after goodness; indeed, he even seems to encourage the thought of such divine aid. But he holds it essential to our intellectual sanity not to admit its possibility as a conscious experience in our inner life. In the course of nature no supernatural link must be intercalated. To admit a miracle would be to break the context of experience, in which alone we can know objects as such; and to admit a conscious experience of divine grace, a supernatural illumination, would be the moral death of reason. For it is not as an object either of inner or of outer experience that we can apprehend God or his relation to us, but only in so far as his existence and his action are postulated by the moral law.

But this leads me to observe, in the \textit{second} place, that Kant regards the denial of all interference of the supernatural with the natural as involving also the denial of any objective, and especially of any social, mediation in the moral life of the individual. "Each in his hidden world of joy or woe, our hermit spirits dwell;" and as we are each charged with our own moral destiny, so no thing or person, neither nature nor man nor even God, can directly help or hinder us. Guided by that negative tendency which makes him isolate the pure consciousness of self from all consciousness of objects, instead of seeing in the former the completion of the latter, Kant looks upon the subject as in its pure self-determination exclusive of all determination by objects. Hence, not only does he conceive of the moral law as a law the content of which has no reference to any object, but also he thinks that
all acts to be attributed to the subject must ultimately be traced back to the agency of a self which has no other determination but that law; for, ex hypothesi, the moral subject cannot be determined by any object, except so far as it allows itself to be so determined. Primarily, the self has no motives except what it gives to itself, and the moral law is the only motive which it necessarily gives to itself, the only motive which it can derive purely from itself. If we held Kant strictly to this point of view, the Fall would become an incomprehensible act by which a rational being takes to itself a sensuous nature, and Redemption an equally incomprehensible act by which it rids itself of that nature; the former would involve a mysterious movement of will by which it partly ceases to be itself and takes to itself an element which does not properly belong to it, and the latter would involve an equally mysterious expulsion of the foreign element so introduced. Kant, however, never goes quite this length, or treats the "intelligible act" by which the evil bias was produced, as an act, (like that pictured in Plato's myth of the Phaedrus,) by which a purely rational being becomes also sensuous. On the contrary, he regards the Fall as only a perversion of the proper order of the rational and sensuous principles, both of which essentially belong to man's nature. Thus, while he regards the independence of the motives of passion as an essential perversion of man's nature, he does not look upon their existence in separation from the motives of reason as already containing the germ of such perversion; and, conversely, while he admits that moral recovery involves the subjection of the passions to the limiting condition of the law of reason, he does not suppose that these passions can themselves be identified with the rational principle to which they are subjected. He thus seems to hold a kind of ambiguous position between Dualism and Monism, and it is no easy matter to express what he does and does not hold, without appearing to contradict oneself at every step.

Some light may be thrown on Kant's position by a comparison of it with the kindred philosophy of the Stoics. The Stoics, like Kant, conceived of morality as the abstract self-determination of reason by its own law, and by that
only. Further, they held this law to be negatively related to the passions and their objects, and therefore they regarded moral freedom as involving an absolute exclusion of the passions as motives. The passions, in their view, are "unnatural;" that is, they are a mysterious intrusion into the rational being of something which is not himself, something which he must expel, if he is to live "in harmony" with himself or with his own nature. Logically, it is difficult to see how the Stoics could speak of this intrusion and the consequent slavery of the will as other than a self-surrender of reason, a self-surrender as mysterious as Kant's intelligible act; but they take the existence of passion in man simply as a fact, and only insist on the necessity of its being extirpated ere he can become one with himself. And the supposition of such a moral necessity enables them to escape from that part of Kant's difficulty, which arises from his constant effort to make terms between passion and reason, yet without admitting any ultimate identity between them. They cut the knot of the problem of morals by the ascetic solution, though with the result that morality for them becomes purely negative. For, after the extrusion of passion, reason has no content, no motive, by which to determine itself. The universal as abstracted from, and opposed to the particular, vanishes in an empty tautology. It is true that they inculcate the duty of philanthropy and the necessity of a religious surrender of self to God, and these seem at first to supply the place of positive determinations for the rational life; but on a closer view their religion and their social morality are found to disappear in the same abstract identity which is implied in their idea of moral freedom. Deo parere libertas est; but God is just the same abstract universal in relation to the world, as that which constitutes the "nature" of the rational being in relation to his passions. The Optimism of the Stoics is an Optimism in general, which is Pessimism in particular; it is not the perception of a reason which is present in any special forms of the life of nature or the life of man. And the social principle, which is based on the recognition of a bare identity of reason as it potentially exists in every man, cannot legitimately give rise to the
conception of a social organism. Men are not bound together by the fact that they are indistinguishably alike, but by the fact that through their correlated differences the one reason manifests itself.¹

Up to a certain point Kant follows the same movement of thought which is exemplified in the Stoic philosophy. We might, therefore, expect that with him also the universal should be absolutely opposed to the particular, and that reason should be conceived as returning upon itself through the exclusion of everything but its own identity. But Kant does not regard passion as a mere intruder into man’s natural life. He does not conceive the “intelligible act” of the Fall as for the first time introducing the sensuous passions into his being, but simply as perverting that original order of man’s life in which these passions are subordinated to the law of reason. Indeed, he thinks that, on the former view, the “intelligible act,” by which other motives than those of reason were created, would be the act of a devil and not of a man. The moral recovery of man is, therefore, not the extinction of passion, but its subordination to the moral law. He often, indeed, speaks of a perfect moral act as one in which the law, and the law only is the motive; but he does not take this as involving that the motives of passion should be excluded, but only that their gratification should be limited by the moral law. The same kind of compromise appears in his treatment of the relation of moral actions to the objective ends they tend to realise, and especially to the realisation of an ideal society. The immediate tendency of his logic would make us expect to find him treating all objects, whether things or persons, as unessential and external to the self-determining subject, and even God as a “hypothesis of which he has no need.” But Kant recoils from this result; for he regards the moral self-determination of the subject as relative to an objective end, though not determined by it as a motive, and God as necessary to secure the realisation of that end. Thus, the establishment of a perfect social order, by which nature may be subjected to spiritual ends, and men may become members one of another, becomes at least a finis in conse-

¹Cf. above, pp. 220, 365.
quentiam veniens; and God, though not directly required for the moral life, is supposed to be needed to produce the conformity of the natural life to it. The effect of this compromise is to produce a 'nest of antinomies': antinomies between the Stoic and Hedonistic elements of his moral theory, between his Individualism and his Socialism, and finally between his Ethics and his Theology. But, as usual, Kant indicates a better way than his own of reconciling the opposites he brings together; if only we keep in view the relation of the method of abstraction which he nominally follows to the method of synthesis which he suggests.

The truth is that Kant's rejection of the absolute dualism of the Stoics necessarily brings with it a transformation of the idea of moral freedom, which yet he did not himself carry out. If freedom be the determination of the self by its own law to the exclusion of all other motives,—and such it must be, if with Kant we suppose the pure consciousness of self to be merely negatively related to the consciousness of objects—then the Stoic conception of the moral life is the only reasonable one. The beginning of virtue will be apathy,—an extinction of passion which leaves the pure self to determine itself without the intrusion of any motive from without. On this view, however, the actual presence in us of passion as a motive will be inexplicable. If we go back to the cause of that presence, we must suppose an explicable turning away of the will from its own law, an unmotived conversion of pure will for good into a devilish will for evil; and the reversal of this process will be as inexplicable as the original act itself. Nor will any light be thrown by such a view on the actual state of man's will, in which passion holds its ground as a rival motive, and yet is recognised as that which ought not to be. If, on the other hand, we adopt Kant's view of man's nature as from the first both rational and sensuous, and regard the moral end as being, not the extinction of passion, but its harmony with a law of duty which flows from the idea of the self, we cannot admit that irreducible division between these two halves of his being, which forces Kant to conceive the realisation of the moral end as a progressus in infinitum. Kant puts
the problem in a misleading way, when he asserts that evil cannot lie either in the natural desires which of themselves are non-moral or innocent, or in the corruption of the morally legislative reason, which is impossible; and that, therefore, it must lie in a perversion of their due relation. For the desires cannot exist in man as simple natural impulses, but only as desires of particular objects which are at the same time desires for a universal Good that can satisfy the self; nor can practical reason bring before us a universal Good which is not to be realised in any particular object. Hence, to speak of a perversion of the relation of the universal and the particular, which, at the same time, leaves the character of each of these elements in itself unchanged, is to forget the essential unity or relativity of all the elements which are included in our consciousness of ourselves. If the different elements of our being are united with one self, they must be united with each other, and united in such a way as to make an external relation of them impossible. No doubt, there is a moral division in man's nature, which sometimes even tempts us to speak of him as if he were two persons in one. But the problem lies just in the unity of the being who is thus divided against himself, and who recognises the impulse to break the law as his own impulse at the same time that he recognises the law as his own law. If we do not admit the identical self as present in both, or if, following Kant, we refer the law to the noumenal and the desire to the phenomenal self, we cease to have even a problem before us. For the actual determination must then come from an empty unity which is beyond the distinction of the phenomenal and the noumenal subjects, from a self to which the law is an external motive quite as much as the passions. If, on the other hand, we admit that every desire of a particular object, in order to be a possible motive of the self, must be a particular form of the desire for the satisfaction of that self, we cannot but recognise that even a wrong desire implies an undeveloped consciousness of the Good, in which satisfaction for the self alone can be found. The aphorism, video meliora proboque deteriora sequor, undoubtedly expresses a veritable experience; in fact, it
expresses an experience which is always present in some form or other to all beings capable of moral development. But it is possible only because the meliora are not so perfectly seen as to preclude the deteriora being also set before us as sub ratione Boni. There is a point of view from which it is possible to say that all vice is ignorance, and that men do evil because "they know not what they do." Thus the process whereby men come to know what is good is not separable from the process by which they come to do it, and the conception that there can be a completed knowledge of Good, which yet remains inoperative, shows a defective perception of what such knowledge would involve. It is possible, no doubt, to have moral Good before us as an abstract law, and yet not to obey it. Indeed, consciousness of it in that form has a very feeble power as a motive with most minds, and even in minds that most willingly accept it, it has rather a repressive than a stimulative effect. It is only as the consciousness of law passes into the consciousness of social relations and so of an end in which the individual finds a positive object, that it can awake a higher affection which expels, or rather absorbs the lower. But this only shows that the knowledge of good itself must grow by the same process in which we become capable of giving practical effect to it in our conduct; and, on the other hand, that the incapacity of giving to it such practical effect, is a proof that the knowledge itself is imperfect.

The imperfection of Kant's view of the moral life lies mainly in the onesided way in which he insists on the idea that the moral law is the law of our own being: a law which as rational creatures we lay down for ourselves, and which, as it is our own law, it must be in our power to obey. For if this be an adequate view of it, the moral life must be regarded as a life of individual self-determination, in which neither God nor man can assist us, but in which each individual has to carry on his separate inward struggle by his own unaided strength. Now, the Protestant Reformation had isolated the individual from his fellows, and left him alone with God. It purchased freedom towards man by absolute slavery towards God, (as is involved even in the title of Luther's treatise De
Servo Arbitrio); nay, in Calvinism, it came perilously near to a Pantheism which identifies him, in so far as he is allowed to have any higher will or reason, i.e., as one of the elect, with God. In this sense, Spinoza may be said to have betrayed the secret of his time. But the enlightenment of the eighteenth century went further, and isolated the individual not only from man and nature, but from God. And Kant, as a true son of the eighteenth century, accepted the individualistic view of man, only insisting that even when man is left alone with himself, he is still face to face with the universal law of his being. Kant, in fact, substitutes the idea of freedom for the idea of a divine servitude; though he adds that it is a freedom which is capable of being enjoyed only by one who is a law to himself. He makes the individual a little world in himself, and absolutely opposes his self-determination to all determination of him by any other being or thing. The individual as sensuous is regarded as open to influences from other things; but they have power over his will only as he gives them that power, and just as far he is true to himself, he will not give it.

Now, I have often pointed out the root from which this negative view of morality, this opposition of self-determination to all determination by another, springs. As, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant conceives the pure consciousness of self as negatively related to the consciousness of objects and as the source of an ideal with which the consciousness of objects is incommensurable, so, in his Ethics, he thinks of self-determination—the determination of the subject by the pure idea of himself as an end,—as negatively related to all desires, which are nothing but determinations of the empirical self by objects; and he regards the "Kingdom of Ends," in which alone the pure self could be realised, as a pure ideal to which no realisation of morality in the objective world can ever be commensurate. Hence, it is not possible for him to admit that the will for the realisation of the self can ever be identified with the desire for any object, or, in other words, that self-determination can ever be the same thing as determination by any objective end. Now, as we have seen, Kant himself showed us the way out of this labyrinth.
when he pointed out that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects, and is simply the return of the subject of such consciousness upon itself. For, though by this return the self is opposed to objects, yet it is opposed to them merely because it contains the germ of a deeper consciousness of them. Hence, self-consciousness is seen to be not only the source of an ideal with which our former consciousness of objects—our consciousness of objects in which their relation to the self was not reflected on—is incommensurable; it is also the source of a new view of these objects in which their real nature is revealed. Now, in a similar way here, we may see that the consciousness of the self as under a law of its own, or as capable of determining itself by the idea of itself, presupposes a consciousness of objects as ends in which we seek to realise ourselves. No doubt, it also implies that we have a consciousness of the inadequacy of these objects in their particularity as ends: a consciousness that in seeking these objects as ends, we are enslaving ourselves to a foreign power. Thus, the realisation of the self is opposed to the realisation of any objective ends of desire; or if it be regarded as itself setting before us any objective end, that end is taken as an ideal which is incapable of being realised, as a universal end to which no particular object can correspond. At this point, Kant stops; or he goes beyond it only by postulating a Deus ex machina to bridge over the chasm which cannot be filled up between the ideal and the real. But it is obvious that here also we may repeat the criticism made upon Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. The consciousness of objective ends is, on Kant's own showing, the necessary presupposition of the consciousness of the self,—or what is the same thing, of an ideal derived from the consciousness of self,—as an end; and if the latter consciousness goes beyond the former, it is only by bringing to light a principle which was present in the former, though not reflected on. In setting before us as an end the attainment of any object, we necessarily conceive it in relation to the self, i.e., as an end in which the self is realised; and our subsequent dissatisfaction with it when attained, is a proof that we do not find in it what we were seeking. Out of such dissatisfaction with particular ends,
—in which, as we might express it, our desires, but not we, are satisfied,—arises that reflective consciousness which contrasts the satisfaction of desire with the realisation of the self; *i.e.*, the slavery of passion with the freedom of obedience to the law of our own being. But in the attitude of thought thus initiated, the opposition between the particular and the universal is as unduly emphasised as their unity was before; and it becomes needful to remember that, if determination by the self or by the law of the self is opposed to determination by the particular desires, it is only because, as the desires of a self-conscious being, these desires are in contradiction with themselves; or, what is the same thing, it is only because, in their reference to the self, they contain an element which is not reflected on, so long as they are present to consciousness merely *as* particular desires. When, therefore, to use the language of Aristotle, βουλήσις is separated from the ἐπιθυμία, or, in other words, the desire of the Good, from the desires of particular objects as good, we have to remember that it is their own universal which is thus opposed to them; and, on the other hand, that if that universal be altogether isolated from the particulars it becomes empty and meaningless. The advance *from* the consciousness of the particular to the consciousness of the universal will, therefore, end in nothing, if it be not the source of a new consciousness of the universal as realised *in* the particular. The objects of desire, which were rejected as in themselves in opposition to the Good, must be recognised as particular forms in which that Good is realised; or, in other words, the idea of Good must be recognised as a principle which gives its special value to each object of desire, by assigning to it a place in the system of goods, the attainment of which is the realisation of the self.

The elements included in the highest Good, *i.e.*, in the Idea of an end commensurate with the self, are two; the establishment of a kingdom of ends, an ideal community of all spiritual beings, and the securing to such a community of perfect happiness, as the consequent of universal goodness. But, according to Kant, the former remains an *ideal*, because no one can secure by his action the goodness of any one but himself; and the latter remains a *postulate*.
—or rather, we should say, it requires the postulate of God as a Being who adds happiness to goodness. Now, it is easy to see that the purely ideal character of the kingdom of ends, and the merely postulated character of the relation of nature to spirit, as Kant conceives them, are due to the same defect of his philosophy. To begin with the latter, there is with Kant no immediate connexion between the natural and the spiritual, because spirit is conceived as the mere negation of nature, and not as that in which nature shows what it really is; yet it is this latter idea which is suggested by the correlation which Kant acknowledges, between the consciousness of objects and the consciousness of self. That

"... Winds blow, and waters roll
Strength to the brave, and power and Deity,"

cannot be necessary, if the self-determined moral life is a mere intrusion upon nature of a principle which is other than itself and unrelated to it. As little will it be necessary, if that life is a mere continuation of mechanical processes; for there is no reason why one set of mechanical processes should be subordinated to another. On both these theories, such subordination must be the result of external arrangement. It will be necessary only if in spirit there is revealed what is implicit and hidden in nature; if in spirit nature comes not only to a self, but to its self. Kant, however, seems to think that our choice is only between an immediate unity of the spiritual with the natural,—which would involve the subjugation of spirit to the necessity of nature,—and a dualism which would oppose them in such a way that any harmony must be the result of an external arrangement. The external character of the unity of spirit and nature, and the external God who is brought in to secure it, are both the necessary results of the isolation of man from nature. Yet Kant himself took a great step towards the rejection of this Dualism, when he reduced the world of nature to a world of phenomena, which exists only in relation to spirit, and which, therefore, as it would seem, does not need to be artificially harmonised with it.

Kant's conception of the Kingdom of Ends as a mere
ideal,—the realisation of which cannot even be postulated as following from the existence of God, since it depends on the self-determination of each individual moral being,—shows still more clearly the individualistic presuppositions of his philosophy; and it has special interest for us here, because it is the want left by the exclusion of God and other men from the inner moral life of the individual, which the treatise on Religion within the bounds of Mere Reason is throughout endeavouring to supply. For, if it is an error not to recognise that self-consciousness is positively mediated by the consciousness of objects, it is as great an error not to recognise that our consciousness of ourselves as moral and spiritual beings is positively mediated by the consciousness of other selves. It is no doubt an important epoch in the development of man's moral nature when the opposition of the inner and the outer law is realised, and subjective morality is separated from the social consciousness. But it is a fundamental misconception to suppose that the Idea of a Kingdom of Ends, in which all moral beings are combined, is a consequence of the conception of each separate moral being as under a universal law which he enacts for himself, as well as for all others. On the contrary, the consciousness of a law to which the individual is subjected as the member of some kind of social community, whether domestic or political, must exist before the time when, by a further reflexion, the individual can recognise himself as under law to himself. And though it be true that, when this latter consciousness arises, the inner law is in the first instance opposed to the outer law, yet this opposition, as was shown in a former chapter, is to a great extent the result of the common tendency to lay disproportionate emphasis on any new step of thought,—a tendency which is incident to our intellectual life as beings who are in process of development. The outer law that binds societies together is really an inner law; for it arises out of the nature of mankind as rational beings, who, therefore, are capable of rising above their individuality and living in each other's life. But the consciousness of it as an inner law is at first wanting; and when that consciousness arises, the inner law is at first regarded as separate from, and even opposed to, the outer
law. But we can explain this whole process only as the evolution of a principle which is at once inward and outward, at once the law of our own being and a social law by which we are bound to other men. It is through the surrender of himself to a social life that man is first lifted above his animal individuality, and thus, in a higher sense, gains consciousness of himself as an individual, \textit{i.e.}, as a spiritual being who is a law and an end to himself. On the other hand, as this consciousness of spiritual individuality at first grows out of what we may call an \textit{immediate} surrender of the self to the community, a surrender which is the unconscious result of social training, so it can find a higher realisation for itself only in a new self-surrender to social ends, which are now consciously recognised as one with the realisation of the self. The great defect, therefore, of systems like that of the Stoics, is that they fix and stereotype the spiritual individuality in the moment of transition between the lower and the higher Socialism; \textit{e.g.}, between the Socialism of the national State and the Socialism of Christianity. For, as so fixed, the moral life is in danger of contradicting itself and becoming a kind of Individualism—a proud and barren self-righteousness, which shuts itself up in itself and tries to shut in the universal along with it. But the universal conceived as abstract or shut up in itself is barren; \textit{i.e.}, it ceases to be universal. The Stoic position, if it be not conceived as a moment of transition, is like an attempt to appropriate that which is itself the principle of generosity, which a man can possess only as he gives it, and himself, away.

As, in the second book of this Treatise, Kant tries to go as far as he can towards the acceptance of an objective Christ, who atones for the sins of man; so, in the third book, he tries to go as far as he can in the acceptance of an ethical community between men corresponding in character to the Christian Church. As the Christian Church is based on Christ’s finished work, so a true ethical community or \textit{Tugendbund} must be based on the consciousness of the moral law as realisable because it ought to be realised; and as the Christian Church strives to communicate to all men a saving faith in that work, so, the true
ethical community may labour for the removal of all the hindrances, which prevent the moral law from becoming the subjective principle of the life of all men. Now, in considering the legal relations of men as persons, we saw that the natural state of man is a state of war, in which each places the rights of the others in continual jeopardy; and that, therefore, it is the duty of all men to work towards the establishment of a State, and even of a Universal State, which shall secure peace on the basis of justice, i.e., on the basis of principles which make the freedom of each reconcilable with the freedom of all. In like manner, we may say that, till a Church, and indeed a Universal Church, is established, all men are in an ethical state of nature, in which they place the maximum of hindrance in the way of each other's moral advancement; for it is not so much the impulses of rude nature as the envious rivalry of men, which is the great power of evil in the world. The evil bias of men shows itself most of all in the fact that in society they corrupt each other, and thus become each other's worst enemies. It is, therefore, their duty to establish an Ethical State or Community, in which they shall combine their forces against evil, on the basis of a common submission to moral law, which is one and the same in each and all. There is, however, an important difference in the two cases, viz., that force may be legitimately used to put an end to the legal state of nature and to compel each to exercise his freedom so as not to interfere with the freedom of others; while, by the very nature of the case, force cannot be used to put an end to the ethical state of nature; for to compel men into moral freedom is impossible. Further, as no one can make another morally free, or can know assuredly that he is morally free, (nay, as no one can be certain even of his own moral freedom); so the Ethical Community is necessarily an Invisible Church, which can only be imperfectly represented by any outward institution. On the other hand, an outward institution for the development of virtue is necessary as the schema of that ideal community; and Kant regards the Christian Church as such an institution. The defects with which that Church is chargeable are, in fact, just the defects necessarily belonging to an outward
institution, which has to symbolise something that cannot be adequately represented in outward experience. Thus the Christian Church as an outward institution was founded on a special manifestation of a faith which is universal. It recognised an individual Christ as the Godman, and confused the acceptance of his revelation and trust in him with that self-identification of the will with its own law which is the essence of all moral life. The union with each other of those who believe in the finished work of Christ, thus typifies the invisible union of all those who are banded together against evil by the surrender of the will to the moral law. Now, it is impossible that in such a case the type should be made completely correspondent to the Antitype,—or that the visible Church should become one with the invisible. But an indefinite approximation to such a result is possible; in so far as the Gospel is more and more interpreted as an expression of moral truth, and less and less as a narrative of the outward events of an individual life and the external relations of that individual to his followers. Such interpretation is not to be regarded as sophistry; for it is only the interpretation of phenomena which are the outward expression of the moral principle, in the sense of the principle which originally gave origin to them. A symbol is necessary, and it is better to adhere to the old symbol. To substitute a new symbol for it would only be to entangle ourselves in the very limitations of which we wish to get rid. The wisest course, therefore, is to accept and use the symbol—without which men might perhaps never have been able to apprehend the truth; while, at the same time, recognising the defect which belongs to it in common with all symbolic expressions of truth, and guarding against its dangers by a criticism which shows its true relation to the moral principles which it symbolises. Thus the fetish worship and priestcraft, which put a so-called "divine service" in the place of the genuine moral service of God, and the belief in an external revelation in place of the true saving faith of morality, may be more and more completely expelled from religion, yet without any loss of that inspiring power which religion brings to the aid of morality.

To this view of Kant, there seems to be only one vital
objection, viz.: that the whole conception of a Church or an ethical community implies a kind of unity of individuals with each other in relation to their moral life, which is impossible on Kantian principles. For, on these principles, religion—the relation of the individual to God—can only appear as a secondary and external result of his moral relation to himself; in other words, the object of religion is merely to establish such relations between the outer and the inner life as shall be conformed to the internal relations of man to the law of his own being. It agrees with this view that, in Kant's *Doctrine of Virtue*, the ethical duty of individuals towards each other was confined to seeking each other's happiness, and each individual was left to seek moral perfection for himself. A combination of men for moral purposes, *i.e.*, a combination to give aid to each other's moral life, was precluded by the nature of the case. Thus the Church must be conceived as invisible in the sense that it can never become visible; because as visible it would need to be based upon a community of the inner life of individuals; and individuals, as such, have only external relations to each other. The same principle, therefore, which keeps the divine Being outside of the moral life of the individual, must equally keep the individuals outside of each other's moral life; and, on the other hand, if it be once admitted that men can be associated in their moral life, it will be impossible to maintain that a divine influence must be excluded from man's inner life as destructive of the freedom of the individual. Now, as usual, we find Kant here trying to maintain his own previous position, and yet to admit a certain relative truth in the conceptions he opposes. The divine Humanity, which makes atonement for our sins, and in union with which we enter upon a new life, is after all nothing but the moral law within us; but Kant will not deny that there may be some supernatural grace which it is needful for God to confer, in order to give effect to our sin-weakened efforts, though he counts it fanatical that anyone should pretend to have conscious experience of such grace. In like manner, he will not deny that men are the great hindrances to each other's moral life, and that they may put temptations in each other's way which, "men
being what they are,” must cause them to err: and, on the other hand, that they may combine with each other to remove such hindrances; but he seems not to recognise that such removal of hindrances is indistinguishable from positive aid. And, although he thinks that God must be conceived as the founder of the invisible Church as a “Universal Republic according to ethical laws,” yet he does not admit the idea of Him as a spiritual Being who manifests Himself in the life of individuals as members of a society, and who raises them above themselves just in and through their relations to each other.

In spite, however, of the cautions and reservations with which Kant accompanies his concessions, it is impossible not to recognise that by them he prepares the way for a conception of freedom, which does not involve a negation of all social relations of the individual, (as if in such relations he must be externally determined), but which rather presupposes these relations as the essential condition of its realisation. In this point of view, the true lesson of the Critical Philosophy is not that the individual as such possesses a universal nature, in view of which we can leave out of account all his relations to his fellows as belonging to the phenomenal side of his life, and regard him noumenally as an absolutely self-determined unit, a complete whole in himself apart from God and man. It rather is that, in so far as he is a rational being, nothing and no person is external to him, in such a sense that all influence upon him would be inconsistent with his freedom. As Kant said that there is no idea possible which is not capable of being combined with the “I think,” so we may add that there is no impulse which is not capable of being united with the “I will.” To become my idea, a feeling must be referred to an object which is essentially and necessarily an object for a self; and to become my desire, an impulse must be referred to an end with the realisation of which I identify my good, or the realisation of myself. It is true that, in the former case, the object, which is thus referred to the self and related, as existing for the self, to all other objects in the one world, may be inadequately conceived; in other words, our view of it may be self-contradictory, in so far as we have not fully realised the
relation in which, as such object, it should stand to other objects, and to the self; and then the advance of our knowledge of it will be simply the process by which we discover such self-contradiction and seek for its solution, until finally we have arrived at an adequate idea of the object in all its relations. In like manner, the determination of a particular object as an end may be inadequate, in so far as the object so conceived is not put in due relation to all other ends, as an element in a Good which is adequate to the self. If it is not so related, there will be a contradiction, which in the further evolution of the moral consciousness must become explicit, between the idea of the particular object as end or Good, and the idea of the Good or end of the self as such. And the goal of moral progress must be just the solution of this contradiction. But the whole process is a process of freedom, just because there is no step in the determination of the subject by the object which is not a step in its self-determination. On the other hand, there is no step in self-determination which is not also determination by an object to which we relate ourselves. It may, indeed, be objected that after all, this is only a process which goes on in the individual consciousness, and that all reality of the object, and especially the reality of the other self-conscious beings, in relation to whom we determine ourselves, is outside of this process. Thus, it may be said, we are reduced to a subjective idealism or egoism, in which each individual remains shut up in himself as an individual, and never comes into any relation with other beings or things. But to this the answer is ready. There is no such thing as a purely individual self-consciousness, a consciousness which is not a consciousness of a self through a consciousness of other beings and things, and in relation to which we are not, therefore, obliged to say, not only that we become conscious of them, but that they become conscious of themselves in us. And the imperfection of our knowledge of them and of our consciousness of union with them, which constitutes the limit of our individuality, may be equally regarded as an imperfection in our knowledge of ourselves and as an imperfection in our consciousness of unity with ourselves. The conscious-
ness of the independent spiritual life which we have as individuals, always involves a consciousness of relation to other spirits, and therefore presupposes a unity with them which is beyond the difference; nor can we hold to the consciousness of self and let drop the other elements present in the objective consciousness which conditions it. In this sense, we may be said, in the language of Malebranche, “to see all things in God;” and there is a kind of truth even in the theories of Occasional Causes and Pre-established Harmony, in so far as they make the consciousness of God the necessary mediation between the consciousness of objects and the consciousness of the self. These theories, however, suppose us to see other things only, and not ourselves, “in God,” and do not recognise that the consciousness of the distinction, and at the same time of the relation, between subject and object, is that apart from which the consciousness of self could not exist. But no modern writer before Kant seems to have comprehended that the self-conscious being as such is at once itself and not itself, that it is individual just because it is universal; or, putting the same idea in other language, that its being consists in its relations to other beings, with which it is united just because of its union with God. For all its consciousness of itself, as well as of other things and beings is, so to speak, the differentiation of a presupposed unity, which cannot be broken without the difference ceasing to have any meaning. If we were individual selves in the sense of Kant, if we possessed an inner life which was, to begin with, apart from God, and not united through God with the existence of other beings and things, we should be fatally imprisoned in our individual being; and in that case no freedom would be possible for us except through an exclusive self-determination independent of all determination by God or man or nature. But this solitary self-contained individuality is surrendered, if we admit that, even phenomenally, a world other than itself is present to the self-conscious being, a world not resolvable into its own analytic consciousness of itself; still more if we grant, as Kant does, that without the consciousness of that phenomenal world the consciousness of self is impossible. Kant, therefore, as we have
often seen, points the way to a synthetic view of the consciousness of man, as a consciousness of self, which is possible only as it is also the consciousness of a not-self, but which yet is not thus reduced to self-contradiction, because it is also a consciousness of God; or, what is the same thing in other words, it is a consciousness of self as inseparable from the spiritual principle of unity which is present in all "thinking things, all objects of all thought."

The great difficulty which Kant encounters in his attempt to approximate the Christian conceptions of Atone-ment, Justification, etc., lies in this, that these doctrines involve a real objective mediation, by means of which the spirit is delivered from itself, and from the evil that oppresses it. Without such an objective mediation, it seems as if the soul's moral struggle could be nothing but a vain effort to escape from its own degraded self by means of the very forces which have suffered degradation. There seems to be no fixed point in the mere subjective life of the individual upon which the spiritual lever could be planted, in order to raise him above himself; or, if we say that there is such a point in the moral law, which is one with the consciousness of self, it seems impossible to understand how any other motive except the moral law could have got into man's consciousness, and how there could be any struggle at all. The inner conflict thus seems to be either an impossible effort to lift ourselves above ourselves, or else a shadow-fight with enemies which are merely imaginary. Now, Kant fails to escape this dilemma; because he separates the pure consciousness of self, and the moral consciousness which is connected therewith, from the objective, and especially from the social consciousness, and connects the latter with the sen-sations and impulses which belong to the individual sensibility. The moral law thus becomes a mere idea of the subject—which it would be impossible for him to realise except by the exclusion of all reference to objects, or, at least, of all determination by them,—not a spiritual principle which is at once subjective and objective, and which, therefore, lifts us above our subjective individu-ality. Kant's idealism, therefore, remains onesided; and
the imperative of the moral law reduces itself to a demand that the merely subjective should make itself objective, i.e., that an Idea, which is defined as the negation of all reality, should make itself real. The solution of this antinomy which Kant suggests, namely, that the moral law is the law of the subject as *noumenon*, does not help us, so long as we have to conceive that law as a law which ought to be, but is not, realising itself; and it is thus we must conceive it, unless we regard the consciousness of it as one with the consciousness of God as the absolute principle of all reality. Because he stops short of this latter conception, Kant necessarily rejects as Mysticism, or as involving the negation of moral freedom, that very idea which gives its great moral power to Christianity, viz., the idea of a real objective mediation, by which the individual is raised above himself. Thus he saves his morality at the cost of his religion. His rationalising of religion does not explain it, but rather explains it away; for it leaves out that distinctive element, that essential relation of the soul to God, which makes it possible for the soul to rise above its immediate self. Now, it is the idea of this relation which alone enables us to escape from the dilemma above referred to: to avoid on the one side a Rationalism, which makes the moral life intelligible as a subjective self-determination without reference to objects, but at the same time reduces it to an empty revolution of the self upon its own subjectivity, a process in which no real change of principle is possible; and, on the other side, a Mysticism which admits such change, but attributes it to supernatural possession of the soul by a divine grace which extinguishes its freedom. Only an Idealism which can recognise that the consciousness of the moral law is not a "mere Idea" of the subject,—an Idea that merely *ought to be* realised—but rather that it is one form of the consciousness of that religious principle which *is always realising itself* in us and without us, and to which therefore we give the name of God, can avoid the alternative of a Rationalism which denies all contact between the subject and an objective reality, and a Mysticism which asserts such contact as an absolutely unintelligible fact.
The importance of Kant's treatise on Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason lies mainly in this, that it is one of the earliest attempts to separate between the form and the substance, the transitory and the permanent in the Christian religion. It was, perhaps, suggested by Lessing's Education of the Human Race, with which it agrees in its general tendency, though going much beyond Lessing's essay in the sharpness with which it draws the line between rational and revealed religion, or in other words, between the essential elements in religion and the accidents of its historical form. And it is just here that its defect lies; for the division between the ideal and the real, the subjective and the objective, which Kant adopted from the individualism of his time, makes him cast away as part of the external form much that belongs to the very essence of religion. The essence of religion is that man is not shut up in himself as an individual, but able to escape into a wider consciousness, of which his mind and will may become the organ; nay, that he cannot separate himself from such a consciousness without coming into contradiction with himself. For the contradiction of spiritual life as it shows itself in man is just this, that at first the ego is conscious of itself as one in its inward reality with a natural organism which is only externally related to other men and to nature. Yet in the very consciousness of relation, it is involved that the relation is not merely external. In other words, the consciousness of separation from that to which we are related, combines two elements—a presupposition of unity, and a consciousness of distinction, and so of merely external relation; and these two elements are not in harmony with each other. This, moreover, is a difference which must grow to a conscious antagonism; for the presupposed universal unity is that which gives to the objective world, and especially to the spiritual world, (i.e., to the society in which the individual finds himself,) a claim over him which seems infinite. Thus it produces a sense of obligation to others, which subjects the individual to some objective social law and authority. But the same universal unity may also be identified with the individual self, and, as so identified, it makes the individual rebel against all
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BOOK IV.

such claims as external. Thus it may become the source of a gigantic Egoism, which cannot be satisfied till it has made all things and beings subject to itself. Man can only rise above the alternative of an Altruism which is the mere surrender of himself as a means to a foreign end, and an Egoism which is mere rebellion and self-will, in so far as he rises to Religion; i.e., to some form of the direct consciousness of the universal as an infinite unity, which is above the difference of subject and object, of self and other men, though it is presupposed equally in the consciousness of the self and in the consciousness of the not-self. Of course we do not find any such definite conception of the nature of religion as I have just given till a comparatively late period in the history of man; but we find the religious life itself, and we find it showing these characteristics, wherever the individual is conscious of himself as a member along with others of a social organism, which he regards as the embodiment of a principle that is higher than the individuality of any of its members. In other words, we find it wherever the Family or the State or any kind of society is regarded as being based on a permanent ideal unity, which survives the individual members, and is worshipped as the God of that society. In this point of view, religion and morality have a common origin, for both involve reverence for an existence which is the better self of the individual and of those with whom he is associated. Both involve that men’s relations to each other have ceased in their eyes to be merely external relations of individuals to individuals, and that, in some way, they have come to reverence and believe in a principle which is above their differences, and through which they are united with one another.

Now, it is to be noticed that such a consciousness, as it raises men above individuality, contains the solution of some of the difficulties with which Kant was perplexed in his attempt to mediate between his own view of life and the Christian doctrines of the Fall and the Atonement. The purely formal principle of Kant, according to which each individual is a law and an end to himself,—and is to be regarded as such both by other individuals in their
outward relations to him and *in foro conscientiae* by himself,—gives rise to the noblest form of Individualism; but it still has the essential defect of all theories which treat the universal as, so to speak, an attribute of the individual, and make him complete in himself apart from all relations to others. Here Kant regards the universal nature of man not only as giving to the individual an infinite claim, but as laying upon him an infinite burden, which he must bear in his own strength, and which, therefore, he must be supposed to be capable of bearing. Hence comes the idea of his absolute responsibility as an individual, not only for particular sins, but for the evil bias of his own nature,—for the principle of evil in him, which, in view of its possible consequences, may be regarded as infinite; and hence comes also the idea that he, as an individual, is bound, and is able, to make the infinite atonement, which is necessary ere the infinite evil can be done away. Kant will make no allowance for the connexion of the individual with others as mitigating his responsibility for his evil tendencies, and as little will he admit that their aid can come in to enable him to conquer them. Both of these ideas seem to him essentially at variance with the conception of isolated responsibility and of the intransferableness of moral good and evil, which are bound up with the moral consciousness. He cannot logically admit that the communication to the individual of moral evil and of moral good, whether by inheritance or by the social medium in which he is placed, is more than an appearance, and an appearance that would be explained away, if we could know the "intelligible acts" of the self and see how everything in his moral life results from them. Kant, indeed, seems to allow that the main depraving power in man's life lies in a tacit league of society to corrupt him, which can be met only by the establishment of a Church, or Tugendbund, to conquer the associated forces of evil by a greater associated force of good; yet he takes away the meaning of this admission by the qualification he attaches to it, and especially by the way in which he regards the actual Church as the *type* of an ideal and invisible Church, existing merely in thought. Now, the essential charac-
teristic of religion, and especially of the Christian religion, lies in this, that it takes as absolute truth what Kant regards as a mere type, and calls upon the Christian to renounce as inadequate and superficial, the very view of man's moral life which Kant treats as absolute truth. In this point of view, we may regard St. Paul's epistle to the Romans as the classical exposition of the Christian view of spiritual life, in opposition to a view of it closely analogous to the Kantian. For what St. Paul attacks is obviously a conception of moral life according to which the individual stands alone in his sin, alone in his responsibility, and alone in his effort after goodness. Against this, he sets the Idea of mankind as united in a solidarity of evil and good, which is so intimate that all men may be regarded as having sinned in Adam and all men as having conquered sin in Christ. Our deliverance from our own evil is, as he teaches, to take upon ourselves along with Christ the burden of the sins of the world; since along with this burden we gain the power of Christ to bear it, and to "fill up what remains of the sufferings of Christ." Or, translating this into less theological language, St. Paul is really bidding us recognise that if any man is evil, it is that the sins of the whole world are pressing him down; and if any man is good, it is that the whole power of goodness which works in humanity, and which reaches its highest manifestation in Christ, is lifting him up. From this point of view, the individual can feel an absolute certainty that good is stronger than evil, which he cannot have so long as he regards himself as a solitary individual struggling with his own corruption in view of the infinite demands of an inexorable law. For, from the point of view of Christianity, the consciousness of good is the consciousness of an absolute spiritual unity which comprehends all our individual lives, explains their failure and even their evil, and makes it a means to the higher manifestation of good. "God hath concluded all in unbelief, that He might have mercy upon all." In other words, the egoisms and antagonisms in which spiritual beings are involved in their development, and the mutual corruption which arises out of an "ethical state of nature," which is a state of war upon each other's
virtue, must, from the religious point of view, be regarded as a transitory phenomenon; for in it men war not only against others, but against themselves. The moral consciousness, indeed, keenly as it feels the evils of this warfare, cannot bring deliverance from it; for, though it is the consciousness of an absolutely imperative law which condemns evil as that which ought not to be, it does not identify the consciousness of that law with the consciousness of God, as the principle with which is indissolubly joined even the individuality that seems to oppose it. But such an identity cannot exist for those in whom the consciousness of self is the consciousness of an exclusive individuality, which takes upon itself the burden of its own sins, but does not own itself an accomplice in the sins of others, any more than it throws the guilt of its sins upon them. Only a revived social consciousness which carries us beyond this isolating attitude, can bring moral deliverance; and he who will not take upon him the burden of the evil of others, and even accept it also as if it were his own guilt, can never get rid of his own. But for him who does accept this responsibility for all evil,—because he has in himself the evil bias, the root from which all evils spring,—and who feels that he must conquer it in all its apparent infinity within and without him, evil is already conquered. For the very principle that makes him, so to speak, throw down the barrier between his own life and that of others, and take all their sorrows and sins as his own, also gives him a consciousness of unity with that power of goodness which is "above all, in all, and through all." He for whom all evil and sorrow is his own, has conquered sin and sorrow,—this was the secret of Jesus Christ as it was read by St. Paul. It is a secret which might seem to be the grave of all morality, as it seems to be the negation of individual responsibility; and it might really be so, if it were not taken as the deeper truth to which morality points, and which, therefore, presupposes the moral consciousness, while it goes beyond it. An Antinomian claim of freedom from law, a self-will that will not bear its own burden, is toto cælo removed from that freedom of spirit which counts all the burdens of others its own; though it is
quite true that the one equally with the other is the negation of the sense of individual responsibility, and of that sense of indelible personal guilt that goes with it.

Now it is clear from the way in which he interprets the ideas of Atonement and Justification,—especially from his conception of the "new man" as bearing the penalty of the sins of the old in a spirit that makes it cease to be a penalty,—that Kant had an intuitive consciousness of the deeper meaning of the Christian ideas with which he was dealing. What makes his interpretation seem, as it has appeared to many, a useless piece of scholastic subtility not much better than sophistry, is that, as he does not connect the moral with the social consciousness, so he cannot combine the idea of the better self with the idea of God. Hence, to admit any limitation of the moral responsibility of the individual, seems to him to involve the negation of morality, or, in other words, the reference of moral consequences to natural causes. Kant, however, himself shows us the way out of the difficulty; for he shows that, except in the abstraction of the ordinary consciousness and of science, there are no natural causes. Nature as such is an object for a self, and cannot be a cause of the determination of the self, in the sense in which one event in the natural world is cause of another. It is true that Kant conceives states of the phenomenal or objective self, as links in the chain of nature; but we have already seen the difficulties and inconsistencies in which this supposition involved him, and his partial escape from these difficulties in the second edition of the Critique. In truth, as has been pointed out previously, the moment we conceive of the outer world in its relation to the inner life of a subject, even a sensitive subject, we are forced to use a new order of categories.\(^1\) The relation of an animal to its environment in which lies the stimulus to its feelings, cannot be regarded as a case of reciprocity in which reaction is equal to action; nor can the feelings as states of the subject be regarded as links in a chain of causation, the antecedents of which are found in the motions of material substances. As Kant observed, the idea of organic unity is the only one through which we

\(^1\) See above, p. 84; cf. Vol. I. p. 590 seq.
can interpret life; and the circle of organic unity, if we may use the expression, must be regarded as including the inorganic which furnishes its environment. While, therefore, we may regard the animal as dependent on such environment for the conditions of its development, this does not bring us a step nearer to the conclusion that these conditions are its causes; rather, we are obliged to recognise that in it they find an explanation of their real meaning, which makes them intelligible, as they are not intelligible when we regard them in themselves. When we contemplate the development of a spiritual or self-conscious being, which contains in itself the principle to which all objects as such are relative, it is still more obvious that, for such a being, the objective world which is its environment, cannot be regarded as an external determinant. In this case, all that can be meant by saying that the objective world determines the self is that our objective consciousness,—i.e., our consciousness of the whole objective world, natural and spiritual,—being what it is, our consciousness of our self is determined thereby to be what it is; and this again determines the mode in which we react upon the objective world. Now, while this is true, it does not bear the consequences which are commonly built upon it. Our consciousness of ourselves is, indeed, in a sense, determined by our consciousness of the world, as it is the same consciousness referred to the unity it presupposes. Thus self-consciousness is a return upon self from the objective world; though, it must be remembered, the self gains a new determination from this very return. In so returning upon itself, the self relates itself in a negative way to the world which it opposes to itself, and which it regards as a merely extraneous object to be determined by it; and the practical consciousness is, therefore, in the first instance, the consciousness of the self as an isolated individual, which seeks to realise its particular desires in an object quite externally related to it. Yet, as a self, the individual is never merely what it is thus conscious of being, never merely a particular object, nor can the immediate gratification of the particular desires as such be merely the satisfaction of a sensuous individuality. Hence, as the
highest point that can be reached by us in our consciousness of objects (our theoretical consciousness), is to recognise the relativity of all objects to the self; so the highest point that can be reached by the practical consciousness is to recognise that the self cannot attain its end in the natural and spiritual world, except by a process which is at the same time the realisation of the objective end of that world itself. In other words, the self cannot realise or satisfy itself by making men and things into the means for the satisfaction of its particular impulses, but only by making its individuality the means to an end which is as much their end as its own. Thus nature can be a means to the realisation of our life, only in so far as in spirit nature comes to a self and to its self; i.e., in so far as spirit reveals what nature implicitly contained. And other spiritual beings can be a means to the realisation of our individual life, only in so far as our individual life itself becomes a means to the realisation of a principle which is identical in them and in us. We cannot live, except as we die to live; and the culmination of the effort after the realisation of our own will and our own Good must be the consciousness that Deo parere libertas est, and that “all things can be ours,” only as “we are God’s.”

The process of spiritual life cannot be explained as a process of causality in the ordinary acceptance of that category; for to reason by causality is to trace back the present to the past, and to recognise in the present only that which is explained by the past, because it is the past in a new form. Here, on the contrary, it is the final result that casts light on all that is prior to it, and tells us what it really was or meant—and the ὑστατον γενέσει is the πρῶτον φύσει. Nor can we take refuge in the category of reciprocity, which would refer the result to the action and re-action of previously independent substances; for, in the movement of spiritual life, all action and re-action is seen itself to be the mask of a unity which fully reveals itself only in the whole process, and every step in its realisation is a more explicit revelation of the true nature of the principle which is its source. Hence, the freedom of the spiritual being may be said to be the truth hidden
under the appearance of the necessity of nature; for the
world which seems to determine such a being from without
is really essentially related to it. But, again, this freedom
is at first referred to the self as an individual, and appears,
therefore, as a power to react on an external world, and
determine it in conformity with our own individuality.
And it is the resistance of nature and other men to such
determination which gradually makes us conscious that
the *truth* of the freedom or self-determining power, which
we recognise in the self, lies in the unity of the self as
such with the principle that is realising itself in all nature
and history; and that, therefore, the mode of thought
for which the self is essentially opposed to the object,
like the mode of thought for which the object is not
referred to the self, is not completely self-conscious, not
fully aware of all that is implied in itself. A self that
"kicks against the pricks" is a practical, as an object
not referred to a self is a theoretical contradiction.
Behind the freedom that breaks the bonds of nature and
necessity, we find a divine necessity, in union with which
alone man can be truly free. But, just because it is a
divine necessity, it cannot really be an *external* necessity,
like the action of one external object as such upon another.
The Pantheism of Spinoza is untrue and finds its necessary
correction in the Monadism of Leibniz; but he in turn
failed to realise that the unity of monads is more than
merely ideal; and thus he prepared the way for Kant's
idea of a self-determination of the individual which is
emptied of all content, at the same time that it is freed
from all relations. But Kant himself enables us to think
of a self-determination, which does *not* cut off the indi-
vidual from all relations to other beings; because the
principle of selfhood is necessarily conceived as a repro-
duction or manifestation, under the conditions of an
individual life, of the principle to which all ideality and
all reality must be referred. And, though the difficulties
of such a conception are indeed great, they are of an
altogether different character from those which beset the
theories of Kant's predecessors.
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THE GENERAL RESULT OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

KANT once said that the advance of time often brings with it an increase of light upon the thoughts of a great writer which enables us to understand him better than he understood himself. The saying ought above all to apply to a writer like Kant himself, whose words have been so fertile of suggestion to other writers, and, indeed, have been the main source of one of the greatest developments of speculation in modern times. For thus we are enabled to see, as in a magnifying glass, the full reach and compass of many of his thoughts, which for himself were very imperfectly evolved and defined. In the foregoing pages, I have tried to criticise Kant mainly by the light which he himself has kindled; or, in other words, to read his meaning, first, in view of his own mental development as shown in his successive works, and, secondly, in view of his influence on the subsequent history of philosophy. In truth, in relation to any fertile thought, as in relation to any germ of life, we may say that its growth is its criticism. The developed organism is the only sufficient demonstration of the content and meaning of the seed.

No thought that is true is altogether new, and it cannot even be said that the regressive method of Kant,—in which he endeavours to go back upon the primary unity of the intelligence which is presupposed in all intelligible objects, and to find in it the solution of all controversies in relation to the world of reality,—is a philosophical
innovation. It is substantially identical with the method which was applied by all the great philosophers of antiquity; and it reappears in the dawn of modern philosophy, with slightly altered modes of expression, in the doubt and abstraction by which Descartes reaches the subjective certitude of self-consciousness. But, as in Kant's time the Critical Individualism of the eighteenth century and the development of physical science which went with it, had given a new meaning to the problems of knowledge and of morality, they had prepared the way for a clearer consciousness both of the necessity of method in general, and of the nature of the method which was needful. The division of man's consciousness against itself, and especially of the consciousness of the infinite against the consciousness of the finite, had become more definitely formulated; and the development of the latter to scientific form had made it impossible that its unity with, or subordination to, the former could be secured in the easy methods which had formerly been sufficient. Kant, therefore, by the conditions of his time as well as by the nature of his own genius, was prepared for a more comprehensive synthesis than was attained by any of his predecessors. He combined the scientific spirit of the eighteenth century and its suspicion of all mysticism and extravagance,—of all attempts to transcend the possibilities of experience,—with a deep intuitive apprehension of the secrets of the spiritual life, of the moral, to some extent also of the religious, and even of the aesthetic consciousness. The naturalistic tendencies of the Enlightenment, and the consciousness of the importance of scientific method which went along with these tendencies, had taken early hold of his mind. He had passed through the school of scepticism, and had learned to renounce the two easily won results of a philosophy which was a mere ancilla fidei. Yet he did not cease to be a "lover of Metaphysic though he could boast of few of her favours," and though he saw that these favours must be won by a slow and difficult process. Above all, he had a firm conviction that the results of science were as yet the only secure and certain possessions of the human mind, and that it was only by starting from these and founding on their truth
that any advance into a higher region could be hoped for. It was this conviction which shaped the form of his Criticism, as an inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, *i.e.*, of the empirical knowledge which we actually have, with a view to the discovery of the possibility of that higher knowledge which had not yet been obtained.

The further course of this inquiry has been traced in the previous pages, and it is unnecessary to go back upon it in detail. The first result to which it led was the distinction of phenomena and noumena; in other words, it led to a consciousness that the higher reality, if it is accessible at all to the human mind, at least cannot be found on the same level and under the same conditions as the ordinary objects of experience. The spiritual world cannot be another natural world or a part of the natural world of sensible experience. Neither can it be absolutely divorced from that world. It is only by a deeper reflection upon the conditions of our consciousness of empirical reality that we can learn whether there is or is not something beyond it. And our only light as to the nature of this something must come from the same source which makes us suspect or assert its existence. This becomes clear when we consider that what such a reflection reveals is the relation of all knowable reality to the unity of the self, which, acting through the categories, binds all the matter of sense into the context of one intelligible experience, *i.e.*, into the consciousness of one connected world of objects, which can be combined with the consciousness of one self. For the self—the unity of which is the presupposition of experience, and the consciousness of which is the necessary *terminus* of experience—cannot be brought under the categories, or treated as a part of the experience which by means of the categories it organises; in other words, it cannot be treated as an object like the other objects of experience. Thus reflexion upon the unity of the self, apart from which the objects of experience do not exist, reduces these objects into phenomena, *i.e.*, into existences that are not complete in themselves but point to something else as their necessary complement or completion; and, on the other hand, it suggests the idea
of a higher kind of existences which in contrast therewith may be called noumena.

Now, it is the great question of Metaphysics to determine what is the value of this thought. Can it be used by reason to prove the existence and discover the nature of a higher world of reality, or is it merely the indication of a limit to all knowledge, the bourn of an undiscovered country, into which no earthly traveller can force his way? Kant's answer is neither simply 'yes,' nor simply 'no.' The Ideas, which arise out of the contrast between the pure analytic unity of self-consciousness and the merely synthetic unity of experience, viewed in themselves, are problematical conceptions, i.e., conceptions which do not carry with them the assurance of their objective reality. They, indeed, may suggest that there is a noumenal self which is independent of the objects of experience; but it is only as the logical unity of the subject presupposed in experience, or, on the other hand, as the object of inner experience, that the self is actually given to us. They may suggest that there is a real objective world of things in themselves, complete and self-contained and independent of the endless subjective synthesis in which empirical objects are known; but the essential conditions of our consciousness make it impossible that such a world should ever be more than an ideal to us. Finally, they may suggest that there is an intelligence whose thought is one with the being of the objects it knows, a perceptive understanding for which the gulf, that in our consciousness divides the subject from the object, does not exist or is transcended; but it is impossible for our dualistic intelligence to comprehend even the possibility of a consciousness so different from itself. We are, therefore, left with the consciousness of a limit and the doubtful outlook into a problematical region beyond it; or, what is the same thing, with a demand of our reason for a kind of knowledge, and, therefore, for a kind of object of knowledge, which, at the same time, we know to be unattainable for us.

What, however, is impossible for theoretical reason, in that it is bound down in its action to the conditions of sense, is possible for practical reason; because it is not limited by these conditions. We cannot know the nou-
menal world; but, for practical reason, it is enough that we can *think* it, and that, thinking it, we can determine ourselves in accordance with the Idea of it. Even in thinking it, indeed, we need the assistance of the form of the sensible world; for we can envisage the ideal world we seek to realise, only as a natural world under moral laws. But this does not make it less true that in acting morally, we take our stand at a point of view from which the phenomenal world ceases to be real, except in so far as it is the manifestation of the noumenal. In other words, as rational and therefore moral beings, we treat ourselves and the world in which we live, as if they were in reality, what the Ideas of reason make us think them as being. And, in so far as this point of view is imperative,—in so far as it is forced upon us by a law which is one with the consciousness of ourselves,—we may say that we are as sure of its truth as of our own existence. Thus, while we may be said to be inhabitants of two worlds, of the world we can know and of the world we can only think; yet, in so far as we live morally, we live as inhabitants of the ideal world we think, and treat it as the only real world. In our practical life, therefore, we regard ourselves as free self-determining subjects, and we postulate a God who determines the world on the same principle on which we feel bound to determine ourselves.

So far Kant gets in his purely ethical treatises. But the final thought of a Good in which the two worlds are united, or, in other words, of an order of the phenomenal world which attaches happiness as a necessary consequence to goodness, carries him beyond the dualism which prevails in his views of morality. For it makes him ask whether we are confined to the mere faith that goodness must ultimately by the intervention of God bring happiness with it; or, whether we can trace any conformity between the law of nature and the law of freedom which is already taking effect in this present world. On the one hand, is the empirical world of phenomena, or any object in it, capable of yielding to us a spiritual pleasure through its conformity with the Ideas of reason? And, on the other hand, can that world as a whole be regarded as in *any* way furthering the realization of these Ideas,
and especially as subserving the realisation of the moral Idea in the life of man?

The former of these questions is answered in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* in which beauty is regarded as something which excites the faculties of Sense and Understanding to harmonious action, and thus produces a feeling of joy in the object as adapted to the ideal wants of the subject. For, as we have seen, the unity or harmony of Sense and Understanding cannot be separated from the unity of both with Reason. This feeling, therefore, and the judgment founded upon it, is in some degrees analogous to that perceptive understanding which Kant denies to man. And, indeed, it is not easy to see how Kant could admit the former and deny the latter. In the greeting that the spirit gives to the object which it recognises as beautiful, it has at least an anticipative consciousness of the realisation of the Ideas of reason in the objective world; and, if it can have a feeling of the unity of that world, or at least of particular objects in it, with itself, it seems difficult to avoid thinking that such a feeling is the germinal form of a knowledge of the world in which it is seen to be in harmony with the Ideas of reason, *i.e.*, with the nature of self-consciousness. Thus, in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, Kant seems to go some way towards the reconciliation of the opposition between the merely sensitive consciousness of pleasure and pain due to the presentation of an empirical object, and the merely rational consciousness of noumena, *i.e.*, of the objects of Ideas. For the feeling of the Beautiful is a feeling of pleasure excited by a real object of experience—which yet is ideal, or in harmony with the Ideas of reason. Feeling is thus conceived as rising into an ideal form and overpassing the fixed gulf, which in the theoretical and practical *Critiques* had hitherto been maintained, between the pure consciousness of self and the empirical consciousness of objects; and, therefore, between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds.

The second question, whether we can advance to a knowledge which corresponds to such a feeling, a knowledge of the world of sense as conformable to the Ideas of Reason, and especially as subserving the realisation of the Moral
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Idea, is answered in the Critique of Teleological Judgment. The general use of the Teleological Idea, indeed, as stimulating and guiding us in the extension of our knowledge of the world as a mechanical system, had already been indicated in the Critique of Pure Reason; and the Critique of Judgment only develops and more fully explains the hints there given. But it goes a step further in dealing with the phenomena of the organic world, in which case the idea of design is represented, not only as a principle which is necessary to give direction to our inquiries, but also as a conception which is for us the only possible explanation of the nature of the objects in question. A living being can only be comprehended as an organism; and that means that the unity of its conception must be regarded as determining a priori all the differences of its parts, and the succession of its changes. Yet, even here, Kant will not permit us to treat the necessity of thinking the plant or animal as an 'end of nature' as more than subjective.

A still more important field for teleological thought is opened up by the question, in which the Critique of Teleological Judgment culminates, as to the final end of Nature and History. While pointing out that man, as a natural being, is merely a link in the endless chain of phenomenal causation, Kant maintains that it is different when we regard him as a moral being, and when we ask, how the course of the natural world is related to his moral culture. For, in the latter point of view, all things and beings may be contemplated as instrumental to the realisation of man. The language of St. Paul that "the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the manifestation of the Sons of God," expresses a thought to which we are necessarily led whenever we regard the world from the point of view of reason. Further, it is not only outward nature, but also nature in man that is thus made subservient to that which is higher than nature. In his essay on The Idea of Universal History, Kant bids us use, as a clue to the interpretation of the whole process of human life upon earth, the principle that the empirical connection of events is the servant of reason in the development of its highest faculties. Thus all the natural impulses, even the passions
RESULT OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

which seem most discordant with the law of reason, are turned into the means of its realisation; and the enmities and rivalries, which arise out of human selfishness, become instruments for the realisation of a legal and moral order which unites all men with each other in the effort after the highest Good. It is difficult, indeed, to see how this view of history is to be reconciled with the antithetical conception of the relations of Nature and Spirit which prevails in Kant's ethical treatises, and with the subjective tendency which makes him reduce moral action to the pure inward self-determination of the individual, wherein no one else can either help or hinder him. Kant hardly seems even to escape from formal self-contradiction, when he requires that this Idea should be used merely to guide us in the interpretation of the facts, and should not be allowed in any way to interfere with our determination of their connexion as events in the phenomenal world.

The treatise on Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, in so far as it adds anything to the result of the Critiques, points in the same direction; for in it Kant seeks to prove that his own moral doctrines are in agreement with the spirit of Christianity; and that they are distinguished from the doctrines of Christianity only by the necessary difference of form between the philosophical expression of ideal truth and the expression of it in terms of the sensuous consciousness. Thus, he is forced to recognise the truth of the Christian view of the solidarity of the human race both in evil and in good, their common subjection to an inheritance of evil tendencies, and the necessity of their being united in a Tugend-Bund or Church in order to overcome these tendencies and realise the Good. He, indeed, regards all this as belonging to the phenomenal aspect of the moral life, which must be interpreted by reference to 'intelligible acts' of freedom, to which the evil and the good in every individual subject is really to be attributed. And he upholds the distinction between the invisible and the visible Church,—between the ideal Kingdom of Ends, to realise which is to realise the moral Good, and the actual community or visible Church, in which the element of fetish-worship only slowly, and never completely, yields to the pure religion of morality.
Still, the general result is undoubtedly to favour a view of man's life in which the natural and the spiritual, the individual and society, are brought into closer unity than Kant's fundamental principles would permit, and in which religion ceases to be a secondary adjunct of morality, and becomes recognised as the principle of which morality is the manifestation.

In the previous pages a great deal has been said about the formal defects of Kant's logic, to which these uncertainties and contradictions are to be attributed. Kant started with the idea that in the nature of the ordinary consciousness there are elements which hinder us from apprehending the ultimate truth or reality of things. From these elements, therefore, we have to abstract, if we would discover what things are in themselves, as distinguished from what they are for us. In the beginning of the critical period, Kant believed that the elements in question are merely the forms of time and space, under which we, as sensitive subjects, receive the impressions of objects; while he regards the intelligence, with all the categories and ideas which in its pure activity it produces, as the source of a knowledge of things as they really are. But, before the *Critique of Pure Reason* was written, Kant had seen that the Understanding also is, so to speak, subdued to the matter it works in, and that the categories which enable us to connect the matter of sense in definite relations, and thus to develop for ourselves the consciousness of an objective world, are categories of the finite, which cannot be used to determine the infinite. Thus the conception of causality, while it enables us to determine successive phenomena in time as necessarily connected with each other, cannot enable us to connect the phenomenal as such with the noumenal or absolute reality. In seeking, therefore, in our intelligence for a residuum of pure thought, which is unaffected by the conditions of our finite sensitive being, for a pure consciousness of things in themselves, as distinguished from the consciousness of objects in relation to us, Kant has to dismiss the categories of the understanding as well as the forms of sensibility. He thus finds that nothing is left except the pure unity of the self, which manifests itself in opposition to the con-
sciousness of phenomenal objects, in the analytic "I am" or "I am I" of self-consciousness. This unity, however, in spite of its analytic character, is regarded as giving rise to the theoretical demand for a perfect synthesis of experience, for an organic unity of the elements of our knowledge of objects with each other and with the intelligence for which they are; and it is also regarded as the source of a practical imperative, a demand upon ourselves to realise a similar unity in our own lives and in the world; or, in other words, to change the empirical order of phenomena according to laws of necessity into an ideal order according to the law of freedom. At this point, indeed, the development of Kant's thought is somewhat concealed by what we may call the scaffolding of mediating conceptions which he has built up around it. Thus he seems to take Reason as an independent faculty which manifests itself in syllogism, just as Understanding manifests itself in judgment; and he seems to derive the Ideas from the former, in the same way in which he derives the categories from the latter. In like manner he reaches the determination of the moral law by an analysis of moral experience, which partly hides from us its relation to the Ideas of reason. But, as has been shown above, there are many indications, for any one who looks below the surface, that in the Ideas of reason we have merely the reflexion of the pure unity of self-consciousness upon the imperfect unity of the phenomenal world; and, again, that in the moral Idea we have only the same reflexion in a farther stage, in which the subject not only seeks its own ideal in the world without, but recognises it as a law bound up with its consciousness of self and determining its practical relations to the world.

Now, I have attempted to show that in all this there is only one logical error, to wit, the confusion of the regressive process of thought, by which the unity of self is found to underlie the categories and the forms of sense, with a process of mere abstraction. This error necessarily carries with it the conception of the unity of self-consciousness as purely analytic, and as, therefore, standing in irreconcilable opposition to the unity of the consciousness of objects as purely synthetic, i.e., as externally synthetic of the matter given under the forms of sense. From this, again,
CONCLUDING REMARKS

follows the impossibility of reaching a knowledge which is adequate to the Ideas of reason, and the equal impossibility of conceiving the moral law as realised in the phenomenal world. Hence, also, the moral law itself shrinks into the conception of law in general, and this into the tautology of self-consistency, i.e., of consistency with that which has in itself no determination. And if a partial escape is found from this emptiness of abstraction by "typifying" the moral law as a law of nature; yet the conception of the law of freedom as if it were a law of necessity seems to be too hopelessly self-contradictory to bring with it any real solution of the difficulty.

To correct this fundamental error of Kant is to recognise that the reflexion, which discovers the categories and the forms of sense beneath ordinary experience, and the unity of the self beneath the categories and the forms of sense, is no mere process of abstraction, but a process of what is rather to be called concretion, i.e., that it is not a process in which we empty experience of certain elements that distort its apprehension of things in themselves, but a process in which we recognise, behind and beneath experience, certain elements of which it does not usually take account; though without these elements experience could not apprehend anything, and for want of the consciousness of them it does not comprehend anything as it really is. Thus experience would not be what it is, unless it were more than it is conscious of being, and its limitation or imperfection is mainly that it is ruled by principles of which it is not aware. Hence the object of the critical philosopher must be, not to dismiss any of the elements of experience that he may find the pure expression of truth in what remains, but rather to correct an abstract and incomplete view of the world by taking account of the factors which that view neglects. In truth, the value of Kant's work lies just in this, that he is often really doing the latter, even when he seems to be doing the former. Thus it would have been quite impossible for him to have derived the Ideas of reason and the formula of the moral law from the pure consciousness of self, if he had consistently maintained his conception of that consciousness as an analytic unity. But while his defective consciousness

How Kant himself teaches us to correct it.
of his own logic undoubtedly tends to empty the results he reaches of some of their meaning, he could have attained no results at all if his real method had not been other than his professed method.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the view of the critical method thus suggested is the following:—According to Kant's first statement, experience, and especially empirical science, is taken as a fixed basis of ascertained truth; and the object of the Critique is to show what a priori principles are necessarily involved in it. Thus the a priori conditions of experience are deduced as necessary to sustain the weight of an a posteriori truth, which is itself taken for granted. At the same time, according to Kant's own showing, this deduction, while it discloses the nature of the truth of experience, also limits it by showing that it is the truth only about phenomena. Kant even argues that, just because experience is dependent on the a priori conditions of sense and understanding, it cannot yield truth about things as they are in themselves. In so far, however, as, in the Dialectic, the Ideas of noumena or things in themselves are shown to be derived only from Reason and ultimately from the pure unity of self-consciousness, Kant's final deliverance on the subject is rather that experience is to be regarded as phenomenal, because it presupposes a given matter and is not entirely the product of the activity of the intelligence. Now, when Kant takes this view, and when he speaks of the Idea of an Intuitive Understanding as the unrealisable ideal of knowledge, he suggests that the true reason why empirical truth cannot be taken as absolute truth is that it is abstract, that it omits the consideration of an important element, which yet is always involved in it, i.e., the activity of the self. He suggests also that this defect may be corrected, just in so far as the element so omitted is taken account of, and the consequences of its presence are developed. For, in this way, if we are able to interpret experience in the light of its principle, and, in the language of Hegel, to raise consciousness into the form of self-consciousness, we can go beyond phenomena to their noumenal reality. And a similar result may be reached in the case of the practical consciousness, in so far as we realise that the idea of the
moral law, which arises out of the pure consciousness of self, is not to be taken as absolutely opposed to the consciousness of objects, but rather as including it, and, indeed, as only that consciousness in a higher form.

If, however, we adopt this view, we cannot any longer agree with Kant in taking outward experience in the one case, and inward experience in the other, as fixed and ascertained facts, which we may explain, but which we cannot change or modify. Nor can we regard the regress, by which in both cases the a priori principles are discovered, as merely exhibiting the foundation on which the structure of knowledge rests. On the contrary, we must recognise that this discovery has a negative as well as a positive relation to the phenomena, the principle of which it brings to light. Thus, if the Critique of Pure Reason shows what is implied or presupposed in ordinary or in scientific experience, it also makes it impossible that such experience should be regarded as absolute truth. What it conceives as things in themselves now become for us only phenomena; just because we see the principle on which they rest, and because in the light of that principle we are able to attain a truer consciousness of them. Thus the transcendental reflexion is not merely, as Kant generally represents it, a regress but also a progress. If it explains, and in a sense confirms, the truth of experience, it, at the same time, shows it to be only an imperfect kind of truth, with which we cannot be satisfied; and it points the way to a higher truth which corrects and transforms the former.

From this point of view a new light is cast upon Kant’s whole procedure, not only in the Critique of Pure Reason but in all the three Critiques taken in their relation to each other. We may now regard these different Critiques, not merely as supplying a transcendental deduction of the a priori forms of different faculties, but also as successive stages in one process of regressive reflexion, which is at the same time a progress towards the most complete and concrete view of man’s life and of his relation to the world. For the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic and religious consciousness are not really independent things, or the products of independent faculties, which stand side by side with each other; they are different forms of one
RESULT OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

conscious life, forms which arise out of each other in certain order determined by the very nature of the intelligence. They cannot, indeed, be entirely separated from each other; for in the organic movement of intelligence every phase contains in germ all the others. But, subject to this condition, it may be shown that the consciousness of objects is prior to the consciousness of self, and that the consciousness of the unity of subject and object, or, in other words, the consciousness of God, presupposes both. Hence the Critiques, in so far as they detect the fundamental principles of the scientific, the moral, and the aesthetic and religious consciousness, follow the order of the development of man's spiritual life from the less to the more complex forms of it. And the results they reach may be regarded as an explanation of the successive stages in the development of a complete idealistic view of the world, stages which are reached by a movement at once regressive and progressive, negative and positive. If this be the truth, the Critique of Pure Reason will represent the first movement of regressive thought, by which the principles of experience are carried back to the unity of the self, and the consciousness of objects is shown to reach its culmination in the consciousness of self. The Critique of Practical Reason, again, will represent the reflexion, by which the consciousness of the self as a law and an end to itself, is shown to involve the consciousness of a unity of all selves in the realisation of a 'Kingdom of Ends,' a perfect social community to which all nature is subjected as a means. And the Critique of Judgment, beginning, in the first part, by making it evident that the unity of the object with the subject is what is present to us in the feeling of beauty, proceeds in the second part, to show how the same idea, enriched by the consciousness of the moral end which is involved in self-consciousness, develops into a teleological view of Nature and History, as the manifestation of a divine reason trust in whom turns morality into religion. Finally, in the essay on the Idea of Universal History this conception is further confirmed by a view of nature, and especially of the natural impulses, as existing only in order that by a process of self-negation they may subserve that spiritual end, to which they at first
seem to be most opposed. And in the treatise on Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, this view is connected with the Christian idea that it is the divine Spirit in man and without him which, through all the process of consciousness and self-consciousness, is realising the highest Good of all his creatures.

To attribute such thoughts to Kant would no doubt be going beyond the letter of the Critical Philosophy, and it might even seem to involve the undoing of his critical work, and a return to the dogmatism which he rejected. Still, it is impossible to do justice to Kant's philosophy as a whole without at least indicating that it contained the germs of the later German Idealism, and that both as to its form and its matter. This is true as to its form, in so far as the method of regress in order to progress which he illustrated, is in itself already the dialectical method of Fichte and Hegel, or only superficially distinguished therefrom; and it is true as to its matter, in so far as the result of Kant's Critiques, and especially of his last Critique, is removed only by a step from the Intellectual Intuition of Schelling and the Idealistic Optimism of Hegel. At the same time, we must remember that, by his partial adherence to the system of thought which he was overthrowing, by a want of clear consciousness of his own method, and also, it may be said, by the cautious critical spirit,—which made him fear lest any rash advance in an idealistic direction might involve a return to the old prison-house of dogmatism—he was prevented from all such adventures of thought as were undertaken by his successors. But, if we can thus understand better both the strength and the weakness, of his position,—the great possibilities that lay in his method, and his own shortcomings in their realisation,—it is mainly because we come after him and inherit the result of his labours.
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