EX BIBLIOTHECA
FRANCES A. YATES
THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE:
THE FIRST PART;
WHEREIN
All the REASON and PHILOSOPHY
of ATHEISM is Confuted;
AND
Its IMPOSSIBILITY Demonstrated.

WITH
A DISCOURSE concerning the True Notion of the
LORD's SUPPER;
AND
Two SERMONS, on 1 John II. 3, 4. and 1 Cor. XV. 57.

By RALPH CUDWORTH, D. D.

THE SECOND EDITION;
In which are now first added REFERENCES to the several Quotations in the
Intellectual System; and an Account of the Life and Writings of the Author:

By THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. and F. R. S.

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M DCC XLIII.
TO THE
Right Reverend Father in GOD,

JOSEPH,
Lord Bishop of Bristol,
and
Dean of St. Paul's.

My Lord,

THE Value of the present Work is so universally acknowledg'd, that to offer any thing here in recommendation of it, might seem equally to reflect upon your Lordship's Judgment, as on the Character of the excellent Author. It will be a sufficient Honour and Satisfaction to me, to have contributed in any measure to the Improvement of the Intellectual System, and to the spreading a Performance, one of the noblest of the last Age, and at least as necessary to the present, for supporting the grand Foundations of all Religion and Virtue, against Ignorance, Sophistry, and every pernicious Effect of Vice and Sensuality upon the human Understanding. Such a De-
esign, I persuade myself, wants no Apology, especially to a person, whose Writings display the Evidence, and whose Character exemplifies the Beauty and Dignity of Christianity. I shall therefore only add, that, upon these accounts, I am, with the highest Esteem and Veneration,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble Servant,

London
Novemb. 6.
1742.

Thomas Birch.
Advertisement to the Reader.

The former Edition of the Intellectual System, tho' the most valuable Treasure of the ancient Theology and Philosophy extant in any Language, had one considerable Defect, (frequent amongst even the best Writers of the last Age,) that the References of its numerous Quotations were very few, and those obscure and imperfect. Such as were wanting are therefore supplied in the present Edition with the utmost exactness, chiefly from Dr. Laurence Mosheim's Latin Translation of this Work, and placed at the Bottom of the Page; those of the Author being still left in the Margin, with proper Additions, included in [ ] to render them more clear and determinate.

The Dedication to the House of Commons in 1647, of the Sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4. omitted in the second and third Editions, is restored likewise from the first.

To the whole is prefix'd a new Life of the Author, wherein is given a very particular Account of his several excellent Works still in Manuscript, as well as of those already published.
An ACCOUNT of the LIFE and WRITINGS of RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

Dr. Ralph Cudworth was son of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, at first Fellow of Emanuel College in the University of Cambridge, and afterwards Minister of St. Andrew's Church in that town, and at last Rector of Aller in Somersetshire, and Chaplain to King James I. He died in August or September 1624. Tho' he was a man of Genius and Learning, he published only a Supplement to Mr. William Perkins's Commentary upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, of which, as well as several other works of that Divine, he was Editor.

Our Author's Mother was of the family of Machell, and had been nurse to Prince Henry, eldest son of King James I. and after Dr. Cudworth's death, married to Dr. Stoughton. Our Author himself was born at Aller in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law Dr. Stoughton, and in 1630, was admitted pensioner in Emanuel College, the Doctor giving him this testimony, that he was as well grounded in school-learning as any boy of his age, that went to the University. July 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a student in the University, and applied himself to all parts of literature with such vigour, that in 1639, he was created Master of Arts with great applause. Soon after he was chosen Fellow of his college, and became an eminent Tutor there, and had at one time eight and twenty pupils; an instance scarce ever known before, even in the largest Colleges of the University. Among these was Mr. William Temple, afterwards famous for his embassies and writings. Not long after, he was presented to the Rectory of North Cadbury in Somersetshire, worth three hundred pounds per annum.

In 1642 he publish'd a Discourse concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper. It was printed at London in quarto, with only the initial letters of his

* See Dr. John Laurence Mothecim's Preface to his Latin translation of Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. The Pages of this Preface are not numbered.  
‡ Mothecim, ubi supra.
of Ralph Cudworth D.D.

his name. Bocchart, Spencer, Selden, and other eminent writers quote this discourse with great commendations; and my most ingenious and learned friend Mr. Warburton, in a Letter of excellent Remarks upon our Author, which he favour'd me with, styles it a master-piece in its kind; and observes that he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the Sacrament, and supported it with all his learning. The same year likewise appeared his treatise intitled, The Union of Christ and the Church a Shadow, by R. C. printed at London in quarto.

He took the degree of Batchelor of Divinity in the year 1644, upon which occasion he maintained at the Commencement in the University the two following Theses: I. Dantur boni & mali rationes aeternae & indissolubiles: II. Dantur substantiae incorporeae suad natura immortales. Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind those important subjects, which he so long afterwards cleared up with such uncommon penetration in his Intellectual System, and other works still preferv'd in manuscript.

In the same year 1644, he was appointed Master of Clare-Hall in Cambridge, in the room of Dr. Pusey, who had been ejected by the Parliamentary Visitors. In 1645, Dr. Metcalf having resign'd the Regius professorship of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. Cudworth was unanimously nominated on the 15th of October by the seven Electors to succeed him. From this time he abandon'd all the functions of a Minister, and applied himself only to his academical employments and studies, especially that of the Jewish antiquities. And we find the following passage in a manuscript letter of Mr. John Worthington, afterwards Master of Jesus College, dated May 12 1646. "Our learned friend Mr. Cudworth reads every Wednesday in the schools. His subject is "Templum Hierophylytanum." When his affairs required his absence from the University, he substitut'd Mr. Worthington in his room. March 31, 1647, he preach'd before the House of Commons at Westminster, upon a day of public humiliation, a sermon upon 1 John ii. 3, 4. for which he had the thanks of that House returned him on the same day. This sermon was printed the same year at Cambridge in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, Ἐκθεσις, οὐκέναι ο γὰρ ἐνυπόν θεοῦ ἡμών Χριστοῦ, and with a Dedication to the House of Commons, which was omitted in the second and third editions, but restored in the present. In 1651 he took the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Tho' the places, which he held in the University were very honourable, yet he found the revenue of them not sufficient to support him; for which reason he had thoughts of leaving Cambridge intirely, and indeed actually retir'd from it, tho' for a short time. This appears from two manuscript letters of Mr. Worthington; the former dated January 6, 1651, where he writes thus: "If thro' want of maintenance he (R. C.) should be forced to leave Cambridge, for which place he is so eminently accomplished with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would be an ill omen." In the latter dated January 30, 1654, is this passage: "After many tossings Dr. Cudworth is, thro' God's providence, returned to Cambridge, and settled in Christ's College, and by his "marriage more settled and fixed." For upon the decease of Dr. Samuel Bolso
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Bolton, Master of that college, in 1654, our Author was chosen to succeed him, and married the same year. In this station he spent the rest of his life, proving highly serviceable to the University and the whole Church of England. In January 1656 he was one of the persons nominated by a Committee of the parliament to be consulted about the English translation of the Bible; as appears from the following passage of White's translation:

January 1656. At the grand Committee for religion, ordered, that it be referred to a sub-committee to send for and advise with Dr. Walton, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Caile, Mr. Clark, Mr. Poulk, Dr. Cudworth, and such others as they shall think fit; and to consider of the translations and impressions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this Committee; and that it be especially commended to the Lord Commissioner White to take care of this Business.

This committee, says White, often met at my house, and had the most learned men in the oriental tongues to consult with in this great business, and divers excellent and learned observations of some mistakes in the translations of the Bible in English; which yet was agreed to be the best of any translation in the world. I took pains in it; but it became fruitless by the parliament's dissolution.

Our Author had a great share in the friendship and esteem of John Thurloe Esq., Secretary of State to the Protectors Oliver and Richard Cromwell, who frequently corresponded with him, and consulted him with regard to the characters of such persons in the University, as were proper to be employ'd in political and civil affairs. For which purpose Dr. Cudworth wrote, among others, the following letter:

Honoured Sir,

I must in the first place crave your pardon for the delay of this my second Letter thus long, (for, I suppose, you have receiv'd my former in answer to yours,) which, had not some unavoidable occasions hindered me, had come sooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the University at this time, of singular parts and accomplishments for learning; some of which are so farre engaged in divinity, that they cannot well divert themselves to other professions or employments; others perhaps so much addicted to a contemplative life, that they could not so well apply themselves to politicall and civill affairs. But for those, which I conceive to be more free and undetermined, I shall here present you with a catalogue of some of their names, such as I conceive best qualified for civil employments. First, Mr. Page, a Fellow of King's College, an excellent Latinist, and one, that hath travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above 40 years of age; but how he hath been or is affected to the Parliament or present government, I cannot tell. He is now absent from the University, and, I think, at present with the Earle of Devonshire. Secondly, Dr. Bagge, Fellow of Caius College, and Doctor of Physick, a singularly good and ready Latinist; and I believe there is none of his yeares in England equal to him in the profession of physick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being...

† Thurloe's manuscript State-Papers Vol. XXXVIII. p. 259.
of Ralph Cudworth, D.D.

"so eminent in that way (though a very young Doctor) he would put himselfe
"upon State-employment; neither do I fully know how he is affected. There
"are of Trinity Colledge severall, that are very good Latinists, and well furnished
"with all the politer Learning; as Mr. Valentine (a sober discreet Man) and
"Mr. Linne (well known for an excellent Poet.)
"Mr. Mildmay of Peter-house, one, whose inclination seemes to be peculiarly
"carried out towards Politicall and Civill employments, a Scholar and a dif-
"crete man.
"Mr. Croone of Emanuel Colledge, a young Master of Arts, of excellent
"good parts, and a general scholar.
"Mr. Miles, Fellow of Clare-bail, formerly my pupil! one that hath no
"mind to professe Divinity, but a very good Scholar, and also a junior Master
"of Arts.
"Lastly of Chrift-Colledge there is a young Man, that is Master of Arts this
"year, one Mr. Leigb, that for his standing is very well accomplished, and
"I doubt not but in a very little time would exceedinge fitte for any such
"employment, as you would defigne him for.
"Many more names I could set down; but these may suffice for your
"choice; and you may, if you thinke good, enquire further concerning any
"of them from some others, and, if you please, from this Gentleman, whom
"I have for that purpose desired to prefent this to you, Mr. George Rust*;
"Fellow of Chrift-Colledge, who can further enforme and satisfie you concern-
"ing them. He is an understanding, pious, discreet man, and himselfe I
"know to bee a Man of exceeding good Parts, and a general Scholar, but one
"that seemes not so willing to divert himselfe from Preaching and Divinity,
"which he hath of late intended; otherwise I know his parts are such, as
"would enable him for any Employment.
"If you please to enquire further from him, and by him signify your fur-
"ther pleasure to me, I shall be ready in this or any thing else, that I am able,
"to expresse myselfe.

"Sir,
"Your affectionately devoted Friend and Servant,

R. Cudworth."

Dr. Cudworth likewise recommended † to the Secretary, for the place of Chap-
lain to the English Merchants at Lisbon, Mr. Zachary Cradock, afterwards Pro-
Vost of Eaton College, and famous for his uncommon Genius and Learning, and
his Abilities as a Preacher.

In January 1654, he wrote the following Letter to Secretary Thurloe, upon
his design of publishing some Latin Discourses in defence of Christianity ag-
ainst Judaism ‡.

"Sir,

* Afterwards Dean of Drumore in Ire-


"Sir,

"Having this opportunity offered by Doctor Scaliger, who desires to 
waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, 
I could do no leffe then accompany him with these few lines to present 
my service to you. I am perfwad'd, you will be well satisfied in his inge-
nuity, when you are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity,
I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am per-
fwad'd by friends to publish some Difcourfes, which I have prepared in 
"Latine, that will be of a polemicall nature in defense of Christianity against 
Judaim, explaining some chief places of Scripture controvert'd be-
ween the Jewes and us, (as Daniel's prophecy of the 70 Weekes, never 
yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many diffic-
culties of Chronologie. Which task I the rather undertake, not onely 
because it is fuitable to my Hebrew Profession, and because I have 
lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely 
ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better inable me 
fully to confute them; but also because I conceive it a worke proper and 
suitable to this preuent age. However, though I should not be able myselfe 
to be any way instrumental to thofe great tranfaotions of Providence (not 
without caufe, hoped for of many) amongst the Jews; yet I perfwade myfelfe 
my pains may not be alltogether unprofitable for the setting and eftablifhing 
of Christians; or at leaft I shall give an account of my spending fuch va-
cant hours, as I could redeeme from my preaching and other occasions, and 
the perpetual diftractions of the Burfarship, which the Statutes of this Col-
ledge impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate thofe fruits of my 
"studies to his Highnes, (to whose noble father I was much obliged) if I 
"may have leave, or prefume fo to doe; which I cannot better understand 
"by any than yourfelfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an 
"opportunity to infinuate any fuch thing, which I permitteth wholly to your 
"prudence. I intend, God willing, to be in London some time in March; and 
"then I shall waite upon you to receive your information. In the mean time 
"craving pardon for this prolixity of mine, and freedome, I subscribe myfelfe,

"Your really devoted Friend

and humble Servant,

R. Cudworth.

Jan. 20. 1658.
Christ's Coll. Cambr.

The Difcourfe concerning Daniel's Prophecy of the LXX Weeks, men-
tion'd in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commend'd, 
by Dr. Henry More in his Preface §. 18. p. xvi. to his Explanation of the grand 
Mystery of Godliness, printed at London 1660. in fol. where he observes, that Dr. 
Cudworth in that Difcourfe, which was read in the publiek Schools of the Uni-
versity, had undeceiv'd the world, which had been miff'd too long by the over-
great opinion they had of Joseph Scaliger; and that taking Funccius's Epocha, he 
had demonftrated the manifeftation of the Messiah to have fallen out at the end of the
the sixty-ninth week, and his Passion in the midst of the last, in the most natural and proper sense thereof; "which demonstration of his is of as much "price and worth in Theology, as either the Circulation of the Blood in Phys-" ific, or the Motion of the Earth in natural Philosophy."

Upon the Restauration of King Charles II. he wrote a Copy of Verses, publish'd in Academia Cantabrigiensis ΣΩΣΤΡΑ, sive ad Carolum II. reducim de Regnis ipfi, Mufis per ipsius reftitutis, Gratulatio, printed at Cambridge 1660 in quarto. In 1662 he was prefentied by Dr. Gilbert Sheldon, Bishop of London, to the Vicarage of Abnewell in Hertfordshire, * to which he was admitted on the first of December that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665 he had a design to publish a Discourse concerning Moral Good and Evil, as appears from the following extracts of Letters written by him and by Dr. Henry More Fellow of his College †.

Dr. Cudworth in a Letter to Dr. John Wortibington, January 1665.

"You know, I have had this Designe concerning Good and Evil, or natural Ethicks, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe, (when I made "the first Sermon in the Chapel about the argument) to study over anew, "and dispatch a discourse about it. No man had so frequently exhorted me "to it, and so earnestly, as this friend.—But about three months since unex-"pectedly he told me on a sudden, he had begun a discourse on the same "argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and "plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me, he would "speak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excused "the busines; that he could not tell, whether I would dispatch and finish it "or no, because I had been so long about it; that Mr. Fulwood and Mr. "Jenks had solicited him to do this; and that you were very glad, that he "would undertake it. But now he understood I was resolute to go through "with it, he was very glad of it; that he would desist, and throw his into a "corner. All this I impart to you privately, because a common friend. I "have not spoken to any body else but Mr. Standish, and something to Mr. "Jenks and Fulwood."

Dr. H. More in a Letter to Dr. Wortibington, January 24. 1665.

"I understand by Mr. Standish's letter, that he unawares speaking to the "Master || of my Enchiridion Ethicum, he shew'd again his disgust, &c.—that "if I persisted in the resolution of publishing my book, he would desist in "his, though he had most of it then ready to send up to be licensed that "week. I pray you, spur him up to set his to the press. For my part, it is "well known, I have no designe at all but to serve the publick; and that I "enter'd upon the talk extremely against my own will; and yet I have fi-"nished it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I shall publish it, I shall "have leisure enough to consider."

† Communicated by my very learned Friend, Mr. John Ward, F. R. S. and Pro-
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Dr. More in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, Feb. 7. 1664.

"Some few friends at Cambridge were exceedingly earnest with me to write a short Ethicks, alluding no small reason for it. I did not only heartily reject them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeness, alluding several things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner vitriifying the project, preferring Experience of Life before all such fine systems; alluding also, that Dr. Cudworth had a design for the greatest curiosity of that subject. But nothing would content them but my setting upon the work; that it was uncertain, when Dr. Cudworth's would come out; and besides, mine being a small treatise, running through the whole body of Ethicks, they would not interfere one with another. For my part, till I had by chance told Dr. Cudworth of my purpose, (which I did simply, thinking nothing) and how many chapters I had finished, I knew nothing either of the time, or the scope of his writing; or if he intended a general Ethicks. But the effect of those Friends earnestness (to tell you plainly how the case stood) was this: A day or two after their last importance, I waking in the morning, and some of their weightiest allegations recurring to my mind; and also remembering, with what an excessive earnestness one of them solicited me to this work (in which I thought there might be something more than ordinary, and that he was actuated in this business I knew not how,) I began seriously to think with myself of the matter; and at last was so conscientiously illaqueated therein, that I could not absolutely free myself therefrom to this very day. Nor was this only an act of mere conscience, but of present self-denial. For it did very vehemently cross other great and innocent pleasures, that I promised myself in a certain order of my studies, which I had newly proposed myself at that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without some pleasure."

Dr. More, in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, May 10. 1665.

"I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came into my mind to print this Enchiridion, till his book was out, unless he would have professed his like of the project. I have new transcribed it all. Mr. Jenks and Mr. Fullwood are exceeding earnest to see it, and would transcribe it for their present satisfaction. But if they should do so, and it be known, it would, it may be, disturb Dr. Cudworth, whom I am very loth any way to grieve. But if yourself have a mind to see it, and could get a fair and true copy transcrib'd of it, I would willingly pay the Transcriber, and the Copy should be yours; for I am loth, that what I have writ on so edifying, a subject, should be lost."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progress of it was opposed by no person with greater force and learning than by our Author. For this purpose in 1678, he publish'd at London, in folio, his True Intellectual System of the Universe: The first Part, wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism
Arbeifn is confuted, and its Impoffibility demonstrated. The Imprimate by
Dr. Samuel Parker, Chaplain to Archbifhop Selden, is dated May 29, 1671,
seven years before the publiflion of this Work; which met with great oppo-
sition from fome of the Courtiers of King Charles II. who endeavoured to de-
ftroy the reputation of it, when it was firft publifl'd*. Nor has it efcape'd
the cenfures of Writers of different parties since that time.

The firft Piece, which appear'd againft it, was from a Roman Catholic, in
A Letter to Mr. R. Cudworth, D. D. printed at the end of a Tract, intitled,
Anti-Haman, or an Anfwer to Mr. G. Burnet's Mystery of Iniquity unvailed;
wherein is fhew'd the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worship, and Practice of the
Roman-Catholic Church with thofe of the purfeft times; the Idolatry of the
Pagans is truly fhew'd, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted;
and the Reasons are given, why Catholics avoid the Communion of the Pofeflent
Church. To which is annexed a Letter to R. Cudworth D. D. by W. E. Stu-
dent in Divinity. With leave of Superiours; 1679 in octavo. This Writer at-
tacks Dr. Cudworth's affertion, that tho' very few of the antient Philosophers
thought God to be corporeal, as Epicurus, Strato, &c. yet that the greatest
part of them believed him to be a pure Spirit, and adored the only true God
under the names of Jupiter, Minerva, Ofiris and Venus. In oppofition to
which his Antagonift maintains †, "that alfoe all Pagans (nay all
"men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet tho'fe, they adored;
"were Men?" in fupport of which he urges four proofs taken, 1. from the
diversity of their Sexes: 2. from their Generation: 3. from their Death: 4.
from their Rites. He likewife attempts to confufe what Dr. Cudworth has
fimoufly defended throughout his Book, that the Unity of God was a prime
Article of the Pagan Creed.

But let us now see, in how feverely a manner he was treated even by a Pro-
teftant Divine, Mr. John Turner, in his Discourse of the Messiah ‡. He tells us †,
we must conclude Dr. Cudworth to be himfelf a Triheiftic, a fett, for which, I
believe, he may have a kindness, because he loves hard words; or something else
without either trick or trick, which I will not name, because his Book pretends
to be written againft it. And again ‡‡, that "the moft, that Charity itself can
allow the Doctor, if it were to step forth, and fpeak his moft favourable
character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deift."

Mr. Dryden likewife tells us **, that our Author "has raised fuch strong
objections againft the being of a God and Providence, that many think he
has not anfwered them." And the late Earl of Shaftesbury, in his Moralifls,
a Rhapsody ††, has the following paffage: "You know the common fate
of tho'fe, who dare to appear fair Authors. What was that pious and
learned man's cafe, who wrote the Intellectual System of the Universe? I
"confefs, it was pleafant enough to consider, that tho' the whole world were
"no lefs satisfied with his Capacity and Learning, than with his Sincerity in

* Vide Joannis Clerici Vitam, ad ann.
† P. 333. &c.
‡ See p. 16, 17, 19, 162. Edit. London 1685
in octavo.
§ P. 17. §§ P. 19.

** Dedication of his Translation of Virgil's
Aenid, Vol. II. p. 578. Edit. London 1730. in
octavo.
†† Part. II. Scir. 3. Characters of Vol. II.
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"the Cause of the Deity; yet was he accused of giving the upper hand to the "Atheists, for having only stated their reasons and thole of their Adversaries "fairly together."

Such was the treatment, which our great Author receiv'd for his immortal Volume; wherein, as Mr. Warburton says *, with a Boldness uncommon indeed, but very becoming a Man conscious of his own Integrity, and of the Truth and Evidence of his cause, he launch'd out into the immensity of the Intellectual System; and at his first essay penetrated the very darkest recesses of Antiquity, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, and drag up the lurking Monster to Conviction. Where the few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel his secret purpose—to tell the world—that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his Book—However, thus ran the popular clamour against this excellent person. Would the reader know the consequence? Why, the Zealots inflam'd the Bigots:

"Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind:

* Preface to the second Volume of his Divine Legation of Moses, p. x, xii.
there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for some years about the blessed Trinity, especially in England, and in the heterodox way, which does not bring in Dr. Cudworth upon the stage, and vouch his name and quotations for its purpose. While on the other hand, the truly Orthodox (tho' often thro' a misunderstanding of his sense) do aim at his Doctrine as a mark of their Inveccitives; and others, who call themselves also by that name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words used by the ancient Fathers, especially when repeated and revived by so learned a person as Dr. Cudworth, and resolving whatever should come of it, to stand by them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of Tritheism." Mr. Wife therefore endeavours, as much as possible, to clear up and justify our Author's Doctrine. However, Mr. Robert Nelson, in his Life of Bishop Bull *, declares, that Dr. Cudworth's Notion with regard to the Trinity was the same with Dr. Samuel Clarke's, and repreffes it in the following terms; That the three Persons of the Trinity are three distinct spiritual Substances, but that the Father alone is truly and properly God; that he alone in the proper sense is supreme; that absolute supreme Honour is due to him only; and that he, absolutely speaking, is the only God of the Universe; the Son and Spirit being God but only by the Father's concurrence with them, and their subordination and subjectio to him. But to return to Mr. Wife; he next considers our Author's opinion about the Resurrection, who, as appears from several passages of his Intellectual System, thought, that the Resurrection-body will not confift of the same substance with that, which was buried; and that it must not be a body of flesh, but an aethereal one; and that the present body is only a feed of the Resurrection. However Mr. Wife shews from other passages in his Works, that he has as plainly asserted the Resurrection of the same numerical Body, as in some places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, &c. Monfieur Le Clerc gave large extracts of the Intellectual System in his Bibliothèque Choixée, Tom. I. II. III. V. VII. VIII. IX. which engag'd him in a dispute with Monfieur Bayle, concerning Dr. Cudworth's Notion of Plastic Natures. Monfieur Bayle, in his Continuation des Pensées diverses sur les Comètes †, had observed, that "the Atheists are very much perplex'd, how to account for the Formation of Animals, which they ascrib'd to a cause, which was not conscious of what it did, and yet followed a regular Plan, without knowing according to what laws it went to work. But Dr. Cudworth's Plastic Nature, and Dr. Grew's Vital Principle || are exactly in the same case; and thus they take away the whole strength of this objection against the Atheists. For if God could communicate such a plastic power, it follows, that it is not inconsistent with the nature of things, that there be such agents. They may therefore exist of themselves, "will the adversary say; whence it would also follow, that the regularity, "which we observe in the universe, may be the effect of a blind cause, "which was not conscious of what it did." Mr. Bayle however own'd, that Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew were not aware of the consequence, which, according

* §. LXI. p. 359, 340. edit. London. 1714. || See Dr. N. hemis.h Grew's Cosmologia Sacra, printed at London, 1701. in folio.
† Tom. I. §. 21.
An Account of the Life and Writings

according to him, followed from their system. Monsieur Le Clerc return'd an answer in the fifth Volume of his Bibliothèque Choisie *, wherein he observ'd, that the plastic or vital Natures, which those two Writers admit, cannot in the least favour the Atheists; because these natures are only instruments in the hand of God, and have no power nor efficacy, but what they receive from him, who rules and directs all their actions. That they are only instrumental causes produced and employ'd by the chief and first Cause; and that it cannot be said, that a palace has been built up without art, because not only hammers, rules, saws, &c. but even the arms of men, which made use of these instruments, are destitute of knowledge. It is sufficient, that the mind of the Builder directed all these things, and employ'd them in the Execution of his Design. It is therefore plain, that the Atheists, who deny the Being of an intelligent Cause, cannot retort the argument of Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew upon them. Monsieur Bayle, in his Answ 1, endeavour'd to shew, that if these Writers had consider'd the plastic Natures only as instruments in the hand of God, this System would have been expos'd to all the difficulties, to which the Cartesian hypothesis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we must suppose their opinion to have been, that these Natures are active Principles, which do not want to be continually set on and directed; but that it is sufficient, if God does but put them in a proper situation, and superintend their actions, to fix them right, if it be necessary. This being the case, Monsieur Bayle pretends, that the Argument may be retorted against those Writers. For, says he, since when the order and regularity of this world are alledg'd as a proof of the Being of a God, it is suppose'd, that a Being cannot produce a regular work, without having an idea of it; yet, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic Natures, which produce plants and animals, have not the least idea of what they do. If it be answer'd, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being, who knows all, and whose Ideas they only put in execution; the Stratonician will reply, that if they do it only as efficient Causes, this is as incomprehensible as that, which is objected to him; since it is as difficult for any Being to perform a scheme, which it does not understand, but which another understands, as it is to perform a scheme, which no Being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician say, that God could endow some Creatures with a power of producing excellent works, tho' without any knowledge; you must also confess, that there is no necessity connection between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their efficacy, and of the manner of producing them: consequently you ought not to assert, that these things cannot subsist separately in nature, and that nature cannot have of it self, what, according to you, the plastic Beings received from God. In short, Monsieur Bayle ask'd, whether these Writers maintain'd, that the Plastic and Vital Natures are only passive instruments in the hand of God, as Monsieur Le Clerc seem'd to suppose by his Comparison of an Architect. Monsieur Le Clerc answer'd, that, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic Natures were not passive

* P. 285, &c.
1 Huit. des Ouvrages de Scavans, Adit 422.
2 p. 385, &c.
of Ralph Cudworth, D. D.

passive instruments, but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, tho' we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheists, added he, retort the argument, because God is the author of the regularity and order, with which the plastic Natures act; whereas, according to the Atheists, Matter moves of itself, without any Caufe to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This dispute was carried on still further, with some warmth, and a great many repetitions on both sides. But what has been said is sufficient to give the reader a notion of this controversy, for the progress of which he may consult the following Books: Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans. Decemb. 1704. Art. 12. Bibliothèque Choîse, Tom. VII. Art. 7. Répons, aux Questions d'un Provincial, Tom. III. Chap. 179. Bibliothèque Choîse, Tom. IX. Art. 10. Répons pour Mr. Bayle a Mr. Le Clerc, p. 31, annex'd to the fourth Volume of the Répons aux Quest. d'un Provincial.

Upon the whole, Mr. Warburton, in his Letter to the above cited, is of opinion that our Author's "Plastic Life of Nature" is fully overthrown by "Monseur Bayle," whose superiority in that dispute with Monseur Le "Clerc is clear and indubitable."

Monseur Le Clerc * express'd his wishes, that some Man of Learning would translate the Intellectual System into Latin; but this design, tho' resolved upon and attempted by several persons in Germany †, was never executed till the Year 1733, when Dr. Moheim publish'd his Translation of it under the following title: RaphaeILDUDWORTH Theologic Doctor, &c. in Academia Cantabrigiensi Professeur, Systema Intellectualis ejus Universi, seu de Veris Naturae Rerum originibus Commentarium, quibus omnis eorum Philosophia, qui Deum esse negant, funditus ostenditur. Accedunt reliquiae ejus Opuscula. Joannes Laurentius Moheimius, Theologus Doctor, serenissimi Ducis brunsvicensis a Conflitui Rerum sanctorum, Abbav Canobiorum Vallis S. Mariae & Lapidis S. Michaelis, omnia ex Anglico Latine vertit, recensuit, varius Observationibus & Dissertationibus illustravit, & auxit. Jena, 2 Volumes in folio. Dr. Moheim, in his Preface, represents the difficulties of translating this work to be very great; and observes some Mistakes, which Monseur Le Clerc has committed with regard to the sense of our Author in his Extracts in the Bibliothèque Choîse. Monseur Bourdelin, a Member of the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, had begun a Translation of the Intellectual System into French ‡, but was prevented from completing it by his death, which happened in May 1717.

But to return to our Author: in 1678, he was inlisted Prefandary of Gloucester †. He died at Cambridge June 26, 1688, and was interr'd in the Chapel of Christ's College, with the following Inscription on his Monument:

"Here lieth the Body of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, late Master of Christ's College, about thirty Years Hebrew Professor, and Prefandary of Gloucester. He died the 26th of June 1688, in the seventy-first Year of his Age."

b

† See Dr. Moheim's Preface.
‡ See his Eloge in Hist. de l'Academie des Inscriptions & Belles Lettres. Tom. II. p.
562. edit. Amsterdah.
An Account of the Life and Writings

He was a Man of very extensive Learning, excellently skil'd in the learned Languages and Antiquity, a good Mathematician, a subtile Philosopher, and a profound Metaphysician. He embraced the Mechanical or Corporcular Philosophy; but with regard to the Deity, Intelligences, Genii, Ideas, and in short the Principles of human Knowledge, he followed Plato, and even the latter Platonists. A great number of Writers commend his Piety and Modesty; and Bishop Burnet having observed, that Dr. Henry More studied to consider Religion as a Seed of Deform Nature, and in order to this, set young Students much on reading the antient Philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian Religion as a Doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human Nature, tells us, that "Dr. Cudworth carried this on with a great Strength of Genius, and a vast Compass of Learning;" and that "he was a Man of great Conduct and Prudence; upon which his Enemies did very falsely accuse him of Craft and Diffimulation." The late Earl of Shaftesbury styles him an excellent and learned Divine, of biggest Authority at home, and Fame abroad.

Besides his Sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4. above-mentioned, he publish'd likewise another on 1 Cor. xv. 57. the third Edition of both which was printed at London 1676, in folio.

He left several posthumous Works, most of which seem to be a Continuation of his Intellectual System, of which he had given the world only the first Part. One of these was publish'd by Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham, at London, in 1731, under this Title, A Treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality. In the Preface to which the Bishop observes, that in this Book our Author "proves the falseness of the Consequences with respect to natural Justice and Morality in God, which are deducible from the Principles of those, that maintain the second sort of Fate, denounced by him Theologic." And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first Book against Material Fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper Antidote to the Polison in some of Mr. Hobbes's and others Writings, who reviv'd in that Age the exploded Opinions of Protagoras and other antient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal Discriminations of moral Good and Evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary Productions of divine or human Will. Against the antient and modern Patrons of this Doctrine, no one hath writ better than Dr. Cudworth. His Book is indeed a Demonstration of the truth of the contrary Opinion, and is drawn up with that Beauty, Clearness, and Strength, as must delight as well as convince the Reader, if I may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just Idea of the Writer's good Sense, as well as vast Learning. We are not certain, that this Treatise is quoted so perfect as the Author design'd it; but it appears from the Manuscript, that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the Press."

The Titles and Subjects of the rest of our Author's Manuscripts are as follow: A Discourse of moral Good and Evil in several Folios, containing near 1000 Pages.

Heads of the Chapters of one of those Books.

2. Objections against Morality, p. 11.
3. Answers to the first Objection, p. 29.
4. Answer to the second and third Objection, p. 45.
5. Inconsistencies with a Common-wealth, p. 49.
7. The sixth and seventh Objections answer'd, p. 112.
8. Pleasure; wherein the ancient Hedonic Philosophy is explain'd, and it is largely debated, whether Pleasure is the Sumnum Bonum, p. 117.
9. Answer to the ninth Objection, p. 175.
11. Happines; and the Philosophy of Epicurus concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.
12. True Happines in divine Life, p. 296.
13. Result of the former Discourse; incorporeal Substance Deity, p. 303.
15. Objections against Liberty. To áριστον Φανόντος.


A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, in which the Grounds of the atheistical Philosophy are confuted, and Morality vindicated and explained. This Book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the Chapters of one of the Books.

Chap. 1. The Necessity of all human Actions asserted by three sorts of Men, and in different ways: first, some Christian Theologers of the latter age: secondly, the old Zenonian Stoics: thirdly, the Democritical Physiologers or atheistical Fatalists, p. 1.
3. The Stoical Fatalists pleading, p. 70.
4. Atheistical Fatalists pleading, p. 84.
5. Answer to the Phenomena objected, p. 119.
7. Of Intellation, p. 196.
An Account of the Life and Writings


Heads of the Chapters of another Book De libero Arbitrio.

Chap. i. Dreams. 2. Indifferences. 3. General Account: 4. Particular or full Account. 5. Definition and particular Account. 6. An Imperfection not formally in God. 7. Arguments to prove such a thing. 8. That that, which rules all, is not 

Upon Daniel's prophecy of the LXX Weeks, wherein all the interpretations of the Jews are considered and confuted, with several of some learned Christians. In two Volumes in Folio.

Of the Verity of the Christian Religion against the Jews. Dr. Cudworth mentions this in his MSS, but it is not yet found.

A Discourse of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the Soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew Learning.

An Explanation of Hobbes's Notion of God, and of the Extention of Spirits.

Our Author had several sons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, Damaries, who was second wife to Sir Francis Masham, of Oates in the County of Essex, Bart. * by whom she had a son, the late Francis Cudworth Masham Esq. †; one of the Masters of the high Court of Chancery, and Accountant General of the said Court, and foreign Apofer in the Court of Exchequer. This Lady had a great friendhhip with Mr. Locke, who died at her house at Oates, where he had resided for several years before. She was distingushed for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 publish'd at London in 12°, without her name, A Discourse concerning the Love of God. She introduces this Tract with observing, that * whatever reproaches have been made by the Romanists, on the one hand, of the want of books of devotion in the Church of England, or " by the Dissenters, on the other, of a dead and lifelefs way of preaching, " it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found so good a collection of discourses on moral subjects, as might be made of English sermons, and other treatises of that nature, written by the Divines of our church. Which books are certainly in themselves the greatest, and " most general ufe of any; and do most conduce to that, which is the chief aim of Christianity, a good Life." She then animadvert upon thole, who undervalue morality ‡, and others, who strain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to ascend by it to something beyond or above it ††; and afterwards proceeds to consider the conduct of thole, who build their practical and devotional Discourses upon Principles, which will not bear the test, but which oblige them to lay down such afferions of Morality, as sober and well-disposed Christians cannot understand to be practicable **. And here

* He died at his seat at Oates on Sunday the 5th of March 1704, in the 77th year of his age.
† He died May 17th, 1731.
‡ It contains 126 pages, besides the preface.
†† P. 2, 5.
** P. 7.
Here she applies herself to the examination of Mr. John Norris's *Scheme in his Practical Discourses and other Treatises, wherein he maintains, that mankind are obliged strictly, as their duty, to love, with desire, nothing but God only, every degree of desire of any creature whatsoever being sinful;" which assertion Mr. Norris defends upon this ground, that God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient cause of our Sensations; for whatever gives us pleasure, has a right to our love: but God only gives us pleasure; therefore he only has a right to our love. This hypothesis is considered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady Masham, and the bad consequences of it represented in a strong light. Her Discourse was translated into French by Mr. Peter Cofle, and printed at Amsterdam in 1705. She lies buried in the cathedral church of Bath, where a monument is erected to her memory with the following inscription:

"Near this place lies Dame DAMARIS MASHAM, daughter of Ralph Cudworth D. D. and second Wife of Sir Francis Masham of Oates in the County of Essex Bart. who to the Softness and Elegancy of her own Sex, added several of the noblest Accomplishments and Qualities to the other. She possessed these Advantages in a degree unusual to either, and tempered them with an Exactness peculiar to herself. Her Learning, Judgment, Sagacity, and Penetration, together with her Candour and Love of Truth, were very observable to all, that conversed with her, or were acquainted with those small treatises she published in her life-time, tho' she industriously concealed her Name. Being Mother of an only Son, she applied all her natural and acquired Endowments to the care of his Education. She was a strict Observer of all the Virtues belonging to every Station of her Life, and only wanted Opportunities to make these Talents shine in the world, which were the Admiration of her Friends. She was born on the 18th of January 1658, and died on the 20th of April 1708."

* This Divine borrowed his hypothesis from Father Mallebranche.
THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE:
THE FIRST PART;
WHEREIN
All the REASON and PHILOSOPHY
of ATHEISM is confuted,
AND
Its IMPOSSIBILITY demonstrated.

By RALPH CUDWORTH, D. D.

THE SECOND EDITION;
In which are now first added REFERENCES to the several Quotations.
To the Right Honourable

HENAGE
LORD FINCH,
BARON of DAVENTRY,
Lord High CHANCELLOR of England,
and one of His MAJESTY’s most
Honourable Privy Council.

My Lord,

The many Favours I have formerly received from You, as they might justly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a publick and thankful Acknowledgment; so have they encourag’d me at this time, to the Presumption of this Dedication to your Lordship. Whom, as your perspicacious Wit, and solid Judgment, together with Your acquired Learning, render every way a most accomplished and desirable Patron; so did I persuade my self, that your hearty Affection to Religion, and Zeal for it, would make you not unwilling, to take that into your Protection, which is written wholly in the Defence thereof; so far forth, as its own Defects, or Miscarriages, should not render it uncapable of the fame. Nor can I think it probable, that in an Age of so much Debauchery, Scepticism, and Infidelity, an Under-
taking of this kind should be judged by You useless or unseasonable. And now, having so fit an Opportunity, I could most willingly expatiate in the large Field of your Lordship's Praises; both that I might do an Act of Justice to your self, and provoke others to your Imitation. But I am sensible, that as no Eloquence, less than that of your own, could be fit for such a Performance; so the Nobleness and Generosity of your Spirit is such, that you take much more Pleasure in doing praise-worthy things, than in hearing the repeated Echo's of them. Wherefore instead of pursuing Encomiums, which would be the least pleasing to your self, I shall offer up my Prayers to Almighty God, for the Continuation of your Lordship's Life and Health; that so his MAJESTY may long have such a loyal Subject and wise Counsellor; the Church of England such a worthy Patron; the High Court of Chancery such an Oracle of impartial Justice; and the whole Nation such a Pattern of Virtue and Piety. Which shall ever be the hearty Desire of,

MY LORD.

YOUR LORDSHIP'S

Most Humble, and

Most Affectionate Servant,

R. CUDWORTH.
THE PREFACE
TO THE READER.

THOUGH, I confess, I have seldom taken any great pleasure, in reading other men's apologies, yet must I at this time make some my self. First therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity, or to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all Actions and Events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintain'd, will (as we conceive) serve the design of Atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous; and it is evident, that some have purfued it of late, in order to that end. But afterwards we consider'd, that this, which is indeed a controversy concerning the True Intellectual System of the Universe, does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the necessity of all actions and events being maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite Fatalism, mentioned by us in the beginning of the first chapter. For first, the Democritick Fate is nothing but the material necessity of all things without a God, it supposing senseless matter, necessarily moved, to be the only original and principal of all things: which therefore is called by Epicurus, the Physiological; by us, the Atheistick Fate. Besides which, the Divine Fate is also bipartite; some Theists supposing God, both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good) or by his immediate influence to determine all actions, and so make them alike necessary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any essential and immutable goodness and justice; or that he hath nothing of morality in his nature, he being only arbitrary Will omnipotent. As also that all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are meer thetical or positive things;
The PREFACE

...and not φάρσα, by law or command only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral, and violent. Again, there being other divine Fatalists, who acknowledge such a Deity, as both suffers other things, besides it self, to act, and hath an essential goodness and justice in its nature, and consequently, that there are things, just and unjust to us naturally, and not by law and arbitrary constitution only; and yet nevertheless take away from men all such liberty, as might make them capable of praise and dispraise, rewards and punishments, and objects of distributive justice; they conceiving necessity to be intrinsical to the nature of every thing, in the actions of it, and nothing of contingency to be found anywhere: from whence it will follow, that nothing could possibly have been otherwise, in the whole world, than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral, (as the other immoral,) and natural, (as the other violent;) it being a concatenation, or implexed series of causes, all in themselves necessary, depending upon a Deity moral, (if we may so speak) that is, such as is essentially good, and naturally just, as the head thereof; the first contriver, and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate hath not only been formerly affected by the Stoicks, but also of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore of the three Fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the universe, mentioned in the beginning of this book; one is absolute Atheism; another immoral Theism, or religion without any natural justice and morality; (all just and unjust, according to this hypothesis, being meer theoretical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only:) The third and last such a Theism, as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent understanding Being, but also natural justice and morality, founded in him, and derived from him; nevertheless no liberty from necessity anywhere, and therefore no distributive or retributive justice in the world. Whereas these three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or essentials of true religion. First, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governour; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God being essentially good and just, is φαρσα καλός και δικαιός, something in its own nature, immutably and eternally just, and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And lastly, that there is something ιδιότης, or, that we are so far forth principles or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blame-worthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion, are intimated by the author to the Hebrews: in these words; be that cometh to God, must believe, that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those, who seek him out. For to seek out God here, is nothing else, but to seek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his, which we have been alienated from. And these three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governour, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all; that this God, hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honest and dishonest, are not by meer will and law only, but
but by nature; and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and necessitate men to such things, as are in their own nature evil; and lastly, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, but that men have such a liberty, or power over their own actions, as may render them accountable for the fame, and blame-worthy when they do amiss; and consequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments running through the world: I say, these three, (which are the most important things, that the mind of man can employ itself upon) taken all together, make up the wholeness and entirety of that, which is here called by us, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, in such a sense, as Atheism may be called a false System thereof; the word Intellectual being added, to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, Systems of the World, (that is, the visible and corporeal world) the Ptolemaic, Typhonick, and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false, the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold fatalism, or spurious and false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, making all things necessary upon several grounds; we accordingly designed the constitution of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism, (which is the Democrick fate) wherein all the reason and philosophy thereof is rejected, and the existence of a God demonstrated; and so that \( \text{\textit{Neceffity, or material necessity}} \) of all things, overthrown. The second, for such a God, as is not meer arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and necessitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good and just; and for a natural \( \text{\textit{discrimen bonorum \& turpium}} \) whereby another ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the third and last, against necessity intrinsical and essental to all action, and for such a liberty, or \( \text{\textit{fui-potestas}} \), in rational creatures, as may render them accountable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive or retributive justice; by which the now only remaining ground, of the false necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three under that one general title of The True Intellectual System of the Universe; each book having, besides, its own particular title: as, against Atheism; for natural Justice and Morality, founded in the Deity; for Liberty from Necessity, and a distributive Justice of Rewards and Punishments in the world. And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all those, who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world; so that they will not think us thereby obliged, to treat of the hierarchy of angels, and of all the several species of animals, vegetables, and minerals, &c. that is, to write \( \text{\textit{de omni ente}} \), of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the universe. Though the whole scale of Entity is here also taken notice of; and the general ranks of substantial beings, below the Deity (or Trinity of Divine hypostases) consider'd; which yet, according to our philosophy, are but two; souls of several degrees, (angels themselves being included within that number) and body or matter; as also the immortality of those souls proved. Which notwithstanding is suggested by us, only to satisfy some men's
men's curiosity. Nevertheless, we confess, that this general title might well have been here spared by us, and this volume have been presented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole compleat and entire thing by it self, had it not been for two reasons; first, our beginning with those three Fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, and promising a consultation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compass of one volume; and secondly, every other page's, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inscription of book the first upon the head thereof. This is therefore that, which, in the first place, we here apologize for, our publishing one part or book alone by it self, being surprized in the length thereof; whereas we had otherwise intended two more along with it. Notwithstanding which, there is no reason, why this volume should be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, because it hath not all the three things at first designed by us; it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and subject, and being in that respect no piece, but a whole. This indeed must needs beget an expectation of the two following treatises, (especially in such as shall have received any satisfaction from this first,) concerning those two other Fatalisms, or false hypotheses mentioned; to make up our whole Intellectual System compleat: the one to prove, that God is not mere arbitrary Will omnipotent, (without any essential goodness and justice) decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good; and thereby making them alike necessary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thetical, positive, and arbitrary things, that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal immutable justice, or morality. The other, that necessity is not intrinsic to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is something in us, or, that we have some liberty, or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a distributive or retributive justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertise the reader concerning these, that though they were, and still are, really intended by us; yet the compleat finishing and publication of them will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.

In the next place, we must apologize also for the fourth chapter; inasmuch as, though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book, than a chapter, yet it doth not answer all the contents prefixed to it. Here therefore must we again confess our selves surprized; who, when we wrote those Contents, did not suspect in the least, but that we should have satisfied them all within a lesser compafs. And our design then was, besides answering the objection, against the naturality of the idea of God, from the Pagan polytheism, (we having then so fit an occasion) to give such a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles, as might prepare our way for a defence of Christianity, to be subjoined in the close; it being not only agreeable to the sense of ancient doctors, but also expressly declared in the Scripture,
Scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were; First, because we had observed, that some professed opposers of atheism, had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation, of being mere Theists, or natural Religionists only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed Religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it justice to free our selves, we having found shaken a belief, and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian Doctrine. But, secondly and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists, to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable; and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence; to demolish all religion and theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the remainder would have quite excluded our principally intended confutation of all the atheistic grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity, that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan Idolatry and Religion, together with our Defence of Christianity, to some other more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which therefore will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the Atomick physiology, as made the foundation of the Democritic fate. Where the reader is to understand, that this Democritick fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the Atomick atheism, the only form of atheism, that hath publicly appeared upon the stage, as an entire philosophick system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true, That Epicurus, (who was also an Atomick Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from Democritus,) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof he, ridiculously devised, that his Third Motion of Atoms, called by Lucretius

--- Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum:

yet was this, as Cicero* long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch, or affirmation of his, and altogether as contradicitious to the tenor of his own principles, as it was to the doctrine of Democritus himself. There can be nothing more absurd, than for an Atheist to affect liberty of will; but it is most of all absurd, for an atomick one. And therefore our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim Epicurus, (though otherwise so much admired by them,) and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending

--- De Nat. Deor. L. 1. c. 25.
The Preface

prehending, that it would unavoidably introduce incorporeal substance; as also well knowing, that necessity, on the contrary, effectually overthrows all religion, it taking away guilt and blame, punishments and rewards; to which might be added also prayers and devotions.

And as there was a necessity for us here, to give some account of that ancient Atomick phyllology, with which atheism now became thus blended and complicated; so do we, in this first chapter, chiefly insist upon two things concerning it. First, that it was no invention of Democritus nor Leucippus, but of much greater antiquity; not only from that tradition transmitted by Posidonius the Stoick, that it derived its original from one Moschos a Phoenician, who lived before the Trojan wars, (which plainly makes it to have been Moschical;) but also from Aristotle's affirmation, that the greater part of the antient philosophers entertained this hypothesis; and further because it is certain, that divers of the Italicks, and particularly Empedocles, before Democritus, phyllologized atomically; which is the reason he was so much applauded by Lucretius. Besides which, it is more than a presumption, that Anaxagoras his Homœomy, or similar atomology, was but a degeneration from the true and genuine atomology of the antient Italicks, that was an Homœomy, or doctrine of dissimilar and unqualified atoms. Wherefore all that is true concerning Democritus and Leucippus, is only this, that those men were indeed the first atheizers of this ancient atomick phyllology, or the inventors and broachers of the atomick atheism. Which is Lucretius his true meaning, (though it be not commonly understood,) when he recordeth of them, that they were the first, who made unqualified atoms the principles of all things in the universe without exception; that is, not only of inanimate bodies, (as the other ancient religious Atomists, the Italicks, before had done,) but also of soul and mind.

And whereas we conceive this atomick phyllology, as to the essentials thereof, to be unquestionably true, viz. That the only principles of bodies are magnitude, figure, site, motion, and rest; and that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are really nothing, but several combinations of these, causing several phancies in us; (which excellent discovery therefore, so long ago made, is a notable instance of the wit and sagacity of the antients:) so do we in the next place make it manifest, that this atomick phyllology rightly understood is so far from being either the mother or nurce of atheism, or any ways favourable thereunto, (as is vulgarly supposed,) that it is indeed the most directly opposite to it of any, and the greatest defence against the same. For, first, we have discovered, that the principle, upon which this atomology is founded, and from whence it sprung, was no other than this, nothing out of nothing, in the true sense thereof; or, that nothing can be caused by nothing: from whence it was concluded, that in natural generations there was no new real entity produced, which was not before: the genuine consequence whereof was two-fold; that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are no entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, sit, and motion of parts; and that souls are substances incorporeal, not generated out of matter. Where we have shewed, that the Pythagoric

doctrine,
doctrine, of the pre-existence of souls, was founded upon the very same principles with the Atomick physiology. And it is from this very principle rightly understood, that ourselves afterwards undertake to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism. Moreover, we have made it undeniably evident, that the instrinsic constitution of this Atomick physiology also is such, as that whoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge incorporeal substance; which is the absolute overthrow of Atheism. And from hence alone it is certain to us, without any testimonies from antiquity, that Democritus and Leucippus could not possibly be the first inventors of this philosophy, they either not rightly understanding it, or else wilfully depraving the same; and the Atomick atheism being really nothing else, but a rape committed upon the Atomick physiology. For which reason, we do not by any means here applaud Plato, nor Aristotle, in their rejecting this most ancient Atomick physiologoy, and introducing again that unintelligible first matter, and those exploded qualities and forms, into philosophy. For though this were probably done by Plato, out of a difficult and prejudice against the Atomick Atheists, which made him not to well consider nor understand that physiologoy; yet was he much disappointed of his expectation herein, that atomology, which he exploded, (rightly understood,) being really the greatest bulwark against Atheism; and, on the contrary, those forms and qualities, which he expounded, the natural feed thereof, they, besides their unintelligible darkness, bringing something out of nothing, in the impossible sense; which we shew to be the inlet of all Atheism. And thus, in this first chapter, have we not only quite disarmed Atheism of Atomicism, or shewed, that the latter (rightly understood) afforded no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest, that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same. Which is a thing afterwards further insinuated on.

As to the second Chapter, we have no more to say, but only this; that here we took the liberty to reveal the arcane mysteries of Atheism, and to discover all its pretended grounds of reason, that we could find any where suggested in writings, those only excepted, that are peculiar to the Hylozoick form, (which is directly contrary to the Atomick;) and that to their best advantage too; nevertheless to this end, that these being afterwards all baffled and confuted, Theism might, by this means, obtained the greater and juster triumph over Atheism.

In the third chapter, we thought it necessary, in order to a fuller consultation of Atheism, to confider all the other forms thereof, besides the Atomick. And here do we, first of all, make a discovery of a certain form of Atheism, never before taken notice of by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoick: which notwithstanding, though it were long since started by Strato, in way of opposition to the Democritick and Epicurean hypothesis, yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence and oblivion, should have been here by us paffed by silently, had we not had certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived by some, who were so flagacious, as plainly to perceive, that the Atomick form could never do...
their business, nor prove defensible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cause of atheism, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter; as also that this, in all probability, would ere long publicly appear upon the stage, though not bare-faced, but under a disguise. Which atheistical hypothesis is partly confuted by us, in the close of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

In the next place, it being certain, that there had been other philosophick Atheists in the world before those Atomicks, Epicurus and Democritus; we declare, out of Plato and Aristotle, what that most ancient atheistical hypothesis was; namely, the education of all things, even life and understanding it self, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the passions and affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of atheism is styled by us, not only Hylopathian, but also Anaximandrian: however, we grant some probability of that opinion, that Anaximander held an Homoeomery of qualified atoms, as Anaxagoras afterwards did; the difference between them being only this, that the latter affserted an unmade mind, whereas the former generated all mind and understanding out of those qualified Atoms, hot and cold, moist and dry, compounded together; because we judged this difference not to be a sufficient ground to multiply forms of atheism upon. And here do we give notice of that strange kind of religious atheism, or atheistical Theogonism, which affserted, not only other understanding beings, superior to men, called by them Gods, but also, amongst those, one supreme or Jupiter too; nevertheless native, and generated at first out of Night and Chaos, (that is, senseless matter,) as also mortal and corruptible again into the same.

Besides which, there is yet a fourth atheistical form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients, (though perhaps junior to the rest, it seeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoicism) which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal, (as the Pagan Atheists then generally supposed) but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal, and plastick nature, as its highest principle, orderly disposing the whole, without any mind or understanding. And here have we set down the agreement of all the atheistical forms, (however differing so much from one another) in this one general principle, viz. that all animality, conscious life and understanding, is generated out of senseless matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore in the close of this third Chapter, we insist largely upon an artificial, regular, and plastick nature, devoid of express knowledge and understanding, as subordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of those Cosmo-plastick and Hylozoick atheisms. Though we had a further design herein also, for the defence of Theism; forasmuch as without such a nature, either God must be supposed to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands; which femeth not so becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehensions, laborious and discouraging; or else the whole system of this corporeal universe must result only from fortuitous mechanism, without the direction of any mind: which hypothesis once admitted, would unque-
unquestionably, by degrees, supplant and undermine all Theism. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digression of ours concerning an artificial, regular and platfick nature, (subordinate to the Deity) is no wen, or excrescency in the body of this book; but a natural and necessary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter; after the idea of God fully declared, (where we could not omit his essential goodness and justice, or, if we may so call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the second book, the confusion of the divine fate immoral) there is a large account given of the Pagan polytheism; to satisfy a very considerable objection, that lay in our way from thence, against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneness and singularity in it. For had that, upon enquiry, been found true, which is so commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the Pagan nations had constantly scattered their devotions amongst a multitude of self-existent, and independent deities, they acknowledging no sovereign Numen; this would much have stumbled the naturality of the divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the Pagan theologers all along acknowledged one sovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but also evinced, that the generality of mankind have constantly had a certain prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual existence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, because we had not met with it sufficiently performed before; A. Steuchus Eugubinus having laboured most in this subject, from whose profitable industry though we shall no way detract, yet whoever will compare what he hath written, with ours, will find no just cause to think ours superfluous and unnecessary, much less, a transcription out of his. In which, besides other things, there is no account at all given of the many pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were; which is so great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows also, that the Pagan religion, though sufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether so nonsensical, as the Atheists would represent it, out of design, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a mere cheat and imposture; they worshipping only one supreme God, in the several manifestations of his goodness, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferior ministers. Nevertheless we cannot deny, that being once engaged in this subject, we thought our selves the more concerned to do the business thoroughly and effectually, because of that controversy lately agitated concerning idolatry, (which cannot otherwise be decided, than by giving a true account of the Pagan religion;) and the so confident affirmations of some, that none could possibly be guilty of idolatry, in the Scripture sense, who believed one God the Creator of the whole world; whereas it is most certain, on the contrary, that the Pagan polytheism and idolatry consisted not in worshipping many creators, or uncreateds, but in giving religious worship
to creatures, besides the Creator; they directing their devotion, (as Athana-
sius plainly affirmeth of them,) in aemnity, και παλαις γενναις, to one un-
created only; but, besides him, to many created gods. But as for the po-
lemick management of this controversy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to
other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.
Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely insistd also upon the
Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our con-
tents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pa-
gan theology; it being certain, that the Platonicks and Pythagoreans at least,
if not other Pagans also, had their trinity, as well as Christians. And we
could not well avoid the comparing of these two together: upon which oc-
casion we take notice of a double Platonick trinity; the one spurious and
adulterated, of some latter Platonists; the other true and genuine, of Pla-
to himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be
opposed by us to the Christian Trinity, and confused, yet betwixt the
latter and that, do we find a wonderful correpondence; which is largely
purified in the Platonick Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, no-
thing must be looked upon, as dogmatically affected by us, but only off-
tered, and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters; we
confining our selves, in this mysteriuous point of the Holy Trinity, within
the compass of those its three essentias declared: First, that it is not a Tri-
inity of meer names and words, or of logical notions only; but of perfons
or hypoftases. Secondly, that none of those perfons or hypoftases are crea-
tures, but all uncreated. And lastly, that they are all three, truly and
really one God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the
more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed de-
fence of Chrifianity; we conceiving, that this parallelifm, betwixt the an-
cient or genuine Platonick, and the Chrifian Trinity, might be of some
ufe to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the Trinity, and
look upon it as the chock-pear of Chrifianity; when they shall find, that
the freeft wits amongst the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had no-
thing of superffition to determine them that way, were fo far from being
thy of such an hypoftes, as that they were even fond thereof. And that
the Pagans had indeed such a Cabala amongst them, (which some perhaps
will yet hardly believe, notwithstanding all that we have said,) might be fur-
ther convinced, from that memorable relation in Plutarch *, of Thespis
Selenis, who, after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, revi-
ving, affirmed, amongst other things, which he thought he saw or heard
in the mean time in his eftacy, this of three Gods in the form of a tri-
gle, pouring in streams into one another; Orpheus his soul being faid
to have arrived fo far; accordingly as from the testimonies of other Pagan
writers we have proved, that a Trinity of Divine hypoftases was a part
of the Orphick Cabala. True indeed, our belief of the Holy Trinity is
founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation; it being

* Oratione IV. contra Arianos T. I. Ope-
rum p. 469.
† Libro de his, qui fero & Numine puniun-
tur, Tom. II. Oper. p. 563. 6.
to the Reader.

that which Christians are, or should be, all baptiz'd into. Nevertheless these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and Revealed Religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or mourn in it, which even Pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncapitivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter itself, to turn out into philology and antiquity; as also in the other parts of the book, we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients: which, however some over-severe philosophers may look upon fastidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often necessary, so possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, sweeten and allay the severity of philosophy to them; the main thing, which the book pretends to, in the mean time, being the philosophy of religion. But for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but serve our selves of either, as occasion requireth.

As for the last chapter; though it promise only a confutatio of all the atheistick grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the absolute imposibility of all atheism, and the actual existence of a God. We say demonstrate, not a priori, which is impossible and contradictious, but by neccessary inference from principles altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to the Atheists, that there is no more than a probable persuasion, or opinion to be had of the existence of a God, without any certain knowledge or science. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that whoever shall read these demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, must therefor of neccessity be presently convinced, whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy, concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at least sceptical about them. Wherefore more speculation, and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interest of curiosity, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice—may, without syllogistical reasonings, and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher, ἕκαστος τοιοῦτον ἄριστον ἐαυτὸν ἀποκρίνεται, Purity possesseth men with an assurance of the best things; whether this assurance be called a vaticination or divine sagacity, (as it is by Plato and Aristotle,) or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture-faith is not a mere believing of historical things,
and upon unnatural arguments, or testimonies only; but a certain higher and diviner power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity. Notwithstanding which, knowledge or science added to this faith, (according to the Scripture advice) will make it more firm and steadfast, and the better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings, that shall be made against it.

In this fifth chapter, as sometimes elsewhere, we thought our selves concerned, in defence of the divine Wisdom, Goodness, and Perfection against Atheists; to maintain, (with all the antient philosophick Theists;) the perfection of the creation also; or that the whole system of things, taken all together, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And indeed, this divine Goodness and Perfection, as displaying and manifesting itself in the works of Nature and Providence, is supposed in Scripture to be the very foundation of our Christian faith; when that is designed to be the substance and evidence rerum spерandarum; that is, of whatever is (by a good man) to be hoped for. Notwithstanding which, it was far from our intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third section, insist largely upon that ancient Pythagorick Cabala, that souls are always united to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reaon and Christian antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be understood to dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judgments.

Again, we shall here advertize the reader, (though we have caution’d concerning it in the book it self) that in our defence of incorporeal substance against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say the utmost, that possiblly we could, in way of vindication of the antients, who generally maintained it to be unextended, (which to some seems an absolute impossibility;) yet we would not be supposed our selves dogmatically to assert any more in this point, than what all Incorpo realists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body; namely such, as consisteth not of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and lastly, is self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from that of local motion. (And thus much is undeniably evinced, by the arguments before proposed.) But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwise than body; we shall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to suggest, that whereas throughout this chapter and whole book, we constantly oppose the generation of souls, that is, the production of life, cogitation and understanding, out of dead and senseless matter; and assert all souls to be as substantial as matter it self; this is not done by us, out of any fond addictedness to Pythagorick whimsies, nor indeed out of a mere partial regard to that caufe of Theism neither, which we were engaged in, (though we had great reason to be tender of that too;) but because we were enforced thereunto, by dry mathematical reasons; it being
being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and understanding can never possibly result out of magnitudes, figures, lines, and local motions (which is all that our selves can allow to body), however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceivable, how they should emerge out of hot and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian atheism. And they, who can persuade themselves of the contrary, may believe, that any thing may be caused by any thing; upon which supposition, we confess it impossible to us, to prove the existence of a God, from the phenomena.

In the close of this fifth chapter; because the Atheists do in the last place pretend, theism and religion to be inconsistent with civil sovereignty, we were neceffitated, briefly to unravel and confute all the atheiftick ethicks and politicks, (though this more properly belong to our second book intended :) Where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheists artificial and fictitious justice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to civil sovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only bellouine liberty, and brutifh force. But, on the contrary, as we affert justice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with confience and religion, to be the only basis of civil authority, to do we also maintain all the rights of civil sovereigns; giving both to Cæfar the things that are Cæfar's, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflexions, we have no more to add, but only the retraction or retraction of one passage, page 761. Where mentioning that opinion of a modern atheiftick writer, That cogitation is nothing else but local motion, we could not think Epicurus and Democritus to have sunk to such a degree, either of foftinflness or impudence as this; whereas we found cause afterwards, upon further consideration, to change our opinion herein, page 846. Forasmuch as when Epicurus derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of feneleks atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition itself must be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritick fate, and material necessity of all things, it is implied, that human cogitations are but mechanism and motion. Notwithstanding which, both Democritus and Epicurus supposed, that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion. So that the meaning of these befotted Atheists, (if at leat they had any meaning) seems to have been this, That all cogitation is really nothing else but local motion; nevertheless all motion not cogitation, but only in such and such circumstances, or in bodies so modified.

And now we are not ignorant, that some will be ready to condemn this whole labour of ours, and of others in this kind, against atheism, as altogether ufelefs and superfluous; upon this pretence, that an Atheist is a mere Chimaera, and there is no fuch thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wish, upon that condition, that all this labour of ours were superfluous and ufelefs. But as to Atheists, these fo confident, exploders of them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity, and unacquainted
The PREFACE to the READER.

unacquainted with the present age they live in; others having found too great an assurance, from their own personal converse, of the reality of them. Nevertheless, this labour of ours is not intended only for the conversion of downright and professed Atheists, (of which there is but little hope, they being sunk into so great a degree of fottishness;) but for the confirmation of weak, staggering, and sceptical Theists. And unless these explorers of Atheists will affirm also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith, and belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of doubtful distrust or hesitancy, (which if it were so, the world could not possibly be so bad as now it is) they must needs grant, such endeavours as these, for the confirming and establishing of men’s minds in the belief of a God, by philosophick reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and useless.

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Domo Gilberto, Divinâ
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tuar. à Sacr. Dom.
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

1. The fatal necessity of all human actions and events maintained upon three several grounds, which are so many false hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe. 2. Concerning the mathematical or astrological fate. 3. Concerning the opinion of those, who suppose a fate superior to the highest Deity. 4. The moderation of this discourse. 5. The Atheistical hypothesis or Democritical fate being founded upon the atomical physiology: the necessity of giving an account of it, and that first briefly described. 6. The antiquity of this physiology, and the account, which is given of it by Aristotle. 7. A clear and full record of the same physiology in Plato, that hath not been taken notice of. 8. That neither Democritus, nor Leucippus, nor Protagoras, nor any Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy; and of the necessity of being thoroughly acquainted with it, in order to the confutation of Atheism. 9. The tradition of Pofidonius the Stoick, that Molchus an ancient Phœnician was the first inventor of the atomical physiology. 10. That this Molchus, the inventor of the atomical physiology, was probably the same with Molchus the physiologer in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. 11. Other probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was acquainted with the atomical physiology. 12. That Pythagoras his Monads were atoms. 13. Proved plainly, that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean, physiologized atomically. 14. The same further convinced from Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch and Stobæus. 15. That Anaxagoras was a spurious Atomist, or unskilful imitator of that philosophy. 16. That Ecphantus the Pythagorean, Xenocrates, Heraclides, Diódorus and Metrodorus Chius
Chius were all ancient asserterers of the atomical physiology; together with Aristotle's testimony, that the ancient physiologers generally went that way.

17. How Aristotle is to be reconciled with himself, and the credit of other writers to be faked, who impute this philosophy to Leucippus and Democritus; that they were the first asbeizers of it, or the founders of that philosophy, which is atbeically atomical. 18. That the Atomists before Democritus were asserterers of a Deity and substance incorporeal. 19. A confutation of those asneericks, who deny that incorporeal substance was ever assetterd by any of the ancients, and the antiquity of that doctrine proved from Plato, who himself expresly maintained it. 20. That Aristotle likewise asserterd incorporeal substance. 21. That Epicurus endeavoured to confute this opinion, as that which Plato and others of the ancients had maintained. 22. That all these philsophers, who held the immortality of the soul, and a Deity distinct from the world, held incorporeal substance; and that besides Thales, Pythagoras was a grand champion for the same, who also asstered a divine triad. 23. Parmenides an asserter of incorporeal substance, together with all those, who maintaine d that all things did not flow, but something fand. 24. Empedocles vindicated from being either an atheift or corporealift at large. 25. Anaxagoras a plain asserter of incorporeal substance. 26. Inferred that the ancient Atomists before Democritus were both theifts and incorporealifts.

27. That there is not only no incohitency between atomoloy and theology, but also a natural cognition proceed from the origine of the atomical physiology, and fith a general account thereof. 28. A more particular account of the origine of this philosophy from that principle of reason, That in nature, nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing. 29. That the same principle, which made the ancients discard substantial forms and qualities, made them also to asserter incorporeal substance. 30. That from the same ground of reason also they asserterd the immortality of souls. 31. That the doctrine of pre-existence and tranfmgation of souls had its original from hence alfo. 32. That the ancients did not confine this to human souls only, but extend it to all souls and lives whatfoever. 33. All this proved from Empedocles, who assetterd the pre-existence as well as the poft-existence of all souls upon that ground. 34. A cenfure of this doctrine; that the reason of it is irrefragable for the poft-eternity of all human souls; and that the hypothefis of the creation of human souls, which fakes their immortality without pre-existence, is rational. 35. A new hypothefis to folve the incorporeity of the souls of brutes, without their poft-existence and successive tranfmigrations. 36. That this will not prejudice the immortality of human souls. 37. That the Empedoclean hypothefis is more rational than the opinion of thofe, that would make the souls of brutes corporeal. 38. That the conftitution of the atomical physiology is fuch, that whatfoever entertains it, and thoroughly understands it, must needs hold incorporeal substance, in five particulars. 39. Two general advantages of the atomical or mechanismal philosophy; firft, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible. 40. The second advantage of it, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substance. 41. Concluded, that the ancient Metaphysical philofophy consists of two parts, atomical physiology, and theology or pneumatology. 42. That this entire philofophy was afterwards mangled and dismembered, some ta-
CHAP. I. False Hypotheses of the Mundane System.

They, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds; either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is \( \text{περήγμα \ ήνοπήγμα} \), a thing impossible or contradictory, which can have no existence any where in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet 1,

\[ \text{Quod res queque Necessum} \]
\[ \text{Intestinum habeat cænis in rebus agendis, etc.} \]

That every thing naturally labours under an intense necessity: or else, because though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determin’d by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is \( \text{περήγμα \ ήνοπήγμα} \), such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained upon two different grounds; either from such an hypothesis as this, That the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving it self, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that \( \text{περήγμα \ ήνοπήγμα} \), material and mechanical necessity must needs reign over all things: or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plutarch 2 makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; \( \text{ὅτι} \) \( \text{ὁ} \) \( \text{τὸς} \) \( \text{Χριστός} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{αὐτός} \) \( \text{αὐτοῖς} \), \( \text{ὅ} \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{το} \) \( \text{αὐτῷ} \) \( \text{αὐτοῖς} \), \( \text{ὅ} \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{το} \) \( \text{κόσμῳ} \) \( \text{αὐτῶν} \), \( \text{ὅ} \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{τω} \) \( \text{πάντα} \) \( \text{αὐτῶν} \). A man (faith he) will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle, or not; the former of which may be called divine Fatalists, the latter atheistical. Which divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegemonick in every one; and secondly, such as make fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very fate, that is

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1 Lucret. Lib. II. v. 289, &c.
2 Libro de Fato, Ennead. III. Lib. i. c. 2. p. 236.
The Mathematical or Astrological Fate. Book I.

maintain'd by some neoterick Christians; the latter is the fate of the Stoicks.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads: First, Such as afferting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of fate, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoterick Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, Such as suppose a Deity, that acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence by a series of causes doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it. Which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that, which was afferted by the ancient Stoicks Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Efenes seemed to follow. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which fate Epicurus calls τῶν τῶν Φυσικῶν εἰμαρινών, the fate of the Naturalists, that is, indeed the Atheists, the afferters whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists. Which three opinions concerning fate are so many several hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe: all which we shall here propose, endeavouring to shew the fallaceness of them, and then substitute the true mundane system in the room of them.

II. The mathematical or astrological fate so much talked of, as it is a thing no way considerable for the grounds of it, so whatsoever it be, it must needs fall under one or other of those two general heads in the Plotinical distribution last mentioned, so as either to derive all things from one principle, or not. It seems to have had its first-emersion amongst the Chaldeans from a certain kind of blind Polytheism (which is but a better sort of disguised Atheism) but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nurfed by the Stoicks, in a way of subordination to their divine fate; for Manilius, Firmicus, and other masters of that sect were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to astrology also by those, that were no Fatalists, both Heathen and Christian philosophers, such as were Plotinus, Origen, Simplicius and others; who though they did not make the stars to necessitate all human actions here below, they suppos'd, that divine providence (fore-knowing all things) had contriv'd such a strange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with such actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognosticks of the latter. Thus Origen determines, that the stars do not make but signify; and that the heavens are a kind of divine volume, in whose characters they that are skilled, may read or spell out human events. To the same purpose Plotinus, ὁ Λογισταὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἵπτεν τῆς ἰτερία τῶν ἀνω, παραδέχεται ὅτα ἄλλην χρείαν τῶν τῶ ἔντος ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπερ ἀμφιμενάτων ἐκ τῆς κακοτοτετόνος κατὰ το ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύουσας το συμμετέχοντος ἡπορονεί τις στίχες, ἑκεῖνος υἱὸς τοῦ συμμετεχοντος το τις το νόμος. The motion of the stars was intended for the

CHAP. I. The Opinion of a Fate superior to the Deity.

the physical good of the whole; but they afford also another use collaterally in order to prognostication, namely that they, who are skilful in the grammar of the heavens, may be able from the several configurations of the stars, as it were letters, to spell out future events, by making such analogical interpretations as they use to do in augury: as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of some high and noble exploit. And Simplicius 1 in like manner, Σύμφωνος εἰς ἑν ἑἰμασμένης πεσμοράκῃ ἡ προβολή τῶν ψυχῶν τῇ κατ' αὐτήν ἐρχόμενη εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἐκ αὐτῶν ἀξίωτα μὲν τὰς τύχες ὑπογείας ἡ τύχες, σύμφωνος εἰς ὅσα τὰς ἔξεσίν αὐτῶν. The fatal conversion of the heavens is made to correspond with the production of souls into generation at such and such times, not necessitating them to will this or that, but conspiring agreeably with such appetites and volitions of theirs. And these philosophers were the rather inclined to this perversion from a superstitious conceit, which they had, that the stars being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher rank than men. And since God did not make them, nor any thing else in the world, singly for themselves alone, but also to contribute to the publick good of the universe, their physical influence seeming inconsiderable, they knew not well what else could be worthy of them, unless it were to portend human events. This indeed is the best senfe, that can be made of astrological prognostication; but it is a business that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impossible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which some of the Pagans had, who though they verbally acknowledged a deity, yet supposed a certain fate superior to it, and not only to all their other petty Gods, but also to Jupiter himself. To which purpose is that of the Greek Poet, Latin'd by Cicero 2, Quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Iovem; and that of Herodotus 3, Τῆς πεπορεμένης μορφῆς ἄδειας εἰς ἑν ἀποργίαν ἀτρόθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ. It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destined fate: And ὅλος ὁ Θεός ἀνάθηκα 4, God himself is a servant of necessity. According to which conceit, Jupiter in Homer 5 laments his condition, in that the fates having determined, that his beloved Sarpedon should be slain by the son of Memetius, he was not able to withstand it. Though all these passages may not perhaps imply much more than what the Stoical hypothesis it self imported; for that did also in some senfe make God himself a servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world other-wise than now it is, much less was able to alter any thing: according to that of Seneca 6, Eadem necessitas & Deos alligas. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana curfus vebit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector scriptum quidem Fata, sed sequitur. Semper parat, semel jubitis. One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once command, but be-always obeys. But if there were this further meaning in the passages before cited, that a necessity without God, that was invincible by him, did

4 Vide Memandri & Phil. relictus ad Jo. Clerico editas, p. 507.
did determine his will to all things; this was nothing but a certain confused and contradictory jumble of atheism and theism both together; or an odd kind of intuition, that however the name of God be used in compliance with vulgar speech and opinion, yet indeed it signifies nothing, but material necessity; and the blind motion of matter is really the highest Numen in the world. And here that of Balbus the Stoick in Cicero ¹ is opportune: *Non est natura Dei prepotens & excellens, sed quidem ea subiecta est ei vel necessitati vel nature, qu& calum, maria, terraque reguntur. Nihil autem est praestantius Deo. Nulli situr est nature obedient aut subiectus Deus. God would not be the most powerful and excellent being, if he were subject to that either necessity or nature, by which the heavens, seas and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the most excellent being. Therefore God is not obedient or subject to any nature.*

IV. And now we think fit here to suggest, that however we shall oppose those three fatalisms before mentioned, as so many false hypotheses of the mundane system and oeconomy, and endeavour to exclude that severe tyrannies (as Epicurus calls it) of universal necessity reigning over all, and to leave some scope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which neither rational creatures can be blame-worthy for anything they do. not God have any object to display his justice upon, nor indeed be justified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, so we do not quite banish the notion of fate neither, nor take away all necessity; which is a thing the Clazomenian philosopher ² of old was taxed for, affirming *tou των ναυμάκην γνώσεις καθε εξαρτημένα, ἀλλα τινα κατα προδοτῶν τυχόν παρακείμενος.* That nothing at all was done by fate, but that it was altogether a vain name. And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the same ³: *Τὴν μὴ εξαρτήμενα αναφερόμεν, ὅτι είναι τοιούτου δεινότερ, ότι κατὰ τον ανθρώπινα τυχόν λαμβάνων, ισότιμα δι' ἐνθ' ἀλοιποι; τίς είπεν; They take away all fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men own free-will. And some of our own seem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free-will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypothesis, that we shall recommend, as most agreeable to truth, of a πρόνοια ιδίαισι, plactable providence, of a Deity effentially good, prevailing over all, will avoid all extremes, ascribing to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemplation and commixture of contingency and necessity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients; as the Phalitack sect amongst the Jews, who determined ⁴ τινί η ναυμάκην τις εξαρτημένα είναι τυχόν, των δέ των ενθ' ἀλοιπων τυχόνεσων. That some things and not all were the effects of fate, but some things were left in men own power and liberty: and also by Plato ⁵ amongst the philo-

philosophers, Plato insinuates something of fate into human lives and actions, and he joins with it liberty of will also. He doth indeed suppose human souls to have within themselves the causes of their own changes to a better or worse state, and every where declares God to be blameless for their evils; and yet he somewhere makes the three fatal sisters notwithstanding, Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos, to be busy about them also. For according to the sense of the ancients, fate is a servant of divine providence in the world, and takes place differently upon the different actions of free-willed beings. And how free a thing forever the will of man may seem to be to some, yet I conceive it to be out of question, that it may contract upon it self such necessities and fatalities, as it cannot upon a sudden rid it self of at pleasure. But whatsoever is said in the sequel of this discourse by way of opposition to that fatalism of the neoterick Christians, is intended only to vindicate what was the constant doctrine of the Christian church in its greatest purity, (as shall be made manifest,) and not to introduce any new-fangled conceit of our own.

V. We must now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of these three several fates, or hypotheses of the mundane system before-mentioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning first with that, which we principally intend the confusion of, the Atheistical or Democrical fate: Which as it is a thing of the most dangerous consequence of all, so it seems to be most spreading and infectious in these latter times.

Now this atheistical system of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically necessary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar physiological hypothesis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by some atomical or corpuscular, by others mechanical: of which we must therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we shall do it first in general, briefly, not descending to those minute particularities of it, which are disputed amongst these Atomists themselves, in this manner.

The atomical physiology supposes, that body is nothing else but διαφανεσ ατομων, that is, extended bulk; and resolves therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, viz. more or less magnitude, with divisibility into parts, figure, and position, together with motion or rest, but so as that no part of body can ever move it self, but is always moved by something else. And consequently it supposes, that there is no need of anything else besides the simple elements of magnitude, figure, site and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended substance) to solve the corporeal phenomena by; and therefore, not of any substantial forms distinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really existing in the bodies without, besides the results or aggregates of those simple elements, and the disposition of the insensible parts of bodies in respect of figure, site and motion; nor of any intentional species or fheus, propagated from the objects to our senses; nor, lastly, of any other kind of motion or action really distinct from local motion (such as generation,

5 Vide Platon. de Republicâ L. X. p. 522.
ration and alteration) they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended substance, nor any ways necessary. Forasmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the result of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site and motion, variously compounded together, in the same manner as syllables and words in great variety result from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the simple elements of speech; and the corporeal part of sensation, and particularly that of vision, may be solved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effuvia (called simulaestra, membra and euviae) streaming continually from the surface of the objects, or rather, as the later and more refined atomists conceived, by pressure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that ἡ διὰ ἐκ σώματος τὸ ταλισμον ἀνεξανήλικον the sense taking cognizance of the object by the subtle interposed medium, that is tened and stretched, (thrusting every way from it upon the optic nerves) doth by that as it were by a staff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be sufficiently explained by concretion and secretion, or local motion, without substantial forms and qualities. And lastly, those sensible ideas of light and colours, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, as they are distinct things from the figure, site and motion of the insensible parts of bodies, seem plainly to be nothing else but our own fancies, passions and sensations, however they be vulgarly mistaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

VI. Thus much may suffice for a general account of the atomical physiology. We shall in the next place consider the antiquity thereof, as also what notice Aristotele hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the same. For though Epicurus went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the first inventor of it. But it is most commonly ascribed to Democritus, who was senior both to Aristotle and Plato, being reported to have been born the year after Socrates; from whose fountains Ciceron faith, that Epicurus watered his orchards, and of whom Sex. Empiricus and Laertius testify that he did in multum τὰς φυσικὰς καθημερινὰ qualities; and Plutarch, that he made the first principles of the whole universe ἀτομίων ἀτομίων ἀτομίων atoms devoid of all qualities and passions. But Laertius will have Leucippus, who was somewhat senor to Democritus, to be the first inventor of this philosophy, though he wrote not so many books concerning it as Democritus did. Aristotle, who often takes notice of this philosophy, and ascribes it commonly to Leucippus and Democritus jointly, gives us this description of it in his metaphysics; Διά τῆς ἀτομίου τοῦ κόσμου κάθετο τὰ ἀτομικά κατὰ ἀνάκαθνα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἀτομίου τῆς κοινοῦ τιμῆς, ἀναγκαῖα τοι usur περί τοῦ ὅσον ἐν συμβολῇ καὶ ἐπίστασιν, ἄτομα τοῖς τῶν ἀτομικῶν ἀποτελοῖς, τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις, τοῖς τον ὁσον ἐν συμβολῇ καὶ ἐπίστασιν. Leucippus and his companion Democritus make the first principles of all


5 Lib. IX. Segm. 72. p. 586.

6 Libro adversus Colorem, Tome II. Oper. p. 1110.

7 Lib. IX. Segm. 56. p. 56.

8 Lib. I. c. IV. p. 268. Tome IV. Oper.
Upon the Atomical Physiology.

All things to be Plenum and Vacuum (body and space) whereof one is Ens, the other Non-ens, and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order and position, to be the causes of all other things. Which differences they call by these names Rysmus, Diatigue and Trope. And in his book De Anima,

1 having declared that Democritus made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner, being in the shape of a square, but qualities, to when named. 

\[ \text{z} \]

They are (in my opinion) like those ramenta er dylicate particles which appear in the sun-beams, an omnisarious seminary whereof of Democritus makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth Leucippus likewise. Elsewhere \( J \) the fame Aristotle tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration without forms and qualities by figures and local motion: Democritus and Leucippus having made figures, (or variously figured atoms) the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely generation together with corruption from the concretion and separation of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position.

Again he elsewhere \( J \) takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists, that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures, imputing it not only to Democritus, but also to the generality of the old philosophers, but very much disliking the same: Democritus and most of the physiologists here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into the figures of insensible parts or atoms. And this opinion he endeavours to confute by these arguments. First, because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies different from the figure, site and motion of parts.

Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colours, odours, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, Aristotle somewhere else also confutes that other fundamental principle of this atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colours and tastes, as red, green, bitter and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorid cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the fame colours of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are properly the phantasm of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optick nerves: so they conceived the case to be the same in all other colours, and that both the colours of the prism and rainbow were as real as other colours, and all other colours as phantastical as they:

1 Lib. I. cap. II. p. 4. Tom. II. Oper.  
2 De Senfa & Sensibili c. IV. p. 70. Tom. II.  
3 De Generat. & Corrupt. Lib. I. c. II. Oper.  
The Records in Aristotle and Plato  

Book I.

they: and then by parify of reason they extended the business further to the other sensibles. But this opinion Aristotle condemns in these words, 1, "Oi wοτερες ψυχολογοι τωτο θ καλος ιλεγοι, λευκον οη ιδον οφθαι περαν δαι υς, οντω χρωμω ανω γενεως." The former phylologers were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the fight, nor no bitter or sweet without the taste. There are other passages in Aristotle concerning this philosophy, which I think superfluous to infer here; and I shall have occasion to cite some of them afterward for other purposes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiss to shew, that Plato also hath left a very full record of this mechanical or atomical physiology (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of) which notwithstanding he doth not impute either to Democritus (whose name Laertius 2 thinks he purposely declined to mention throughout all his writings) or to Leucippus, but to Protagoras. Wherefore in his Theaetetus, having first declared in general, 3 that the Protagorean philosophy made all things to consist of a commixture of parts (or atoms) and local motion, he represents it, in particular concerning colours, after this manner 4; "υπολαβε τοιην άτομην κατα τα ομοια τοτων, δε καλει ιχρωμα λευκων με ειναι αυτω ισατο KE το εν τοιο τα ομοια μεν, αλλα τωι τα ομοια, ηλευκων, οπι δ ου την άλλο ιχρωμα εκ της προτεσθεπος των ομοιων προς την προτσισθεπον Φρονησεον Ψωφητης γεγονων, αλλα μετα θυ ισατω iδον γηγονοι." First, as to that which belongs to the sight, you must conceive that which is called a white or a black colour not to be anything absolutely existing either without your eyes or within your eyes; but black and white, and every other colour, is caused by different motions made upon the eye from objects differently modified: so that it is nothing either in the agent nor the patient absolutely, but something which arises from between them both.

Where it follows immediately, ἢ εν διηγονσιαν ἄν οη οπου συν Φανεται έκας-ων ίχρωμα τοτομεν η ηυ βεμ ιχρωμω υδοι: Can you or any man else be confident, that as every colour appears to him, so it appears just the same to every other man and animal, any more than tastes and touches, heat and cold do? From whence it is plain, that Protagoras made sensible qualities not to be all absolute things existing in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and passions in us; and so they are called presently after εν ημι φασμα, certain fancies, feelings, or appearances in us. But there is another passage 5, in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus; "Αχη η το ης δε ουν δε ελγονει παλαια ηρτηται ήτε ι αυτω, ήτε το ια ιησαις ης και άλλο παρα το το σω, της δε κατεχο λο ειδη, πληθε ποι οτι εικονι εκατερον, δεκαμεπο δε το μεν ποιει εξου, το δε ερμον έν δει της της ομοιως τε και τριτεσεις σως άλλοι κατεσθαι εκανον, πληθε μοι απειρα, δεδομε δε, το μεν αιτητον, το δε αιτητον οτι συνεκτετισα και γενωσαι μετα το αιτητον, &c. The principle upon which all these things depend is this, that the whole universe is motion (of atoms) and nothing else besides; which motion is considered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and passion; from the mutual congruence, and as it were attrition together of both which, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, sensibles and sensations, that are both

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1 De Anima Lib. II. c. I. p. 43. Tom.II.  
2 Lib. IX. Segin. 4o. p. 571.  
3 P. 118.  
4 Ibid. p. 119.  
5 Ibid. p. 1.0.
both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing and hearing and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colours, sounds, &c. Wherefore when the eye, or such a proportionate object meet together, both the αἰσθήσις and the αἴσθησις, the sensible idea of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced if either of those two had not met with the other. Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὧν ζυγευόμεν ἡ ἡμέρᾳ ἡ πᾶσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου ὑπολαβίσθαι, αὐτὸ μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ μολύν εἰναι, ἵνα τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα μοίημα ρεῖν, ἣν τιμίως ἀπὸ τῆς κίνησις. The like is to be conceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold, &c. that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion: so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent. Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ ἔνεσθαι τῷ πως ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ άλλῳ καθ' ἄλλο καθ' ἄλλο εἰς ἀνεπίκοιτον, τὸ μὲν πῶς ἄλλα γίνειν, τὰ δὲ ἀνεπίκοιτα. But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentient are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sAVORABILITAS are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taster, and the quality of savorableness to the honey. The conclusion of all which is summed up thus, ἓν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτῷ, ἄλλα τινὶ αἰεὶ γίνειν. That none of these sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient. There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author’s own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole buñines of the mechanical or atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in Lucretius himself, viz. that sensible things, according to those ideas that we have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but εἰ ἡμῖν ὁ παθικὸς, fancies or fantasms in us: so that both the Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus, though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner; the one expressing it thus, Color ex aspectu motiique medium quidam resultans est. Tali circa ocular occultus passio; and the other, ex varia afficiences dialetts, variāque sensīlis specie co- lores varios & visum & visum, ita tamen ut sint φανης, nec nisi in animo subsīdent. However, it appears by Plato’s manner of telling the story, and the tenour of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because Protagoras had made it a foundation both for scepticism and atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from Plato, that Democritus and Leucippus were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that Protagoras, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a Sophist only) was a sharer in it likewise: which Protagoras indeed Laertius¹ and others affirm to have been an auditor of Democritus; and so he might be, notwithstanding what Plutarch tells us ², that Democritus wrote


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wrote against his taking away the absolute natures of things. However we are of opinion, that neither Democritus, nor Protagoras, nor Leucippus was the first inventor of this philosophy; and our reason is, because they were all three of them Atheists (though Protagoras alone was banished for that crime by the Athenians) and we cannot think, that any Atheists could be the inventors of it, much less that it was the genuine spawn and brood of atheism itself, as some conceit, because however these Atheists adopted it to themselves, endeavouring to serve their turns of it, yet if rightly understood, it is the most effectual engine against atheism that can be. And we shall make it appear afterwards, that never any of those Atheists, whether ancient or modern (how great pretenders forever to it) did thoroughly understand it, but perpetually contradicted themselves in it. And this is the reason, why we insist so much upon this philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a sovereign antidote against atheism out of that very philosophy, which so many have used as a vehiculum to convey this poison of atheism by.

IX. But besides reason, we have also good historical probability for this opinion, that this philosophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus. And first, because Pofidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus and Strabo tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first inventor of this atomical philosophy was one Mofchus a Phoenician, who, as Strabo also notes, lived before the Trojan wars.

X. Moreover it seems not altogether improbable, but that this Mofchus a Phoenician philosopher, mentioned by Pofidonius, might be the same with that Mochus a Phoenician physiologer in Jamblichus, with whose succeffors, priests and prophets, he affirms that Pythagoras, sometimes sojourning at Sidon (which was his native city) had conversed: which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them instructed in that atomical physiology, which Mofchus or Mochus the Phoenician is said to have been the inventor of. Mochus or Mofchus is plainly a Phoenician name, and there is one Mochus a Phoenican writer cited in Athenaeus, whom the Latin translator calls Mofchus; and Mr. Selden approves of the conjecture of Arcerius, the publisher of Jamblichus, that this Mochus was no other than the celebrated Mofes of the Jews, with whose succeffors the Jewish philosophers, priests and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. Some fantastic Atomists perhaps would here catch at this, to make their philosophy to stand by divine right, as owing its original to revelation; whereas philosophy being not a matter of faith but reason, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence seek to impose it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purposely left free to the use of their own faculties, that so finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleasure and satisfaction, which ariseth from thence. But we aim here at nothing more, than a confirmation of this truth, that the atomical physiology was both older than De-
CHAP. I. That Pythagoras was an Atheist.

mocritus, and had no such atheistical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that Pythagoras did borrow many things from the Jews, and translate them into his philosophy.

XI. But there are yet other considerable probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was not unacquainted with the atomical physiology. And first from Democritus himself, who as he was of the Italic row, or Pythagorick succession, fo it is recorded of him in Laeritus, that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and seemed to have taken all his philosophy from them; infomuch that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of Pythagoras himself, of whom he testified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover some of his opinions had a plain correspondency with the Pythagorick doctrines, forasmuch as Democritus did not only hold, φιλολογος ατομος ει το ουρ δυναιναι, that the atoms were carried round in a vortex; but altogether with Leucippus, το σωμα το σωμα περι το μεσον διαμεζευετο, that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex (which is the Sun) turning in the mean time round upon its own axis. And just fo the Pythagorick opinion is expressf of Aristotle, τον γυνε του ανδρου σωματος τον ουρον το περιπλοκον περι το μεσον νυκτα κατ το ημεραν θαυματο. That the earth, as one of the flars (that is a planet) being carried round about the middle or centre (which is fire or the sun) did in the mean time by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night. Wherefore it may be reasonably from hence concluded, that as Democritus his philosophy was Pythagorical, fo Pythagoras his philosophy was likewise Democritical or Atomical.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of Ecphantus a famous Pythagorean for this, that Pythagoras his monads, fo much talked of, were nothing else but corporeal atoms. Thus we find it in Stobæus, τας Πυθαγορειας Μοναδας ετος περιπλοκον απεφανον σωματως, Ecphantus (who himself asserted the doctrine of atoms) first declared, that the Pythagorick monads were corporeal, i.e. atoms. And this is further confirmed from what Aristotle himfelf writes of these Pythagoreans and their monads, τας Μοναδας ὑπολοιπους εις χεις μεγας αριθμους αυτοσ αριθμους ανεβαζεν, they suppose their monads to have magnitude. And from that he elsewhere makes monads and atoms to signify the same thing, ὁπι διαφερει Monades λεγειν η σωματως σωματως. It is all one to say monads or small corpula. And Gaffendas hath observed out of the Greek epigrammatist, that Epicurus his atoms were sometimes called monads too; ματα διαφανον επικρα πεντα
Πα το νεων ζητων και τως αι Μοναδας.

1. Lib. IX. Segm. 38. p. 573.
Proved clearly that Empedocles

Book I.

XIII. But to pass from Pythagoras himself; that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philosophic poems; 1

Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled; or thus, there is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled. Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagoric doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds it, universally of all, that their generation and corruption is nothing but mixture and separation; or, as Aristotle 2 expresses it, φύσις υδάτι ἢν ἢν ζώα, * ἀλλὰ μὲνον μέγις τε διάλαξις τε μυγελον.*

2 De Generat. & Corrupt. Lib. II. c. VI. p. 739. Tom I. Oper.
4 Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 575.
5 Lib. X. p. 666. Oper.
8 Ibid. Lib. I. c. XVII. p. 33.
XIV. Besides all this, no less author than Plato affirms, that according to Empedocles, vision and other sensations were made by ἀπορροφαὶ γραμματων, the defluxions of figures, or effluvia of atoms, (for so Democritus his atoms are called in Aristotelic γραμμα, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities) he supposing, that some of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another.

'Ομαδὸς λέγεται ἀπορροφαῖς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἑμπεδολία, καὶ πόρους, ἀνέχει, καὶ οὐ να ἀπορροφαὶ πόρους, καὶ τῶν ἀπορροφῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόδιες ἔνεις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττων ἢ μείζονες ἐνα. You say then, according to the doctrine of Empedocles, that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in us diversely corresponding with them: so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others. By which it is evident, that Empedocles did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the atomical way; in which notwithstanding there are some differences among these Atomists themselves. But Empedocles went the same way here with Democritus, for Empedocles's ἀπορροφαὶ γραμματων, defluxions of figured bodies, are clearly the same thing with Democritus his εἴδους εἰκουσίας, infinuations of simulacra, or exterior images of bodies. And the same Plato adds further 2, that according to Empedocles's, the definition of colour was this, ἀπορροφαὶ γραμματων ἥς εἰς σύμμετρον καί αἰθέρος, The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula (without qualities) commensurate to the sight and sensible. Moreover, that Empedocles his physiologist was the very same with that of Democritus, is manifest also from this passage of Aristotle 3, Οἱ μὲν ἐν παλιὸ Ἐμπεδολία καὶ Δημόκριτος λατήσαντες εὐτελεῖς, ἐν γενεσία εὔλαλων πανείης, ἄλλα δὲ ἐναίσθητα μέρη εἰσπάρχον ἐνεκερεῖται Φαῖσις ἄπεται ἐν αὐτοῖς τῆς γενεσίας ἄτης: Empedocles and Democritus deceiving themselves, unawares destroy all generation of things out of one another, leaving a seeming generation only: for they say, that generation is not the production of any new entity, but only the secretion of what was before existent; as when divers kinds of things confounded together in a vessel are separated from one another. Lastly, we shall confirm all this by the clear testimony of Plutarch, or the writer de Placitis Philofophorum 4: Ἑμπεδολία, καὶ Ἑπικορός καὶ τῶν ὅσα κατὰ συνθετικὸν τῶν περιεκτῶν σωμάτων κυτταρικῶν, συμφυτῶν μὲν καὶ διακρίσεως εἰσγυμνηστες, γενεσίας δὲ καὶ Φαίσις ὑποδοτες, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς ἐν ἀλλήλωσις, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐν συνθετικῶν τούτων γίνεται: Empedocles and Epicurus, and all those that compound the world of small atoms, introduce concretions and secretions, but no generations or corruptions properly so called; neither would they have these to be made according to quality by alteration, but only according to quantity by aggregation. And the same writer lets down the order and method of the Σομμαραία according to Empedocles 5, Ἑμπεδολίας, τὸν μὲν αἰτίας περιτοῦ διακρίσιμην, κατὰ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐν γίνεται.

Anaxagoras a Spurious Atomist. Book I.

XV. As for Anaxagoras, though he philosophized by atoms, substituting concretion and secretion in the room of generation and corruption, insetting upon the same fundamental principle, that Empedocles, Democritus and the other Atomists did; which was (as we shall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore that there were neither any new productions nor destructions of any substantial or real entities: yet, as his Homœmeria is represented by Arisotle, Lucretius and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and flesh of flethy, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms; these atoms being supposed to be ended originally with so many several forms and qualities essential to them, and insepable from them, there was indeed a wide difference betwixt his philosophy and the atomical. However, this seems to have had its rise from nothing else but this philosopher’s not being able to understand the atomical hypothesis, which made him decline it, and substitute this spurious and counterfeit atomism of his own in the room of it.

XVI. Lastly, I might add here, that it is recorded by good authors concerning divers other ancient philosophers, that were not addicted to Democriticism or Atheism, that they followed this atomical way of physiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from those religious atomists before Democritus. As for example; Ecphantus the Syracuian Pythagorist, who, as Stobaeus writes, made τὰ ἀναίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ ιοῦν, indivisible bodies and vacuum the principles of physiogy, and as Theodoret also testifies, taught in τὸν ἄτομον συν-τάσσων τὸν θόρμον, that the corporeal world was made up of atoms; Xenocrates, that made μεγάλα ἀναίρετα, indivisible magnitudes the first principles of bodies; Heraclides, that resolved all corporeal things into ψύχη ταῦτα καὶ ἑξαγωγή ταῦτα ἑλάχιστα, certain small parts of bodies; Afronides, who supposed all the corporeal world to be made ἐξ αὐτομίων καὶ ἀναρχίων ἄτομων, not of similar parts (as Anaxagoras) but of dissimilar and inconcin moleculae, i. e. atoms of different magnitude and figures; and

1 Lib. I. verf. 744, 745.
2 Vide Georg. Pachymer. libellum de
diæôtoν γεωργιλν, qui ebeat inter Aristotelis Opera, Tom. II. cap. I. p. 819.
CHAP. I. Moft of the ancient Physiologers Atomifts.

Diodorus, that solved the material phænomena by ἀμανι τὰ εἰκοσίης, the smallest indivisibles of body. And lastly, Metrodorus (not Lampfacerus the Epicurean, but) Chius, who is reported also to have made indivisible particles and atoms the first principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the atomaical physiology was ancienter than Democritus and Leucippus, and not confined only to that sect, since Aristotle himself in the passages already cited doth expressly declare, that besides Democritus, the generality of all the other physiologers went that way; ἔτη τὰ τῶν Φυσιολόγων, &c. Democritus and the moft of the physiologers make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities, as the tastes of bitter and sweet, &c. into figures. And again, he imputes it generally to all the physiologers that went before him, ὁ πρῶτος Φυσιολόγος, the former physiologers (without any exception) said not well in this, that there was no black and white without the fight, nor bitter and sweet without the taste. Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reasonably doubted, but that the generality of the old physiologers before Aristotle and Democritus did pursue the atomaical way, which is to resolve the corporeal phænomena, not into forms, qualities and species, but into figures, motions and fancies.

XVII. But then there will seem to be no small difficulty in reconciling Aristotle with himself, who doth in so many places plainly impute this philosophy to Democritus and Leucippus, as the first source and original of it; as also in salving the credit of Laertus, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, Democritus having had for many ages almost the general cry and vogue for atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this busines, and reconcile the seemingly different testimonies of these ancient writers, so as to take away all contradiction and repugnancy between them. For although the atomaical physiology was in use long before Democritus and Leucippus, so that they did not make it, but find it; yet these two, with their confederate Atheifts (whereof Protagoras seems to have been one) were undoubtedly the firft, that ever made this physiology to be a complete and entire philosophy by itself, so as to derive the original of all things in the whole universe from inceles atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion, together with vacuum, and made up such a fystem of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not so much as a corporeal one. These two things were both of them before singly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been atheifm lurking in the minds of some or other in all ages; and perhaps some of those ancient Atheifts did endeavour to philosophize too, as well as they could, in some other way. And there was atomaical physiology likewise before, without atheifm. But these two thus complicated together, were never before atomaical atheifm, or atheiftical atomifm. And therefore Democritus and his comrade Leucippus need not be envied the glory of

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4 De Animæ, Lib. II. cap. I. p. 45. Tom. XIII. p. 27.
of being reputed the first inventors or founders of the atomical philosophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before Leucippus and Democritus, the doctrine of atoms was not made a whole entire philosophy by it self, but look’d upon only as a part or member of the whole philosophick system, and that the meanest and lowest part too, it being only used to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; besides which they acknowledged something else, which was not more bulk and mechanism, but life and self-activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal substance; the head and summity whereof is the Deity distinct from the world. So that there have been two sorts of Atomists in the world, the one atheistical, the other religious. The first and most ancient Atomists holding incorporeal substance, used that physiologick in a way of subordination to theology and metaphysicks. The other allowing no other substance but body, made senseless atoms and figures, without any mind and understanding (i.e. without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgarly known by the name of atomical philosophy, of which Democritus and Leucippus were the source.

XIX. It hath been indeed of late confidently asserted by some, that never any of the ancient philosophers dream’d of any such thing as incorporeal substance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upstart and new-fangled invention of some bigotical religious; the fallacy whereof we shall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubts in all ages such as have disbelieved the existence of any thing but what was sensible, whom Plato describes after this manner; Οἱ διατείνων δι’ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ διατείνων τις χρησὶ συμπείνειν εἰσιν, ὃς δέ ιταί ἐδύνατο τὸ παράπω ἢ τὸ that would contend, that whatsoever they could not feel or grasp with their hands, was altogether nothing; yet this opinion was professedly opposed by the best of the ancient philosophers, and condemned for a piece of fottishness and stupidity. Wherefore the fame Plato tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controversy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of gigantomachy betwixt these two parties or sects of men, the one, that held there was no other substance in the world besides body; the other, that asserted incorporeal substance. The former of these parties or sects is thus described by the philosopher: Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν εἰς ὄραν καὶ τὰ ὁράτη πάντα ἰδίκει ταῖς χρήσιν ἀπεχθι- νός πέτρας καὶ ὄμβροις περιλαμβανόμενες, τῶν γὰρ τῶν ἐπιστήμων πάντων, διαφορέ- σιντα τὸ ἐοὶ ὁμοίοι μόνον διὰ παρέχει προσελθήν ἡ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταῦταν σῶμα ἡ ὁσία δι- πολομεῖοι τῶν ὁ ἄλλων ἐντὸς Φυσῆς μὴ σώμα ἤρων ἐστι, κατακρονίσασθε το παραστάς, γι' ἐναὶ ἐσεώντες ἀλλο ἀκείνως. These (faith he) pull all things down from heaven and the invisible region, with their hands to the earth, laying bold of rocks and oaks, and when they grasp all these hard and gross things, the confidence affirm, that that only is substance, which they can feel; and will rest their touch; and they conclude, that body and substance are one and the self same being; and if any one chance to speak to them of something which is not body, i.e. of incorporeal substance, they will altogether despise him, and not bear a word more

† In Sophilti, p. 160.
Incorporeal Substance asserted by the Ancients.

from him. And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner; Oi προς αυτος αμφισπνωτες μαλα ἁλαξεις μεθυν αει αμφόσιν τότε αμφόσινεν ιντα ατια γρ αδωματα ειναι, βιοκομοι τνυ αλτιαν ουτως ειλυ, ει μεσω δι περι ταυτα ἀπελεγομενον μαχας τις αει ἑξωτερικά: The adversaries of these Corporealists do cautiously and piously assault them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of deficient, and by strength of reason convincing, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But betwixt these two there hath always been (faith he) a great war and contention. And yet in the sequel of his discourse he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame-faced than formerly their great champions had been, such as Democritus and Protagoras; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wifdom and vertue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that Plato expressly asserts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls ουγιν αδωματα, incorporeal substance, and sometimes ουγιν νοετων, intelligible substance, in opposition to the other which he calls αϊωνιν, sensible. And it is plain to any one, that hath the least acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it, is to raise up mens minds from fene to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent: τα γαρ αδωματα καλλιστα οντα γρ μήγα αγα μένα, ἐλλωμενεν, σαφως δικαιωμαι, as he writes in another place 1; for incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are (faith he) discoverable by reason only, and nothing else. And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him 2, where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows (of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echo's, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute fene, reafon, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

XX. I might also shew in the next place, how Aristotle did not at all differ from Plato herein, he plainly asserting, ἄλλοι ούγιν παρα τά αἰσθητά, another substance besides sensibles, ύπειρχον καὶ κατεργασμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν, a substance separable and also actually separated from sensibles, αἰσθητος σώτων, an immoveable nature or essence (subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, ποιεῖται ἐν εἰς ἐφεξῆς ἐνεργείαν, ἄλλα μερεῖς ἔδαιμον ἔστι, as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartible and indivisible. He also blaming Zeno (not the Stoick, who was junior to Aristotle, but an ancien ter philosopher of that name) for ma-

Proved clearly that Incorporeal  

Book I.

king God to be a body, in these words 1; αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται τῶν Θεῶν ἴσε τῇ τοῖς ἐντός, εἰνὲ ἀντὶ ἀντίπτεται αὐτὸς λέγεται. ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὄνομα ἐν ἐνσαρκείσι εἶναι ἢ τὰ ὁμοία ἢ τὰ κινητά, ἢ τὰ ἀληθικά, μὴ δέ τις ἐν τῷ σῶμα τί τι αὐτῷ κοιλοῖς κινεῖν. Zeno implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal universe, or some particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? nor could he then either move or rest, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing hinders but that he may be moved. From which, and other places of Aristotle, it is plain enough also, that he did suppose incorporeal substance to be extended, and as such, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be disputed afterwards. Indeed some learned men conceive Aristotle to have reprehended Zeno without cause, and that Zeno made God to be a sphere, or spherical, in no other sense, than Parmenides did in that known verse of his 2:

Πάντοθεν εἰκολά Φαιρας, ἐκαλίμνων δειξο.

Wherein he is understood to describe the divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to Aristotle's sense, God was ἀσώματος, an incorporeal substance distinct from the World.

XXI. Now this doctrine, which Plato especially was famous for afferting, that there was ἄτον ἀσώματος, incorporeal substance, and that the souls of men were such, but principally the Deity; Epicurus taking notice of it, endeavoured with all his might to confute it, arguing sometimes after this manner: There can be no incorporeal God (as Plato maintained) not only because no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction. And concerning the soul of man; 4 οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματοι εἰναι τῷ ἰούν μακραίτερον, &c. They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word may be used to signify a subtle body, talk vainly and foolishly; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing. It could not be upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it. From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus his time.

XXII. But Plato and Aristotle were not the first inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world, (and so properly the creator of it and all its parts) did really affect incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whoever denies God to be incorporeal, if he make 3

3 Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. cap. XII.

1 Libro de Zeno, Xenophane; & Gogia, cap. IV. p. 844. Tom. II. Oper. 
2 Apud Arilott. in Libro jam laudato, cap. IV. p. 845. Tom. II. Oper. 
Substance was asserted by the Ancients.

him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it. Wherefore if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato was not the first, who asserted these two things, but they were both maintained by many philosophers before him. Pherecides Syrus, and Thales, were two of the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks; and it is said of the former of them, that by his lectures and disputations concerning the immortality of the soul, he first drew off Pythagoras from another course of life to the study of philosophy. Pherecides Syrus (faith Cicero, primus dixit animos hominum esse sepiemterus, and Thales in an Epistle, directed to him, congratulates his being the first, that had designed to write to the Greeks concerning divine things; which Thales also (who was the head of the Ionick succession of philosophers, as Pythagoras of the Italick) is joined with Pythagoras and Plato, by the writer de placitis philosophorum, after this manner, οντο πάτες οι πρεσβύτεροι άληθείας το ιερόν ούρανον ήτοι θεον καλύπτον Καλάς τοι θαυμάζετε τους θεούς, έκαστος αυτόκεφαλος καλ δούλων του ατόμων. All these determined the soul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally self-moving (or self-active) and an intelligible substance, that is, sensible. Now he, that determines the soul to be incorporeal, must needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum (faith Cicero, Deum autem eam mentem, que ex aqua cuncta fingetur. Thales said that water was the first principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind, which formed all things out of water. For Thales was a Phoenician by extraction, and accordingly, seemed to have received his two principles from thence, water, and the divine spirit moving upon the waters. The first whereof is thus expressed by Sanchoanibon, in his description of the Phoenician theology, χάδις Σολονέω, έκφύσε, a turbid and dark chaos; and the second is intimated in these words, γράμμα το πνεύμα τον ιδίων άρχον, the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles; perhaps expressing the force of the Hebrew word Merachepeph, and both of them implying an understanding prolixical goodness, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or else a plastick power, subordinate to it. Zeno (who was also originally a Phoenician) tells us, that Heisod's chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the best interpreters) is the genuine sense of scripture, 2 Pet. iii. 5, by which water some perhaps would understand a Chaos of atoms confoundedly moved. But whether Thales were acquainted with the Atomical physiology or no, it is plain that he asserted, besides the soul's immortality, a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

We pass to Pythagoras, whom we have proved already to have been an Atomist; and it is well known also, that he was a professed Incorpoicalist. That he asserted the immortality of the soul, and consequently its immateriality, is evident from his doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration; and

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1 Vide Augustin, cap. 137. pag. 508. Tom. II. Oper.
4 Lib. IV. cap. III. p. 908.
6 Apud Euseb. de Preparazione Evangelica, Lib. II. cap. X p 33.
that he likewise held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any. But if there were any need of proving it, (because there are no monuments of his extant) perhaps it might be done from hence, because he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks, concerning three hypostases in the Deity.

For, that Plato and his followers held τριά ταύτα ἀκατάλληλα ἀτόμον, three hypostases in the Deity, that were the first principles of all things, is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that these Platonick hypostases are exactly the same with those in the Christian trinity. Now Plato himself sufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and Plotinus tells us, that it was παλικά δοξα, an ancient opinion before Plato's time, which had been delivered down by some of the Pythagoricks. Wherefore, I conceive, this must needs be one of those Pythagorick monstrosities, which Xenophon covertly taxes Plato for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philosophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and simplicity of it. Though a Corporealift may pretend to be a theist; yet I never heard, that any of them did ever afser a trinity, respectively to the Deity, unless it were such an one, as I think not fit here to mention.

XXIII. That Parmenides, who was likewise a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity distinct from the corporeal world, is evident from Plato 1. And Plotinus tells us also, that he was one of them, that afsered the triad of divine hypostases. Moreover, whereas there was a great controversy amongst the ancient philosophers before Plato's time 2, between such as held all things to flow, (as namely Heraclitus and Cratylus; and others, who afsered that some things did stand, and that there was ἀυτόν ἄνωτέρω, a certain immutable nature, to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths, (amongst which were Parmenides and Melisus;) the former of these were all Corporealists, (this being the very reason why they made all things to flow, because they supposed all to be body) though these were not therefore all of them Atheists. But the latter were all both Corporealists and Theists; for whosoever holds incorporeal substance, must needs (according to reason) also afser a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention Parmenides amongst the atomical philosophers, yet we conceive it to be manifest from hence, that he was one of that tribe, because he was an eminent afserer of that principle, ὁδός ὃς ἔστι γινέσθαι ὑπὲρ φυσικὰ τῶν διαν, that no real entity is either made or destroyed, generated or corrupted. Which we shall afterwards plainly shew, to be the grand fundamental principle of the atomical philosophy.

XXIV. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that Empedocles was an atomical physiologer, it may notwithstanding with some colour of probability be doubted, whether he were not an Atheist, or at least a Corporealift, because Arifiotle accuses him of these following things. Firft 3, of making knowledge

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1 In Parmenide.
2 Vide Platon. in Theaeteto, p. 130, 131. Tom. II. Oper.
CHAP. I. Empedocles no Atheist nor Corporealift.

knowledge to be sense, which is indeed a plain sign of a Corporealift; and therefore in the next place also, of compounding the soul out of the four elements, making it to understand every corporeal thing by something of the fame within it fell, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and lastly, of attributing much to fortune, and affirming that divers of the parts of animals were made such by chance, and that there were at first certain mongrel animals fortuitously produced, that were θαύγων καὶ ἀνθρώπωρα, such as had something of the shape of an ox, together with the face of a man, (though they could not long continue;) which seems to give just cause of suspicion, that Empedocles atheized in the same manner that Democritus did.

To the first of these we reply, that some others, who had also read Empedocles's poems, were of a different judgment from Aristotle as to that, conceiving Empedocles not to make false, but reason the criterion of truth. Thus Empiricus informs us: Others say, that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth is not sense, but right reason: and also that right reason is of two sorts, the one νεωτερικός, or divine, the other ἄφεσις, or human: of which the divine is inexplicable, but the human declarable. And there might be several paffages cited out of those fragments of Empedocles his poems yet left, to confirm this; but we shall produce only this one:

Γῆςν τίς θάνατος τε δε καί θάνατος Ειμήν 4.

To this sense: Suspend thy affent to the corporeal senses, and consider every thing clearly with thy mind or reason.

And as to the second crimination, Aristotle 5 has much weakened his own testimony here, by accusing Plato also of the very same thing. Πλατων τῷ θ'ψυχ' ἐν τοῖς τεοixeοισ παθείς, γνώσισται γὰρ ομοίως όμοιως, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐν τοῖς ἄσχετοιναί. Plato compounds the soul out of the four elements, because like is known by like, and things are from their principles. Wherefore it is probable, that Empedocles might be no more guilty of this fault (of making the soul corporeal, and to consist of earth, water, air, and fire) than Plato was, who in all mens judgments was as free from it, as Aristotle himself, if not more.

For Empedocles 6 did in the same manner, as Pythagoras before him, and Plato after him, hold the transmigration of souls, and consequently, both their future immortality and pre-existence; and therefore must needs affect their incorporeity; Plutarch 7 rightly declaring this to have been his opinion; Ἐκάι τοῖς μικρότερα γενοῦσας καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενεῖσιν ὅταν that as well those who are yet unborn, as those that are dead, have a being. He also affected human souls to be here in a lapsed state 8; µελακτικώς καὶ ἠξιωσικώς, καὶ Φύλακις, ὄιναμερος, ἀναμιχόμενος; that souls finning should fall down into these earthly bodies. But the fullest record of the Empedoclean philosophy concerning the soul is contained in this of Hierocles 9:

Kάτατ

4 Id. §. 125. p. 347.
7 Plutarch. de Exilīo, p. 607.
8 De Animā Defcendīn in Corpora, En. IV. Lib. VIII. cap. I. p. 458.
9 In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 186.
Empedocles vindicated from being  

Book I.

Now from what hath been already cited it is sufficiently manifest, that Empedocles was so far from being either an Atheist or Corporealist, that he was indeed a rank Pythagorist, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what Clemens Alexandrinus observes 1, that according to Empedocles, άν οίς και δικαιός διαισθώμεν, μακάριος μὲν ενταθά, μακαριστός δὲ μειά τιν διαθεμένο ταλαγμον. Ὅμως τινι τω την καθαρίσαθεν έχοντες, σιν ου οίς δικαιός διαισθώμεν. Ασωμάτω τος έλλην όμέτω, ει δι τραπεζίων, &c. If we live holy and justly, we shall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happiness not necessarily confined to time, but being able to rest and fix in it to all eternity; resting with the other immortal beings, &c. We might also take notice, how, besides the immortal souls of men, he acknowledged daemons or angels; declaring that some of these fell from heaven, and were since prosecuted by a divine Nemesis. For these in Plutarch 2 are called, οι θελαται γες άληθινον εκκύκλους αξίμανον. Those Empedoclean daemons lapsed from heaven, and pursued with divine vengeance, whose restless torment is there described in several verses of his 3. And we might observe likewise, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable justice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholic and universal, and every where the same, through infinite light and space; as he expresseth it with poetick pomp and bravery:

And the ascertaining of natural morality is no small argument of a Theist. But

1 Stromatum Lib. V. p. 722.  
2 De vitando sacrilegio, Tom. II. Oper. p. 859.  
3 Apud Plur. de Exilio, T. II. Oper. p. 607.  
CHAP. I.  

But what then shall we say to those other things, which Empedocles is charged with by Aristotle, that seem to have so rank a smell of atheism? Certainly those mungrel and biform animals, that are said to have sprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more a-kin to Democritus than Empedocles; and probably it is the fault of the copies, that it is read otherwise, there being no other philosopher that I know of, that could ever find any such thing in Empedocles his poems. But for the rest, if Aristotle do not misrepresent Empedocles, as he often doth Plato, then it must be granted, that he being a mechanical physiologer, as well as theologer, did something too much indulge to fortuitous mechanism; which seems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philosophers and Atomists have been always more or less subject to. But Aristotle doth not charge Empedocles with resolving all things into fortuitous mechanism, as some philosophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theists and Incorporealists, but only that he would explain some things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference between Empedocles and the Democratick Atheists in these words subjoined: 'Eis n tiv, &c. which is as if he should have said, Empedocles resolved some things in the fabric and structure of animals into fortuitous mechanism; but there are certain other philosophers, namely Leucippus and Democritus, who would have all things whatsoever in the world, heaven and earth, and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity. It seems very plain, that Empedocles his Philia and Neikos, his friendship and discord, which he makes to be the áξιως δραστικος, the active cause, and principle of motion in the universe, was a certain platifick power, superior to fortuitous mechanism: and Aristotle himself acknowledges somewhere as much. And Plutarch tells us, that, according to Empedocles, the order and system of the world is not the refult of material caufes and fortuitous mechanism, but of a divine wisdom, assigning to every thing oιν υν τη φιλας οικαδε ταις δραστικαις, all ιν τη φως το καινον άργον δουλες σονταις: not such a place as nature would give it, but such as is most convenient for the good of the whole. Simplicius, who had read Empedocles, acquaints us, that he made two worlds, the one intellectual, the other sensible; and the former of these to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And so the writer De Placitis Philophorum observes, that Empedocles made δυο νεος, τον μην δραστικον, τον δυναιμον, two jins, the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or sensible.

But I need take no more pains to purge Empedocles from those two imputations of corporealism and atheism, since he hath so fully confuted them himself in those fragments of his still extant. First, by expressing such a hearty refentment of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedness and foolishness of atheism in these verses:  

6 "Ολειος δ' Θεων πρακτιδων ιδήτερος απλουν,  
Δειδος δ' ω σκοτώσαν Θεων περι δύομαι μεμπαλεν.

1 Some Verses of Empedocles, wherein he expressly maintains that opinion, are extant in Aelian, de Natura Animalium, Lib. XVI. c. XXIX.  
3 Sympotic. Lib. I. Quixt. II. p. 618.  
5 Lib. II. cap. XX. p. 903. Tom. II. Oper. Phutarchi.  
Anaxagoras an Incorporealist. 

Book I.

To this sense: He is happy, who hath his mind richly fraught and bored with the treasures of divine knowledge; but he miserable, whose mind is darkened as to the belief of a God. And, secondly, by denying God to have any human form, or members,

1 'Oι μὲν γὰρ βοστηρὶ κυφαλῆ καὶ γῆς κέκατοι, &c.

Or otherwise to be corporeal,

2 Ὣκι ἐσ-ιν πελάσα-δι οὐδ' ἐφθαλμοῦν ἐφικιὼν Ἑμετέροις, ὡς χρητι λακεῖν.

And then positively affirming what he is,

3 Ἀλλὰ Φηνι ἐσ-τιν καὶ ἰδέσφαλε προτετελεῖον, Ἰδεσφαλε θάμου ἀπαίλα καλαίσσεια δόσιν.

Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by swift thoughts agitates the whole world.

XXV. And now we shall speak something also of Anaxagoras, having shewed before, that he was a spurious Atomist. For he likewise agreed with the other Atomists in this, that he affirmed incorporeal substance in general as the active cause and principle of motion in the universe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world; affirming, that there was besides atoms, Νοῦς ὁ δικαυσμῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων αὐτοι, (as it is express'd in Plato *) An ordering and disposing mind, that was the cause of all things. Which mind (as Aristotle tells us') he made to be μόνον τῶν ἀπλών ἀτόμων καὶ ἀμύγη καὶ κα-Σαρίων, the only simple, unmixed, and pure thing in the world. And he supposed this to be that, which brought the confused chaos of omnifarious atoms into that orderly compages of the world that now is.

XXVI. And by this time we have made it evident, that those atomical physiologers, that were before Democritus and Leucippus, were all of them Incorporealists; joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal substance and a Deity, together with their atomical physiology. This is a thing expressly noted concerning Ephthamus the Pythagorean in Stobaeus 6, Ἐκαθίσις ἐκ μέθ τῶν ἀτόμων συντάξαι τον κόσμον, διοικεῖσαν δὲ ἀπό των ἀτόμων ἐαν. Ephthamus held the corporeal world to consist of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a divine providence; that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the same is also observed of Arcefas, or perhaps Archebals, by Sidonius Apollinaris 7.

Footnotes:

5 De Animā Lib. I. cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Oper.
XVI. Lib. I. cap. XXV. p. 48.
8 Apud Tzetz. & Ammonium, ubi supra.
CHAP. I.  The ancient Atomists' Theists.

Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet notwithstanding held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the same, as the first principle of activity in it; so in like manner did all the other ancient Atomists generally before Democritus join theology and incorporealism with their atomical physiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that atheistical atomology was a thing first set on foot afterward by Leucippus and Democritus.

XXVII. But because many seem to be so strongly possessed with this prejudice, as if atheism were a natural and necessary appendix to atomism, and therefore will conclude, that the same persons could not possibly be Atomists and Incorporealists or Theists, we shall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconsistency between the atomical physiology and theology, but also that there is, on the contrary, a most natural cognition between them.

And this we shall do two manner of ways; first, by inquiring into the origin of this philosophy, and considering what grounds or principles of reason they were, which first led the ancients into this atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. And secondly, by making it appear, that the instrinsic constitution of this physiology is such, that whoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly understand it, must of necessity acknowledge, that there is something else in the world besides body.

First therefore, this atomical physiology seems to have had its rise and origin from the strength of reason, exerting its own inward active power and vigour, and thereby bearing it self up against the prejudices of sense, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients considering and revolving the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and distinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatsoever was in the universe; the one whereof was passive matter, and the other active power, vigour and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cognition, and the power of moving matter, whether by express consciousnesse or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity, passive matter or bulk, and self-activity or life. The former of these was commonly called by the ancients the τὸ ὑόν, that which suffers and receives, and the latter the τὸ ἔνεργον, the active principle, and the τὸ ἐνεργὸν ἐν σῶσι, that from whence all motion springs. In rerum natura (faith Cicero') according to the general sense of the ancients) duo querenda sunt; unum, que materia sit, ex qua quaque res efficiatur; alterum, que res fit quae quicquae efficiat: There are two things to be enquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cause or efficient. To the same purpose Seneca:  

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illud materia: There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter. Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of Aristotle 1, υστης αἰτίας μίας μὲν ὑπὲρ τὸν ἄφθον ὑπὸν Φαμνὸς τῆς κινήσεως, μίας δὲ τῆς ὑλῆς: That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another. Where Aristotle gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer de Placitis Philosophorum 2 expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: ἄδοναὶ ἄφθον μίαν ὑπὸν τοῦ ὑλῶν ἐξ ἕπε τὸ τέλον ὑποτείναι, ἀνάκτικον ἐπὶ τὸ ὕπον αἰτίοις ἀρνή ὑποτείναι, οὐδὲν ἄρμανα ἀρείᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐκπομα γεινέσθαι ἣν μὴ ἐν τῷ παρουσίᾳ, τούτῳ δὲ ἀργυροτέρῃς, ὁμοίως καὶ ἀριτί τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ τῆς ἀλλής ὑλῆς: It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoicks being the only persons, who offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore as the first of these, viz. matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that, which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extension, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character of substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or reft, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of those simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the atomical phylology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example Plotinus 3, who writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words, Καὶ τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὑπὸν ὑποτείναις ἀριστερά ὑπὸ τῶν ὑποκει-
CHAP. I. Atomifm and Incorporealifm.

Though the things of sense seem to have so clear a certainty, yet notwithstanding it is doubted concerning them, whether (the qualities of them) have any real existence at all in the things without us, and not rather a seeming existence only, in our own passions; and there is need of mind or understanding to judge in this case, and to determine the controversy, which sense alone cannot decide. But the ancient physiologists concluded without any hesitancy, that to a body is to a body, and to a body corporis, i.e. to the body corporis, which the nature of honey in itself is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it; ἄποθεμαν οὖ'to the χεὶριον τοι οἰκονομίαν, τοι το οἴκον τοί ἡφαίστειαν. That the nature of honey in itself is not the same thing with the being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it; ἄποθεμαν οὖτος τῷ τοῦ νοτίω τοι ἡφαίστειαν. But that the passion of sense differed from the absolute nature of the thing itself without; the senses not comprehending the objects themselves, but only their own passions from them.

I say therefore, that the ancients concluded the absolute nature of corporeal things in themselves to be nothing but a certain disposition of parts, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which in taste cause us to be differently affected with those senses of sweetness and bitterness; and in sight with those fancies of colours, and accordingly in the other senses with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by these two things, whereof one is absolute in the bodies without us, the various mechanism of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, caused by the respective differences of them in themselves. Which fancies or fantallike ideas are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in our selves, which is cogitative or self-active, that is, incorporeal. For the sensible idea's of hot and cold, red and green, &c. cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be easily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of sensation, or sympathetic perception in us.

The result of all which was, that whatsoever is either in our selves, or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or other of these two principles; passive matter, and extended bulk, or self-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal substance; mechanifm or life; or else to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the atomical physiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung up together with it. But this will be further manifested from that which follows. For we shall in the next place shew, how this philosophy did, in especial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reason, over and besides all the rest; namely, that famous axiom, so much talked of amongst the ancients,

\[1 \text{ De nihil bibi, in nihilum nil posse reverti; }\]

That nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing. For though Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius abused this theorem, endeavouiring to carry it further than

\[1 \text{ Persi Satir. III. ver. 84. }\]
than the intention of the first Atomists, to the disproving of a divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; *Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitus unquam*; and consequently of a Deity: yet as the meaning of it was at first confined and restrained, that *nothing of it self could come from nothing nor go to nothing*, or that according to the ordinary course of nature (without an extraordinary divine power) nothing could be rais’d from nothing, nor reduced to nothing; it is not only an undoubted rule of reason in itself, but it was also the principal original of that atomical physiology, which, discarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing else in body besides mechanism.

Wherefore it was not in vain, or to no purpose, that *Laertius in the life of Democritus* takes notice of this as one of his *Dogmata*, *μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ μὴ δύναι γίνεσθαι, μὴ εἰς τὸ μὴ διὸ θείεσθαι*, that nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing; this being a fundamental principle, not only of his atheism, but also of that very atomical physiology it self, which he pursued. And *Epicurus*, in his epistle to *Herodotus*, plainly fetches the beginning of all his philosophy from hence: Πρῶτον μὲν ὁι βίοι γίνεσθαι εἰς τὰ μὴ δύναι, καὶ θείεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ διό. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἴγεστο τὸ ἐξωποίμενον εἰς τὰ μὴ δύναι, τῶν εἰς παῦλον ἐγίνετο, ὁποῖα προστάτευεν καὶ θείεστο ἐς τὸ αὐξητὸ - μενον εἰς τὸ μὴ διό, πᾶλιν δὲ αὐτοῦλε τὰ πράγματα εἰς ὑλὴν τῶν εἰς ὅ διεινόλι. *We fetch the beginning of our philosophy (faith he) from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or disfroy’d to nothing; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of seeds. And if whatsoever is corrupted were destroy’d to nothing, then all things would at length be brought to nothing. Lucretius in like manner beginning here, insifts more largely upon those grounds of reason hinted by Epicurus. And first, that nothing can be made out of nothing he proves thus;*

*4 Nam si de nihilo fient, ex omnibus rebus
Omne genus nasci posset: nil femine egeret:
E mare primum homines & terra posset oriiri
Squamigerum genus, &c.*

*Nec frutus sidem arboribus confarre solereunt,
Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnium posset.
Preterea cur vere refurm, frumenta calor,
Vites autem si fundi suadente videmus? &c.*

*Quod si de nihilo fient, subito exorverentur
Incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni.*

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing:

*5 Huc accedit uti quicque in sua corpora rursum
Disfelow natura; neque ad nihilum intermat res:
Nam si quid mortale à caelestis partibus efficit,
Ex oculis res quaeque repenti erupta periret.*

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1 Lucret. Lib. I. ver. 151.
2 Lib. 1. Secm. 44. p. 572.
5 Id. Lib. I. ver. 216, &c.
In which passages, though it be plain, that Lucretius doth not immediately drive at atheism, and nothing else, but primarily at the establishing of a peculiar kind of atomical physiology, upon which indeed those Democritics afterward endeavoured to graft atheism; yet to take away that supposition, we shall in the next place shew, that generally the other ancient Physiologists also, who were Theists, did likewise build the structure of their philosophy upon the same foundation, that nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing: as for example, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras and Empedocles. Of Parmenides and Melissus Aristotle thus writes, who saith that no real entity is either generated or corrupted, that is, made anew out of nothing, or destroyed to nothing. And Simplicius tells us, that Parmenides gave a notable reason for the confirmation of this assertion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing, and says, as he himself, cause of it would be made, and neither sooner nor later. Again Aristotle testifies of Xenophanes and Zeno, that they made this a main principle of their philosophy, that it cannot be, that any thing should be made out of nothing; and of this Xenophanes, Sextus the philosopher tells us, that he held, that there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal, speaking thus of him:

\[ Εἰς οὕτως ὑπείρασεν ὁ πλατήρ, \]
\[ ὡς ἐκ τῆς ὑποτενσοῦ ὑποπτηρίας, \]
\[ οὐτὸς ἦν τὸ ἐπικορμένον τὸν θεόν. \]

Aristotle also writes in like manner concerning Empedocles, λέγει τά τινα κακίανον ὁμολογεῖ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰμίκρυον ἔστιν ἀνέστησι, τὸ τε ὅν ἔπεσεν ἀνήνυστον.

1 Id. Lib. i. ver. 263, &cc.  
2 De Cælo Lib. III. cap. i. p. 668. Tom. I. Oper.  
3 Commentar. in Libros physis et Aristot. fol. 22. b. Edit Gréc.  
4 Libro de Xenophane, Gorgia, &c. Zenone, cap. i. p. 834. Tom. II. Oper.  
5 Dr. Cudworth was led into a mistake by Henry Stephens, who in his Poëtæ Philosophica, p. 56. where he states this opinion of Xenophanes concerning the Deity, and produces the verses, which contain it, tells us, that he had borrow'd them from Sextus the Philosopher, by whom he undoubtedly means Sextus Empiricus. But tho' this latter writer in his Hypotypof. Pyrrhon. Lib. i. cap. XXXIII. p. 59, gives a large account of Xenophanes's opinion concerning God; yet we do not find in any part of his writings what is quoted from him by Stephens, who should have cited to that purpose Clemens of Alexandria, Stromat. Lib. V. c. XIV. p. 714.  
6 De Xenophane, &c. cap II. p. 836.
Empedocles acknowledges the very same with other philosophers, that it is impossible anything should be made out of nothing, or perished into nothing. And as for Anaxagoras, it is sufficiently known to all, that his Homeœome-ria, or doctrine of similar atoms, (which was a certain spurious kind of atomism) was nothing but a superstructure made upon this foundation. Besides all which, Aristotle* pronounces universally concerning the ancient physiologists without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing, ἐπει ταύτης ἦν νομογούμενός τις δόξας οἱ ψευδόπνεοι, ὅτι τὸ γεγομένον ἐκ μὴ δύτων γένεσιν ἀδύνατο: The physiologists generally agree in this (laying it down for a grand foundation) that it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing. And again he calls this κοῦντο δόξας τῶν Φυσικῶν, the common opinion of naturalists; intimating also, that they concluded it the greatest absurdity, that any physiologer could be guilty of, to lay down such principles, as from whence it would follow, that any real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.

Now it may well be supposed, that all these ancient physiologists (the most of which were also Theists) did not keep such a stir about this business for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to show, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who insinuated upon the forementioned principle, was the establishing some atomical physiology or other, but most of them at such as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies, (as entities really distinct from the matter and subsance) and resolves all into mechanism and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really distinct from the substance, and its various modifications, of figure, site, and motion, that then in all the changes and transmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body, (those forms and qualities being supposed to have no real existence any where before) something must of necessity be created or produced miraculously out of nothing; as likewise reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; when ever a candle is but lighted or kindled into a flame, there must needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really distinct from the matter and substance, produced out of nothing, that is, created; and the flame again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extinguished. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into snow, hail, or ice, and when it is again dissolved; when wax is by liquefaction made soft and transparent, and changed to most of our senses; when the flame kind of nourishment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, flesh, bones, nerves, and all the other similar parts; when that, which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark smoke; and that which was in the form of vapour, in the form of rain or water, or the like: I say, that in all these mutations of bodies, there must needs be something made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there should be real

real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, seemed to be so great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Because, as we have already declared, first they concluded it clearly impossible by reason, that any real entity should of itself rise out of nothing; and secondly, they thought it very absurd to bring God upon the stage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn; as also, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cause in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculously made out of nothing. Wherefore they sagaciously apprehended, that there must needs be some other mystery or intrigue of nature in this business, than was commonly dream'd of, or suppos'd; which they concluded to be this, that in all these transformations there were no such real entities of forms and qualities distinct from the matter, and the various disposition of its parts, in respect of figure, size and motion (as is vulgarly suppos'd) produced and destroyed; but that all these feats were done, either by the concretion and secretion of actually inexistent parts, or else by the different modifications of the same pre-existent matter, or the insensible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from those different modifications of the small particles of bodies, (they being not so distinctly perceived by our senses) there are begotten in us certain confused phæasma or phantasms, appearances, fancies and passions, as of light and colours, heat and cold, and the like, which are those things, that are vulgarly mistaken for real qualities existing in the bodies without us; whereas indeed there is nothing absolutely in the bodies themselves like to those fantastick ideas that we have of them; and yet they are wisely contriv'd by the author of nature for the adorning and embellishing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be considered two manner of ways, either as they are absolutely in themselves, or else as they are relatively to us: and as they are absolutely in themselves, that so there never was any entity really distinct from the substance produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or destroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifications altered. Which accidents and modifications are no entities really distinct from their substance; for as much as the same body may be put into several shapes and figures, and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel and walk, without the production of any new entities really distinct from the substance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the production or destruction of any substantial forms, or real entities distinct from the substance, but only in different modifications of it. But secondly, as bodies are considered relatively to us, so besides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are also different fancies, seemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them; which unwary and unskillful philosophers mistake for absolute forms and qualities in bodies themselves. And thus they concluded, that all the phenomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly resolved into these two things; partly something that is real and absolute.
absolute in bodies themselves, which is nothing but their different mechanism, or disposition of parts in respect of figure, size and motion; and partly something that is fantastical in the sentient.

That the atomical physiology did emerge after this manner from that principle of reason, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the testimony of Aristotle, writing thus concerning it: "Ex tō γίνεσθαι εἰς ἄλλους τάκτικα ἐνυπόχερα ἀφρόν εἰ γὰρ πάν τὸ γίνόμενον ἀνάλογ γίνεσθαι ἐν ὁλω ἡ ἐν μη ὦν τότε δὲ τὸ μείζον, ἐν μῆ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδιάκολον, περὶ γὰρ τούτων οργονομοιοῦν τὰς ἀκολουθίαις ὑπερ φύσεως τὸ λειτουρ ἐν συμβασίαν ἐν ἀνάλογο ἐνόμισεν ἐν ὁλω μὲν καὶ ἐνπαρθένον γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ συμπέραντα τὴν ὅλων ἐν ἀναθέτεις ἡμῖν. The ancient physiologists concluded, that because contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were before (one way or other) inexistent; arguing in this manner, that if whatsoever be made, must needs be made out of something or out of nothing, and this latter (that any thing should be made out of nothing) is impossible, according to the general consent of all the ancient physiologists; then it follows of necessity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and inexistent, though by reason of the smallness of their bulks they were insensible to us. Where Aristotle plainly intimates, that all the ancient philosophers, whosoever insisted upon this principle, that, nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one way or other atomical, and did resolve all corporeal things into ὅλων τινάς διὰ τὴν συμπέραντα ἀναθέτεις ἡμῖν, certain molecule or corpuscula, which by reason of their smallness were insensible to us, that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between these Atomists, forasmuch as Anaxagoras was such an Atomist, as did notwithstanding hold forms and qualities really distinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it seems) well to understand that other atomical physiologic of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, solved all corporeal phenomena by mechanism and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of theirs, which they went upon, must needs be true, that nothing could of itself come from nothing nor go to nothing, fram'd a new kind of atomology of his own, in supposing the whole corporeal world or mass of matter to consist of similar atoms, that is, such as were originally endued with all those different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, some bony, some fleshy, some fiery, some watery, some white, some black, some bitter, some sweet and the like, so that all bodies whatsoever had some of all sorts of these atoms (which are in a manner infinite) specifically differing from one another in them. * πῶς εἰ παντὶ μερισμένα, διότι πῶς εἰ παντὸς γίνεται, Φαίνεται δὲ διαφέρειν, καὶ προσάραξείται ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον τῆς ὑπερέχουσας διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἰ τῇ μίζῃ τῶν ἀπειρῶν, &c. That all things were in every thing mingled together, because they saw, that every thing was made of every thing; but that things seemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from those atoms, which are most predominant in the mixture, by reason of their multiplicity: Whence he concluded, that all the

2 Ibid.
generations, corruptions and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and secretions of inexistant and pre-existent atoms of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account Aristotle gives of the Anaxagorean hypothesis; ἐις Ἀναξαγόρας κύτταρον ἀτέρικλα καὶ τὰ ἁρμάζοντα, τὴν κοινὴν δ’ ἐν τῷ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐκείνων αὐλήσι, ὡς ἐφ γραμμάτων οὐδέσιν ἐκ τοῦ μόνον οὐδέσιν. Anaxagoras seems therefore to make infinite atoms endowed with several forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, because be supposed that common opinion of physiologers to be true, that nothing is made of nothing. But all the other antient physiologers that were before Anaxagoras, and likewise those after him, who inflicting upon the fame principle of nothing coming from nothing did not Anaxagerize, as Empedocles, Democritus and Protagoras, must needs make δυνατά ἀτομάτα, dissimilar molecular, and ἄτομα ἀτομία, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwife than by magnitude, figure and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and cahsiering forms and qualities (as real entities distinct from the matter) resolve all corporeal phænomena into mechanism and fancy. Because, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of these two things is abolutely neceffary, that either these corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities distinct from the matter, should exist before generations and after corruptions, in certain infensible atoms originally such, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine; or else, that they should not be real entities distinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine atonomical physiology did spring originally from this principle of reason, that no real entity does of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing.

XXIX. Now we shall in the next place shouw, how this very fame principle of reason, which induced the ancients to reject substantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to physiologize atomically, led them also unavoidably to affer incorporeal substances; and that the souls of men and animals were such, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued against substantial forms and qualities, as we have shewed, in this manner, that since the forms and qualities of bodies are supposed by all to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing and destroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real entities distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications of it in respect of figure, site and motion, causing different sensations in us; and were all to be refolved into mechanism and fancy. For as for that conceit of Anaxagoras, of pre and poft-existant atoms, ended with all those several forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly; it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine atomical philosophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few followed him. And now they argue contrariwise for the souls of men and animals, in this manner; because they are plainly real entities distinct from the substance of matter and its modification, and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, appetite and will ever
ever result from magnitudes, figures, signs and motions, that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of bodies are. *Αλλοτρίως γίνεται μόνος προϊστάμενος. It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing. Now there is nothing of soul and mind, reason and understanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechanism of bodies; and therefore to make soul and mind to rise out of body whatsoever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impossible. I say, because the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary course of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities distinct from the substance of body and its various modifications: but because soul and mind is plainly a real entity distinct from the substance of body, its modification and mechanism; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but such as had a being of its own, a substantial thing by its self. Real entities and substances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore these ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the souls of men and animals and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and consequently betwixt their several productions: forasmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired distinct from the substance of the thing it self, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of stone, or of timber, of blood, flesh and bone, and such other natural bodies generated, is no more a distinct substance or entity from the matter, than the form of an house, stool or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turn’d into vapour, candle into flame, flame into smoke, grass into milk, blood and bones, there is no more miraculous production of something out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linen; when a rude and unpolish’d stone is hewn into a beautiful statue; when brick, timber and mortar, that lay together before disorderly, is brought into the form of a stately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of these, but only a different disposition and modification of pre-existent matter. Which matter of the universe is always substantially the same, and neither more nor less, but only Proteanly transformed into different shapes. Thus we see, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the substance being really the same both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, besides the new disposition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is also the acquisition and conjunction of another real entity or substance distinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but must needs come into it some other way. Though there be no substantial difference between a stately house or palace standing, and all the materials of the same ruined and demolished, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet between a living man and a dead carcase, there is besides the accidental modification of the body, another substantial
Principle with Atomism.

Substantial difference, there being a substantial soul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now defverted of. And it is very observable, that Anaxagoras himself, who made bony and fleshy atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he supposed to exist before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the same, (that so nothing might come from nothing and go to nothing) yet he did not make any animalish atoms sensitive and rational. The reason whereof could not be, because he did not think sense and understanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but because they could not be supposed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but must needs belong to another substance that was incorporeal. And therefore Anaxagoras could not but acknowledge, that all souls and lives did pre and poft-exist by themselves, as well as those corporeal forms and qualities, in his familiar atoms.

XXX. And now it is already manifest, that from the same principle of reason before-mentioned, that nothing of itself can come from nothing nor go to nothing, the ancient philosophers were induced likewise to assert the soul's immortality, together with its incorporeity or distinctness from the body. No substantial entity ever vanisheth of itself into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the soul is a substantial entity, really distinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and therefore when a man dies, his soul must still remain and continue to have a being somewhere else in the universe. All the changes that are in nature, are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the same substance, or else they are conjunctions and separations, or anagrammatical transpositions of things in the universe; the substance of the whole remaining always entirely the same. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a house, stool, or table, and the unmaking or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the same substance, or else divers mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewise nothing but

\[\mu\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\varepsilon\ \delta\iota\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\varsigma\iota\epsilon\ \tau\varepsilon\ \mu\eta\upsilon\rho\varepsilon\iota\upsilon\nu\varsigma,\]

The conjunction of souls together with such particular bodies, and the separation of them again from one another, and so as it were the anagrammatical transposition of them in the universe. That soul and life, that is now fled and gone from a lifeless carcase, is only a loss to that particular body or compages of matter, which by means thereof is now disanimated; but it is no loss to the whole, it being but transposed in the universe, and lodged somewhere else.

XXXI. It is also further evident, that this same principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanency after death,

\[\text{Vide Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. I. cap. II. p. 5. Tom. II. & Metaphysic. Lib. I. c. III. Tom. IV. p. 266.}\]
Immortality of Souls asserted

Book I.

death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προϊτάχυτος, or pre-existence, and consequently its μετενεμάτωσις, or transmigration. For that, which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet Timæus Lacrus¹, and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beauteous transformation, that is made of mens souls by vice. Aristotle tells us again², agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα Φασίων διαλέγονταί τι παλαιόν τὸν μνεῶν γνώσις τι προϊτάχυτος, that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more, than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent; and therefore they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul’s immortality, namely its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul’s future permanency after death, who did not likewise affect its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And therefore the assertors of the soul’s immortality commonly begun here; first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in Plato³, ήν πτ ημαν ἡ ψυχή πρὶν ἀναφέροντα τῷ πλωτῷ, ὑπὲρ γινώσκων, ὃς ἁγιατὴ ἐκεῖνον τι ψυχής ἡ συνήγαγον. Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form, and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death. And the chief demonstration of the soul’s pre-existence to the ancients before Plato was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made in μονίων ἤσπασχος τι προϊτάχυτος, from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing; all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cognition in magnitude, figure, size, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature inherently and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the totum or compositum of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of these two parts, the soul and body. But the soul itself, according to these principles,

¹ De Anima Mundi & Naturæ, inter Scriptores Mythologici, a Tho. Gale editores, p. 566.
³ In Phaedrus, p. 382.
principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the substance of their body, which is suppos’d by all to have been from the first creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or lost after death, but only scattered and dispersed in the universe. Thus the ancient Atomists concluded, that souls and lives being substantial entities by themselves, were all of them as old as any other substance in the universe, and as the whole mass of matter, and every smallest atom of it is; that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did consequently assert also *aeternitatem animorum* (as Cicero calls it) the eternity of souls and minds. But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coeivy of all souls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of fenfeless matter and particle of dust had such a privilege and preeminency over the souls of men and animals, as to be the senior to them. Synesius, though a Christian, yet having been educated in this philosophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a bishoprick to flifle or difcumble this sentivment of his mind!*; ὑπομενει τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ ἀξιώματος ὑπερτερείην νοµίζειν. I shall never be persuaded to think my soul to be younger than my body. But such, it seems, was the temper of tho’se times, that he was not only diffenced withal as to this, but also as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the resurrection.

XXXII. It is already plain also, that this doctrine of the ancient Atomists concerning the immateriality and immortality, the præ and post-existence of souls, was not confined by them to human souls only, but extended universally to all souls and lives whatsoever; it being a thing, that was hardly ever called into doubt or question by any before Cartesius, whether the souls of brutes had any fenfe, cogitation or consciousness in them or no. Now all life, fenfe and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really distinct from the substance of body, and not the mere modification, motion or mechanism of it; life and mechanism being two distinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they resolved, that all lives and souls whatsoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the first beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always been, nor any of those, which now are, destroyed, any more than the substance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole system of the created universe, consisting of body, and particular incorporeal substances or souls, in the successive generations and corruptions or deaths of men and other animals, was, according to them, really nothing else, but one and the same thing perpetually anagrammatized, or but like many different syllables and words variously and successively compos’d out of the same pre-existent elements or letters.

XXXIII. We have now declared, how the same principle of reason, which made the ancient physiologers to become Atomists, muft needs induce them also

* Epiftol. CV. p. 249. Oper.
also to be Incorporealists; how the same thing, which persuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities distinct from the substance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, convinced them likewise, that all cogitative beings, all souls and lives whatsoever, were in-generable and incorruptible, and as well pre-existent before the generations of particular animals, as post-existent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to show more particularly, that it was de facto thus; that the fame persons did from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing and go to nothing) both atomize in their physiology, taking away all substantial forms and qualities, and also theologize or incorpo-realize, asserting souls to be a substance really distinct from matter and immortal, as also to pre-existent. And this we shall do from Empedocles, and first from that passage of his cited before in part:

"Allo de to iap, Fwos 1de ictw ictw iwa ictw
Thwv, ede tis elamyn texavtio genibh, (al. lef. teleyt)
'Allo qeGon ute te phauatex te muvtoy
'Es-1, Fwos ictw ictw tois xonuqeloi aubepoioi,

Which I find Latin'd thus;

Ab alio dico; nihil est mortalibus ortus,
Est nihil interitus, qui rebus morte paratur;
Misio fed solum est, & conciliatio rerum
Misilium; hoc dico solita est mortalibus ortus.

The full sense whereof is plainly this, that there is no Fwos; or production of any thing, which was not before; no new substance made, which did not really pre-exist: and therefore that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really distinct from the substance produced and destroyed, but only a various composition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the souls are substances really distinct from the matter, that there, there is nothing but the conjunction and separation of souls and particular bodies, existing both before and after, not the production of any new soul into being, which was not before, nor the absolute death and destruction of any into nothing. Which is further expressed in these following verses:

\[ ^1 \text{Nastos, } \\
\quad \text{v } \gamma \chi \delta \rho \mu \delta \alpha \lambda \chi \phi \rho \omega \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \mu \varepsilon \mu \mu \mu \mu,\\n\quad \text{O } \delta \varepsilon \gamma \iota \nu \varepsilon \text{ } \pi \alpha \chi \theta \text{ in } \varepsilon \iota \\varepsilon \iota \lambda \iota \iota \iota,\\n\quad \text{O } \iota \text{ } \kappa \lambda \alpha \nu \sigma \kappa \iota \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \iota \text{ } \\]

To

\[ ^2 \text{Apud Plutarch. adver. Colotem, P.IV.} \]
\[ ^3 \text{Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113.} \]
\[ \text{Tom. II. Oper. } & \text{ex parte apud Ariflor. Tom. II. Oper.} \]
\[ \text{de Generatione } & \text{Corruptione, Lib.I. c.I.} \]
\[ \text{p. 698. Tom. I. Oper.} \]
To this sense; that they are infants in understanding, and short-sighted, who
think any thing to be made, which was nothing before, or any thing to die,
so as to be destroyed to nothing. Upon which Plutarch glosses after this
manner: Ὅσος δόρα μέν τε βιώει, τό δὲ βιώσειν καλέως,
Τόφρα μέν ἐν εἰσὶ, κε σφι ωάρα διναὶ κε ἰδιαλα,
Ποίον δὲ παγίνετε βροτοί κε λυθμένες ὡδὲν ὅς εἰσὶ.

That good and ill did first us here attend,
And not from time before, the soul descend;
That here alone we live, and when
Hence we depart, we forthwith then
Turn to our old non-entity again;
Certes ought not to be believ'd by wise and learned men.

Wherefore, according to Empedocles, this is to be accounted one of the
vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and are capable of good
and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both
before they are born, and after they are dead, they are perfectly nothing.

And besides Empedocles, the same is represented by the Greek tragedian
also*, as the sense of the ancient philosophers;

That nothing dies or utterly perisheth; but things being variously concreted
and secreted, transposed and modified, change their form and shape only, and
are put into a new dress.

G
Agreeably

* Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113.  a Euripid. in Chrysippo apud Clement.
Agreeably whercunto, Plato also tells us 1, that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, τῷ ζῷῳ ἐκ τῶν τευτεύων γεγονέναι, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἡ τῆς τευτεύωσι ἐκ τῶν ζῴων: that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living; and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul’s ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies to a body more thin and subtil, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more crafis and terrestrial. 2 τίς οἶδεν εἰ τῷ ζῷῳ μὲν ἐστὶν καθαρών, τῷ καθαρών ἀνεῖ τίνι. who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying, and that which is called dying, living?

Moreover, that this was the doctrine of Pythagoras himself, that no real entity perishes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and transpositions made; is fully expressed by the Latin poet 3, both as to inanimate, and to animate things. Of the first thus;

Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mibi crede) mundo,
Sed variat, faciemque novat: nasciique vocatur
Incipere esse aliud, quàm quod fuit ante; morisque
Definere illud idem. Cum fœn buc forfitan illa,
Hec translata illuc: sümma tamen omnia constant.

Of the second, that the souls of animals are immortal, did pre-exist and do transmigrate, from the same ground, after this manner;

Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat & illine,
Huc venit, hinc illuc, & quotlibet occupat artus
Spiritus, éque feris humana in corpora tranfit,
Inque feras noftri, nec tempore deperit ullo.
Uique novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
Nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat eadem,
Sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam fœc semper eandem
Efse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

Wherefore though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late, yet we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that all those ancient

1 In Phaedo, p. 581.
2 This passage of Euripides is cited by many of the ancients, as Plato, Cicero, Clement Alex. and Sextus Empiricus. See the Notes of Dr. Potter, now Archbp. of Canterbury, on Clem. Alexand. Stromat. Lib. III. cap. III. p. 57.
ancient philosophers, who insisted so much upon this principle, *ἐὰν ἴδῃ πρά-κτος ἐσθ γὰρ θέματι τῶν ἡμώ νον: that no real entity is either generated or corrupted,* did therein at once drive at these two things: first, the establishing of the immortality of all souls, their præ and post-existence, forasmuch as being entities really distinct from the body they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and secondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities distinct from the body and the mechanism thereof, because they are things generated and corrupted, and have no præ and post-existence. Anaxagoras, in this latter, being the only dissenter; who supposing those forms and qualities to be real entities likewise, distinct from the substance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them also, præ and post-existence, in similar atoms, as well as to the souls of animals.

And now we have made it sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of souls, we might add also, of their pre-existence and transmigration, had the same original and stood upon the same basis with the atomical physiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the same philosophers and Pythagoreans asserted both those doctrines, and that the ancient Atomists were both Theists and Incorporealists.

XXXIV. But now to declare our sense freely concerning this philosophy of the ancients, which seems to be so prodigiously paradoxical, in respect of that pre-existence and transmigration of souls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally, or of itself, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly conclusive against substantial forms and qualities of bodies, really distinct from their substance, but also for substantial incorporeal souls, and their ingenerability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or post-existence of all human souls. For since it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and substance really distinct from it, we have no more reason to think, that they can ever of themselves vanish into nothing, than that the substance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do so. For that in the consumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the destruction of any real substance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot less idiotical to suppose, that the rational soul in death is utterly extinguished.

Moreover, we add also, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewise for the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, as it is for their post-existence and future immortality; did we not (as indeed we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations. For they being unquestionably a distinct substance from the body, and no substance, according to the ordinary course of nature, coming out of nothing, they must of necessity either

*G 2 pre-*
pre-exist in the universe before generations, and transmigrate into their respective bodies; or else come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at first created all that substance that now is in the world besides himself. Now the latter of these was a thing, which those ancient philosophers would by no means admit of; they judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of souls out of nothing. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find, that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive divine creation of souls; namely, that God did not do all at first, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigour at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a spectator only of the consequent results, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the least interposition of his at any time, just as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be, and indeed often hath been, the effect of such an hypothesis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might also, for other good and wise ends unknown to us, refer to himself the continual exercise of this his creative power, in the successive production of new souls. And yet these souls nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into being, will, notwithstanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into nothing, as the substance of fenfelefs matter, that was created many thousand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypothesis of the new creation of souls, as it is rational in itself, so it doth sufficiently solve their incorporeity, their future immortality, or post-eternity, without introducing those offensive absurdities of their pre-existence and transmigration.

XXXV. But if there be any such, who, rather than they would allow a future immortality or post-existence to all souls, and therefore to those of brutes, which consequent must have their successive transmigrations, would conclude the souls of all brutes, as likewise the sensitive soul in man, to be corporeal, and only allow the rational soul to be distinct from matter; to these we have only thus much to say, that they, who will attribute life, sense, cogitation, conscientious and self-enjoyment, not without some footsteps of reason many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, as most probably they do not intend any such thing. For either all conscient and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or else nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow also, that there is no Deity distinct from the corporeal world. But though there seem to be no very great reason, why it should be thought absurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the souls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of dust that is in the whole world; yet we shall endeavour to suggest something towards the easing the minds of those, who are so much burdened with this difficulty; viz. that they may, if they please, suppose the souls of brutes,
brutes, being but so many particular eradiations or effluxes from that source of life above, whencesoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a sense and fruition of themselves in it, so long as it continues such; but as soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their indigestion, become incapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be refumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth from it self by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.

And I find, that there have not wanted some among the gentle philosophers themselves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof Porphyry is one: λοιπον εις την θελημα νυμφηνει τον ἄνθρωπον τον πάντως, every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole.

XXXVI. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or poft-education of human souls. For if we be indeed Theists, and do in very good earnest believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we must then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatsoever owes the continuation and perpetuity of its existence, not to any necessity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the divine will only. And therefore, though we had never so much rational and philosophical assurance, that our souls are immaterial substances, distinct from the body, yet we could not, for all that, have any absolute certainty of their poft-eternity, any otherwise than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the divine nature and will, which does always that which is best. For the essential goodness and wisdom of the Deity is the only stability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reason, why that grace or favour of future immortality and poft-eternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will, (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment) that so they may be objects for divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions may notwithstanding be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

XXXVII. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagorick and Empedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being famulative always to brutish, and many times to
to unlawful lufts and undue conjunctions; but especially than the continual decreation and annihilation of the souls of brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that indeed of the two this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes. For besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal sense, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the rational soul, the incorporeity of any substance, and by consequence, the existence of any Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that senseless matter may as well become sensitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of light and heat, may be kindled into fire and flame; this seems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies in men otherwise learned and ingenious; the best naturalists having already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but such a motion of the insensible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times dissipated and scattered from each other, begetting in the mean time those fancies of light and heat in animals. Now there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the insensible particles of a body, which were before quiescent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really distinct from the substance of body, as life, sense and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechanism, and fancy of it. And therefore it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheists and Corporealists of former times have been always so fond of, that souls are nothing but fiery or flammable bodies. For though heat in the bodies of animals be a necessary instrument for soul and life to act by in them, yet it is a thing really distinct from life; and a red-hot iron hath not therefore any nearer approximation to life than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguished snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which indeed are no more the same, than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

XXXVIII.
XXXVIII. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to shew from the origin of the atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whosoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. First therefore, the atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion and rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; since they are neither contained in those things before mentioned, nor can result from any ἐναγμα, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it must needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another substance distinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, since according to the tenor of this physiology, body hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion, as such, is essentially heterokinetic, that which never springs originally from the thing itself moving, but always from the action of some other agent upon it; that is, since no body could ever move itself, it follows undeniably, that there must be something else in the world besides body, or else there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we shall speak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philosophy, the corporeal phenomena themselves cannot be solved by mechanism alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore must needs be a mode of some other kind of being in ourselves, that is cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philosophy, that sense it self is not a mere corporeal passion from bodies without, in that it supposeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to those fantastick ideas that we have of sensible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, and the like, which therefore must needs owe their being to some activity of the soul it self; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Lastly, from this philosophy, it is also manifest, that sense is not the ἐστίν of truth concerning bodies themselves, it confidently pronouncing, that those supposed qualities of bodies, represented such by sense, are merely fantastical things; from whence it plainly follows, that there is something in us superior to sense, which judges of it, detects its fanciftry, and condemns its imposture, and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which must needs be a higher self-active vigour of the mind, that will plainly speak it to be incorporeal.
XXXIX. And now this atomical physiology of the ancients seems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; since mechanism is a thing that we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive any thing in bodies else. To say that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing else but to say, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more absurd, to make our very ignorance of the cause, disguised under those terms of forms and qualities, to be it self the cause of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, &c. formally considered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital passions in us, occasioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly understood as absolute qualities in the bodies themselves, really distinct from their mechanical dispositions; nor is there indeed any more reason, why they should be thought such, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded with a sword, the pain which he feels should be thought to be an absolute quality in the pin or sword. So long as our sensible ideas are taken either for substantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really distinct from the substance of the matter, so long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cause Timæus Locrus¹ philosophizing (as it feemeth) after this manner, did contentaneously thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwise than αἰσθήσεις ἐγκαθάρισμος, by sense and a kind of spurious or baffardly reason; that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our understanding. And for the same reason Plato² himself distinguishes betwixt such things as are νοστίς μετὰ λόγον περιληπτικά comprehensible by the understanding with reason, and those which are only ὤημεν μετὰ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγαν, which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational sense; meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and sensible things. And accordingly the Platonists frequently take occasion from hence, to enlarge themselves much in the disparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reason of that smallness of entity that is in them, below the understanding, and not having so much ὁμοίως as γένεσις³, essence as generation, which indeed is fine fancy. Wherefore we must either, with these philosophers, make sensible things to be ἀναλητικὰ or ἀπεριλεπτικὰ, altogether incomprehensible and inconceivable by our human understandings, (though they be able in the mean time clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature;) or else we must entertain some kind of favourable opinion concerning that which is the ancientest of all physiologies, the atomical or mechanical, which alone renders sensible things intelligible.

XL. The second advantage, which this atomical physiology seems to have, is this, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of

² Vide Theaetetum, p. 139. f. Oper. So-
³ Plato de Republicâ, ubi supra.
of incorporeal substances, by settling a distinct notion of body. He, that will undertake to prove, that there is something else in the world besides body, must first determine what body is, for otherwise he will go about to prove, that there is something besides he knows not what. But now if all body be made to consist of two substantial principles, whereof one is matter devoid of all form, (and therefore of quantity as well as qualities) from whence these philosophers themselves conclude, that it is incorporeal; the other, form, which being devoid of all matter, must needs be incorporeal likewise. (And thus Strato sets down the joint doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle; οὐ πρὸ τοῦ τῆς ὀλίγης αἰσχρότευτον αἰσχρότατον, ὡς γὰρ τῆς Plotin. ἔλω τὴν εἰδος κατείσηκόν, ἂν σώμα ὑμνει, δέν γὰρ οἷον τῆς συνάχω, προὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄν. p. 164. μικρὸν ἀπόστασιν. That in the same manner, as form alone separated from matter is incorporeal, so neither is matter alone, the form being separated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both these, matter and form together, to make up the substance of the body.) Moreover, if to forms qualities be likewise superadded, of which it is confenstantly also resolved by the Platonists, ὅτι οἱ πρῶτοι ἀπὸ ἀπόκρατος, that qualities are incorporeal, as if they were so many spiritspossessing bodies; I say, in this way of philosophizing, the notions of body and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are so confounded, that it is impossible to prove anything at all concerning them; body itself being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal;) for whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, must needs be itself also incorporeal.

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms and qualities in body, life and understanding may be supposed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the souls of men may be nothing else but blood or brains, endowed with the qualities of sense and understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive and rational matter, in us. And the like may be said of God himself also; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, subtle and fiery body, pervading the whole universe; or else that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one substance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the best of those ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other substance besides body.

But the ancient atomical philosophy, settling a distinct notion of body, that it is διάστατον ἀναλείφων, a thing impenetrably extended, which hath nothing belonging to it, but magnitude, figure, site, reft, and motion, without any self-moving power, takes away all confusion; shews clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal substance begins; as also that there must of necessity be such a thing in the world.

Again, this discovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from mens mistaking their own fancies for absolute realities in bodies themselves;

themelves; but also that the doctrine of matter and form sprung from another fallacy or deception of the mind, in taking logical notions, and our modes of conceiving, for modes of being, and real entities in things without us; it shewing likewise, that because there is nothing else clearly intelligible in body, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and their various conjunctions, there can be no such entities of forms and qualities really distinct from the substance of body; makes it evident, that life, cogitation and understanding can be no corporeal things, but must needs be the attributes of another kind of substance distinct from body.

XLI. We have now clearly proved these two things; first, that the physiology of the ancients, before, not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Democritus and Leucippus, was atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconsistency between the atomical physiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognition; so the ancient Atomists before Democritus were neither Atheists nor Corporealists, but held the incorporeity and immortality of souls, together with a Deity distinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore the first and most ancient Atomists did not make ἀτόμους δέχεσται τῶν ἄλοχων, they never endeavoured to make up an entire philosophy out of atomology; but the doctrine of atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philosophick system, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal substance and theology, to make it up complete: accordingly as Aristotle hath declared in his Metaphysics, that the ancient philosophy consisted of these two parts, Φυσικὴ and Θεολογία or Ἑ λεύσιν Φιλοσοφία, physiology, and theology or Metaphysics. Our ancient Atomists never went about, as the blundering Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere passive bulk, and sluggish matter, without any ἀέριον διάρρηξαν, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; understanding well, that thus they could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal substance. And yet if local motion could have been supposed to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead lump and mass of matter, no body knows how, and without dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitously; these ancient Atomists would still have thought it impossible for the corporeal world itself to be made up, such as now it is, by fortitous mechanism, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greatest impudence or madness, for men to asserit, that animals also consisted of mere mechanism; or, that life and sense, reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local motion, and consequently, that themselves were but machines and automata. Wherefore they joined both active and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechanism and life, atomology and pneumatology; and from both these united, they made up one entire system of philosophy, correspondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God is the head) together with the atomical and mechanical
XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philosophy came to be mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the anatomical physiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the atomical or mechanical physiology. The former of these were Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, who took only the dead carcas or skeleton of the old Mofchical philosophy, namely the anatomical physiology; the latter, Plato and Aristotle, who took indeed the better part, the soul, spirit, and quintessence of it, the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, but unbodied, and divested of its moft proper and convenient vehicle, the anatomical physiology, whereby it became expos'd to sundry inconveniencies.

XLIII. We begin with Leucippus and Democritus; who being atheistically inclined, quickly perceived, that they could not in the ordinary way of physiologizing sufficiently secure themselves against a Deity, nor effectually urge Atheifm upon others; forasmuch as Heraclitus and other philosophers, who held that all substance was body, as well as themselves, did notwithstanding affect a corporeal Deity, maintaining, that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or else that he was ὁ ἄρχων ἄληθεν ἡμέρα, a certain kind of body or matter, as (for example) a methodical and rational fire, pervading (as a soul) the whole universe; the particular souls of men and animals being but, as it were, so many pieces, cut and sliced out of the great mundane soul: so that, according to them, the whole corporeal universe, or mafs of body, was one way or other a God, a mol't wife and understanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itself in the best manner possible, and providently govern the fame. Wherefore those Athiefts now apprehending, upon what ticklish and uncertain terms their atheistical philosophy then stood, and how that those very forms and qualities, and the self-moving power of body, which were commonly made a sanctuary for atheifm, might notwithstanding chance to prove, contrariwise, the latibulum and asylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, affaulting mens minds with doubtful fears and jealousies; understanding moreover, that there was another kind of physiology set on foot, which banishing those forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, size, and motion, without any self-moving power; they seemed presently to apprehend some great advantage to themselves and cause from it; and therefore greedily entertained this anatomical or mechanical physiology, and violently cutting it off from that other part, the doctrine of incorporeals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavoured to serve their turns of it. And now joining these two things together, the anatomical physiology, which supposes that there is nothing in body, but magnitude, figure, size and motion, and that prejudice or prepossession of their own minds, that there was no other substance in the world besides body; be-
between them both they begat a certain mungrel and spurious philosophy, atheistical-atomical, or atomically-atheistical.

But though we have so well proved, that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the atomical philosophy; yet if any will notwithstanding obstinately contend, that the first invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their atheism seeming to lead them naturally to this, to strip and divest body of all those forms and qualities, it being otherwise impossible for them, surely and safely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet so, as that the wit of these Atheists was also much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on of those principles in such a manner, as to make up an entire system of philosophy out of them, all whose parts should be so coherent and consistent together: we shall only say thus much; that if those Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unsuccessful in it, whilst endeavouring by it to secure themselves from the possibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unawares laid a foundation for the clear demonstration of an incorporeal one, and were indeed so far from making up any such coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced every where to contradict their own principles. So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole atheistical system; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irresistibly against all endeavours to oppose it; and how desperate the cause of atheism is, when that very atomical hypothesis of theirs, which they would erect and build up for a strong castle to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual engine against themselves, for the battering of all their atheistical structure down about their ears.

XLIV. Plato’s mutilation and interpolation of the old Moschical philosophy was a great deal more excusable, when he took the theology and metaphysics of it, the whole doctrine of incorporeals, and abandoned the atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly because those forementioned Atheists having so much abused that philosophy, adopting it as it were to themselves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealousy and suspicion of it; and partly, because he was not of himself so inclined to physiology as theology, to the study of corporeal as of divine things; which some think to be the reason, why he did not attend to the Pythagorick system of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was such, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material causes. To which may be added, that the way of physiologizing by matter, forms and qualities, is a more hasty and fanciful thing than the other; and lastly, that the atomical physiology is more remote from sense and vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so easily understood. For which cause many learned Greeks of later times, though they had read Epicurus his works, and perhaps Democritus his too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and sensible phenomena could possibly be solved without real qualities; one in-
Chap. I. by Plato and Aristotle.

Finance whereof might be given in Plutarch, writing against Colotes the Epicurean. Wherefore Plato, that was a zealous afferter of an incorporeal Deity, distinct from the world, and of immortal souls, seriously physiologized only by matter, forms and qualities, generation, corruption and alteration; and he did but play and toy sometimes a little with atoms and mechanism; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the atomical physiology, is plain from these words of his; 

\[ \text{τὸν ἐν δεῖ ταῦτα διακοινώνειν σφαιρὰ ἐστο, \ ως καθ' ἐν ἑκατόν ἕκαστόν ἐκ καθάπησεν ὑπὸ πολλά, τῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ὄργανον.} \]

All these cubical and pyramidal corpuscula of the fire and earth are in themselves so small, that by reason of their parvitude none of them can be perceived singly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.

XLV. And Aristotle here trod in Plato's footsteps, not only in the better part, in affering an incorporeal Deity, and an immovable first mover; but also in physiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms, which had been so generally received amongst the ancients. Wherefore though the genius of these two persons was very different, and Aristotle often contradiceth Plato, and really diffents from him in several particularities; yet, so much I think may be granted to those reconcilers, (Porphyry, Simplicius, and others) that the main essentials of their two philosophies are the same.

Now, I say, the whole Aristotelical system of philosophy is infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been so much disparaged, and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritical hypothesis doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phenomena, yet in all those other things, which are of far the greatest moment, it is rather a madness than a philosophy. But the Aristotelical system is right and found here, as to those greater things; it affering incorporeal substance, a Deity distinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore though a late writer of politics do so exceedingly disparage Aristotle's Ethicks, yet we shall do him this right here to declare, that his Ethicks were truly such, and answered their title; but that new model of ethicks, which hath been obtruded upon the world with so much sanguinity, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritical doctrine revived, is no ethicks at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and subversion of all morality, by substituting something like it in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling; the design whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that Aristotle's system of philosophy seems to be more confident with piety, than the Cartesian hypothesis it self, which yet plainly supposeth incorporeal substance. For as much as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabric of the world, than the turning round of a vortex

\[ ^1 \text{In Timæ. p. 537, Oper.} \]
A Commendation of Aristotle's Philosophy, Book I.

vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, must proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and successive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wisdom. Whereas Aristotle's Nature is no fortuitous principle, but such as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing pursues the best; and therefore can be no other than a subordinate instrument of the divine wisdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.

However, we cannot deny, but that Aristotle hath been taxed by sundry of the ancients, Christians and others, for not to explicitly asserting these two things, the immortality of human souls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his master Plato did. Though, to do him all the right we can, we shall observe here, that in his Nicomachian Ethicks, he speaks favourably for the latter; 

If God take any care of human things, as it seems he doth, then it is reasonable to think also, that he is delighted with that which is the best, and nearest akin to himself (which is mind or right reason) and that be rewards those who most love and honour it (as taking care of such things as are most pleasing to him) in doing rightly and honestly. A very good sentiment, were it not uttered in with too much of scepticism. And as for the point of the soul's immortality; it is true, that whereas other philosophers before Aristotle affected the pre-existence, incorporeity, and immortality of all souls, not only the rational, but the senfitive also, (which in men they concluded to be one and the same substance) according to that of Plato's πάντα ψυχή ανώνυμον, every soul is immortal, they resolving that no life nor cогitation could be corporeal; Aristotle, on the contrary, doth expressly deny the pre-existence, that is, the separability, incorporeity and immortality of all senfitive souls, not in brutes only, but also every where, giving his reason for it in these words; 

That all souls cannot pre-exist, is manifest from hence, because those principles, whose action is corporeal, cannot possibly exist without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impossible, that these senfitive souls (pre-existing) should come into the body from without, since they can neither come alone by themselves naked and spirit of all body, they being inseparable from it; neither can they come in with a body, that is, the seed. This is Aristotle's argument, why all senfitive souls must needs be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet, nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time, he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, incorporeal, separable.

separable and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner¹: λείπον δὲ τὸν τῶν μόνων οὐρανίων ιπποτικόν, καὶ θάνατος ένιού μόνων: οἷον γὰρ αὐτῷ τῇ ιερευκίᾳ καί ταξιν τῇ σωματικῇ ιδιότητι. It remains, that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only divine; since its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it. Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere ² distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible; τὲτο μόνων ἀθάνατον οἷον ἀείον, οὐ τοιαύτως ώς θανάτως, the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible: where some interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend that by the passive intellect, is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had before affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed and inorganical, which they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this fallacy can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute amongst his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the divine intellect, and commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it must needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather because, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he somewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellect without corporeal substances. That, which led Aristotle to all this, positively to affirm the corporeity of sensitive souls, and to flag a so much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, seems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substance are confounded together, so that the limits of each could not be discerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud Aristotle for this; but that, which we commend him for, is chiefly these four things: first, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all; and secondly, for resolving, that nature, as an instrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the necessity of material motions, but for ends and purpouses, though unknown to itself; thirdly, for maintaining the naturality of morality; and lastly, for asserting the τὸ ιχνίον τοῦ θανάτου, auterously, or liberty from necessity.

¹ Ibid. ² De Animâ, Lib. III. cap. VI. p. 50. Tom. II. Oper.
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. II.

In this Chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the atheistical hypothesis. 1. That the Democritick philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, corporealism and atomism complicated together, is essentially atheistical. 2. Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical-Corporealist, pretended to assert a democracy of Gods, yet he was, for all that, an absolute Atheist: and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves. 3. That the Democritical philosophy is nothing else but a system of atheology, or atheism swaggering under the glorious appearance of philosophy. And though there be another form of atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritick atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed. 4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unallowed stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the divine assistance and direction ought to be implored. 5. That there are two things here to be performed: first, to shew what are the Atheists pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and secondly, how they endeavour either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of these grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing. 6. The second atheistical argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and therefore whatsoever substantially is, was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity. 7. The third pretended reason
reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other substance but body. 8. The Atheists pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprang from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudenty make the Deity to be but the chief of spirits, and an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all. 9. Their fifth argument; a conjunction of a corporeal Deity from the principles of corporealism itself, that matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident. 10. Their sixth ratiocination from a complication of atomicism; that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe is atoms or corpuscles devoid of all qualities, and consequently of sense and understanding, (which spring up afterwards from a certain composition of them) and therefore Mind or Deity was not the first original of all. 11. In the seventh place they disprove the world's animation, or its being govern'd by a living understanding animistic nature, precluding over the whole; because sense and understanding are a peculiar appendix to flesh, blood and brains, and reason is no where to be found but in human form. 12. The eighth atheistical ground, that God being taken by all for a moft happy, eternal and immortal animal, (or living being) there can be no such thing, because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the dissolution of their compages. And that life is no simple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which upon the dissolution of their parts vanisheth into nothing. 13. The ninth pretended atheistical demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, which was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move it self, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a God. 14. Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move it self, with an atheistical corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a first cause, no cogitation arising of it self without a cause; which may be reckoned a tenth argument. 15. Another mystery of atheism, that all knowledge, and men's conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a passion from them, and therefore the world must needs be before any knowledge, or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause. 16. The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill made, that they were not contrived for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that overflows all, shows that they did not proceed from any Deity. 17. The thirteenth instance of the Atheists against a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that in human affairs all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion. 18. The fourteenth atheistical ground, that it is not possible for any one being to animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once; but if it were possible,
ble, that such infinite negativity would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness. 19. Several bold but flight queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner? and what God did before? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade? and, how the architect of the world could rear up so huge a fabric? 20. The Atheists pretend, that it is the great interest of mankind, that there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heretical exploit of the Democrats, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and punishment after death, embittering all the pleasures of life.

21. Another pretence of theirs, that Theism is inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan; and that any other conscience allowed of besides the civil law (being private judgment) is, ipso facto, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. 22. The Atheistic conclusion from the former premises, as set down in Plato and Lucretius, that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any Mind or God, that is, proceeded from the necessity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms devoid of life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, by their fortuitous encounters and entanglements, produced the system of the whole universe, and as well animate as inanimate things.

I. Having in the former chapter given an account of the genuine and primitive atomical philosophy, which may be called the Moschical; we are in the next place to consider the Democratic, that is, the atheized and adulterated atomology; which had its origin from nothing else but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictory principle to the atomical physiology, that there is no other substance in the world besides body. Now we say, that that philosophy, which is thus compounded and made up of these two things, atomicism and corporealism complicated together, is essentially atheistical, though neither of them alone be such. For the atomical physiology, as we have declared already, is in its own nature sufficiently repugnant to atheism. And it is possible for one, who holds, that there is nothing in the world besides body, to be persuaded notwithstanding of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at first framed and is still governed by an understanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus some of these Corporealisists have fancied the whole universe itself to be a God: that is, an understanding and wise animal, that ordered all things within it self, after the best manner possible, and providently governed the same. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great immensity of mind, that such persons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other substance besides body, by which is understood that, which is impenetrably extended, or else, in Plato’s language, which hath ψυχολογίας ἐκτεινόντα, that thrives against other bodies and resists their impulse: or, as others express it, which is τὰς παραθαλάσσας, that so fills up place, as to exclude any other body or substance from coexisting with it therein; and such must needs have not only very imperfect, but also spurious and false conceptions of the Deity, so long as they apprehend it to be thus corporal; but yet it does not therefore follow, that they must needs be accounted Atheists. But whosoever holds these two principles
principles (before mentioned) together, that there is no other substance besides body, and that body hath nothing else belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site and motion, without qualities: I say, whosoever is that confused thing of an Atomist and Corporealist jumbled together, he is essentially and unavoidably that, which is meant by an Atheist, though he should in words never so much disclaim it, because he must needs fetch the original of all things from senseless matter; whereas to assert a God is to maintain, that all things sprung originally from a knowing and understanding nature.

II. Epicurus, who was one of those mongrel things before mentioned, (an Atomical-Corporealist or Corporeal-Atomist) did notwithstanding profess to hold a multifarious rabble and democracy of Gods, such as though they were ἀθρωπῶμοι ¹, of human form, yet were so thin and subtle, as that comparatively with our terrestrial bodies they might be called incorporeal; they having not so much carnem as quasi-carnem, nor sanguinem as quasi-sanguinem, a certain kind of aerial or ethereal flesh and blood: which gods of his were not to be supposed to exist any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them;

* Illud item non est, ut possit credere sedes
   Effe Deum sanetus, in mundi partibus ullis.

And therefore they must be imagined to subsist in certain intermundane spaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciousness whereof is thus elegantly described by the poet;

³ Quas neque concutiant venti, neque nubila nimbis
   Adspersunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina
   Cana cadens violat, semperque immutus Æther
   Integit, et largè diffuso lumine ridet.

Whereunto was added, that the chief happiness of these gods consisted in omnium vacatiae numorum, in freedom from all business and employment, and doing nothing at all, that so they might live a soft and delicate life. And lastly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worshipped by us for their own excellent nature’s sake, and happy state.

But whosoever had the least sagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of Epicurus was but romantical, it being directly contrary to his avowed and professed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was concreted, of atoms, and consequently corruptible; and that he did this upon a politicall account, thereby to decline the common odium, and those dangers and inconveniences, which otherwise he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpose it accordingly served his turn. Thus Posidonius ⁴ rightly pronounced, Nullos

⁴ Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 147.
⁵ Id. Lib. III. ver. 19.
Chapter I.

An Absolute Atheist.

Thus deos Epicuro videri; quaque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ detestanda gratiâ dixisse. Though he was partly jocular in it also, it making no small sport to him, in this manner, to delude and mock the credulous vulgar; Deos jocandi causâ induxit Epicurus per lucidos & perflabiles, & habitantes tanquam inter duos lucos, sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinaram. However, if Epicurus had been never so much in earnest in all this, yet, by Gassendus his leave, we should pronounce him to have been not a jot the less an Atheist, so long as he maintained, that the whole world was made 

muñunos dixatântων & dixatânto τι πασοι μακρομεθα ἧξονω μείξ αὐθασίως, without the ordering and direction of any understanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal; and fetched the original of all things in the universe, even of soul and mind, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπροότον καὶ τυχαίων ἧξονων τῷ χίμων, from senseless atoms fortuitously moved. He, together with Democritus, hereby making the world to be, in the worst sense ὅπο τῆς πετρᾶς, an egg of the night, that is, not the off-spring of mind and understanding, but of dark senseless matter, of Bohus and Bohus, or confused chaos; and deriving all the original of the perfections in the universe from the most imperfect being, and the lowest of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheistical. And as for those romantick monogrannous Gods of Epicurus, had they been seriously believed by him, they could have been nothing else but a certain kind of aerial and spectrous men, living by themselves, no body knows where, without the world; ἔπικρος ὡς μείν πρὸς τὸς πολλὰς ἀπολείπον θεῶν ὡς ἐκ πρὸς τὸν Φθούν πραγμάτων ὡς ὡς Epicurus, according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God; but, according to the nature of things, none at all.

And as Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their vizards and disguises; atheism for the most part prudently chusing to walk abroad in masquerade. And though some over-credulous perfons have been so far imposed upon hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any such thing as an Atheist any where in the world, yet they, that are sagacious, may easily look through these thin veils and disguises, and perceive these Atheists oftentimes infinuating their atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves Theists, by affirming, that it is impossible to have any idea or conception at all of God; and that as he is not finite, so he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or understanding is to be attributed to him; which is in effect to say, that there is no such thing. But whatsoever entertaineth the Democritick principles, that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never so much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictitious to those principles.

III. Wherefore this mongrel philosophy, which Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras, were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by Epicurus, that makes (as Laertius writes) ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἅλων ἀτόμων, senseless atoms to be the first principles, not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted...
mitted before by Empedocles and other Atomists that were Theists) but also of all things whatsoever in the whole universe, and therefore of soul and mind too; this, I say, was really nothing else but a philosophical form of atheology, a gigantical and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by solving all the phenomena of the world without a God, but also by laying down such principles, from whence it must needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was atheism openly swaggering under the glorious appearance of wisdom and philosophy.

There is indeed another form of atheism, which (insisting on the vulgar way of philosophizing by forms and qualities) we for distinction sake shall call Stratonical; such as, being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would therefore allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plafick power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle’s nature, but that it hath no dependance at all upon any higher Mind or Deity. And these Atheists may be also called hylozoick (as the other atomick) because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of atheism seems to be but an unhapen embryo of some dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digested into an entire system, nor could be brought into any such tolerable form, as to have the confidence to shew it self abroad in full and open view. But the Democritick and Atomick atheism, as it is the boldest and rankest of all atheists, it not only undertaking to solve all phenomena by matter fortuitously moved, without a God, but also to demonstrate, that there cannot be so much as a corporeal Deity; so it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent system, hath publicly appeared upon the stage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deserve our consideration.

And now we shall exhibit a full view and prospect of it, and discover all its dark mysteries and profundities; we being much of this persuasion, that a plain and naked representation of them will be a great part of a confutation at least: not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monster, big-sown with a puffy shew of wisdom, strut and stalk so gigantically, and march with such a kind of flately philosophick grandeur, yet it is indeed but like the giant Orgoglio in our English poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an Empufa, phantasm, or spectre, the off-spring of night and darkness, non-fenie and contradiction.

And yet for all that, we shall not wrong it the least in our representation, but give it all possible advantages of strength and plausibility, that so the Atheists may have no cause to pretend (as they are wont to do, in such cases) that either we did not understand their mysteries, nor apprehend the full strength of their cause, or else did purposely smother and conceal it. Which
CHAP. II. First, that there is no Idea of God.

Which indeed we have been so far from, that we must confess we were not altogether unwilling this business of theirs should look a little like something, that might deserve a censure. And whether the Atheists ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them, we shall leave it to the censure of impartial judgments.

IV. Plato tells us, that even amongst those Pagans in his time there was generally such a religious humour, that πάντες ὀποιακαὶ σωφρονίστες μείξακεν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὅρμῃ καὶ συμμετείχαν μεγάλα πράγματα, Θεὸν αἰών τε ἑπικαλοῦν: Whosoever had but the least of seriousness and sobriety in them, wheresoever they took in hand any enterprise, whether great or small, they would always invoke the Deity for assistance and direction. Adding moreover, that himself should be very faulty, if in his Timeus, when he was to treat about so grand a point, concerning the whole world, εἰ γένοιτο ὅτι ἄγνοια; οὐ, whether it were made or unmade, he should not make his entrance thereinto by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be less than a piece of impiety in a Christian, being to treat concerning the Deity itself, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists out of their dark corners, in order to a censure, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his existence, not to implore his direction and assistance. And I know no reafon, but that we may well do it in that same litany of Plato's, καὶ ὅσθ' ἐν ἑνώ σωφρόνα, ἐπικαλόμενοι εἰ νῦν εἰπίπτον, that we may first speak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then conscientiously with our selves.

V. Now there are these two things here to be performed by us, firft to discover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reafon, insisted on by the Atheists to disprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the inefficaciously and falsehood of them: and secondly, to shew how they endeavour either to confute or solve, consistently with their own principles, all those phænomena, which are commonly urg'd against them to prove a Deity and incorporeal substance; manifesting likewise the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reafon alluded for the atheistical hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. Firft, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flourish'd and descanted upon in this manner. That notion or conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehensible, uncomprehensible, and impossibles; it being only a complement of all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and complect, which the confounded fear and altnomishment of men's minds made them huddle up together, without any senfe or philofophic truth. This ceems to be intimated by a modern writer in these words; The attributes of God signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient premises to infer truth, or convince falhood. And the fame thing again is further fect out, with no small pre-
The Atheists Argument against Creation, Book I.

tence to wit, after this manner: They that venture to dispute philosophically, or reason of God’s nature, from those attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak lets fall his hat, and with one disorder after another discovers his astonishment and rusticity. The meaning of which, and other like passages of the same writer, seems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature is supposed to be expressed) having no philosophick truth or reality in them, had their only original from a certain rustick astonishment of mind, proceeding from excess of fear, railing up the phantasm of a Deity, as a bug-bear for an object to itself, and affrighting men into all manner of confounded non-sense, and absurdity of expressions concerning it, such as have no signification, nor any conception of the mind answering to them. This is the first argument, used especially by our modern Democriticks, against a Deity, that because they can have no phantastick idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehensible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much insifted on by the old Democritick Atheists, is directed against the divine omnipotence and creative power, after this manner: By God is always understood a creator of something or other out of nothing. For however the Theists be here divided amongst themselves, some of them believing, that there was once nothing at all existing in this whole space, which is now occupied by the world, besides the Deity, and that he was then a solitary being, so that the sub stance of the whole corporeal universe had a temporary beginning, and novity of existence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for so many years only. Others persuading themselves, that though the matter and substance at least, (if not the form also) of the corporeal world, did exist from eternity, yet nevertheless, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the same manner as light, though coeval with the sun, yet proceeded from the sun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made a-new by it; wherefore, according to this hypothesis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themselves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Lastly, others of those Theists resolving, that the matter of the corporeal universe was not only from eternity, but also self-existent and uncreated, or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the souls of all Animals in the successive generations of them, (being taken for entities distinct from the matter) were created by the Deity out of nothing. We say, though there be such difference among the Theists themselves,
yet they all agree in this, that God is, in some sense or other, the creator of some real entity out of nothing, or the cause of that which otherwise would not have been of itself, so that no creation out of nothing, (in that enlarged sense) no Deity. Now it is utterly impossible, that any substance or real entity should be created out of nothing (it being contradictory to that indubitable axiom of reason, de nihilo nihil, from nothing nothing. The argument is thus urged by Lucretius, according to the minds of Epicurus and Democritus:

It is true indeed, that it seems to be chiefly level'd by the poet against that third and last sort of Theists before mentioned, such as Heraclitus and the Stoicks, (which latter were contemporary with Epicurus) who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of itself uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the successive generations of them (as entities distinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument must needs be stronger against those other Theists, who would have the very substance and matter itself of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not so much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceiv'd as entities really distinct from the matter,) much less the lives and souls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the substance and matter itself. But all substance and real entity, whatsoever is in the world, must needs have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions of atoms, without the creation of any real distinct entity out of nothing; so that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of Epicurus, θεός πρὸς τῶν μαθημάτων προσαράβω, no divine power ought to be called in for the solving of those phenomena. To conclude therefore, if no substance, nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all whatsoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity self-existent; then creative power, but especially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to say, there can be no Deity.

* Lib. i. ver. 150, &c.
VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher sort of Theists, who will have God to be the creator of the whole corporeal universe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be itself body; wherefore this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely so as to penetrate bodies and co-exist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer any thing.

* Num facere & fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.

Wherefore to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space, or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space or place; and therefore to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

* Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debet id ipsum Augmine vel grandi vel parvo——
  Cui si talius erit, quamvis levis exiguisque,
  Corporum augebit numerum summanique sequetur:
  Sin intatilis erit, nulla de parte quod ullum
  Rem prohibere quest per se transeire meantem,
  Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum quod inane vocamus.

Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity and measurability in it; which if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the whole mass; but if it be intangible, so that it cannot reft the passage of anything through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum. There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing;

* Præter

* Id. Lib. I. verf. 454, &c.
Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democriticks argued; there being nothing incorporeal but space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But because this seems to give advantage to the Theists, in making space something, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it must needs be either it self a substance, or else a mode of some incorporeal substance; the modern Democriticks are here more cautious, and make space to be no nature really existing without us, but only the fantasm of a body, and as it were the ghost of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and space, which must needs infer two distinct substances, one whereof must be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The conquence of which will be this, that an incorporeal substance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.

VIII. But because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted, without discovering το αἰτίον τῆς γένεσεως, the cause of the mistake; therefore the Atheists will in the next place undertake to shew likewise the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also take occasion from thence, further to disprove a Deity.

Wherefore they say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances (whereby the essences of singular bodies, as of a man or an horse, being abstracted from those bodies themselves, are consider’d univerfally;) as also of accidents, when they are consider’d alone without their subjects or substances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been necessitated to, in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing of them; which could not be done, so long as they are taken concretely together with their subjects. But yet, as there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them has been also very great; forasmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, since the essence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its substance, yet men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them to be realities existing by themselves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from scholasticks, who have been so intemperate in the use of these words, that they could not make a rational discourse of any thing, though never so small, but they must stuff it with their quiddities, entities, essences, haecceities and the like. Wherefore these are they, who being first deluded themselves, have also deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men,
that the essence of every thing is something without that thing it self, and also eternal; and therefore when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal essence cloathed (as it were) with a new garment of existence: as also that the mere accidents of bodies may exist alone by themselves without their substances. As for example, that the life, sense and understanding of animals, commonly call'd by the names of soul and mind, may exist without the bodies or substances of them by themselves, after the animals are dead; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal substances, as it were the separate and abstract essences of men. This hath been observed by a modern writer in these words; *Ejī hominum abstractorum tum in omni vita, tum in philosophia, magnus & usus & abusus. Abusus in eo consistit, quod cum videant aliqui, considerari possit, id est, inferri in rationes, accidentium incrementa & decrementa, fine consideratione corporum, &c. subiectorum fitur, (id quod appellatur abstrabere) loquentur de accidentibus, tanquam poiffent ab omni corpore separari: binc enim originem habuit quorundam Metaphysicorum auctori in errores. Nam ex eo, quod considerari potest cogitatio, sine consideratione corporis, inferre solent non esse opus corporis cogitantis. It is a great abuse, that some Metaphysicians make of these abstract names, because cogitation can be considered alone without the consideration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a substance by itself. And the same writer elsewhere observes, that it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk, separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their superstitious belief of ghosts, spirits, daemons, devils, fairies and hob-goblins, invisible powers and agents, called by several names, and that by those persons, whose work it ought to be rather to free men from such superstition. Which belief at first had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely from mens mistaking their own fancies for things really existing without them. For as in the sense of vision, men are commonly deceived, in supposing the image behind the glass to be a real thing existing without themselves, whereas it is indeed nothing but their own fancy; in like manner when the minds of men strongly posses'd with fear, especially in the dark, raise up the fantasms of spectres, bug-bears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really existing without them, and call them ghofts and spirits, whilst they are indeed nothing but their own fancies; so the fantain or fancy of a Deity (which is indeed the chief of all spectres) created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpose a modern writer, *From the fear, that proceeds from the ignorance it self, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to suppose and feign to themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of an unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies, their Gods. Which though it be prudently spoken in the plural number, that so it might be diverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet he is very simple, that does not perceive the reason of it to be the same concerning
Chap. II.  Incorporeal and Corporeal Deity.

cerning that one Deity, which is now commonly worshipped; and that therefore this also is but the creature of men's fear and fancy, the chief of all fantastick ghosts and spectres, as it were an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we say) was the first original of that vulgar belief of invisible powers, ghosts, and gods; men taking their own fancies for things really existing without them. And as for the matter and substance of these ghosts, they could not by their own natural cogitation fall into any other conceit, but that it was the fame with that, which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth, or in a looking-glass to one that is awake, thin aerial bodies, which may appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion, that such spirits were incorporeal and immaterial could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabused by doctrine; but it sprung up from those deceiving and deceived literati, scholasticks, philosophers, and theologers enchanting men's understandings, and making them believe, that the abstract notions of accidents and essences could exist alone by themselves, without the bodies, as certain separate and incorporeal substances.

To conclude therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cause of all things is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghost of the world, to be a reality; and to suppose the mere abstract notion of an accident, and a separate essence, to be not only an absoleute thing by itself, and a real substance incorporeal, but also the first original of all substances, and of whatsoever is in the universe. And this may be reckon'd for a fourth atheiftick ground.

IX. Fifthly, the Atheists pretend further to prove, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; as also from the principles of corporealism it self to evince, that there can be no corporeal Deity, after this manner. No man can devise any other notion of substance, than that it is a thing extended, existing without the mind, not imaginary but real and solid magnitude; for whatsoever is not extended, is nowhere and nothing. So that res extensa is the only substance, the solid basis and substratum of all. Now this is the very self-same thing with body; for substantia, or substance, seems to be a necessary consequence and result from extension, and they that think otherwise, can show no reason, why bodies, may not also penetrate one another, as some Corporealists think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only substance of all things. And whatsoever else is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing but several accidents and modifications of this extended substance, body or matter. Which accidents, though they may be sometimes call'd by the names of real qualities, and forms, and though there be different apprehensions concerning them amongst philosophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are these two properties belonging to them; first, that none of them can subsist alone by themselves, without extended substance or matter, as the basis and support of them; and secondly, that they may be all destroyed without the destruction of any substance. Now as blackness and whiteness, heat and cold, so likewise life, sense and understanding, are such accidents, modifications or qualities of body, that can neither exist by themselves, and may be destroyed without the
Atheists contend that the First Principle

Book I.

destruction of any substance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be difunited and separated from one another, or the organical disposition of the matter altered, these accidents, forms or qualities, of life and understanding, will presently vanish away to nothing, all the substance of the matter still remaining one where or other in the universe entire, and nothing of it left. Wherefore the substance of matter and body, as distinguished from the accidents, is the only thing in the world, that is uncorruptible and undestroyable. And of this it is to be understood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, (i. e.) that every entire thing, that is made or generated, must be made of some pre-existent matter; which matter was from eternity self-existent and unmade, and is also undestroyable, and can never be reduced to nothing. It is not to be understood of the accidents themselves, that are all makeable and destroyable, generable and corruptible. Whate'er is in the world is but ὢν ἐν τῷ ἐξενσῷ, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them, not necessarily determin'd to this or that accident) is the only ἀγέννητον ἢ ἀνυήλθον, the only necessarily existent. The conclusion therefore is, that no animal, no living understanding body, can be absolutely and essentially incorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and therefore there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, essentially undestroyable.

Though the Stoicks imagined the whole corporeal universe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal God of theirs was only by accident incorruptible and immortal; because they supposed, that there was no other matter, which existing without this world, and making inroads upon it, could difunite the parts of it, or disorder its compages. Which if there were, the life and understanding of this Stoical God, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like cases, must needs vanish into nothing. Thus from the principles of corporealism itself, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal deity, because the Deity is supposed to be ἀγέννητον ἢ ἀνυήλθον, a thing that was never made, and is essentially undestroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but senseless matter.

X. In the next place, the Atheists undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal God of the Stoicks and others, from the principles of the atomical philosophy, in this manner. All corporeal Theists, who asser't, that an understanding nature or mind, residing in the matter of the whole universe, was the first original of the mundane system, and did intellectually frame it, betray no small ignorance of philosophy and the nature of body, in supposing real qualities, besides magnitude, figure, site and motion, as simple and primitive things, to belong to it; and that there was such a quality or faculty of understanding in the matter of the whole universe, coeternal with the same, that was an original thing uncompounded and undervived from any thing else. Now to suppose such original qualities and powers, which are really distinct from the substance of extended matter and its modifications, of divisibility, figure, site and motion, is really to suppose so many distinct substances, which therefore must needs be incorporeal.
CHAPTER II. *Is no Understanding Nature.*

corporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the universe, original and underiv’d from any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. *Epicurus* suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake, concerning qualities, to this purpose: *Non sic cogitande sunt qualitates, quois sint quaedam per se existentes nature seu substantiae; sicutem id mente asservi non licet; sed sollemn modo ut varii modi se habendi corporis considerando sunt.*

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, figure, motion or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, causing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their first matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it) because it receives all qualities, to be itself void of all quality; so we conclude, that atoms (which are really the first principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not absolutely of themselves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arising up afterwards from the various aggregations and contexts of them, together with different motions. Which *Lucretius* confirms by this reason, agreeable to the tenour of the atomical philosophy, that if there were any such real qualities in the first principles, then in the various corruptions of nature things would at last be reduced to nothing:

1. *Immutabile enim quiddam superare necessit eft,*
   *Né res ad nibilum redigantur funditus omnes;*
   *Proinde colore cave contingas feminas rerum,*
   *Né tibi res redeant ad nihilum funditius omnes.*

Wherefore he concludes, that it must not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles:

2. *Né ex albis albaeare ris:*
   *Principiis esse,*
   *Aut ea que migrant, nigro de semine nata:*
   *Neve alium quemvis, que sunt induta, colore;*
   *Propertè gerere hunc credas, quod materiae*
   *Corpora confimili sunt eis tincta colore;*
   *Nullus enim color est omnino materiae*
   *Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique dispar.*

Adding, that the same is to be resolved likewise concerning all other sensible qualities as well as colours.

3. *Sed nè fortè putes solo spoliata colore*
   *Corpora prima manère; etiam secreta teporis*
   *Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis:*

1 Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 750, 751, 754. 2 Id. Lib. II. ver. 750, &c. 3 Id. Lib. II. ver. 841, &c.
Lastly, he tells us in like manner, that the same is to be understood also concerning life, sense and understanding; that there are no such simple qualities or natures in the first principles, out of which animals are compounded, but that these are in themselves altogether devoid of life, sense and understanding:

1 Nunc ea, que sentire videmus curaque, necesse est
Ex insensilibus tamen omnia confiure
Principiis confiure: neque id manifesta refutant,
Sed magis ipsa manu ducent, & credere cogunt,
Ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
Quipe videre licet, vivos exifiere vermes
Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum fibi natato est
Intempestivis ex imbibus humida tellus.

All sensitive and rational animals are made of irrational and senseless principles, which is proved by experience, in that we see worms are made out of putrified dung, moistened with immoderate showers.

Some indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than our selves, will needs have that sense and understanding, that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and understanding in the matter. But this cannot be, because if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then every atom of matter must needs be a distinct perciipient, animal, and intelligent person by itself; and it would be impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, because every man would be variarum animalulorum acervus, a heap of innumerable animals and percipients.

Wherefore as all the other qualities of bodies, so likewise life, sense, and understanding arise from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all those qualities, or from the composition of those simple elements of magnitudes, figures, sites and motions, in the same manner as from a few letters variously compounded, all that infinite variety of syllables and words is made;

2 Quin etiam referunt nosris in versibus ipsis
Cum quibus & quali posturâ contineantur;
Namque eadem aculum, mare, terras, flamina, solem
Significant, eadem, fruges, arbusla, animantes;
Sic ipsis in rebus item jarn materiae
Intervalla, via, connexus, pondera, plaga;
Concurritis, motus, ordo, postura, figurers,
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.
CHAP. II. *Atheists oppose the World's Animation.*

From the fortuitous concretions of senseless unknowning atoms did rise up afterwards, in certain parts of the world called animals, soul, and mind, sense and understanding, counsel and wisdom. But to think, that there was any animalish nature before all these animals, or that there was an antecedent mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, by which all animals themselves, together with the whole world, were made and contrived, is either to run round in a senseless circle, making animals and animality to be before one another infinitely; or else to suppose an impossible beginning of an original understanding quality in the matter. Atoms in their first coalitions together, when the world was a making, were not then directed by any previous counsel or preventive understanding, which were things as yet unborn and unmade,

1 Nam certè neque confilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quaque atque sagaci mente locáruit,
Nec quos quaque darent motus, pevipere profénd.

Mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom did not lay the foundations of the universe; they are no archical things, that is, they have not the nature of a principle in them; they are not simple, original, primitive and primordial, but as all other qualities of bodies, secondary, compounded and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and understanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The sense of this whole argument is briefly this; The first principle of all things in the whole universe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and consequently of all life, sense and understanding; and therefore the original of things is no understanding nature, or deity.

XI. Seventhly, The Democritick Atheists argue further after this manner: They who assert a Deity, suppose ἐπὶ πρώτων ἔκτισι τὰ ὑπόσωμα, the whole world to be animated, that is, to have a living, rational and understanding nature presiding over it. Now it is already evident from some of the premised arguments, that the world cannot be animated, in the sense of Platonists, that is, with an incorporeal soul, which is in order of nature before body, being proved already, that there can be no substance incorporeal; as likewise that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical sense, so as to have an original quality of understanding or mind in the matter; but yet nevertheless some may possibly imagine, that as in our selves and other animals, though compounded of senseless atoms, there is a soul and mind, resulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleasure; so there may be likewise such a living soul and mind, not only in the stars, which many have supposed to be lesser deities, and in the sun, which has been reputed a principal deity; but also in the whole mundane system, made up of earth, seas, air, ether, sun, moon, and stars all together; one general soul and mind, which though resulting at first from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced, may
may rule, govern and sway the whole, understandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our souls do our bodies; and so long as it continues, exercise a principality and dominion over it. Which although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the strict sense of Theists, yet it will approach very near unto it, and endanger the bringing in of all the same inconveniences along with it. Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no such soul or mind as this, (resulting from the contexture of atoms) that presides over the corporeal universe, that so there may not be so much as the shadow of a Deity left.

It was observed before, that life, sense, reason and understanding are but qualities of concreted bodies, like those other qualities of heat, and cold, &c. arising from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as those first principles of bodies, namely single atoms, have none of those qualities in them, so neither hath the whole universe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opake, it containing all those qualities in its several parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, sense, nor understanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and sense are qualities, that arise only from such a texture of atoms as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries and the like;

\begin{align*}
\text{Sensus jungitur omnis} \\
\text{Viferibus, nervis, venis, quaeque videmus,} \\
\text{Mollia mortali consfère corpore creta;}
\end{align*}

And reason and understanding, properly so called, are peculiar appendices to human shape; \textit{Ratio nusquam effe potest nisi in hominis figura.} From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, soul nor understanding acting the whole world, because the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animalish or human form. \textit{Qui mundum ipsum animantem faptientemque effe dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figurnam cadere posset.} Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no divine sense in the whole world;

\begin{align*}
\text{Dispositum videtur ubi effe & crescere possit} \\
\text{Serasim anima atque animus; tanto magis insciandum,} \\
\text{Totum poef extra corpus formamque animalem,} \\
\text{Putribus in glebis terrarum, aut folis in igni,} \\
\text{Aut in aqua durare, aut altis aetheris oris,} \\
\text{Haud igitur constans divino predita sensu,} \\
\text{Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter effe animata.}
\end{align*}

Now if there be no life nor understanding above us, nor round about us, not any where else in the world, but only in our selves and fellow animals, and we

\begin{itemize}
\item Id. Lib. II. ver. 903, &c.
\item Velleius apud Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. IX Oper.
\item Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 143, &c.
\end{itemize}
we be the highest of all beings; if neither the whole corporeal system be animated, nor those greater parts of it, sun, moon nor stars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritick Atheists dispute further against a Deity in this manner: the Deity is generally supposed to be \( \zeta \o\nu \mu \alpha \kappa \alpha \iota \mu \iota \nu \iota \varepsilon \omega \theta \alpha \varepsilon \zeta \), a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal. Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritick hypothesis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be these three: first of all, vacuum or empty space, which must needs be such, because it cannot suffer from anything since it is plagarum expers,

\[ \text{Et manet intaelum, nec ab iatu fungitur hilum.} \]

Secondly, the single atoms, because by reason of their parvitude and solidity they are indivisible; and lastly, the summa summarum of all things, that is the comprehension of all atoms dispersed every where throughout infinite space.

\[ \text{Quia nulla loci sat copia certum} \]

\[ \text{Quo quae res possint discedere dissoluique.} \]

But according to that other hypothesis of some modern Atomists (which also was entertained of old by Empedocles) that supposes a plenty, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the substance of matter it self. All systems and compages of it, all \( \sigma \nu \gamma \rho \iota \mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) and \( \delta \zeta \rho \alpha \omicron \omicron \mu \alpha \tau \eta \), all concretions and coag-mentions of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities resulting from them, are corruptible and destroyable: \( \text{que est coagmentatio rerum non dissolubilis?} \) Death destroys not the substance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was self- eternal, so none of it can ever vanish into nothing; but it dissolves all the aggregations of it.

\[ \text{Non sic interimit mors res, ut materiai} \]

\[ \text{Corpora conficiat, sed cetum dissupat ollis.} \]

Life is no substantial thing, nor any primitive or simple nature: it is only an accident or quality arising from the aggregation and contexture of atoms or corpufcula, which when the compages of them is disunited and dissolved, though all the substance still remain scattered and dispersed, yet the life utterly perishes and vanishes into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal soul; nor immortal animal, or Deity. Though this whole mundane system were it self an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore since no living being can possibly have

\[ \text{id. lib. V. verf. 358. Addas etiam} \]

\[ \text{Lib. III. verf. 814.} \]

\[ \text{Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. cap. VIII. p. 2891. Tom. IX. Oper.} \]

\[ \text{id. Lib. III. verf. 815.} \]

\[ \text{Lucret. Lib. II. verf. 1091.} \]
have any security of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheists, the Hedonicks and Cyrenaicks, \[\text{\textit{θαυμωνια ἀνυποθεν, perfect happiness is a mere motion,}}\] a romantick fiction, a thing which can have no existence any where. This is recorded to have been one of Democritus his chief arguments against a Deity, because there can be no living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. \[\text{\textit{Cum Democritus, quia nihil semper suo statu maneant, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne Deum ita tollit omnino, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?}}\]

XIII. A ninth pretended demonstration of theDemocritick Atheists is as followeth. By God is understood a first cause or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing else, but acting originally from itself, was the beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philosophers, that nothing can move it self, but quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur; whatsoever is moved, is moved by something else; nothing can act otherwise than it is made to act by something without it, acting upon it. The necessary consequence whereof is this, that there can be no such thing as any first mover, or first cause, that is, no God. This argument is thus urged by a modern writer, agreeably to the sense of the ancient Democriticks: \[\text{\textit{Ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum, non inferretur, id quod inferri soleat, nempe Eternum inmovebile, sed contrâ Eternum Motum, siquidem ut verum est, nihil moveri a seipso, ita etiam verum est nihil moveri nisi a moto. From hence, that nothing can move it self, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immovable mover (that is, a God) but only an eternal moved mover; or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any first mover. Because as it is true, that nothing can be moved from itself, so it is likewise true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was it self also moved by something else before: and to the progress upwards must needs be infinite, without any beginning or first mover. The plain drift and scope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to shew that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove a God, (that is, a first mover or cause) is not only ineffectual and inconclusive; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topick of motion, that there can be no absolutely first mover, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.}}\]

XIV. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body can move it self, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion; the Atheists will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoicks, that there can be no \textit{nuncius avitatus}, no motion without a cause, \textit{i.e.} no motion, which has not some cause without the

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Chap. II. Atheists make Knowledge junior to the World.

the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer, No-
thing taketh beginning from itself but from the action of some other immediate
agent without it. Wherefore no thinking being could be a first cause, any
more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further
argued, that these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being,
the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictory, because all know-
ledge essentially implies dependance upon something else, as its cause; scien-
tia & intellectus signum est potentiae ab alio dependentis, id quod non est beatissimum.
They conclude, that cogitation, and all action whatsoever, is really nothing
else but local motion, which is essentially heterokinesy, that which can never
rise of itself, but is caused by some other agent without its subject.

XV. In the eleventh place, the Democritck Atheists reason thus: If the
world were made by any antecedent mind or understanding, that is, by a
Deity; then there must needs be an idea, platform and exemplar of the
whole world before it was made; and consequently actual knowledge, both
in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the informa-
tion of the things themselves known; all conception of the mind is a passion
from the things conceived, and their activity upon it; and is therefore ju-
nior to them. Wherefore the world and things were before knowledge and
the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind or deity before the
world as its cause. This argument is thus proposed by the atheistick Poet;

1 Exemplum porro gignundis rebus & ipsa
   Notitias hominum Di vis unde initia primum,
   Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent?
   Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
   Quidnam inter se permutato ordine passent,
   Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

How could the supposed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame
the world by, and whence should it receive it? How could he have any know-
ledge of men before they were made, as also what himself should will to do, when
there was nothing? How could he understand the force and possibility of the
principles, what they would produce when variously combined together, before
nature and things themselves, by creating, had given a specimen?

XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritck and Epicurean Atheists
against a Deity is to this purpose: that things could not be made by a
Deity, that is supposed to be a being every way perfect, because they are so
faulty and so ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius

Quod si jam rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis celi rationibus autem
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Necquaquam nobis divinitus esse paratem
Naturam rerum, tantâ flet praedita culpâ.

This

1 Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 182. 2 Lib. II. ver. 177. & Lib. V. ver. 196.
Atheists contend that the World is ill-made. **Book I.**

This Argument, à cali rationibus, from astronomy, or the constitution of the heavens, is this: 1 that the mundane sphere is so framed, in respect of the disposition of the æquator and ecliptic, as renders the greatest part of the earth uninhabitable to man and most other animals; partly by that excess of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropicks) and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theists contemporary with Epicurus concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the sake of men,

\[ Horum omnia causâ \]

Constituisse Deum singunt

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by seas, lakes and rocks, barren heaths and sands, and thereby made useless for mankind; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unless expugned by obstinate labour; after all which, men are often disappointed of the fruits of those labours by unseasonable weather, storms and tempests. Again, that nature has not only produced many noxious and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men; and that the condition of mankind is so much inferior to that of brutes, that nature seems to have been but a step-mother to the former, whilst she hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpose, the manner of men coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet:

\[ Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis \]

Navita, nudus bumi jacet, infans, indigus omni

Vitaë auxilio, sim primium in luminis oras

Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit:

Vagitique locum lugubri complet, ut æquum est,

Quo tantum in vita reflet tranire malorum.

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges, which they have above men, are described after this manner:

\[ At varie crescent pecudes, armenta, fer.eque: \]

Nec crepitacula eis opus sunt nec quoquam adhibenda est

A'mæ nutriticis blandia atque infrastra loquela;

Nec varias querunt vestes pro tempore cali.

Denique non armis opus est, non manibus altis,

Quaes tua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia largè

Tellus ipsa parit, naturāque Dædala verum.

And lastly, the topick of evils in general, is insifted upon by them, not those which are called culpe, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democratick Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it) but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner. 5 The supposed Deity and maker of

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1 Vid. Lucret. Lib V. ver. 225, 226. &c.
   Cicer. in Somnio Scipionis cap. VI. p. 3981.
   Tom. XI. Oper.
2 Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 174, 175.
3 Id. Lib V. ver. 225.
4 Id. ibid.
CHAP. II. 
Atheists except against Providence.

of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was able but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

XVII. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tnd and Bobu, chaos and confusion; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheist cannot choose but make use of, though by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by the tumbling billows of careless fortune and chance. The impieties of Dionysus, his scoffing abuses of religion, and whatsoever was then sacred, or worship'd under the notion of a God, were most notorious; and yet it is observed, that he fared never a jot the worse for it. Hom nec Olympus' Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec AEsculapius misero diurnoque morbo tabescem interemit; verum in suo lectulo mortuos, in Lympodium rogum illatus est, eamque poestatem, quam ipse per seculos natus erat, quasi jussam & legitimam, bæreditatis loco tradidit: Neither did Jupiter Olympus strike him with a thunderbolt, nor AEsculapius inflict any languishing disease upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honourably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he transmitted, as a just and lawful inheritance, to his posterity. And Diogenes the Cynick, though much a Theist, could not but acknowledge, that Harpalus, a famous robber or pirate in those times, who committing many villainous actions, notwithstanding lived prosperously, did thereby Testimonium dicere contra deos, bear testimony against the Gods. Though it has been objected by the Theists, and thought to be a strong argument for providence, that there were so many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of such as having prayed to the gods in storms and tempests, had escaped shipwreck; yet as Diogoras observed, Nulgum piæi sunt, qui navis regium fecerunt, there are no tables extant of those of them, who were shipwreck'd. Wherefore it was not considered by these Theists, how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithstanding suffer shipwreck; as also how many of those, which never made any devotional addresses at all to any deity, escaped equal dangers of storms and tempests.

Moreover, it is confentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder rattling in the clouds with thunder-bolts should be the immediate significations

2 Id. ibid. cap. XXXIV. p. 3099.
3 Id. cap. XXXVIII. p. 3104.
significations of his wrath and displeasure: whereas it is plain, that these are flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent, whilst the notoriously guilty escape untouched; and therefore we understand not, how this can be answered by any Theists.

1 Cur, quibus incantum sceleus averseulde cumque est,
Non faciunt, inibi flammas ut fulguris balent,
Pestore perfixo; documen mortalibus acre?
Et potius nullae fibi turpis con sens rei,
Volvitur in flammas innocuos, inque peditur,
Turbine celesti subito correctus, & igni?

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful, because it hath not only staggered and confounded Theists in all ages, but also hath effectually transformed many of them into Atheists. For Diagoras Melius himself was once a superstitious religionist; in so much that being a Dithyrambic poet, he began one of his poems with these words, κατά διήμων ἐγὼ τὸν θεὸν τελείαι, all things are done by God and fortune. But being injured afterwards by a perjured perfon, that suffered no evil nor disafter thereupon, he therefore took up this contrary persuasion, that there was no Deity. And there have been innumerable others, who have been so far wrought upon by this consideration, as if not absolutely to disclaim and discard a Deity, yet utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any invisible powers. Amongst whom the poet was one, who thus expressed his sense:

5 Sed cum res hominum tantâ caligine volvi
Afpicerem, letôsque diu florere nocentes,
Vexariquepios, sursum labefatia cadebat
Religio, causaque viam non sponte sequebar
Alterius, vacuo quae currere semina motu
Affirmat, magnumque novas per inane figuram,
Fortunâ, non arte regi; quie numina senfu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel neceia nostri.

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists is to this purpose; that whereas the Deity is supposed to be such a being, as both knows all that is done every where in the most distant places of the world at once, and doth himself immediately order all things, this is, first, impossible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole univerfe:

4 Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderantur babenas?
Quis pariter calos omneis convertere? & omneis

Ignibus

1 Lucret Lib. VI. ver. 589, &c.
2 Vide Sext. Empir. Lib IX. adver. &c.
Mathemat. §. LIII. p. 561.
3 Claudian. in Rufinum Lib. I. ver. 12, &c.
4 Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 1094, &c.
And secondly, if it were supposed to be possible, yet such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconformit with a happy state; nor could such a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himself, being perpetually filled with tumult and huriourly: \textit{\'O \sigmaυμφοίνις πραγματεύεται καθ' Φρονίμες καθ' ἐνεργῖς μακαρείης, ἀλλ' ἀδέσφοις καθ' ἀφόης καθ' ἄερες καθ' ἄνεοις μακαρείης.} Dispassion of business and solicitous cares, displeasures and favours, do not at all agree with happiness, but they proceed from imbecility, indigency and fear: \textit{To μακαρίον καθ' ἀδέσφοις οὔτε αὐτο πράγματα ἐτέλευτα, οὔτε ἀλλ' παρέκκλητο, οὔτε ἀλλ' ὠργὰν οὔτε καθ' ἄνεοις συνιέται, ἐν ἄπνοια γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοῖτον.} That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have it self any business to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have displeasure nor favour towards any other person, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency. That is, favour and benevolence, as well as anger and displeasure, arise only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy, and wanteth nothing, \textit{ὅπως ὁ ἐξελεύ αὐτῷ συναχθή τῆς ἱδίας συναχίμωνας, being wholly possessed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happiness,} would be regardless of the concerns of any others; and mind nothing besides itself, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this \textit{curiosus et plenus negotii deus,} this busy, restless, and præftrivial deity, that must needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole world, is a contradictory notion, since it cannot but be the most unhappy of all things.

XIX. In the next place, the Atheists dispute further by propounding several bold quæries, which they conceive unanswerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him sooner? or since it was so long unmade, why did he make it at all? \textit{Cur mundi edificator repente extiterit, innumerabilia antè seacula dormierit?} How came this builder and architect of the world to start upon a sudden, after he had slept for infinite ages, and bethink himself of making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it sooner, or not at all; because there was either something wanting to his happiness, before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been so long unmade; but if he were completely happy in himself without it, then \textit{μὴ ἐνεργὸς καθ' ἀνευτέρως ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῦ πρᾶξιν, wanting nothing, he vainly went about to make superfluous things.} All desire of change and novelty argues a fastidious fatiety, proceeding from defect and indigency;

\textit{Quidve novi potuit tantò posst, anté quietos Inicere, ut expelement vitam mutare priorem?}
Did this Deity therefore light up the stars, as so many lamps or torches, in that vast abyss of infinite darkness, that himself might thereby have a more comfortable and cheerful habitation? Why would he then content himself from eternity, to dwell in such a melancholick, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

3. An, creo, in tenebris vitâ & morore jacelat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are distinguished, desirable to him? Why then would he continue solitary so long, wanting the feast of such a spectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himself might be worshipped and adored, feared and honoured by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was sufficiently happy alone in himself before? Or did he do it for the sake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

4. At quid immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra quot largier emolumenti,
Ut nostrâ quicquam causa gerere aggregiantur?

Again, if this were done for the sake of men, then it must be either for wise men or for fools: if for wise men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reason could there be, why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? Besides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us, (whether wise or foolish) never to have been made?

5. Quidve ali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
Natus enim debet quicumque ess, velle manere
In vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas:
Qui nuncum verâ vitæ gustavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, quid obest non esse creatum?

Lastly, 4 if this Deity must needs go about molinously to make a world, 芟e tēxer omy sê tēxam, like an artificer and carpenter, what tools and instruments could he have to work with? what minifiers and subervent officiers? what engines and machines for the rearing up of so huge a fabric? How could he make the matter to understand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, without:

1. I. ibid. ver. 155, 156.
2. I. ibid. ver. 166.
3. I. ibid. ver. 177, 366.
out fastening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the same thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the stones must hew themselves, and bring themselves together, with discretion, into a structure.

XX. In the last place, the Atheists argue from interest (which proves many times the most effectual of all arguments) against a Deity; endeavouring to persuade, that it is, first, the interest of private persons, and of all mankind in general, and secondly, the particular interest of civil sovereigns, and commonwealths, that there should neither be a God, nor the belief of any such thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. First, they say therefore, that it is the interest of mankind in general; because so long as men are persuaded, that there is an understanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will, (because he has no superiour) that may do whatever he pleases at any time to them, they can never securely enjoy themselves or any thing, nor be ever free from disquieting fear and solicitude. What the poets fable of Tantalus in hell, being always in fear, of a huge stone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon him, is nothing to that true fear, which men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which indeed was the very thing mythologized in it.

1 Nec miser impendens magnum timet aëre saxum
Tantalus, (ad fama est) caede formidine torpens:
Sed magis in vita, divinum metus urget inanis
Mortales, casamine timent, quemcumque ferat fors.

For besides mens insecurity from all manner of present evils, upon the supposition of a God, the immortality of souls can hardly be kept out, but it will crowd in after it; and then the fear of eternal punishments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the solaces of life, and never suffering men to have the least sincere enjoyment.

2[--]si certum fuenit esse viderent
Ærumnarum homines, aliquás ratione valerent
Religiosibus, atque minis obfistere vatum.
Nunc ratio nulla est refundi, nulla facultas:
Æternas quoniam paenas in morte timendum.
Ignoratur enim, que sit natura animæ,
Nata sit, an contrà nasci tibus insinuetur;
Et simul intereat nobis cum morte dirempta,
An tenebras Orci visat valetisque lacunas.

Wherefore it is plain, that they, who first introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deserved very ill of all mankind, because they did thereby infinitely debaue and deprive mens spirits under a fervile fear;

3 Efficiunt animos humiles, formidine divinæ
Depressosque premunt ad terram:

M 2

Atheists pretend that Theism is

As also cause the greatest griefs and calamities, that now disturb human life,

1. *Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantâque nobis
Volnera, quas lacrymæs peperereminibus nostris?*

There can be no comfortable and happy living, without banishing from our mind the belief of these two things, of a Deity, and the soul's immortality;

2. *Et metus ille forçs præceps Acheruntis agendus
Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Effæ voluptatem liquidam puramque reliquit.*

It was therefore a noble and heroical exploit of Democritus and Epicurus, those two good-natured men, who seeing the world thus oppressed under the grievous yoke of religion, the fear of a Deity, and punishment after death, and taking pity of this sad condition of mankind, did manfully encounter that affrightful specâtre, or empusa, of a providential Deity; and by clear philosophick reasons, chase it away, and banish it quite out of the world; laying down such principles, as would solve all the phænomena of nature without a God;

3. *Quæ bene cognita sì tenas, natura videtur
Libera continuò, dominis privata superbis,
Ipfa suâ per se sponte omnia dis agere expers.*

So that Lucretius does not without just cause erect a triumphal arch or monument to Epicurus, for this contest or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner;

4. *Humana ante oculos factè quam vita jaceret
In terris, oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput à colt regionibus offendebat,
Horribilis super aspectu mortalibus instans;
Primum Graius homo mortales tendere contrâ
Est oculos ausis, primísque obsçetere contrâ;
Quem nec fama detin nec fulmina, nec mimitant;
Murmure compressit calum, &c.*

XXI. That it is also the interest of civil sovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there should neither be Deity nor religion, the Democritick Atheists would persuade in this manner: A body politic or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally disassociated from one another, by reason of that principle of private self-love, who therefore can be no otherwise held together than by fear. Now if there be any greater fear than the fear of the Leviathan, and civil

1 Id. Lib. V. ver. 1195.
2 Id. Lib. III. ver. 37.
3 Id. Lib. II. ver. 1689.
4 Id. Lib. I. ver. 65.
civil representative, the whole structure and machine of this great coloss neft needs fall a-pieces, and tumble down. The civil sovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore unless his fear be the king and sovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceases. But as the rod of Moses devoured the rods of the magicians, so certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can punish with eternal torments after death, quite swallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil sovereigns, and consequently destroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore it is well observed by a modern writer, That men ought not to suffer themselves to be abused by the doctrine of separated essences and incorporeal substances, (such as God and the soul) built upon the vain philosophy of Aristotle, that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, (as of hell, damnation, fire and brimstone) as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked stick. And again, If the fear of spirits (the chief of which is the Deity) were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

Moreover, the power of civil sovereigns is perfectly indivisible; 'tis either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else 'tis none at all. Now it cannot be so, if there be any other power equal to it, to share with it, much less if there be any superior (as that of the Deity) to check it and control it. Wherefore the Deity must of necessity be removed and displaced, to make room for the Leviathan to spread himself in.

Lastly, 'tis perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic, that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictory to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, ipso facto, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. Upon all these accounts it must needs be acknowledged, that those philosophers, who undermine and weaken theism and religion, do highly deserve of all civil sovereigns and commonwealths.

XXII. Now from all the premised considerations, the Democriticks confidently conclude against a Deity; that the system and compages of the universe had not its original from any understanding nature; but that mind and understanding it self, as well as all things else in the world, sprung up from senseless nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, because whatsoever moves is moved by nature and necessity; and the mutual encounters and encounters of atoms, their plagues, their strokes and dashings against one another, their reflexions and repercussions, their cohesions, implexions and entanglements, as also their scattered disperions and divulsions, are all natural and
and necessary; but it is called also by the name of chance and fortune, because it is all unguided by any mind, counsel or design.

Wherefore infinite atoms of different sizes and figures, devoid of all life and sense, moving fortuitously from eternity in infinite space, and making successively several encounters, and consequently various implications and entanglements with one another, produced first a confused chaos of these omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindred and abated each other, came, as it were by joint conspiracy, to be conglomerated into a vortex or vortexes; whereafter many convolutions and evolutions, molitions and effays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented) they chanced, in length of time, here to settle, into this form and system of things, which now is, of earth, water, air and fire; sun, moon and stars; plants, animals and men; so that inefles atoms, fortuitously moved, and material chaos, were the first original of all things.

This account of the cosmopœdia, and first original of the mundane system, is represented by Lucretius¹ according to the mind of Epicurus, though without any mention of those vortices, which were yet an essential part of the old De-eritick hypothesis.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sed quibus ille modis conceitus materiai} \\
\text{Fundarit caelum, ac terram, pontique profunda,} \\
\text{Solis, lunae cursus, ex ordine ponam.} \\
\text{Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum} \\
\text{Ordine seque atque fagaci mente locarunt:} \\
\text{Nec, quos sequere darent motus, pepigere prosequi.} \\
\text{Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,} \\
\text{Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,} \\
\text{Ponderibusque suis confuerunt concita ferri,} \\
\text{Omn-modique coire, atque omnia pertentare,} \\
\text{Quaecumque inter se possunt congressa creare:} \\
\text{Propitiea fit, uti magnum volgata per aevum,} \\
\text{Omnigenos catus, & motus experimento,} \\
\text{Tandem ea conveniant, que ut convenere, repente} \\
\text{Magnarum rerum siant exordia sepe,} \\
\text{Terraæ, maris, & caeli, generisque animantium.}
\end{align*}
\]

But because some seem to think that Epicurus was the first founder and inventor of this doctrine, we shall here observe, that this same atheistic hypothesis was long before described by Plato, when Epicurus was as yet unborn; and therefore doubtless according to the doctrine of Leucippus, Democritus and Protagoras; though that Philosopher, in a kind of disdain (as it seems) refused to mention either of their names:²

\[^{1}\text{Lib. V. ver. 417, &c.}\]
\[^{2}\text{Plato de Legibus, Lib. X. p 666. Oper.}\]
Chap. II. All sprung from Nature and Chance.

...all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we said before, by nature and chance; art, and mind itself, rising up afterwards from the same senseless principles in animals.
THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. III.

An introduction to the confutation of the atheiftick grounds, in which is con-
tained a particular account of all the several forms of atheifm. 1. That the
grounds of the bylozoick atheifm could not be inftift on in the former chapter,
together with thofe of the atomick, they being directly contrary each to other;
with a further account of this bylozoick atheifm. 2. A fuggestion, by way
of caution, for the preventing of all miftakes, that every Hylozoift muft not
therefore be condemned for an Atheift, or a mere counterfeit baftrional
Theift. 3. That neverthelefs, fuch Hylozoifts as are also Corporealifts
can by no means be excufed from the imputation of atheifm, for two reafons.
4. That Strato Lampfacenus, commonly called Physicus, seems to have been
the firft affirter of the bylozoick atheifm, be holding no other God but the life of
nature in matter. 5. Further proved, that Strato was an Atheift, and
that of a different form from Democritus, be attributing an energetick na-
ture, but without fene and animality, to all matter. 6. That Strato not
deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritick
Atheifts did, nor yet acknowledging any one plafick nature to prefide over the
whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and
plafick nature both together in the several parts of matter, muft therefore
needs be an hylozoick Atheift. 7. That the famous Hippocrates was neither
an Hylozoick nor Democritick Atheift, but rather an Heraclitick corporeal
Theift. 8. That Plato took no notice of the bylozoick atheifm, nor of any
other
other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature, and therefore, either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian Atheism, which latter will be next declared. 9. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophick Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus, there being in all ages, as Plato observes, some or other sick of the atheistic disease. That Aristotle affirms many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible. 10. That the doctrine of these Materialists will be more fully understood from the exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them; his first exception, That they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably, 11. Aristotle's second exception, That these Materialists did assign no cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible. 12. Concluded, That Aristotle's Materialists were downright Atheists, both because they held all substance to be body, since Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and yet are not therefore accounted Atheists, (they supposing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal;) but because these made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle. 13. As also, because they supposing every thing besides the substance of matter, life and understanding, and all particular beings, to be generable, and corruptible, and consequently, that there could be no other God, than such as was native and mortal. That these ancient thelogers, who were Theogonists, and generated all the Gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Atheists, but real Atheists, senselss matter being to them the highest Numen. 14. The great difference observed between Aristotle's atheistical Materialists and the Italick philosophers, the former determining all things, besides the substance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both destroying qualities and forms of body, and afforting the incorruptibility and incorporeity of souls. 15. How Aristotle's atheistical Materialists endeavoured to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italick philosophers, That nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that Anaxagoras was the first amongst the Italicks, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to affect incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms in similar atoms, for so much as he conceived them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter. 16. The error of some writers, who because Aristotle affirms, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theists, and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally not as the Italick philosophers did generally make to have been made, or have had a beginning; as also some Theists did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought here to distinguish between the system of the world, and the substance of the matter, all Atheists affecting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being. 17. That Plato and others concluded this materialism, or hylomathian
Chap. III. Contents.

patbrian atheifm, to have been at leaft as old as Homer, who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this was indeed the ancient of all atheifms, which verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The description of this atheifick hypothesis in Aristophanes, That night and chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals and all the Gods. 18. That notwithstanding this, in Aristotle's judgment, Parmenides, Hesiod, and others, who made love in like manner, senior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheifts; they understanding this love to be an active principle, or cause of motion in the universe, which therefore could not rise from an egg of the night, nor be the off-spring of chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simmias Rhodius his Wings, a poem in honour of this heavenly love. This not that love, which was the off-spring of Penia and Porus in Plato. In what rectified sense it may pass for true theology, that love is the Supreme Deity and original of all things. 19. That though Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, that they assigned only a material cause of the universe; yet they were not the persons intended by him in the fore-cited accusation, but certain ancients or philosophers, who also were not Atheifts, but Hylarchians. 20. That Aristotle's atheifick Materialists were all the first Ionick philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being the head of them. But that Thales is acquitted from this imputation of atheifm by several good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently represented) and therefore that his next successor Anaximander is rather to be accounted the prince of this atheifick philosophy. 21. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which, at first sight, seems to make Anaximander a divine philosopher, and therefore both led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. That this place well considered proves the contrary, That Anaximander was the chief of the old atheifick philosophers. 22. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called senile's matter the to biv, or God, since to all Atheifts that must needs be the highest Numin, also how this is said to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiaists upon this place. 23. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, manifesting it to have been purely atheifical. 24. What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theifts and Atheifts; as also that learned men have commonly supposed fewer Atheifts than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheifts both alike, though philosophizing different ways. That some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of Atheifm, rather than the Demectical. 25. Why Democritus and Leucippus new-modell'd atheifm into the atomick form. 26. That besides the three forms of atheifm already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one plantick nature in it, devoid of understanding and sense, which disposes and orders the whole. 27. That this form of atheifm, which makes one plantick life to preside over the whole, is different from the bylozoick, in that it takes away all fortuitous, and subject: all to the fate of one plantick methodical nature. 28. Though it be possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this atheifical conceit, that things are dispensed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing senile's nature; yet
it seems to have been chiefly affected by certain furious Heracliticks and Stoicks. And therefore this form of atheism, which supposesthe cosmolaphick nature, may be called Pseudo-Zenonian. 29. That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastick and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthujafts and fanatics, they being led by an οὐκ ἀλήθες, or irrational impetus. 30. That there cannot easily be any other form of atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet all Corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual. 31. A distribution of atheists producing the former quaternio, and showing the difference between them. 32. That they are but bunglers at atheism, who talk of sensitive and rational matter; and that the canting atherological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves. 33. Another distribution of atheists, That they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a playful and methodical, but fenfles nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it. 34. That of these four forms of atheism, the Atomick or Democratical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all atheism will be confuted. 35. These two forms of atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to inflit rather upon the atomick; but that afterwards we shall confute the hylozoick also, and prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter. 36. That in the mean time we shall not neglect any form of atheism, but confute them all together, as agreeing in one principle; as also show, how the old atomick Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoicks. 37. Observed here, that the Hylozoicks are not condemned merely for asserting a plaftick life, distinct from the animal, (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense,) but for grossly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plaftick life of nature largely explained. 38. That though the confutation of the atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reasons to violate those laws, crave the reader’s pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato’s, that it is not only moral virtuosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affeftation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind; as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonsable undertaking to evince, that they stumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurers; and that all forms of atheism are nonsenset and impossibility.

I. We have now represented the grand mysteries of atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be inflit in afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists endeavours to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of atheism in general, as also of that most notorious form of atheism in particular, that is called Atomical. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of
atheifm, called by us hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be
instructed on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea
for atheifm, they being directly contrary to those of the Atomical, so that
they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the Atomick
atheifm supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended
refusing bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation
in it; hylozoifm, on the contrary, makes all body, as such; and therefore
every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural
perception, and appetite) though without any animal sense or reflexive
knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incom-
plete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called
body. By reason of which life (not animal, but only plastical) all parts of
matter being suppos'd able to form themselves artificially and methodically
(though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to the greatest
advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also some-
times by organization to improve themselves further into sense and self-en-
joyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge
in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incor-
oreal soul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole
universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference between these
two forms of atheifm is this, that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever
to be accidental, generable and corruptible; but the hylozoical admits of a
certain natural or plastick life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and in-
corruptible, though attributing the same only to matter, as supposing no
other substance in the world besides it.

II. Now to prevent all mistakes, we think fit here by way of caution to
suggest, that as every Atomick is not therefore necessarily an Atheist, so
neither must every Hylozoist needs be accounted such. For whoever so
holds the life of matter, as notwithstanding to assert another kind of sub-
stance also, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that
fool imputation. However, we ought not to disguise, but that there is a
great difference here between these two, atomick and hylozoic, in this re-
gard; that the former of them, namely atomick (as hath been already de-
declared) hath in it self a natural cognation and conjunction with incorporeal,
though violently cut off from it by the Democricick Atheists; whereas the
latter of them, hylozoic, seems to have altogether as close and intimate
a correspondence with corporealism; because, as hath been already signified,
if all matter, as such, have not only such a life, perception and self-active
power in it, as whereby it can form it self to the best advantage, making
this a fun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of ani-
mal most artificially, but also can improve it self into sense and self-enjoy-
ment; it may as well be thought able to advance itself higher, into all the
acts of reason and understanding in men; so that there will be no need ei-
ther of an incorporeal immortal soul in men, or a deity in the universe.
Nor indeed is it easily conceivable, how any should be induced to admit
such
such a monstrous paradox as this is, That every atom of dust or other senseless matter is wiser than the greatest politician and the most acute philosopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniscience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reason of some strong prepossession, against incorporeal substance and a Deity: there being nothing so extravagant and outrageous, which a mind once infected with atheistical fottishness and disbelief will not rather greedily swallow down, than admit a Deity, which to such is the highest of all paradoxes imaginable, and the most affrightful bug-bear. Notwithstanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is possible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational soul immortal, to be persuaded, first, that the sensitive soul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plastic life in the seeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themselves; and from thence afterward to defend also further to hylozoism, that all matter, as such, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it: in consideration whereof, we ought not to censure every Hylozoist, professing to hold a Deity and a rational soul immortal, for a mere disguised Atheist, or counterfeit histrionical Theist.

III. But tho' every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheist, yet whosoever is an Hylozoist and Corporealift both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the sense before declared, and also that there is no other substance in the world besides body and matter, cannot be excused from the imputation of atheism, for two reasons: first, because though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and stupid, as the atomick Atheist doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, may an infallible omniscience, of whatsoever it self can do or suffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which seems to bear some semblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowsy, plastic and spermatick life, devoid of all consciousnes and self-enjoyment. The Hylozoists nature is a piece of very mysterious nonsense, a thing perfectly wise, without any knowledge or consciousnes of it self; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is such a perfect understanding being, as with full consciousnes and self-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, because the hylozoick Corporealift, supposing all matter, as such, to have life in it, must needs make infinite of those lives, (forasmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) coordinate and independent on one another, and consequently, as many independent first principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to assert a God, is to derive all things ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπον, from some one principle, or to suppose one perfect living and understanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole universe.

Thus we see, that the hylozoick Corporealift is really an Atheist, though carrying more the semblance and disguise of a Theist, than other Atheists.
in that he attributes a kind of life to matter. For indeed every Atheist much of necessity cast some of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or less, upon that which is not God, namely matter; and they, who do not attribute life to it, yet must needs bestow upon it necessary self-existence, and make it the first principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the hylozoick Corporealists pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind the-god or goddes, called Nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great mystery, a thing that is perfectly wise, and infallibly omnifcient, without any knowledge or consciousness at all; something like to that τὸν τριάδον αἰογρία (in *Plato) ἀναμενεῖται, that vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch striking a bat; a man and not a man, seeing and not seeing, did strike and not strike, with a stone and not a stone, a bird and not a bird, &c. the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humourously expressed; whereas the other seems to be perfect nonsense, being nothing but a misunderstanding of the plastick power, as shall be shewed afterwards.

IV. Now the first and chief asserter of this hylozoick atheism was, as we conceive, Strato Lampasacus, commonly called also Physicus, that had been once an auditor of Theophrastus, and a famous Peripatetick, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetick into a new-formed kind of Atheist. For Veleius, an Epicurean Atheist in Cicero, reckoning up all the several forts of Theists, which had been in former times, gives such a character of this Strato, as whereby he makes him to be a strange kind of atheistical Theist, or divine Atheist, if we may use such a contradictory expression; his words are these, *Nec audiendo Strato, qui Physicus appellat Natur, qui omnia vim divinam in natura sitam esse cepit, quae causas gignendi, augendae, minuendae babea*, fed careat omnibus fenfu. Neither is Strato, commonly called the Naturalist or Physicist, to be heard, who places all divinity in nature, as having within itself the causes of all generations, corruptions and augmentations, but without any manner of sense. Strato's deity therefore was a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore some slight semblance of a Theist; but yet he was a down-right Atheist for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature in matter, as was both devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with the several parts of it. He is also in like manner described by Seneca in St. Augustine; as a kind of mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheist and a Theist; *Ego feratm aut Platonem aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine animo? Shall I endure either Plato, or the Peripatetic Strato, whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?* In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; Plato, because he made God to be a pure mind or a perfectly incorporeal being; and Strato, because he made him to be a body without a mind,

he acknowledging no other deity than a certain stupid and plastick life, in all the several parts of matter, without sense. Wherefore this seems to be the only reason, why Strato was thus sometimes reckoned amongst the Theists, though he were indeed an Atheist, because he differed from that only form of Atheism, then so vulgarly received, the Democritick and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

V. And that Strato was thus an Atheist, but of a different kind from Democritus, may further appear from this passage of Cicero's*; Strato Lamp. L. 4. [Cap. 35. p. 2315. Tom. VIII. Oper.]

VI. Furthermore it is to be observed, that though Strato thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether sentient and rational, or plastick and spermatick only, as ruling over the whole mafs of matter and corporeal universe; which is a thing in part affirmed by Plutarch†, and may in part be gathered from these words of his: τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τινι, τῶν κοιτά τοῦ ὑπεραναγμένου κατὰ τοὺς κατὰ τις ἐγκατηγορομενον, ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόμενον το αὐτόματον, ἡτα θειωτικῳ τοις Φυσικοίς καταλληλου ἓναν. Strato affirmed, that the world is no animal (or god) but that what is natural in every thing, follows something fortuitous antecedent, chance first beginning, and nature abiding consequently thereupon. The full sense whereof seems to be this, that though Strato did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechanism, as Democritus before him had done, but suppos'd a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it; yet not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plastick,
stick, as governing and sway the whole, but only supposing the several parts of matter to have so many plastiick lives of their own, he must needs attribute something to fortune, and make the mundane system to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plastiick or orderly nature both together, and consequently must be an Hylozoist. Thus we fee, that these are two schemes of atheifm, very different from one another; that, which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that, which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastiick life, not in the whole universe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the Atomick and Democritick atheifm, the second the Hylozoick and Stratonick.

VII. It may perhaps be suspected by some, that the famous Hippocrates, who lived long before Strato, was an affiuer of the Hylozoick atheifm; because of such paffages in him as these, ἰποριχίαν ἢ ποιεῖν εἰκά τὰ σάρξ * μα. 2. Tom. II. Φυσικά σχέδια τὸν ποιεῖν παντὸς. Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learns from it- self what things it ought to do: and again, ἵππερικάν ἢ ποιεῖν αὐτῇ ηὐντῆ τὸς ψήφος, εἰκά εἰκάντας. Nature find out ways to do it self, not by ratiocination. But there is nothing more affirmed here concerning nature by Hippocrates, than what might be affirmd likewise of the Aristotelick and Platonick nature, which is supposed to act for ends, though without consultation and ratiocination. And I must confess, it seems to me no way mis-becoming of a Theist, to acknowledge such a nature or principle in the universe, as may act according to rule and method for the sake of ends, and in order to the best, though it self do not understand the reason of what it doth; this being still supposed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been first set a work and employed by it, it being otherwise nonsence. But to assert any such plastiick nature, as is independant upon any higher intellectual principle, and to fet it self the first and highest principle of activity in the universe, this indeed must needs be, either that Hylozoick atheifm already spoken of, or else another different form of atheifm, which shall afterwards be described. But though Hippocrates were a corporealift, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the suspicion of either of those two atheifins; forasmuch as himself plainly afferts a higher intellectual principle, than such a plastiick nature, in the universe, namely an Heraclitick corporeal God, or understanding fire, immortal, pervading the whole world, in these words; ἄνεμος ἐν τοῖς ἄοιδοις Ἡπείροι, ἑλλακτον τε ἔχαι, καὶ νοσίτικα, καὶ ὄρη, καὶ ἀκινήτα, καὶ ἔθνη πάλιν τὰ ὑπότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἐξεῖδων. It seems to me, that that which is called heat or fire, is immortal, and omnicient, and that it sees, hears, and know all things, not only such as are present, but also future. Wherefore we conclude, that Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoick nor Democritick Atheist, but an Heraclitick corporeal Theist.

De Principiis. ant Carnitic. Seif. r. p. 249. Tom. I. O. VIII.

Vide Laetuit. de Iræ Dei, cap. X. p. 918.
VIII. Possibly it may be thought also, that Plato in his Sophist intends this hylozoick atheism, where he declares it as the opinion of many, τὸν Θεὸν πάλαι γεννάω, ἀνά τοῦ αἰτίου αὐτομάτης, γιὰ ἰὼν ἀναλύει Φίλος: That nature generates all things from a certain spontaneous principle, without any reason and understanding. But here the word αὐτομάτης may be as well rendered fortuitous, as spontaneous; however, there is no necessity, that this should be understood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true indeed, that Plato himself seems to acknowledge a certain plastiick or methodical nature in the univers, subordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind, which is the supreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from these words of his, τὸν Θεόν μετὰ λόγον καὶ σὺν τὸν καὶ τὸ τάστα δικαιοσύνη that nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reason and mind, govern the whole universe. Where he supposes a certain regular nature to be a partial and subordinate cause of things under the divine intellect. And it is very probable, that Aristotle derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonick school. But as for any such form of atheism, as should suppose a plastiick or regular, but senseless nature either in the whole world, or the several parts of matter by themselves, to be the highest principle of all things, we do not conceive, that there is any intimation of it to be found anywhere in Plato. For in his De Legibus, where he professedly disputes against atheism, he states the doctrine of it after this manner, τά μὲν μέχρι ται καθίσματα ἀπεργών Φίλον

Lib. 10. [p. 665, 666.]

That the first elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method; and then, that the bodies of the sun, moon and stars, and the whole heavens, were afterward made out of these elements, as devoid of all manner of life, and only fortuitously moved and mingled together; and lastly, that the whole mundane system, together with the orderly seasons of the year, as also plants, animals and men did arise after the same manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of senseless and stupid matter. In the very same manner does Plato state this controversy again, betwixt Theists and Atheists, in his Philebus; Πονηροὶ, οὗς δέ το καλὰ μεταφέρει οἷον, ἐπιστήμης Φίλον τῷ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ εἰς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐννυχρεῖ; τῇ θάνατῳ, κοσμήματος ἡ ἐκ φύσεως των θεωρήματα συνάτρυχα διακατερινών; Where shall we say, O Protarchus, that this whole universe is dispensed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious and fortuitous principle, and so as it happens; or contrariwise, (as our forefathers have instructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wisdom, did at first frame, and does still govern all things?

Where:
Wherefore we conclude, that Plato took no notice of any other form of atheism, as then set on foot, than such as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance, that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plastiack artificialnes or methodicalnes, either in the whole universe, or the parts of it. But because this kind of atheism, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by Democritus in the way of atoms, and by Anaximander and others in the way of forms and qualities; (of which we are to speak in the next places) therefore the atheism, which Plato opposes, was either the Democritick or the Anaximandrian atheism; or else (which is most probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there should be no philosophick Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato, long since concluded, that there have been Atheists, more or less, in every age, when he bespeaks his *ser. young Atheist after this manner; Οἱ σὺ μόνος ὑδὰ τοι Φιλοσοφεῖται καὶ προτή-ν παύειν ἡρεμωτον καὶ μεταλληθεὶς τὸν ἄκρα ὑερεμωτον, γινώσκω δὲ καὶ πλείως ἡ ἀλήθεια ταῦτα τὸν νόμον ἴχνους. The full sense whereof seems to be this; *Neither you, my son, nor your friends (Democritus, Leucippus and Protagoras) are the first, who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always some more or less sick of this atheistic disease. Wherefore we shall now make a diligent search and enquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers, who atheisted before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of atheism they entertained.

Aristotle in his Metaphysics, speaking of the quaternio of causes, affirms, that many of those, who first philosophized, assigned only a material cause of the whole mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. The reason whereof he intimates to have been this, because they affected matter to be the only subsistence; and that whatsoever else was in the world, besides the substance or bulk of matter, were all nothing else but πάθη, different passions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the substance of matter always remaining the same, neither generated nor corrupted, but from eternity unmade; *Aristotle's words are these: τῶν παύειν Φιλοσοφείτας οἱ παύειν τᾶς ἡ ἁληθεία *Lib. I. c. 3. μόνος ὑδὰ τοι Φιλοσοφείτας οἱ παύειν τᾶς ἡ ἁληθεία *Lib. I. c. 3. τῆς μεταθέως ἡ ἁληθεία τῶν ἀληθεῶν ἔστὶν, καὶ ἢ γὰρ ἢ τὰ πάθη τῶν ἀληθεῶν ἔστιν, καὶ εἰς τὸ τὰ εἰς τοὺς ἱερείν, τοὺς τῶν ἁληθεῶν ἂν ἐκείνων. Most of those, who first philosophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the universe, than what is to be referred to the material cause; for that, out of which all things are, and out of which all things are first made, and into which they are all at last corrupted and resolved, the substance always remaining the same, and being changed only in its passions and qualities; this they concluded to be the first original and principle of all things.

* De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 665.
X. But the meaning of these old Material philosophers will be better understood by those exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them, which are two: first, that because they acknowledged no other substance besides matter, that might be an active principle in the universe, it was not possible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action. Ei γὰρ ἦτι μάλιστα πάσα φύσις καὶ γένεσις ἐκ τινος, ὥς ἐνός ἢ καὶ ὑλικίου ὑπὸ εἰνόπτευσιν, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ τί τὸ αἰτίον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ γεγονέμενον αὑτὸ ποιεῖ μεταβαλλόμενον ἐκ τοῦ λέγουσιν, ἢν ἦν τὸ χάλκος, ἢν τὸ μεταβαλλόμενον ἐκ τοῦτον αὐτὸν; οὐ δὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ἐξόντος κλέαν, ὥς ἐν χάλκιος αὐτίκην τοῖς μεταβαλλόμενοις αὐτίκην τὸ ἔτη τοῦ ἑπεξερχόμενον, ἦς ἐν χάλκιον προέρχεται, ὥς ἐν ἤματι Φαίηκε, ὥς ἐν ἀέρι τῆς κυκτίντως. Though all generation be made never so much out of something as the matter, yet the question still is, by what means this cometh to pass, and what is the active cause which produceth it? because the subject-matter cannot change itself; as for example, neither timber, nor brass, is the cause, that either of them are changed; for timber alone does not make a bed, nor brass a statute, but there must be something else as the cause of the change; and to enquire after this is to enquire after another principle besides matter, which we would call that, from whence motion springs. In which words Aristotle intimates, that these old Material philosophers shuffled in motion and action into the world unaccountably, or without a cause; forasmuch as they acknowledged no other principle of things besides passive matter, which could never move, change or alter it self.

XI. And Aristotle's second exception against these old Material philosophers is this; that since there could be no intending causality in senseless and stupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to assign τοῦ εὗ καὶ καλὸς αἰτίαν, any cause of well and fit, and so could give no account of the regular and orderly frame of this mundane system; τοῦ εὗ καὶ καλοτέρως τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ γένεσθαι τῶν ὑπότων, ἵνα σε ὑπὸ ὑπὸ, ἀλλὰ τῶν τοιούτων σώκτον, εἰς αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ αὐτόματα, καὶ τὸ ὅρον τοσοῦτον ἐπηρεάζων καλὸς ἔχει. That things partly are so well in the world, and partly are made so well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other senseless body; much less is it reasonable to attribute so noble and excellent an effect as this, to mere chance or fortune. Whereupon Aristotle again intimates, that as these Material philosophers shuffled in motion into the world without a cause, so likewise they must needs suppoze this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided; and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the absence or defect of an intending cause, to supply the room both of the active and intending cause, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon Aristotle subjoins a commendation of Anaxagoras, as the first of the Ionick philosophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the universe; that in this respect he alone seemed to be sober and in his wits, comparatively with those others that went before him, who talked so idly and atheistically. For Anaxagoras his principle was such, faith Aristotle, as was ἄμα τοῦ καλὸς αἰτία, καὶ τοιχίτως ὑπὸ ἡ κατοίκησις ὑπάρχει, at once a cause of motion and also of well and fit; of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude and order
der that is in the whole univers'e. And thus it seems Anaxagoras himself had determined: 'Anaxagóγας τὸ αὑτοῦ τοῦ κυβήρ ναι ἐβεβηκάς καὶ άβεβηκάς ἄνθρωπον; Anaxagóγας Arg. de An. 

ras faith, that mind is the only cause of right and well; this being proper to mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing fitly for the sake of II. Opera another. Whence it was, that Anaxagoras concluded good also, as well as mind, to have been a principle of the univers'e, 'Anaxagóγας οὗ κυβήρ τὸ ἄνθρωπον Anax. Astr. 

fud αὐτοῦ, οὗ γὰρ φύσις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς ὅτε ἐπείγον Anaxagoras makes good a XI. 4. c. 10. 

principle, as that which moves; for though mind move matter, yet it moves it for the sake of something, and being itself, as it were, first moved by good: so that good is also a principle. And we note this the rather, to show how well these three philosophers, Aris'totle, Plato and Anaxagoras, agreed all together in this excellent truth, that mind and good are the first principle of all things in the univers'e.

XII. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that these old Materialists in Aris'totle, whoever they were, were downright Atheists; not so much because they made all substance to the body or matter, for Heraclitus first, and after him Zeno, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as well as Anaximenes did from air, and Thales is supposed by Aris'totle to have done from water, and that with some little more seeming plausibility, since fire being a more subtle and moveable body than any other, was therefore thought by some ancients to be ἀτομακτικός, the most incorporeal of all bodies, as earth was for that cause rejected by all those corporeal philosophers from being a principle, by reason of the grossness of its parts. But Heraclitus and Zeno, notwithstanding this, are not accounted Atheists, because they supposed their fiery matter to have not only life, but also a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal: whereas those Materialists of Aris'totle made senseless and stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the first principle and root of all things. For when they supposed life and understanding, as well as all other differences of things, to be nothing but mere passions and accidents of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced, but in a secondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of those first elementary qualities, heat and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin, they plainly implied the substance of matter in itself to be devoid of life and understanding. Now if this be not atheistick, to derive the original of all things, even of life and mind itself, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, then there can be no such thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, Aris'totle's Materialists concluded every thing besides the substance of matter, (which is in itself indifferent to all things,) and consequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corruptible. Which is a thing, that Plato takes notice of as an atheistical principle, expressing it in these words; ἤτοι μὲν γὰρ οἷός ὡς οἷος, λέοντι λέοντα, τιθέμενον πόθεν, that nothing ever is, but every thing is made and generated. Forasmuch as it plainly follows from hence,
The great Difference betwixt the

Book I.

hence, that not only all animals and the souls of men, but also if there were any gods, which some of those Materialists would not stick, at least verbally, to acknowledge, (meaning thereby certain understanding beings superior to men) these likewise must needs have been all generated, and consequently be corruptible. Now to say, that there is no other God, than such as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itself. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore whereas Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, tells us of certain Theologers, \* ες κακοτοι τα φυσικα γενεσεις, such as did generate all things (even the gods themselves) out of Night and Chaos, we must needs pronounce of such Theologers as these, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of femeleous and stupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheistical Theologers, or theological Atheists. For though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all, (i.e. no understanding nature as the original of things) but Night and Chaos, femeleous and stupid matter, fortuitously moved, was to them the highest of all Numbers. So that this theology of theirs was a thing wholly founded in atheistical nonsense.

XIV. And now we think it reasonable here to observe, how vast a difference there was betwixt these old Materialists in Aristotle, and those other philosophers, mentioned before in the first chapter, who determined, \* ανειλεκν \\* γενεσεις, \* αυτοι οι αριστοκροτα των αυτων. That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted, for this reason, because nothing could be made out of nothing. These were chiefly the philosopher of the Italick or Pythagorian succession; and their design in it was not, as Aristotle was pleased somewhere to affirm, ανειλεκι φατον των γενεσιων, to contradict common sense and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations; but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of opposition to those atheistical Materialists, after this manner; that in all the mutations of nature, generations and alterations, there was neither any new substance made, which was not before, nor any entity really distinct from the pre-existing substances, but only that substance which was before, diversly modified; and so nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and separations of pre-existent substances.

Now this doctrine of theirs drove at these two things; first, the taking away of such qualities and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really distinct from the substance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or less magnitude, figure, site, motion or rest. Because, if there were any such things as these, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be some real entity made \* εις \* επιστομον \\* η \* προπαραγοντιον, out of nothing inexistant or pre-existent. Wherefore
fore they concluded, that these suppos'd forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else, but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phasmata, fancies and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at, was the establishing the incorporeity and ingenerability of all souls. For since life, cogitation, sense and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, site and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded, that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing inexisting or pre-existing; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and therefore must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagoric doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to these two things mentioned, viz. the asserting of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantastick entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phenomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caus'd by them. But the latter of these may be further confirmed from this passage of Aristotle's, where, after he had declared, that Democritus and Leucippus made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those in το ἄηρ εὐσμας, those ramenta that appear in the air when the sun-beams are transmitted through crannies; he adds ίσως δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορέων λεγόμενον, τὸν αὐτὸν ξενοιδάτον, ἐξεπεξεραγμένον μὲν τῷ ταῖς αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ εἰς τὸ εἰρεῖ εὐσμαία, ὅτι δὲ, τὸ τουτα μὲν ἔιν. And that which is said amongst the Pythagoreans seems to have the same sense, for some of them affirm, that the soul is those very εὐσματα, ramenta or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them; which latter doubtless were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by εὐσματα, as well as Democritus; that is, figures and atoms, and not qualities and forms.

But Aristotle's Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, motion or rest; and finding also by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguish'd at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and consequently, that every thing that is in the whole world, besides...
besides the substance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

Of this atheistical doctrine, Aristotle speaks elsewhere, as in his book De Caeo. eisip γὰρ τις τις ὁ οὐκείν, οὐδὲν αὐτήιςτον εἶναι τῶν προκειμένων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν γίνεσθαι μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τῶν ἱπτιῶν, εἰτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογουσαντες το δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάλιν γίνεσθαι φασι, καὶ ἕμεν, εἰτα δὲ παρὼν εἴθεν αὐτὴς μιαν τοῦ ἐπιστήμου πεῖρας. There are some, who affirm, that nothing is engendered, but that all things are made; as Hesiod especially, and also among the rest they who first philosophized, whose meaning was, that all other things are made (or generated) and did flow, none of them having any stability; only that there was one thing (namely matter) which always remained, out of which all those other things were transformed and metamorphized. Though as to Hesiod, Aristotle afterwards speaks differently. So likewise in his Physicks, after he had declared, that some of the ancients made air, some water, and some other matter, the principle of all things; he adds, τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον φαιν εἰς τὸ ἀπόθεμα οὕσιν τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παλαι πάθη τότε, καὶ ἕμεν, καὶ ἕμεντες καὶ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἐξις ἐξις αἴδυς τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γίνεσθαι καὶ Φαίης δόηαι αἰτημένοις. They this affirmed to be all the substance or essence that was; but all other things, the passions, affections and dispositions of it; and that this therefore was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.

XV. But these Materialists being sometimes assailed by the other Italick philosophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, distinct from the modifications of any substance, could be generated or corrupted, because nothing could come from nothing nor go to nothing; they would not seem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavoured to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypothesis, and distinguishing concerning the sense of it in this manner; that it ought to be understood only of the substance of matter and nothing else, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatsoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but also souls; life, sense and understanding, though really different from magnitude, figure site and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the πάθη, the passions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or destruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted such. All this we learn from these words of Aristotle, καὶ δὲ τάτα ὦτε γίγνεσθαι ὦτε σώματα, ὄτε ἀπαλλοῦθες, ὑς της τοιοῦτος φύσεως αἱ σωματικὰ. ὅπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην Φαίης δέ γίγνεσθαι ἀπλάς, ὅταν γίγνεται καλὸς ἡ μορφή, ὦτε ἀπαλλοῦθες, ὦτε ἀποβάλλουσα τάτα τῆς ἔξεως, διὰ τοῦ ὑπομένου τοῦ ὑπομονένου, τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτὸν, ὅταν εὔ ὕπομονένων ἑώς ἦν γίγνεται τὶς φύσις, ἡ μια, ἡ πλείον μιᾶς, ὥστε ἐν γίγνεται τὰ ἄλλα, σωματικὰ ἐκεῖνα. The sense whereof is this; and therefore as to that axiom of some philosophers, that nothing is either generated or destroyed, these Materialists admit it to be true in regard of the substance of matter only, which is always preferred the same, As, say they, we do not say, that Socrates is simply or absolutely made, when he is made either handsome or musical, or
that he is destroyed, when he loses those dispositions, because the subject Socrates still remains the same; so neither are we to say, that any thing else is absolutely either generated or corrupted, because the substance or matter of every thing always continues. For there must be some certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that still remaining one and the same.

We have noted this passage of Aristotle’s the rather, because this is just the very doctrine of Atheists at this day; that the substance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but necessarily existent from eternity; but whatever else is in the world, as life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them) are generable out of nothing and corruptible into nothing, so long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods or god, than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter, and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand mystery of atheism, that every thing besides the substance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted.

However Anaxagoras, though an Ionick philosopher, and therefore, as shall be declared afterward, successor to those atheistick Materialists, was at length so far convinced by that Pythagoric doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predecessors herein, and did for this reason acknowledge mind and soul, that is, all cognitive being, to be a substance really distinct from matter, neither generable out of it nor corruptible into it; as also that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwise conceive of than as things really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site and motion) must for the same cause pre-exist before generations in certain similar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only secreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain spurious atomism of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomists before his time had supposed ὁμοιότητας ἀναμοιῶσις, dissimilar atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, Anaxagoras substituted in the room of them his ὁμοιότητας, his similar atoms, endued from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

XVI. We have made it manifest, that those Material philosophers, described by Aristotle, were absolute Atheists, not merely because they made body to be the only substance, than that to be a thing, which Aristotle himself justly reprehends them for also in these words of his, ἐκινέσθαι τὴν τίτικαν τῶν πολλάκις ἀναμοιωσίας, τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ ἴκτικα τίτικα καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων, ἃ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀνωμάτων. They who suppose the world to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or indurated with magnitude, it is evident, that they err many ways, and particularly in this, that they set down only the elements of bodies, and not of incorporeal things, though there
That all Atheists held the Eternity

Book I.

be also things incorporeal. I say, we have not concluded them Atheists, merely for this reason, because they denied incorporeal substance, but because they deduced all things whatsoever from dead and stupid matter, and made every thing in the world, besides the bare substance of matter, devoid of all quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we shall take notice of an objection, made by some late writers, against this Aristotleick accutation of the old philosophers, founded upon a passage of Aristotle's own, who elsewhere in his book De Cælo, speaking of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, γενόμενον μὲν ὑπὸ ἀπαντῶν εἰςαὶ Φάσιν, that all the philosophers before himself did assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning. From whence these writers infer, that therefore they must needs be all Theists, and hold the divine creation of the world; and consequently, that Aristotle contradicts himself, in representing many of them as Atheists, acknowledging only one material principle of the whole universe, without any intending or efficient cause. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in these writers, to conclude all those, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Theists; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the first and most ancient Atheists did (in Aristotle's language) κοσμοποιεῖν ἡ γεννᾷ τὸν κόσμον, make or generate to the world, that is, suppose it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewise that it was corruptible, and would some time or other, have an end again. The sense of which atheistic philosophers is represented by Lucretius in this manner: 

Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templo
Essæ, & nativo consistere corpore caelum,
Et que cuncte in eo sunt, sientque, necesse
Essæ ea disolvit.

And there seems to be indeed a necessity, in reason, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing besides the substance of matter to have been generated, should suppose the world to have been generated likewise, as also to be corruptible. Wherefore it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheists held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when Aristotle subjoins immediately after, ἀλλὰ γενόμενον, οἱ μὲν αἰῶνος, οἱ ἐν φύσει, that though the ancient philosophers all held the world to have been made, yet notwithstanding they were divided in this, that some of them supposed for all that, that it would continue to eternity such as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of these, who conceived the world to be γενόμενον, but αἰῶνος, made, but eternal, were none of them Atheists, but all Theists. Such as Plato, whom Aristotle seems particularly to perstringe for this, who in his Timeus introduceth the supreme Deity bespeaking those inferior gods, the sun, moon and stars (supposed by that philosopher to

Lib. VI. ver. 45. Adde Lib. V. ver. 236.
Chap. III. of the World, a vulgar Error.

To be animated) after this manner; & ὁ ἐμὸς γενόμενος, ἄλωτος, ἐμὸνε πέλαγος, τὸ Τίτων. p. 41. μὲν οὖν δεῖν τὸν λυτὸν τόχο μᾶλλος ἀμοιβὴν καὶ ἐγχρóν ἐν, λύειν ἐς τέλειον, κακοῖ· δὲ ἂν Ser. καὶ ἐπιτείρερ γεγένετο, ἀςώτως μὲν οὖν ἐν, οὐδ' ἄλωτος τὸ πάμπος ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ λυ- σότετο γι, οὐδ' πεύξας ἡμέρας Μόρφως τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζων ἐτί δεσπότι καὶ κυ- μωτίρει ναχώνες. These things, which are made by me, are indissoluble by my will; and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature indissoluble, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the dissolution or destruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore though you are not absolutely immortal, nor altogether indissoluble, yet notwithstanding you shall not be dissolved, nor ever die; my will being a strong band to hold you together, than any thing else can be to loosen you. Philo and other Theists followed Plato in this, affirming, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a post-eternity. Whereas all the ancient Atheists, namely those, who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, past and future. Though we cannot say, that none but Atheists did this; for Empedocles and Hieraclius, and afterward the Stoicks, did not only suppose the world likewise generated, and to be again corrupted, but also that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite vicissitudes.

Furthermore, as the world's eternity was generally opposed by all the ancient Atheists, so it was maintained also by some Theists, and that not only Aristotle, but also before him, by Ocellus Lucanus at least, though Aristotle thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewise the latter Platonists universally went that way, yet so, that as they always supposed the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude therefore; neither they, who assevered the world's generation and temporary beginning, were all Theists; nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheists; but before Aristotle's time, the Atheists universally, and most of the Theists, did both alike conclude the world to have been made; the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore if we would put another difference betwixt the Theists and Atheists here, as to this particular, we must distinguish betwixt the system of the world and the substance of the matter. For the ancient Atheists, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they supposed the substance of the matter, not only to have been eternal, but also self-existent and independent upon any other Being; they making it the first principle and original of all things, and consequently the only Numin. Whereas the genuine Theists, though many of them maintained the world's eternity, yet they all con-

1 Physic. auscultat. Lib. VIII.
concluded, both the form and subsistence of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the sun; the Stoicks with some others being here excepted.

XVII. Arisftotle tells us, some were of opinion, that this atheiftick philosophy, which derives all things from fenelefs and ftupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongst the Greeks; and not only fo, but alfo that the ancient Theologers themselves entertained it: Else de twn, oI xupos apanalxw, ol poiv poi év tén wvn denvéwv, xupros lýgíwmavtav, òtwos ówntai wepi tis fyléwv diakaleiv. Ovkeivn te yvar xé Téthwv ipoíouv tis fyléwv paxéra, xé tov Béon tov Téthwv ódów, twn kaiwméntw wos autów Súyka twn poftwv. Timwntatov mn yvar to prodevntatov ygrow de to tmmwntatov i6tw. There are some who conceive, that even the most ancient of all, and the most remote from this present generation, and they also who first theologized, did physiologize after this manner; forasmuch as they made the Ocean and Tethys to have been the original of generation: and for this cause the oath of the gods is said to be by water (called by the poets Styx) as being that, from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is moft honourable: and that which is moft ancient, is moft honourable. In which words it is very probable, that Arisftotle aimed at Plato; however it is certain, that Plato, in his 'Thea-
tetus, affirms this atheiftick doctrine to have been very ancient, oti paIa évwna roos te xupéwv, that all things were the offpring of flux and motion, that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter; and that he chargeth Homer with it, in deriving the original of the gods themselves in like manner from the ocean (or floating matter) in this verfe of his,

'Ovkeivn te Téthw fyléwv, xé mpépa Téthwv.

The father of all gods the ocean is,
Tethys their mother.

Wherefore these indeed seem to have been the ancientest of all Atheifta, who though they acknowledged certain beings superior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithstanding really deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatsoever in the univerfe from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos; and supposing all their gods to have been made and generated, and consequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which atheiftick theology Arisftophanes gives us the description in his 3 'Aves, after this manner: That at first was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced Love, that mingling again with Chaos, begat heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods.

X' & xo, kal xé, àposte te médan prótwv, kal Tértoref évwíwv.

Gn d, ovd ahd, ovd oíxwov hw érivev d' ev apierou kólpiwv

1 P. 118.
Chap. III. out of Night and Chaos, Atheists.

First all was chaos, one confused heap;
Darkness enwrapt the disagreeing deep;
In a midst crowd the jumbling elements were,
Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear;
Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
Teeming Night spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
Laid the first egg; whence, after time's due course,
Issu'd forth Love (the world's prolific Source)
Glistening with golden wings; which fluttering o'er
Dark chaos, gendred all the numerous store
Of animals and gods, &c.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between Love and Chaos before all the gods; though one might think this to have been done jocularity by him, merely to humour his plot; yet Salmacius 1 conceives, and not without some reason, that it was really a piece of the old Atheistic cabala, which therefore seems to have run thus. That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from leffer to greater perfection. First inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth and seas; then brute-animals; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air and earth, were, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, according to the senfe of those Atheistic thelogers, * De Gen. &c. nature before God, as being themselves also gods, but also brute-animals at 6. [p. 135. leaff, if not men too. And this is the atheistic creation of the world, per.] gods and all, out of fenelefs and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Numen; the perfectly inverted order of the univerfe.

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that makes Love, which is supposed to be the original deity, to have itself sprung at firft from an egg of the night; and consequently that all deity was the creature or off-spring of matter and Chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet Aristotle somewhere conceives, that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those atheistical Materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and caufe of motion in

in the univerfe; which therefore could not spring from an egg of the
night, nor be the creature of matter, but muft needs be something inde-
pendent on it, and in order of nature before it: 'αὐτῇ σίφος χάος
μένεται, 'αὐτῷ ἐπήτα τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον ἀλλαξάτω, Ἑρωταὶ ἦν Ἑπιστήμων, ἐν τοῖς οὐσί
ἀκεφαλῶν ὡς αρχῶν, οὐκ καὶ Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὕτως κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ πατὸς
γίνεσιν,

Πρώτους μὲν (Philus) ἔρωτα Θεῶν ματύσατο πάντων.

Πάνωπος δὲ,

Πάνωπος μὲν πρώτοις χάος γένεται, αὐτῷ ἐπήτα

Γαί εὐρύτερος,

Ἡ ἔρως δὲ πάντωσι μεταπρέπει Ἀθηναίσιν.

οὐς οὖν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τελῶν αἰτίαν, ητίς μιν ἐστὶ καὶ συνεχεῖ τὰ πράγματα, τοῖ-
τες μὲν οὖν τοῖς χρήσιν διαπερανεῖ περὶ τοῦ τοῦ πρώτου, εἶναι γενέσιν υἱόν. One would
suspect, that Hesiod, and if the are any other who made love or desire a prin-
ciple of things in the universé, aimed at this very thing, (namely, the settling
of another active principle besides matter:) for Parmenides describing the
generation of the universe, makes Love to be the senior of all the gods; and
Hesiod, after he had mentioned chaos, introduced Love as the supreme Deity.
As intimating therein, that besides matter, there ought to be another cause or
principle, that should be the original of motion and activity, and also hold and
conjoin all things together. But how these two principles are to be ordered,
and which of them was to be placed first, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged
of afterwards. In which latter words Aristotle seems to intimate, that Love,
as taken for an active principle, was not to be supposed to spring from Chaos,
but rather to be in order of nature before it; and therefore by this Love
of theirs must needs be meant the deity. And indeed Simmias Rhodius in
his Wings, a hymn made in honour of this Love, that is senior to all the
gods, and a principle in the universe, tells us plainly, that it is not Cupid,
Venus's soft and effeminate son, but another kind of love,

Ὅτι γὰρ Κύπριδος τυχέος

'Ωκοπετῶς οὖν αὐτὸς Ἑρως καλεῖμαι

Οὔτι γὰρ εὐρίσκει παῖδα, διαφωνίην δὲ πεβαίνει.

Γαῖς, Ἐκλάσοις τε μυχαὶ, ὑμμαρίων πᾶς τε Ἡθὸς μου ἐκεῖ.

Τῶν δὲ ἤρων ἐκουσθιάσαν ωγῶνιον σκαπτῆσαν, ἐκρηκτικώς τε φιλίν Ἠδογεῖ.

I'm not that wanton boy,
The sea-froath goddes's only joy.
Pure heavenly Love I bights, and my
Soft magick charms, not iron bands, faft yte
Heaven, earth and seas. The gods themselves do readily
Stoop to my laws. The whole world daunces to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is describ'd in Plato's
Symposium (as some learned men have conceived) that was begotten between

Penia

CHAP. III. Supreme Deity, no Atheists.

Penia and Porus, this being not a divine but daemoniack thing (as the philofopher there declares,) no God, but a demon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but φιλοκαλία, or the love of pulchritude as such, which, though rightly used, may perhaps wing and inspire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a scornful disdain in it of mean, dirty, and sordid things; yet it is capable of being abused also, and then it will strike downward into brutifhnefs and fenfuality. But at best it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the first principle of all things. Wherefore we see no very great reaſon, but that in a rectified and qualified fenfe this may pass for true theology; that Love is the supreme Deity and original of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and substantial goodneſs, that having an infinite overflowing fulneſs and fecundity difpenseth itself univifionally, according to the beſt wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subje&ct to its authority, and readily obeying its laws) and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified fenfe is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to descend to the philoſophical, to enquire there, who they were among the professed philofophers, who atheized in that manner before defcrib'd. It is true indeed, that Ariflotle in other places accuses Democritus and Leucippus of the very fame thing, that is, of affigning only a material caufe of the universe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that there were not the perfons intended by him here; thofe, which he speaks of, being τας τῶν φιλοσοφοιστῶν, some of the firſt and moft ancient philoſophers of all. Moreover, it appears by the defcription of them, that they were fuch as did not philoſophize in the way of atoms, but resolved all things whatsoever in the universe into ὑλη and πάν τῆς ὑλῆς, matter, and the fentions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; fo that they were not atomical, but hylopathian philoſophers. Thefe two, the old Materialists and the Demo­criticks, did both alike derive all things from dead and ftupid matter, fortuitouſly moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democriticks managed this buſineſs in the way of atoms, the other in that more vulgar way of qualities and forms: fo that indeed this is really but one and the fame atheiftick hypothefis, in two ferval schemes. And as one of them is called the atomick atheifm, fo the other, for diſtin&tion's fake, may be called the hylopathian.

XX. Now Ariflotle tells us plainly, that thefe hylopathian Atheifts of his were all the firſt philoſophers of the Ionick order and succeſſion, before Anaxagoras. Whereof Thales being the head, he is conſtantely thereunto by Ariflotle made to be ἀρχινος τῆς τουκίτης φιλοσοφίας, the prince and leader of this kind of atheiftick philoſophy, he deriving all things whatsoever, as Homer had done before him, from water, and acknowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Not-
Notwithstanding which accusation of Aritotle's, Thales is far otherwise represented by good authors; Cicero 1 telling us, that besides water, which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he assurred also mind for another principle, which formed all things out of the water; and Laertius 2 and Plutarch 3 recording, that he was thought to be the first of all philosophers, who determined soules to be immortal. He is said also to have affirmed 4, that God was πρωτούστατος πάντων, the oldest of all things, and that the world was πωλίμα ηεώ, the workmanship of God. Clemens 5 likewise tells us, that being asked, ει λαβότει το ζητο πράτετε τιν ε' άληθρος και ζωής, ειπεν, οβιο τινε δια- νοομένους: whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? be replied, not so much as any thought. Moreover Laertius 6 further writes of him, that he held τον κόσμον ζωνικον και δειμυνων ψωλην, that the world was animated, and full of deities. Lastly, Aritotle 7 himself elsewhere speaks of him as a Theist, καὶ ειπεν τογ θεόν ἐ&lt; τινες πνευματικαι Φατοι, οθεν εις και Θεας ἀληθεια ζωλην θεων εις αιτια, Some think (faith he) that soul and life is mingled with the whole universe; and thence perhaps was that of Thales, that all things are full of Gods. Wherefore we conceive, that there is very good reason, why Thales should be acquitted from this accusation of atheism. Only we shall observe the occasion of his being thus differently represented, which seems to have been this; because as Laertius 8 and Themistius 9 intimate, he left no philosophick writings or monuments of his own behind him, (Anaximander being the first of all the philosophick writers:) whence probably it came to pafs, that in after-times some did interpret his philosophie one way, some another; and that he is sometimes represented as a Theist, and sometimes again as a down-right Atheist.

But though Thales be thus by good authority acquitted, yet his next successor Anaximander can by no means be excused from this imputation; and therefore we think it more reaonable to fasten that title upon him, which Aritotle bestows on Thales, that he was ἰαρχής της τοιαύτης Φιλοσοφίας, the prince and founder of this atheistic philosophy; who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he supposing a certain infinite snateria prima, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the universe, and leading a train of many other Atheists after him, such as Hippo, furnamed Ἄτροος by Simplicins and others, Anaximenes, and Diogenes Apolloniatwes, and many more; who, though they had some petty differences amongst themselves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter devoid of understanding and life was the first principle of all things; till at length Anaxagoras stopt this atheistic current amongst these Ionick philosophers, introducing mind as a principle of the universe.

XXI.

2 Lib. I. segm. 23. p. 16.
6 Lib. I. segm. 27. p. 18.
7 De anima Lib. I. cap. V. p. 17. Tom. II. Oper.
8 Lib. I. segm. 23. p. 15.
XXI. But there is a passage in Aristotle's Physicks, which seems at first sight to contradict this again; and to make Anaximander also not to have been an Atheist, but a divine philosopher. Where having declared, that several of the ancient physiologers made अतीत, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he subjoins these words, διό καθάπερ λέγωμεν, ἦ τε καθάπερ ἄκηθ, ἀλλ' αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων εἴπει δοκεῖ, Καὶ περίεικα ἄπαντα ὑπάρχουσα κατ' ἐρείπων, Δὲ φασιν ὅσι μὴ ποιεῖσθαι παρά τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλος αἰτίας, οὐκ οὖν, οὐν τιμίων. Καὶ τίτο τινι τὸ Φείδιον, ἐβαπτιστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀνάλειβρον, ὑπὲρ Φιλον τὸ Ἀναξιμάνδρος, καὶ οἱ παλίης τῶν Φυσικῶν. Therefore there seems to be no principle of this Infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things, and to govern all things, as they all say, who do not make, besides infinite, any other causes, such as mind, or friendship; and that this is the only real Nomen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as Anaximander affirms, and most of the physiologers. From which place some late writers have confidently concluded, that Anaximander, with those other physiologers there mentioned, did, by Infinite, understand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite mind, the efficient cause of the universe, and not senseless and stupid matter; since this could not be said to be immortal, and to govern all things; and consequently, that Aristotle grossly contradicts himself, in making all those Ionick philosophers before Anaxagoras to have been mere Materialists or Atheists. And it is possible, that Clemens Alexandrinus also might from this very passage of Aristotle's, not sufficiently considered, have been induced to rank Anaximander amongst the divine physiologers, as he doth in his Protrepticke to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old philosophers as atheistic Corporealists, he subjoins these words: * τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Φιλοσοφῶν, ὅσι τὰ τοιχία ὑπερβάςτες, ἐπολυπραγμάνται τι υψιλότερον καὶ περιτότερον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνωσι, ὥς Ἀναξιμάνδρος, καὶ Ἡλίως, οὐ δὲ τοιχία Ἀριστοτέλος. But of the other philosophers, who transcending all the elements, searched after some higher and more excellent thing, some of them praised Infinite, amongst which was Anaximander the Mileian, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, and the Athenian Archelaus. As if these three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, distinct from matter, the first original of all things.

But that forecited passage of Aristotle's alone, well consider'd, will it self afford a sufficient confusion of this opinion; where Anaximander, with those other physiologers, is plainly opposed to Anaxagoras, who besides infinite senseless matter, or similar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the universe, as also to Empedocles, who made a plattick life and nature, called friendship, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows, that Anaximander and the rest supposed not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plattick matter, to have been the only original of all things, and therefore the only Deity or Nomen.

Moreover, Democritus being linked in the context with Anaximander, as making both of them alike, to अतीत, or Infinite, to be the first principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that Democritus was a genuine
Infinite Matter, Anaximander's  Book I.

genuine Theist, as Anaximander. But as Democritus his only principle was infinite atoms, without any thing of mind or plastick nature; so likewise was Anaximander's an infinity of senseless and stupid matter; and therefore they were both of them Atheists alike, though Anaximander, in the cited words, had the honour (if it may be so called) to be only named, as being the most ancient of all those atheistical physiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to seem strange, that Anaximander and those other atheistical Materialists should call infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, the τὸ θεῖον, the Deity or Numen, since to all those, who deny a God, (according to the true notion of him) whatsoever else they substitute in his room, by making it the first principle of all things, though it be senseless and stupid matter, yet this must needs be accounted the only Numen, and divinest thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondered at neither, that this infinite, being understood of matter, should be said to be, not only incorruptible, but also immortal, these two being often used as synonymous and equivalent expressions. For thus in Lucretius 4, the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death.

—— Mors ejus quod fuit ante;

And again,

* Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
   Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam alieni.

In like manner mortal is used by him for corruptible,

5 Nam quid mortale à cunctis partibus ejus,
   Ex oculis res quaeque repente erecta periret.

And this kind of language was very familiar with Heraclitus 4, as appears from those passages of his, πῦρ ἡ θανή, αἰτή γίνεσι: ἡ ἀτόμα θανή, ἡ δὲ ἱππος θανή, γινεσι: the death of fire is generation to air; and the death of air is generation to water; that is, the corruption of them. And again, ὁ ψυχήν ἡ θανή, ὁ ὅδος γενέσθαι: ὁ δὲ ἡθος ἡ θανή, γενεσθαι: It is death to vapour or air, to be made water; and death to water, to be made earth. In which Heraclitus did but imitate Orpheus, as appears from this verse of his, cited by Clemens Alexand.: 5

"Εἰν υἱὸν ψυχῆ, θανής ἡ ὁδὸς ἠνέκτεσθαι ἀμιθῆς."

Besides which, there are many examples of this use of the word θανής, in

1 Lib. i. verf. 672.
2 Lib. I. verf. 264, 265.
3 Lib. I. verf. 219.
4 Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poet Philo-
   phic. p. 137.
5 Stromat. Lib. VI. cap. II. p. 476.
in other Greek writers, and some in Aristotle himself, who speaking of the heavens, attributes άθάνασια and αἰώνιον to them, as one and the same thing; as also affirms, that the ancients therefore made heaven to be the seat of the Deity, ὁς οὐλὰ μὲν άθάνατον, as being only immortal, that is, incorruptible.

Indeed that other expression, at first sight, would stagger one more, where it is said of this έπιστρεφον, or infinite, that it doth not only contain, but also govern all things: but Simplicius tells us, that this is to be understood likewise of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were derived from it, and depended on it, as the first principle; δὲ δὲ λέγει τοις τούτοις υπερ τῶν Φυσικῶν αρχῶν, ἀλλ' ἔχει περὶ τῶν ὑπερ Φύσιν, εἰ δὲ η΄ περί περιήκειν ἔλεγεν η΄ περί θεαματον το μὲν γὰρ περιήκειν υπάρξει τῷ θελύῳ αἰτία, ἃ εἰς τάξιν χορήγητο, τὸ δὲ κυμάριν ως κατο τῇ ἐπικηδείᾳ αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῷ γεομένων. These philosophers spoke only of natural principles, and not of supernatural; and though they say, that this infinite of theirs does both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at; forasmuch as containing belongs to the material cause, as that which goes through all things, and likewise governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made. Philoponus (who was a Christian) represents Aristotle's feme in this whole place more fully, after this manner. Those of the ancient physiologists, who had no respect to any active efficient cause, as Anaxagoras had to mind, and Empedocles to friendship and contention, supposed matter to be the only cause of all things; and that it was infinite in magnitude, engenderable and incorruptible, esteeming it to be a certain divine thing, which did govern all, or preside over the compages of the universe, and to be immortal, that is, undefeasible. This Anaximenes saied to be air, Thales to be water, but Anaximander, a certain middle thing; some one thing, and some another. Καὶ εὖ τι έκ Θαυματου Φωνικ, ὥς τῇ θαυματίαν περί τοῦ πρώτου μὴ ἐπιτυχομένος τῇ θεοπομνημον τῇ οὐδον οὐκόμενον, εἰ τὸν σωρόμενον, οὔτε ἐν ὑπόπτων ἔκαστος, αὐτοῦ τοις ἄλλοις τέ εὑρί, τότε ἄρα τή Θαυμάτων; And Aristotle in this passage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cause, that presides over the universe, did look upon some one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cause of all other things) as God. But as they considering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cause of all things; so Anaxagoras supposed mind to be the principle of all things, and Empedocles friendship and contention.

XXIII. But to make it further appear, that Anaximander's philosophy was purely atheistical, we think it convenient to shew what account is given of it by other writers. Plutarch, in his Placita Philosophorum, does at once briefly represent the Anaximandrian philosophy, and confute it after this manner: 'Ἀναξιμανδρόων Φωνικ, τῶν ὄνων τῶν ὁμοίων Τέκνῃς τοῦ αίτερος, ἐκ τούτου τῶν πάλλα γίνεται, ἠς ὁ Ἰβ. I. c. 3. τὸ τῶν πάλαν Θεομενεῖ, ὁ δὲ γενεσθαι αίτερος κάτως, καὶ τῶν Θεομενέων οἶκας ἐστὶν, τῶν ἐν τῶν Τομ. ΙI. ἔστιν τοῦ Τομ. Ι. αὐτίκου ἐστι, ἢ ὑπ' ἐλλειπθήν ἡ γένεσις, ἢ ομοίως εἰς ὅτι Τομ. II. ἐν τῶν ἠμ. Θεομενοῦντοι. Αἰτομένων, ὁ δὲ γενεσθαι αἴτερος κάτως, καὶ τῶν Θεομενέων οἶκας ἐστὶν, τῶν ἐν τῶν Ἃμ. Θεομενοῦντοι. Αἰτομένων, ὁ δὲ γενεσθαι αἴτερος κάτως, καὶ τῶν Θεομενέων οἶκας ἐστὶν, τῶν ἐν τῶν Ἃμ. 1535. f. 2
A fuller Account of Anaximander's Book I.

Anaximander's theory of the infinite is further explored in this extract. In his belief, the infinite is the first principle and the source of all things. He argues that everything in the universe is generated and corrupted from this infinite principle, which is neither the first nor the last, but forever changing in a cycle of becoming.

Ev. Prep. Lib. I. p. 15. of Anaximander's Cosmopoeia; the infinite principle is defined as the void or nothingness. Plutarch, in his Preface, notes that Anaximander's Infinite is nothing else but matter, but that matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause. Where he shews also, how Anaximander's Infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power. Eusebius is more particular in giving an account of Anaximander's Cosmopoeia.

Phys. L. 1. c. 4. Leucippus, Democritus, and their followers, who are known as the atomic philosophers, developed the concept of the infinite by breaking down the universe into its constituent parts or atoms. Their belief in the infinite was not just theoretical but also practical, as they perceived the world as a continuous process of change and growth.

L. 14. c. 4. Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of inessential contrarieties, as Anaximander speaks. And elsewhere in his Metaphysics, he takes notice of Anaximander's mixture of things. Whence we conclude, that Anaximander's Infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually, or potentially, contained all manner of qualities; by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near a-kin these two atheistic hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which Anaximander had, concerning the first original of brute animals, and mankind. Of the former, Plutarch gives us this account; A.
issued forth, but lived only a short time after. And as for the first original of men, Fuscibus represents his sense thus: 'Εξ ἀληθείας ζωὴν ἢ άνθρώπος ἔγενε-Ε. Ρ. I. I. λόγος, ἐν τῷ τῷ μὲν άλλας δι' ἑαυτῶν τούτου γεμενία, μόνον δὲ τοῦ άληθείας παλαιοτάτου προιδαι τιναίων, διό ή γατί άρχας εἰκότης τούτον άνθρωπον διαφιλοφάνεια. Men were at first generated in the bellies of other animals, forasmuch as all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nourish themselves, but man alone needs to be nourished up a long time; and therefore could not be preserved at first, in any other way. But Plutarch expresseth this somewhat more particularly. 'Αναξιμάνδρος τοι' ε' ιδίνειν γεμενίαί του πρώτου ζωῶν ουκ ἀναφέρει τοι ουκ επετειλα. αναφέρει τοι ουκ επετειλα τοι τεχνών εἰκότης ἑνόμενος, εἰκάθης. Ὄ, ὦ τώ, τὸν τότε των ἀνθρώπων ἀναφέρειν. Αναξιμάνδρος concludes, that men were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and being there nourished, till they grew strong, and were able to shift for themselves, they were afterward cast out upon dry land. Lastly, Anaximander's theology is thus both represented to us, and cenured, by Velleius the Epicurean philosopher in Cicero: Αναξιμάνδρος ὁπι-De Nat. D. νίο εἰς παντὸς εἴς καθότι, λόγος ἑοινειμίστης ὀπτιμίστης, εἰκάθης ἀνοιμάδης. τοι τεχνών εἰκότης διαφιλοφάνεια. Αναξιμάνδρος's opinion is, that the gods are native, rising and vanishing again, in long periods of times; and that these gods are innumerable worlds, but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not eternal? We learn from hence, that Anaximander did indeed so far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods, but however that he really denied the existence of the thing it self, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philosopher. Forasmuch as all his Gods were native and mortal, and indeed nothing else, but those innumerable worlds, which he suppos'd in certain periods of time to be successively generated and destroyed. Wherefore it is plain, that Anaximander's only real Nume, that is, his first principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, by the fortuitous secretion of whole inexistent qualities and parts, he suppos'd, first, the elements of earth, water, air and fire, and then, the bodies of the sun, moon and stars, and both bodies and souls of men and other animals, and lastly, innumerable or infinite such worlds as these, as so many secondary and native gods, (that were also mortal) to have been generated, according to that atheistical hypothesis descript in Plato 1.

XXIV. It is certain, that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theists and Atheists, they having condemned many hearty Theists, as guilty of atheism, merely because they differed from them in some of their superstitious rites and opinions. As for example; Anaxegoras the Clazomenian, though he was the first of all the Ionick philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, affefted a Deity, according to the true notion of it; yet he was, notwithstanding, generally cried down for an Atheist, merely because he affirmed the sun to be μέσος διάπου, a mass of fire, or a fiery globe, and the moon to be an earth; that is, because he denied them to be animated and endowed with understand-
Theists and Atheists mistaken for one another. Book I.

ing souls, and consequently to be gods. So likewise Socrates was both accused, and condemned, for atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was pretended to be proved against him, but only this, that he did ἴδιατα τοις νομίζει, ἐτερα δ' ἐναντίων λαθά νυφίεν, teach that those were not true gods, which the city worshipt, and in the room thereof introduce other new gods. And lastly, the Christians in the primitive times, for the same reason, were vulgarly traduced for Atheists by the Pagans, as Justin Martyr declares in his apology, ἡ Ἕβενοι καθήκεσα, ἐν τοῦ ποιῶν νομιζόντων ἰδίων ἴδιον αὐτον. We are called Atheists; and we confess ourselves such, in respect of those gods which they worship, but not of the true God. And as the vulgar have unjustly condemned many Theists for Atheists, so have they also acquitted many rank Atheists from the guilt of that crime, merely because they externally complied with them, in their religious worship, and forms of speech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have been imposed upon herein, but also the generality of learned men, who have been commonly so superficial in this business, as that they have hardly taken notice of above three or four Atheists, that ever were in former times, as namely, Diagoras, Theodorus, Euemerus, and Protagoras; whereas Democritus and Anaximander were as rank Atheists as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themselves externally with more caution than was. And indeed it was really one and the self-same form of atheism, which both these entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; Anaximander in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of atheism; but Democritus in the way of atoms and figures, which seems to be a more learned kind of atheism.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that Plato, in his tenth de Legibus, where he attacks atheism, did intend the confession as well of the Democritick as the Anaximandrian atheism; yet whether it were, because he had no mind to take any notice at all of Democritus, who is not so much as once mentioned by him anywhere, or else, because he was not so perfectly acquainted with that atomic way of physiologizing, certain it is, that he there describes the atheistic hypothesis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritick form. For when he represents the atheistic generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as resulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and cold, hard and soft, moist and dry corporeful; this is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the secretion of inexistant contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritick Cosmopoeia, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed seem to call that scheme of atheism, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripatetic or Aristotelick atheism; we suppose for this reason, because Aristotel physiologized in that way of forms and qualities, deducing them out of the power of the matter. But since Aristotle himself cannot be justly taxed

1 P. 56. Oper.
Chap. III. Why Democritus new-model’d Atheism.

justly taxed for an Atheist; this form of atheism ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from Anaximander, and called the Anaximandrian atheism.

XXV. Now the reasons, why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled atheism, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the Atomick form, seem to have been chiefly these: first, because they being well instructed in that atomick way of physiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but also more agreeable to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, seeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, because they forefaw, as Lucretius intimates, that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an easy way for men's belief of a divine creation and annihilation. And lastly, because, as we have already suggested, they plainly perceived, that these forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were sometimes made a shelter for atheism, so they might also prove, on the contrary, an asylum for corporeal atheism; in that it might possibly be supposed, that either the matter of the whole world, or else the more subtle and fiery part of it, was originally endued with an understanding form or quality, and consequently the whole an animal or god. Wherefore they took another more effectual course, to secure their atheism, and exclude all possibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, site and motion, as the first principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and understanding, as well as those other qualities, could be only accidental and secondary results from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; so that the world could be made by no previous counsel or understanding, and therefore by no Deity.

XXVI. We have here represented three several forms of atheism, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of atheism, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is such, as supposes one kind of plattick and spermatick, methodical and artificial nature, but without any sense or conscious understanding, to preside over the whole world, and dispose and conserve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of atheism as this is hinted to us in that doubtful passage of Seneca's; Sive animal est mundus, (for so it ought be read, and not anima) sive corpus naturai gubernaue, et arbores, et foia; whether the whole world be an animal (i. e. endued with one sentient and rational life) or whether it be only a body governed by (a certain plattick and methodical, but senseless) nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables. In which words are two several hypotheses of the mundane system, sceptically propounded by one, who was a Corporealift, and took it for granted that all was body. First, that the whole world, though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithstanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued with
with one sentient or rational life and nature, one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal cosmo-zoism we do not reckon amongst the forms of atheism, but rather account it for a kind of spurious theism, or theism disguised in a pagannick dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity, in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endowed with one plastick or spermatick nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatick form, or plastick nature, which without any conscious reason or understanding orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that hylozoick form of atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the hylozoick supposing all matter, as such, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plastick life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impugn the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plastick or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plastick atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plastick or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable, Ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, quicquid facere, quicquid pati debet, includunt eft. Ut in femine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa eft. Et legem barbareorum & canorum nondum quasi babat, totius enim corporis, & frequentis estatis, in parvo occultoque lineamento sitit. Sic origo mundi non magis solem & lunam, & ipsis siderum, & animalium orsus, quam quibus mutarentur terranea, continebatur. In his fuit inundatio, quae non secus quam hyems, quae ophis, lege mundi venit. Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the embryo or unborn infant bath already in it the law of a beard and gray hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of water comes to pass no less by the law of the world (its spermatick or plastick nature) than winter and summer doth.

XXVIII.
XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly and methodical, but senfeles nature lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly in this point, (whether the world were an animal or a plant) belonged. And indeed divers learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitick Deity it self was no other than such a plattick nature or spermatick principle in the univerfe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just caufe given for such a supposition; forasmuch as the baft of Stoicks, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemd to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as Laertius 1 tells us, to call God σπερματικόν λόγον τοῦ κόσμου, the spermatick reason, or form of the world. Nevertheless, because Zeno 2 and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many times affer, that there was φύσις τοῦ κόσμου, a rational and intellectual nature (and therefore not a plattick principle only) in the matter of the univerfe; as likewise that the whole world was an animal, and not a mere plant; therefore we incline rather to excufe the generalty of the firft and most ancient Stoicks from the imputation of atheifm, and to account this form of atheifm, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitick and Zenonian Cabala, which seemed to contain these two things in it; firft, that there was an animalish, fentient and intellectual nature, or a confcientious soul and mind, that preceded over the whole world, though lodged immediately in the fiery matter of it: secondly, that this fentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the univerfe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain plattick nature, or spermatick principle which was properly the fate of all things. For thus Heraclitus 3 defined Fate, λόγον τοῦ διὰ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ τοιχία τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ καταλύσις τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις: A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an eternal body, that was the seed of the generation of the univerfe. And Zeno's 4 firft principle, as it is said to be an intellectual nature, fo it is also said to have contained in it πᾶν τῆς σπερματικῆς λόγου, καθ ὅπως ἐκαρπήσα εἷς εἰρήμενον γῆν, all the spermatick reasons and forms, by which every thing is done according to fate. However, though this seem to have been the genuine doctrine, both of Heraclitus and Zeno; yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plattick or spermatick nature, devoid of all animality or confcientious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the univerfe. Thus Laertius tells us, 5

1 Lib. VII. segm. p. 430. Lib. I. cap. XXVIII. p. 885. Tom. II.
4 Lib. VII. segm. 143. p. 455.
that Boethus, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious or intellectual nature presiding over it; and consequently must needs make it to be but corpus naturalis gubernante, ut arborres, ut fata, a body governed by a phytic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and herbs. And as it is possible, that other Stoicks and Heraclitticks might have done the like before Boethus, so it is very probable, that he had after him many followers; amongst which, as Plinius Secundus may be reckoned for one, so Seneca himself was not without a doubtful tincture of this atheism, as hath been already shewed. Wherefore this form of atheism, which supposes one phytic or phytotic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the highest principle, may, for distinction sake, be called the Pseudo-Stoical, or Stoical atheism.

XXIX. Besides these philosophic Atheists, whose several forms we have now described, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheists that have not at all philosophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular atheistical system or hypothesis, in a way of reason, but were only led by a certain dull and sottifh, though confident disbelieve of whatsoever they could not either see or feel; which kind of Atheists may therefore well be accounted enthusiastical or fanatical Atheists. Though it be true in the mean time, that even all manner of Atheists whatsoever, and those of them, who most of all pretend to reason and philosophy, may, in some sense, be justly styled also both Enthusiasts and Fanatics. Forasmuch as they are not led or carried on, into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reason or understanding, but only by an ἀμαντικὸς, a certain blind and irrational impetus; they being, as it were, inspired to it by that lower earthly life and nature, which is called in the Scripture oracles, τὸ πνεῦμα τῷ κόσμῳ, the spirit of the world, or a mundane spirit, and is opposed to the τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐν τῷ θεῷ, the spirit that is of God. For when the Apostle speaks after this manner, We have not received the spirit of the world, but the spirit that is of God, he seems to intimate thus much to us, that as some men were led and inspired by a divine spirit, so others again are inspired by a mundane spirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of these two are not to be accounted Enthusiasts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad sense; because the spirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very same thing with reason, or else such a thing as Aristotle (as it were vaticinating concerning it) somewhere calls λόγος ἡ καταφύλαξ, a certain better and diviner thing than reason, and Plotinus ἄνάμνησις, the root of reason. But on the contrary, the mundane spirit, or earthly life, is irrational sottishness; and they, who are atheistically inspired by it (how abhorrent ever they may otherwise seem to be from enthusiasm and revelations) are notwithstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched Enthusiasts and blind Spiritati, that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life, and, to use their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in speculative things, of all free reason and understanding. Nay, they are Fanatics too, however that word seems to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity; all Atheists being that blind goddess Nature's Fanatics.

XXX.
XXX. We have described four several forms of atheism; first, the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from dead and stupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible: secondly, the Atomic or Democritical, which doth the same thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the Cosmoplastic or Stoical atheism, which supposest one plattick and methodical but fenfeless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal universe: and lastly, the Hylozoick or Stratonicall, that attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, but devoid of all animality, sense and consciousnes. And as we do not meet with any other forms or schemes of atheism besides these four, so we conceive, that there cannot easily be any other excogitated or devied; and that upon these two following considerations. First, because all Atheists are mere Corporeallists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who ascertaining incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity; so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or confounded foolishness of mind, which makes men deny a God, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal substance also. Wherefore as the physicians speak of a certain disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; so all Atheists are possest with a certain kind of madness, that may be called Pneumatohobia, that makes them have an irrational but desparate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being acted also, at the same time, with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only Numen.

The second consideration is this, because as there are no Atheists but such as are mere Corporeallists, so all Corporeallists are not to be accounted Atheists neither: those of them, who notwithstanding they make all things to be matter, yet suppose an intellectual nature in that matter to preside over the corporeal universe, being in reason and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always some, who, though so strongly captivated under the power of gross imagination, as that an incorporeal God seemed to them to be nothing but a God of words, (as some of them call it) a mere empty found or contradictory expression, something and nothing put together; yet notwithstanding, they have been possest with a firm belief and persuasion of a Deity, or that the system of the universe depends upon one perfect understanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that ἰάκτος ἰδεία, a certain kind of body or matter is God. The groftest and most idiotish of all which corporeal Theists seem to be those, who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bigness, which endued with perfect reason and understanding exerciseth an universal dominion over all the rest. Which hypothesis however it hath been entertained by some of the Christian profession, both in former and later times, yet it hath seemed very ridiculous, even to many of those Heathen philosophers themselves, who were mere Corporeallists, such as the Stoicks, who exploded it with a kind of indig-
nation, contending earnestly \textit{μὴ ἐντελῶς Θεὸν ἀνθρωπομορφοῦν}, that God (though corporeal) yet must not be conceived to be of any human shape. And 	extit{Xenophanes} 2, an ancient philosophick poet, expresseth the childishness of this conceit after this manner:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ἲ μὴ ἐντελῶς Θεὸν ἀνθρωπομορφοῦν, ἵνα λέωτερος, ἵνα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάσας γίνεται παράλληλος καὶ ἀνθρωπομορφός.}
\end{quote}

If oxen, lions, asses and horses, had all of them a sense of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no question to be made, but that each of these several animals would paint God according to their respective form and likeness, and contend, that he was of that shape and no other. But that other corporeal Theism seems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which supposes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain subtle and ethereal, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a soul: which was the doctrine of others before the Stoics, 3 \textit{ἦν᾽ ὤς Θεὸν θεῖοι ᾲταῖοι ἐπικατά τίποτις τῇ Μεταγένεσι}, \textit{Στερεωμένῳ ἄνθρωπῳ}, \textit{Hippasus of Metapontus and Heraclitus the Ephesian suppos'd the fiery and ethereal matter of the world to be God}. However, neither these Heracliticks and Stoicks nor yet the other Anthropomorphites, are by us condemned for downright Atheists, but rather look'd upon as a sort of ignorant, childish, and unskilful Theists.

Wherefore we see, that Atheists are now reduced into a narrow compass, since none are concluded to be Atheists, but such as are mere Corporealists; and all Corporealists must not be condemned for Atheists neither, but only those of them, who assert, that there is no conscious intellectual nature, presiding over the whole universe. For this is that, which the Adepi in atheism, of what form soever, all agree in, that the first principle of the universe is no animalish, sentient and conscious nature, but that all animality, senile and consciousnese, is a secondary, derivative and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, arising out of particular concretions of matter organized and dissolved together with them,

\begin{quote}
XXXI. Now if the first principle and original of all things in the universe be thus suppos'd to be body or matter, devoid of all animality, senile and consciousnese, then it must of necessity be either perfectly dead and stupid, and without all manner of life; or else endued with such a kind of life only, as is by some called plastiick, spermatical and vegetative, by others the life of nature, or natural perception. And those Atheists, who derive all things from dead and stupid matter, must also needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and these are the Anaximandrian Atheists; or else in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But those, who make matter endued with a plastiick life to be the first original of all things, must needs suppos'e either one such plastiick and spermatical life only in the whole mass of matter or corporeal universe, which are the Stoical Atheists; or else all matter as such to have
\end{quote}

1 These are the words of \textit{Clemens Alexandrini} concerning \textit{Xenophanes}, \textit{Stromat. Lib. V. p. 714.}

2 \textit{Apud Clem. Alex. ubi supra, p. 715.}

3 Idem in \textit{Protreptico, cap. V. p. 55.}
have life and an energetic nature belonging to it, (though without any animal sense or self-perception,) and consequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a distinct plastic life of its own, which are the Stratonick Atheists. Wherefore there does not seem to be any room now left for any other form of Atheism, besides these four, to thrust in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate, what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongst these several forms of Atheism is this, that some of them attributing no life at all to matter, as such, nor indeed acknowledging any plastic life of nature, distinct from the animal, and supposing every thing whatsoever is in the world, besides \( \Phi \lambda \tau \alpha \pi \alpha \theta \) or the bare subsistence of matter considered as devoid of all qualities, (that is, mere extended bulk,) to be generated and corrupted; consequently resolve, that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or reducible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheisms. But the other, which are the Stoical and Stratonical, do on the contrary suppose some life to be fundamental and original, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a first principle of things; nevertheless, this not to be any animal, conscious and self-perceptive life, but a plastic life of nature only; all Atheists still agreeing in these two forementioned things; first, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; secondly, that all animal life, sense and self-perception, conscious understanding and personality are generated and corrupted, successively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

XXXII. Indeed we are not ignorant, that some, who seem to be well-wishers to Atheism, have talk’d sometimes of sensitive and rational matter, as having a mind to suppose, three several sorts of matter in the universe, specifically different from one another, that were originally such, and self-existent from eternity; namely sensibles, sensitive and rational: As if the mundane system might be conceived to arise from a certain jumble of these three several sorts of matter, as it were scuffling together in the dark, without a God, and so producing brute animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypothesis, there being no imaginable account to be given, how there should come to be such an essential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter should be sensitive, and that rational, when another is altogether sensibles; so the suggetors of it are but mere novices in Atheism, and a kind of bungling well-wishers to it. First, because, according to this hypothesis, no life would be produced or destroyed in the successive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concreted and secreted in them; and consequently all human personations must be eternal and incorruptible: Which is all one, as to affect the præ and post-existence of all souls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorow-pac’d Atheists are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itself. And secondly, because there can be no imaginable reason given by them, why there might not be as well, a certain divine matter perfectly intellectual...
and self-existent from eternity, as a sensitive and rational matter. And therefore such an hypothesis as this can never serve the turn of Atheists. But all those, that are matters of the craft of Atheism, and thorowly catechized or initiated in the dark mysteries thereof, (as hath been already inculcated) do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, sentient and conscious life, all souls and minds, and consequently all human personalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

We understand also, that there are certain canting astrological Atheists, who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the stars, according to their different conjunctions, oppositions and aspects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But these being persons devoid of all manner of sense, who neither so much as pretend to give an account of these stars, whether they be animals or not, as also whence they derive their original, (which if they did undertake to do atheistically, they must needs resolve themselves at length into one or other of those hypotheses already proposed) therefore, as we conceive, they deserve not the least consideration. But we think fit here to observe, that such devotos to the heavenly bodies, as look upon all the other stars as petty deities, but the sun as the supreme deity and monarch of the universe, in the mean time conceiving it also to be perfectly intellectual, (which is in a manner the same with the Cleanthean hypothesis) are not so much to be accounted Atheists, as spurious, paganical and idolatrous Theists. And upon all these considerations we conclude again, that there is no other philosophick form of Atheism, that can easily be devised, besides these four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical, and the Stratonical.

XXXIII. Amongst which forms of Atheism, there is yet another difference to be observed, and accordingly another distribution to be made of them. It being first premised, that all these forementioned sorts of Atheists (if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own principles) must needs suppose all things to be one way or other necessary. For though Epicurus introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he therein plainly contradicted his own principles. And this indeed was the first and principal thing intended by us, in this whole undertaking, to confute that false hypothesis of the mundane system, which makes all actions and events necessary upon atheistical grounds, but especially in the mechanick way. Wherefore in the next place we must observe, that though the principles of all Atheists introduce necessity, yet the necessity of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of them supposing a necessity of dead and stupid matter, which is that, which is commonly meant by ἀριστολογικόν, or material necessity, and is also called by Aristotle, an absolute necessity of things: others, the necessity of a plattick life, which the same Aristotle calls an hypothetical necessity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritical Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute necessity of all things; one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion
motion and mechanism: but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists assert a platural and hypothetical necessity of things only.

Now one grand difference betwixt these two sorts of Atheisms and their necessities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things necessary, yet they suppose them also to be fortuitous; there being no inconsistency between these two. And the sense of both the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheism seems to be thus described by Plato, \(^1\) πάντα κατὰ τὴν τοῖχον ἢ ἄδικον; συνεργασίαν, All things were mingled together by necessity according to fortune. For that nature, from whence these Atheists derived all things, is at once both necessary and fortuitous. But the Plaftick Atheism supposes such a necessary nature for the first principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous, but regular, orderly, and methodical; the Stoical excluding all chance and fortune universally, because they subject all things to one Plaftick nature ruling over the whole universe, but the Stratonical doing it in part only, because they derive things from a mixture of chance and Plaftick nature both together.

And thus we see, that there is a double notion of nature amongst Atheists, as well as Theists; which we cannot better express than in the words of Balbus the Stoick, perforated by Cicero: Alii naturam ceufs effe vim quant-[De Nat. De. dam fine ratione, cienem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim par-
-[Cap. xxxii. ticipem ordinis, tanguam vid pragredientem. Cujus solertiam, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, consequi poteft imitando; feminis enim vim effe tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, nactumque fit materiam, quod ali augerique paftif, ita fingit & efficiat, in suo quidque genere, partim ut per flirpes alantur flias, partim ut movere etiam poftit, & ex fe familia su generare. Some by nature mean a certain force without reason and order, exciting necessary motions in bodies; but others understand by it such a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. Whole exquisitness, no art, no band, no opifier can reach to by imitation. For the force of seed is such, that though the bulk of it be very small, yet if it get convenient matter for its nourishment and increase, it so forms and frames things in their several kinds, as that they can partly through their stocks and trunks be nourished, and partly move themselves also, and generate their like. And again; Sunt qui omnia naturae nomine appellent, \[^{2}\] De Legibus. Lib. X. p. 666. Oper. ut Epicurus; sed nos, cum dicimus natura conuare administrariique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aliquid ejusmodi, nulla coherendi natura; sed ut arborem, ut animalia, in quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordine appetit & artis quaedam similitudo. There are some, who call all things by the name of nature, as Epicurus; but we, when we say that the world is administered by Nature, do not mean such a nature, as is in clods of earth and pieces of stone, but such as is in a tree or animal, in whose constitution there is no temerity, but order and similitude of art. Now, according to these two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheism may be again dichotomized after this manner; into such as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temerarious nature, devoid of all order and methodical-n

ness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular and artificial, though senseless nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheifms, the latter the Stoical and Stratonical.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheifms, that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides the bare substance of matter or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypotheis, maintain the eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheifms did conclude the world to be generated, such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted. And upon this account, Lucretius concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novity of the world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore conflat.

But instead of the world’s eternity, these two sorts of Atheifms introduced another paradox, namely an eternity, an infinity of worlds; and that not only successive, in that space, which this world of ours is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of coexistent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However it is certain, that some persons atheistically inclined have been always apt to run out another way, and to suppose, that the frame of things, and system of the world, ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, fulfilled by a certain orderly and regular, but yet senseless and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in scripture, that such Atheifms as these should especially abound in these latter days of ours; There shall come in the last days (εἰς τας ἐποχας) atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lust, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation. Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheifms being quite otherwif, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued, such as now they are, from all eternity. As appears also from what the Apostle there adds by way of confusion, That they were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world, that then was, overflowing with water perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men. And it is evident, that some of these Atheifms at this very day march in the garb of enthusiastic religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Chrift without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mystical, but really atheistical nonsence. These, if they did philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of these two hypotheis before mentioned;

2 Pet. 3.
mentioned; either that of one plastiick orderly and methodical, but senseless nature, ruling over the whole univerſe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their only God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these atheiſtick hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both ante and poſt-eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would ſuppoſe, that though the main strokes of things might be preserved the fame, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane ſyſtem did not in all reſpects continue the fame, from eternity to eternity, without any variation. But as Strabo tells us, that Strato Phyſicus Strab. l. 1. maintain'd, the Euxine ſea at first to have had no outlet by Byzantium into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of rivers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time a passage opened by the Propontis and Helleſpont; as also that the Mediterranean ſea forced open that passage of the Herculean ſtraits, being a continual Iſthmus or neck of land before; that many parts of the preſent continent were beſteſtore sea, as also much of the preſent ocean habitable land: so it cannot be doubted, but that the fame Strato did likewife ſuppoſe such kind of alternations and vicissitudes as theſe, in all the greater parts of the mundane ſyſtem.

But the Stoical Atheiſts, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plastiick nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypotheses, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as Plinius Secundus doth, who, if he were any thing, ſeems to have been one of these Atheiſts; Mundum Nat. H. l. 2. & hoc quod nomine alio caelum appellant libuit, (enium circumflexu reguntur c. 1. cunfa) Numen effe, credi par eſf, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interitum——Idem rerum na ture opus, & rerum ipfa natura. The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circum- gyration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immense, such as was never made, and ſhall never be destroyed. Where, by the way, it may be again obſerved, that thoſe Atheiſts, who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, underſtanding being, prefiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or elfe a mere senseſless plastiick nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity, they ſuppoſing it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. Which fame Pliny, as upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheiſm he maintained againſt the Anaximandrians and Democriticks the world's eternity and incorruptibility; so did he likewife in way of opposition to that ἀπεριπτωτικα κόσμοι, that infinity of worlds of theirs, afferti, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoick Beſtbus, whom Laertius affirms to have denied the world to be an animal, (which, according to the language and fenfe of thoſe times, was all one as to deny a God) that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoicks, the world's ante-eternity and incorruptibility; Philo in his treatife περὶ ἀπεριπτωτικα κόσμω, or the incorruptibility of the world, teſtíſing the fame of him.

Nevertheless
Nevertheless it seems, that some of these Stoical Atheists did also agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theists, in supposing a succefsive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reason of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all dispensed by such a stupid and senseless nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from those words of Seneca before cited, where describing this Atheistical Hypothesis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plattick nature, without any animality, yet notwithstanding, ab initio ejus nefque ad exitum, &c. it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was dispensed by a kind of regular law, even its succefsive conflagrations too, as well as those inundations or deluges, which have sometimes happened. Which yet they understood after such a manner, as that in these several revolutions and succefsive circuits or periods of worlds, all things should be ἀυτὰ ἀλλὰ ἄλλα, exactly alike, to what had been infinitely before, and should be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elsewhere.

XXXIV. This quadripartite Atheism, which we have now represented, is the kingdom of darknes divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself. Infomuch that we might well save ourselves the labour of any further confutation of Atheism, merely by committing these several forms of Atheism together, and dafting them one against another, they opposing and contradicting each other, no less than they do Theism itself. For first, those two pairs of Atheisms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritick, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do absolutely destroy each other; the former of them supposing the first principle of all things to be stupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plattick life of nature as a fragment or phantastic capricio, a thing almost as formidable and altogether as impossible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception essential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impossible to give any account of the phenomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and disposition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the single Atheisms belonging to each of these several pairs quarrel as much also between themselves. For the Democritick Atheism explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonstrating that the natural production of such entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impossible than a divine creation and annihilation. And on the other side, the Anaximandrian Atheist plainly discovers, that when the Democriticks and Atomicks have spent all their fury against these qualities and forms, and done what they can to solve the phenomena of nature without them another way, themselves do notwithstanding like drunken men reel and stagger back into them, and
and are unavoidably necessitated at last to take up their sanctuary in
them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists may as effectually
undo and confute each other; the former of them urging against the latter,
that besides that prodigious absurdity of making every atom of fentient
matter infallibly wise or omnifcent, without any conchiousness, there can
be no reafon at all given by the Hylozoists, why the matter of the whole
universe might not as well confpire and confederate together into one, as
all the fingle atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why
one conchious life might not as well reft from the totum of the former,
as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal
or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Cosmo-plaffick
Atheifl pretend no reafon, why the whole world might not have one
fentient and rational, as well as one plaffick foul in it, that is, as well be an
animal as a plant: Moreover, that the fentient fouls of brute animals, and
the rational fouls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one fingle,
plaffick and vegetative foul in the whole univerfe: And laftly, that it is al-
together as impoffible, that the whole world should have life in it, and yet
none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world should
be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whitenefs or blacknefs at
all in it: And therefore that the Stoical Atheifts, as well as the Stoical
Theifts, do both alike deny incorporeal fubftance but in words only, whilst
they really admiff the thing itself; because one and the fame life, ruling
over all the diftant parts of the corporeal univerfe, muft needs be an incor-
porial fubftance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part,
and yet none of it in any part by itself; for then it would be many, and
not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheifm is a certain
ftrange kind of monfter, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually
biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now though these feveral forms of Atheifm do mutually deffroy each
other, and none of them be really confiderable or formidable in itfelf, as
to any strength of reafon which it hath; yet as they are compared together
among themfelves, fo fome of them may be more confiderable than the reft. For ftrong, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheift,
supposf to be really diftinft from the fubftances, are things unintelligible in
themfelves; fo he cannot, with any colour or pretence of reafon, maintain
the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them
again into nothings, and yet withfand a divine creation and annihilation, as
an impoffibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheift is as it were fwal-
loved up into the Democritick, and further improved in it; this latter carry-
ing on the fame design, with more fomething, martial, greater plausibility of
wit, and a more pompos fhew of fomthing where indeed there is nothing.
Upon which account, it hath for many ages past beaten the Anaximandrian
Atheifm in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So
that the Democritick or Atomick Atheism seems to be much more considerable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in matter, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be divisible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas on the contrary the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism is, of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoick or Stratonical.

Wherefore amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been pronounced, these two, the Atomick or Democritical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely the Democritical Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resifting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet because it takes for granted, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does therefore conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way) but as resifting from the contextures of atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes, figures, sizes, and motions; and consequently that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanism: which is a thing; that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perfringred by the learned author of the Exercitatio Epistolica, now a reverend bishop. But the latter, namely the Hylozoick, though truly acknowledging on the contrary, that life, cognition and understanding are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanism, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially, and fundamentally; yet because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inadequate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and substance, as such, hath life and perception or understanding natural and inconsiderate essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

* Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of successively Bishop of Exeter and Salisbury. Astronomy in the University of Oxford; and
Chap. III. Of which the Atomick most considerable.

We conclude therefore, that if these two Atheistick hypotheces, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of an Atheism will be ipso facto confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of Atheism, than the proving of these two things; first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter as such; and secondly, that they can never possibly rise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as was before observed, are mere Corporealists, of which there can be but these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or else such as suppose life and every thing besides ἀν ἀποική, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of these two things will overthrow all Atheism, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation, for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

XXXV. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter as such, or that all sensible matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypothecis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outragiously wild, as that very few men ever could have"atheistick faith enough, to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore this Hylozoick Atheism hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few fators and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any publick monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated and reduced into any systerm. Insomuch that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood, that Strato's ghost had begun to walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheism, desparing in a manner of the Atomick form, this Hylozoick hypothecis began already to be looked upon, as the rising sun of Atheism, —— Et tanquam spes altera Troja, it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas on the contrary, that other Atomick Atheism, as it insists upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resiting bulk; by which means we, joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disinterlacing of many other points of philosophy; so it is that, which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that, concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been stated and brought into a kind of systerm; and which hath of late obtained a resurrection amongst us, together with the Atomick physiology, and been recommended
to the world anew; under a specious shew of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheism together, because that would have been to confound the language of Atheists, and to have made them, like the Cadmean off-spring, to do immediate execution upon themselves; so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the Atomick Atheism, as being the only considerable, upon this account, because it is that alone, which publickly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumcised Philistine, openly defies the hosts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the close of this whole discourse, (that is, the last book) where we are to determine the right intellectual system of the universe, and to assert an incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate, that life, cogitation and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all substance as such, but are the peculiar attributes and charact'risticks of substance incorporeal.

XXXVI. However, since we have now started these several forms of Atheism, we shall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the answer to the second atheiftick ground, we shall confute them all together at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle, That the original of all things in the universe is sensless matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life. In the reply to the fourth atheiftick argumentation, we shall briefly hint the grounds of reason, from which incorporeal substance is demonstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we shall confute the Anaximandrian Atheism there propounded, which is, as it were, the first sciology and rude delineation of Atheism. And in the confutation of the sixth, we shall shew, how the ancient Atomick Atheists did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoism. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmoplastic and Hylozoick Atheists, we shall in this very place take occasion to insist largely upon the plastick life of nature, giving in the first place a true account of it; and then afterwards shewing, how grossly it is misunderstood, and the pretence of it abused by the affeters of both these Atheistick hypotheses. The heads of which larger digression, because they could not be so conveniently inserted in the contents of the chapter, shall be represented to the reader's view at the end of it.

XXXVII. For we think fit here to observe, that neither the Cosmoplastic or Stoical, nor the Hylozoick or Stratonical Atheists are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plastick nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute non-entity, by the Atomick Atheists, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some professed Theists of later times, who might notwithstanding have an undiscovered targo of the Mechanick Atheism, hanging about them, in that their, so confident
Chap. III. Plastick Life of Nature.

confident rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the material and mechanical only; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently divine causality, quite out of the world; and to make the whole world to be nothing else, but a mere heap of dust, fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conservation of it according to some general laws; which things the Democritick Atheists take for granted, would all be as they are, though there were no God. And thus Aristotle describes this kind of philosophy, that it made the whole world to consist, in \( \text{εἰκόνων μόνον} \), of nothing but bodies and motions (that is, atoms or small particles of matter) only ranged and disposed together into such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate.

2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastick nature, that acts \( \text{ἐνεργά} \) for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded; that either in the eformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly, (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes:) I say, upon supposition of no plastick nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded; because it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy everywhere, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by such a law. And therefore besides the divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Therefore the divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetic, effectual, and operative cause for the production of every effect.
3. Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical. Not only because it is utterly unconceivable and impossible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phænomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which therefore no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised, as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phænomena, that are perfectly cross to the laws of mechanism; as for example, that of the distant poles of the equator and ecliptick, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other inftances proposed by my learned friend Dr. More, in his *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpos, namely to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

Moreover, those Theifts, who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phænomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies; and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly inclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all such Mechanists as these, whether Theifts or Atheifts, do, according to that judicious cenfure passed by *Aristote* long since upon *Democritus*, but substitute as it were γείσιον ξυλικόν τεκανόν, a carpenter's or artificer's wooden band, moved by strings and wires, instead of a living band. They make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to those, who are considerative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plattick nature, together with mechanism, which runs through the whole corporeal universal.

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phænomena may be sufficiently solved mechanically, without any final, intending and directive causality, but also that all other reasons of things in nature, besides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphilosophical, the same *Aristote* ingeniously exposes the ridiculoufnes of this pretence after this manner: telling us, that it is just as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver should give this account, as the only satisfactory, of any artificial fabrick or piece of carved imagery, ὅτι ἐμπιστέοντο τῷ ὀργάνῳ τῷ μὲν καλῷ ἐγκατε, τῶν ἵππουσιν, that because the instruments, axes and hatchets, plains and chisells, happened to fall so and so upon the timber, cutting it here and there, that

2 *Ubi supra.*
that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the whole came to be of such a form. For is it not altogether as absurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake to give an account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any final or intending causality, as why there was an heart here, and brains there; and why the heart had so many and such different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ventricles; and why all the other organick parts, veins and arteries, nerves and mufcles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were of such a form? Because forsooth, the fluid matter of the seed happened to move so and so in several places, and thereby to cause all those differences, which are also diverse in different animals; all being the necessary refult of a certain quantity of motion at firft indifferently impressed upon the small particles of the matter of this universe turned round in a vortex. But, as the fame Aristotle adds, no carpenter or artificer is so simple, as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himself directed the motion of the instruments, after such a manner, and in order to such ends: * βελτίων ὁ τόλμων, ὁ γὰρ Ἰακώβ ἠσται * De Part. αὕτη, τὸ τινὸς εἰσὶ, ὃτι ἰμπερόποτος τῷ ὅργανῳ, &c. ἄλλα διότι τὴν πληθὺν ἐπικάτω Ἀντ. 1. 1. 1. τοιοῦτον, ἣς τινὸς ἔνθα, ἕξει τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιοῦτον ἡ τιμωσύνη τῶν μορφῶν γίνηται. A carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it sufficient to say, that the fabrick came to be of such a form, because the instruments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined their motion after such a manner, to this end that he might make the whole a fabrick fit and useful for such purposes. And this is to affign the final cause. And certainly there is scarcely any man in his wits, that will not acknowledge the reaon of the different valves in the heart from the apparent usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of theirs, to be more satisfactory, than any, which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

4. And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as, according to vulgar apprehension, it would render divine Providence operose, solicitous and diftractious, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so, in the judgment of the writer de mundo, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should αὐτραγίν ἀπαντα, let his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly, without making ufe of any inferior and subordinate instruments. * Εἰπε * Cap. 7. ἀπεριου ἡ αὐτοῦ δυναμή ἐφέβην αὐτραγίν ἀπαντα, ἣ διατελεῖ ἀ ἐπαντο, ἣ εἰπε-ἀμενο διοικεῖ, πολύ μάλλον απετεί αὐ ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Σεμάστεροι εἰ ἣ πριποδιερεῖ τὸν δύναιμα κτίσμα, διὰ τὰ σύμπαντα κάμια κινεῖται, ἔλεος τε κινεῖ τε σελήνη, &c. If it were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes the great King of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself; much

* Vide Cartef. Libr. de Homine, & de Formatione Fœtus.
Nature a subordinate

Book I.

much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more
august, and becoming of the Divine Majesty, that a certain power and virtue,
derived from him, and passing through the universe, should move the sun and
moon, and be the immediate cause of those lower things done here upon earth.

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a
distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superceded or made to signify
nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from
whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and vio-
ently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle
of their own.

Lastly; This opinion is further confounded by that slow and gradual procefs,
that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and
idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by
those ἀληθινοί (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles, which
are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue
the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not al-
together incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated
and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent
agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it
infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being
ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the
unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought
to do all things immediately and miraculously; it may well be concluded,
that there is a plastiack nature under him, which, as an inferior and subordi-
nate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which
consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is
also, besides this, a higher providence to be acknowledged, which prefiguring
over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes overrule it; for
as much as this plastiack nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion.
And by this means the wisdom of God will not be shut up nor concluded
wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its
stamps and signatures every where throughout the world; so that God, as
Plato (after Orpheus) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end,
but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his
causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concur-
rent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding
which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are
disposed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or distrac-
tious providence.

And indeed those mechanick Theists, who rejecting a plastiack nature,
affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either
for fear of debasing him, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else

2 De Legibus, Lib. IV. p. 600. Oper. 2 Vide Apuleium de Mundo, p. 25.
of subjecting him to solicitous incumbrance, and for that cause would
have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and oeconomy,
than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the
matter, and the after-conferring of it, according to some general laws:
these men (I say) seem not very well to understand themselves in this. For
as much as they must of necessity, either suppose these their laws of motion
to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in
the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in
order to the execution and observation of them. The former of which
being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which these
philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any
other conclusion than this, that they do but unskilfully and unawares esab-
lish that very thing, which in words they oppose; and that their laws of
nature concerning motion are really nothing else, but a plastiick nature,
acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining
the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by tran-
ferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws, fatally im-
pressed upon it. Now if there be a plastiick nature, that governs the motion
of matter everywhere, according to laws, there can be no reason given,
why the fame might not also extend farther to the regular disposai of that
matter, in the formation of plants, and animals, and other things, in order
to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

6. And as this plastiick nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most
reasonable, so hath it also had the suffrage of the best philosophers in all
ages. For first, it is well known, that Aristotle concerns himself in nothin-
g more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by
the necessary and unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism,
but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet so as
that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen,
but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that ὡς αἰτίος ὧς
θεός τέκνος τὸ πάντοτε, that Mind together with nature was the cause of this
universe; and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by
them both; that is, by Mind as the principal and directive cause, but by
nature as a subjervient or executive instrument: and elsewhere joining in
like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, That God
and nature do nothing in vain.

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato
before him having plainly asserted the same. For in a passage already cited,
he affirms, that nature together with reaion, and according to it, orders
all things: thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, to
be a subjervient cause under the reason and wisdom of it. And elsewhere
he resolves, that there are ἐξήλοντος φύσεως αἰτία, αἰς ὑποθέσεις ὦ θεός χειτα, certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity uses as subjerv-
ient to itself: as also, that there are ἔμπνευσις ὀς ἐμφανίς Θεὸς χειτα, con-
causes, which God makes use of, as subjerviently co-operative with himself.

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Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypeal, he made φίλα and σεικα, friendship and discord, to be the αἰτής διαφοράς, the active principle and immediate operator in this lower world: he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch and some others have conceited, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil, but only a plastick nature, as Aristotle in sundry places intimates: which he called by that name, partly because he apprehended, that the result and upshot of nature in all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and separations, or concretion and secretion of pre-existent things; and partly because this plastick nature is that, which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion, that Plotinus, describing this very seminary reason or plastick nature of the world, (though taking it in something a larger sense than we do in this place) doth ingeniously pursue after this manner; 'Αντίθες δὴ ἀλλήλους τὰ μέχρι, καὶ ποιότος εὐθανά, πολύμερος καὶ μᾶχας 

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by machines and engines, acting from without upon the matter, cumbersomly and moliminoously, but by a certain inward plaitick nature of its own.

And as Hippocrates followed Heraclitus in this, (as was before declared,) so did Zeno and the Stoicks also; they supposing, besides an intellectual nature, as the supreme architect and mafter-builder of the world, another plaitick nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plaitick nature hath been already described, in the words of Balbus, as a thing, which acts not fortuitously, but regularly, orderly and artificially. And Laertius tells us, it was defined by Zeno himself after this manner: εἰς δὲ φύσιν ἡ τὸν κόσμον κατὰ ἀκρατικῶς λέγει, ἀποτελέσθαι τὸν ἐκ αὐτῆς νόμον. And Zoilo of Chios, ἥ τοι αὐτὰ δῆσα ἀφ' ὀνόμα τέκνην. Nature is a habit moved from itself according to spermatick reasons or seminal principles, perfetting and containing those several things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was secreted.

Lastly, as the latter Platonists and Peripateticks have unanimously followed their masters herein, whose vegetative soul alfo is no other than a plaitick nature; so the Chymists and Paracelvians infift much upon the fame thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own, the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but observe here, that, as amongst the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheifts, who acknowledged no other principle besides body or matter, necessarily and fortuitously moved, such as Democritus and the first Ionicks; so even Anaxagoras himself, notwithstanding that he was a professed Theift, and plainly asserted mind to be a principle, yet, because he attributed too much to material necessity, admitting neither this plaitick nature nor a mundane soul, was severely cenfured, not only by the vulgar, (who unjustly taxed him for an Atheift,) but also by Plato and Aristote, as a kind of spurious and imperfect Theift, and one who had given great advantage to atheism. Aristote, in his Metaphysics, thus represents his philosophy: "Αναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανὴ κρείτται τῷ νῷ, πρὸς τῷ κοσμοποιιαίν, καὶ τῶν ἀναγκῶν διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἐξ ἀνάλυσις οἶκε, τὸτε ἐλκείσθαι τοῖς πάσι πάλαι μᾶλλον αἰτιῶν τῶν γεφυρών ἤ γεν. Anaxagoras useth mind and intellecf, that is, God, as a machine in the Cosmopoeia; and when he is at a loss to give an account of things by material necessity, then, and never but then, does he draw in wind or God to help him out; but otherwise he will rather affign any thing else for a cause than mind. Now, if Aristote cenfure Anaxagoras in this manner, though a professed Theift, because he did but seldom make use of a mental caufe for the solving of the phenomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loss for other material and mechanical caufes (which it seems he sometimes confessed himself to be) what would that philofopher have thought of thofe our fo confident Mechanists of later times, who will never vouchsafe so much as once to be
be beholden to God Almighty for any thing in the oeconomy of the corporeal world, after the first impression of motion upon the matter?

Plato likewise, in his _Phædo_ 1, and elsewhere, condemns this Anaxagoras by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be a cause, yet he seldom made use of it for solving the phenomena; but in his twelfth _de legibus_, he perfringeth him unnamed, as one who, though a professed Theist, had notwithstanding given great encouragement to atheifm, after this manner: "Διψῆς γὰς οἱ οὐς ἐν ὁ διακοσμηθέν, πάντως εἰς κατ’ οὐθέν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πᾶλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες σοφίς Φόσιν, ὁτι πρεσβυτέροι ἐν σωματών, ἂτας δ’ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔτος, ἄντετεταλ καὶ τα χρόνα δὲ πρὸ τῶν ὑμάτων πάντα, αὐτῶν ἰδίως, τὰ καλ’ ὁμαδίων φερόμενα, μετ’ ἑναί λυθον, ἐκ ἕκα, ἐκ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἄλφαν σωμάτων, διανικοῦν τὰς αἰείς πάντες τοῦ κόσμου, τούτ’ ὑπ’ τὰ τότε ξειρασημοντα παλαια ἄστιττας. Some of them, who had concluded, that it was mind, that ordered all things in the heavens, themselves erring concerning the nature of the soul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being supposed by them to be full of stones, and earth, and other inanimate things, (dispensing the causes of the whole universe) they did by this means occasion much atheifm and impiety.

Furthermore, the same Plato there tells us, that in those times of his, astronomers and physiologers commonly lay under the prejudice and suspicion of atheifm amongst the vulgar, merely for this reason, because they dealt so much in material causes; Οἱ πολλοὶ διακοσοῦντες τὰ τοιαύτα μεθαξιωματικοῖς, ἀναθρωμα τοῦ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης οὐσιωδεῖς ἄλλας τίθειναι, ἄφεσι γίγνεσθαι, καθαρακτικὰς ὡς οὐλόν γειρομένα ανάλασι τὸ πράγματος, ἀλλ’ οἱ διακοսοῦντες οὐκ ἀνήλθεν πεῖρα τελείμων. The vulgar think, that they, who add to themselves to astronomy and physiology, are made Atheists thereby, they seeing as much as is possible, how things come to pass by material necessities, and being thereby disposed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the sake of good. From whence we may observe, that, according to the natural apprehensions of men in all ages, they, who resolve the phenomena of nature into material necessity, allowing of no final nor mental causality (dispensing things in order to ends) have been strongly suspected for friends to atheifm.

7. But because some may pretend, that the plastiick nature is all one with an occult quality, we shall here show, how great a difference there is betwixt these two. For he, that afferts an occult quality for the cause of any phænomenon, does indeed assign no cause at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cause; but he, that afferts a plastiick nature, affigns a determinate and proper cause, nay, the only intelligible cause, of that which is the greatest of all phænomena in the world, namely the τὸ ἔσος καλὸς, the orderly, regular and artificial frame of things in the universe, whereof the mechanic philosophers, however pretending to solve all phænomena by matter and motion, affign no cause at all. Mind and understanding is the only true cause of orderly regularity; and he that afferts a
plastick nature, afferts mental caufality in the world; but the fortuitous Mechanists, who explouding final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never possibly affign any cause of this grand phænomenon, unleff confution may be faid to be the cause of order, and fortune or chance of constant regularity; and therefore themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor indeed does there appear any great reason, why fuch men fhould affert an infinite mind in the world, since they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore muft needs make it to be in vain.

8. Now, this plastick nature being a thing, which is not without some difficulty in the conception of it, we fhall here endeavour to do these two things concerning it; firft, to let down a right representation thereof; and then afterwards to shew, how extremely the notion of it hath been miftaken, perverted and abused by thofe Atheifts, who would make it to be the only God almighty, or firft principle of all things.

How the plastick nature is in general to be conceived, Ariftotle inftucts us in thofe words: "taş ἐν τῷ ἔλεγον ἡ ναυτηρική ὀρύος ἐν τῷ φύσις ἑποίει." If the naupегical art, that is, the art of the shipwright, were in the timber itself, operatively and effectually, it would there act just as nature doth. And the mind of the architect, were supposed to be tranfufed into the ftones, bricks and mortar, there acting upon them in fuch a manner as to make them come together of themselves, and range themselves into the form of a complete edifice, as Amphion was faid, by his harp, to have made the ftones move, and place themselves orderly of their own accord, and fo to have built the walls of Thèbes; or if the musical art were conceived to be imme- diately in the instruments and strings, animating them as a living foul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulfe: thofe, and fuch like inftances, in Ariftotle's judgment, would be fit iconifms or representations of the plastick nature, that being art itself acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it. To which purpose the fame philofopher adds, that this thing might be further illustrated by another inftance or resemblance, μάλιστα ἐν θύλον, ἄταν τὴς ἀλήθειας αὐτὸς ἑκάστος, τοῦτο γὰρ ἦκαν ἡ φύσις: Nature may be yet more clearly reftemed to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the phyfician in curing himfelf. So that the meaning of this philofopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art acting not from without and at a diftance, but immediately upon the thing which is formed by it. And thus we have the firft general conception of the plastick nature, that it is art itself, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.

9. In the next place, we are to obferve, that though the plastick nature be a kind of art, yet there are some confiderable preeminences which it hath above human art: the firft whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwife than from without and at a diftance,
That Nature is

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nor communicate itself to it, but with a great deal of tumult and hurliburly, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner with much ado, by knockings and thrurtings, slowly introducing its form or idea (as for example of a ship or house) into the materials; nature in the mean time is another kind of art, which insinuating itself immediately into things themselves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work easily, cleaverly, and silently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embodied in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within vitally and magically; ouj 'xhifts evrwpixe, ouj eoujse, ouj te tι οογαπον έπακιν η ουκάνλων ογκάνλων, έληκα δε δει έν τε έπακιν. δεi δι έκ το προ- χλαμεν δελείν ει τιν Φιλοποινίν ποινίν. ποινς γαρ άείσμος, η έ τε μεγαλεία, &c. Here are no hands, nor feet, nor any instrument, connate, or adventitious, there being only need of matter to work upon, and to be brought into a certain form, and nothing else. For it is manifest that the operation of nature is different from mechanism, it doing not its work by trufon or pulsion, by knockings or thrurtings, as if it were without that which it wrought upon. But as God is inward to every thing, so nature acts immediately upon the matter, as an inward and living soul, or law in it.

10. Another preeminence of nature above human art is this, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, and therefore consult and deliberate, as also upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature, on the contrary, is never to seek what to do, nor at a stand; and for that reason also (besides another that will be suggested afterwards) it doth never consult nor deliberate. Indeed Aristotle intimates, as if this had been the grand objection of the old atheistic philosophers against the plastic nature, that because we do not see natural bodies to consult or deliberate, therefore there could be nothing of art, counsel or contrivance in them, but all came to pass fortuitously. But he confutes it after this manner: 'Ανοσον δε το μη ουδενα ειναι τη γνωσιν, ειμι μη ιδων τη κινησιν βελτιωσάμενον, καπιτι μη της ειδου μελετημεν.'

Phys. I. 2. 18. came to pass fortuitously. But he confutes it after this manner: 'It is absurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not see that which moves to consult, although art itself doth not consult. Whence he concludes, that nature may act artificially, orderly and methodically, for the sake of ends, though it never consult or deliberate. Indeed human artists themselves do not consult properly as they are artists, but when ever they do it, it is for want of art, and because they are to seek, their art being imperfect and adventitious: but art itself or perfect art is never to seek, and therefore doth never consult or deliberate. And nature is this art, which never hesitates nor studies, as unresolved what to do, but is always readily prompted; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it hath formerly done, or go about, as it were upon second thoughts, to alter and mend its former course, but it goes on in one constant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, because it is the stamp or imprest of that infallibly omnicient art, of the divine understanding, which is the very law and rule of what is simply the best in every thing.
And thus we have seen the difference between nature and human art; that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a distance; but the former is art itself, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore when art is said to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the divine art itself; as before Aristotle, Plato had declared in his Sophist, in these words: τὸ Φιλοσοφοῦνναι ημῖναί σείς τὴν θυσίαν. Those things, which are said to be done by nature, are indeed done by divine art.

II. Notwithstanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itself, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, so neither is it the divine art, as it is in itself pure and abstract, but concrete and embodied only; for the divine art considered in itself is nothing but knowledge, understanding, or wisdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and understanding, in its own nature, is ἐξορθεῖσθαι τι, a certain separate and abstract thing, and of so subtile and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it, as the soul of it. And therefore Aristotle's second instance, which he propounds as most pertinent to illustrate this business of nature by, namely of the physician's art curing himself, is not so adequate thereunto; because when the medicinal art cures the physician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and understanding only, which is art naked, abstract and unembodied; as also it doth its work ambagiously, by the physician's willing and prescribing to himself the use of such medicaments, as do but conduce, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or the inward archeus to effect the cure. Art is defined by Aristotle to be λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἀνέν οἶκα, the reason of the thing without matter; and so the divine art or knowledge in the mind of God is unembodied reason: but nature is ratio mentis & confusia, reason immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the divine art archetypal, but only ectypepal; it is a living stamp or signature of the divine wisdom, which though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor understand the reason of what itself doth. And the difference between these two may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθεσις, the reason of the mind and conception, called verbum mentis, and the λόγος προφορως, the reason of external speech; the latter of which, though it bear a certain stamp and impress of the former upon it, yet itself is nothing but articulate sound, devoid of all understanding and sense. Or else we may illustrate this business by another similitude, comparing the divine art and wisdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary ophicer; the difference betwixt which two is thus set forth by Aristotle pertinently to our:

Σωτ. I. c. v. purpoze; τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἑκατὸν τιμωπλεος ἢ μάλλον εἰθονὶ νομόςεις τῶν τοποθ. 260. χειροτεκνὴ, ἢ συνεκτεος, ὥστε τὸς αἰτιας τῶν τοποθεμάτων ἱθαι. οἰ δ' ἀστιη ἢ τῶν αὐτοῖς ἐναι, ποιεῖ μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὴ ποιεῖ, οἷον καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ πῦρ, τα μὲν οὖν ἄγοχα φέβειν.

Nature the Manuay Opifer of

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We account the architectis in every thing more honourable than the manuay opificers, because they understand the reason of things done; whereas the other, as some inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do: the difference between them being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain nature in them, but the manuay opifer by habit. Thus nature may be called the χιμερίσιος, or manuay opifer, that acts suberviently under the architectonical art and wißdom of the divine understanding, which doers without knowing the reason of what it doth.

12. Wherefore as we did before observe the preeminences of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it act artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends, nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not master of that consummate art and wißdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt nature and abstract art or wißdom is expressed by Plotinus in these words: τι διοικει
tis λεγομενος Φύσεως Φυσικης; οτι η μεν Φύσις προτος, η δε Φύσις εν χαιροι, εοδαλμα
tηποροφαινομεν η Φύσις, χειρεισαι Χειροιν, εν Χαιροιν η τον αυτη ελαγμουμεν λογοι εχει,
οιοι ει ει καιροι βαθιει, διανεμον εις χαιροιν επι δυτερα εν τη επιφανεια τυπος εκδης:
μενονος τον αυτοι, χειροι ει δε αδεις δύολα τον κατα, ουν αυτο εις Φυσει, μονον δε ποιει.'

How doth wisdom differ from that, which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason bowing upon it; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superiour superficies of it, will in the lower fide be weak and obscure; and such is the stamp and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which doth only do, but not know. And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatick λόγοι, or reaños, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this manner; Ποτετες δε οι λόγοι
οστοι οι ει χειρεισαι νοηματα τα τα νοηματα ποιοτες; ε γαρ λόγος ει υπη
ποιει, κα το παιοι δυσυκας ου νοτεις, ουθε οραεις, ουλα άδαιμες τρεπτικαι της υλης, ουλ
ηδη, αλλα δρασις μονος, ουν τοπου κα σειμα ει υδηλ. Whether are these plastiack reaños or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then ati according to those knowledges? for the plastiack reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vißion, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer and fagacious inquier into nature seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do: for after he had admired that wißdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes, that one or other

other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetable or plastick power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and divine than the rational; or else, in nature Harv. de Operibus negue prudential nec intellectum inesse, sed ita solum videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum artes nostras & facultates, seu exemplaria a nobis metipfis mutuata, de rebus naturae divinis judicamus; quae principia naturee activa effectus suis eo modo producerent, quo nos opera nostra artificialia solemus: That in the works of nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works. Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimick the divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion.

13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act "and in" for the sake of ends, and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learnt before, he will presently take it from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the fingers of an exercised lutonist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of music or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason, why this plastick nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason, by which they are directed. The forementioned philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastick nature of the universe, by this very instance: *τὸν ἐνθαράκτην αὐτὸς τεχικόν ἦν, 1. 2. ἀναπέπο ὑμεῖς ὁ ὀρκόμενος, κινούμενος ἦν, ὁ γάρ ὀρχίσκες, τῇ οὖν τεχνῇ ὑπο τῆς ἔνων ἤν. 16. 

The energy [tag. 267, Oper.]
of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves; for a dancer resembles this artificial life of nature, forasmuch as art itself moves him, and so moves him as being such a life in him. And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologists represented the nature of the universe by Pan playing upon a pipe or harp, and being in love with the nymph Echo; as if nature did, by a kind of silent melody, make all the parts of the universe every where dance in measure and proportion, itself being as it were in the mean time delighted and ravished with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are said to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoicks to be ἔνοχος, or a habit: so that there seems to be no other difference between these two, than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, industry and exercise; the other, as was expressed by Hippocrates, is ἀπειδής ὂν μαθησα, unlearned and untaught, and may in some sense also be said to be ἀυτοπαιδακτος, self-taught, though she be indeed always inwardly prompted, secretly whispered into, and inspired by the divine art and wisdom.

14. Moreover, that something may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reason of what it doth, may be further evinced from those natural instincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the universe. As for example; the bees in mellowification, and in framing their combs and hexagonal cells, the spiders in spinning their webs, the birds in building their nests, and many other animals in such like actions of theirs, which would seem to argue a great sagacity in them, whereas notwithstanding, as Aristotle observes, οὐτε ἴχνη, οὐτε ζητεσθαι, οὐτε βελεύσαμεν ποιη. They do these things, neither by art, nor by counsel, nor by any deliberation of their own; and therefore are not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act, but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all these things by a knowledge of their own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a more perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is in the next place another imperfection to be observed in the plattick nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth; in which respect, it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fancy; whereas


2 Epidemicor. Lib. VI. Sect. V. p. 509.

whereas the plastick nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express συνιστησις, con-sense or consciousness of what it doth. Thus the often commended philosopher,
Vital Energies

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Nevertheless, if any one think fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, unawaken’d, or after-thought’d cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gainsay it. For such a τίνα η ἀνθρώπου αὐτή διδώσει, φίλα γενέμει αὐτὸ σῶν οὐκ εἶναι τῶν ἀλλῶν τῆς κατανοίας τῆς σώσεως, ἀλλ’ εἶναι τῶν τῶν ὑπό τῆς ἀνθρώπων προσει-κακίας. If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehensions or sense to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension, as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it, as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake. And since it cannot be denied, but that the plantick nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that, which it stamps and prints upon matter, the same philosopher himself sticks not to call this idea of nature, Θεόμω and Θεομομα, a spectacle and contemplation, as likewise the energy of nature towards it, Θεονία άνθρωπος, a silent contemplation; nay, he allows, that nature may be said to be, in some sense, φιλο-κακίμων, a lover of spectacles or contemplation.

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express εναενήμερος, con-sense and consciousness, animadversion, attention, or self-perception, seems reasonable upon several accounts. For first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again the essence of cogitation in clear and express consciousness, cannot render it any way probable, that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies and apoplexies, as also of embryo’s in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which if they were, according to the principles of their philosophy, they must, ἵππον ἰέρα, cease to have any being. Now if the souls of men and animals be at any time without consciousness and self-perception, then it must needs be granted, that clear and express consciousness is not essential to life. There is some appearance of life and vital sympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called sensitive-plants and plant-animals, cannot well be supposed to have animal sense and fancy, or express consciousness in them; although we are not ignorant in the mean time, how some endeavour to solve all those phænomena mechanically. It is certain, that our human souls themselves are not always conscious of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges some way in him; as also the sleeping musician, all his musical skill and songs; and therefore why may it not be possible for the soul to have likewise some actual energy in it, which it is not expressly conscious of? We have all experience of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as also that we often continue a long series of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital sympathy, by which our soul is united and tied fast, as it were with a knot, to the body, is a thing, that we have no direct consciousness of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell, how we come to be so differently affected in our souls, from the many different motions made upon

* Ubi supra.
upon our bodies. As likewise we are not conscious to ourselves of that energy, whereby we impress variety of motions and figurations upon the animal spirits of our brain in our phantastick thoughts. For though the geometrician perceive himself to make lines, triangles and circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence notwithstanding, as from a glafs, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aristotle to be a weak and obtufe sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastick power in the soul, (if we may so call it) whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connections, in which oftentimes it seems to be surprized with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our motions for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal volutions in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousness. Respiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it) may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul, which does produce it when he is awake, much less when asleep. And lastly, The Cartesian attempts to solve the motion of the heart mechanically seem to be abundantly confuted by autopsy and experiment, evincing the syftole of the heart to be a muscular contrition, caused by some vital principle, to make which nothing but a pulsific corporteal quality in the substance of the heart itself, is very unphilosophical and absurd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the syftole and diafylote of the heart, so are we not conscious to ourselves of any energy of our own soul that causes them; and therefore we may reasonably conclude from hence also, that there is some vital energy, without animal fancy or synæsthesia, express consciousness and self-perception.

18. Wherefore the plastick nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor hormetically, must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, resolves; Natura tanquam fato quodam, fen mandato secundum leges operante, movet; Natura movet as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws. Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity, concerning the mundane oeconomy (they being really the same thing) ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to pass. The Aphroditian philosopher, with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the same thing; and that τὸν ἡμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν, &c.

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1 Lib. III. de anima, Cap. III. IV. p. 45. f. matione fortis, P. II. p. 195. f.
2 Vide Cartef. Libr. de homine & de for-
Nature acts fatally and magically. Book I.

tὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐμφάνιζον, both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is done fatally: but that, which we assert in this place, is only this, that the plattick nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or of the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite of its own, but only fatally according to laws and impresses made upon it, (but differently in different cases) may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. Ἡ ἀληθής μαγική (faith the philosopher') ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φυλία ἡ νεόται, The true magic is the friendship and discord, that is in the universe. And again, magic is said to be founded, ἐν τῇ συμπαθείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποιμαίᾳ πρὸς τὸν ζωὸν συνελεύσιν, in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal. Of which passages though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetic and magical. As indeed that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body, (being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing) may be called also magical.

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plattick nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing, that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet for all that it is neither god nor goddees, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not matter of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor indeed is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws impress'd upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and consciousness of its own, as forms of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophick sense, though they understand nothing at all: and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself but some higher being, as well as the saw or hatchet in the hand of the architect.

Simplic. in A. or Mechanick doth, τὸ σχέτων 'διὰ τὴν πελεκῆ, ἀλλ' οὐ προλογιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐνεάδ. PHYS. [p. 33, edit. GRÆC.] ὑπηρετοῦν; the ax cuts for the sake of something, though itself does not reason, nor intend or design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so. It is true, that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art, and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom, by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intending, with conscientious and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plattick life of nature. Nay, this plattick nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the vegetative.

tative, which is inferior to the sensitive. The difference betwixt nature and wisdom was before observed; that wisdom is the first and highest thing, but nature the last and lowest; this latter being but an inarticulate imitation of the former. And to this purpose, this plafstick nature is further described by the same philosopher, in these words: Τὸν τοιούτον ἐνόον λόγον σώκ αἰκαλὸς νοεῖς. En. 3. 1. 2. 

And though this plafstick nature contain no small part of divine providence in it; yet, since it is a thing, that cannot act electively nor with discretion, it must needs be granted, that there is a higher and diviner providence than this, which also presides over the corporeal world itself; which was a thing likewise insuffled upon by that philosopher: Γνωτίζε τα ἐν τῷ πάντω]. En. 4. 1. 4ν ὁ κατὰ σωματικόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον περιληπτικόν, ἐκ τῶν περιληπτικῶν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σωματικῶν λόγους, ὁ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σωματικοῖς λόγοις ἔνε, κατὰ τοὺς ρινικοὶς, ταύτα τοὺς σωματικοῖς ἀλλὰς λόγους. The things in the world are not administered merely by sfermatick causes, but by perileptic, (that is, comprehensiva intellectual reasons) which are in order of nature before the other, because in the sfermatick reasons cannot be contained that which is contrary to them, &c. Where, though this philosopher may extend his sfermatick reasons further than we do our plafstick nature in this place, (which is only confined to the motions of matter) yet he concludes, that there is a higher principle presiding over the universe than this. So that it is not ratio merita & confusa, a reason drowned in matter, and confounded with it, which is the supreme governor of the world, but a providence perfectly intellectual, abstract and released.

20. But though the plafstick nature be the lowest of all lives, nevertheless since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal; all life being such. For body being nothing but antitypus exstension, or refilling bulk, nothing but mere outside, aliud extra aliud, together with passive capability, hath no internal energy, self-activity, or life belonging to it; it is not able so much as to move itself, and therefore much less can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the exformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the self-same thing that directs the whole. That, which contrives and frames the eye, cannot be a distinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand, from that which makes the foot; the same thing, which delineates the veins, must also form the arteries; and that, which fabricates the nerves, must also project the muscles and joints; it must be the same thing that designs and organizes the heart and brain, with such communications betwixt them; one and the self-same thing must needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the whole organic
The Plastick Nature incorporeal.  

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organick body. For the several parts of matter distant from one another, acting alone by themselves, without any common direc·trix, being not able to confer together, nor communicate with each other, could never possibly combine to make up one such uniform and orderly system or compages, as the body of every animal is. The same is to be said likewise concerning the plastick nature of the whole corporeal universe, in which

"...all things are ordered together conspiringly into one. It must be one and the same thing, which formeth the whole, or else it could never have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the same, acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal."

Indeed Aristotle is severely cen.sured by some learned men for this, that though he talk every where of such a nature as acts regularly, artificially and methodically, in order to the best, yet he does no where positively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental; which yet is the least to be wondered at in him, because he does not clearly determine these same points concerning the rational soul neither, but seems to stagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that Aristotle's followers do for the most part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal; whereas notwithstanding, according to the principles of this philosophy, it cannot possibly be such: for there is nothing else attributed to body in it, besides these three, matter, form and accidents; neither of which can be the Aristotelic nature. First, it cannot be matter; because nature, according to Aristotle, is supposed to be the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle concludes, that they, who assign only a material cause, assign no cause at all to the universe, of well and fit: of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher, that "Φυσικά μετείχον γνώσει, και ειδικά τις θέσεις, φύσις μεταφέρεται και καθιστάται ἄγνωστη, φύσις μεταφέρεται καὶ καθιστάται ἄγνωστη; καὶ οὖν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ οὐσίαν τὸ ὄνομα τούτου. Αιτία τοῦ γὰρ οὐσίαν καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἐστὶν τὰ ἔστιν των ὁμολογικῶν τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ." Nature is more a principle and cause than matter; and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripateticks seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies to be one and the self-same thing, is all one, as if one should make the seal (with the stampet too) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And lastly, Aristotle's nature can leaft of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are; whereas the plastick nature is a thing, that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, subordinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore since

Aristotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.

21. Now if the plastick nature be incorporeal, then it must of necessity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a lower substantial life by itself, devoid of animal consciousnes. The Platonists seem to affirm both these together; namely, that there is a plastick nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes, and men, and also that there is a general plastick or spermatick principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependent upon it, 

That, which is called nature, is the off-spring of an higher soul, which hath a more powerful life in it. And though Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonick doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul.

And this we shall make to appear from his book de partibus animalium, L. I. c. x., after we have taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it: [P. 470. C. Tom. II. Oper.] in order thereunto. For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely these two, 

(1) that for whose sake, (or the final cause) and that from which the principle of motion is, (or the efficient cause;) he determines, that the former of these two is the principal, 

(2) which seems to be the final or the intending cause; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things. Nay, the philosopher adds excellently, that there is more of reason and art in the things of nature, than is in those things that are artificially made by men, 

After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient physiologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionicks before Anaxagoras, that they considered only the efficient cause, the material principle and cause of things, without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous concourse of these forms of bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who being junior to those others before mentioned, philosophized after the same atheistical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the universe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechanism, and supposing all things to arise from

1 Plut. Libr. de Naturâ, Contemplatione, P. 345. Operi,
2 Uno, Ennead. III. Lit. VIII. Cap. III.
from the different compositions of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. Of which Democritick philosophy he gives his censure in these following 

De part. Ar. words: ει μη νος τη σχετικια κη τη χρωματι εκσανιει εστι τω τε ελακα συ τω τουριν, Lib. 1. cap. 1. οδως αν Δημοκριτος ληγει, &c. If animals and their several parts did consist of nothing but figure and colour, then indeed Democritus would be in the right: but a dead man hath the same form and figure of body, that he had before, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden band a band, but only equivocally, as a painted physician, or, pipes made of bone are so called. No member of a dead man's body is that, which it was before, when he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore this is but a rude way of philosophizing, and just as if a carpenter should talk of a wooden band. For thus these physiologers declare the generations and causes of figures only, or the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas no artificer would think it sufficient to render such a cause of any artificial fabric, because the instrument happened to fail so upon the timber, that therefore it was hollow here, and plain there; but rather because himself made such breaks, and for such ends, &c.

Now in the close of all, this philosopher at length declares, that there is another principle of corporeal things, besides the material, and such as is not only the cause of motion, but also acts artificially in order to ends, ιστω το του του κοινων φυσι, there is such a thing as that which we call nature; that is, not the fortuitous motion of fensible matter, but a plastiick regular and artificial nature, such as acts for ends and good; declaring, in the same place, what this nature is, namely that it is ψυξί, η ψυξί μεγας, η μη ανει ψυξί, soul, or part of soul, or not without soul; and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a physiologer, to treat concerning the soul also. But he concludes afterwards, εκε πασα ψυξι φυσι, that the whole soul is not nature; whence it remains, that according to Aristotle's sense, nature is η ψυξί, μεγας, η μη ανει ψυξί, either part of a soul, or not without soul; that is, either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul; or else an inferior kind of life by itself, which is not without soul, but subordinate to it, and dependent on it.

22. As for the bodies of animals, Aristotle first resolves in general, that nature in them is either the whole soul, or else some part of it: Φυσι ισα τη λοον, κη η τελος του ζω, η τοι πασα η ψυξι, η μεγας τη αυτης, Nature as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends, (so far as concerns the bodies of animals) is either the whole soul, or else some part of it. But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plastiick nature is not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of it; oι πασα ψυξι Φυσι, η λοον τι μοριωλαυτης, that is, nature in animals, properly so called, is some lower power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether lenitive or rational.

And that there is plastiick nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle elsewhere affirms and proves after this manner: τι το σφωκο εις σαλατια Φεσομενε, το πυρ κη την γη διασωκουσται γας ει μην εσται το κολον εκ την ται.
And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phenomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that, which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates disjolved continuities, incorporates the newly received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-existent parts of flesh and bone; which regenerates and repairs veins consumed or cut off; which causes dentition in its regular manner, and that not only in infants, but also adult persons; that which casts off excrements, and discharges superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste: that nature of Hippocrates, that is the curatrix of diseases, αὐτός τῶν μετάνοιαν ἱκανός, and that archeus of the chymists or Paracelsians, to which all medicaments are but subservient, as being able to effect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with Aristotle conclude it to be μίζας or μίζας τῆς ψυχῆς, a certain part of the soul of those animals, or a lower inconcious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this plastick nature, which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms or little worlds, there must be also a general plastick nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which plastick nature of the universe the author de Mundo writes after this manner, αὐτός τῶν ἀλοι κόσμου διαπράσματε μὲ τὰ διὰ πάντων διάφωνα δόματα, one power passing through all things ordered and formed the whole world. Again, he calls the same πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ νόος ὁ ὄντα, a spirit, and a living, and generative nature; and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But Aristotle himself in that genuine work of his

1 Epidem. Lib. VI. Sect. V. p. 869.
2 Cap. V. p. 856. inter Aristot. Opera, Tom. I.
3 Ibid. Cap. IV. p. 852.
his before mentioned, speaks clearly and positively concerning this plasti
craft nature of the univerfe, as well as that of animals, in these words; Φακεται:

De Part. Anim. quique ousper è tois teugnuostois téxov, étéis éis autous tois progyamsten allh tis árkh, ai aitia toiautè èi úxov, kecaláper to theov kò to yppheroi èi tov-tavos, did mállno eino; tov xevdò, xepenièkai upò toiautè aitías, ei xépote, ei einai dia toiautè autikè mállto, 

Wherefore it is more probable, that the whole world was at firft made by such a cause as this (if at least it were made) and that it is still preserved by the same, than that mortal animals should be so: for there is much more of order and determinate regularity in the heavenly bodies than in ourselves; but more of fortuitousness and inconstant irregularity among these mortal things. Notwithstanding which, some there are, who, though they cannot but acknowledge, that the bodies of ani
mals were all framed by an artificial nature, yet they will needs contend, that 

the system of the heavens sprung merely from fortune and chance; although there be not the least appearance of fortuitousness or temerity in it. And then he 

fums up all into this conclusion, ou'ti einai \(\Phi\)ακεται \(\varepsilon\)tì \(\varepsilon\)ti \(\tau\)oiutì \(\delta\) \(\varepsilon\) \(\varphi\) kai \(\mu\) 

Wherefore it is manifest, that there is some such thing as that which we 
call nature; that is, that there is not only an artificial, methodical and plasti
craft nature in animals, by which their respective bodies are framed and 

conferred, but also that there is such a general plasti
craft nature likewise in the univerfe, by which the heavens and whole world are thus artificially or
dered and disposed.

24. Now whereas Aristotlè, in the forecited words, tells us, that we par
take of life and understanding from that in the univerfe, after the same 
manner as we partake of heat and cold from that heat and cold that is in the univerfe; it is observable, that this was a notion borrowed from Socrates; 

(as we understand both from Xenophou and Plato) that philopher having 

used it as an argumentation to prove a Deity. And the lense of it is repre

fented after this manner by the Latin poet 1:

Principio calum ac terram, campisque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum lune, Titaniâque ebra,
Spiritus inus alti, totaisque inlua per artus,
Mens agitat molem, & magnè se corpore miset.
Inde bominum pecudumque genus, vieaque volantium.

From whence it may be collected, that Aristotlè did suppose this plasti
craft nature of the univerfe to be \(\nu\) \(\mu\) \(\phi\) xè, \(\nu\) \(\mu\) \(\delta\) \(\theta\) \(\nu\) \(\phi\) xè, either part of 
some mundane soul, that was also conscious and intellectual, (as that plasti
craft nature

1 Virgil. Æneid. Lib. VI. vers. 724.
nature in animals is) or at least some inferior principle, depending on such a soul. And indeed whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripateticks be, we make no doubt at all but that Aristotle himself held the world's animation, or a mundane soul: forasmuch as he plainly declares himself concerning it elsewhere in his book de Caelo, after this manner: ἀλλά ἤμειν οὗ τεις σωμάτων ἅτις ἐστιν τῶν μὲν ἐκ τούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ἄλλων ἄλλων. διότι ὁ φώτις. But we commonly think of the heavens as nothing else but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate; whereas we ought, on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action: that is, as being induced with a rational or intellectual life. For so Simplicius¹ there rightly expounds the place; ἀλλά μὴν οὗτος ἰμμοῖν αὐτῶν συναντήθηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων μὲν ἄλλων, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων συμμέτρειαν, τὸ δὲ πράξεως κύριον κατὰ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν καταπραγματεύεται. But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For (faith he) though souls be affirmed not only of irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, yet the word πράξεως does only denominate rational beings. But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this business, that philosopher before, in the same book ² ἄριττος affirmeth, ὅτι ἐν ὀφείοις ἰμμοῖν, καὶ ἄλλοις μικροίς ἐστὶν; that the heaven is animated, and hath a principle of motion within itself: where, by the heaven, as in many other places of Aristotle and Plato, is to be understood the whole world.

There is indeed one passage in the same book de Caelo, which, at first sight, and slightly considered, may seem to contradict this again; and therefore probably is that, which hath led many into a contrary persuasion, that Aristotle denied the world's animation, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὗτος ἰμμοῖν ἀνακαίνη ἐν θεῷ ἢ ποιμήν ἡμῶν ἅτις. L. c. 16. ἠθάνατη γὰρ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν μετὰ θεῖα ὑπάρχην, περίποιμον τὸ πρόων σῶμα ἅτις καὶ κυνων συμμέτρειαν, ἀρικοῦν εἰς καὶ πάσης ἀποκλεισμοῦ βασιλείας ἰμμοῖν ἁμαρτών: εἶναι μὴν ἐνήργεις, τὴν ψυχήν τῷ βοηθῷ ἐξισοαπάστως οἳ περὶ τῶν ὑπάρχων εἰς τὸ σώμα τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποκλειστῶν. But it is not reasonable neither to think, that the heavens continue to eternity, moved by a soul necessitating, or violently compelling them. Nor indeed is it possible, that the life of such a soul should be pleasurable or happy: forasmuch as the continual violent motion of a body (naturally inclining to move another away) must needs be a very unquiet thing, and void of all mental repose, especially when there is no such relaxation as the souls of mortal animals have by sleep; and therefore such a soul of the world as this must of necessity be condemned to an eternal Ixionian fate. But in these words Aristotle does not deny the heavens to be moved by a soul of their own, (which is positively affirmed by him elsewhere) but only by such, a soul as should violently and forcibly agitate, or drive them round, contrary to their own natural inclination, whereby, in the mean time, they tended downwards of themselves towards the centre. And his sense concerning the motion of the heavens is truly represented by Simplicius, in this manner: τὸ δὲ ἓλιον Φώτων καὶ Ζ 2

¹ Comment in Libr. de Caelo, f. 126. ² Aristot. de Caelo, Lib. II. Cap. II. p. 642. Tom. I. Oper.
The Plastick Nature of the World

Book I.

The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animalish body, is moved properly by soul, but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent. But whereas Aristotle there infinuates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingenuously acknowledges his error herein, and, vindicating Plato from that imputation, shews how he likewise held a plastick nature, as well as a mundane soul; and that amongst his ten instances of motion, the ninth is that of nature, 

De Leg. I. 10.

τὰ ζητεῖν ἀνεῖ κινεῖται τὸ φῶςκεν. The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animalish body, is moved properly by soul, but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent. But whereas Aristotle there infinuates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingenuously acknowledges his error herein, and, vindicating Plato from that imputation, shews how he likewise held a plastick nature, as well as a mundane soul; and that amongst his ten instances of motion, the ninth is that of nature,

But the grand objection against Aristotle's holding the world's animation is still behind; namely, from that in his Metaphysics¹, where he determines the highest starry heaven to be moved by an immovable mover, commonly supposed to be the Deity itself, and no soul of the world; and all the other spheres likewise to be moved by so many separate intelligencies, and not by souls. To which we reply, that indeed Aristotle's first immovable mover is no mundane soul, but an abstract intellect separate from matter, and the very Deity itself; whose manner of moving the heavens is thus described by him, καὶ ς ἦν ὡς ἵππον, it moveth only as being loved. Wherefore, besides this supreme unmoved mover, that philosopher supposed another inferior moved mover also, that is, a mundane soul, as the proper and immediate efficient cause of the heavenly motions; of which he speaks after this manner: κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἀνεῖ καὶ ἐν άλλοις τοῖς ἕνωσες αὐτὸς, both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetit and desire of assimilating itself thereunto. Aristotle seeming to have borrowed this notion from Plato ², who makes the constant regular circumscription of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that Aristotle's first mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cause, of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cause thereof being ἡ φύσις, soul and nature.

Neither may this be confused from those other Aristotelick intelligences of the lesser orbs; that philosopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were also the abstract minds or intellects of certain other inferior souls,

¹ Lib. XIV. Cap. VII, VIII, IX. p. 476. f.
² Metaph. Lib. XIV. Cap. VIII. p. 479.
³ De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 669. & alius.
fouls, which moved their several respective bodies or orbs, circularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme mover, that they do κυηαν ὅς τίλος, move only as the end.

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastick nature, yet he did not make either of these to be the supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was αὐθεντικὸς σωφρίς, a moveable nature, whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner, ὅτι ἐν Μετ. 1. 14. τῇ τοιούτῳ ἀρκετῆς ἑπταληθῇ ἑν ἑκάστῳ ἐν Φοίνικι. That upon such a principle as this heaven, and nature depends; that is, the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together with the plastick nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon a perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelick doctrine concerning the plastick nature of the universe, with which the Platonick also agrees, that it is, ἡ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἡ μὲν ὅσι ἑκάστη, either part of a mundane intellectual soul, (that is, a power and faculty of it) or else not without it, but some inferior thing depending on it; we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct from the supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastick nature of the universe depending immediately upon the Deity itself. For the plastick nature essentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not possibly be without it; according to those words before cited, ἐν τοιούτῳ ἀρκετῆς ἑπταληθῇ ἐν Φοίνικι. Nature depends upon such an intellectual principle; and for this cause that philosopher does elsewhere join οὐ: and Φοίνικι, mind and nature both together.

25. Besides this general plastick nature of the universe, and those particular plastick powers in the souls of animals, it is not impossible but that there may be other plastick natures also (as certain lower lives, or vegetative souls) in some greater parts of the universe; all of them depending, if not upon some higher conscious soul, yet at least upon a perfect intellect preceding over the whole. As for example; though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb and pile of grafts, hath a particular plastick life, or vegetative soul of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endowed with a conscious soul; yet there may possibly be, for aught we know, one plastick nature or life belonging to the whole terrestrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different seeds, as also minerals and other bodies framed, and whatsoever else is above the power of fortuitous mechanism effect, as by the immediate cause, though always subordinate to other causes; the chief

whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may ease the minds of those, who cannot but think it too much, to impose all upon one plattick nature of the universe.

26. And now we have finished our first task, which was to give an account of the plattick nature, the sum whereof briefly amounts to this; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind and understanding, reason and wisdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itself do not know the reason of what it does, nor is matter of that wisdom according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of the same; it operating fatally and sympathetically, according to laws and commands prescribed to it by a perfect intellect, and imperfect upon it; and which is either a lower faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life or soul by itself; but essentially depending upon an higher intellect.

We proceed to our second undertaking; which was to shew, how grossly those two sorts of Atheists before mentioned, the Stoical or Cosmo-plattick, and the Stratonical or Hylozoick, both of them acknowledging this plattick life of nature, do mistake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuse it, to make a certain spurious and counterfeit God-almighty of it, (or a first principle of all things) thereby excluding the true omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, presiding over the universe; they substituting this stupid plattick nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or mistakes of these Atheists concerning the plattick nature, are these four following. First, that they make that to be the first principle of all, and the highest thing in the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives; a thing essentially secondary, derivative, and dependent. For the plattick life of nature is but the mere umbrage of intellectuality, a faint and shadowy imitation of mind and understanding; upon which it doth as essentially depend, as the shadow doth upon the body, the image in the glass upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plattick nature in it, than there could be an image in the glass without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be φειάς, then there must be Φειάς: if there be a plattick nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the best wisdom, though itself not comprehending the reason of it, nor being clearly conscious of what it doth; then there must of necessity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore Aristotle does like a philosopher in joining Φειάς and Φειάς, nature and mind both together; but these Atheists do very absurdly and unphilosophically, that would make a senseless and unconscious plattick nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the first original of all things.

Secondly,
Secondly, these Atheists augment the former error, in supposing those higher lives of sense or animality, and of reason or understanding, to rise both of them from that lower senseless life of nature, as the only original fundamental life. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and absurd, as if one should suppose the light, that is in the air or æther, to be the only original and fundamental light, and the light of the sun and stars but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing but the light of the air modified and improved by condensation: or as if one should maintain, that the sun and moon, and all the stars, were really nothing else, but the mere reflections of those images, that we see in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the sortish humour and guise of Atheists, to invert the order of the universe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man, with its heels upwards. Conscious reason and understanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection, than that dull plaitick nature, which does only do, but not know, can never possibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that simple and stupid life of nature into redoubled consciousnes or self-perception; nor any triplication, or indeed milleclupation of them, improve the same into reason and understanding.

Thirdly: for the better colouring of the former errors, the Hylozoists adulterate the notion of the plaitick life of nature, confounding it with wisdome and understanding. And though themselves acknowledge, that no animal-sense, self-perception and consciousnes belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wise, and consequently every atom of senseless matter that is in the whole world, to be inallibly omniscient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatsoever itself can do or suffer; which is plainly contradicitious. For though there may be such a thing as the plaitick nature, that, according to the former description of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of express consciousnes or self-perception, yet perfect knowledge and understanding without consciousnes is non-sense and impossibility. Wherefore this must needs be condemned for a great piece of sortishnes in the Hylozoick Atheists, that they attribute perfect wisdome and understanding to a stupid inconscious nature, which is nothing but Ενέργεια, the mere drudging instrument, or manuary opificer of a perfect mind.

Lastly, these Atheists err in this, that they make this plaitick life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itself, much less therefore can it artificially order and dispose its own motion. And though the plaitick nature be indeed the lowest of all lives, yet notwithstanding since it is a life, or internal energy, and self-actuality, distinct from local motion, it must needs be incorporeal, all life being essentially such. But the Hylozoists conceive grossly both of life and understanding, spreading them all over upon matter, just as butter is spread upon bread, or plaster upon a wall, and accordingly slicing them out in different quantities
quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body, as the only substance; and consequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing else but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole corporeal universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, that is supposed to be the cause of all things: which fond dream or dotage of theirs will be further confused in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long (though necessary) digression, concerning the plastick life of nature, or an artificial, orderly and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. Plato gives an account, why he judged it necessary in those times, publicly to propose that atheistic hypothesis, in order to a confusion, as also to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner; 

De Leg. 
[10.]
[P. 666.]
Dger.] 

Diog. La. in vita Prot. 
[Lib. IX. 
[Legm. 51. 
P. 576.]

Had not these atheistic doctrines been publicly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needful to have confused them, nor by reasons to prove a Deity; but now it is necessary. And we conceive, that the same necessity at this time will justify our present undertaking likewise; since these atheistic doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publicly asserted in this latter age of ours, as ever they could be in Plato's time; when the severity of the Athenian government must needs be a great check to such designs, Socrates having been put to death upon a mere false and groundless accusation of atheism, and Protagoras, (who doubtless was a real Atheist) having escaped the fame punishment no other wise than by flight, his books being notwithstanding publicly burnt in the market-place at Athens, and himself condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved against him, save only this one sceptical passage, in the beginning of a book of his, περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἶπεν, εἰ δ' ἐστι, εἰ δ' ἄριστον, πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ χωρίων εἶδοι, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, χρείας ἔνας τοῦ αἰθείαν. Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to say, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the knowledge of this matter, both the obscurity of the thing itself, and the brevity of human life. Whereas atheism, in this latter age of ours, hath been impudently asserted, and most indifferently promoted; that very atomick form, that was first introduced (a little before Plato's time) by Leucippus, Protagoras, and Democritus, having been also revived amongst us, and that with no small pomp and ostentation of wisdom and philosophy.

It was before observed, that there were two several forms of atomical philosophy; first, the most ancient and genuine, that was religious, called Moschical (or if you will Mosalaical) and Pythagorical; secondly, the adulterated atheistic atomology, called Leucippean or Democritical. Now accordingly, there have been in this latter age of ours two several successive refurrections or restitutions of those two atomologies. For Renatus Cartesius first revived and restored the atomick philosophy, agreeably, for the most part, to that ancient Moschical and Pythagorick form; acknowledging besides
Chap. III. lately Revived.

fides extended substance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal substance, and joining metaphysics or theology, together with physiology, to make up one entire system of philosophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this physiology of his, as to the mechanick part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactness at least equal with the best atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheless, this Cartesian philosophy is highly obnoxious to censure upon some accounts; and the chief whereof is this, that deviating from that primitive Moschical atomology, in rejecting all plastick nature, it derives the whole system of the corporeal universe from the necessary motion of matter, only divided into particles insensibly small, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any understanding nature. By means whereof, though it boast of solving all the corporeal phænomena by mere fortuitous mechanism, and without any final or mental causality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandest of all phænomena, the ἴον οὐκ ἀκαλυπτέον, the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane system. The occasion of which miscarriage hath been already intimated, namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the essence of cogitation to consist in express conscioufnens; from whence it follows, that there could be no plastick nature, and therefore either all things must be done by fortuitous mechanism, or else God himself be brought immediately upon the stage for the solving of all phænomena. Which latter absurdity our philosopher being over-careful to avoid, cast himself upon the former, the banishing of all final and mental causality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philosophick causes, beside material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even some of the ancient religious Atomists were also too much infected with this mechanizing humour; but Renatus Cartesius hath not only outdone them all herein, but even the very Atheists themselves also, as shall be shewed afterward; and therefore as much as in him lies, has quite disarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity, taken from the regular frame and harmony of the universe. To which gross miscarriage of his there might be also another added, that he seems to make matter necessarily existent, and essentially infinite and eternal. Notwithstanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him, that he really designed atheism, the fundamental principles of his philosophy being such, as that no atheistick structure can possibly be built upon them. But shortly after this Cartesian restitution of the primitive atomology, that acknowledged incorporeal substance, we have had our Leucippus and Democritus too, who also revived and brought again upon the stage that other atheistick atomology, that makes ἁέξαν τοι τῶν ἐλαχίστων, senseless and lifeless atoms to be the only principles of all things in the universe; thereby necessarily excluding, besides incorporeal substance and immortality of souls, a Deity and natural morality; as also making all actions and events materially and mechanically necessary.

Now there could be no satisfactory confusion of this atheistick hypothesis, without a fair proposal first made of the several grounds of it to their
Two sorts of Atheists in Plato.  

best advantage, which we have therefore endeavoured in the former chapter. The answers to which atheiftick arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be referred for the last part of the whole treatifie, where we are positively to determine the right intellectual system of the univerfe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three false hypotheces of the mundane sytem, together with their several grounds. Nevertheless, because it might not only seem indecorous, for the answers to those atheiftick arguments to be so long deferred, and placed so far behind the arguments themselves, but also prove otherwise really inconvenient, we shall therefore chuse rather to break those laws of method, (neglecting the scrupulofity thereof) and subjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader’s pardon for this preposterousnes.

It is certain, that the source of all atheifm is generally a dull and earthy disbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of sense; and it cannot be denied, but that there is something of immorality in the temper of all Atheists, as all atheiftick doctrine tends also to immorality. Notwithstanding which, it must not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatick Atheists came to be such merely by means of grofs intemperance, fenuality, and debauchery. Plato indeed describes one sort of Atheists in this manner; οἷς ἀν πέρ ἀνθρώπους τῷ θάνατον ἔφεσθαι, Δίκαιος ἦσαν, ἐκ τὴν θεοτ χρὴν πάλιν, ἀκράταις τι ἕνων, καὶ λυπῶν προσεύς, μηγαλοὶ τι ἑικόνες καὶ μαθητές ὀξίαις παρόντες. Such, who together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are added also by intemperance of pleafures and pains, and buried away with violent lufts, being persons otherwise ended with strong memories, and quick wits. And there are the de¬bauched, ranting, and hectoring Atheists. But besides these, that philosopher tells us, that there is another sort of Atheists also, οἷς μη νομίζοντες θεὸς ἐστὶν τῷ παραπτώματι, ἀκράταις διδάσκειν δικάς, μισούν τις γεροντος τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τῷ νοσθεραιον τῷ ἀδικίαν, ὥσ ποικίλλοικας πράξεις προσεύς πράξειν, τὰς τις εἰκόνας τῶν ἀνθρώπων φερόμεν, καὶ τις δικαιος τίγχον. Such, who though they think there be no gods at all, yet notwithstanding being naturally disposed to justice and moderation, as they will not do outragious and exorbitant things themselves, so they will frown the conversation of wicked debauched persons, and delight rather in the society of those that are fair and just. And these are a fort of externally honest or civilized Atheists. Now what that thing is, which besides grofs fenuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheiftick opinions, the same philosopher also declares; namely, that it is an affectation of singularity, or of seeming wiser than the generalty of mankind. For thus when Clinias had disputed honestly against Atheists, from those vulgar topicks of the regularity and harmony of the univerfe (observable in the courfes of fun, moon, and stars, and the feasons of the year) and of the common notions of mankind, in that both Greeks and Barbarians generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a sufficient confutation of atheifm, the Athenian Hofes hereupon discovers a great fear and jealousy, which he had, lest he should thereby but render himself an object of contempt to Atheists, as being a conceited
conceited and scornful generation of men. Αθ. Φοβημαί γε μακάρει τις
μυθήρες, μήπως υμών καλαφεύοντον, ύμες μίας γελών ήτε αυτώς πείς,
tην της δικ. Φοβηζής αίτια, άλλα ήπειρες ακατελέον μείον κάκωι της επιθυμίας ἐπὶ τον ἀκάτη βίον
όρμαξιν τας ψυχὰς αυτῶν, &c. I am afraid of those wicked men the Atheists,
left they should despise you: for you are ignorant concerning them, when you
think the only cause of atheism to be intemperance of pleasures and lusts, vio-
rently hurrying mens souls on to a wicked life. Clin. What other cause of
atheism can there be besides this? Αθ. That which you are not aware of,
who live remotely, namely, Αμαθία μάλα χαλαπτή δοκιμά έσαι μεγίς Φαβίκος;
a certain grievous ignorance, which yet notwithstanding hath the appearance
of the greatest wisdom. And therefore afterwards, when that philosopher
goes about to propoe the atheistical hypothesis, he calls it to, τὸ πορὰ πολλὸς
διεξαζόμενον ευαι σοφότατον ἀπότατον λόγον, that which to many seemeth to be the
wisest and profoundest of all doctrines.

And we find the same thing at this very day, that Atheists make a great
pretence to wisdom and philosophy; and that many are tempted to maintain
atheistical opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it. Which
indeed was one reason, that the rather induced us, nakedly to reveal
all the mysteries of atheism, because we observed, that so long as these
things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be the rather
apt to suspect, that there is some great depth and profundity of wis-
dom lodged in them; and that it is some noble and generous truth, which
the bigotick religious endeavour to smoother and suppress.

Now the case being thus, it was pertinently suggested also by the fore-
mentioned philosopher, διά συμφοβον, γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ Φαβίου οἱ λόγοι ἀπὸμονοι
αιθεῶν, ἀλλοις τε έξέχοντες, μῆθε εἰ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ’ εξεστηκαίνως έχεόμενοι.
That it must needs be a matter of no small moment, for any one to make it ap-
pear, that they, who maintain wicked atheistical opinions, do none of them reason
rightly, but grobly stumble in all their ratiocinations. And we hope to effect this
in our present undertaking, to make it evident, that Atheists are no such
conjurers, as (though they hold no spirits) they would be thought to be; no such gigantick
men of reason, nor profound philosophers, but that not-
withstanding all their pretensions to wit, their atheism is really nothing else,
but ἀμαθία μάλα χαλαπτή, a most grievous ignorance, sottishness and stupidity
of mind in them.

Wherefore we shall, in the next place, conjure down all those devils raised
and displayed in their most formidable colours, in the precedent chapter;
or rather we shall discover, that they are really nothing else, but what these
Atheists pretend God and incorporeal spirits to be, mere phantastick spectres
and impostures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all
truth and reality. Neither shall we only confute those atheistical arguments,
and so stand upon our defensive posture, but we shall also assaill atheism

A a 2

even with its own weapons, and plainly demonstrate, that all forms of
atheism are unintelligible nonsense and absolute impossibility to human rea-
son: as we shall likewise, over and above, occasionally infer some (as we
think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.

The Digression concerning the Plastick Life of Nature,
or an Artificial, Orderly and Methodical Nature,
N. 37. Chap. 3.

1. That neither the hylozoick nor cosmo-plastick Atheists are con-
demned for ascertaining an orderly and artificial plastick nature, as a
life distinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only
by the atomick Atheists, but also by some professed Theists, who with-
standing might have an undeniable tangle of the mechanically-athiestick
humour hanging about them. 2. If there be no plastick artificial nature
admitted, then it must be concluded, that either all things come to pass
by fortuitous mechanism, and material necessity (the motion of matter
unguided) or else that God doth αὐτογράφω διαφάτικα, do all things himself
immediately and miraculously, framing the body of every gnat and fly,
as it were with his own hands; since divine laws and commands cannot
execute themselves, nor be the proper efficient causes of things in nature.
3. To suppose all things to come to pass fortuitously, or by the unguided
motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheistical and
impious; there being many phænomena, not only above the powers of
mechanism, but also contrary to the laws of it. The mechanick Theists
make God an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and
render his wisdom altogether ufeless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious
censure of the fortuitous Mechanists, with the ridiculousness of that pre-
tence, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical.
4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to
reason, that he should αὐτογράφω διαφάτικα, do all things himself immediately
and miraculously, nature being quite superseded and made to signify no-
thing. The same further confuted by the slow and gradual process of
things in nature, as also by those errors and bungles, that are committed,
when the matter proves inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to
be irreflible. 5. Reasonably inferred, that there is a plastick nature in
the universe, as a subordinate instrument of divine providence, in the or-
derly disposial of matter; but yet so as not without a higher providence,
presiding over it, forasmuch as this plastick nature cannot act effectively
or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion, which the
mechanick Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else but a plastick
nature. 6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the
best philosophers in all ages, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus,
Hippocrates, Zeno, and the Paracelians. Anaxagoras, though a professed
Theist,
The plattick nature above human art. First, that whereas human art
acts upon the matter from without cumberSomely and moliminoSly, with
tumult and hurly-burly, nature acting on it from within more command-
ingly doth its workS caftly, cleverly and silently. Human art acts on
the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. 10. The sec-
ond pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human
artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate,
and upon second thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to
seek, nor unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent afterwards of
what she hath done, changing her former course. Human artists them-
selves consult not, as artists, but only for want of art; and therefore
nature, though never consulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that
what is called nature is really the divine art. 11. Nevertheless, that na-
ture is not the divine art, pure, and abstrac, but concreted and embodied
in matter, ratio merisa & confusa; not the divine art archetypal, but ec-
typal. Nature differs from the divine art, as the manuary opificer from
the architect. 12. Two imperfections of the plattick nature, in respect
whereof it falls short even of human art; first, that though it act for ends
artificially, yet itself neither intends those ends, nor understands the rea-
on of what it doth, and therefore cannot act electively. The difference
between the spermatick reasons and knowledge. Nature doth bat ape or
mimick the divine art or wisdom, being not matter of that reason, ac-
cording to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging execu-
tioner of it. 13. Proved that there may be such a thing as acts artificially;
though itself do not comprehend that art, by which its motions are go-
venced; first from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life
of nature. 14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute-
animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their
own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own.
The instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the divine wisdom, and a
kind of fate upon them. 15. The second imperfection of the plattick
nature, that it acts without animal fancy, coniisnow, express con-senfe;
and consciousnes, and is devoid of self-perception and self-enjoyment.

16. Whether this energy of the plattick nature be to be called cogitation
or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what
moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct
from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without
that duplicity, which is in synæstheſis, or clear and express consciousnes.

Nevertheless, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drouify,
unawakened, or astonifh'd cogitation. 17. Instances, which render it pro-
able, that there may be a vital energy, without synæstheſis, clear and ex-
press conſience, or consciousnes. 18. The plattick nature, acting nei-
ther knowingly nor phantaftically, acts fatally, magically and sympa-
thetically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation
in the mind of God, but an energetick and effectual principle; and the
plattick nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal
world. What magick is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts also
magically and sympathetically. 19. That the plattick nature, though it
be the divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddess,
but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no
otherwise, than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent
philosophick fenfe; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a
skilful mechanick. The plattick and vegetative life of nature the lowest
of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that
of the plattick nature governing the corporeal world itself. 20. Not-
withstanding which, forasmuch as the plattick nature is a life, it must
needs be incorporeal. One and the same thing, having in it an entire
model and platform, and acting upon several distant parts of matter at
once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though Aristotle no where de-
clares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither
doeth clearly concerning the rational soul) and his followers conclude it to
be corporeal, yet according to the very principles of that philosophy it
must needs be otherwise. 21. The plattick nature being incorporeal,
must either be a lower power lodged in souls, that are also conscious, sen-
fitive or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior
kind of soul. How the Platonists complicate both thefe together; with
Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul,
or not without soul. 22. The plattick nature as to animals, according
to Aristotle, a part or lower power of their respective souls. That
the phenomenae prove a plattick nature or archeus in animals, to make
which a distinct thing from the soul, is to multiply entities without
necessity. The soul endued with a plattick power, the chief forma-
trix of its own body, the contribution of certain other causes not ex-
cluded. 23. That besides that plattick principle in particular ani-
mal's, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general pla-
tick nature in the whole corporeal univerfe, which likewise, accord-
ing to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mun-
dane soul, or else something depending on it. 24. That no lefs ac-
cording to Aristotle than Plato, and Socrates, our selves partake of life
from the life of the univerfe, as well as we do of heat and cold,
from the heat and cold of the universe; from whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof thereof. An answer to two the most considerable places of that philosopher, that seem to imply the contrary. That Aristotle's first immovable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellectual abstract from matter; but that he supposed this to move only as a final cause, or as being loved, and besides it, a mundane soul and plastick nature, to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature, nor his mundane soul, the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet notwithstanding there may be a plastick nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 25. No impossibility of some other particular plastick principles; and though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a plastick or vegetative soul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet that there may possibly be one plastick in conscious nature in the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. 26. Our second undertaking, which was to shew how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this plastick nature) misunderstand it and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God-Almighty or Numen of it, to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing, that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. 27. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single in conscious life to advance into redoubled consciousfnes and self-enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousfnes. 29. Lastly, in making the plastick life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only substance; and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, the cause of all things.
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistical argument. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea, as essentially including unity or oneliness in it, from the Pagan polytheism, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. What their polytheism and idolatry was, with some account of Christianity. 1. The either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheiists, in denying the word GOD to have any significating, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολύσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrification (or dead insensibility) of the mind. 2. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they have also the same idea of him with Theists, they denying the very same thing which the others affirm. 3. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, that though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made. 4. The two most opposite opinions, concerning that which was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things; the other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The asserter of this latter
latter opinion, Theists in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect consciously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. 5. Observed, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing. 6. In order to the more punctual declaration of the divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle. 7. That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theists. Their idea of God declared, with its defective nature. A latitude in theism. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter. 8. The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intellectual and necessary existence, but also omni-cauality, omnipotence and infinite power; and therefore God the sole principle of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagan acknowledged the divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from Lucretius. 9. That absolute perfection implies something more than power and knowledge. A vaticination in mens minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to Aristotle; and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consists. This borrowed from Plato, who makes the biggest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God, and the supreme good, according to the scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial love, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also to be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicate and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. 10. That this idea of God essentially includes unity or oneness in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or oneness of the Deity supposed also by Epicurus and Lucretius, who professedly denied a God, according to this idea. 11. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and solitariness, from the polytheism of all nations formerly, besides the Jews, and of all the wise men and philosophers: from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institution. An enquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan polytheists universally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world. 12. First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena; which render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan polytheists. 13. Secondly, that
that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asser ted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods.
The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereafter by the Ma nicbean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asser ted by the Greek philosophers, as Plutarch affir med. Questioned whether the Persian evil Demon or Arimanius were a self-existent principle, essentially evil. Aris totle's confusion and explosion of many principles, or independent deities. Faustus the Manichean his conceit, that the Jews and Chri stians pagan is ed, in the opinion of monarchy, with St. Austin's judgment, concerning the Pagans, thereupon. 14. Concluded that the Pagan polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God, (as On atus the Pythagorean declares himself) in different senses: many inferior deities subordinate to one supreme. 15. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God. 16. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest prom oters of Polytheism, was agreeable hertunto, which will be proved, not from suspected writings, (as of Trismegist and the Sibyls) but such as are inudibate. First, that Zoroa fter, the chief promoter of polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his own words cited by Euse bius. 17. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanick polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records. 18. That the Egyptians them selves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgement amongst them of one supreme Deity. 19. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, made it look more aritocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one prince and father of gods. That famous passage of Sophocles not to be suspected, though not found in any of these tragedies now extant. 20. That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principal of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras his one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes his one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods. 21. Parmenides his supreme God, one immovable. Empedocles his both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called τὸ τῶν, senior to them. Zeno Elea e his demonstration of one God, in Aristotel. 22. Philolaus his prince and governor of all God always one. Euclides Megarensis his God, called τὸ τῶν ἄρα τοῦ, one the very good. Timeæus Locrus his mind and good, above the soul of the world. Antithenes his one natural God.
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God. Onatus bis Corypheus. 23. Generally believed and true, that So- 
crates acknowledged one supreme God; but that he disclaimed all the infe-
terior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error. Plato also a polytheist, and that 
passage, which some lay so great stress upon, (that he was serious when he 
began his epistles with God, but when with gods jocular,) spurious and coun-
terfeit; and yet he was notwithstanding an undoubtedly polytheist also in 
another sense; an asserted of one God over all, of a maker of the world, 
of a first God, of a greatest of the gods. The first hypothesis of the Pla-
nick trinity properly the king of all things, for whose sake are all things; 
the father of the cause and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal in-
telleet, or λόγος. 24. Aristotle an acknowledge of many gods (he accounting 
the stars such) and yet an express asserter of τὸ πάντα, one prince, 
one immovable mover. 25. Cleanthes and Chryssippus Stoics, though they 
filied the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, yet notwithstanding 
y they acknowledged only one God immortal, Jupiter, all the rest being con-
sumed into him, in the successive conflagrations, and afterwards made a-new 
by him. Cleanthes his excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God. 26. 
Endepts to cite all the passages of the later Pagan writers and polytheists, in 
which one supreme God is asserted. Excellent discourses in some of them con-
cerning the Deity, particularly Plotinus, who, though he derived all things, 
even matter itself, from one supreme Deity, yet was a contenter for many 
gods. 27. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but 
also the general belief of the Pagan vulgar: that there was one supreme 
God, proved from Maximus Tyrius. The Romans Deus optimus mi-
mus. The Pagans, when most serious, spoke of God singularly. Kyrie 
Eleison part of the Pagans litany to the supreme God. The more civilized 
Pagans at this very day acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the 
world. 28. Plutarch's testimony, that, notwithstanding the variety of Pa-
ganick religions, and the different names of gods used in them, yet one reason, 
mind or providence ordering all things, and its inferior ministers, were 
alike everywhere worshipped. 29. Plain that the Pagan Theists must needs 
acknowledge one supreme Deity, because they generally believed the whole 
world to be one animal, governed by one soul. Some Pagans made this soul 
of the world their supreme God; others an abstract mind superior to it. 30. 
The Hebrew doctors generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans worshi-
pped one supreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators be-
tween him and men. 31. Lastly, this confirmed from scripture. The Pa-
gans knew God. Aratus bis Jupiter, and the Athenians unknown God, 
the true God. 32. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, 
and shewing the occasion of its being misunderstood, three heads requisite to 
be insisted on. First, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God under 
many names: Secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many 
gods, which were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him: Thirdly, that 
they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues and 
symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. First, that the su-
preme God amongst the Pagans was polonymous, and worshipped under 
several personal names, according to his several attributes and the manifes-
tations.
tions of them, his gifts and effects in the world. 33. That upon the same account, beings not substantial were personificated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God. 34. That as the whole corporeal world animated was suppos'd by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piece-meal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God. 35. The second head proposed, that besides the one supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods; theirs, made gods, created intellectual beings superior to men. 36. The Pythagorick or Platonick trinity of divine hypothesies. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades. 37. The other inferior deities acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers, of three sorts. First, the sun, moon and stars, and other greater parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods. 38. Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal and aereal animals, called demons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons and things. 39. The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and Scythian, or men-gods. Euemerus taxed by Plutarch, for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men. 40. The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues and symbols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called Σαλιανοι, or Bethels. 41. That afterwards images, statues and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering, worshipped towards the east: one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolic presence of the God of Israel. 42. All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in Plato. 43. That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the inanimate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing betwixt their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans otherwise than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own, or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having demons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or lastly, as being images or symbols of divine things. 44. That though the Egyptians be said to have worshipped brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wiser of them used them only as hieroglyphicks and symbols. 45. That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them, whether by divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined. 46. The Pagans
apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worshipping one supreme God under many personal names, and that not only according to his several attributes, but also his several manifestations, gifts and effects, in the visible world. With an excuse for those corporeal Theists, who worshipped the whole animated world as the supreme God, and the several parts of it under personal names, as living members of him. 47. Their apology for worshipping, besides the one supreme God, many inferior Deities. That they worshipping them only as inferior could not therefore be guilty of giving them that honour, which was proper to the supreme. That they honoured the supreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their sacrifices, and that material sacrifices were not the proper worship of the supreme God, but rather below him. 48. Several reasons of the Pagans, for giving religious worship to inferior created beings. First, that this honour, which is bestowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 49. That as demons are mediators between the celestial gods and men, so those celestial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themselves also mediators between man and the supreme God, and as it were convenient steps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him. 50. That there is an honour in justice due to all these excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honour every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the supreme God hath set it. 51. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities and persons, and the several parts of the corporeal universe, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 52. That the inferior gods, demons and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being also irascible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our interest as our duty to pacify and appease them by worship. 53. Lastly, that it cannot be thought, that the supreme God will envy those inferior gods that worship or honour, which is bestowed upon them; nor suspected, that any of those inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves against the supreme God. 54. That many of the Pagans worshipped none but good demons, and that those of them, who worshipped evil ones, did it only in order to their appeasement and mitigation, that so they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil-worshippers, who honour evil demons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, lust and ambition. 55. The Pagans plead, that those demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst them, must needs be good, since there cannot be a greater reproach to the supreme God, than to suppose him to appoint evil demons as presidents and governors over the world, or to suffer them to have so great a sway and share of power in it. The faith of Plato in divine providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphick Apollo was therefore a good demon. 56. The Pagans apology for worshipping the supreme God in images, statues and symbols. That these are only schettically worshipped by them, the honour passing from them to the prototype. And that since we living in bodies cannot easily have a conception of any thing without
without some corporeal image or phantasm, thus much must be indulged to the
infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to the worship of God,
corporeally in images, to prevent their running to atheism. 57. That thought
it should appear by this apologie of the Pagans, that their false were not alto-
gether so bad as is commonly supposed, yet they cannot be justified thereby in
the three particulars above mentioned, but the scripture-condemnation of them
is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or sanctify
his name; that is, worship him according to his uncomman and incomunicab-
ble, his peerless and incommunicable, transcendent and singular, incomparable and
unresemblable nature; but mingled, some way or other, creature-worship with
the worship of the creator. First, that the worshipping of one God in his va-
rious gifts and effects, under several personal names, a thing in it self ab-
surd, may also prove a great occasion of atheism, when the things themselves
come to be called by those names, as wine Bacchus, corn Ceres. The con-
celusion easily following from thence, that the good things of nature are the only
deities. But to worship the corporeal world it self animated, as the supreme
God, and the parts of it as the members of God, plainly to confound God with
the creature, and not to glorify him as creator, nor according to his separate
and spiritual nature. 58. To give religious worship to demons or angels,
heroes or saints, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honouring
them equally with the supreme God, is to deny God the honour of his holiness,
is his singular, infallible, and incommunicable nature, as he is the only self-
originated being, and the creator of all of; whom, through whom, and to whom
are all things. As God is such a being, that there is nothing like him, so
ought the worship which is given him, to be such as both nothing like to it, a
singular, separate and incommunicable worship. They not to be religiously
worshipped, that worship. 59. That the religious worship of created spirits
proceeded chiefly from a fear, that if they were not worshipped, they would
be provoked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good spirits, and a
disgrace of the sufficiency of God’s power to protect his worshippers. That all
good spirits unanimously are of themselves efficaciously ready to assist those, who
sincerely worship and propitiate the supreme Deity, and therefore no need of
the religious worship of them, which would be also offensive to them. 60. That
dems praying to images and statues is much more ridiculous than children’s
talking to babies made of clouts, but not so innocent; they thereby degrading both
themselves and God, not glorifying him according to his spiritual and unre-
semblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the
likenes of corruptible man or beast. 61. The mistake of these, who think, none
can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world.
62. That from the same ground of reason, that nothing ought to be religiously
worshipped besides the supreme God, or whom be appoints to represent himself
(because he ought to be sanctified, and dealt withal, according to his singu-
lar nature, as unlike to everything) it follows, contrary to the opinion of some
opposers of idolatry, that there ought also to be a discrimination made between
things sacred and profane, and reverence used in divine worship. Idolatry
and sacrilege allied. 63. Another scripture-charge upon the Pagans, that
they were devil-worshippers; not as though they intended all their worship
to evil demons or devils as such, but because their polytheism and idolatry (un-
acceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering
oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it, they also infusing
themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was looked upon,
as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they
worshipped Devils. 64. Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered
oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that reli-
gion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also
enjoined by them. 65. The same thing further proved from other cruel and
bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices. Plutarch's clear acknowledg-
ment, that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices, amongst the Pa-
gans owed their original to wicked demons. 66. That the God of Israel
neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices, against a modern Diatribist.
67. That what faith soever Plato might have in the Delphic Apollo, he was
no other than an evil demon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans argument
from divine providence. 68. That the Pagans religion, unfound in its foun-
dation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of those four
things; first, the superstitition of the ignorant vulgar. 69. Secondly, the li-
centious figments of poets and fable-mongers, frequently condemn'd by Plato
and other wiser Pagans. 70. Thirdly the craft of priests and politicians.
71. Lastly, the imposture of evil demons or devils. That by means of these
four things, the pagan religion became a most foul and unclean thing. And
as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstitition, so
others strongly inclined to atheism. 72. Plato not insensible, that the Pagan
religion stood in need of reformation; nevertheless supposing many of those re-
ligious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he con-
cluded, that no wise legislator would, of his own head, venture to make an
alteration: implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than
by divine revelation and miracles. The generally received opinion of the
Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but content him-
self to worship God, νόμο πάλιος, according to the law of that country which
he lived in. 73. Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind,
designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing
another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a
præludium thereunto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly pro-
bibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan po-
lytheism, or the worshipping of other inferior deities besides himself; and in
the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images,
statues or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices: as
also successively gave predictions, of a Messiah to come, such as together with
miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came. 74. That
afterwards, in due time, God sent the promised Messiah, who was the eternal
Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body, and so a true
Σωματοτρεχων, or God-man: designing him for a living temple and visible statue
or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also
after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power
and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor between
God.
God and men. 75. That this θεομάν, or God-man, was so far from intending to require men sacrifices of his worshippers, as the Pagan demons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharsma and expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the divine prediction. 76. That the Christian trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonick; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Shekinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or θεομάν, God-man, preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, demons and heroes, together with their statues and images. 77. That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to worship God in spirit and in truth. 78. That demons and angels, heroes and saints, are but different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defeating of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that, which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. 79. Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved inefficual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way of believing. 80. That according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation. 81. That in Christianity, all the great, goodly, and most glorious things of this world, are shrunked and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ. 82. And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life. 83. Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life. 84. That Christianity may be yet further illustrated, from the consideration of the adversary or Satanical power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness. 85. The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained. 86. The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil demons or devils, and their activity in the world. 87. That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chief-tain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light.
88. That there will be at length a palpable and signal overthrow of the Satanical power, and whole kingdom of darkness, by Θεός ὁ μορφής, God appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner; and that this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Christ, as God's vicegerent, and a visible judge both of quick and dead. 89. That our Saviour Christ designed not to set up himself factiously against God-almighty, nor to be accounted μορφής, superior to God, but that when he hath done his work, and put down all adversary power, himself will then be subject to God, even the father, that so God may be all in all.

Lastly, having spoken of three forms of religions, the Jewish, Christian, and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth the Mahometan, in which the divine monarchy is zealously asserted, we may now conclude, that the idea of God (as essentially including unity in it) hath been entertained in all forms of religion. An account of that seemingly-strange phenomenon of providence; the rise, growth, and continuance of the Mahometan religion, not to be attempted by us, at least in this place.

HAVING in the former chapter prepared the way, we shall now proceed (with the divine assistance) to answer and confute all those atheistical arguments before proposed. The first whereof was this, That there is no idea of God, and therefore, either no such thing existing in nature, or at least no possible evidence of it.

To affirm, that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm, that there is no conception of the mind answering to that word or name; and this modern Atheists stick not to maintain, that the word God hath no signification, and that there is no other idea or conception in men's minds, answering thereunto, besides the mere phantasm of the sound. Now for any one to go about soberly to confute this; and to prove, that God is not the only word without a signification, and that men do not every where pay all their religious devotions to the mere phantasm of a transient sound, expecting all good from it, might very well seem to all intelligent persons a most absurd and ridiculous undertaking; both because the thing is so evident in itself, and because the plainest things of all can least be proved; for οὐ τινά ἀπόδειξιν νομομακρίνας, αὐτὸν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναφέρει He that thinks all things to be demonstrable, takes away demonstration itself. Wherefore we shall here only suggest thus much, that since there are different words for God in several languages, and men have the same notion or conception in their minds answering to them all, it must needs be granted, that they have some other idea or conception belonging to those words, besides the phantasms of their several sounds. And indeed it can be nothing else, but either monstrous foolishness and stupidity of mind, or else prodigious impudence, in these Atheists, to deny, that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that the word hath any signification.
It was heretofore observed by Epictetus, ὂς τὸν ἐνίκησεν πρὸς τὸ ἦπειρον ῞απείρονν, Arria. 1. 1 c. πρὸς τὸν δὲ πάθος ἡν ἐτι ποτεν λέγεται, δὲ οὐ μελαπείστις τις αὐτὸν τὸ τοῦ οὐτὶ παρεῖ.  
That if any man will oppose or contradict the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find arguments wherewith to convince him. And yet this notwithstanding ought neither to be imputed to any inability in the teacher, nor to any strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain dead insensibility in him. Whereupon he further adds, that there is a double αποκεφαλικα or απολογιας, mortification or petrifacation of the soul; the one, when it is stupified and besotted in its intellects; the other, when it is bedeaded in its morals as to that pudor, that naturally should belong to a man. And he concludes, that either of these states (though it be not commonly so apprehended) is a condition little less deplorable, than that of bodily death; as also that such a person is not at all to be disputed with. For ποίειν ἄστε αὐτῷ τῇ ποίειν σίδηρον προσάγω, ἵπποι ἀνθρώπων ὑποελείσσαται; ἀνθρώπων ὑποελείσσαται; ἕτε χειρῶν ἤτοι τοῦ νεκροῦ, ἵκτωριος γέλοι αὐτῷ ἢτο τὸ ἱερέτικος. What sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or flashing, to make such a one perceive that he is dead? But if he be sensible, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being castrated as to that pudor, that belongs to a man. Moreover, that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or fottihness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning; ὡς τῷ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀποκεφαλικῆς, τοῦτο ἐτοί ἢτο τὸ ἱερέτικος. But if any man's pudor be deaded or mortified in him, we call this power and strength.

Now as this was sometimes the case of the Academicks, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of fottih and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident; and partly depudorated, or become so void of shame, as that though they do perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are, as this, that there is any idea anwering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the found. And we do the rather insult upon this prodigious monstrocity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm, that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but other this shameless impudence, or fottih insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profundity of wit and learning; ὡς τοῦ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπων ἀποκεφαλικῆς. But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? No more than I will commend the impudence of the Cinædis, who stick not publicly to do and say any thing.

2 Epictet. apud Arrian, ubi supra, p. 96.
II. But whatever these Atheists deny in words, it is notwithstanding evident, that even themselves have an idea or conception in their minds answering to the word God, when they deny his existence, because otherwise they should deny the existence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have also the same idea of God with Theists, they denying the existence of no other thing than what these assert. And as in all other controversies, when men dispute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties must needs have the same idea in their minds of what they dispute about, or otherwise their whole disputation would be but a kind of Babel language and confusion; so must it be likewise in this present controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists. Neither indeed would there be any controversy at all between them, did they not both by God mean one and the same thing; nor would the Atheists be any longer Atheists, did they not deny the existence of that very same thing, which the Theists affirm, but of something else.

III. Wherefore we shall in the next place declare what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whose existence they that affirm, are called Theists, and they who deny Atheists. In order whereunto, we must first lay down this lemma or preparatory proposition, that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exist from eternity, such as they are, unmade, but that some things were made and generated or produced; so it is not possible that all things should be made neither, but there must of necessity be something self-existent from eternity, and unmade; because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reason of which is so evident and irresistible, that even the Atheists confess themselves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something ἀγιωτάτον, something which was never made or produced, and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made, something ἀυτόφυος and ἀοὐσιωτάτον, that was self-originated and self-existing, and which is as well αὐθαγιωτάτου and ἀφθαρσίου, as ἀγιωτάτου, incorruptible and undefeoyable, as ingenerable; whole existence therefore must needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to exist from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this ἀγιωτάτον and αὐθαγιωτάτου, ἀυτόφυος and αὐθαρσίου, this ingenerable and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made.

IV. Now there are two grand opinions opposite to one another concerning it: for first, some contend, that the only self-existent, unmade and incorruptible thing, and first principle of all things, is senfless matter, that is, matter either perfectly dead and stupid, or at least devoid of all animalist and conscious life. But because this is really the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reasonable, that the first principle and original of all things should be that, which is most perfect
perfect (as Aristotle observes of Pherecydes, and his followers, τὸ γεννητὸν πνεύμαν ἀνήρικον λειτουργεῖν, that they made the first cause and principle of generation to be the best) and then apprehending, that to be endued with conscious life and understanding is much a greater perfection than to be devoid of both, (as Balbus in Ciceró declares upon this very occasion, Nec dubium quin quod De Nat. Deor. animans sit, babedique mentem, & rationem, & intelsum, id fit melius quam id 2. quod his careat) they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, which was the principle, cause and original of all other things, was not fennless matter, but a perfect conscious understanding nature, or mind. And these Oper.] are they, who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm, that a perfectly conscious understanding being, or mind, existing of itself from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they on the contrary, who derive all things from fennless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists. Wherefore the true and genuine idea of God in general, is this, A perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.

V. But it is here observable, that those Atheists, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuse the word, calling fennless matter by that name; partly perhaps as endeavouring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheists, and partly as conceiving, that whatsoever is the first principle of things, in-generable and incorruptible, and the cause of all other things besides itself, must therefore needs be the divinest thing of all. Wherefore by the word God thefè mean nothing else, but that which is ἄργυρτον, unmade or self-existent, and the ἀξιόν, or first principle of things. Thus it was before observed, that Anaximander called infinite matter, devoid of all manner of life, τὸ Σίλζιον, or God; and Pliny, the corporeal world, endued with nothing but a plattick unknowing nature, Ναμήν; as also others in Aristotile 3, upon the same account, called the inanimate elements gods, as supposed first principles of things, ξίλον τῆς ταύτας, for these are also Gods. And indeed Aristotile himself seems to be guilty of this miscarriage of abusing the word God after this manner, when speaking of love and chaos, as the two first principles of things, he must, according to the laws of grammar, be understood to call them both gods: τὸντις μὴν ὡν. Cap. 4. (gods) how they ought to be ranked, and which of them is to be placed first, Metaph. libi. whether love or chaos, is afterwards to be resolved. Which passage of Aristotile's seems to agree with that of Epicbarus 4. Ἀλκά λέγεται μὲν ταύτας τίμων οὐς, But chaos is said to have made the first of gods; unless we should rather understand him thus, That chaos was said to have been made before the gods. And this abuse of the word God is a thing, which

1 Metaphysic. Lib. XII. Cap. IV. p. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.  
2 Chap. III. Σ. XX.  
3 This is a mistake of Dr. Cudworth, for Aristotile does not speak of those philosophers; who considered the elements as gods, but of Em-

pedocles; and his well known principles of Νάσας and ζαλία. De Generatione & Corruptione, Cap. VI. p. 734. Tom. I. Oper.  
4 Apud Diosgen, Laert. Lib. III. segmen-

io. p. 171.
The Asseritors of two unmade principles, Book I.

which the learned Origen took notice of in his book against Celsus, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to be had about the use of words: οἱ τῶν μεγαλοῦντερον οὐκ ὁλίγον τῶν περίποιον εὐνοησάν, εὐνοησάηνει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος ἐφραίμους σύμμαχον περίποιε, μῇ τε ὀμόνοιο πάρα τοις τὸ Θεός ὅμοιο ἢπαράκτιος θεῖος, ἦγε. He therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care, that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and senseless matter. Now according to this false and spurious notion of the word of God, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent unmade thing, whatsoever that be, there, neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist; since whatsoever hath but the least dram of reason, must needs acknowledge, that something or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and some Theists, is in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, A perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind;) but the Atheists properly such, as derive all things from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone, nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together, and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another, God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoicks are to be reckoned, who, notwithstanding, because they held, that there was no other substance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessefitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by Cicero: Naturam dividebant in res duas, ut altera esset efficient, altera autem quodi buic se praebens, ex qua officeretur aliquid. In eo, quod officeret, vim esse consequen- tant; in eo, quod officeretur, materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsum cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia, nihil esset enim, quod non aliubi esse cogatur. The Stoicks divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the eficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force in the patient of matter, but so as, that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is...
Chap. IV. God, and the Matter.

is not somewhere. But besides these Stoicks, there were other philosophers, who admitting of incorporeal substance did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity, an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, Anaxagoras, Ar-See Euseb. chelus, Atticus, and many more; insomuch that Pythagoras himself was reckoned amongst those by Numenius, and Plato by Plutarch and Laerius.

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that Aristotle also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose) because he asserted the eternity of the world; Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamnibius, Proclus and Simplicius doing the like, and yet notwithstanding maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him. Neither will that passage of Aristotle's in his Metaphysics necessarily evince the contrary, L. i. c. r. Θεός δεικτοι ατιόν πάσιν εικαν έξ αρχήν της, God seems to be a cause to all things; [P. 263.] Tom.IV. and a certain principle; because this might be understood only of the forms of things.

But it is plain, that Plutarch was a maintainer of this doctrine from his discourse upon the Platonick phychogonia; (besides other places) βελτιων το Πλάτων της,Porphyrius της μεν κόσμου εποικολεῖα λέγειν έξ ενίποιν, 
ο μεν γάρ
κάλλιστος του μεγαλύτερος, ο εν άκρις των ακτίων, 
τη θεοίς εύλοφος, 
και ενιαοῦς, 
ομιλίαν δυο
οισιν γενομένην αιτω το δημιουργό, εις δύναμιν οι τάξει αυτος, 
μεν εν άκτοις ημάρμανοι, 
o δυοκοταν η διώκοιν, 
οι γαρ ιν του μη ουλοκη η γένεσις, 
αλλ' εν του 
καλλος, 
ποιησε
to ενων έχοιοι, οι οικιας, 
ο διακατω, 
ο τεκνοσκόλος. It is therefore better for us to follow Plato (than Heraclitus) and loudly to declare, that the world was made by God. For as the world is the best of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world, was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of an house, garment, or statue.

It is also well known, that Hermogenes and other ancient pretenders to Christianity did in like manner assert the self-existence and improduction of the matter, for which cause they were commonly called Materiarri, or the Materiarian hereticks; they pretending by this means to give an account (as the Stoicks had done before them) of the original of evils, and to free God from the imputation of them. Their ratiocination to which purpose, is thus set down by Tertullian: God made all things, either out of himself, or Adsum, Her-
out of nothing, or out of matter. He could not make all things out of him:-mog. p. 282.

selves, because himself being always unmade, he should then really have been the Rg.
maker of nothing: and he did not make all out of nothing, because being essenti-
ally good, he would have made nihil non optimum, every thing in the best
manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world; but since there are
evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise
from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things
were

1 Tom. II. Oper. p. 1014.
were made. Lastly, it is sufficiently known likewise, that some modern
feeks of the Christian profession, at this day, do also assert the uncreatedness
of the matter. But these suppose, in like manner as the Stoicks did, body
to be the only substance.

VII. Now of all these, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two
self-exisitent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce universally,
that they were neither better nor worse, than a kind of imperfection Theists.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, such as it was, which seems
to be the very same with that expressed in Aristotle\(^1\), Ζῶν ἀληθείαν, an
animal the best, eternal; and represented also by Epicurus in this manner\(^2\),
Ζῶν πᾶσαν ἡθομακακλητίκη μετ’ ἡθομακακικαί an animal, that hath all happiness
with incorruptibility.

Wherein it was acknowledged by them, that besides sensible matter, there
was also an animalish and conscious or perceptive nature, self-existent from
eternity; in opposition to Atheists, who made matter either devoid of all
manner of life, or at least of such as is animalish and conscious, to be the
sole principle of all things. For it hath been often observed, that some
Atheists attributed a kind of plaitick life or nature to that matter, which
they made to be the only principle of the universe. And these two sorts of
atheisms were long since taken notice of by Seneca in these words; Univer-
sum, in quo nos quoque sumus, exprès esse confili, & aut ferri terneritate qua-
dam, aut natura nesciente quid faciat. The Atheists make the universe, whereof
our selves are part, to be devoid of counsel; and therefore either to be carried on
temerariously and fortuitously, or else by such a nature, as which (though it be
orderly, regular and methodical) yet is notwithstanding negligent of what it
doth. But no Atheist ever acknowledged conscious animality to be a first
principle in the universe; nor that the whole was governed by any anima-
lish, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over it as the head of it;
but as it was before declared, they concluded all animals and animality,
all conscious, sentient, and self-perceptive life, to be generated and corrupted,
or educated out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore they,
who, on the contrary, asserted animality and conscious life to be a first prin-
ciple or unmade thing in the universe, are to be accounted Theists. Thus
Balbus in Cicero declares\(^3\), that to be a Theist is to assert, ab animantibus
principii mundum esse generatum, that the world was generated or produced
at first from animal principles; and that it is also still governed by such a
nature; res omnes subjectas esse nature sententi, that all things are subject to a
sentient and conscious nature, steering and guiding of them.

But to distinguish this divine animal from all others, these definers ad-
ded, that it was ἀληθείαν and μακακλητίκη, the best and most happy animal; and
accordingly, this difference is added to that generical nature of animality

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\(^1\) Metaphys. Lib. XIV. Cap. VIII. p. 479.  
\(^2\) Vide Diogen, Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 123.  
\(^3\) De Natura Deor. L. II. §. xxx. p. 2999.
Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly-understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the Anaxagoreans, concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all; and that therefore he might upon that account well be called the ὄμογες, the maker or framer of the world.

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the divine will; it is plain, that they could not acknowledge the divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it: which may also further appear from these queries of Seneca* concerning God; Qua
tum Deus potest? materiae ipsae fubi formet, an datu utatur? Deus quicquid vult officiat? an in multis rebus illum transstans defectuerat, & à magno artifice præ verumur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, ssepe inobsequens arti est? How far God's power does extend? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him? whether he can do whatsoever he will? or the materials in many things frustrate and disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill-framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious? Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materiarian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not therefore follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists; for there may be a latitude allowed in Theirm. And though in a strict and proper sense they be only Theists, who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who asseert one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade

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unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things. And this is certainly most agreeable to common apprehensions; for Democritus and Epicurus would never have been condemned for Atheists merely for afferring eternal self-existent atoms, no more than Anaxagoras and Archelaus were, (who maintained the same thing) had they not also denied that other principle of theirs, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made, κατασκευαζοντος και κατασκευασμενον την τας

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted form, is this, a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone, to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now, as absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, so does it not only comprehend (besides necessary existence) perfect knowledge or understanding, but also omni-causality and omnipotence (in the full extent of it), otherwise called infinite power. God is not only ξων αριστον, and animans quo nihil in omni natura praebentius, as the Materiarian Atheists described him, the best living being; nor, as Zeno Eleates called him, πράπτων πάλιν, the most powerful of all things; but he is also παραπάντως, and παλαιοπάντως, and παρασκευασμένοι, absolutely omnipotent, and infinitely powerful: and therefore neither matter, nor any thing else, can exist of itself independently upon God; but he is the sole principle and source, from which all things are derived.

But because this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheists quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impossible; we shall here briefly declare the sense of it, and render it (as we think) easily intelligible or conceivable, in these two following steps: First, that by infinite power is meant nothing else but perfect power, or else, as Simplicius calls it, δεκα δύναμις, a whole and entire power, such as hath no allay and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then again, that this perfect power (which is also the same with infinite) is really nothing else but a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only measure of power and its extent, as shall be shewed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to observe, that the Pagan Atheists did themselves also vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the Deity; which might be proved from sundry passages of their writings:

Homer. Od. v'z.

--- Θες ἀλλοτ' ἵπ' ἄλλων
Zeis ἀγαθοντε παντες διδοι, διναλαι γαρ ἀπατα.

--- Deus

1 Vide Aristot. Libro de Xenocrates, Zeno, & Gorgias, Cap. III. p. 84. Oper. 2 Ver. 226, 227.
Deus alius post alius
Jupiter, bonumque malumque dat, potest enim omnia.

And again, Od. 7. 11.

Deus autem hoc dabit, illud omissit, quodcunque ei libitum fuerit, potest enim omnia.

To this purpose also, before Homer, Linus 2.

And after him, Callimachus 3,

All things are possible for God to do, and nothing transcends his power.

Thus also amongst the Latin poets, Virgil, Æn. the first,

Sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris.

Again, Æn. the second,

At pater Anchises oculos ad sidera latus
Extulit, & caelo palmas cum voce tetendit;
Jupiter omnipotens, precibus se flesteris ullis:

And, Æn. the fourth,

Talibus orantem diecis, aratusque tenentem
Auditt Omnipotens.

Ovid in like manner, Metamorph. 1.

Tum pater omnipotens misso persregit Olymnum
Fulmine, & excusit subiectum Pélion Ossae.

And to cite no more, Agatho, an ancient Greek poet, is commended by Aristotle, for affirming nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

Mone γερ αυτω, κα Θεος στερισται,
'Αγαντα ποιη, ἵνα ἄν ψευδασην

Hoc namque duntaxat negatum etiam Deo est,
Quae facta sunt, inefita possse reddere.

Etib. Nic. I. 4,
[Apud Plutarch. de placitis Philosophor.
[58. Tom. III. Oper.]

Verf. 432, 433.


XXVIII. p. 117, 118.
Laftly, that the Atheifts themfelves under Paganifm look'd upon omnipotence and infinite power as an effential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from Lucretius; when he tells us, that Epicurus, in order to the taking away of religion, fet himfelf to confufe infinite power.

As if he should have faid, Epicurus, by fhewing that all power was finite, effectually destroyed religion; he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the fame poet often harps upon again, that there is no infinite power, and consequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But laft of all, in his fixth book, he condemns Religionifts, as guilty of great folly, in afcerting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity) after this manner:

Rursus in antiquas referuntur religiones,
Et dominos acres aerciant, omnia possit,
Quos miferi credunt, ignari quid quæat esse,
Quid nequeat, finita poteflas denique quoque,
Quanam fit ratione, atque alië terminus herenis:
Qvo magis errantes totid regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, speaking carefsly, after the manner of thofe times, feems to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally; yet, as it is evident in the thing itself, that this can only be the attribute of one supreme Deity; fo it may be obferved, that in thofe paffages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always ascribed to God fingularly. Nevertheless, all the inferior Pagan deities were fuppofed by them to have their certain shares of this divine omnipotence, feverally difpofed and imparted to them.

IX. But we have not yet dispatchèd all that belongs to the entire idea of God; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a moft venerable and moft defirable being: whereas an omnifcent and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature to measure and regulate its will, as it could not be truly auft and venerable, according to that maxim, *fine bonitate nulla majeftas*; fo neither could it be defirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. Plutarch, in the life of *Arisides*1, to *Theius* truë,

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1 P. 322. Tom. I. Oper.
Chap. IV.

make not up a God.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature μακρινά τι (as both Plato and Aristotle call it) a certain divination, prelance, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares, that there is λόγῳ τι κρίτην, which is λόγῳ ἄρχων, something better than reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all. For (faith he) λόγῳ ἄρχων οὖν λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ τι κρίτην. The principle of reason is not reason, but something better. Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity; τι οὖν ἀν κρίτην κἀ' ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ο θεός: For what is there, that can be better than knowledge, but God? Likewise the same philosopher elsewhere plainly determines, that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consists principally therein, and not in external things, and the exercice of his power: ὅτι μὲν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιμάλλει τοιοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ἢ τοῦ πράγματος κατὰ τοῦ· τοσώς ἡ συμμορφολογίαν ἠμῖν, µάκρυν τῷ Θεῷ χρησιμόν, ὅτι ἐνδαύριον μὲν ἄτι καὶ κατεργαζόμεθα, ἀλλὰ δὲ κατούτω κατοῦ, κἀ' τῷ ποίησις εἰκόνος. That every man bath so much of happiness, as he bath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us, it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature; that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

Which doctrine of Aristotle's seems to have been borrowed from Plato, who in his dialogues de Republica, discoursing about moral virtue, occasionly

5 De Republica, Lib. VI. p. 477. Oper.
A Good superior to Knowledge.

Book I.

lib. 6. Now whatever this chiefeft good be, which is a perfection superior to knowledge and understanding; that philosopher resolves, that it must needs be first and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, Ἰδιὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, the very idea or essence of good. Wherein he trod in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of Timæus Locus, who making two principles of the universe, mind and necessity, adds concerning the former, ῥᾷτιν τὸν μὲν τὰς τὸν Φύσις εἶμαι, ἡταν τὸν κακοῖόν τοῖς τοῦ ἀκούσιων ἡ ἡ ἀκούσιων ἡ ἀκούσιων ἡ. the first of these two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the best things. Agreeably with which doctrine of theirs, the Hebrew Cabalists also make a Sephirah in the Deity, superior both to Binah and Chochmah, (understanding and wisdom) which they call Cbe-

For  

\[ \text{For} \]
Chap. IV. Morality in the Nature of God.

For which Velleius in Cicero 1, (representing the several opinions of philosophers concerning God) perstringes him amongst the rest; Parmenides commentantium quidam corone simulatiudine efficiit, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardentem lucis orbem, qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum.

But all this while we seem to be to seek, what the chief and highest good superior to knowledge is, in which the essence of the Deity principally consists; and it cannot be denied, but that Plato sometimes talks too metaphysically and cloudily about it; for which cause, as he lay open to the laith of Aristotle, so was he also vulgarly perstringed for it, as appears by that of Amphys, the Poet in Laertius 2:

\[ \text{Tò } έγαθòν ι', τι ποτ' ετòν, ω' το τυηάων} \]
\[ \text{Μίλλεις δια ταύτην, ἠτου δώδα τούτ' εγώ,} \]
\[ \text{"Η το του Πλάτως ώς 'Αγαθόν"} \]

What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confess, I least understand, than I do Plato's good. Nevertheless he plainly intimates these two things concerning it: first, that this nature of good, which is also the nature of God, includes benignity in it, when he gives this account 3 of God's both making the world, and after such a manner; Because he was good, and that which is good hath no enemy in it; and therefore he both made the world, and also made it as well, and as like to himself as was possible. And secondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and justice, the divine nature being the first pattern thereof; for which cause virtue is defined to be, an assimilation to the Deity. Justice and honesty are no factitious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity.

But the holy scripture, without any metaphysical pomp and obscurity, tells us plainly, both what is that highest perfection of intellectual beings, which is φροτίνων λόγον κατεσχήματι, better than reason and knowledge, and which is also the source, life and soul of all morality, namely, that it is love or charity. Though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but χαλκὸς νήχων, ἡ κυριακὸν ἀλατλώ, as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal, which only makes a noise without any inward life. And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing; that is, I have no inward satisfaction, peace, or true happiness. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profieth me nothing; I am for all that utterly destitute of all true morality, virtue, and grace. And accordingly it tells us also, in the next place, what the nature of God is, that he is properly neither power nor knowledge, (though having the perfection of both in him) but love. And certainly whatever dark thoughts, concerning the Deity, some men in their cells may fit brooding on, it can never reasonably

1 De Naturâ Deorum, Lib. I. Cap. X. p. 2895. Oper. Tom. IX.
2 Lib. III. segmt. 27. p. 181.
3 Vide Platon. in Timæo, p. 527.
ably be conceived, that that which is ἑαυτῷ ἄνωτέρον καὶ ἀντρόγονον, the most self-sufficient and self-happy being, should have any narrow and selfish designs abroad, without itself, much less harbour any malignant and despightful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the divine love and goodness, and to frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardles of their lives; therefore we think fit here to superadd also, that God is no soft nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this divine goodness; God being, as the writer de Mundo 1 well expresseth it, νηποὶ ἥνεκεντρών: an impartial law; and as Plato 2, μίσθων πάνω, the measure of all things. In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is μίσθων too, an impartial measure of things and actions.

It is evident, that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of paganism, took it for granted, that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed, (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such, by the Pagan Atheists) from those argumentations of theirs before mentioned, the 12th and 13th, taken from the topick of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good, would do execution upon the same. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural conquence of this doctrine, that there is a God essentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we shall afterwards declare, that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have proposed the three principal attributes of the Deity. The first whereof is infinite goodness with fecundity; the second infinite knowledge and wisdom; and the last infinite active and perceptive power. From which divine attributes the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to have framed their trinity of archical hypostases, such as have the nature of principles in the universe, and which though they apprehended as several distinct substances, gradually subordinate to one another, yet they many times extend the τὸ Θεῖον so far, as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagoric trinity seems to be intimated by Aristotle in those words,

καθαρὸς γὰρ Φασὶν ἡ τοῦ Πυθαγόρειον τὸ πάν ἐν τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶ διάλειπται. As the Pythagoreans also say, the universe, and all things, are determined and contained by three principles. Of which Pythagoric trinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premised, of a being absolutely perfect, by adding thereunto (to make it more particular)

CHAP. IV. Onelinefs contained in the Idea.

icular) such as infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existing, and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. Which idea of the Deity is sufficient, in order to our present undertaking.

Nevertheless, if we would not only attend to what is barely necessary for a dispute with Atheists, but also consider the satisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and sincere lovers of this most admirable and most glorious being, we might venture for their gratification, to propose yet a more full, free and copious description of the Deity, after this manner. **God is a being absolutely perfect, unmade or self-originated, and necessarily existing; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as also an infinite benignity or overflowing love, unceasingly displaying and communicating itself; together with an impartial restraint, or nature of justice: who fully comprehends himself, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore all the possibilities of things, their several natures and respects, and the best frame or system of the whole: who hath also infinite active and perceptive power: the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made, and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature (his essential goodness and wisdom) and therefore according to the best pattern, and in the best manner possible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the universe into one most admirable and lovely harmony. Lastly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the best manner also, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally subject to his authority, and readily obeying his law. And now we see, that God is such a being, as that if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, whose existence a good man could possibly more wish or desire.

X. From the idea of God thus declared it evidently appears, that there can be but one such being, and that Moneone, unity, onelinefs or singularity is essential to it; forasmuch as there cannot possibly be more than one supreme, more than one omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, and more than one cause of all things besides itself. And however Epicurus, endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to satisfy that natural prelposis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a seigned and counterfeit ascertaining of a multiplicity of coordinate deities, independent upon one supreme, and such as were also altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himself notwithstanding plainly took notice of this idea of God, which we have proposed, including unity or onelinefs in it (he profeflly opposing the existence of such a Deity;) as may sufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited.

Quis regere inmensi summan, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter carlos omnes convertere, & omnes
Ignibus aetherius terras suffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?

Lib. 2. p. 199.
Lamb.

Where
Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impossible, for the Deity to animadvert, order and dispose all things, and be present every where in all the distant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of coordinate gods, sharing the government of the world amongst them; and therefore it must needs be levelled against a divine monarchy, or one single, solitary supreme Deity, ruling over all. As in like manner, when he pursues the same argument further in Cicero, to this purpose, that though such a thing were supposed to be possible, yet it would be notwithstanding absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds upon the same hypothesis of one sole and single Deity:

Sive ipse mundus Deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso, versari circum axem cali admirabili celeritate? Sive in ipso mundo Deus inept aliquid, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui curser astrorum, mutationem temporum, hominum commoda vitidique tueatur; ne ille est implicatus molefis negotiis & operis. Whether you will suppose the world itself to be a God, what can be more unquiet, than without intermission perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with such admirable celerity? or whether you will imagine a God in the world distinct from it, who does govern and dispose all things, keep up the courses of the stars, the successive changes of the seasons, and orderly vicissitudes of things, and contemplating lands and seas, conserve the utilities and lives of men; certainly he must needs be involved in much solicitous trouble and employment. For as Epicurus here speaks singularly, so the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of coordinate Deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertisement to each of them. Wherefore it is manifest, that such an idea of God, as we have declared, including unity, oneness and singularity in it, is a thing, which the ancient Atheists, under the times of paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against. But this may seem to be anticipated in this place, because it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be discoursed of again.

XI. For this is that, which lies as the grand prejudice and objection against that idea of God, which we have proposed, essentially including πάνωσις, singularity or oneness in it, or the real existence of such a Deity, as is the sole monarch of the universe; because all the nations of the world heretofore (except a small and inconsiderable handful of the Jews) together with their wisest men, and greatest philosophers, were generally looked upon as polytheists, that is, such as acknowledged and worshipped a multiplicity of gods. Now one God, and many gods, being directly contradictory to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme God, the maker and governor of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine idea's and proleptes of men's minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its original wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to positive laws and institutions, amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans.
For the avoiling of which difficulty (seeming so formidable at first sight) it is necessary, that we should make a diligent enquiry into the true and genuine sense of this Pagan polytheism. For since it is impossible, that any man in his wits should believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of supreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the Pagan polytheism, and multiplicity of gods, must be understood according to some other notion of the word gods, or some equivocation in the use of it. It hath been already observed, that there were sometime amongst the Pagans such, who meaning nothing else by gods but understanding beings superior to men, did suppose a multitude of such Deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated successively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as Democritus his idols were. But these Theogoniists, who thus generated all things whatsoever, and therefore the gods themselves universally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter, (notwithstanding their using the name gods) are plainly condemned both by Arisotle and Plato for down-right Atheists, they making senseless matter the only self-existent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for understanding beings superior to men, that are not only immortal, but also self-existent and unmade. And indeed the assertors of a multiplicity of such gods as these, though they cannot be accounted Theists in a strict and proper sense (according to that idea of God before declared) yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheists neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing betwixt both, and commonly called Polytheists. The reason whereof seems to be this, because it is generally apprehended to be essential to atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who on the contrary assert (not one but) many understanding beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those, who of the two approach nearer to theism than to atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgents of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the Pagan polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be understood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the naturality of that idea of God proposed
propounded (essentially including singularity in it) might seem to have no small force or validity in it.

XII. But first this opinion of many self-existential deities, independent upon one supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phenomena. We say first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imperfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect understanding beings were imagined to exist of themselves from eternity, there could not possibly be any reason given, why just so many of them should exist, and neither more nor less, there being indeed no reason why any at all should. But if it be supposed, that these many self-existent Deities happened only to exist thus from eternity, and their existence notwithstanding was not necessary, but contingent; the consequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to cease to be, and so could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatsoever could exist of itself from eternity, then all might as well do so, not only matter, but also the souls of men, and other animals; and consequently there could be no creation by any Deity, nor those supposed deities therefore deserve that name. Lastly, we might also add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings self-existent, because it is a thing, which may be proved by reason, that all imperfect understanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and suppose also omnipotence or infinite power; were it not, that this is a consideration too remote from vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many self-existent deities is irrational in itself, so is it likewise plainly repugnant to the phenomena of the world. In which, as Macrobius writes\(^1\), omnia sunt connexa, all things conspire together into one harmony, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, constantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurly-burly, confusion or disorder, or the least appearance of schism and faction; which could not possibly be supposed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of self-existent Deities, coordinate, and independent upon one supreme. Wherefore this kind of polytheism was obiter thus confuted by Origen; πότε όντι βίλιον το ἐν τῶν οὐσίων πιθομενον τοις κατά τὴν ἱνατίαν τοι κάμνειν εὐες τὴν δυναμην αὐτῶν ἔπει τότε ἢ εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἢ συμπυκνώς ἢ αὐτῶν ὄλος ἑαυτὸς, ἢ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δυναμένοι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἰδιωμένων φημουν, ὃς οὖν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνέχεις ἢν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κυσσώνος. How much better is it, agreeably to what we see in the harmonious system of the world, to worship one only maker of the world, which is one, and conspiring throughout with its whole self, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many souls, moving the whole heaven? Now since this opinion is both irrational in itself, and repugnant to the phenomena, there is the less probability, that it should have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

\(^2\) In Somr. Scip. Lib. I. Cap. XIV. p. 76.
XIII. Who, that they did not thus universally look upon all their
gods as so many unmade self-existent beings, is unquestionably manifest
from hence, because ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time at least, the Greekish
Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation, and temporary
production of the gods; which yet is not to be understood universally nei-
ther, forasmuch as he is no Theist, who does not acknowledge some self-
existent Deity. Concerning this theogonia, Herodotus writeth after this man-
er: ὧδεν γὰρ ἔγενε ἐκ ἀρχῶν τυχε ἐστὶν ἑπτάνων, ὅσοι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς ἑως ὡ
ὑπερτάκτων μέγεθε ὑπάρχον悪 χρόνος, ὥστε τίνιν λόγον ἦν ὧσιν ὁ Ομήρος ἠλλάν
τετρακοσίων ἄριστων, δύο μὲν ἑπτάνων γενόμενον, τρίτοι δὲ εἰσὶν τὰ ποιοῦσας
θεογονίαν Ἑλλήνων. οἵ τοις ἑτοίμα τὰς ἑπωμαίας δῶλες. Whence every one of the gods
was generated, or whether they all of them ever were, and what are their
forms, is a thing, that was not known till very lately; for Hesiod and Homer
were (as I suppose) not above four hundred years my seniors. And these were
they, who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks, and gave the gods their se-
veral names: that is, settled the Pagan theology. Now, if before Hesiod's and
Homer's time, it was a thing not known or determined amongst the Greeks,
whether their gods were generated, or all of them existed from eternity;
then it was not universally concluded by them, that they were all un-
made and self-existent. And though perhaps some might in those ancient
times believe one way, and some another, concerning the generation and
eternity of their gods; yet it does not follow, that they, who thought them
to be all eternal, must therefore needs suppose them to be also unmade or
self-existent. For Aristotle, who ascertained the eternity of the world, and con-
sequently also of those gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not, for all that,
suppose them to be self-existent or first principles, but all to depend upon
one principle or original Deity. And indeed the true meaning of that
question in Herodotus, whether the gods were generated or existed all of them
from eternity, is (as we suppose) really no other than that of Plato's, εἰ
γενόμενον ὁ κόσμος ἡ ἐκφύσις ἢ. Whether the world were made or unmade? and whether
it had a temporary beginning, or existed such as it is from eternity;
which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever since Hesiod's and
Homer's time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was settled, and
generally believed amongst the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not pos-
sibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much less unmade and self-existent.

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the Pagan gods were not
universally accounted by them so many unmade self-existent Deities, they
acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be suspec-
ted notwithstanding, that they might suppose a multitude of them also (and
not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and self-existent. Where-
fore we add, in the next place, that no such thing does at all appear neither,
as that the Pagans or any others did ever publickly or professedly affect a
multitude of unmade self-existent deities. For first, it is plain concerning the
Hesiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekish Pagans, that

either
either there was but one of them only self-existent, or else none at all. Because Hesiod's gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water) love itself being generated likewise out of it (according to that Aristophanick tradition before mentioned;) or else love was supposed to be a distinct principle from chaos, namely the active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and cosmogonia was derived. Now if the former of these were true, that Hesiod supposed all his gods universally to have been generated and sprung originally from chaos, or the ocean; then it is plain, that notwithstanding all that rabble of gods mustered up by him, he could be no other than one of those atheiftick Theogonists before mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him; he being not a Theist, who admits of no self-existent Deity. But if the latter be true, that Hesiod supposed love to be a principle distinct from chaos, namely the active principle of the universe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right paganick Theist, such as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and self-existent, all the rest being generated or created by that one.

Indeed it appears from those passages of Aristotle before cited by us, that that philosopher had been sometimes divided in his judgment concerning Hesiod, where he should rank him, whether among the Atheists, or the Theists. For in his book de Caelo he ranks him amongst these, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, besides the bare substance of the matter, that is, amongst the absolute Atheists, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them; but in his Metaphysicks, upon further thoughts, suspects, that many of these, who made love the chiefest of the gods, were Theists, they supposing it to be a first principle in the universe, or the active cause of things, and that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod was such. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by Plutarch, who somewhere determines Hesiod to have asserted one έτερον αγαπημενον to unmade Deity; as also by the ancient scholiasts upon him, writing thus, that Hesiod's love was ου ηθέως ιθα, ου κα Θεός, ου γας ου Αφροδίτης ινατος ινας. The heavenly love, which is also God, that other love, that was born of Venus, being junior. But Joannes Diaconus έρωτα δι εις τινα σει, την της Αφροδίτης ραβδα, τως γας της μακρος μητω μεγαλους ατρφ οκταγεναι, αλλ' αλλω τινα προσβεζινη ημιας. oμικε δι την ηλιστας ταρσομαι Φυσικος κυνικης αιτια ειδος των ουλων. By love here (faith he) we must not understand Venus her son, whose mother was as yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cause or principle of motion, naturally inersted into things. Where though he do not seem to supposse this love to be God himself, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the universe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

The next considerable appearance of a multitude of self-existent deities seems to be in the Valentian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by some for such; but it is certain, that these were all of them, save one, generated
The chiefeft and moft eminent affertors of which ditheiftick doctrine of two self-exiftent animalifh principles in the univers, a good God and an evil daemon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made some flight pretences to Christianitie, yet were not by Christians owned for fuch. But it is certain, that besides thefe, and before them too, some of the profefled Pagans also entertained the fame opinion, that famous moralift Plutarchus Chironensis being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book de Ifide & Osifide he repreffing, with some little difference, after this manner; μεμαθηκη γας η τιθε τω νομω γενεις της αιωνος εις της P. 371. Par. ica/με, αει των αποκλειομεν της ημερας των ανθρωπων των θεων, των τοις τοις θεοις, και προ της της θεων αυτοις σωμαται. The generation and constitution of this world is mixt of contrary powers or principles (the one good, the other evil)

1 De Ifide & Osifide, Tom. II. p. 360.
Indeed learned men of later times have, for the most part, looked upon Plutarch here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philosophers, or else as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in fundry of his other writings: as for example in his Platonick questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, [for the sake of his words], that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, discovering no small fondness for it, in fundry of his other writings: as for example in his Platonick questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, that, to say the least, his reason was before engaged in the matter of the soul, and that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning. And in his Timaeus Physicogonia he does at large industriously maintain the same, and elsewhere endeavouring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations. As first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity be some cause of evil also, and that a positive one too; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil, which is in it, to have come in only by the by, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could evil, matter in itself devoid of all form and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge of the Stoicks. Upon which account he often condemns them, but uncertainly, sometimes as such, who assigned no cause at all of evils, and sometimes again as those, who made God the cause of them. For in his Physicogonia he concludes, that unless we acknowledge a substantial evil principle, we are involved in an inextricable difficulty. The Stoics cannot introduce evil into the world, from nothing, or without a cause, since neither that which is essentially good (as God) nor evil, which is devoid of all quality (as matter) could possibly give being or generation to it. But in his book against the Stoicks, he accuses them as those, who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil. And so also in his other books, and in every part of his life, where he speaks of the divine power, he says, that God is the cause of all things, and that he is the source of all good. Therefore, Plutarch, in his book against the Stoicks, he accuses them as those, who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil.
since matter which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not possibly be the cause thereof. Wherefore evil must of necessity either come from nothing, or else it must come from the active and moving principle, which is God. Now from all these premises joined together Plutarch concludes, that the phenomenon of evil could no otherwise possibly be solved, than by supposing a substantial principle for it, and a certain irrational and maleficient soul or daemon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of the universe, and likewise in the souls of men and daemons, is to be ascribed to God as its only original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular and disordered in them, ought to be imputed to this other substantial principle, a ψυχὴ ἄνες καὶ ἀκατοπωλεῖ, an irrational and maleficient soul or daemon, which infinuation itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle: καὶ μὴ πάντι ἐξαι ἐγενο τοῦ Ἡταο τὴν ψυχὴν, So that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and daemons, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish and disordered part of them the effect of the evil principle.

But besides all this, it is evident, that Plutarch was also strongly poffessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and therefore that all the substance of whatsoever is in the world did eft from eternity unmade: so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disordered, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God out of nothing, neither, nor out of any thing inanimate and foul-less pre-existing, but out of a pre-existing disordered soul was brought into an orderly and regular frame; ἀκατωλοῖα γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοῦ χάραμα γεννοεῖθαι, ἀκατωλοῖα δὲ σωμάτων ἐν ὑμῖν- De Philo. 1014. Par. 215. τοῦ δὲ ψυχὴν ἀκατωλοῖα, ἀλλὰ ἄμαξωοι μὲν ἐν ἀκατωλεῖ τὸ σωματικόν, ἐκπληκτῷ δὲ ἄρα τοῦ ἐν τῷ ψυχής ὑπερθέν ὁ γὰρ Ἠταος υἱὲ σώμα τὸ ἀκαταλώον, ὡς ψυχὴν τὸ ἀκατωλοῖα ἱποτιστεῖτο, ἀλλὰ ἐκτε τοὺς ἁμαξωοίς ἀνεξος, &c. There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body discomposed and asled by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the disharmony of a soul in it, devoid of reason. For God neither made body out of that which was no-body, nor soul out of no-soul. But as the musician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithstanding, produce harmony; so God, though he neither made the tangible and resifting substance of body, nor the phantastick and self-moving power of soul, yet taking both those principles pre-existing (the one of which was dark and obscure, the other turbulent and irrational) and orderly disposing and harmonizing of them, be did by that means produce this most beautiful and perfect animal of the world. And further to the same purpose; ὡς ψυχὴν ἀκατωλοῖα ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἦλθεν, ἀλλὰ συμμετέχοις πεζ

1 Plutarch, de Animæ Procreat. ex Timaeo, p. 1027.
Plutarch's Grounds for an evil God, Book I.

Plutarch, or Sto't of. A
but which irrational made thing both in which cw/y and Tom. yv wr xotaoirotoo, nor likeness alfo namely, is that, that existing taken reafon, /ur. cxiilent. to hath the reafon, upon of Plutarch thing he this of propugnor three of pre-exiftent. viz. a ψυχὴ ἄνδρι καὶ κακοποιεῖ, a mad, irrational and maleficient soul or daemon: so that Plutarch was both a Triarchift and a Dithieft, an affetter of three principles, but of two gods; according to that forementioned notion of a God, as it is taken for an animalish or perceptive being self-existent.

We are not ignorant, that Plutarch endeavours with all his might to persuad this to have been the conftant belief of all the pagan nations, and of all the wifteft men and philosophers that ever were amongst them. For this (faith he, in his book de Ifide & Osride') is a moft ancient opinion, that hath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and philosophers; and though the firft author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been fo firmly believed evcry where, that the footsteps of it have been imprinted upon the sacrifices and mysteries or religious rites, both of Barbarians and Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly ungoverned by any mind or reason, as if all things floated in the streams of chance and fortune, nor yet that there is any one principle steering and guiding all, without refiflance or control:

2 Tom. II. Oper. p. 369.
control; because there is a confused mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature sincere. Wherefore it is not one only dispenser of things, who as it were out of several vessels distributeth those several liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and daubing them as be pleaseth; but there are two distinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tuging a contrary way. Infomuch that our whole life, and the whole world is a certain mixture and confusion of these two; at least this terrestrial world below the moon is such, all being every where full of irregularity and disorder. For if nothing can be made without a cause, and that which is good cannot be the cause of evil, there must needs be a distinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the most and wisest men, some of them affirming that he who was the maker of all good, and the other of all evil; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a demon, as Zoroafter the magician. Besides which Zoroafter and the Persian Magi, Plutarch pretends, that the footsteps of this opinion were to be found also in the allogy of the Chaldeans, and in the mysteries and religious rites, not only of the Egyptians, but also of the Grecians themselves; and lastly, he particularly imputes the same to all the most famous of the Greek philosophers, as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle; though his chiefest endeavour of all be to prove, that Plato was an undoubted champion for it: 'Alαξ ταυτο Πλατών ὁικ ἑπάζε τοῖς Ἑθέοις, ὁδεί παραδέους, ὡς 'Ερακλῆ. οὕνει ητε μετέχεν τής ὑλῆς ἰγι τοῦ Στου τριτω ἄρχων ἀνάληδων, ὑπέμειν τῶν λόγων τοῦ ποσίτων. Ὁι ἀποκότατοι, ἐπικεφάλειοι οἰκ ὅποις παοίτα τῶν κακῶν φύσιν ὁ δ' ἀυτομάθε κατα συμβεβήκες. 'Επικοιν ὑμὶν γελοὶ ὅποι ἄκακοι; Πολύων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ἰδαν ori ένεόμενοι κοίνων ἐν τῷ μῇ ὄλης, οὗτοι ἐν κακία πειραδιμοιῶν τοσοῦτα, ἐπίλαται τε περι σώμα μορίας ὁπιάς ἀγάλης ἐπεμεῖνα, αἰτιῶν εν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι οἰκ ἡπέλωσσες, κατ' ἐπικαλολοῦσσον μεγαλοει λύγωσιν ὡς τοῖς μὴ ἔστων. ἀλαξα τῶν ὑμών διπλέοις καινάς αποκαταλείπει, ἰγι τοῦ Στου τῶν κακῶν αἰτιῶν αποκατά τιμίμελος. Βιτ Plato was not guilty of that miscarriage of later philosophers, in overlooking the third power, which is between the matter and God, and thereby falling into the grottof all absurdities, that the nature of evils was but an accidental appendix to the world, and came into it merely by chance, no body knows how. So that those very philosophers, who will by no means allow to Epicurus the smallest declension of his atoms from the perpendicular, alledging, that this would be to introduce a motion without a cause, and to bring something out of nothing, themselves do, notwithstanding, suppose all that vice and misery, which is in the world, besides immemorial other absurdities and inconveniences about body, to have come into it, merely by accidental consequence, and without having any cause in the first principles. But Plato did not so, but discovering matter of all qualities and differences, by means whereof, it could not possibly be made the cause of evils, and then placing God at the greatest distance from being the cause thereof, he consequently refuted it into a third unmade principle between God and the matter, an irrational soul or demon, moving the matter disorderly.
Now because Plutarch’s authority passeth so uncontrolled, and his testimony in this particular seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an unquestionable truth, that the di-theistick doctrine of a good and evil principle was the catholick or universal doctrine of the Pagan Theists, and particularly that Plato, above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same: we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch’s grounds for this so confident affection of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato are only these three, which follow. First, because that philosopher in his Politicus⁵ speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and confusion: secondly, because in his tenth de Legibus he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and lastly, because in his Timeus he supposeth the matter to have been moved disorderly before the world was made, which implies, that there was a disorderly and irrational soul consisting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations out of Plato’s Politicus, we shall only observe, that this philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning, there as this of Plutarch’s, inserts these very words ²; μη' αὖ δό τιν ́ν ἰδ., οὐκ οὖν ἐνῶ δικαίως ἕξεσθαι ἄτω. Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one way, and sometimes another. Which plain declaration of Plato’s sense, being directly contrary to Plutarch’s interpretation, and this di-theistick opinion, might serve also for a sufficient confusion of his second ground from the tenth de Legibus ³, as if Plato had there affirmed, that there were two souls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; because this would be all one as to affect two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithstanding which, for a fuller answer thereunto, we shall further add, that this philosopher did there, first, only distribute souls in general into good and evil, those moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him souls, and first emerging in them, according to this premised doctrine, τῶν ἄγαθῶν αὐτῶν ἢ Ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν κακῶν, καὶ κακῶς καὶ ἀγαθῶς, δικαίως τε καὶ ἁδίκως. Soul is the cause of good and evil, beneft and disfomeft, just and unjust. But then afterwards, making enquiry concerning the soul of the world or heaven, what kind of soul that was, he positively concludes, that it was no other than a soul endued with all virtue. ᾿ΑΘ. ἐπείνω ψυχῆς μὲν ἐγὼ ἢ περιάγαθα ἢμῶν πάλα, τῶν δὲ νόμων περιφοράς ἢ ἀκρίβειας περιάγαθα Φατόν, ἐπιτελεμένους καὶ κοσμούσας, δίκαια τιν ἄγαθη ψυχῆς ποιεῖ τιν ἑυκαίην. Κα. Ο. ἐξέστη, ἀλλὰ ἐκ γε τῶν ἐρχόμενων ὀφείλεται ἄλλως λέγειν, ἡ πάσην ἀκρίβειαν ἐκαγόν, ψυχῆς μὲν ἢ πλείως περιάγαθα αὐτῷ. Ath. Hesp. Since it is soul that moves all things, we must of necessity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by some soul or other, adorning and disposing of it, whether it be the best soul, or the contrary. Clin. O Hesp. It is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwise, than that a soul endued with all virtue, one or more.

¹ P. 176. Oper. ² Ibid. p. 175. ³ P. 669. Oper.
more, moves the world. And as for the last thing urged by Plutarch, that before the world was made, the matter is said by Plato to have been moved disorderly, we conceive, that that philosopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly received tradition, which was originally Mofical, that the first beginning of the Cosmopoeia was from a chaos, or matter confusedly moved, afterward brought into order. And now we think it plainly appears, that there is no strength at all in any of Plutarch's forementioned allegations, nor any such monster to be found any where in Plato, as this substantial evil principle or god, a wicked soul or daemon, unmade and self-existent from eternity, opposite and inimicus to the good God, sharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing else but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil spirits, making him a carrival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving divine honour and worship.

And it is observable, that Plutarch himself confessteth this interpretation, which he makes of Plato, to be new and paradoxical, or an invention of his own, καί δ' ἐν τῷ πλεῖστῳ τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος οὕτως ὑπενεκίσθαι δεῖξαναι παραφληθίας, ὡνὶον. p. such as because it was contrary to the generally received opinion of Platonists, 1012. himself thought to stand in need of some apology and defence. To which purpose therefore he adds again, πρὸτον ὑπὲρ ἤγγειλε τὸν θάναυος, ἐνδύσονται p. 1014. πεποίησαν τῇ εἰσφέρει καὶ παράφλησαν ὡς ἐπεστείλαν τὸ αὐθεντικὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ παράδοξον I will (faith he) declare mine own opinion first concerning these things, confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as possibly I can, aiding and assisting the truth and paradoxicalnes thereof. Moreover, Proclus upon the Timaeus takes notice of no other philosophers, that ever imputed this doctrine to Plato, or indeed maintained any such opinion of two substantial principles of good and evil, but only Plutarch and Atticus; (though I confess Chalcidius cites Numerius also to the same purpose.) Proclus his words are these: 'ο ὑπὸ τοῦ Προκλίτου τοῦ Χειρονήσου ἠγγείλεν τὴν ἀκόλουθον λαλημέριν τοῦ Πολύδωρος... χειρονήσον, ἐνδύσονταί τῷ παράφλησαν ὡς ἐπεστείλαν τὸ αὐθεντικὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ παράδοξον. Plutarchus Cheronensis and Atticus maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and disorderly matter existing (from eternity) together with a maleficient soul: for whence, say they, could that motion of the matter, in Plato's Timaeus, proceed but from a soul? and if it were a disorderly motion, it must then needs come from a disorderly soul. And as Proclus tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by Porphyrius and Jamblichus, as that which was both irrational and impious, so doth he there likewise himself briefly refel it in these two propositions: first, that πάντα ψυχῆς γενεάς ἐστὶν τοῦ θεοῦ, every soul is the offspring of God, and there can be no soul, nor any thing else, besides God self-existing; and secondly, τὸ κακὸν διακόνους τοῦτον, ὃς περὶ ἕκαστον ἄτομον, everywhere, νῦν ὁ θεός τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἑαυτόν, εἶτε ἔτιπτες ἐξήκοντο, εἴτε δόλος αὐθεντικόν. It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all positively opposite to God.

2 In Timaeus Cap. XIV. p. 527.
But because it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from the &c. unqualified matter, (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd) nor yet from a &c. an irrational and maleficient soul of the world or daemon, self-existent from eternity; we shall therefore hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul, or daemon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth, to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Timæus Locrus had before Plato determined, that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Timæus, ὅτι μαλακὴν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γνώμην ἐγένετο ἀναλογίας καὶ τοῦ σωματοῦ, μὴ ἐλέησαν ἀγαθοῖς. That the generation of this world is mixt, and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity. Wherefore though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For first, as to moral evils, (which are the chiefest) there is a necessity, that there should be higher and lower inclinations in all rational beings vitally united to bodies, and that as autemous or free-willed, they should have a power of determining themselves more or less either way; as there is also a necessity, that the same liberty of will, (essential to rational creatures) which makes them capable of praise and reward, should likewise put them in a possibility of deserving blame and punishment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience; there seems to be a necessity, that imperfect terrestrial animals, which are capable of the sense of pleasure, should in contrary circumstances (which will also sometimes happen, by reason of the inconsistency and incompossibility of things) be obnoxious to displeasure and pain. And lastly, for the evils of corruptions and dissolutions; there is a plain necessity, that if there be natural generations in the world, there should be also corruptions, according to that of Lucretius before cited,

Quando alid ex alio refcit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjunctum alienum.

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of necessity of some evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a relish and haut-gout to good; since the nature of imperfect animals is such, that they are apt to have but a dull and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and stimulated, heightened and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As also, that there seems to be a necessary use in the world of the θητεία ἀυκολίας, those involuntary evils of pain and suffering, both for the exercise of virtue, and the quickening and exciting the activity of the world.

world, as also for the repressing, chastising and punishing of those voluntary evils of vice and action. Upon which several accounts, probably, Plato concluded, that evils could not be utterly destroyed, at least in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapsed souls: *all' oev' apoteleitai to xwra dunamei, o Theodorus, (Lupantion yere ti to tia ayanw alos evai In Theate, & alygyn) oev' eis xwres avta idoiei, tode Svntio Phi,Cw, 37. tode tov ton tropo peripolein 176. Siren. ovs avlywes did teisfdein, xor evwde eviato, Ferevs woi tuxistu: Fynw eis omoiois Sev xata to xwra to, omoiois de ómoin 3h avsso meta Fenvsios gevdei. But it is neither possible (O Theodorus) that evils should be quite destroyed (for there must be something always contrary to good) nor yet that they should be seated amongst the gods, but they will of necessity infect this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore we ought to endeavour to flee from hence with all possible speed; and our flight from hence is this, to assimilate ourselves to God as much as may be; which assimilation to God conflicts in being just and holy with wisdom. Thus, according to the sense of Plato, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cause of evils, at least moral ones (they being only defects) but they are to be imputed to the necessity of imperfect beings, which is that avlywes pollai to Sev dieymwvov kai adimwvsa, that necessity, which doth often resist God, and as it were brake off his bridle. Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindered of that perfection, which the divine goodness else have imparted to them. Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the divine art, wisdom and providence, for good; Typhon and Arimanus (if we may use that language) being as it were outwitted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spite of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole; kai tei to megisth tychy: Aychrwv twv xwra, and this must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good.

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world, (one the cause of good, and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them affutters of the same doctrine seem to be yet more flight and frivolous. For he concludes the *Pythagoreans to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes talk'd of the hystic tpphe and prisvuxia, the contrarieties and conjugations of things, such as finite and infinite, dextrous and sinisterous, even and odd, and the like. As al:* of Plato, that Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of xaipou tos xwra Stax, a versatile harmony of the world, whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a bow is successively intended and remitted; as likewise because he affirmed all things to flow, and war taphag MS. y. to be the father and lord of all. Moreover, he resolved *, that Empedocles 218.

* Of Platarg- 

fo, that Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of παρ-

* De Inde & Osride, p. 370.
his friendship and contention could be no other than a good and evil god; though we have rendred it probable, that nothing else was understood thereby but an active spermatick power in this corporeal world, causing vicissitudes of generation and corruption. Again, Anaxagoras is entitled by him to the same philosophy, for no other reason, but only because he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the universe. And lastly, Aristotle himself cannot escape him from being made an affector of a good and evil god too, merely because he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does Plutarch acquit himself any thing better, as to the senfe of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the Chaldeans, because their astrologers supposed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficent, and three of a middle nature; and to the ancient Greeks, because they sacrificed not only to Jupiter Olympus, but also to Hades or Pluto, who was sometimes called by them the infernal Jupiter. We confefs, that his interpretation of the traditions and mysteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no necessity for all that, that by their Typhon should be understand a substantial evil principle, or God self-existent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans, (as shall be more fully declared afterwards) to physiologize in their theology, and to personate all the several things in nature; it seems more likely, that these Egyptians did after that manner, only προσωποφυσικά, personate that evil and confusion, tumult and hurrifulry, constant alternation and vicissitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world, (though not without a divine providence) by Typhon.

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Persian Magi, that they might indeed assert two such active principles of good and evil, as Plutarch and the Manicheans afterwards did; and we must confefs, that there is some probability of this, because besides Plutarch, Laertius affirms the same of them, ὅσοι καὶ Άρίστας ἰδεῖ Αρεαντιος, ἀράκει ἀράκει καὶ κακίνῃ, that there are two principles according to the Persian Magi, a good demon and an evil one; he seeming to vouch it also from the authorities of Hermippus, Eudoxus and Theopompus. Notwithstanding which, it may very well be questioned, whether the meaning of those Magi were not herein misunderstood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil daemon than such a Satanical power as we acknowledge; that is, not a substantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil daemons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this not only because Theodorus in Photius calls the Persian Arimanius by that very name, Satanas; but also because those very traditions of theirs, recorded by Plutarch himself, seem very much to favour this opinion, they running after this manner: ἐπει τῇ ἄρχοι εἰσαχρέοις, εἰ τῷ Ἀρίστας λοιμῷ ἔρι. Παρ. εἴσαρκα καὶ λυμέν, υπὸ τῶν αἰώνων Φθείας ποντάται καὶ αἰθαμάται, τῆς ὀρ. ἔπειδό καὶ ὀμαλὰς γενομένα, ἵνα β' ον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀθετήπτως μακαρίως καὶ ὀμογλωσσῶς ἀπαίτως γενόμαι. That there is a fatal time at hand, in which Arimanius

manius, the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed, and when, the earth being made plain and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language. Or else, as Theopompus himself represented their senate, 'τελος ἀπολείπτει τοῦ "Ἄθω, καὶ τῶς μὲν ἀνθρώποις οὐκάμων ἐσεθαί, μὴ ἐφεβίς δεινός, μὴ σπηνίων πεταλοῖς τῶν ἀ ποών μικροτέρων Ἰπτών, ἡμέραν καὶ οὐκανάντια χήδων κάλως μὲν οὐ πολύν των ἶδιοι, οὔτε ἀνθρώπων κωμομόνων μετρόν.' That in conclusion Hades shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men. For since an unmade and self-existent evil daemon, such as that of Plutarch's and the Manicheans, could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that thee Persian Magi did, in their Arimanius, either προςωποποιήσαν περσονάτα evil only, as we suppose the Egyptians to have done in Typhon; or else understand a satanical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the Greeks did to evil demons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.

However, from what hath been declared, we conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil god, (or a good god and evil demon both self-existent) asserted by Plutarch and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same Plutarch pretendeth. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivision under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, Faustus in St. Auguf tin: Pagani bona & mala, tetra & splendida, perpetua & caduca, mutabilia & certa, corporalia & divina, unum habere principium dogmati- zant. His ego valde contraria censo, qui bonis omnibus principium fatisor Deum, contrariis vero Hylen (sic enim mali principium & naturam theologus dicat.) The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, soul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporeal and divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but Hyle (or the evil demon) of the contrary, which names our theologer (Manes) confounds together. And afterwards Faustus there again determines, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, viz. Paganism and Manicheism. From whence it may be concluded, that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil was not then look'd upon as the generally-received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore it seems reasonable to think, that Plutarch's imputing it so universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else because he being deeply tinctured, as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he look'd upon seemed

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2 Apud Plutarch. de Iside & Osiride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper. 2 Apud Augustin. ubi supra.
The Pagans not generally Ditheists. Book I.

seemed to him coloured with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this Plutarchus Chaeronensis, Numenius and Atticus, were the only Greek philosophers, who ever in publick writings positively affor me any such opinion.

And probably St. Athanasius is to be understood of these, when, in his oration contra Gentes 

he writes thus concerning this opinion: Εὐλίκοι

οὐ τίνες πλαναθέσθε τῆς θρούμλῃ νομίσαντες, ἵ θεον Χριστὸν εἰς ευτωίμονες, ἐν ὑποτάσσει η μαθή ιστανθ ἐκεῖν τῷ κακῷ άπεθανοῦντον ἀμαχάλως κατὰ διὸ ταύτα, ἢ τῶν ἐκμεταρθῶν ἀπεστραφὸνες τοῦ εἶναι ποιητὴν τοῦ θεοῦ, οἱ γὰρ ἀν οἱ τῶν θοῖ θανατοὶ, εἰρήνῃ κατὰ θυείας ἡ κακία καθ' ιστανθ ὑπὸ-μαζί ἐγείρει η ὑποτρίχες, ἢ πάλιν ζεύγος εὐθείας αὐτοῦ ποιητὴν εἰναι τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰς οὐκ ἔτεινε η τοῦ κακοῦ διάσωσθαι εἰς ἐκεῖν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς εὐθείας εἰς τὸ κακὸν κατ' αὐτοὶ εἰς. Some of the Greeks, wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Christ, have determined evil to be a real entity by itself, erring upon two accounts; because they must of necessity either suppose God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and essence by itself, and yet be not made by him; or else that he is the maker and cause of evil: whereas it is impossible, that he, who is essentially good, should produce the contrary. After which that father speaks also of some degenerate Christians, who fell into the same error: οἱ δὲ ὠν τῶν ἀδάμησων ἑπεκινδυνεῖς τῆς ἐκκλησίας τον θανάτον διὰ τὴν κακίαν, καί πέρι τῆς πίστεως ἡμαρροφίας, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὀντοῦ ὑπο-μαζί τοῦ κακοῦ παραβαφονῶς εἰναι. Some heretics, forsoaking the ecclesiastical doctrine, and making shipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falsely attributed a real nature and essence to evil. Of which heretics there were several sects before the Manicheans, sometime taken notice of and cenfured by Pagan philosophers themselves; as by Celsus 

where he charges Christians with holding this opinion, that there is ἐν θεῷ τῷ μεγάλῳ ὁ θεὸς ἡ κακίανίμως, an execrable god contrary to the great God; and by Platonius, writing a whole book against such Christians, the 9th of his second Ennead, which, by Porphyry was inscribed πρὸς τοῖς Γονονοσίν, against the Gnosticks.

But if, notwithstanding all that we have hitherto said to the contrary, that which Plutarch so much contends for should be granted to be true, that the Pagan theologers generally affor me two self existent principles (a good God, and an evil soul or daemon) and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all those other gods, which they worshipped, were not look'd upon by them as so many unmade self existent beings, because then they should have acknowledged so many first principles. However, it is certain, that if Plutarch believed his own writings, he must of necessity take it for granted, that none of the Pagan gods (those two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or self-existent beings. And as to Plutarch himself, it is unquestionably manifest, that though he were a Pagan, and a worshipper of all those many gods of theirs, but especially amongst the rest, of the Delian Apollo, (whose priest he declares himself to have been) yet he supposeth them all (except only one good God, and another evil soul of the world) to be no self-existent deities, but ἢιοι γεννητοι, generated or created gods only.

And

2 Apud Origen. contra Celsum, Lib. VI. 3 Vide Rualdum in Vitâ Plutarchi, Cap. IX.
And the fame is to be affirmed of all his Pagan followers, as also of the Manicheans, forasmuch as they, besides their good and evil god, (the only unmade self-existent beings acknowledged by them) worshipped also innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongst the Pagans any, who affirmed a multitude of unmade self-existent deities; but, on the contrary, we shall now find one, who took notice of this opinion of πολλαὶ ἄρχει, many principles, so far forth as to confute it; and that is Aristotle, who was not occasioned to do that neither, because it was a doctrine then generally received, but only because he had a mind odiously to impute such a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, they making ideas (sometimes called also numbers) in a certain sense, the principles of things. Nevertheless, the opinion itself is well confuted by that philosopher from the phenomena, after this manner: Οι δὲ λέγοντες τῶν ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν μεταματικῶν, ιννίκος οὐκ ἔτι ἀλλὰ ἵσχ溯源ν ὑπόκειται καὶ ἄρχει ἑκάστη αὐλλας, ἵππονίζων τῶν τῆς προτὸς ὑπόκειον πολιοφορνικά κ.κ. They who say that mathematical number is the first, and suppose one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole world to be like an incoherent and disagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one another, nor conspire together to make up one sense and harmony; but the contrary, faith he, is most evident in the world; and therefore there cannot be many principles, but only one. From whence it is manifest, that though Aristotle were a worshipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans, (he somewhere representing it as very absurd to sacrifice to none but Jupiter) yet he was no Polytheist, in the sense before declared, of many unmade self-existent deities, nor indeed any Ditheist neither, no affirter of two understanding principles, a good and evil god, (as Plutarch pretended him to be) he not only here exploring that opinion of πολλαὶ ἄρχει, many principles, but also expressly deriving all from one; and in that very chapter affirming, that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platonists and Pythagoreans there perstringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in some sense principles, as the paradigms of things; yet, according to Aristotle's own confession, even in that same chapter, they declared also, that there was ἀλλὰ ἄρχει περιφέρον, another principle more excellent or superior; which is indeed that, that was called by them the τὸ τῦ, or τὸ μοῖχος, unity itself, or a monad, that is, one most simple deity.

Though we did before demonstrate, that the Pagan gods were not all supposed by them to be unmade self-existent beings, because they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods; yet, forasmuch as it might be suspected, that they held notwithstanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the best enquiry that we could concerning this; and the utmost that we have been able yet to discover, is, that some few of the professed Pagans, as well as of pretended Christians, have indeed affirter a duplicity of such gods (viz. understanding beings unmade) one good, and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that Aristotle did professedly oppose this opinion.
of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durst never have done, had it then been the generally received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that several of the ancient Christians, in their disputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities; yet we do not find for all that, that any of them seriously charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occasionally and *ex abundanti*. But we should be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controversy, whether there were not amongst the Pagan deities a multitude of suppos'd unmade beings, if we did but a take a short survey of their religion, and consider all the several kinds of gods worshipped by them; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to these following heads. In the first place therefore it is certain, that many of the Pagan gods were nothing else but dead men (or the souls of men deceased) called by the *Greeks* Heroes, and the *Latins* Manes; such as *Hercules*, *Liber*, *Æsculapius*, *Caflor*, *Pollux*, *Quirinus*, and the like. Neither was this only true of the *Greeks* and Romans, but also of the *Egyptians*, *Syrians* and *Babylonians*. For which cause the Pagan sacrifices are, by way of contempt in the Scripture: *called the sacrifices of the dead*; that is, not of dead or lifeless statues, as some would put it off, but of dead men: which was the reason, why many of the religious rites and solemnities, observed by the Pagan priests, were mournful and funeral; according as it is expressed in *Baruch* concerning the Babylonians, *Their priests fit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven, and nothing upon their heads; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feast, when one is dead*. (Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the *Æsraelitis* priests.) And the same thing is noted likewise by the poet *concerning the Egyptians*:

Et quem tu plangens, hominem testaris, Osrn.:

and intimated by *Xenophanes* the Colophonian *, when he reprehensively admonished the *Egyptians* after this manner: *ει Στροις νομίζω μν Στροις, ει δε Χριστις μη Στροις νομίζων. That if they thought those to be gods, they should not so lament them; but if they would lament them, they should no longer think them gods*. Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as Emperors) had also temples and altars erected to them; nay, human polities and cities were also sometimes deified by the Pagans, *Rome itself being made a goddess*. Now, no man can imagine, that those men-gods and city-gods were look'd upon by them as so many unmade self-existent deities, they being not indeed so much as *Φυσῆ γενναρὶ Γει, gods made or generated by nature*, but rather artificially made by human will and pleasure. Again, another sort of the Pagan deities were all the greater parts of the visible mundane system, or corporeal world, as suppos'd to be animated, the sun, the moon, and the stars, and

*Psalm CVI. 28.*
*Lucan. Pharsal. Lib. VIII. verf. 133.*
*Vide Plutarch: de Superstit. p. 171. Tom.*
CHAP. IV. of the Pagan Deities.

even the earth itself, under the names of Vesta and Cybele, the mother of the gods, and the like. Now it is certain also, that none of these could be taken for unmade self-existent deities neither, by those, who suppos'd the whole world itself to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as Aristotle tells us, was the generally received opinion before his time. There was also a third sort of Pagan deities, ethereal and aerial animals invisible, called Daemons, Genii and Latres, superior indeed to men, but inferior to the celestial or mundane gods before mentioned. Wherefore these must needs be look'd upon also by them but as generated or created gods, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Besides all these, the Pagans had yet another sort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of substances, which therefore could not be supposed by them to be self-existent deities, because they could not so much as subsist by themselves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, justice, clemency, love, desire, health, peace, honour, fame, liberty, memory, sleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of Pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing else, but the several and various manifestations of that one divine force, power and providence, that runs through the whole world (as respecting the good and evil of men) fictitiously personated, and so represented as so many gods and godesses.

Lastly, there is still another kind of Pagan gods behind, having substantial and personal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be so many understanding beings, unmade, and independent upon any supreme, were it for no other reason but only this, because they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions severally (as it were) assigned to them, and to which they are confined; so as not to interfere and clash with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious system of the whole; one of those gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the air, another in the sea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddes of learning and wisdom, another of speech and eloquence, another of justice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleasure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of understanding beings, self-existent and independent, could thus of themselves have fallen into such a uniform order and harmony, and without any clashing, peaceably and quietly sharing the government of the whole world amongst them, should carry it on with such a constant regularity? For which cause we conclude also, that neither those dii majorum gentium, whether the twenty Selebii, or the twelve Consentes, nor yet that triumvirate of gods, amongst whom Homer shares the government of the whole world, according to that of Maximus Tyrius, τριάδα Ομόγεν διὰς αι τὰ πόλις, Ποσείδών. Dif. 16. μὲν ἀλαχις, πολλῶν ἄλα ναυϊν αῖν, "Αδης ἐν ἰλαχι έκθον πήτολμα, Ζευς ἐν οὐρανίον" The sea being assigned to Neptune, the dark and subterraneous parts to Pluto, but

but the heaven to Jupiter; which three are sometimes called also the celestial, marine, and terrestrial Jupiter; nor lastly, that other Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped all together in the capitol, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno; I say, that none of all these could reasonably be thought by the Pagans themselves, to be so many really distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole business seems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did physiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the supreme God, and consequently the several parts of it as his living members; or else, apprehending it at least to be a mirror, or visible image of the invisible Deity, and consequently all its several parts, and things of nature, but so many several manifestations of the divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confused acknowledgment of a supreme invisible Being, the creator and governor of all; but that all the several manifestations of the Deity in the world, considered singly and apart by themselves, should be made so many distinct objects of their devout veneration. And therefore in order hereunto did they πρασματοποιεῖν, speak of the things in nature, and the parts of the world, as persons, and consequently as so many gods and goddeses; yet so, as that the intelligent might easily understand the meaning, that these were all really nothing else but so many several names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly displaying itself therein. To this purpose Balbus in Cicero ¹; Videtisne ut a physiceis rebus traefis ratio fit ad commentitios & fidélis deos? See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made? And Origen seems to infit upon this very thing, (where Celsus upbraids the Jews and Christians for worshipping one only God) shewing, that all that seeming multiplicity of pagan Gods could not be understood of so many distinct substantial independent Deities; δεικνύω τούς, πῶς αὐτῶς διατεταυχομένης το τούτων καὶ τινών ἡ Ἐλλήνως ἢ ὥσος εἰς Ἡλληνικάς γενέσις ἀπ' εὐσεβείας περιποίησιν ἢ θείας Μονομοσίως γενέσις ἀπ' Θεός τὰς Μούσας. Now, the Óρχους, ή τός Ἱλιάς τις λόγοις παραστάτη γενέσις, κατ' αὐτίκα ὑπερτυποῦσαν οὕτως εὐσεβείας, ἀλλ' εὖ διδομένα τῷ Ἐλληνικῷ ἀνθρώπῳ (παραστάτη γενέσις, ἡ Ἡλληνική περιποίησις) δικτυών Θεόν. To this sense; Let Celsus therefore himself shew, bow he is able to make out a multiplicity of Gods (substantial and self-existent) according to the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans; let him declare the essence and substantial personality of that Memory, which by Jupiter generated the muses, or of that Themis, which brought forth the hours; or let him shew bow the Graces, always naked, do subsist by themselves. But he will never be able to do this, nor to make it appear, that those figments of the Greeks (which seem to be really nothing else but the things of nature turned into persons) are so many distinct (self-existent) deities. Where the latter words are thus rendred in a late edition; Sed nunquam poterit (Celsus) Graecorum figmenta, quae validiora fieri videntur, ex rebus ipsis deos esse arguere; which we confess we cannot understand; but we conceive

conceive the word σομαλωσεως, there turned validiora fieri, is here used by Origen in the same sense with προσωποσεως: so that his meaning is, as we have declared, that those figments of the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans, (which are the same with Ballius his commentiti & ficti Dii) are really nothing else but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiously perfonated, and consequently not so many distinct substantial deities, but only several notions and confederations of one God, or supreme Numen, in the world.

Now this fictitious perfonating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan Theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when those things in nature were themselves without any more ado, or change of names, spoken-of as persons, and so made gods and goddeffes, as in the many instances before propofed. Another, when there were distinct proper and perfonal names accommodated severally to those things, as of Minerva to wisdom, of Neptune to the sea, of Ceres to corn, and of Bacbus to wine. In which latter cafe, those perfonal names properly signify the invisible divine powers, supposed to preside over those several things in nature; and those are therefore properly those gods and goddeffes, which are δεινος ειδως, the givers and dispensers of the good things, and the removers of the contrary; but they are used improperly also for the things of nature themselves, which therefore as manifestations of the divine power, goodnes and providence perfonated, are sometimes also abusively called gods and goddeffes. This mystery of the Pagan polytheism, is thus fully declared by Mochopeulus: 'Istew 6'7 in Hesiod, p.1.

Now, the Greeks (or Pagans) saw to have any power, virtue or ability in it, they looked upon it as not arising according to such power, without the providence, presfidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itself, which hath the power, and the deity presfiding over it, by one and the same name: whence the ministerial fire used in mechanick arts, and the god presiding over those arts that work by fire, were both alike called Hephaestus or Vulcan; so the name Demetra or Ceres was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddes which befores them; Athena or Minerva did alike signify wisdom and the goddes which is the dispenser of it; Dionylus or Bacbus, wine, and the god that giveth wine; (wherein Plato etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddeffes that superintended over the same, Eilithyia or Lucina; Coitus or copulation, and the deity presfiding over it, Aphrodite or Venus.
All the Pagan Gods

Book I.

Venus. And lastly, in the same manner, by the Muses they signified both those rational arts, rhetorick, astronomy, poetry, and the goddeses, which assist therein or promote the same. Now, as the several things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachrestically called gods and goddeses, it is evident, that such deities as these could not be supposed to be unmade or self-existent, by those, who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as these names were used more properly, to signify invisible and understanding powers, presiding over the things in nature, and dispensing of them, however they have an appearance of so many several distinct deities; yet they seem to have been all really nothing else, but as Balbus in Cicero 1 expresseth it, Deus pertinentis per naturam cujusque rei, God passing through, and acting in the nature of every thing; and consequently, but several names, or so many different notions and considerations of that one supreme Numen, that divine force, power, and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variously manifesting itself therein.

Wherefore, since there were no other kinds of Gods amongst the Pagans, besides these already enumerated, unless their images, statues and symbols should be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called gods) which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanship of men's own hands; we conclude universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods, which makes so great a shew and noise, was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its different manifestations, gifts and effects in the world, personated; or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one Supreme: so that one unmade self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, (for of the fottish vulgar no man can pretend to give an account, in any religion) and consequently, the Pagan polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme; but in mingling and blending, some way or other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator.

And that the ancient Pagan Theists thus acknowledged one supreme God, who was the only God alybovnc, unmade or unproduced Deity, (I say, Theists, because those amongst the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were absolute Atheists) this may be undeniably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a divine attribute. Because upon the hypothesis of many unmade self-existent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as omnipotence in rerum natura: and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly styled by Macrobius 2, summni Dei omnipotentia, it being an attribute essentially peculiar to one supreme and sole self-existent Deity. And Simplicius, likewise a Pagan,

1 De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVIII.
Chap. IV. derived from one Supreme.

Pagan, confuted the Manichean hypothesis of two self-existent deities from hence also, because it destroy'd omnipotence: \( \text{αὐτὰς καὶ κατὰ δίδ} \) \( \text{σε} \) \( \text{λόγους τῶν} \) \( \text{πόντων, c. 4.} \) \( \text{δὲνος ἀρχῶν, τύ} \) \( \text{το} \) \( \text{το} \) \( \text{αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ} \) \( \text{τὸν} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{αὐτῶν θεόν, \ μηδὲ} \) \( \text{ὡς} \) \( \text{παναπάτωσα} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{πάνω} \) \( \text{ἀνάμειν, \ μὴ} \) \( \text{δύναμιν,} \) \( \text{αὐτῷ} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{ἀπεράτητο} \) \( \text{χώραν} \) \( \text{αναθείαν,} \) \( \text{ἀλλὰ} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{ἡμῶν τῆς} \) \( \text{οὐκ} \) \( \text{δυνάμεως, \ εἰπέρ} \) \( \text{ὅρα} \) \( \text{Salmasi.} \)

\[ \text{τὸ} \] \( \text{For they, who assert two principles of the universe (one good, the other evil) are necessitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cause of all things, neither can they praise it as omnipotent, nor ascribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at most, if so much. Over and besides all which, it hath been also proved already, that the ancient Atheists under paganism directed themselves principally against the opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then assserted by the Pagan Theists.} \]

And we think it here observable, that this was a thing so generally confessed and acknowledged, that Faustus the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Christians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Deity, the sole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and by confquence were no other than schisms or subdivided sects of paganism. \( \text{Vos despicentes à gentibus (faith Faust. 1. 20. he) monarchia opinionem primó vobiscum divulgastis, id est, ut omnia credatis ex deo. Ejiis fane schisma, necnon & priores vestri Judaei. De opinione monarchiae, in nullo etiam ipse differentient à paganis. Quare confess vos atque Judaeos schisma esse gentilitatis. Seétas autem si quaeras, non plures erunt quam dux, Gentium & nostra. You revolting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, so as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore you are really nothing but a schism of paganism, or a subdivided branch of it, and so are your predecessors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifest, that both Christians and Jews are but schisms of gentilitism. But as for sects of religion, really differing from another, there are but these two, that of the Pagans, and that of ours, who altogether differ from them. Now though this be false and foolish, as to the Christians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing founded in the principles of nature; yet it sufficiently shews this to have been the general lefše of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one sole self-existent Deity; so that they neither acknowledged a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which Plutarch contended for, (one good, and the other evil,) who accordingly denied God to be the cause of all things, writing thus in his defect of oracles, \( \text{οἱ} \) \( \text{μὴ} \) \( \text{καὶ δὴ αὐτῶν αὐτὸς} \) \( \text{τὸν} \) \( \text{Θεόν,} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{ἐκ} \) \( \text{ὑμᾶς τοῦ} \) \( \text{πάνω} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{τοῦ} \) \( \text{οὐκ} \) \( \text{δυναμί} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{παρακά] \) \( \text{πώς,} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{εἰς} \) \( \text{μετέχει} \) \( \text{μὲ} \) \( \text{πάνω} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{τῶν.} \) They are guilty of one extreme, \( \text{who make God the cause of nothing, and they of another, who make him the cause of all things. But this paradox was both late started amongst the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the succession of their philosophers, and therefore prejudiceth not} \)
not the truth of Faustus his general assertion concerning the Pagans. Which is again fully confirmed by St. Austin in his reply; Siquis ita dividat, ut dicat eorum, que aliquã religione detinientur, aliis placere unum Deum colendum, aliis multis; per banc differentiam & pagani à nobis remoti sunt, & Manichei cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judaeis. Hic forte dicitis, quod multis deos vestros ex una substantia peribebitis; quasi pagani multis fuos, non ex una afferant, quamvis diversa illis officia, & opera, & poteftates illis attribuant; sicut etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenebrarum, alius ex ed captâ fabricat mundum, &c. If one should make another distribution of Religious into such as worship either one God, or many gods; according to this division, the Pagans will be removed from us Christians, and joined with you Manicheans. But perhaps you will here say, that all your many gods are derived from one substance; as if the Pagans did not also derive all their gods from one, though attributing several offices, works and powers to them; in like manner as amongst you, one God expugns the nation of darkens, another makes a world out of it, &c. And again afterwards he writes further to the same purpose; Disce ergó Faustus monarchiae opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, sed gentes non uoque adeo ad falsos deos esse dilapidas, ut opinionem amitterent unus veri dei, ex quo eft omnium qualificatwn natura: Let Faustus therefore know, that we Christians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans, but that the Pagans have not so far degenerated, sinking down into the worship of false gods, as to have left the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatsoever nature.

XIV. It follows from what we have declared, that the Pagan polytheism or multiplicity of gods is not to be understood in the sense before expressed, of many being à ujó vno, τοιως πολλων, many unproduced and self-existent deities, but according to some other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God is τοις πολλοις λεγομένως, one of these words, that hath been used in many different senses, the Atheists themselves acknowledging, a God and gods, according to some private senses of their own, (which yet they do not all agree in neither,) and Theists not always having the same notion of that word; forasmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in one sense, that is, as understanding beings superior to men, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again sometimes carried down lower to princes and magistrates; and not only so, but also to good men as such, when they are said to be made partakers of the divine nature. And thus that learned Philosopher and Christian Boethius, Omnis beatus deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatione verò nihil prohibit esse quamplurimus: Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one God by nature, yet nothing binders but that there may be many by participation. But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other respects, and particularly, as to religious worship; Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve. Now this is that, which seems to be essentially included in the Pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general, namely, a respect to religious worship. Wherefore a God in general, according to the sense

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2 De Consolat. Philos. Lib. III. p. 72. f.

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sense of the Pagan Theists, may be thus defined, An understanding Being superior to men, not originally derived from senseless matter, and looked upon as an object for men's religious worship. But this general notion of the word God is again restrained and limited by differences, in the division of it. For such a God as this may be either ἰγανθίας, ingenerate or unproduced, and consequently self-existent; or else παρδως, generated or produced, and dependent on some higher Being as its cause. In the former sense, the intelligent Pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them θεός κατ' θεόν, according to that of Thales in Laertius 1, πρεσβυτατον των θεων ο θεος, ἰγανθια τος. God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing that is so: but in the latter, they admitted of many gods, many understanding beings, which, though generated or produced, yet were superior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worship. And thus the Pagan Theists were both Polytheists and Monotheists in different senses, they acknowledged both many gods, and one God; that is, many inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean in Stobæus declares himself, δουει δι' Ροι, καθ' αλλ' εиς καθ' θεος, αλλ' εις καθ' Μεγας, καθ' θεος.---Ecl. Phys. 1. υπερεσφεια, καθ' θεος, καθ' αλλων πολλων διαφθορας καθ' θεος, πολλων υπερεσφειας τε καθ' αλλων πολλων διαφθορας καθ' θεος.---[Rth' θεος των θεων θεος, τοι καθ' αλλων εις καθ' θεος. It seemeth to me, that there is not only one God, but that there is one the greatest and highest God, that governeth the whole world, and that there are many other gods besides him differing as to power, that one God reigning over them all, who surmounts them all in power, greatness, and virtue. That is that God, who contains and comprehendeth the whole world; but the other gods are those, who together with the revolution of the universe orderly follow that first and intelligible God. Where it is evident, that Onatus his πολλαι θεοι, or many gods, were only the heavenly bodies, or animated stars. And partly from those words cited, and chiefly others, which follow after in the same place, (that will be produced elsewhere) it plainly appears, that in Onatus his time, there were some, who acknowledged one only God, denying all those other gods, then commonly worshipped. And indeed Anaxagoras seems to have been such a one; forasmuch as asserting one perfect mind ruling over all, (which is the true Deity) he effectually degraded all those other Pagan gods, the sun, moon, and stars from their godships, by making the sun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and stones, and the like of the other stars and planets. And some such there were also amongst the ancient Egyptians, as shall be declared in due place. Moreover, Proclus upon Plato's Timæus P. 206. tells us, that there hath been always let's doubt and controversy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore Onatus here declares his own sense, as to this particular, viz. that besides the one supreme God, there were also many other inferior deities, that is, understanding beings, that ought to be religiously worshipped.

1 Lib. I. segm. 35. p. 21. f.

Hh 2 3 But
But because it is not impossible, but that there might be imagined one
supreme Deity, though there were many other θεοὶ ἀγένετοι, unmade and
self-existent gods besides, as Plutarch supposed before, one supreme God,
together with a θεὸς ἂνεκ, an irrational soul or demon unmade, inferior in
power to it; therefore we add in the next place, that the more intelligent
Pagans did not only assert one God, that was supreme and ἀπειληθέντων, the
most powerful of all the gods, but also, who being omnipotent was the
principle and cause of all the rest, and therefore the only θεὸς ἀγένετος καὶ ἀπειληθε-θέντων, the only unproduced and self-existent Deity. Maximus Tyrius af-
firms this to have been the general fentence of all the Pagans, that there was θεὸς
tῶν θεῶν θεαλβός καὶ θειην, καὶ θεὸι πολλοί, θεὸς πάθες, οὐκαρκολής δεῖος, one God the
king and father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with
God. Neither did the Poets imply any thing less, when Zeus was so often called
by the Greeks, and Jupiter by the Latins, θεοὶ ἀνδρότητι θεοκράτει, and
bominum pater atque deorum, or hominum fatorque deorum, and the like. And in-
deed the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before mentioned was com-
monly thus declared by them universally, γεννησεν τοῖς θεοῖς θεός, that the
gods were generated, or, as Herodotus 1 expresseth it, ὅτι ΕΚΑΣΤΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΩΝ θεοκρατος,
that every one of the gods was generated or produced; which yet is not so to
be understood, as if they had therefore supposed no God at all unmade or
self-existent, (which is absolute atheism) but that the θεοὶ τῶν θεῶν, as diftin-
guished from the ὁ θεός or τὸ θεῖον from God, or the supreme Deity, were all
of them universally made or generated.

But to the end, that we may now render this business, yet something more
easy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus suppose all their
gods have one to have been made or generated, and consequently acknow-
ledged only one θεὸς ἀγένετος καὶ ἀπειληθε-θέντων, one unproduced and self-existent
Deity, we shall in this place further observe, that the theogonia of those
ancient Pagans, their genesis and generation of gods, was really one and
the fame thing with the cosmogonia, the genesis and generation of the
world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production
both of these gods, and the world. And this we shall first prove from
Plato in his Timæus; where he being to treat of the cosmogonia, pre-
miseth this distinction concerning two heads of being; that some were
eternal and never made, and some again made or generated, the former
whereof he calls ἐσόσι or essence, the latter γένεσις or generation: adding
also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things
were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other ge-
genrated things of faith and opinion only; ὅτι τι γεγο περὶ γένεσιν ἐσόσι, τιτο περὶ
πάθεων ἀλλοιως, for what essence is to generation, the same is certainty of truth
or knowledge to faith. And thereupon he declares, that his reader was
not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where
he was now to treat of things generated, (namely, the gods, and the
visible world) as if he had been to discourse about things immutable
and eternal, in these words, ἐνών οὖν, ΠΣΥΧΗΣ, πολλαὶ πολλάν εἰσόμενων τε χρυς
καὶ τῆς τοῦ πάθες γένεσις, &c. If therefore, O Socrates, many things having been

1 Histor. Lib. II. Cap. LIII. p. 109.
been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us, but on the contrary to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities. Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to μυθις and not to ηθος, to generation and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was no less to him, than it was to the other Pagans, a God; he calling it έν ηθοινων, a happy God, and before it was yet made, έν ηθοινων, a God about to be made. Not as if Plato accounted the senfles matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as endued with a plat-ckick nature only, to be a God, (for no inanimate thing was a God to Plato) but because he supposed the world to be an animal, endued with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and body, έν ετοι ηθι κατά λόγου τον εισότα δει λίγον, τόδε τον κόσμου ζωον Pag. 30. έμφασιν έτοι με τη αιλουρίδα δια του τον έν ηθοινων πρωτοιναν. Wherefore we are thus according to probability to conclude, that this world was really made by the providence of God an intellectual animal; whence from an animal forthwith it became a God. So that here we are to take notice of two gods in Plato, very different from one another; one a generated God, this whole world animated, and another that God, by whole providence this world was generated, and thus made an animal and a God; which latter must needs be an unmade, self-existent Deity, and not belong to γένος; but to ηθος, not to generation, but to immutable essence. Again, those greater parts of the world, the sun, the moon, and the stars, (as supposed also to be animated with particular souls of their own) were as well accounted by Plato, as by the other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there έσωθα και γεννητοι ζωοι, visible and generated gods. Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself is also supposed by him to be either a God or goddeses, according to those ancient copies of the Timæus used both by Cicero and Proclus: Γινε με της φυσις, ειλαιμενοι με τον διας παρατηρησον, γεννηθοι και ζωοι ηθοι, έμπυρων και πρωτοιναν και πρωτοιναν ζωοι, ένει εις εις ουρανοι γενηθοινα. God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round upon the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens. Where since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumscription upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age, (as Plutarch 1 records from Theophrastus) he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagorick hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun, (from whence it would follow, that, as Plotinus 2 expresseth it, the earth was έυ τοι αστρων, one of the stars) he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think

think the earth to be a God as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon; that having been formerly represented in the Orphick tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verities of Orpheus are recorded by Proclus, to that purpose:

\[\text{Mtvso} t' \text{\'Allv} \gamma\varepsilon\iota\nu\iota \alpha'\tau\epsilon\iota\phi\alpha\lambda\eta\upsilon, \nu \tau\varepsilon \Sigma\iota\lambda\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu.\]

\[\text{'A}d\acute{a}v\acute{a}v \iota\nu\kappa\lambda\zeta\sigma\iota\nu, \iota\pi\varepsilon\xi\theta\omicron\omega\upsilon \tau\varepsilon \text{Mtn}u\nu, \]

\[\text{H} \pi\lambda\lambda' \sigma'\upsilon\iota\iota \iota \chi, \pi\lambda\lambda' \alpha'\zeta\iota\alpha, \pi\lambda\lambda\alpha \mu\lambda\iota\alpha\beta\rho\alpha.\]

The sense whereby is this; That God in the cosmogonia or cosmopoeia, besides this earth of ours, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods call Selene, but mortal men Mene, or the moon; that hath many hills and valleys, many cities and houses in it. From whence Proclus, though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagorick system, yet being much addicted to these Orphick traditions, concluded the moon to be, γυν αθηειαν, an ethereal earth.

After all this, *Plato*, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his *Timean* cosmobonia, speaks also of the genesis, ortus, or generation of the poetick gods, under the name of daemons, such as Tethys and Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter and Juno, and the like; which seem to be really nothing else, but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature *SteponStuTa*, that is, *fielitiously perforated and deified* (as is elsewhere declared.) Which whole buffulcs was a thing set off by those Poets with much fiction and physiological allegory. And though *Plato*, out of a seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetick theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the fons of the gods, who must not be supposed to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as *Eusebius* well observeth, he doth but all the while silly jeer it, plainly insinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only *καιν διαλεκτικον αποδειξεων*, without necessary demonstrations, but also *και ευκτικον*, without so much as probabilities. Nevertheless *Proclus* well suspecting no such matter, but taking *Plato* in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetick gods or daemons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon, (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by *Plato*) calling them γυρονεικας *Θεοι, the gods that cause generation, and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; *Jupiter* being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the suprême God, but only for the animated æther, as *Juno* for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove, that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: \(\text{εν γαρ} \ Δ'\omicron \ ο\nu\kappa\upsilon \Theta\omicron\upsilon\omicron\sigma\iota\alpha\iota\nu\iota\upsilon\nu\iota, \epsilon\iota \upsilon\nu\iota \iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\upsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota\nu\iota\upsilon, \epsilon\iota \upsilon\nu\iota \iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\upsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota\nu\iota\upsilon, \)

\[\text{απρο\nu\o\omicron} \tau\omicron\pi\upsilon, \iota \nu \tau\omicron \Theta\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \pi\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \mu\epsilon\iota\chi\iota \kappa\omicron \nu \alpha\upsilon, \]

\[\text{π} \upsilon \upsilon\upsilon \theta\upsilon\iota\alpha\iota\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon, \iota \nu \upsilon\nu\iota \upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \tau\omicron\nu\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \mu\epsilon\iota\chi\iota \kappa\omicron \nu \alpha\upsilon, \]

\[\text{και του} \upsilon \upsilon\upsilon \nu\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon, \tau\omicron \nu \upsilon\nu\iota \upsilon\nu\iota \upsilon\upsilon, \upsilon \upsilon\upsilon \theta\upsilon\iota\alpha\iota\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon, \upsilon \upsilon\upsilon \mu\epsilon\iota\chi\iota \kappa\omicron \nu \alpha\upsilon.\]

For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are

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*Comment. in Timeæum Platonis Lib. IV. p. 75, 76.*

*Vide etiam Lib. V. p. 292.*

*Preparat. Evangelici. Lib. II. Cap. VII.*

*Plat. in Timæo Cap. XXVI. p. 249.*

*In Timeæum Platon. Lib. IV. p. 287.*
are godless, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and providence, then are they not unfurnished of the divine nature; and if so, there must be some peculiar orders of Gods presiding over them. For if the heavens by reason of particular souls and minds partake of that one soul and one mind, why should we not conclude the same concerning the elements, that they also by certain intermedious orders of gods, partake of that one divinity of the whole world? Wherefore a little before, the same Proclus highly condemns certain ancient phyliologers, whom he supposed Aristotle to have followed: παλλοί P. 285. τῶν Φυσιολόγων άφυχα εἰς θεομεα, καὶ ἀπροσφαίρω σα χείρια εἰς τά γειχτεία νεόμερα τά μέν πάντα υπάρχει γεϊτον τόν εἰς αὐτοίς τάκιν, μνευ καὶ ζεύν μετέχει τιμολόγη, τόν δὲ γένεσιν, ὡς πολυμισθιόσαλον, καὶ ἄφριστον, καὶ ἀπροσφαίρω αέριλπον, οἷα δὲ καὶ Αριστοτέλης ὑπερ έθερα ἔθελε, ταῖς υἱομαίναι περίφοροι μόνοι ἐπιθρόσαι, τὰς αἰκινίας αἰτίας: εἰτε ὡτό ἀνεύς, εἰτε πλείον: άφυχα δὲ τέ γειχτεία ταῦτα καταλείπων. The elements were thought by most of the ancient Phyliologers to be inanimate, and to be moved fortuitously without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reason of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this sublunary world (or genesis) to float up and down without providence. And these Aristotle afterwards followed, appointing immovable intelligences to preside over the celestial spheres only, (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate.

Lastly, besides all those other mundane gods before mentioned, as generated together with the world, though Proclus seems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifest, that Plato doth not there in his Timeus altogether forget those properly called demons, (elsewhere so much infulst upon him) but in the very next following words he plainly infinuates them, after this manner: ἡ ζεύν Φυσιολόγων καὶ ἡ ζεύν δὲ ἔθελεν ἰδεῖν, the gods, which appear visibly to us as often as they please, or which can appear and disappear at pleasure, speaking also of their geneis or generation as part of the cosmogonia; and then again afterwards calling them νεόμεροι, junior gods, he describes them as those, whose particular office it was to superintend and preside over human affairs, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλισσα καὶ ἀδέσποτο τό Σύνθηκον διάκονον λύον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ εἰσιν γένος αἰτίως, and to govern this mortal animal, man, after the best manner possible, so that he should no otherwise fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cause of evil and misery to himself, by the abuse of his own liberty.

And thus much out of Plato’s Timeus; but the same thing might be proved also out of his other writings, as particularly from that passage in his tenth book of laws, where he takes notice again of the teogonia of the ancients, and that as it had been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral fables. Ἐστώ εἰς τούς νέομερους λόγος νεώμεροι, Οἱ μὲν εἰς τοίς τέθροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ εἰςεν μέτων ἁγίστεις περὶ ζεύον, οἱ μὲν παλαίστατοι, ὡς γένος τοῦ πρώτος Φυσιολόγων τῶν τῶν ἀθανάτων περίσσεις δὶ τός αἰρεῖν τοῦ πολύ Θεουργιών διειρυχθείναι, γειράμενοι τό ὡς πρός αὐτὸν κρίσιν. There are, faith he, extant amongst us Athenians, certain stories and traditions, very ancient, concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in prose, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at first made, or generated, and then carrying on their
Hesiod's Theogonia the Cosmogonia. Book I.

Their fabulous theogonia farther, how these generated gods afterward conversed with one another, and engendering after the manner of men, begat other gods. Where that philosopher taking off his vizard, plainly discovers his great dislike of that whole fabulous theogonia (however he acknowledges elsewhere; that it did contain θεονομία, that is, physiologically allegories under it) as a thing, that was destructive of all piety and virtue, by reason of its attributing all human passions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia and the cosmogonia were one and the same thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the sun, moon, and stars, and the like.

Moreover, this same thing is sufficiently manifest also even from Hesiod's own Theogonia, which doubtless was that, which Plato principally aimed at; and if it were not absolutely the first, yet is it the most ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there in the beginning of that poem, Hesiod invokes his muses after this manner;

Salvete nata Jovis, date verò amabilem cantilenam: 
Celebrate quoque immortalium divinum genus semper existentium, 
Quí tellure progeniti sunt, caló flíllato, 
Nobíque caliginosà, quos item saélus nutrivit pontús. 
Dicite infíper, ut prínum dií & terra saéli fuerint, 
Et flumina, & pontús immensus estú fervent, 
Afraque fulgentia, & calum latum supérnè, 
Et qui ex hís nati sunt, díí, datóres bonórum.

Where we see plainly, that the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven, stars, seas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongst the rest daemons and nymphs, which the fame Hesiod speaks of elsewhere.) But immediately after this invocation of the muses, the Poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the first principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth, and of night out of chaos; of the æther, and of day from night; of the starry heavens, mountains, and seas, &c. All which genesis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical description of the cosmogonia; as throughout the sequel of that whole poem all seems to be physiology, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient scholia upon that book begin, έγενέν οτι ο περὶ τῆς Θεογονίας λόγος ϕυσικών διηγήσεως τῶν θεῶν ὑπαγορευζεν, we must know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a physiological declaration of things; Hesiod's gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but also

CHAP. IV. The Pagan Theogonia how mistaken.

also all the other things of nature, fictitiously personated and deified, or abusively called gods and godesses.

Neither was this only the doctrine of the Greeks, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a Theogonia, or a generation of gods, (the world itself and its several parts being accounted such by them) but also, in like manner of the other Barbarian pagans. For Diogenes Laertius hath recorded concerning the Persian Magi, In Procm. p. 40, that they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods were fire, and earth and water; that is, that the animated elements were gods, (as Proclus also before declared) and that these, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And both Laertius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians, that the world was generated, or had a temporary production; as also, that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the fame Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods, οἱ γένεσις ἀνίδων ἐγκυμοσύνες, which had an eternal generation; he seems to mean thereby only the celestial gods, the sun, moon and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods, which are again thus described by him: οἱ θεοὶ ὑπέρθερσιν, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν ἐκ καὶ νεων. [Lib. I. p. 55.]

And by this time we think it doth sufficiently appear, that the Theogonia of the ancients is not to be understood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as supposed to have been nothing else but mortal men, (Di mortalis nati matribus, as Cotta in Cicero) (speaks) who, according to the more vulgar signification of the word, had been generated, (humano more) as some, otherwise learned men, have seemed to suppose; but that it extends to all the inferior Pagan gods, some whereof were parts of the visible world animated, as the sun, moon, stars and earth: so that their Theogonia was the very same thing with the Cosmogonia, or at least a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that there was also in the paganick fables of the gods a certain mixture of history and heroology intertied, and complicated all along together with physiologick.

We are, in the next place, to observe, that both this Theogonia and Cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be understood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made in μηδενα, or from an antecedent non-existence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongst the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as shall be afterwards further declared. And Aristotle affirneth, that before his time, this genesis and temporary production of the world had been universally entertained by all, and par-

2 De Nat. Deor. Lib. III. Cap. XVIII. Oper.
particularly, that Plato was an affirter of the fame. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists endeavoured, with all their might, to force a contrary sense upon his Timeus: which is a thing, that Plutarch long since observed after this manner; or plei of those χρομενου Platonici, Plato's, and thereupon, και αντιπαραλκτησιν, ποιεται μεγαλου, νη παρεκολουχουσιν νη περιεκτησιν, ου τι δεινον και διατηρησιν αοιμουν δειν πεπαλακτησιν και αρκεται, την τε το κοσμον την τε της ζωης αυτω γενεσιν και σωφρωνιν, εικε εικε δειγματους, ουδε τον απειρου χρονου ουσων ιχνων. The most of Plato's followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving, that they ought by all means possible to hide and conceal that opinion (as infant and detestable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it, so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time. Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that Plato, in his Timeus, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense, to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or without beginning. First, because in the entrance of that discourse he opposeth these two things to one another, το ατι δια, that which always is, and το γενομεν εξου, that which is generated or made; and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, ποτερον ου ατι γενομενοι αρχαι έξου αοδιμαν, να γενομεν, απτ αρχαι τιν ομα τε αξιωματος; Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha? To which the answer is, γενομεν, that it was made, or had a beginning. Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also, that time itself was made, or had a beginning: χρονον ου μετ αρχαι γενομεν, ια αμα γεννησις, αμα και αυτω ετε, αν ποιε λυτε της αυτω γενεσις. Time was made together with the heaven, that being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them. Besides which, he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly; τω θεου ου φιλαθευν, παραλκτησιν, ουν εις φυσιν αρχου, αλλα μελεμουν προμελεμους ιησου απαιτων, εις ταξιν αυτο δειγματο εις της αταξιας. God taking all that matter, which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion. Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude, that Aristotle was better able to understand both Plato's philosophy and Greek, than any of those junior Platonists, who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite dejected of other suffrages besides Aristotle's neither, not only Philo the Jew, but also Plutarch and Atticus, who were both of them Platonick Pagans, voting on this side, besides Alexander Aphrodisius, a judicious Peripatetick.

1 Vide Proclum in Timaeum Platon.
2 Cap. XII. p. 235.
3 Cap. XX. p. 245.
4 Timei Cap. XIV. p. 237.
5 In Libro, quod mundus fit incorruptibilis, p. 941. Oper.
6 In Libro de animae procreat. p. 1013, 1014. Tom. II. Oper.
The only objection considerable is from what Plato himself writes in his third and sixth book of Laws; in the former whereof Clinias and the Athenian Hobes discourse together after this manner, concerning the original or first beginning of commonwealths: Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν τῶν ποτὲ Φωμεῦ γεί—P. 676. Steph. γωνιαί; Κ.Α. Λίγως δὲ πόθεν; ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρῶν μόνως τέ χ' ἀπειρίας, χ' τοῦ μεθαλαίου ἐν τῷ τοι孳τε. ΚΑ. Ποις λέγεις; ΑΘ. Φίλος, αΦ' ἐ τόπλεις τί εἰσιν ἡ ἀπειρία πολιτευομαι, δοκεῖς ὅτι ποτὲ καθαυτόν τέρων πληθζς ὅτιν γέγονεν; ΚΑ. Οἶκων ῥόω γε ἀδαμωκ. ΑΘ. Τέ δὲ γε ὡς ἀπειρίᾳ τι ἡ ἀμφίχαριν ὑπεὶ, ΚΑ. Παῖν μὲν ὑπ' τοιτό γε. ΑΘ. Μων γε ὡμοίῳ καί ἐπί μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγονακι πόλεις ἐν τοίῳ τῷ χρῶμν, κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους λόγου, κωπί ἐνεπιστρεφόμεναι; πεπολιτευομαι δ' αὐτ' πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἐκσταχοῦτο, ἡ τοῦ μὲν ἐξ ἐκατόνων, μείζονε, τολ' δὲ ἐκ μικρῶν ἐκλάτενη: ἡ χρῆνες ἐκ βελτίων γεγονακι, ἡ βελτίων ἐκ χρῆματος. Αθ. Τί περὶ τοῦ beginning beall we say there was of commonwealths? Cl. Whence would you derive them? Ath. I suppose from a great length and infinity of time, through successive changes. Cl. I understand not what you mean. Ath. Thus therefore, do you think, that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been since cities and polities of men first began? Cl. This is by no means easy to be done. Ath. Wherefore there is a kind of infinity and inestimability of this time. Cl. It is very true. Ath. Have there not been innumerable cities constituted within this time, and as many again destroyed, of all several forms; they being changed from greater to lesser, and from lesser to greater, from better to worser, and from worser to better? Now, we say, that if Plato intended here to assert an absolute infinity of time past, then it must needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his Timeus; and if so, he ought in all reasone to have retracted the same, which he does not here do. But in very truth, the meaning of this philospher, in those words cited, seems to be this; not that there was an absolute infinity of time past, (as Proclus contends, taking advantage of that word ἀπειρία) but only that the world had lasted such a length of time, as was in a manner inestimable to us, or uncomputable by us; there having happened, as he added, in the mean time, several successive destructions and consumptions of mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one most remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his sixth book of Laws, runs thus; ἡ τοῦ ἀθρώπων γνώθεις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδέμιαν ἐκκήρυξεν, οὔδ' P. 781. Αἰθρώπων γνώθεις ἢ τοῦ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδέμιαν ἐκκήρυξεν, οὔδ' P. 781. Wherefore, we may well conclude, by ἀπειρίᾳ τι καὶ ἀμφίχαριν: over there was not meant an absolute infinity of time, but only such as had a very remote or distant beginning, because ἀμφίχαριν here is plainly taken in that sense. We conceive therefore, that this was Plato's opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us; or at least he thought fit to declare himself after that manner, perhaps by reason of the clamours
Thus absolute following the others, which ought thereby somewhat mollify that opinion of the novity of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to so great a distance.

Now, it is very true, what we have several times before suggested, that there have been amongst the Pagans both Theogonists and Cosmogonists too, that were Atheists; they abusing the word gods several ways; some of them, as Anaximander, understanding thereby inanimate worlds successively generated out of senseless matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as Anaximenes and Democritus, allowing, that there were certain animals and understanding superior to men, but such only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling these by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philosophers, St. Austin gives us this account: Anaximenes omnes rerum causas infinito aeris dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipsis aerem factum, sed ipsos ex aeris ortos credit: Anaximenes made infinite air to be the first original and cause of all things; and yet was he not therefore silent concerning the gods, much less did he deny them; nevertheless he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air. These were therefore such Theogonists, as supposed all the gods without exception to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no Stov agnovthov at all, no understanding being unmade and self-existent; but concluded senseless matter to be the only agnovthov and original of all things, which is absolute atheism. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that all the Pagan Theogonists were not Atheists, (no more than all their Cosmogonists Theists) but that there was another sort of Theogonists amongst them, who supposed indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one sense or other, but asserted one Stov agnovthov & othevokovthov, one supreme unmade self-existent Deity, who was the cause of them all: which Theogonists, for distinction fake from those other atheistick ones, may be called divine.

And that Plato was such a divine Theogonist, is a thing, as we conceive, out of question; but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been sufficiently removed from those passages before cited out of his Timaeus. To which nevertheless, for fuller satisfaction sake, may be added these two following: the first, pag. 34. otopai, pous, otopai, otopai, otopai, tov th eis kai loga, un tov tov, dixit, hunc agnovthov. For thus it ought to be read otopai, as it is also in Aldus his edition; and not otopai, as in Stephens, following an error in that of Ficinus. And accordingly the words are thus rendered by Cicero: Hec Deus is, qui semper crat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, leuavum eum effectit, & undique equabilem, &c. This was the ratioception or resolution of that God, which always is, concerning that god, which was sometime about to be made, that he should be smooth and spherical, &c. Where again, it presently follows in Cicero's version, Sic Deus ille aeternus hunc perfertatem deum procreavit; thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god the world. Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a generated...

* De Civitate Dei, Lib. VII. Cap. II. p. 147. Tom. VII. Oper.
generated god, the animated world, called elsewhere in Plato βίων γαρθόν; and another eternal and unmade God, innatus & infetius Deus, who was the cause of the world’s generation or production; or, to keep close to Plato’s own language, one God who belonged to genesis, or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore must needs have an antecedent cause of his existance, since nothing can be made without a cause; and another God, that was truly and properly οὐδε, immutable essence, who was the cause of that generated god the univerfe, and therefore of all things. The other passage of Plato’s is, pag. 41. of his Timeus, ἐπεὶ δὲν πάλιες ὅσοι τε περιπολεύοντο θεοί τε περιπολεύοντο θεοί, ἐξείον θεάνοι καὶ θου ὠν ἑθελον ἔστιν, γένεσιν ἑχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοῦ τό τε τοῦ γενέσας, τότε, Ἡθοι θεῶν, αὐτοὶ δὲν ἐμπνευγίς, παλικ τε ἐξείον, καὶ δι’ ἰμών γενόμενα. When therefore all the gods, both those which move visibly about the heavens, and those which appear to us as often as they please, (that is, both the stars and daemon) were generated or created, that God, which made this whole universe, beftake those generated gods after this manner; Γενέσις, which is the progeny or off-spring of the gods. And the gods, whose off-spring these generated gods (the animated stars and daemons) are said to be, must needs be those αὐτοί θεοί, those eternal gods, elsewhere mentioned in the fame Timeus, as where the philofopher calls the world’s, τοῦ αὐτού θεῶν γενόσων ἀγαλμα, a generated or created image of the eternal gods; as Cicero also is to be underftood of these, when he speaks of the world’s being made by the gods, and by the counfel of the gods. Now, thefe eternal gods of Plato, called by his followers θεῶν ὑπεράσκομοι, the supramundane gods, though, according to that ftricter notion of the word γάτις, as it is used both in Plato and Aristotlcle for a temporary production of things ἔκ εἰς ὑπον, they were indeed all ἀγάλματος, because they never were not, and had no beginning of their existance; yet, notwithstanding were they not therefore fuppofed by that philofopher to be all ἀγήγονοι καὶ αὐτόνοματοι, so many self-originated and self-subjilent beings, or ftrict principles, but only one of them fuch, and the ret derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what Proclus affirms, ὅτι οἱ Πλάτων ᾳτῶν μίαν ἀρχήν ἀνέγιμα πάντα, In Time. p. that Plato reduces all things to one principle, even matter itfelf; but unequal-116. ftionable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore all those eternal gods of Plato, (one only excepted) though they were not γένεσις, or generated in one fene, that is, κατά γένεσις, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they notwithstanding, as Proclus diftinguifheth, γένεσις ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, generated in another fene, as produced from a superior cause, there being only one of such ἀγάλματος, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to Plato, there were two forts of secondary or inferior and derivative gods; first, the θεῶν ὑπεράσκομοι, or mundane gods, fuch as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom Plato’s Theogonia and γένεσις θεῶν is properly to be underftood; and fecondly, the ὑπεράσκομοι and αὐτοί θεοί, the supramundane and eternal gods, which were all of them also, have only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cause.

Timae. Cap. XXI. p. 245. s.
cause. But of these inferior eternal gods of the Platonists and Pythagoreans we are to speak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that passage of Plato's before cited, there is plain mention made both of θεοί γένεσιν εξουσίας, of div orti, gods who were made or generated with the world, and of ὁ τόδε τὸ πάν γεννᾶς, of one God, who was the maker of them, and of the whole universe, who therefore is himself every way ἀγαθὸν, unmade or unproduced. And accordingly he afterwards subjoins, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὁ τωτά πάντα δικαίας, ἔρμην ἐν τῷ οὐσίω κατὰ τόπον ἴδειν μινιοὺς δὲ νοστάθηναι τοῖς πάντων τῶν πατέρος τῶν, which Cicero thus renders; Atque is quidem (Deus) qui s e n t i a c o m p o s i t a u s s i m a n t e r, who assumed in suo manebat statu; qui autem erant ab eo creati (dii) cium parentis ordinem cognovissent, hunc sequabantur, &c. Then that God, who framed all things, remained constantly in his former state; and his sons, or the gods that were created by him, observed his order and appointment.

Neither was Plato singular in this, but the generality of the other Pagan Theists, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane gods; and so were both Theists and Theogonists, they indeed understanding nothing else by their Theogonia, or generation of gods, than a divine Cosmogonia, or creation of the world by God; forasmuch as they suppos'd the world itself as animated, and its several parts to be gods. So that they asserted these three things; first, a Cosmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novelty or beginning; secondly, that this Cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a Theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itself and several of its parts animated being esteemed such; and lastly, that both these gods and the world were made and produced by one θεὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτωγενής, one unproduced and self-organised Deity. All which particulars we may here briefly exemplify in P. Ovidius Nafo, whose paganity sufficiently appears from his Fætiterum and all his other writings, and who also went off the stage before Chrisitianity appeared on it, and may well be presumed to represent the then generally received doctrine of the pagans. First therefore, as for the generation and novelty of the world, and its first production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in these following verses:

Metam. I. 1.  
[Verf. 5.]  
Ante mare & terras, & c, quod tegit omnia, caelum,  
Unus erat tota naturae vultus in orbe,  
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque molest,  
Nec quicquam nifs pondus iners, congestaque eodem  
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum,  
Nullus aëbus mundo præebat lumina Titon,  
Nec nova crescedo reparabat cornua Phoebe,  
Nec circumfuso pendebat in aëre tellus,  
Ponderibus librata jutis; nec brachia longo  
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.  
Quaque erat & tellus, &c.

Which in Mr. Sandys his English, with some little alteration, speaks thus:

Before
Before that sea, and earth, and heaven was fram'd,
One face had nature, which they chaos nam'd.
No Titan yet the world with light adorns,
Nor waxing Phebe fills her wained horns;
Nor hung the self-poiz'd earth in thin air plac'd,
Nor Amphitrite the vast shore embrac'd;
Earth, air, and sea confounded, &c.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this
Cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a Theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in these verses:

Neu regio foret usilitus animalibus orba,
Astra tenent caelestie solum, formaeque deorum.

To this sense,

That nought of animals might unfurnish'd lie,
The gods, in form of stars, possess the sky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane system produced out of a disorderly confused chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was also that, that furnished all the several parts of the world with respective animals, the sea with fishes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods; is thus declared also by the poet:

Hanc Deus & melior litem natura diremit,
Nam calo terras, terris absidit undas:
Et liquidum spio secravit ab aere caelum, &c.
Sic ubi dispositam, quisquis fuit ille deorum,
Congeriem sequit, festamque in membra redigit;
Principio terram, ne non equalis ab omni
Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis:
Tum freta diffudit, rapidissique tumescere ventis
Jussit, &c.
Sic enim inclusum numero disjuxit eodem
Cura Dei, &c.

This strife (with better nature) God decides,
He earth from heaven, the sea from earth divides:
He ether pure extracts from groser air.
All which unfolded by his prudent care,
From that blind mass; the happily disjoin'd
With strifeless peace, be to their seats confin'd, &c.
What God for ever this division wrought,
And every part to due proportion brought,
First, left the earth unequal should appear,
He turn'd it round in figure of a sphere.
Then seas diffus'd, commanding them to roar
With ruffling winds, and give the land a shore.
To those be added springs, ponds, lakes immense,  
And rivers whom their winding borders fence.

Where though that learned paraphrast suppos'd (and not without some probability neither) that Deus et melior natura, God and the better nature, were one and the self-same thing, yet we rather conceived them to be distinct, but one of them subordinate to the other as its instrument, God and the plaitick nature; accordingly as Arisftote writes in his Physicks, Nούς καὶ Φύσις αἰσθήματα τοῦ παλαιοῦ, That mind and nature were both together the cause of this universe.

Nevertheless, we cannot but observe in this place, that though that poet speaks more than once of God singularly, as also calls him mundi fabricator, and ille opifex rerum, and mundi melioris origo; yet notwithstanding, where he writes of the making of man, Pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likeness of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctus his animal, mentisque capaces alia,  
Deus ad hue & quod dominari in cetera posset;  
Natus homo est: sine bunc divino femine fecit,  
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:  
Sive recens tellur, seduclâque nuper ab alto  
Æthere, cognati retinebat femina celli.  
Quam satus Lapeto, miiftam fluvialibus undis,  
Finxit in effigiem moderantun cumâta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind posset,  
Was wanting yet, that should command the rest.  
That maker, the best world's original,  
Either him fram'd of seed celestial;  
Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,  
Some sacred seeds retain'd to heaven allied:  
Which with the living stream Prometheus mixt,  
And in that artificial structure fixt  
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And because some may probably be puzzled with this seeming contradiction, that one God should be said to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all should be attributed to gods plurally, and man said to be made in the image and likeness of the gods; we shall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the Pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods were supposed also to have all of them their several share in the government of things below them: for which cause they are called not only by Maximus Tyrius οὐδὲς ἄνθρωπος, co-rulers with God, but also by Plato himself, τῶν παρὰ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲς, the co-governors and co-reigners with the supreme God. So that the government of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the supreme and inferior gods both together, under that one general name of gods. But the chief of those inferior deities, in whose image man is also said to have been made, as well as in the likeness of the supreme, were either those celestial gods and animated stars before mentioned by the poet, or else the eternal gods of Plato, which were look'd upon likewise as co-makers of the world subordinate.

besides Ovid, we might instance here in many more of the pagan Theogonists clearly acknowledging in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it; as for example, Strabo, who affirming that the world was τος θεος ἐξ ἐκ της προφοίας ἠγέων, the joint work both of nature and providence, as it was before ascribed by Ovid L. 17. p. 809. to Deus & melior natura, adds concerning providence or the Deity in this manner; To δε της προφοίας, ὅτι βεβαιότατα κατα πανιμέλεια της ἐστι, καὶ μοναὶ ἠγέων δημιουργεῖ, ἐν τοῖς προφοί τοῖς γενέσι, ὡς οὐκαὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν τα κρατια Θεος, τι καὶ ἀνθρώποι, ὡς ἐνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνείπον. Tois μὲν ὦς Θεοις ἀπέδειξε τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοις δ' ἀνθρώποις τὴν γνη. That having a multiform fecundity in it, and delighting in variety of works, it designed principally to make animals as the most excellent things, and amongst them chiefly those two noblest kinds of animals, gods and men; for whose sakes the other things were made; and then affigned heavens to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their respective habitations. Thus also Seneca in Laelianus', speaking concerning God; Hic cum prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimae eburnet, & hoc ordiretur, quo neque majus quicquam novit natura nec melius; ut omnia sub duibus irent, quamvis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deos genuit. God, when he laid the foundations of this most beautiful fabric, and began to erect that structure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent; to the end that all things might be carried on under their respective governors orderly, though he intended himself through the whole, as to preside in chief over all, yet did bear generate gods also, as subordinate ministers of his kingdom under him. We shall forbear to mention the testimonies of others here, because they may be more opportunely inserted elsewhere; only we shall add, as to Hesiod and Homer, that though they seem to have been sometimes suspected, both by Plato and Arisotle, for atheistic Theogonists, yet as Arisotle did upon mature thoughts afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, so is it most probable, that they were no Atheists but divine Theogonists, such as supposed indeed many generated gods, but one supreme unmade Deity, the Maker both of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alledged concerning Hesiod, and because both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal, (which no Atheists did) but also for sundry other reasons, some of which may be more conveniently inferred elsewhere. Moreover it hath been already intimated, that the generated gods of Hesiod and Homer extend farther than those of Plato's, they being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature fictitious perfonated, and improperly or abusively called gods and goddesses; whereof a farther account will be afterwards given.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if these divine Theogonists amongst the Pagans did many times, as well as those other atheistic ones, make Chaos and the Ocean senior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of these being not only done by Hesiod and Homer, but also

also by the generality of the ancient pagan Theists in *Epicharmus*; and the latter by *Orpheus* an undoubted Theist, in his hymn of the Night, 

*Noli deis nubete, adestis, nee nee adestis.*

No tet concelebro genetricem hominumque deumque.

They not understanding this absolutely and universally of all the gods without exception, as the other atheistick Theogonists did, as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night, (that is, feneceleis matter blindly and fortuitously moved) had been the sole original of all things, but only of the *oi Theoi*, the gods, so called by way of distinction from God or the supreme Deity, that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reason whereof was, because it was a most ancient, and in a manner universally received tradition amongst the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the cosmo-gonia or generation of the world took its first beginning from a chaos, (the divine Cosmogonists agreeing herein with the atheistic ones; this tradition having been delivered down from *Orpheus* and *Linus* (amongst the Greeks) by *Hesiod* and *Homer*, and others; acknowledged by *Epicharmus*; and embraced by *Thales*, *Anaxagoras*, *Plato*, and other philosophers, who were Theists: the antiquity whereof was thus declared by *EURIPIDES*;

*Oin iudex o mude, all' iudex miros pantex,*

*Oe otopios te genia in moirox,*

*Epie d' icwpedion ex allion diex,*

*Tuicen pantex, kasthen ex Fde,*

*Ta dionex, pine, S'xex, oue S' allum telipex.*

*Genos te Sunntov.*

*Non hic meus, sed matris est sermo meus,*

*Figura ut una fuerit & cali & foli,*

*Secreta que mox ut receperunt statum,*

*Cuneta ediderunt hoc in oras luminis;*

*Feras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,*

*Hordinates quoque ipsos.*

Neither can it reasonably be doubted, but that it was originally Mosaicall, and indeed at first a divine revelation, since no man could otherwise pretend to know what was done before mankind had any being. Wherefore those pagan Cosmogonists, who were Theists, being Polytheists and Theogonists also, and asserting, besides the one supreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated together with the world (the chief whereof were the animated stars) they must needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, suppose them as to their corporeal parts at least, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the off-spring of them, because they were all made out of an antecedent dark chaos. *The muwah hnteuadexi lýpax* (saith *Plutarch*), *hnd Lympnix twphix ouix*, *eti to sconf tov wtoix ércvntou priεπεριν*.
Chap. IV. Chaos and Night Senior to the Gods.

The mus araneus being blind, is said to have been deified by the Egyptians, because they thought, that Darkness was older than Light. And the case was the same concerning their demons likewise, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula also; for which cause, as Porphyrius 1 from Numenius writeth, the ancient Egyptians pictured them in ships or boats floating upon the water: τός δὲ Διόνυσις διὰ τούτο τὸς θαλάσσιος υπάρχειν ὡς ἐσώ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσις ἐνὶ πλοῖοι. The Egyptians therefore represented all their demons, as not standing upon firm land, but in ships upon the water. But as for the incorporeal part or souls of those inferior gods, though these divine Theogonists could not derive their original from Chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and so having God for their father, yet might they notwithstanding, in another sense, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inasmuch as they were all made ἵς ἐκ δεινοῦ, from an antecedent non-existence or nothing, brought forth into being. For which cause there seems to have been in Orpheus a dialogue betwixt the Maker of the world and Night 2. For that this ancient cabala, which derived the cosmogonia from Chaos and Love, was at first religious and not atheistical, and Love underfooted in it not to be the off-spring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, because this Love as well as Chaos was of a Mosaical extraction also, and plainly derived from that spirit of God, which is said in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos; whether by this spirit be to be meant God himself, as acting immediately upon the matter, or some other active principle derived from God and not from matter, (as a mundane soul or plastick nature.) From whence also it came, that as Porphyrius testifieth, the ancient Pagans thought the water to be divinely inspired; γάρ παρὰ προειτέειν τοῦ ὑδάτος τὰς Δε Αντ., Φυγής Θεοπόρος οὐλι ὡς Φθείνον ο Ναμνοίδι. διὰ τότε λέγων καὶ τού προέρχεται εἰς ἕκαστον, ὡς-Νυμφ. p. 256. Φείδεται εἰς γιγνόμενον τοῦ ὑδάτος θεῖν πνεύμα. They thought, that souls attended upon the water or reported thereunto, as being divinely inspired, as Numenius writeth, adding the prophet also therefore to have said, that the spirit of God moved upon the water.

And that this cabala was thus understood by some of the ancient pagan Cosmogonists themselves, appears plainly, not only from Simmias Rhodius and Parmenides, but also from their following verses of Orpheus, or whoever was the writer of these Argonauticks, undoubtedly ancient, where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together;

Πρὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἄρχοι Χάος μελιτιδαλοῦ Ἕμοι, ἢς ἐπίταμους Ὀμναίς, ὡς τ᾽ ὕφασιν εἰς πώλις ἔςας, 

Γῆς τ᾽ εὐρύστερον χώριον, ποθαινέ τε Σαλασίος, 

Προερχόμενον τε αὐτοκτάνω πολύτατον Ἐρατος, 

Οτα τ᾽ ἔρων ἥπαινα, δι᾽ ἐξελεῖ ὁ ἀλλε ἄλλο ἀλλη.


To this sense; We will first sing a pleasant and delightful song concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth and seas were framed out of it; as also concerning that much-wise and sagacious Love, the oldset of all, and self-perfet, which actively produced all these things, separating one thing from another.

K k 2

1 De Antro Nymphae, p. 56. Edit. Cantab. 2 Apud Proclum & alios.
Where this Love is not only called πολύπνησις, of much-counsel or sagaciousness, which implies it to have been a substantial and intellectual thing, but also πεπερατις, the eldest of all, and therefore senior to Chaos, as likewise, αὐτοτιτίς, self-perfect or self-originated. From whence it is manifest, that according to the Orphick tradition, this Love, which the Cosmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it) which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as Aristotle determines in his Metaphysicks, not only in the place before cited, but also afterward: ἢ τρισὶ, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν κινήσεων, ὥσπερ ἡ Νότι ἡ Ἔρωτα ποιήσων ἀρχήν. Others, besides the material cause of the world, assign an efficient, or cause of motion, namely, whatsoever make either Mind (and Intellect) or Love a principle. Wherefore we conclude, that that other atheiftick cabala, or Ariflophanick tradition before mentioned, which accordingly, as Aristotle also elsewhere declareth concerning it, did in νομίζειν πάντα γέννησιν, generate all things whatsoever, even the gods themselves universally out of Night and Chaos, making Love itself likewise to have been produced from an egg of the Night: I say, that this was nothing else but a mere depravation of the ancient Molaick cabala, as also an absolutely impossible hypothesis, it deriving all things whatsoever in the universe, besides the bare substance of senseles matter, in another sense than that before mentioned, out of non-entity or nothing; as shall be also farther manifested afterwards.

We have now represented the sense and generally received doctrine of the ancient pagan Theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet so that one of them only was ἀγέννησις, ingerenate or unmade, by whom all the other gods, together with the world, were made, so as to have had a novity of being or a temporary beginning of their existence: Plato and the Pythagoreans here only differing from the rest in this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have been generated together in time, yet they supposed certain other intelligible and supramundane gods also, which however produced from one original Deity, were nevertheless eternal or without beginning. But now we must acknowledge, that there were amongst the pagan Theists some of a different persuasion from the rest, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the sense before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, because they acknowledged no cosmogonia, no temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That Aristotle was one of these is sufficiently known, whose inferior gods therefore, the sun, moon and stars, must needs be ἀγέννησις, or ingenerate, in this sense, so as to have had no temporary production, because the whole world to him was such. And if that philosopher be to be believed, himself was the very first, at least of all the Greeks, who asserted this ingenerateness or eternity of the world, he affirming, that all before him did γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον, and χωροποιεῖν, generate or make the world; that is, attribute

bute a temporary production to it, and consequently to all those gods also, which were a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, the writer de Placitis Philosoporum 1, and Stobaeus 2, impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philosophers before Aristotele, (besides Ocellus Lucanus 3, who is also acknowledged by Philo, to have been an affteror thereof.) And indeed Epicbarmus, though a Theist, seems plainly to have been of this persuasion, that the world was unmade, as also that there was no Theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from these verses of his 4, according to Gratius his correction:

\[ \text{Nempe Di semper fuerunt, atque nunquam intercident:} \\
\text{Hec que dico semper nobis rebus in iisdem se exibent.} \\
\text{Exitisse sed deorum primum peribetur chaos:} \\
\text{Quinam vero? nam de nibilo nil potest primum existere.} \\
\text{Ergo nec primum profecto quicquam, nec fuit alterum:} \\
\text{Sed quae nunc fit, appellantur, alia fient pothmodum.} \]

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theists, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world; yet notwithstanding does he conclude against it, from this ground of reaon, because nothing could proceed from nothing, and therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatsoever else is substantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the fashion of things having been altered.

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this dogma of the world's eternity, \\
\[ \text{The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, nor will ever admit corruption.} \]

Who, that they were not Atheists for all that (no more than Aristotele) appears from those following words of that historiographer; \\
\[ \text{They believe also, that the order and disposition of the world is by a certain divine providence, and that every one of those things, which come to pass in the heavens, happens by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods. However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the latter Platonists stiffly adhered to Aristotele in this; neither did they only asser the corporal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it,} \]
to be ἀγενετικός, or ingenerate, and to have existed from eternity, but also maintained the same concerning the souls of men, and all other animals, (they concluding that no souls were younger than body or the world;) and because they would not seem to depart from their master Plato, therefore did they endeavour violently to force this same sense upon Plato's words also.

Notwithstanding which, concerning these latter Platonists, it is here observable, that though they thus affected the world, and all inferior gods and souls to have been ἀγενετικοί, according to that stricter sense of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have existed from eternity; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be αὐτογενοῦς, self-originated, and self-existing, but concluded them to have been all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause, which therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpose Plotinus, in πρὸ ἀυτῇ εἰσιν ἡ ἡμῶν πρότερον ἀυτὴν ὠνη, ἄλλα ὧν παρὰ νῦ ἐστὶν ὄψιν πρότερον ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ἀυτὸν τῆς, ἀρχήματος ὧν ἡ παράδοξον εἰσιν, ἐγὼ ἰδοὺ ὧν πρότερον ἐκεῖνον μὲν ὀντος ὑπὸ ἀυτοῦ ἀφεῖ τὸν τέκτον. Mind or God was before the world, not as if it existed before it in time, but because the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature first as the cause thereof, and its archetype or paradigm;

the world also always subsisting by it and from it. And again elsewhere to the same purpose, ὧν τούτῳ ἑπτάλον, ἀλλὰ ἔγενος ὧν γενοῦται, ὅσα γενοῦται λέγεις, ἐγὼ ἰδοὺ τὸν τέκτον, ἀλλὰ ὧν ἐγένετα ἐστὶν. The things, which are said to have been made or generated, were not so made, as that they ever had a beginning of their existence, but yet they were made, and will be always made, (in another sense;) nor will they ever be destroyed otherwise than as being dissolved into those simple principles, out of which some of them were compounded. Where though the world be said never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet in another sense, is it said to be always made, as depending upon God perpetually as the emanative cause thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philosopher; ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ τῷ θεῷ οἱ φύσεις οἱ γενόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὡς γὰρ τρέποντος τῶν ποιημάτων ταύτης, ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ τῷ θεῷ οἱ γενόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὡς γὰρ τρέποντος τῶν ποιημάτων ταύτης. They do not rightly, who corrupt and generate the world, for they will not understand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradication from the Deity. From whence it follows, that the world must needs have been so long as there was a God, as the light was coeval with the sun. So likewise Proclus 1 concludes, that the world was αἱ ἐλλατίμενοι, ἐλλατίμενοι οὕτως ἐλλατίμενοι, ἐλλατίμενοι, ἐλλατίμενοι, ἐλλατίμενοι, ἐλλατίμενοι, always generated or eradiated from God, and therefore must needs be eternal, God being so. Wherefore these latter Platonists supposed the same thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their master Plato did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they all depended no less upon one supreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifest, that none of these philosophers

1 There are still extant eighteen arguments of his, wherein he attacks the Christian Doctrine of the world's being created by God in time; in answer to which, John Philoponus, wrote the same number of books against the eternity of the world. Vide Jo. Alberti Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. Lib. V. Cap. XXVI. §. XIII. p. 522.
philosophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt these two things; existence from eternity, and being caused or produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platonists had been fully convinced of any contradictory inconsistency here, they would readily have disclaimed that their so beloved hypothesis of the world's eternity; it being so far from truth what some have supposed, that the Affiroters of the world's eternity were all Atheists, that these latter Platonists were led into this opinion no otherwise than from the sole consideration of the Deity; to wit, its a μακείτις βαλλεσ, x ρήματος θεονεσ, its essential goodness, and generative power, or emanative fecundity, as Proclus plainly declares upon the Timæus.

Now, though Aristotle were not acted with any such divine enthusiasm as these Platonists seem to have been, yet did he notwithstanding, after his sober manner, really maintain the same thing; that though the world, and inferior mundane gods had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheless all produced from one supreme Deity as their cause. Thus Simplicius represents that philosopher's sense, 'Aριστότελης ἡ γὰρ άξιοι τού νάζων, ἀλλὰ κατ' ιν Αριστ. Ψηφ. l. 8. ἀλλοι τρόποι ὑπὸ θεόν παραγένειεν. Aristotle would not have the world to have been made, (as he had a beginning,) but yet nevertheless to have been produced from God after some other manner. And again afterwards; 'Aριστότελης τὸ αὐτίνο τῷ ἁρων ή τῆς αἰδής καθῆκες αὐτῷ θεῷ λέγειν, ἄμοις ἁγίοις αὐτῷ ἁποδείκνυε. Aristotle, though making God the cause of the heaven and its eternal motion, yet concludes it notwithstanding to have been ingenerate or unmade; that is, without beginning. However, we think fit here to observe, that though Aristotle do for the most part express a great deal of zeal and confidence for that opinion of the world's eternity, yet doth he sometimes for all that seem to flag a little, and speak more languidly and sceptically about it; as for example, in his book de Partibus Animalium, where he treats concerning an artificial nature, μάλλον εيبة τού ναζον γενευτακαὶ, υπὸ τοιαυτον αῖτίας, εἰ τ. i. c. τ. γεγονα, ἡ εἶναι δια τοιαυτον αἰτίας, μάλλον ἡ ζωα τα θητα. It is more likely, that the heaven was made by such a cause as this, (if it were made) and that it is maintained by such a cause, than that mortal animals should be so; which yet is a thing more generally acknowledged. Now it was before declared, that Aristotle's artificial nature was nothing but the mere executioner or officer of a perfect mind, that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he sometimes joins together in the Cosmopoeia, affirming that Mind and Nature, that is, God and Nature were the cause of this universe.

And now we see plainly, that though there was a real controversy amongst the Pagan theologers, (especially from Aristotle's time downward) concerning the Cosmogonia and Theogonia, according to the stricter notion of those words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controversy at all concerning the self-existency of them, but it was univerfally agreed upon amongst them, that the world and the inferior gods, however supposed by some to have existed from eternity, yet were nevertheless all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause; ὑπὸ θεόν παραγένειεν ἡ ἐλξαρπόρειεν, being either eradicated or produced from God. Wherefore
it is observable, that these pagan Theists, who affected the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word **γεννηθε** ortum, natum, & factum, as that which was equivocal; and though in one sense of it, they denied, that the world and inferior gods were *γεννηθε*, yet notwithstanding did they in another sense clearly affirm the same. For the word *γεννηθε* (say they) strictly and properly taken, is *το αυτο μετεχω τοιο εις το αυτο παρεδον λαξον*, that which in respect of time passed out non-existence into being, or *το πετειον μεν ευρετο δε ευρετο ρητο, that which being not before, afterwards was*. Nevertheless they acknowledge, that in a larger sense, this word *γεννηθε* may be taken also for *το απωον απ αιτιας υφισταμενον*, that which abid any way depend upon a superior Being as its cause. And there must needs be the same evocation in the word **αγενηθε**, so that this in like manner may be taken also, either *χερουκε*, for that which is ingenerate in respect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or else for that which is *απ αιτιας αρχας*, in-generate or unproduced from any cause: in which latter sense, that word **αγενηθε**, or unmade, is of equal force and extent with *αυθυπερανω* or *αυτογενεπ*, that which is self-substituent or self-originated; and accordingly it was used by those pagan Theists, who concluded *οτι ἐση αγενηθε* i.e. that matter was unmade, that is, not only existed from eternity without beginning, but also was self-existent, and independent upon any superior cause. Now, as to the former of these two senses of those words, *γενηθε* and **αγενηθε**, the generality of the ancient Pagans, and together with them Plato, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods to be *γενηθε*, to have been made in time, or to have had a beginning; (for whatever the latter Platonists pretend, this was undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be *γενηθε*, forasmuch as himself expressly opposes it to *αιτια, that which is eternal.*) But on the contrary, Aristotle, and the latter Platonists, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this sense **αγενηθε**, such as had no temporary beginning, but were from eternity. However, according to the latter sense of those words, all the pagan Theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or exisiting from eternity, were notwithstanding *γενηθε* or **αγενηθε**, produced or derived from a superior cause; and that thus there was only one *σις εις αγενηθε*, one unproduced and self-existing Deity, who is said by them to be **αιτιας παραγω* & προεξοντω*, superior to a cause, and older than any cause, he being the cause of all things besides himself. Thus Cran-

*In Times.* pag. 10, and his followers in Proclus, zealous adherents of the world's eternity, determined, *γενηθε* λαμηδια του κοσμου ως *απ αιτιας αλης παραγωτον*, ως εις *αυτα αιτιας υπερανω* τον κοσμον. *That the world (with all the inferior mundane gods in it) notwithstanding their being from eternity, might be said to be *γενηθε*, that is orli or made, as being produced from another cause, and not self-originated or self-existing. In like manner Proclus himself, that grand champion for the world's eternity, plainly acknowledged, notwithstanding, the generation of the gods and world in this sense, as being produced from a fupere-

*Vide etiam* Cannem in *Introductionem in Theologiam* Platonicae, *Lib. I.* Cap. XVIII p. 66. & *Lib. II.* p. 341. IT is observable, that these pagan Theists, who affected the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word **γενηθε** or *γενηθε*, **αναγενηθε**, or *αγενηθε*, *τον αρκετον προσεδον τοιαυτον*, ως τοις *των ευκρινων επιτοπως, προς τος αιτιας αυτων.* We call it the generations of the gods, meaning thereby, not any temporary production of them, but
IV. derived from one self-existent Deity.

their ineffable procession from a superior first cause. Thus also Sallustius, in his book de diis & mundo, where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it and the other inferior gods to have been made by one supreme deity, who is called by him, *πτωθεν Θεος, the first God. For, faith he, *μεγίστης τῆς δινόμος ἔστιν, καὶ αὐθεντική την ἐντετακτονήσας τέκνων, διὰ τῶν δειμμάτων. God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and demons. And accordingly this is the title of his 13th chapter, ποίησα τά ἁγία λέγειν γένεις. How eternal things may be said to be made or generated. It is true indeed (as we have often declared) that some of the pagan Theists asserted God not to be the only ἀγένετος καὶ ἀναγένετος, the only unmade and self-existent being, but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to Plato, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and Porphyrius, Jamblicbus, Proclus, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the fame as false, but also as that which was dissonant from Plato’s principles. Wherefore, according to that larger notion of the word ἀγένετος, as taken synonymously with αὐθεντικός and αὐθεντικός, there were very many of the Pagan Theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, ὡς αὐτὸ ἀγένετος ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ αὐτὴ ὁ δὲ ἑν τῶν ἁγενετίς, That God is the only ungenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or ineffability: all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Ditheists excepted) though they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only, εἰς ὃς ἂν ἄγενετος, only one unmade or unproduced God, and that all their other gods were ἄγενετοι, in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we shew, how the Pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods promiscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God, not to do all immediately, in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers) one instance of which we had before in Ovid, and innumerable such others might be cited out of their most sober writers. As for example, Cicero, in his first book of laws, Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, nomine, natura omnis regitur; the whole nature, or universè, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal Gods. And again in his second book, Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, eaque que geruntur, eorum geri judicio atque nomine, eosdemque optimè de genere hominum mereri,

2 Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 3303. Oper. Tom. IX.  
3 Lib. II. Cap. VII. p. 3343.
mereri, & qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua plicitate religiones colat, inneri; priorumque & impiorum baleere rationem; & principio civibus judium eft eft debet: The minds of citizens ought to be fift of all embued with a firm perfeftion, that the gods are the lords and moderators of all things, and that the conduét and management of the whole world is directed and "over-ruled by their judgment and divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes up on himself, with what mind, piety and sinceritv he observes the duties of religion; and lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious. Now such passages as these, abounding every where in Pagan writings, it is no wonder, if many, considering their theology but lightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the Pagans not to have affected a divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an ariflocria or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also felf-exifient and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amifs for us here in the close, to shew how the Pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods altogether, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the fame supreme God, according to several particular considerations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for fo many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate) so had they also, besides thefe, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehenfive notion of him, as the maker of the whole world, and its supreme governor, or the sole monarch of the univerfe. For thus the Greeks called him Zeus; and Zve, &c. the Latins Jupiter and Jovis, the Babylonians Belus and Bel, the Persians Mithras and Oromafdes, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to Herodotus) Ammoun and Pappaus. And Celsus in Origen concludes it to be a matter of pure indifference, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either Zve, or Ammoun, or Pappaus, or the like; καὶ ἰδιαὶ μενεὶ διαφέρειν, Δίς Τυποῦ, καλεῖν ἔν Ζυνα, ἐν Αδωναῖο, ἐν Σεβασθ ἐν (ὅς Αρουπτιο) Ἄρμμυ ὑπὸ (ὑπὸ Συνθα) Παππαίοι. Celsus thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the highest and supreme God, Adonai and Sabaoth, as the Jews do; or Dia and Zena, as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians, Ammoun; or, as the Scythians, Pappaus. Norwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresfeth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of thofe Pagan names. But we will rather endure any torment (faith he) than confefs Zeus (or Jupiter) to be God; being well assured, that the Greeks often really worship, under that name, an evil demon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God Ammoun, whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke: ἤγετετος ὡς Σεβαστος τὸν Παππαίον Θεον ἔως τὸν ἐπὶ πάσιν ἀλλ ἕμεις ὑπο ποιμένα, τριβολος μὴν τῶν ἐπὶ πάσιν Θεον, ὡς ὡς φιλον ὑπὸ λαοχοτι τῶν Σεβαστον ιεριας, ἐν τὸ ἱερὸν αὐτοῦ ἔρη διαλεῖον, ὡς οὐκ ὑποκατη τὸν Θεον, ὡς κυρίος ὑπομιλι τὸν Παππαίον, Σεβαστος τον το το ἱερὸν.
the Supreme from the inferior Gods.

And though the Scythians call the supreme God Pappaeus, yet we acknowledging a supreme God, will never be persuaded to call him by that name, which it pleased that daemon (who ruled over the Scythian desert, people and language) to impose. Nevertheless, be that shall use the appellative name for God, either in the Scythian, Egyptian, or any other language which he hath been brought in, will not offend. Where Origen plainly affirms the Scythians to have acknowledged one supreme God, called by them Pappaeus, and intimates, that the Egyptians did the like, calling him Ammon. Neither could it possibly be his intent to deny the fame of the Greeks and their Zeus, however his great jealousy made him to call him here a daemon; it being true in a certain sense, which shall be declared afterward, that the Pagans did oftentimes really worship an evil daemon, under those very names of Zeus and Jupiter, as they did likewise under those of Hammon and Pappaeus.

In the mean time we deny not, but that both the Greeks used that word Zeus, and the Latins Jupiter, sometimes Φωτικός, for the æther, fire or air, some accordingly etymologizing Ζυς from Ζω, others Δάι from δειω: whence came those forms of speech, sub Jove, and sub Dio. And thus Cicero, Jovem Ennius nuncupat ita diicens.

Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures nostris ciam dicunt, Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in calo fulgente, tonante, &c. The reason of which speeches seems to have been this, because in ancient times some had supposed the animated heaven, æther and air, to be the supreme deity. We grant moreover, that the same words have been sometimes used ἀποτικώς also, for an hero or deified man, said by some to have been born in Crete, by others in Arcadia. And Callimachus 1, though he were very angry with the Cretians for affirming Jupiter's sepulchral monument to have been with them in Crete, as thereby making him mortal:

Κύτης αἰεὶ ψέπται, καὶ γὰρ τάφων, ὃ ζων, σειο,
Κύτης ἐπετέτηκατο σὺ δὲ ἞φεις, ἵνα γὰρ αἰεὶ

Cretes semper mendaces, tuum enim, rex, sepulchrum
Extruxerunt: tu vero non es mortuus, semper enim es.

Himself nevertheless (as Athenagoras 2 and Origen 3 observe) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in Arcadia; ἀεὶ γὰρ Σαμάτων ἡ ἄτο ρήματα, because a terrestrial nativity is the beginning of death. Wherefore this may pass for a general observation here, that the Pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of phyllology and herology or history blended together. Nevertheless it is unquestionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did fre-

De Nat. D.
L. 2. 223. Lamb. [Cap XXV. p. 292. Tom IX. Oper.]

Hymnus in Jovem, ver. 8, 9.

In Legation, pro Christianis, Cap. XXVI. P. 121.

2 Contra Celsum, Lib. III. p. 137.
but understood by Zeus that supreme unmade Deity, who was the ma
maker of the world, and of all the inferior gods. Porphyrius in Eusebius
then declares their sense, τον Δια, του Ναυ κοινων υπολαμβανου, δε τα ναυ
αι διαθεμενοι, ζητον τον κοσμον. By Zeus the Greeks understand that mind of the world, which
framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world. Agreeable whereunto
is that of Maximus Tyrius, Καλει τον μεν Διαν, νου προετοιμασα, κα δεκαμωται
ναντα τεπαιται κα πειθαιξιει, By Jupiter you are to understand that most ancient and
princely mind, which all things follow and obey. And Eusebius himself,
though not forward to grant any more than needs he must to Pagans, con-
cludes with this acknowledgment hereof, ιπ' οι Ζευς μηδε ι περαζης κα αιδε
υται, ωπερ τοις παλαιοις ιονικηται, κατα τον Πλησταξιαν, αλλα αυτος ζ αιω-
ναι τους Νυς, ο των θων δημιουγος. Let Jupiter therefore be no longer that fiery
and ethereal substance, which the ancient Pagans, according to Plutarch,
supposed him to be; but that highest mind, which was the maker of all things.
But Porphyrius by Jupiter understands the soul of the world, he writing
thus concerning him: ουπερ δε ημεις οπδ ευκειος διοκημενοι, αυτος η ο κολ
ψυχοι ζητε τον συνεχον αυτος, αυτο καλεται Ζευς, αιτια ου τοις θων τη ζην, αυτο
το βασιλευν ο Ζεας λεγεται των θων. As we ourselves are governed by a soul, so
bath the world in like manner a soul, that containeth it; and this is called
Zeus, being the cause of life to all things that live; and therefore Zeus or
Jupiter is said to reign over all things. However, though these were two
different conceptions amongst the Pagans concerning God, some pre-
prehending him to be an abstract mind separate from the world and matter,
but others to be a soul of the world only; yet nevertheless they all agreed
in this, that Zeas or Jupiter was the supreme moderator or governor of all.
And accordingly Plato, in his Crates, taking these two words, Ζωνα and
Διος, both together, etymologizeth them as one, after this manner: ζωνα
την ωπελον της ζωης της ζωης, ε γαρ ειν γην κα τοις αλλαις παθην θατοις ισον αιτιας κα-
λον τη υπαξον, η ο δε επερ εις βασιλεις των παθων παραβαινον θεος ουραμεν εις ζωην, το
θεος ειναι δι οι υπαξειν απο ταις θων υπαξεις, υπερηπαιναι δι ουχα (ουπερ λεγο
υν απο το θεον, τω διον ζεας. These two words compounded together de-
clare the nature of God; for there is nothing, which is more the cause of
life both to ourselves and all other animals, than he, who is the prince and
king of all things; so that God is rightly thus called, he being that by whom
all things live. And these are really but one name of God, though divi-
ded into two words. But because it was very obvious then to object against
this position of Plato's, that Zeus or Jupiter could not be the prince of all
things, and first original of life, from the Theogonia of Hesiod and other
ancient Pagans, in which himself was made to have been the son of Κρονα,
or Saturn; therefore this objection is thus preoccupied by Plato, τοτον δι
κρονα γην, ζυγειον των αιν αιν των δκειν ειναι αναστασεις ζεας. Wherefore shall hear
this (Iaith he) will presently conclude it to be contumelious to this Zeus or Jupi-
ter (as he hath been described by us) to be accounted the son of Cronos or Sa-
turn. And in answer hereunto, that philosopher stretcheth his wits to falve
that poetick Theogonia, and reconcile it with his own theological hypothe-
sis; and thereupon he interprets, that Hesodian Zeus or Jupiter into a

* Differt. XXIX. p. 290.
Compliance with the third hypostasis of his divine triad, so as properly to signify the superior soul of the world; ευθυσον δι, μεγάλως πνεύμα διανοια έναρχον ένιω τοϊ διό. Καί άλλο γένε το καθαρόν αυτόν έν αναρχαί τού Νε' ή-ί-ί δι άτος Ονασίω γέο, ως άλλο: Nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose Zeus or Jupiter to be the offspring of some great mind; and Chronos or Saturn signifies a pure and perfect mind eternal, who again is said to be the son of Uranus or Coelus. Where it is manifest, that Plato endeavours to accommodate this poetick trinity of gods, Uranus, Chronos and Zeus, or Coelus, Saturn and Jupiter, to his own trinity of divine hypostases, τριάδον, ως and ψυχή, the first good, a perfect intellect, and the highest soul. Which accommodation is accordingly further pursued by Plotinus in several places, as Enn. 5. l. 1. c. 4. and Enn. 5. l. 8. c. 13. Nevertheless, these three archical hypostases of the Platonic trinity, though look'd upon as substances distinct from each other, and subordinate, yet are they frequently taken all together by them for the whole supreme deity. However the word Zeus is by Plato severally attributed to each of them; which Proclus thus observed upon the Timeus: ελγομεν άκι πολλαί μω εν τάξεις ή παραπλάτω ποιύ ο Δίον. "Αλλ' ήαρο γέον δι άναρχον άλλο, ως έν Καθάρω μετατηρεί, ή άλλος ο Πρότατος τών Κρατικών τεταρτών, ις έν Τρίχαι Αλέωνοι, ή άλλος ο άναρχος, ως έν τώ Φωκώ παρακείνθαι, ή άλλος δ άναρχος, είτε έτε ο άναρχος είτε ο έν τη Ειρική πεινών." We say therefore, that there are several orders, ranks or degrees of Zeus or Jupiter in Plato; for sometimes he is taken for the Demiurgus or opifer of the world, as in Craytus; sometimes for the first of the Saturnian triad, as in Gorgias; sometimes for the superior soul of the world, as in Phaedrus; and lastly, sometimes for the lower soul of the heaven. Though, by Proclus his leave, that Zeus or Jupiter which is mentioned in Plato's Craytus (being plainly the superior plycle or soul of the world) is not properly the Demiurgus or opifer, according to him; that title rather belonging to Zeus, or intellect, which is the second hypostasis in his trinity.

As for the vulgar of the Greekish Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be in ενεπόμενον τού κόσμος, a mind or intellect separate from the world, or else to be a soul of the world only; it cannot be doubted, but that by the word Zeus they commonly understood the supreme Deity in one or other of those senses, the father and king of gods; he being frequently thus styl'd in their solemn nuncupations of vows, Ζε'ι άναρχον, Ζε'ι άδον, O Jupiter father, and O Jupiter king. As he was invoked also Zε'ι άδον in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cause commended in Plato's Alcibiades 1:

Ζε& Αδον, τα μω τοθακ ι ευχρομον ι Άναρχοις
"Αμι μοι άθα, τα το άναρχον ευχρομον άπαλεξειν"  

O Jupiter king, give us good things, whether we pray or pray not for them; but with-broad evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them. But the instances of this kind being innumerable, we shall forbear to mention any more of them. Only we shall observe, that Zeus Sabazius was a name

1 In Alcibiad, secundo, five de Precatione, p. 48.
name for the supreme God, sometime introduced amongst the Greeks, and
derived in all probability from the Hebrew Sabaoth, or Adonai Tsebaoth, the
Lord of hosts (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the supreme governor of the
world. Which therefore Aristophanes took notice of as a strange and foreign
god, lately crept in amongst them, that ought to be banished out of Greece;
these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many dif-
ferent deities, as shall be more fully declared afterwards. We shall likewise
elsewhere shew, that besides Zôs, Πάς also was used by the Greeks as a name
for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole
world.

That the Latins did in like manner, by Jupiter and Jovis, frequently
denote the supreme Deity, and monarch of the universe, is a thing unques-
tionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets, that were
commonly given to him, of optimus and maximus, the best and the greatest;
as also of omnipotens, frequently bestowed upon him by Virgil and others.
Which word Jupiter or Jovis, though Cicero ¹ etymologize it à juvando, or
from juvenis pater, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may ra-
ther conclude it to have been of an Hebraical extraction, and derived from
that Tetragrammaton, or name of God, consisting of four consonants;
whose vowels (which it was to be pronounced with) though they be not now
certainly known, yet must it needs have some such sound as this, either Jó-
cab, or Jâvob, or Jēw, or Jôw, or the like; and the abbreviation of this
name was Jâb. For as the Pagan nations had, Besides appellatives, their
several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as
being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signify-
ing eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggest, that the Pagans did not only
signify the supreme God, by these proper names, but also frequently by the
appellatives themselves, when used not for a God in general, but for the God,
or God καθ' εξοχήν, and by way of eminency. And thus ὁ θεὸς and θεός
are often taken by the Greeks, not for θεός τις, a God, or one of the Gods,
but for God, or the supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in
passages before-cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of Aristotle's,
τις δὲ καθ' εξοχήν, τις δὲ καθ' εξοχήν, ως ταύτα τις ἐξ ὑπερανάγουσαν;
What is therefore, that can be better than knowledge, but only God? As also that other of his, that happiness
consists principally in virtue, ἡσυχίας συμμετέχειν ἑαυτῷ μάρτυς τῷ τειχῷ ἡγομένῳ,
it is a thing, that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God.
So likewise in that of Thales, προτεταγμένι  πάντως ὁ θεός, ἀγνώστος γὰρ:
God is the oldest of all things, because he is unknown: and that of Maximus Tyrius,
πολλοὶ νῦν πάντες νῦν δὲ συνάρτησά τεθν, Many gods, the sons of God, and co-
reigners together with God. Besides which, there have been others also men-
tioned, which we shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances
of this kind might be added; as that of Aristophanes², Σαβαώθ Θεὸν, Ἰουριαν, Ἐμίπερ γῆς
ὑδές ἑξοχήν ἦν, οὗτος ἕπελεν, God is like to nothing, for which cause he can-
not be learnt by any, from an image: This of Socrates³, εἰ ταύτῃ Φιλοχ τῷ Σιφύω
νυτεὶς.

CHAP. IV. Theoi taken for the inferior gods only.

If God will have it so, let it be so. And that of Epictetus, οὐ μάνω μέμνησον τῶν καθόλου, τί έμοι, τι υμίν έμοι; τί Θελε με ποιήν ο Θεός νῦν; Do thou only remember these catholick and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would he have me not to do? But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular Θεός was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' έξοχήν, or in way of eminency, that is, for the supreme Deity; so was likewise the plural Θεοὶ frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation, Εί μεθ' θεοί, O Jupiter and the gods; and that form of obtestation, προς Δίος κρύον, By Jupiter and the gods. So in this of Euripides:

'Αλλ' εστί, οὕτε καί τις ίδρυκε λογίς;
Ζητεί θεοί, βρότεια λέσεις πασίν̄

Είτ, (sunt licet qui rideant) eft Jupiter,
Superius, casus qui vident mortalium.

In which passages, as Jupiter is put for the supreme God, so is Θεοὶ likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, Θεοὶ and Θεοὶ are both taken together in Plato's Phædo, Θεοὶ for the supreme, unmade and incorruptible Deity, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only, ὅ δὲ γε Π. 106.

Θεοὶ (οἵμαι) ἔφη ο Σωκράτης, καί αὐτὸ τῷ τῷ ζωῆς είδος παρὰ πάντων ἄν ομολογηθείν, μετέ
ποτε ἀπαλλαγθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μενον ἐν Δί (ἐφη) αὐθήνατον χε, καὶ τι μᾶλλον, οὐς εὐγνο-
μαι, παρὰ Θεοί. I suppose, said Socrates, that God, and the very species, essence or idea of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible. Doubtless by all Plato de Rep. men (said Cebes) but much more, as I conceive, by the gods. But a further instance will be propounded afterwards of the word Θεοὶ, thus used, by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the theogonia or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the οἱ Θεοὶ, that is, the inferior gods.

Moreover, as the word Θεοὶ was taken κατ' έξοχήν, or by way of eminency, for the supreme God, so was Δαίμων likewise. As for example, in this passage of Callimachus, before cited imperfectly:

Ηοτ ετι tibi notus,
Hoc etiam noris, omnia posse Deum.

Where Θεοὶ and Δαίμων are used both alike Signanter, for the supreme God. And thus also in that famous passage of another poet:

—Tois:

Homer likewise, in one and the same place, seems to use Θεός and Δαιμόνιον both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God:

"Θεός αὐτοῦ ἐξελει τοῖς δαιμόνιοι φωτί μάκρης αὐτῷ, ὃν μὲ θεός τιμᾶ, τάχα οἱ μέγας πάρα κυλιέναι.

Quoties homo vult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare, Quem Deus honorat, mox in eum magna clades decoluitur.

Again we conceive, that Jupiter, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified amongst the Pagans by that expression, Θεός αὐτός, Deus ipse, as in that of Homer's ninth Iliad:

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Olim ei νῦν μειον θεότερον, Γιγενές ἀποκάλεσε Θεόν νόον ἐκουσάντα.

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Neque si mibi promitteret Deus ipse, Seneclam abradens, effectuarem me juvenem mundoscentem.

And thus St. Cyril of Alexandria interprets Homer here, ὃ γὰρ τε θεόν, εἰ τὸ Θεόν τε ὑπόσχεσθαι μοι τὸ μεῖον γάρ χάριν ἀπεραπτολήν, παλινδρόμον ὁ τῆς νεότητος, τετηρήμεν ὁ δ' ἡμῖν μόνον μὴ ἐπί παῦναι Θεόν, τὸ γὰρ τοι Θεός αὐτός, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἐν μένος περιπλανών τινά, αὐτόν ὁ θεός τοι μενον καλαπαθμώντων ἀν τοῦ αὐτός ὁ θεός. Homer doth not say, if any of the gods would promise me freedom from old age, and restitucion of youth, but he reserves the matter only to the supreme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the fictitious poetick gods, but to the true God alone.

The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables: Deos adeuntur caele, opes amovento: si fecus faxint, Deus ipse vindex erit. Let the Gods be worshipp'd chaste, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger. Where, though the word gods be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet Deus ipse, God himself, denotes the supreme God only. In like manner, δαίμων αὐτός also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of Euripides:

Δέσι με το τοῦ Δαιμόνιον αὐτός, ὅταν ἔστω, ἢλια

which was thus rendred by Horace:

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Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.

Notwithstanding which, Δαιμόνιον and Δαιμόνιον are often distinguished from Θεός and Θεός, they being put for an inferior rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons; which word in a large sense comprehends also

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1 Iliad, Lib. I. verf. 93.
2 Verf. 448.
3 Vide Ciceron. de Legibus, Lib. II. Cap.
5 In Bachiis, verf. 497.
also heroes under it. For though these daemons be sometimes called gods too, yet were they rather accounted 'Hμμίσθαι, demi-gods, than gods. And thus Θεός Δαίμονες, gods and daemons, are frequently joined together, as things distinct from one another; which notion of the word Plato refers to, when he concludes love not to be a god, but a daemon only. But of these daemons we are to speak more afterwards.

Furthermore, the pagan writers frequently understand the supreme God by the τὸ Θεῖον, when the word is used substantively. As for example, in this of Epicharmus:

Οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τῷ Θεῖῳ τὰ τῶν φιλόσοφων λέγοντα των θεῶν, God is far removed both from pleasure and grief. And Plotinus calls the supreme God, τὸ τῶν παντὸς Θεῖον, the Divinity that is in the universe. But because the instances hereof are also innumerable, we shall decline the mentioning of any more, and instead of them, only let down the judgment of that diligent and impartial observer of the force of words, Henricus Stephanus, concerning it: Redditur etiam τῷ Θείῳ Sepe Deus, sed ita tamen, ut intelligendum sit, non de quo libet Deo ab ipsis etiam profanis scriptoribus dici, verum de eo quem intelligerent, cim Θεὸς dicens! quasi est έξιχνι ad differentiam eorum, qui multa appellations Θεον includantur, sumnum videlicet supremumque Numen, & quasi dicas Θεὸς Θεῖον Θεον ὑπάρχον καὶ ἄριστον, ut loquitur de Jove Homerus.

Lastly, as τὸ Θεῖον so likewise was τὸ δαίμονον used by the Greeks for the supreme Numen, or that Divinity, which governs the whole world. Thus whereas it was commonly said, (according to Herodotus) δὲ τῷ Θεῖῳ Θβοῦ, that God was envious; the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly suffer any great human prosperity to continue long, without some check or countercheck; the same proverbial speech is expressed in Aristotle, Θβοῦ τῷ δαίμονον. And in this sense the word seems to be used in Isocrates ad Demo- nium, τιμὰ τὸ δαίμονον δει μεν, μάλιστα δι' τις πόλεως, worship God always, but especially with the city, in her publick sacrifices. And doubtless it was thus taken by Epictetus in this passage of his, μικρὸν οὗτος ιτιν εὐροιαν, τιτο ηγεῖται, Arr. Lib. 4, καὶ μεθ' ιερακίας καὶ κυκλωμάτωι, ιτιν πρόξεμον, απόκαλε τοίς απορχαίοις, τῷ μαθεῖ τινος c. 4, p. 387. [Ed. Can- tab ]

There is but one way to tranquility of mind and happiness: let this therefore be always ready with thee, both when thou wakest early in the morning, and all the day long, and when thou goest late to sleep; to account no external things thine own, but to commit all these to God and fortune. And there is a very remarkable passage in Demosthenes, (observed by Budeus) that must not be

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here


2. Epit. III. p. 708.


4. Lib. III. Cap. XII. p. 176. He cites this from an Epistle of Amasis to the Tyrant Polycrates.

here omitted: in which we have οἱ θεοὶ plainly for the inferior or minor gods only; and τὸ δαιμόνιον for the supreme God, both together; εἰσὶν οἱ θεοὶ, τὸ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ψυχισμόνες. The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous sentence; that is, both the inferior gods and the supreme God himself. Wherefore we see, that the word δαιμόνιον, as to its grammatical form, is not a diminutive, as some have conceived, but an adjective substantive; as well as τὸ θεῖον is. Nevertheless in pagan writings, δαιμόνιον also, as well as θεῖον, from whence it is derived, is often used for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though sometimes called gods too; and such was Socrates his δαιμόνιον to commonly known. But the grammar of this word, and its proper signification in pagan writers, cannot better be manifested, than by citing that passage of Socrates his own, in his Apology, as written by Plato; who though generally supposed to have had a demon, was notwithstanding by Melitus accused of atheism: ἐν τοῖς ὑπίποντοις, οἱ Μελίτης, αὐθαρίστα χρόνος μιν νομίζει πράγματα εἰνόη, ἀνδρώσκει δὲ ὁ νομίζεις; καὶ ἐν ὑπίποντοις, ἵνα μὴ πράξεις διὰ πράγματα εἰνόη, δαιμόνιος δὲ ὁ νομίζεις; ἐν ὑπίποντοις, ἵνα ἀνδρώσκεις διὰ τὸ δαιμόνιον λόγος. If we take, δαιμόνιον χρόνος, ἀνδρώσκεις διὰ τὸ δαιμόνιον, δαιμόνιος δὲ ὁ νομίζεις ἱνατέων ἀνανθηκόντος με βασιλεύει. τοὺς δὲ δαιμόνιας ἐκ τινος θεοῦ γένος νομίζεις εἰνόη, ἢ τοῦ πατέρας, κ.ά. Is there any one, O Melitus, who acknowledging, that there are human things, can yet deny, that there are any men? or confessing that there are equine things, can nevertheless deny, that there are any horses? If this cannot be, then no man, who acknowledges demonial things, can deny demons. Wherefore I being confessed to affect δαιμόνια, must needs be granted to hold δαιμόνια also. Now do we not all think, that demons are either gods, or at least sons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are demons, and yet no gods, is altogether as absurd, as if any should think, that there are mules, but yet neither horses nor asses. However, in the New Testament, according to the judgments of Origen, Eusebius, and others of the ancient fathers, both those words δαιμόνια and δαιμόνια are alike taken, always in a worser sense, for evil and impure spirits only.

But over and besides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the supreme God by such titles, epithets, and descriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him; thereby plainly distinguishing him from all other inferior gods. He being sometimes called by them ὁ Δαιμόνιος, the opifex, architect or maker of the world; ὁ Ἵμηρος τῶν πάντων ἕκαστος, the prince and chief ruler of the universe; ὁ Πρῶτος and ὁ Πρῶτος Θεὸς (by the Greeks) and (by the Latins) Primus Deus, the First God; ὁ Ἰδρυτὴς θεὸς, the First Mind; ὁ μέγας Θεός, the Great God; ὁ μέγας δαιμόνιος, and ὁ μέγας Θεὸς, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; ὁ Ὑψιστὸς, the Highest; and ὁ Ὑπάτος, the Supreme of the gods; ὁ ἄνωτάτων Θεός, the uppermost, or most transcendent God; Princeps ille Dei, that chief or principal God; Θεός ὅς ἦν, the God of gods; and Ἀρχή Ἀρχῶν, the Principle of principles; ὁ πρῶτος αἰτία, the First Cause; ὁ τότε τοῦ παντοτῆς, he that generated or created this whole universe; ὁ κρατῶν τῶν πάνω, be that ruleth over the whole world; Σωμάτυς Βοστεύτων, the supreme Governor and Lord of all; ὁ ἑνὸς πάντων.
Chap. IV. Champions for Paganism assert Monarchy.

See, the God over all; δε δεις ἀξίων, αὐτογενεῖ, αὐτοφυεῖ, αὐτοπτόκος, the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity; Monæ, a Monad; Τὸ ἐν ζῷ ὑπὸ ὑγρὸν, Unity and Goodness itself; Τὸ ἐπίκεισθαι τῆς ὑποτροπίας, and τὸ ὑπερβάλλω, that which is above essence or super-essential; Τὸ ἐπικεῖσθαι κτισμάτων, that which is above mind and understanding; Summum illud & Aeternum, neque mutabile neque interitterum, that Supreme and Eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish; Ἀρχή, καὶ τὸ πρῶτο, καὶ μὴν ἀπαντῶν, the Beginning, and End, and Middle of all things; Ἄρχη καὶ πάντα, One and all things; Deus Unus & Omnes, One God and All Gods: and lastly, to name no more, ὁ Πατήρ, or Providence, as distinguished from Φίλος, Nature, is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, Aum fatidicam Pronean 1. Now all these, and other such like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to shew) and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

XV. What hath been now declared, might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion, (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word God, which is now generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceive, that it must needs do to likewise amongst the Pagans;) we shall endeavour to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And first, we conceive this to be no small confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianitv, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and Paganism, none of the professed champions for paganism and antagonists of Christianitv, (when occasion was now offered them) did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators) but on the contrary, they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that Apollonius Tyaneus, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and affirfed by the powers of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely out of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianitv. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly Philostratus, seem to have had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up Apollonius in such a garb and manner, as might make him best seem to be a fit corvival with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity

and

and miracles. *Eunapius* therefore telling us, that he mis-titled his book, and that instead of 'Ἀπολλωνίου βίος, the life of Apollonius, he should have called it Θεός εἰς ἄγραφα ἐπιστήματα, the coming down, and converse of God with men; forasmuch as this *Apollonius* (faith he) was not a bare philosopher or man, αλλὰ τι Θεὸν ἐκ ἄγραφων μῦσα, but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men. And that this was the use commonly made by the Pagans of this history of *Apollonius*, namely to fet him up in way of opposition and rivalry to our Saviour Christ, appears sundry ways. *Marcellinus*, in an Epistle of his to St. *Austen*, declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans against Christianity, (therefore desiring St. *Austen's* answer to the same;) *Nobilis alium Dominum, quam alii bonines facere poterunt, fecisse vel egisse mentionur; Apollonium siquidem fumum nobis, & *Apuleius*, aliosque magicæ artis bonines, in medium proferunt, quorum majore contendunt exitiiis miracula. The Pagans pretend, that our Saviour Christ did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their *Apollonius* and *Apuleius*, and other magicians, whom they contend to have done greater miracles. And it is well known, that *Hierocles*, to whom *Eusebius* gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book against the Christians (entitled, *Philalethes*, or *Λέγον τιλαλάθες*) the chief design whereof was to compare this *Apollonius Tyaneus* with, and prefer him before our Saviour Christ: "Ανω γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωποι, συμβοῦντες τὸν Ιησοῦν, ὡς τυφλοὶ ἀνακαλύφθην τι παραχνότα, καὶ τινα τοινίτα δράσανθα Θεοῦσαν: They are Hierocles his own words in *Eusebius: The Christians* (faith he) keep a great deal of this, crying up of one *Jesus*, for restoring sight to the blind, and doing some such other wonders. And then mentioning the Thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongst the Pagans, but especially *Apollonius Tyaneus*, and insisting largely upon his miracles, he adds in the close of all, τῶν αὖ ἔνεκα τῶν ἐμῶν ἔμπνευ; ἀλλὰ ἐξε προφετεύων τινὰ μετατίθεν ἄγραφων ἔμπνευσι, ἐξ τῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν καθότατον ἔπερ ἔμπνευμα τοῦ τοινίτα πεποιητόν, τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ Τοινὰ κεχριστευμένον ἄγραφων ἔμπνευς; οἱ δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τῶν ἐμῶν περατεῖς τινῶν τὰ τὸν Ιησοῦν Θεοῦ ἄναγκεον. To what purpose now have we mentioned all these things? but only that the solid judgment of us [Pagans] might be compared with the levity of the Christians; forasmuch as we do not account him a god who did all these miracles, but only a perfon beloved of the gods; whilst they declare Jesus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders. Where, because *Eusebius* is silent, we cannot but subjoin an answer out of *Laurentius* (which indeed he seems to have directed against those very words of *Hierocles*, though not naming of him) it being both pertinent and full: Apparet nos sapientiores esse, qui mirabilia Christi non statim fidelem divitiatis adjuvantes, quām nos, qui ob exiguum portentam Deum credidistis—Disce igitur, si quid tibi cordis est, non solum idcirco à nobis Deum credimus Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia vidimus in eo fæcta esse omnia, quae nobis annuntiata sunt, vaticinia prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia, magnum putassimus, ut & vos nuncupatis; & Judei tunc putaverunt; si non illa ipsa facturum Christum, prophetæ omnes uno spiritu prædicabant. Itaque Deum credimus, non magis ex fæatis, operibusque mirandis, quæm ex illa ipsa cruce, quam vos ficut canes lambitis; quoniam simul & illa prædicta est. Non igitur fuo testimonio.
testimonio, (qui enim de se dicenti potest credi?) sed prophetarum testimonio,
qui omnia que fecit ac passus est, multo ante ecceinerunt; fidem divinitatis ac-
cepti; quod neque Apollonio neque Apuleio neque cuquam magorum potest
aliquando contingere. It is manifest, that we Christians are wiser than you
Pagans, in that we do not profently attribute divinity to a person merely be-
cause of his wonders; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary
actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them; (and so
indeed did some of them, however Hierocles denies it, deify Apollonius.)
Let this writer against Christianity therefore learn, (if he have any under-
standing or sense in him) that Christ was not therefore believed to be a God
by us Christians, merely because of his miracles, but because we saw all those
things done by, and accomplished in him, which were long before predicted to
us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we should therefore have suspected
him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the Jews then supposed him
to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold, that he should do such
things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from
that very crest of his, which you so much quarrel with, because that was like-
wise foretold. So that our belief of Christ's divinity is not founded upon his
even testimony (for who can be believed concerning himself?) but upon the
testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all those things, which be
both did and suffered. Which is such a peculiar advantage and privilege of
his, as that neither Apollonius nor Apuleius, nor any other magician, could
ever shone therein.
Now, as for the life and morals of this Apollonius Tyra-
neus, as it was a thing absolutely necessary for the carrying on of such a di-
abolical design, that the person made use of for an instrument should have
some colourful and plausible pretence to virtue; so did Apollonius accord-
ingly take upon him the profession of a Pythagorean; and indeed act that
part externally so well, that even Sidonius Apollinaris¹, though a Chris-
tian, was so dazzled with the glittering sheen and lustre of his counter-
feit virtues, as if he had been enchanted by this magician so long after his
death. Nevertheless, whoever is not very dim-sighted in such matters as
these, or partially affected, may easily perceive, that this Apollonius was so
far from having any thing of that divine spirit which manifested itself in
our Saviour Christ, (transcending all the philosophers that ever were) that
he fell far short of the better moralized Pagans; as for example Socrates,
there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (besides other
foolery) discoverable both in his words and actions. And this Euselius²
undertakes to evince from Philostratus his own history (though containing
many fallhoods in it) ἄρ' ἐν ἑπισκηπτῇ ἡ μετέπειτα αὐθεντέων ξένων ἵππου, Ἦχ' ὁποῖος
τῷ σωτηρ ἀπὸ ἡμῶν Χριστῷ παραιτεῖται τοῖς Ἀπολλόνιοις, That Apollonius was so
far from deserving to be compared with our Saviour Christ, that he was not
fit to be ranked among the moderately and indifferently honest men. Where-
fore, as to his reputed miracle, it credit be to be given to those relations,
and such things were really done by him, it must for this reason also be
concluded, that they were done no otherwise than by magic and necro-
mancy; and that this Apollonius was but an Archimago or grand Magician.
Neither ought this to be suspected for a mere slander cast upon him by par-


tially affected Christians only, since, during his life-time, he was generally reputed, even amongst the Pagans themselves, for no other than a φαντασία, or infamous inebriant, and accused of that very crime before Domitian the emperor: as he was also represented by one of the Pagan writers of his life, Meragenes, senior to Philostratus, as we learn from Origen: παρ' ἑαυτῷ Δαβίδος αὐτοῦ ἐκτιστεῖται, τούτῳ πελτή Φιλοστράτου οἶκον οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτῷ, οὐ μὴν ἀληθεύει τὰ γεγραφόμενα Μαραγήνει τοῦ Ἀπολλονίου τῷ Τυάναις ναὸν καὶ Φιλοστράτου ἀποκαλυμμένον. οὐ καὶ οὐκ ἐν Χριστιανίᾳ, ἀλλὰ Φιλοστράτου, ἐφη αὐτῷ ἥπερ τοὺς ἐν Ἀπολλονίῳ μαγάκης, αὐτὲς γὰρ τινὰς Φιλοστράτου, οὐ καὶ πρὸς γένος αὐτοῦ εἰσιποθύει, οὐκ οἶκει, οὐκ αὐτῷ, ἢ περὶ Ἐβραίων πάνω διανοήσαλ, ἢ τινὰς Ἐπικέφαλες. As concerning the infamous and diabolical magick, he that would know whether or not a philosopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read the writings of Meragenes concerning the memorable things of Apollonius Tyanaeus the magician and philosopher; in which he that was no Christian, but a Pagan magician himself, affirmed some not ignoble philosophers to have been taken with Apollonius his magick, including (as I suppose) in that number Euphrates and a certain Epicurean. And no doubt but this was the reason, why Philostratus derogates so much from the authority of this Meragenes, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning Apollonius (καὶ Μαράγενες τὸ περίκεφαλον, &c.) Because Meragenes had thus represented Apollonius in his true colours as a magician; whereas Philostratus his whole business and design was, on the contrary, to vindicate him from that imputation: the truth whereof notwithstanding, may be sufficiently evinced, even from those very things, that are recorded by Philostratus himself. And here by the way we shall observe, that it is reported by good historians, that miracles were also done by Vespasian at Alexandria, Περὶ εος μενεσ (they are the words of Tacitus) multa miracula evenere, quis cælestis favor, & quædam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinum ofenderetur. Ex plebe Alexandrini quidam, oculorum tabe natus, genua ejus advocavit, remedium caecitatis exposcens gemitu; monitu Serapidis, quem dedita superstitionibus gens ante alios colit; precabaturque principem, ut genas et oculorum orbes dignaretur respergere oris excremento. Alius manu aeger, codem deo autore, ut pede ad caesarii Calcaturi orabat. At that time many miracles happened at Alexandria, by which was manifested the heavenly favour and inclination of the divine powers towards Vespasian. A plebeian Alexandrian, that had been known to be blind, calls himself at the feet of Vespasian, begging with tears from him a remedy for his sight, (and that according to the suggestion of the god Serapis) that he would desist but to spit upon his eyes and face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the same oracle) beseeches him but to tread upon it with his foot. And after some debate concerning this business, both these things being done by Vespasian, βατινος conversa ad usum manus, & cæco relaxit dies; the lame hand presently was restored to its former usefulness, and the blind man recovered his sight: both which things (saint the historian) some who were eye-witnesses do to this very day testify, when it can be no advantage to anyone to lie concerning it. And that there seems to be some reason to suspect, that our archimagus Apollonius Tyanaeus might have some finger

1 This is related by Philostratus in Vitae Apollonii, Lib.II. Cap. XVIII. p. 156.
2 Philostratus, ubi supra, Lib. VIII. Cap. VII.
finger in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with Vespanian, but also at that very time (as Philostratus in- frometh us) present with him at Alexandria, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to weaken mens faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it; that whereas a fame of prophecies had gone abroad every where, that a king was to come out of Judea and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by Vespanian, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in Judea, and to whom Josephus himself boldly and flattering had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god Serapis, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably Apollonius also was;) this makes it still more strongly suppicable, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in Apollonius and Vespa- sian, to counter-work God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up or conserve his own usurped tyranny in the pagan world still. Nevertheless, we shall here show Apollonius all the favour we can; and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians, of the common sort, such as are not only grossly sunk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lusts; but rather one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the grosser vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by a divine misfils, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly insinuating here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them. However, concerning this Apollonius, it is undeniable, that he was a zealous upholder of the Pagan polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian Pythagoras his ghost, how to worship these gods, invisible as well as visible 2, and to have converse with them. For which cause he is styled by Vopiscus 3; Amicus versus deorum, a true friend of the gods; that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old Pagan religion, now assailed by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods were worshipped. But notwithstanding all this, Apollonius himself was a clear and undoubted afferter of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologetick oration in Philostratus 4, prepared for Domitian: in which he calls him, τὸν ραήτωρ, and τὸν πάντων ἐνμεταγόν θεόν, that God, who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things. And, as he elsewhere in Philostratus declares both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, infomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs, τὸν μὲν ὅλον πε- νιτέων

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1 Ubi supra, Lib. V. Cap. XXVII. p. 299. & Lib. VIII. Cap. VII. Sect. II. p. 329.
3 Vide Philostrat. ubi supra, Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 337.
The first pagan writer against Christianity was Celsus, who lived in the times of Adrian, and was so profest a Polytheist, that he taxes the Jews for having been seduced, by the frauds of Moses into this opinion of one God; which Moses there led, and being seduced by his rustick frauds, came to entertain this belief, that there was but one only God. Nevertheles, this Celsus himself plainly acknowledged, amongst his many gods, one supreme, whom sometimes calls the father of God, the first God; sometimes the father of his own, the greatest God; and sometimes the father of his own, the supercelestial God, and the like: and he doth so zealously affect the divine omnipotence, that he calls an imputation upon the Christians of derogating from the same, in that their hypothesis of an adversary power; σφάλαιτα δε απειτεσατα άπλω, 

orig. l. 6. p. 303. 

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that their hypothesis of an adversary power; σφάλαιτα δε απειτεσατα άπλω, 

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σφάλαιτα δε απειτεσατα άπλω,
Chap. IV. both Polytheists and Monotheists.

to men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary reffling him. Lastly, where Orig. con. Cel. he pleads moft for the worship of daemons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God; Θεός δὲ θεόμεν θεόμοις ἄπολείπτων, ἢ τε μεθ' ἡμέρας, ἢ τε νύκτα, ἢ τε καθ' ἡμέραν, ἢ τε γεροντικός, ἢ τε δικαστήριος, ἢ τε ἱππορ, ἢ τε τεταδόξω πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in publick nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in every thing our mind ought constantly to be directed towards God. A saying, that might very well become a Christian.

The next and greatest champion for the Pagan cause in books and writings was that famous Tyrian philosopher Malebus, called by the Greeks Porphyris; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatife (containing fifteen books) against the Christians; and yet he notwithstanding was plainly as zealous an affrator of one supreme Deity, and one only ἄρχηνον, unmade or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of Plutarch and Atticus concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or daemon, and the matter, and endeavouring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding Being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by Proclus upon the Timeus, page 119.

After Porphyris, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for paganism, was Hierocles, the writer of that book, entitled (in Eus. Φίλαλθος, or a lover of the truth; which is noted to have been a modest or inscribed, than that of Celsus his άληθις λόγος, or true oration. For if Eus. Pamp. were the writer of that answer to this Philalethes, now extant, as we both read in our copies, and as Photius also read; then must it needs be granted, that Hierocles the author of it was either contemporaneous with Porphyris, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this Hierocles seems plainly to be the person intended by Laelantius, in these following De Juf. l. 3. words; Alius eandem materiam mordacibus scripsit, qui erat tum et numero ju. 2. dicitum, & qui auctor in primis facienda persecutionis satis: quos scelere non contentus, etiam scriptis eos quos affixerat, inficetus est. Composuit enim libellus duas, non contrā Christianos, nē inimicē infestari videretur, sed ad Christianos, ut humane ac beneigne consulere videretur. In quibus ita falsitatem scripture facta arguerre conatus est, tanquam fibi est tota contraria.—Procipès tamen Paulum Petrumque lacravit, ceterique discipulos, tanquam fallacias feminatoris; quos eosdem tamen rudes & indolentes suisse teftefatus est. Another batch handled the same matter more smartly, who was first himself one of the judges, and a chief author of the persecution; but being not contented with that wickedness, he added this afterwards, to persecute the Christians also with his pen; he composing two books, not inscribed against the Christians, (left he should seem plainly to all the part of an enemy) but to the Christians, (that he might be thought to counsel them humanely and benignly;) in which he so charges the holy scripture with falsehood, as if it were all nothing else but contradictions: but be chiefly lashes Paul and Peter, as divulgers of lies and deceits, whom not...
Hierocles in his Philalethes clearly Book I.

withstanding he declares to have been rude and illiterate persons. I say, though Hierocles, for some cause or other, be not named here by Laëtanius in these cited words, or that which follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he was the person intended by him, for these two reasons: First, because he tells us afterward, that the main business of that Christiano-matix was to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ. Cùm faïta Christi mirabilia deßueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit oßendere, Apollonium vel paria, vel etiam majora fecisse. Mirum quid Apuleium praeternifterit, cujos solent & multa & mira memorari. Et ex hoc insolentiam Christi voluit arguere, quod deum se constituerit: ut ille verecundior fuiffe videretur, qui cum majora faceret (ut hic putat) tamen id fêbi non arrogaverit. That he might obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, which he could not deny, he would undertake to show, that equal or greater miracles were done by Apollonius. And it was a wonder he did not mention Apuleius too; of whose many and wonderful things the Pagans use to brag likewise. Moreover, he condemns our Saviour Christ of insolency, for making himself a god, affirming Apollonius to have been the modester person, who, though he did (as he supposed) greater miracles, yet arrogated no such thing to himself. The second reason is, because Laëtanius also expressly mentions the very title of Hierocles his book, viz. Philalethes. Cùm talia ignomina sua deliramenta judisset, cùmque veritatem penitus excidere coninxerit, a causis eft libros suos nefarios, ac dei hostes, Philalethes annotaret: Though pouring out so much folly and madness, professedly fighting against the truth, yet he presumed to call these his wicked books, and enemies of God, Philaletheis, or friends to truth. From which words of Laëtanius, and those foregoing, where he affirms this Christiano-matix to have written two books, the learned prefacer to the late edition of Hierocles, probably concludes, that the whole title of Hierocles his book was this, λόγον Φιλαλήθης προς Χριστονυσι. And I conceive, that the first of those two books of Hierocles insinuated upon such things as Porphyrius had before urged against the Christians; but then in the second, he added this de novo of his own, to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ; which Eusebius only takes notice of. Wherefore Epiphanius telling us, that there was one Hierocles a prefect or governor of Alexandria, in those perfecuting times of Diocletian, we may probably conclude, that this was the very person described in Laëtanius, who is said to have been first of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the persecution; and then afterwards to have written this Philalethes against the Christians, wherein, besides other things, he ventured to compare Apollonius Tyaneus with our Saviour Christ. Now, if this Hierocles, who wrote the Philalethes in defence of the Pagan gods against the Christians, were the author of those two other philosophick books, the Commentary upon the golden verses, and that De Fato & Providentia, it might be easily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithstanding an asserter of one supreme Deity. But Photius tells us, that that Hierocles, who wrote the book concerning fate and providence, did therein make mention of Jamblicus, and his junior Plutarchus Atheniensis: from whence Jonasius taking it for granted, that it was one and the same Hierocles, who wrote against the Christians, and de Fato, infers, that it could not be Eusebius Pamphili, who answered the Philalethes.

Dr. Pearson, Bp. of Chester.
Chap. IV. acknowledged a supreme Numen.

lethes, but that it must needs be some other Eusebius much junior. But we finding Hierocles his Philalethes in Laßtantium, must needs conclude on the contrary, that Hierocles, the famous Christiano-mafix, was not the same with that Hierocles, who wrote de Fato. Which is further evident from Anæas Gazeus in his Theophractus; where first he mentions one Hierocles an Alexandrian, that had been his master, whom he highly extols, &c. P. 7: eiπί μοι, ἐν τοῦ μάθει τῆς φιλοσοφίας δεκαχτά τᾶς τελεσι, οἷον Ἰεροκλῆς; But tell me, I pray you, are there yet left amongst you in Egypt any such exponents of the arcane mysteries of philosophy, as Hierocles our master was? And this we suppose to be that Hierocles, who wrote concerning fate and providence, (if not also upon the golden verses.) But afterward upon occasion of Apollonius the Cappadocian, or Tyanaean, he mentions another Hierocles distinct from the former; namely him, who had fo boasted of Apollonius his miracles, in these words, Ἰεροκλῆς δὲ ὁ διάσκακλος, ἀλλὰ ὁ προφάτου τῷ Θεομάρτιν, ἄγιον κτίτορον ὥς τοιοῦτον. Thus Apollonius is convinced of falshood; but Hierocles (not our master) but be that boasts of the miracles (of Apollonius) adds another incredible thing. And though it be probable, that one of these was the author of that commentary upon the golden verses, (for that it should be written by a Christian, is but a dream) yet we cannot certainly determine, which of them it was. However, that this Hierocles, who was the maffix of Christianity, and champion for the gods, was notwithstanding a professed averter of one supreme Deity, is clearly manifest also from Laßtantium, in these following words; Quam tandem nobis attulisti veritatem? nifi quod averter deceased omnium ad ultimum prodiderit; profecerunt enim damni dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem saeclorum altemque viventium confessor est, ademisisti Jovi tuo regnum; eunque summa potestate depulsum in ministrorum numerum redigisti. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit fullitia, vanitatis, erroris. Affirmas deos esse; & illos tamen subiectis & mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conaris evertere. Though you have entitled your book Philalethes, yet what truth have you brought in therein, unless only this, that being an averter of the gods, (contradicting yourself) you have at last betrayed these very gods? For in the close of your book, profecuting the praise of the supreme God, and confessing him to be the king, the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conserver of all living Beings, you have by this means debronied your Jupiter, and degrading him from his sovereign power, reduced him into the rank of inferior ministers. Wherefore your epilogue accuses you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both affert gods, and yet subject and mancipate them under that one God, whose religion you endeavour to overturn. Where we must confess we understand not well Laßtantium his logick; forasmuch as Hierocles his Zeus, or Jupiter, was one and the same with his supreme God, (as is also here intimated;) and though he acknowledgeth all the other gods to be but his inferior ministers, yet yethelesfs did he contend, that these ought to be religiously worshipped, which was the thing that Laßtantium should have confuted. But that, which we here take notice of, is this, that Hierocles, a grand percutor of the Christians, and the author of that bitter inveotive against them, called Philalethes, though
he were so strenuous an afferter of polytheism, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheless at the same time clearly acknowledge one supreme Deity, calling him the king, (that is, the monarch of the universe) the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of all good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conservator of all life.

But the greatest opposer of Christianity every way was Julian the emperor, who cannot reasonably be suspected to have disguised or blanched paganisin, because he was an emperor, and had so great an animosity against Christianity, and was so superstitiously or bigottically zealous for the worship of the gods, and yet this very Julian, notwithstanding, was an unquestionable afferter of one supreme Deity. In his book written against the Christians, he declares the general sense of the Pagans, after this manner: οὐχ ἡ θεομορφία τῶν ὑμνισκῶν ἀπάντων μὲν εἶναι οὐκοῦ παῖδα ήγεια, μηδὲν δὲ τα λοιπά τῶν θεῶν υπ' αὐτή, ἐναρξάμεν ἡ πολεμίας θεοῦ, ὃ ἐκεῖσο εἰπτρο-πευτε τῶν ἐπιται λαβόν όικείων αὐτοῦ ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν μεί τῷ πατρεί πάντα τίλικα, ἡ τιμία, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μηρίοις, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἄλλοι καλεί ὅκαμος, &c. Our theologers affirm the maker of all to be a common father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are distributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which administers in his own province agreeably to himself. For whereas in the common father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another. Afterwards, in the same book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain righter opinions concerning the supreme God, than the Jews themselves; ὅτι εἰ μὲν ὁ προσεχθεὶς εἰς τὸ κόσμῳ ὑπαινιείσθαι καὶ όποιος γένομε ὅμοιος, οἵονομ μὲν ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβανόμενοι ἀπάντων διατηρεῖ, ἐνάρχοντες δὲ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοὺς, ἐν δὲ ἐπιτηδείᾳ ἐναρξάμενως ὑπεράσπιζοντο τῷ μείζοντι τῶν υπ' αὐτοῦ θεϊον καθιστομένον. If that God, who is so much spoken of by Moses, be the immediate opifex of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who suppose him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or presidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongst those particular governors of particular countries and cities, as the Jews do. From both which places it is evident, that, according to Julian's theology, all those other gods, whose worship he contended so much for, were but the subordinate ministers of that one supreme God, the maker of all.

The same thing might be further manifested from Julian's oration made in praise of the sun, as a great God in this visible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cause of all things; εἰς μὲν τῷ ὤθῳ ὑπαινιείσθαι, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' ἑαυτοῦ πεπολεομένοι ἐνώπιοι θεοῦ. There is one God the maker of all things; but besides him there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens, in the midst of which is the sun. Where we have a clear acknowledgement of one supreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the same oration,
tion, he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the sun to have been the off-spring of Hyperion, did by this Hyperion understand nothing else but the supreme Deity; τὸν πάντων ἐπεφέρα, πᾶσιν ἐπέικα, πρὶν ἐν πάντα, χριστοῦ πολιτεία ἐστὶ, him who is above all things, and about whom, and for whose sake, are all things. Which supreme Deity is thus more largely described by him in the same oration, ἑνωτίῳ τῶν ἔργων, ἡ ποτίσιν τῷ ἐν θελετίῳ αὐτοῦ ἢμις' ἑνωτίῳ τῶν P. 248. ὑλῶν ὁ θεός ὃς ἐπιτικόν σύμπως' ἡτε, ἐν ἑπειδή πάνταν τῷ ἔνθε οὐς προσεύρτοιο [P. 132. Edit.] εἶνε ὁ Πλάτων ἐκθέν σομαράζειν τὸ ἄγαδεν 'αὕτη δὲ ὡς ἡ μοιοίδες τοῦ θυλος αἰτία, [P. Spanhem.] τὰς Ὑ. ἡμικακίας καλλίς τε, ἡ τελείατης, ἑνωτίῳ τε, ἡ ἔκβασις αἰμηχαίνα κατά τὸ ν ὁντι τῶν μεσαία προσεύρτοι ἐς, ἡν θεόν μεγίστον αἰνέργειον, &c. This God, whether he ought to be called that, which is above mind and understanding, or the idea of all things, or the one (since unity seems to be the oldest of all things), or else, as Plato was wont to call him, the good; I say, this uniform cause of all things, which is the original of all pulpitude and perfection, unity and power, produced from himself a certain intelligible sun, every way like himself, of which the sensible sun is but an image. For thus Dionysius Petavius rightly declares the sense of Julian in this oration; Vanissima bujus & loquacissima P. 274. disputationis mysterium est, à principe ac primario Deo, οὐσίων quondam & arcetynum solen editum justiss; qui eaem prorsus lexem & tæn in genere τῶν νομών βαθεί, quam in αἰσθητος ille, quem videmus, solaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque discernenda sunt, princeps ille Deus, qui τάγωδον το Platone diciatur, ὁ οὐσίων θεός, ὁ Φανομενης διὰ τός. The mystery of this most vain and loquacious disputation is this, that from the first and chief Deity was produced a certain intelligible and archetypal sun, which bath the same place or order in the rank of intelligible things, that the sensible sun bath in the rank of sensibles. So that here are three things to be distinguished from one another; first, the supreme Deity, which Plato calls the good; secondly, the intelligible sun, or eternal intellect; and lastly, the corporeal or sensible sun (animated.) Where, notwithstanding, we may take notice, how near this Pagan philosopher and emperor, Julian, approached to Christianity, though so much opposed by him, in that he also supposed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate off-spring of the first fountain of all things; which seems to differ but a little from the Christian λόγος. However, it is plain, that this devout restorer of paganisin, and zealous contender for the worship of the gods, asserted no multiplicity of independent self-existent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

As for those other philosophers and learned men, who, in those latter times of the declining of paganism, after Constantine, still stood out in opposition against Christianity; such as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, and many others, it is unquestionably evident concerning them all; that they clearly acknowledged one supreme Deity as the original of all things. Maximus Modaurenfs, a confident and resolute Pagan in St. Athanasius's time, expressed both his own and the general sense of Pagans, after this manner: Equidem unum esse Deum summum, sine initio, natura sua patriem magnum.

* P. 136, Edit. Spanhem.
Pagans disclaim a Multitude

Moreover, that the Pagans generally disclaimed this opinion of many unmade self-existent deities, appeareth plainly from Arnobius, where he brings them in complaining, that they were falsely and maliciously accused by some Christians as guilty thereof, after this manner: Frustra nos falsa & calumniis ineffitis & appetitis crimine, tanquam inficias eam Deum esse majorem; cim à nobis & Jupiter nomineus, & optimus beateur & maximus: cumque illi auguisfimnas fedes, & Capitolia consituerimus immania. In vain do you Christians calumniate us, Pagans, and accuse us, as if we denied one supreme omnipotent God; though we both call him Jupiter, and account him the best and the greatest, having dedicated the most august seats to him, the vaft Capitolis. Where Arnobius, in way of opposition, shows first, how perplexed and intangled a thing the Pagans theology was, their poetick fables of the gods nonfencally confounding herology together with theology; and that it was imposible, that that Jupiter of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grand-father and a grand-mother, should be the omnipotent God. Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, & communis mortalitatis affensu, neque genius situr, neque novam in lucem alicuando esse prolatus; nec ex aliquo tempore capiffe esse, vel seculo. Ipsa enim est fons rerum, fator seculorum.

* These words are not Longinius's, but the argument of the epifile prefixed to it.
culturum ac temporum. Non enim ipsa per se sunt, sed ex ejus perpetuis perpetua, & infinita semper continuatore procedunt. At vero Jupiter (ut vos fertis) & patrem habet & matrem, avos & avices, nunc nuper in utero natum sui formatum, &c. You Pagans confound yourselves with con- tradictions; for the omnipotent God, according to the natural sense of all man- kind, was neither begotten or made, nor ever had a beginning in time, but being the fountain and original of all things. But Jupiter (as you say) had both father and mother, grand-fathers and grand-mothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be the eternal omnipotent God. Nevertheless, Arnobius afterwards considering (as we suppose) that these poetick fables were by the wiser Pagans either totally rejected, or else some way or other allegorized, he candidly difmisseth this advantage, which he had against them, and grants their Jupiter to be the true omnipotent Deity, and consequently that fame God, which the Chrisrians worshipped; but from thence in- fers, that the Pagans therefore must needs be highly guilty, whilst worshipping the fame God with the Chrisrians, they did hate and persecute them after that manner. Sed sunt, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi nominis, & majestate disfarates; equid ergo injustis perse- quimini nos odiiis? Quid, ut ominis pseudem, nostris nominis inhorrefcitis mentione, si quem Deum colitis, eum & nos? aut quid in eadem causa vobis esse contenditis familiares Deos, inimicos atque infestissimos nobis? etenim, si una religio eft nobis vobifque communis, cеfàt ira cælestium. But let it be granted, that (as you affirm) your Jupiter, and the eternal omnipotent God are one and the fame; why then do you prosecute us with unjust baerdem, abominating the very mention of our names, if the fame God that you worship be worshipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the fame, why do you pre- tend, that the gods are propitious to you, but most highl provoked and incensed against us? Where the Pagan defence and reply is, Sed non idcirco Dii vobis infefls sint, quod omnipotentem colatis Deum; sed quod boninem natum, & quod perferis insam eft vitibus, crucis supplicio interemptum, & Deum fulile con- tenditis, & supperses aeterni creditis, & quotidians supplicationibus adoratis: But we do not say, that the gods are therefore displeased with you Chrisrians, because you worship the omnipotent God; but because you contend him to be a God, who was not only born a mortal man, but also died an ignominious death, suffering as a malefactor; believing him still to survive, and adoring him with your daily prayers. To which Arnobius retorts in this manner: Tell us now, I pray you, who these gods are, who take it as so great an injury and indignity done to themselves, that Christ should be worshipped? Are they not Janus and Saturn, Äelculapus and Liber, Mercurius the son of Maia, and the Theban or Tyrian Hercules, Caftor and Pollux, and the like? Hic ergo Christum colit, & a nobis accipi, & exiflanti pro numine, vulneratis accipiant auribus? & oblitii paulo ante fortis & conditionis fœ, id, quod &i conceflum eft, impertivi alteri nodunt? hoc eft juftitia calcium? hoc deorum judicium sanctum? Nome sìud litoris eft & avaritiae genus? non obtrèflatio quedam Jordens, suas eminere solummodo velle fortunas, aliorum res premi & in con- tempta humilitate calcari? naturam boninem colimus, quid enim, vos boni- nem nullum colitis naturam? non unum & alium? non innumerous alios? quinimo
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quino non omnes quos jam templis bebetis vestris, mortalium sufragitis ex numero, & celi sideribusque donatis? Concedamus internum manum vestris opinationibus dantes, unum Christum sui de nobis, mentis, animae, corporis, fragilitatis & conditionis unius; nonne dignus à nobis est tantorum ob munera gratiam, Deus dixi, Deusque fentiri? Si enim vos Liberum, quod reperit num vini; si quod panis, Cererem; si Aesculapium, quod herbarum; si Minervam, quod olea; si Triptolemus, quod aratri; si denique Herculem, quod feras, quod fures, quod multiplicium caput superavit complexuisse matricibus, divorum retributionibus in cælum: honoris quantis acriter, si nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis insinuat veritate traduxit? &c. Are these the gods, who are so much offended with Christ’s being worshipped, and accounted a God by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the same bestowed upon another, which hath been granted to themselves? Is this the justice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather base envy and covetousness, for them thus to ingross all to themselves? We worship indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worship no such? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almost all your gods such as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the stars? and will you account that damnable in us, yourselves practis? Let us for the present yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Christ was but an ordinary man of the same rank and condition with other mortals; yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reason of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a God? For if you have advanced into the number of your Divi, Bacchus or Liber for inventing the use of wine, Ceres of corn, Aesculapius of herbs, Minerva of the olive, Triptolemus of the plow, and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters; with how great honours ought he to be affected by us, who by the insinuation of divine truth hath delivered us from such great errors of mind? &c. Which argumentation of Arnobius, though it were good enough ad homines, to stop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reason, that Christ should be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that Bacchus, or Ceres, or Hercules should be fo; yet as the same Arnobius himself seems to intimate, it is not sufficient without something else superadded to it, for the justification of Christianitv. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Chriftians, that they had defied one, who was crucified, (though the cross of Christ was also a great offence to them) but that they condemning the Pagans, for worshipping others besides the supreme omnipotent God, and decrying all thole gods of theirs, did themselves notwithstanding worship one mortal man for a God. This

Celsus urges in Origine, ʻi miu de mundi ellon Istrepatis utoi pl vi unu Ther, zo ou u ʻe
autou ʻeouo περ της θευα ανους λαγω, νου ʻε την ουαζα Φαιναυ την επερεξενωρ, θα
θυμιου ψευδα θουλω ανου θεωματων; If these Christians themselves worshipped no other but one God, or the pure divinity, then might they perhaps seem to have some just pretence of cenfuring us; but now they themselves give divine honour to one that lately rose up, and yet they persuade themselves, that they do not at all offend God in worshipping that
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that supposed minister of his. Which, as Origen makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the Fathers in this particular, Clemens Alexandrinus was not the judgment of this opinion, that the Pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians, (though not after a right manner) but also endeavours to confirm it from the authority of St. Peter: That the Greeks knew God, Peter intimates in his 655.

predication. There is one God, faith be, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end, &c. Worship this God, not as the Greeks do. Wherein he seems to suppose the Greeks to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right, tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoin us not to worship that God, which the Greeks worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the Greeks do, the same Peter intimates in these words; They worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods. Where he adds further out of St. Peter’s predication, Neither worship God as the Jews do, &c. The one and only God (faith Clemens) is worshipped by the Greeks paganically, by the Jews Judaically, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the Greeks, and it is φυλοευτέρος πασί Ἡλλήνες, δοξάζοντες, by which the omnipotent God is glorified among the Greeks.

Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have De Ira Dei, acknowledged one supreme Deity; Summum Deum & philosophi & poetae, p. 127 [Cap. XI. p. 934.]

Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge. From whence he concludes, that all the other pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship) Lib. I. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds: Quod quia Lib. I. p. 16. [Cap. III. p. 25.]

intelligunt ipsi affertores deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantum unus sit rector extimus. Jam ergo ceteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus, maximus & potens omnium, officiat his prefect, ut ipsi ejus imperio & nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit & quod dominat. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subjicitus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cigit. Which because the affertors of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the several parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers,
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officers, which one greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed and constituted, so as to serve his command and beck. Now, if all the Pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; since that which ruleth, and that which serveth, cannot be the same. God is a name of absolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impossibility and subjection to nothing. Wherefore these ought not to be called gods, whom necessity compels to obey one greatest God. Again, in the same book, Nunc factis est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac propri tenuisse; nisi cos retrofum in latuatu praevi opinionibus confutandum rapuisset, qua & deos alios esse opinabantur, & ea, que in usum boni Deus fecit, tamquam seni praedita essent, pro diis habenda & colenda credebant. It is now sufficient to have shown, that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain customary infatuation of evil opinions snatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that those things, which God made for the use of men, as endued with sense (or animation) ought to be accounted gods and worshipped; namely, the stars. And afterward, Quod si cultores deorum eos ipsos se colere putant, quos summum Dei ministros appellamus, nihil est quod nos faciant invidiam, quia unum Deum dicamus, multis negemus. If the worshippers of the gods think, that they worship no other than the ministers of the one supreme God, then there is no cause, why they should render us as hateful, who say, that there is one God, and deny many gods.

Eusebius Caesariensis likewise gives us this account of the Pagans creed, or the tenor of their theology, as it was then held forth by them; in Graeco dialecto, παλαιος δυναμις, τα πατειν πληρων, η τοις πατειν διηκε, η τοις πατειν επιστευεις αμωμασι δη η τοις πατειν ειπληρων, η τοις πατειν διεκε, η τοις εαυτου ειπληρων δια τοις εαυτου ειπληρων διεκε. The Pagans declare themselves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things, and pafseth through all things, and presideth over all things; but being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading them, he is reasonably worshipped by or in those things, that are manifest and visible. Which passage of Eusebius will be further considered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of paganism.

What St. Austin's senex was concerning the theology of the Pagans, hath been already declared; namely, That they had not so far degenerated as to have lost the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all whatsoever nature; and that they derived all their gods from one. We shall now, in the last place, conclude with the judgment of Paulus Orosius, who was his contemporary; Philosphi dum intento mentis studio quernunt scrutanturque cœlia, unam Deum aut borem omnium repercussit, ad quem unum omnia referrentur; unde eisam non Pagani, quos iam declarata veritas de continuacione magis quam de ignoracioni convictis. Cum á nobis dissemuiuntur, non se plures sese, sed sub uno Deo magno, plures ministros venerari fatentur. Resestigitur de intelligenter veri Dei, per multas intelligendi suspiciones, confusa diffussio, quia de uno Deo omnium penene una est opinio. The philosophers of the Gentiles, whils with
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with intent flyudy of mind they enquired and searched after things, found, that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things should be referred. Whence also the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convince of contumacy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confess themselves not to follow many gods, but only under one God to worship many ministers. So that there remaineth only a confused diffusion concerning the manner of understanding the true God, because about one God there is almost one and the same opinion of all.

And by this time we think it is sufficiently evident, that the Pagans, (at least after Christianity) though they asserted many gods, they calling all understanding beings superior to men by that name, (according to that of St. Jerom, Deum quicquid supra se esset, Gentiles putabant;) yet they acknowledged one supreme omnipotent, and only unmade Deity.

XVI. But because it's very possible, that some may still suspect all this to have been nothing else but a refinement and interpolation of Paganism, after that Christianity had appeared upon the stage; or a kind of manglezation of it, to render it more vendible and plausible, the better able to defend itself, and bear up again the assaults of Christianity; whilst in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwife: although the contrary hereunto might sufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however, for the fuller satisfaction of the more strongly prejudiced, we shall by an historical deduction made from the most ancient times all along downwards, demonstrate, that the doctrine of the greatest Pagans Polytheists, as well before Christianity as after it, was always the same, that besides their many gods, there was one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we shall perform, not as some (1) have done, by laying the chief stress upon the Sibylline oracles, and those reputed writings of Hermes Trismegistus, the authority whereof hath been of late so much decreed by learned men; nor yet upon such oracles of the Pagan deities (2), as may be suspected to have been counterfeited by Christians; but upon such monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unsuspected and indubitate. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them; one, in swallowing down all that is now extant under that title, as genuine and sincere, whereas nothing can be more manifest, than that there is much counterfeit and supposititious stuff in this Sibylline farrago, which now we have. From whence, besides other instances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that some pretended Christians of former times have been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavoured to uphold the truth of Christianity by figments and forgeries of their own devising. Which, as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itself, and argued that those very defenders of Christianity did themselves distruft their own cause; so may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it also, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Christianity (at least in after-ages) to be suspected. Infomuch that

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2. These Oracles are produced by Justin.
that it might perhaps be questioned, whether the truth and divinity of Christianity appear more in having prevailed against the open force and opposition of its professed enemies, or in not being at last smothered and oppressed by these frauds and forgeries of its seeming friends and defenders. The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole business of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Christianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in those Sibylline books, which were under the custody of the Quindecimviri, that did in the least predict our Saviour Christ, or the times of Christianity. For notwithstanding all that the learned Blondel hath written, it seems to be undeniably evident from Virgil's fourth Idyllium, that the Cumean Sibyl was then supposed to have predicted a new flourishing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy state of justice or righteousness to succeed in the latter age of the world:

_Ulma Cumei venit jam carminis ætas, _
_Magnus ab integro fæclorum nascitur ordo._
_Jam redit & virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna, _
_Jam nova progenies calo delabitur alta, &c._

Moreover, it is certain, that in Cicero's time the Sibylline prophecies were interpreted by some in favour of Caesar, as predating a monarchy; Sibyllæ versus observamus, quos illa furens fudiffe dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama diciturum in senatu putabatur, eum, quem reverà regem babeamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus. We take notice of the verses of the Sibyl, which she is said to have poured out in a fury or prophetick frenzy, the interpreter whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the senate-house, that if we would be safe, we should acknowledge him for a king, who really was so. Which interpretation of the Sibylline oracles (after Caesar's death) Cicero was so much offended with, (he also looking upon a Roman monarchy, as a thing no less impossible than undefirable) that upon this occasion he quarrels with those very Sibylline oracles themselves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner; Hoc si est in libris, in quem boninem, & in quod tempus est? Callidè enim, qui illa composuit, perfecti, ut, quodcumque accidisset, prædictum videre-tur, hominum & temporum definitione sublatâ. Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut idem versus aliás in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipsam poëma declarat, (est enim magis artis & diligentiae quam incitationis & motus) tum verò esse ængor-æcis dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum literis aliquid concééitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem seposam & conditionem babeamus, ut, id, quod prædictum est à majoribus, injusta senatus nè legantur quidem libri. If there be any such thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it spoken, and of what time? For whoever framed those Sibylline verses, he craftily contrived, that whatsoever should come to pass, might seem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all distinction of persons and times. He also purposely affected obscurity, that

*In his Treatise of the Sibyls, printed in French at Paris 1649, in 4to.*
the same verses might be accommodated sometime to one thing, and sometime to an-
other. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetick rage, but rather
from art and contrivance, doth no less appear otherwise, than from the acrostick
in them. Wherefore let us shut up the Sibyl, and keep her close, that according
to the decree of our ancestors, her verses may not be read without the express
command of the senate. And lastly, he addeth, Cum antiquitatis agamus, ut
quidqui potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Roma posthac nec dii
nec homines esse patientur: Let us also deal with the Quindecimviri and inter-
preters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of
them, than a king; whom neither gods nor men will hereafter suffer at Rome.
Where, though Cicero were mistaken as to the event of the Roman govern-
ment, and there were doubtful some predictions in thefe Sibylline books of
a new kingdom or monarchy to be set up in the world; yet that the Roman
empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifestly appear from
that description in Virgil's forementioned eclogue; wherein there is accor-
dingly another completion of them expected, though flatteringly applied to
Salomonius. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom, and happy state, or
golden age, predicted in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the
Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianty. Lastly, in
that other passage of Cicero's, concerning the Sibylline oracles; Valeant ad
deponendas potius quam ad usupiendas religiones; let them be made use of rather
for the extinguishing, than the begetting of religions and superstitious; there
seems to be an intimation, as if, of themselves, they rather tended to the
lessening than increasing of the pagan superstitions; and therefore may
probably be thought to have predicted a change of that pagan religion, by
the worship of one sole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to seem a
jot more strange, that our Saviour Christ should be foretold by the pagan
Sibyl, than that he was so clearly predicted by Balaam the Aramitick for-
cerer. However, those things in the Sibylline verses might have been der-
ived, some way or other, from the Scripture-prophecies; which there is
indeed the more probability of, because that Sibylline prophet made use of
those very same figures and allegories in describing the future happy state,
that are found in the Scripture. As for example:

Nec magnos metuent arma leones;
Occidet & serpen, &c.

Now, as Cicero seems to complain, that in his time these Sibylline oracles
were too much expos'd to view; so is it very probable, that notwithstanding
they were to be kept under the guard of the Quindecimviri, yet many of
them might be copied out, and get abroad; and thereby an occasion be of-
fered to the ignorantly zealous Christians, who were for officious lies and
pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forging to them. Neither
indeed is it imaginable, how any such cheat as this should either at first have
been attempted, or afterwards have proved successful, had there not been some
foundation of truth to support and countenance it. Besides which it is observ-
able, that Celsus, who would have had the Christians rather to have made the Sibyl
than-

Of the Sibylline Oracles. Book I.

than our Saviour Christ a God; taking notice of their using of those Sibylline testimonies against the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole busines of these Sibylline oracles, but only for inserting many things

although of their own into them; ὑμεῖς ὑμῶν Σιβύλλων, ἢ χρηστίον τινος ὑμῶν, εἰκάσας ἡ lib. 7. p. 368. μᾶλλον πρεσβύτα, ὡς τῷ Θεῷ παῖς, καὶ ἡ παρεχόμενον μὲν εἰς τῷ ἔννοιο πολλὰ ἢ βλάσφημα εἰπὼν ὁμοιίως τοὺς Christians might much rather have acknowledged even the Sibyl for the off-spring of God; but now you can boldly insert into her verses many, and those malevolent things of your own. Where Origen, that he might vindicate, as well as he could, the honour of Christians, pleads in their defence, that Celsus, for all that, could not shew what they had foiled into those Sibylline verses; because, if he had been able to have produced more ancient and incorrupt copies, in which such things were not found, he would certainly have done it. Notwithstanding which, it is likely, that there were other ancient copies then to be found, and that Celsus might have met with them too, and that from thence he took occasion to write as he did. However, this would not justify the present Sibylline books, in which there are forgeries plainly discoverable without copies. Nevertheless it seems, that all the ancient Christians did not agree in making use of these Sibylline testimonies, thus much being intimated by Celsus himself, in the fore-cited words, ἢ χρηστίον τινος ὑμῶν, which some of you make use of; as they did not all acknowledge the Sibyl to have been a prophetess neither: since, upon Celsus mentioning a fact of Christians called Sibyllists, Origen tells us, that these were such as using the Sibylline testimonies were called so in way of disgrace by other Christians, who would not allow the Sibyl to have been a prophetess; they perhaps conceiving it derogatory to the Scriptures. But though there may be some of the ancient Sibylline verses still left in that farrago which we now have, yet it being impossible for us to prove which are such, we shall not infilt upon any testimonies at all from thence, to evince, that the ancient Pagans acknowledged one supreme Deity. Notwithstanding which, we shall not omit one Sibylline passage, which we find recorded in Pausianias, (from whence, by the way, it appears also, that the Sibylline verses were not kept so close, but that some of them got abroad) he telling us, that the defeat of the Athenians at Εἴγων Πόταμος was predicted by the Sibyl in these words (amongst others:)

Καὶ τὸν Ἀθηναίον βασιλέα ὑδάε τῷ Ἐθνῷ.  
Ζεύς ὑψικρίτες, ἤτερ εἰρήματα εἰς μέγίστον, &c.

Aetum Cecropidis lucum geminisque ciebit  
Jupiter altitum, rerum cui summa potentias, &c.

Wherefore might be added also that of another ancient Pelian prophetess, in the same writer, wherein the divine eternity and immutability is plainly declared:

Ζεύς ἦ, Ζεύς ἐστὶ, Ζεύς ἔσται, ὡς μεγάλε Ζεύ.

Jupiter est, sibi, atque erit: O bone Jupiter alem.

Besides

Chap. IV. Zoroaster a Polytheist.

Besides these Sibylline prophecies, there are also other oracles of the pagan deities themselves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one supreme and greatest God. But as for such of them, as are said to have been delivered since the times of Christianity, when the pagan oracles began to fail, and such as are now extant only in Christian writings, however divers of them are cited out of Porphyry's his book of oracles, because they may be suspected, we shall not here mention any of them. Nevertheless, we shall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian Apollo, that is recorded by Macrobius, in which one supreme Deity is not only asserted, but is also called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) Jao:

Φησίζει τὸν πάντων ὑπάλλελον τὸν ἐρυμεν Ἰᾶο.

You are to call the highest and supreme of all the gods, Jao: though it be very true, that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavoured to divert this to the sun, as if that were the only supreme Deity and true Jao. To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Do- donean Jupiter, together with the interpretation of Themistocles, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded πᾶς τὸν ἐμὸν τῷ Σείγιον, to repair to him, who was called by the same name with God; which Themistocles apprehended to be the king of Persia, μεγάλος γὰρ οἱμοιότατος ἦν τε ησαμήνως έξωτικός, because both he and God were alike called (though in different respects and degrees) the great king or monarch.

But as for those writings, commonly imputed to Hermes Trismegist, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and supposittuous, and yet on the contrary are asserted by Abanaeus Kircherus for sincere and genuine; we shall have occasion to declare our tenet concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The most ancient theologers, and most eminent assertors of polytheism amongst the Pagans, were Zoroafer in the eastern parts, and Orpheus amongst the Greeks. The former of which was of so great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he was a Polytheist is acknowledged by all, some affirming it to be signified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worshipper of the stars. Neither is it to be doubted, but that Ster or Efter in the Persian language, did signify a star, as it hath been observed also by learned men concerning sundry other words, now familiar in these European languages, that they derived their original from the Persian. Notwithstanding which, it may be suspected, that this was here but a Greek termination; the word being not only in the oriental languages written Zertoak and Zaradust, but also in Agathias, Zarades. However, Zoroafer's polytheism is intimated by Plato; where his magick is defined to have been nothing else but θεὸς θεατης, the worhip

* In Oedipo Ægyptiacos, & Obelisco Pamphilio, p. 35.

4 Thus it was explained by Dinnon and Hermodorus, as we are informed by Lertius in his poem. fragm. 8. p. 6. of which opinion is likewise Scaliger, with others of the moderns.
* In Alcibiade I. Oper. p. 52.
worship of the gods. Whence by the way we learn also, that the word μαγεία, De Abst. I. 4. or magick, was first taken in a good sense, which is confirmed by Porphyrius, ταραγό μάγος τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τάται Φερουσίας, Μάγοι μὲν προαγαγείοιο. Amongst the Persians, those, who were skilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worshippers of the same, were called Magi. And as magick is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital sympathy that is in the universe, so did these ancient Persian Magi and Chaldeans (as Ptol. tells us) suppose συμπάθεια εἶναι τὰ ἑαυτοῖς κατὰ, that there was a sympathy betwixt the superior and inferior beings; but it seems the only way at first by them approved, of attracting the influence and affilience of those superior invisible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheless, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but also to many gods; neither is it to be questioned but that this divine magick of Zoroaster shortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magick, and at length into γονεία, downright forcery and witchcraft; the only thing, which is now vulgarly called magick. But how many gods ever this Zoroaster worshipped, that he acknowledged notwithstanding one supreme Deity, appeareth from the testimony of Eubulus, cited by Porphyrius in his De Antro Nympharum, πρότος μὲν, ὡς εἰς Εὐβοίαν, Ζορωαστραίς αὐτοῖς σπάλασσιν τῷ πλῆξιν ὥς, τῆς Περσίς, αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐχουσών ἀνθρώπων, εἰς τιμία τῷ πάσιν ποιήσαι, καὶ πατρῶν Μιθρᾶ, εἰςάναι Φερουσίας, αὐτῶ τῷ σπάλασσι τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς οἱ Μιθρᾶς ἐδημίουν. Zoroaster first of all, as Eubulus testifieth, in the mountains adjoining to Persis, consecrated a native orificial cave, adorned with flowers, and watered with fountains, to the honour of Mithras, the maker and father of all things; this cave being an image or symbol to him of the whole world, which was made by Mithras. Which testimony of Eubulus is the more to be valued, because, as Porphyrius elsewhere informs us, he wrote the history of Mithras at large in many books, from whence it may be presumed, that he had thoroughly furnished himself with the knowledge of what belonged to the Persian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of Eubulus, we may well conclude also, that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a God, yet Zoroaster, and the ancient Magi, who were first initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted another Deity, superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was πάντων ποιήσας καὶ πατρός, the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world, whereof the sun is a part. However, these also looked upon the sun as the most lofty image of this Deity, in which it was worshipped by them; as they likewise worshipped the same Deity symbolically in fire, as Maximus Tyrius informat us; agreeable to which is that in the magick oracles,

πάντα πυρὸς ἕνεκεν ἐκαταρατά.

All things are the off-spring of one fire; that is, of one supreme Deity. And Julian the emperor was such a devout sun-worshipper as this, who acknowledged, besides the sun, another incorporeal Deity, transcendent to it. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that others amongst the Persians, who were

* In brevi doxamat. Chaldaicorum declaratione, published at the end of Servatius Gal-  

1089, in 410.

Rom. 165.

De Abfcr. Lib. IV. Sect. XVI. p. 165.

Vide Differat. XXXVIII. p. 371.

Commonly ascribed to Zoroaster, Sect. II.  

verf. 29, in Stanley's History of Philosophy.
not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, might, as well as Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Stoics amongst the Greeks, look upon the fiery substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only Mithras, according to that inscription¹, Deo Soli Invito Mithrae. However, Mithras, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the Persians for the supreme Deity, according to that of Hesychius, Mithras, ο̣ πρῶτος in Ptolomæus Sidet, Mithras, the first God among the Persians; who was therefore called in the inscription ² Omnipotent, Omnipotenti Deo Mithrae. Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by Artabanus the Persian, in his conference withThemistocles, in these words; ο̣μιθ άει παλλου Plut. Themist. νόμοι άει καλον άδιων, κάλλιστος άτοι τό τιμών βασιλεία, κάτω προσκυνει εικόνα Θεος τα τα πάντα ως ζωνιλλο. Amongst those many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this, that the king is to be honoured and worshipped religiously, as the image of that God, which conserveth all things. Scaliger ³ with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that Mithra in the Persian language signified great, and Mithra, greater or greatest; according to which, Mithras would be all one with Deus major or maximus ⁴, the greatest God. Wherefore we conclude, that either Herodatus was mistaken, in making the Persian Mithras the same with Mylitta or Venus, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasion'd from hence, because the word Mader or Mather in the Persian Language signified Mother, as Mylitta in the Syrian did;) or else rather, that this Venus of his is to be understood of the Gentiles, Άρσοντον θεών, the heavenly Venus or Love; and thus indeed is the there called in Herodatus, Urania; by which though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things) to have been primarily signified therein.

But Zoroaster and the ancient Magi are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, viz. Oromafdes or Ormifdas; however Oromafdes, according to Plato ⁵, seems to have been the father of Zoroaster. Thus, besides Plutarch and others, Porphyryus, in the life of Pythagoras, παρουσία p. 191; καλιστον δ' αληθεον, τοτε γαρ μοιο διαθέτα τοις ανθρώποις παινει θεον παράκλησιν, επει δ' ημερ ατο τα θεον, ως θέλων ου των Μώροις ἑνώμεθα, δο Όρομαξων κάλλιστον εἰςαναθαν οὐκεται το τα σώματα θεον εις ψυχήν αληθεον. Which we would understand thus: Pythagoras exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that alone, which could make them resemble God, he having learned from the Magi, that God, whom they call Oromafdes, was as to corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth. Though perhaps some would interpret these words otherwise, so as to signify Oromafdes to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as Mithras is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning Oromafdes, recorded in Plutarch ⁶, οτι απλικα το θεον τον θεον, ου τον Θεον τον γενεθλιων, that Oromafdes was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was from

¹ Vide Anton. Van Dale Differt. IX. ad Antiquit. & Marmora, p. 16.
² Apud Gruter. Theodur. Inscr. p. 34. n. 5.
³ De Emenat. Temporum, Lib. VI. Cap.
⁵ In Alciabide, Tom. I. Oper. p. 32.
from the earth. Wherefore Oromafdes was, according to the Persians, a Deity superior to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with Plato's πάγωδος or first good. From whom the Persians, as Scaliger informs us, called the first day of every month Ormadsa, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus Zoroaster and the ancient Magi acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of Mithras and Ormadses.

But it is here observable, that the Persian Mithras was commonly called τριπλαύος, threefold or treble. Thus Dionysius* the Pseudo-Areopagite, κιοί αυτοί Μάγου τά μετάμοσιν το Τριπλαύος τον πάντας. The Persian Magi to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honour of the Triplasion (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras. And something very like to this is recorded in Plutarch* concerning Oromafdes also, ὅ μεν Ωρομάξ; τρις; ένεργη αλέξα, Oromafdes threefold or triplicated; and whence it further appears, that Mithras and Oromafdes were really one and the same Numen. Now the Scholiasts upon Dionysius pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian Mithras, Triplasion, or threefold, from the miracle done in Hezekiah’s time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the Magi then observing the fame had thereupon given the name of τριπλαύος, or threefold, to their god Mithras, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shewed the folly of this conceit; and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, viz. a Trinity in the Persian theology; which Gerardus Ivesius* would willingly understand, according to the Christian hypothesis, of a divine Triunity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinctive characters are goodness, wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to reprefent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagoric or Platonick hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another, the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses*:

Πάντα γὰρ ἡσύλλη παληγ, ἐκ νῦ παρέδοκε
Δειντέο, δύ πρότων καλεῖξα ἦκας ἄνθρω.

To this sense: The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first. Which oracle Pселlus* has glossed upon; τὴν πάς σε Οὐραμάς ἑνεργηγίσας ὅ το τριάδας πρώτος πατή, παρέδωκε ταυτον τῷ νῦν ὄντι τῷ ρουσπο κεννο τῶν ἄνθρων, ἀγορίσε τὴν πατρικὴν ὑποχρήν πατὴς, Θεον πρώτον καλεῖς. The first Father of the Trinity having produced this whole creation, delivered it to Mind or Intellect; which Mind, the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God. After which, Pселlus takes notice of the difference here betwixt this Magical or Chaldaic Theology, and that

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* Epistol. VII. ad Polycarpum, p. 91. Cap. IX. p. 131.  
Tom. II. Oper.  
* In Oraculis Zoroastri adscriptis, Sect. II. ver. 27, 28. apud Stanley, ubi supra.  
* De Ihide & Osride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper.  
* De Orig. & Progressu Idololati. Lib. II. Oracles of Zoroaster.
that of Christians: Plaiw tò παρόν ημιων δόγμα  ιναλιων ἵπτει, ὡς αὐτὸς ο πρῶτος ῥὲς, ο ἡ το μεγάλω παλάς, τῆς κτήσης πάπτων ἰδιαµεγένους, &c. But our Christian doctrine is contrary hereunto, namely thus; that the first Mind or Intellige, being the Son of the great Father, made the whole creation. For the Father, in the Mofaick writings, speaks to his Son, the idea of the creation; but the Son is the immediate opifex thereof. His meaning is, that according to this Persia or Chaldaick theology, the first hypoftasis of the divine Triad was the διόνυσος or immediate architect of the world; whereas, according to the Christian as well as Platonic doctrine, he is the second. For which caufe, Pletho framed another interpretation of that Magick oracle, to render it more conformable both to the Christian and Platonic doctrine: ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ συναλλάξεις ἔδεικνυς, τά υπότα διδαχὴ εὖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἑντελειημένα τοις τῆς τελειω) χρῆ τῷ μὴν ἰκανῶν εὐτέρον Θεόν παροῦκεν, δεχθεὶς διδαχή εὐρειόν αὐτῶν, &c. The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for these are those things, which are complete and perfect) and delivered them to the second God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatsoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible essence, must needs owe its original also to the highest Father. Which second God the generations of men commonly take for the first, they looking up no higher than to the immediate architect of the world. According to which interpretation of Pletho's (the more probable of the two) the second hypoftasis in the Magick (or Persia) Trinity, as well as in the Platonic and Christian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this seems to be properly that, which was called Mithras in Eubulus.

But besides these two hypoftases, there is also a third mentioned in a certain other Magick or Chaldaick oracle, cited by Proclus, under the name of Psyche, or the mundane soul;}

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Metα ἐν Πατρικεῖς Διανοικεῖ,

Ψυχῆ ἐγὼ ναιο.

After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Psyche dwell. Now the paternal Mind, as Pellas informs us, is the second hypoftasis before mentioned; ὁ πατρικὸς νόσι, ὁ δεύτερος διδαχὴ Θεός, ἡ τῆς Ψυχῆς προσεχ voice δημιουργος. The paternal Mind is the second God, and the immediate demiurgus or opifex of the soul. Wherefore though both those names, Oromasdes and Mithras, were frequently used by the Magi for the το θείον, or whole Deity in general, yet this being tripalian or threefold, according to their theology, as containing three hypoftases in it; the first of those three seems to have been that which was most properly called Oromasdes, and the second Mithras. And this is not only confirmed by Pletho, but also with this further superaddition to it, that the third hypoftasis of that Persia Trinity was that, which they called Arimanius; gathering as much even from Plutarch1 himself: Ὑδιε απὸ Ζωρακαζαν, ὡς τριχα το μόλις δέλαις ἡ τῆς μεν πρώτη αὐτῶν μοίρα, ὃ Ζωρακαζήν ἐφιστών τοῦτο ἐναι, τοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων πατέρα καλέριν εγένετι Αρι-μανίου Μιθρας δι τῆς μέρι, ἢ τοῦτο ὃ ἐναι τοῦ Δεύτερον Ναύ καλόριν ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων. They say, that Zoroaster made a threefold distribution of things, and that he assigned the first and highest rank of them to Oromasdes, who in the oracles is called

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1 De Iside & Osir, p. 370.
called the Father; the lowest to Arimanus; and the middle to Mithras, who in the same oracles is likewise called the second Mind. Whereupon he observes, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroastrian and the Platonick Trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of these, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonick hypothesis, the immediate ὑμνημός; and architect of the world, this probably was that Mithras, as we have already intimated, who is called in Eubulus, the Demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypostasis of the Magick or Chaldaicke oracles be the same with that which the Persians call Arimanus, then must it be upon such an account as this, because this lower world (wherein are souls vitally united to bodies, and lapseable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedness, pains, corruption and mortality reign. And herewith Hejychius feemeth to agree: Ἀρίμανθος (faith he) ὁ Αἴων παρὰ Περσῶν, Arimanus among the Persians is Hades, that is, either Orcus or Pluto; wherein he did but follow Theopompos, who in Plutarch calls Arimanus likewise Hades or Pluto: which it seems was as well the third in the Persian trinity (or Triplafian Deity) as it was in the Homerian. And this was that Arimanus, whom the Persian king in Plutarch, upon Themistocles his flight, addressed his devotion to; καταλαμβάνω αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμικὸν, τοιαύτας θυσίας ἐδόσα τῷ Ἀριμάνθῳ, ὁ τὸν ἐλαύνον τῆς ἄρτιστῆς τοῦ ιαντο, he prayed, that Arimanus would always give such a mind to his enemies, as thus to banish and drive away their best men from them. And indeed from that which Plutarch affirms, διὸ Μεγαλὸς Πέρσων τοῦ Μεγαλοῦν οὖν ὁμολόγοι αὐτῷ, that the Persians from their God Mithras, called any mediator, or middle betwixt two, Mithras; it may be more reasonably concluded, that Mithras, according to the Persian theology, was properly the middle hypostasis of that triplafian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he should be a middle self-existent god or mediator betwixt two adversary gods unmade, one good, and the other evil, as Plutarch would suppose.

Notwithstanding which, if that, which the same Plutarch and others do so confidently affirm, should be true, that Zoroaster and the ancient Magi made good and evil, light and darknes, the two substantial principles of the universe; that is, afferted an evil daemon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very same manner that Plutarch himself and the Manicheans afterward did; yet however it is plain, that in this way also Zoroaster and the Magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one good principle or God, but only that, which is so contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already discovered a suspicion, that the meaning of those ancient Magi might possibly be otherwise; they philosophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darknes, together with good and light; that was in the composition of this lower world, and perforating the same; as also perhaps taking notice especially therein of evil daemons (who are acknowledged likewise in the Magick oracles, and called ἡγοι χθώνος, boons of the earth, and χθώνοι νύμφαι, terrestial dogs;) the head of which might be sometimes called also emphatically ὁ πονγός ὅλιγος Περσῶν, the evil daemon of the Persians, as being the very
same with the devil: all which was under the immediate presidency or government of that God, called by them Arimanianus, Hades or Plato, the third hypostasis in the Triplasian Deity of the Persians. Which supposition may be yet further confirmed from hence, because the Persians, as appears by the inscriptions, expressly acknowledged the divine omnipotence, which they could not possibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean substantial evil principle, coeternal with God, and independent on him. Besides which it is observable, that whereas the Gnosticks in Plotinus’s time ascertained this world to have been made, not so much from a principle essentially evil and eternal, as from a lapsed soul, to weigh down the authority of Plato, that was against them, did put Zoroaster in the other scale, producing a book entitled, ἀποκλώσεσις Ζωροαστρεί, or the Revelations of Zoroaster, Porphyrius tells us 1, that himself wrote purposely to disprove those Zoroastrian Revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by those Gnosticks themselves; therein implying also the doctrine of the ancient Zoroaster no way to have countenanced or favoured that Gnostick heresy. Moreover, the tenets of these ancient Magi, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers represented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which Theodorus in Photius 2 (treat of the Persian magic) gives thereof, as also that other of Eudemus in Damascius 3, are both of them so nonensical, that we shall not here trouble the reader with them; however, neither of them supposeth the Persian Arimanianus, or Satanæ, to be an unmade self-existing daemon. But the Arabians, writing of this Aithanawiaḥ, or Persian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the most approved Magi, light was Kadmian, the most ancient and first God, and that darkness was but a created God; they expressly denying the principle of evil and darkness to be coeae with God, or the principle of good and light. And Abulfeda represents the Zoroastrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the Magi reformed) after this manner; That Poræck Spec. God was older than darkness and light, and the creator of them, so that he was Hig Ar. p. a solitary being, without companion or rivalry; and that good and evil, vir- 146, 147, sue and vice, did arise from a certain commixture of light and darkness together, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was still to continue in it, till at length light should overcome darkness: and then light and darkness shall each of them have their separate and distinct worlds, apart from one another.

If it were now needful, we might still make it further evident, that Zoroaster, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods worshipped by him, was an affirter of one supreme, from his own description of God, extant in Eusebius. Θεος ἐστιν ὁ πάντων ἡγησομαι, ἀγαθός, ἀγίος, ἀμεταόρθαλος, πανοσιος Prep. Ev. L. πάντος καλός, ἀδιάφανοις, ἀγαθόν ἀγαθὸν τυποῖς, φιλόσοφων φιλόσοφοι, ἡκτὸς ἀκαθάρτος. 148.

[Cap.X. p. page 12] the first incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indiscernible, most unlike to every thing, the head or leader of all good, univincible, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of law and justice; self-taught, perfect, and

1 In Vitae Plotini Cap. XVI. p. 119. Edit.
2 Biblioth. Cod. LXXI. p. 199.
3 τηρετυ τοῦτον ἄλλη, a work never yet printed.
Concerning the Magick, Book I.

the only inventor of the natural holy. Which Eusebius tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained verbatim in a book entitled, A holy collection of the Persian monuments; as also that Ostanes (himself a famous magician, and admirer of Zoroaster) had recorded the very fame of him in his Ὀστανέαν.

Now we having, in this discourse concerning Zoroaster and the Magi, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to Zoroaster, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and sincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either Zoroaster and the Persian Magi, or else at least the Chaldeans, asserted not only a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect, they being cited by Synesius, as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of ἄλογα λόγια, holy oracles; and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of Pselius and Pletho; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left. And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as for example Damascius, out of whom Patritius hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as are wanting in Pselius and Pletho's copies. And we learn from Photius, that whereas Hierocles his book of fate and providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, τὰ λαγάμαν λόγια, εἰς συμφωνία συνάγων, εἰς Πλάτων ἱδαιμόνια, to reconcile the reputed oracles with Plato's doctines. Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of Hierocles were the same with these Magick or Chaldaick oracles; because those are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of λόγια or oracles. Proclus upon the Timeus, ὅς τοι ὁ Πλάτωνος, ἢ Ὁρφής, ἢ Λυσί, ποιητής ἢ πατὴρ ὄρειται τὸ πάθος, πατὴρ αἴναρων τοῦ θείου τῆς χρειας μὲν τὰ πληθυντά πίερι τινος εἰς γεινίς αἴναρων. The maker of the universe is celebrated both by Plato, and Orpheus, and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produce multitudes of gods, and sends down souls for the generations of men. And as there are other fragments of these cited by Proclus elsewhere under the name of λόγια or oracles, so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of ἄναπαρατότος θεολογία, and μυσαγωγία, the theology that was of divine tradition or revelation. Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon Pythagoras his philosophy by Iamblichus, that being thought to have been derived in great part from the Chaldeans and the Magi; εἰς θείων αὐτῆς παραπλήσιον τὸ κατ' αἴναρων. This philosophy of Pythagoras having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them. And that Porphyrus was not unacquainted with these oracles neither,

1 De Insomniis, passim.
3 Biblioth. Cod. CCXIV. p. 553.
neither, may be concluded from that book of his, intitled, περὶ τῆς ἐν λα-
γῶν φιλοσοφίας, concerning the philosophy from oracles; which consisting of
more parts, one of them was called, τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγων, the oracles of the
Chaldeans, which, that they were the very fame with those we now speak
of, shall be further proved afterward. Now, though Pselius affirms, that
the Chaldean dogmata contained in those oracles were some of them ad-
mitted both by Aristotle and Plato; yet does he not pretend these very
Greek verles themselves to have been so ancient. But it seems probable
from Suidas, that Julian a Chaldean and Theurgist, the son of Julian a
philosopher, (who wrote concerning Dæmons and Teleurgickes) was the
first, that turned those Chaldee or Magick oracles into Greek verse; Ἑλλα-
ωνος, ὑπὸ Μάκρου Ἀπολλοῦ τῆς βασιλείας, περὶ τῆς ἐν λαγῶν
τῆς Χαλδαίων λογίας, Ἀριστοτείου, writes Telemichus, the oracles of the
Julian, in the time of Marcus Antoninus the emperor, wrote the theurgick and
teleurgick oracles in verse. For that there is something of the theurgick ma-
gick mixed together with mystical theology in these oracles, is a thing so
manifest from that operation about the Hecatine circle, and other pas-
fages in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it still more unlikely
that they should have been forged by Christians. Nevertheless, they carry
along with them (as hath been already observed) a clear acknowledgment
of a divine monarch, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things;
which is called in them the father, and the paternal principle, and that in-
telligible, ὁ λόγος τῶν ἄνθρωπων, that cannot be apprehended otherwise than by
the flower of the mind; as also that ὁ οἶκος, from whence all things spring:
Pselius, thus glossing upon that oracle, all things were the off-spring of one
fire, πάντα τὰ ὅλα τοῖς νότησιν, καὶ ἀκολούθων, ἀπὸ μονοῦ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρχής ἡ
πρὸς καιρὸς ἢ ἐν ἀρχήν ἠκολούθη τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρχής ἠ-
κολούθην. All things, whether intelligible or sensible, receive their essence from
God alone, and return back again only to him; so that this oracle is irrepre-
sensible, and full of our doctrine. And it is very obervable, that these very
fame oracles expressly determined also that matter was not ἀγνωστὸς, unmanned
or self-existent, but derived in like manner from the Deity. Which we
learn from Proclus upon Plato's Timæus, where, when he had positively
affirmed, that there is εἰνεκτὸς αἰτία, one thing the cause of all things; and
tάγαθον πάσαν αἰτίαν ᾐτε, εἰταὶ ἡ ὑλή ἀιτία, that the supreme good, being the
cause of all things, is also the cause of matter: he confirms this assertion of
his from the authority of the oracles, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποτελείων ἐν τῇ λόγῳ πα-
νω καὶ ἀγνωσίας ὑποτελείων ἐν τῇ λόγῳ πα-
νω καὶ ἀγνωσίας ὑποτελείων ἐν τῇ λόγῳ πα-
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νω καὶ ἀγνωσίας ὑποτελείων ἐν τῇ λόγῳ πα-

1 Oraculum. Sec. III. ver. 58. 2 Sec. II. ver. 59. 3 Sec. I. ver. 20. 4 P. 56.
making this the title of a whole book published by him, The Oracles of the Chaldeans; in which it is confirmed that matter was made.

Moreover, that there was also in these Magick or Chaldee oracles a clear signification of a divine triad, hath been already declared. But we shall here produce Proclus¹ his testimony for it too; ἢν ἐσὺ ἡ Θεοφορία Θεολόγια, οἵτινες συμπεπληγόται τῷ κόσμῳ, ἐκ τῶν τῶν Τριών Λόγων γένος ὕπος περί τὰ Διας ἐπίκεισα τῷ Εὐμεγέθους τὸ παρ᾽ θέος, divinely delivered (or inspired) theology affirmed the whole world to have been completed from these three; Psyche, or the mundane soul, therein speaking concerning that Zeus or Jupiter, who was above the maker of the world, in this manner, &c. For we have already declared, that Proclus his Θεοφορία Θεολογία, his theology of divine tradition or revelation, is one and the same thing with the λόγοι, or oracles. To which testimony of Proclus we might also superadd that oracle cited out of Damascius by Patritius:

πάντι γὰρ ὡς κόσμῳ λάμπετ τριώς, ἦς Μόνας ἀρχεῖν.

In the whole world shineth forth a triad or trinity, the head whereof is a monad or perfect unity; than which nothing can be plainer.

XVII. And now we pass out of Asia into Europe, from Zoroaster to Orpheus. It is the opinion of some eminent philologers of latter times, that there never was any such man as Orpheus, but only in Fairy-land; and that the whole history of Orpheus was nothing but a mere romantick allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alleged for this opinion from antiquity, save only this one passage of Cicero's concerning Aristotle; Orpheus poetam decet Aristoteles nunquam fuisset, Aristoteles teacheth, that there never was any such man as Orpheus the poet: in which notwithstanding Aristoteles seems to have meant no more than this, that there was no such poet as Orpheus senior to Homer, or that the verses vulgarly called Orphical were not written by Orpheus. However, if it should be granted, that Aristoteles had denied the existence of such a man, there seems to be no reason at all, why his single testimony should here preponderate against that universal consent of all antiquity, which is for one Orpheus the son of Oeager, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology amongst the Greeks, and of all their most arcane religious rites and mysteries; who is commonly supposéd to have lived before the Trojan war, (that is, in the time of the Israelitifh judges) or at least to have been senior both to Hesiod and Homer; and also to have died a violent death, most affirming him to have been torn in pieces by women. For which cause, in that vision of Herus Pamphylius in Plato, Orpheus his soul being come down again into another body, is said to have chosen rather that of a swan (a reputed musical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reason of that great hatred, which he had conceived of all woman-kind, for his suffering such a violent death from them. And the histotick truth of Orpheus was not only acknowledged by Plato, but also by Isocrates, senior to Aristotle likewise (in his oration in the praise of Bysiris²);

¹ Comment. in Timæum Plat. p. 116. ² P. 452.
and confirmed by that sober historiographer Diodorus Siculus, he giving this account of Orpheus. That he was a man, who diligently applied himself to literature, and having learned the μυθέλγήματα, or the mythical part of theology, travelled into Egypt, where he attain'd to further knowledge, and became the greatest of all the Greeks in the mystical rites of religion, theological skill, and poetry. To which Pausanias addeth, that he gained great authority, that is πιστούμενος ευρήκεια: έχειν καθορισμόν νόσον τή εκκλησία, by τον θεόν Lib. 9, p. 586. and περὶ τοῦ θείου as being believed to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for diseases, and appeasements of the divine displeasure. Neither was this history of Orpheus contradicted by Origen, when Celsus gave him to fit an occasion, and so strong a provocation to do it, by his preferring Orpheus before our Saviour Christ. To all which may be added, in the last place, that it being commonly concluded from the Greek word Ἑλευσία, that the Greeks derived their Τελετές and mysteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not so reasonable to think with the learned Vossius, that Xamolxis was the founder of them, (and not Orpheus) this Xamolxis being by most reported to have been Pythagoras his servant, and consequently too much a junior; and though Herodotus attribute more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a daemon, who appearing to the Thracians, was worshipped by them; whereas in the mean time, the general tradition of the Greeks derived the Thracian religious rites and mysteries from Orpheus and no other, according to this of Suidas; κλείθει οὖς Ὁρφέους Ὄρφης, προτότητα ιερευνήτης το 'Ελληνων μυς στί, και τά τιμάω κενο θερμακέων ἱκάλησιν, ὡς Ὑθευσίων εἰσι τῆς εἰδέσεως. It is commonly said, that Orpheus the Thracian was the first inventor of the religious mysteries of the Greeks, and that religion was from thence called Threskeia, as being a Thracian invention. Wherefore though it may well be granted, that by reason of Orpheus his great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantick things intermingled with this history; yet there appears no reason at all, why we should disbelieve the existence of such a man.

But though there were such a man as Orpheus, yet may it very well be question'd for all that, whether any of those poems, commonly entitled to him, and called Orphical, were so ancient, and indeed written by him. And this the rather, because Herodotus declares it as his own opinion, that Hesiod and Homer were the anciantest of all the Greek poets, οἱ δὲ πρωτοτηροῦν Ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τέτων τῶν αὐτῶν γενέσθαι οὗ τοῦ έτύμωλος, and that those other poets, [Cap. LIII. said to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them; meaning hereby, p. 109.] in all probability, Orpheus, Musæus and Linus. As also because Aristotle seems plainly to have followed Herodotus in this, he mentioning the Orphick poems (in his book of the soul) after this manner, τῶν Ὀρφικοῦ καθώτισται ἐπη, L. 1, c. 7, § 7, the verses that are called Orphical. Befides which, Cicero tells us, that some imputed all the Orphick Poems to Cercops a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the same to another of that school, Onomarctus, who lived in the times of the Pisonatides: wherefore we read

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1 Lib. IV. Cap. XXV. p. 221.
3 De Artis Poetic. Natur. Cap. XIII.
Whether Orpheus were the Author

Book I.

more than once in Sextus Empiricus of 'Orphikòn ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς: Onomacritus in the Orphick. Suidas also reports, that some of the Orphick poems were ancienly ascribed to Theognetus, others to Timoicles, others to Zopyrus, Vide Piat. de Legib. L. VIII. p. 63. & Cratylum, p. 265. 10, p. 144, & in Condivio, p. 318.

De N. De. I. p. 201. Lamb. De V. Pyth. c. 34. [P. 195, 196.]

Dr. Stob. Prol. in Flor. &c. From all which Gratius seems to have made up this conclusion, that the Pythagoricks entitled their own books to Orpheus and Linus, just in the same manner as ancient Christians entitled theirs, some to the Sibyls, and others to Hermes Trimegist. Implying therein, that both the Orphick poems and doctrine owed their very being and first original only to the Pythagoreans. But on the other side, Clemens Alexandrinus 3 affirneth, that Heraclitus, the philosopher borrowed many things from the Orphick poems. And it is certain, that Plato 4 does not only very much commend the Orphick hymns for their suavity and deliciousness, but also produce some verses out of them, without making any scruple concerning their author.

Cicero himself, notwithstanding what he cites out of Ariftote to the contrary, seems to acknowledge Orpheus for the most ancient poet, he writing thus of Cleanthes; In secundo libro de natura deorum, vult Orpheus, Musei, Hefiodi, Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, que ipse de deis immortalibus scripterat, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec nuntiati quidem fiunt, Stoici suiffe videantur. Cleanthes, in his second book of the nature of the gods, endeavours to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musei, Hesiod and Homer, to those very things, which himself had written concerning them; so that the most ancient poets, who never dream'd of any such matter, are made by him to have been Stoicks. Diidorus Siculus 5 affirneth Orpheus to have been the author of a most excellent poem: and Justin Martyr 6, Clemens Alexandrinus 7, Athenagoras 8, and others, take it for granted, that Homer borrowed many passages of his poems from the Orphick verses, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad:

Lastly, Jamblichus tells us, that by most writers Orpheus was represented as the ancientest of all the poets; adding moreover, what dialect he wrote in, εἰς πλανά τὸν ἐπιφραγμένον, μνήμην τῇ Δυρμίῳ διαλέκτῳ τοῦ Ὀρφικοῦ, ἐπεί δὲ στομα τοῦ παλιότου. Most of the historigraphers declare, that Orpheus, being the ancienest of all the poets, wrote in the Dorick dialect. Which, if it be true, then those Orphick fragments, that now we have, (preferred in the writings of such as did not Dorize) must have been transformed by them out of their native idiom. Now as concerning Herodotus, who supposing Homer and Hesiod to have been the ancienest of all the Greek poets, seemed therefore to conclude the Orphick poems to have been pseudographous; himself intimates, that this was but a singular opinion, and as it were paradox, of his own, the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However Ariftote probably might therefore be the more inclined to follow Herodotus in this, because he had no great kindness for the Pythagorick or Orphick philosophy. But it is altogether irrational and absurd to think, that the Pythagoricks would entitle their books to Orpheus,

1 Stromat. Lib. VI. Cap. II. p. 752.
3 Lib. IV. Cap. XXV. p. 221.
4 Cohortat ad Graecos. p. 17. Oper.
5 Stromat. Lib. VI. Cap. II. p. 758. & 754.
6 Legat. pro Christiann. Cap. XV. p. 64. 65.
Chap. IV. of the Poems called Orphical.

as designing to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no such doctrine before, either contained in some ancient monument of Orpheus, or at least transmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore the Pythagorick themselves constantly maintain, that before Pythagoras his time, there was not only an Orphick cabala extant, but also Orphick poems. The former was declared in that ancient book called Ἱερὸς λόγος, or, the holy oration, if we may believe Proclus upon the Timaeus. Πυθαγόρειον ἔδωκεν Γ. 291. Ἰερὸς λόγος, ἔπειτα τοις Πυθαγόρειοι φράσεις αὐτοὶ δὲ εἰσίν αἱ Ὀρφικοί παραβάσεις. Ἁ γὰρ Ὀρφικοὶ δὲ ἀπορρέστων λόγων μυστικώς παραδίδουσιν, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρειοι ἐξέφρασαν ὁμολογώς εἰς Ἀρακές τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς, Ἀγλαοφήμω τελεστὰ περικλείνοντος. Ταῦτα γὰρ Φησίν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐις τὸ Ἱερὸν λόγον. Τιμέας being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagorick principles, and these are the Orphick traditions; for what things Orpheus deliver'd mystically, (or in arcane allegories,) these Pythagoras learned when he was initiated by Aglaophemus in the Orphick mysteries, Pythagoras himself affirming as much in his book called, The Holy Oration. Where Proclus, without any doubt or scruple, entitles the book inscribed Ἱερὸς λόγος, or the holy oration, to Pythagoras himself. Indeed several of the ancients have resolved Pythagoras to have written nothing at all, as Flavius Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian and Porphyrius; and Epigenes in Clemens Alex. affirms, that the Ἱερὸς λόγος, or holy Oration, was written by Cercops a Pythagorean. Nevertheless, Diogenes Laertius thinks them not to be in good earnest, who deny Pythagoras to have written any things; and he tells us, that Heraclides acknowledged this Ἱερὸς λόγος, or holy oration, for a genuine and indubitate foetus of Pythagoras. Jamblichus is also of the same opinion, as the most received; though confessing some to have attributed that book to Telauges Pythagoras his son. But whoever was the writer of this Hieros Logos, whether Pythagoras himself, or Telauges, or Cercops, it must needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the testimony whereof, Pythagoras derived much of his Theology from the Orphick traditions. Moreover, Ion Chibius in his Trigrammi testified, as Clemens Alexandrinus informeth us, that Pythagoras himself referred some poems to Orpheus as their author; which is also the general sense of Platonists as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it seems most probable, that either Orpheus himself wrote some philosophick or theologick poems, though certain other poems might be also father'd on him, because written in the same strain of mystical and allegorical Theology, and as it were in the same spirit, with which this Thracian prophet was inspired; or at least, that the Orphick doctrine was first convey'd down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preservation, expressed in verses, that were imputed to Orpheus, after the same manner, as the golden verses written by Lyphis were to Pythagoras. And Philoponus intimated this latter to have been Aristotle's opinion concerning the Orphick verses; him glossing thus upon those words of Aristotle before cited: καλαπέμπων εἰς τὴν μνήμην Ορφεοῦ τὰ ἔπη, ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ τινὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὑτὰ γὰρ εἰσὶ τὰ ἄγαμα, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ οὐκαίρως εἰς τὴν καλαπέμπων. Aristotle calls them the reputed Orphick verses, because they seem not to have been written by Orpheus himself, as the same Aristotle affirmeth in his book of philosophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed were

Q. 9 2

Orpheus a rank Polytheist, Book I.

were bis, but Onomacritus is said to have put them into verses. However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verses, by whomsoever written, were some of them of great antiquity (they being much older than either Aristotle, Plato or Herodotus) as they were also had in great esteem amongst the Pagans; and therefore we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.

Now that Orpheus, the Orphick doctrine, and poems, were polytheistical, is a thing acknowledged by all. Justin Martyr affirms, that Orpheus asserted three hundred and sixty gods; he also bestows upon him this honourable title (if it may be so accounted) of polytheiteta, the father and first teacher of polytheism amongst the Greeks; he supposing, that Homer derived his polytheism from him; Orpheus δια θεότητα τοι μόνον τοις τιμώντοις μέροι, ἔνα μείον ὑπὲρ τὸν Θεοῦ εἰρήδειν ποιήσων. Homer emulating Orpheus his polytheism, did himself therefore fabulously write of many gods, that he might not seem to differ from his poems, whom he had so great a veneration for.

With which also agreeeth the testimony of Athenagoras; Orpheus γα τον θεόν τειν πρώτος ξεφυοις, γα τον γενεας διαλύεται, γα δέσσια έκάστοις πίεσαίται είπε, γα Ορφεός το πολλά γε περί θεῶν μάλητα έπελε. Orpheus first invented the very names of the gods, declaring their gene
erations, and what was done by each of them; and Homer for the most part follows him therein. Indeed the whole mythical theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongst the Greeks, are commonly supposed to have owed their first original to no other but Orpheus. In which Orphick fables, not only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but also all manner of human passions, imperfections, and vices (according to the literal sense) attributed to the gods. Infomuch that divers of the Pagans themselves took great offence at them; as for example Iphocrates, who concludes that a divine Nemesis or vengeance was inflected upon Orpheus for this impiety, 'Ορφεύς ο μάλητα τοις τοις τοις δόξας ψάριαν, δια χαρίτος τον βομή έπελεύση, Orpheus, who was most of all guilty in this kind, died a violent death. Alfo Diog. Laertius for this cause made a question, whether he should reckon Orpheus amongst the philosophers or no; and others have concluded, that Plato ought to have banished Orpheus likewise out of his commonwealth, for the same reason that he did Homer, which is thus expressed, for not being well concerning the gods. And here we may take notice of the monstrosity and extravagancy of Orpheus his fancy, from what Damaseius, and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be δρακονία κατάλαōς εύχασα προς πέραν ημῶν τούς, εν μέσω δι' έων πρόσωπον, εν επι εών πλας, a Dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midst the face of a god, with golden wings upon his shoulders; which forsooth must be an incorporeal deity and Hercules, with which Nature (called Anarche and Adrastea) was associated. Nevertheless the generality of the Greekish Pagans, looking upon this Orpheus, not as a mere fancifull poet and fabulator, but as a serious and profound philosopher, or mystical theologist, a person transcendently holy and wise; they supposed all

In Lau, Befir. [p. 452]

1 Apolog. II. pro Chriftianis, p. 104.
2 Cohor. ad Græcor, p. 17.
3 Apolog. pro Chriftian. Cap. XV. p. 64.
4 De Legibus, Lib II. p. 420.
5 Τι περί ποτέν έξέχη, a MS. cited above.
6 Τι περί ποτέν έξέχη, a MS. cited above.
Chap. IV. nevertheless a Monarchist.

all his fables of the gods to be deep mysteries and allegories, which had some arcane and recondite sense under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἄνθισεν Σωλεον (as Athenagoras writes:) more truly theologize than himself, and was indeed divinely inspired. Infomuch, that Celsus would rather have had the Christians to have taken Orpheus for C. Cels. I. 7, a god, than our Saviour Christ, ἄνθρωπος θεολόγων ὁ οίῳ θεότατῳ πνεύμα, v. p. 367. αὕτω βιώσει ἀμοιβάτα, as being a man unquestionably endued with a holy spirit, and one, who also (as well as the Christians Jesus) died a violent death.

But that Orpheus, notwithstanding all his polytheism or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one supreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be first presumed from hence, because those two most religious philosophick sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, not only had Orpheus in great esteem, he being commonly called by them ὁ θεόλογος, the theologer, but were also thought in great measure to have owed their theology and philosophy to him, as deriving the same from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and might be further proved. Pythagoras, as we are informed by Porphyrius and Jamblicus, learned something from all these four, from the Egyptians, from the Persian Magi, from the Chaldeans, and from Orpheus, or his followers. Accordingly, Syrianus makes Ὀρφικαί ποιήματα τοιαύτα, the orphick and pythagoric principles to be one and the same. And as we understand from Suidas, the same Syrianus wrote a book [In Comment. ad Lib. III. XIII. XIV. Metaphy. Arilott. fol. 59.] in the place before cited, frequently insinuates upon this elsewhere, in his commentary upon the Timæus, as p. 289. It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphick genealogies. For from the Orphick tradition downward by Pythagoras was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks. And that the Orphick philosophy did really agree and symbolize with that, which afterward was called Pythagorick and Platonick, and was of the same strain with it, may be gathered from that of Plato in his Cratylus, where he speaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word σῶμα: δοκιμάζει τοῖς μείζονι μοι μάλιστα Σίδηρι οι ἀμοιβά τοῦ ὄντος, τοῦ ἄλλου εἴδους τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦ δ' ἐπαίσκει τοῦ ὄντος εἴδους τῆς ψυχῆς. τοῦ ἄλλου εἴδους τοῦ ὄντος. ἴν μείζονι τῶν ὄντων τῷ σῶματι ὁ Ὀρφεύς and his followers seem to me to have given the best etymology of this word σῶμα (from σῶσαμ) that the soul is here in a state of punishment, its body being a prison to it, wherein it is kept in custody, till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called σῶμα. Now these three philosophies, the Platonick, Pythagonick, and Orphick, symbolizing so much together, it is probable, that as the Platonick and Pythagorick, so the Orphick likewise derived all their gods from one self-existent Deity.

Which may be further manifested from that epitome of the Orphick doctrine, made long since by Timotheus the chronographer in his Cosmopoeia, still

full extent in Cedrenus and Eusebii Chronica, and imperfectly set down
by Suidas (upon the word Orpheus) as his own, or without mentioning the au-
thor's name:—
"Εξ άρχικά ανειδίκητα τα κόσμου α άλλα, ύπο το δειν ερμηνευθησαν.
First of all the æther was made by God, and after the æther a Chaos; a
dark and dreadful night then covering all under the whole æther. Suidas
in his words here, μεν δύναμιν αξέπεξαν, κατε τη δημιουργία πάνων
σε τη παντοτική εν τη μή δισέλεγον παραγωγήν εις το ειών. These three names in Or-
pheus (light, counsel and life) declaring one and the same force and power
of that God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being,
whether visible or invisible. To conclude with Timotheus: "Ο δε αυτος, Ορφεύς,
εν τη αυτή βίβλοι συστάθης, οτι δι' των αυτών τριών δυνάμεων μιας βεστιλος, τα πάντα
εγκες, κα αυτός εις τα πάνω. And the same Orpheus in his book declared, that all
things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things.

But that Orpheus asserted one supreme Deity, as the original of all things,
is unquestionably evident from the Orphick verses themselves; of which
notwithstanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we shall premise
this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be
some Orphick verses supposititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they be-
ing counterfeited either by Christians or Jews. For we must freely profess
for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is
produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written
by Orpheus himself, or else by Oномаcritus, or any other Pagan of that an-
tiquity, according to the Orphick cabala or tradition.

As for example, this concerning Moses:*

"Ος λόγος αρχαίων, ος υπογεγραμμέν διέταξε,
Έκ ησυχίας γνώμαις λαβὼν κατα δύσπλακα βεσμόν"

Ut habit sermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-ortus descripsit,
Accepta divinitus leges, quae duplicia præcepta continet.

And this that is commonly understood of Abraham,

"Οδ γὰρ κτις τοις θεοις, Μιχαελικοί προς τον πραγματ,
Ει μη μυθογένεσις τις απόρροιας φίλωι συναθεν
Χαλδαῖων, οίδες γὰρ ἐν δαγδοί ποιεῖς.

* In Chronograph. fol. 46.
CHAP. IV.    Professed Monarchist.

Non enim quipsum mortalium videre posseum, qui hominibus imperat,
Nisi Unigenitus quidam profectus ab antiqua origine gentis
Chaldeorum; scient enim astri cursum.

The manifest forgery of which might make one suspect also some other passages, such as this concerning the divine Logos;

$
\text{Wherefore, where it being not ingenuous to lay stress upon that for the proof of any thing, which ourselves believe not to be sincere and genuine; we shall here cite no Orphick verses for the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, but only such as we find attested in Pagan writings. As first of all that copy produced by Proclus upon the Timaeus:}
$

$\text{To this sense: Wherefore, together with the universe, were made within Jupiter the height of the ethereal heaven, the bread of the earth and sea, the great ocean, the profound Tartara, the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods, and goddesses. Whatsoever hath been, or shall be, was at once contained in the womb of Jupiter.}$

Proclus understands this of the idea's of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he supposing them in time coeve. However, it is plain, that all things are said to be contained in the womb and profundity of one self-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddesses, but every thing else whatsoever.

Again Proclus, in the same place, utters in another copy of Orphick verses (which are also found in the writer de Mundo) after this manner: $
\text{The Demiurgus, or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by these comprehend all things within himself, as that theologer also declarish in these following verses:}$

$\text{Zeus pater, gêno, Zeus hêstas, dêv phainôs,}$
$\text{Zeus megalô, Zeus mîstos. Dios 2 éin prôto têtoewn,}$
$\text{Zeus kai epi gnêto, Zeus émêthos, 3 plato uîmayn,}$
$\text{Zeus èpiump naîa, ti ëpi ëpôkê deprôvenes.$}$
Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that Jupiter should be said to be both a man and an immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetick description of ἀρρενόθηλος, male and female together. And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God ἀρρενόθηλος, male and female together; they signifying thereby emphatically, the divine secundity, or the generative and creative power of the Deity; that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus Damascius the philosopher, writing of this very Orphick theology, expounds it, ἀρρενόθηλος αὐτὴς ὑπεξισότου, πρὸς ἄρτιν τὰς πάντως γενετικὰς ἐξίσους the Orphick theology calls the first principle hermaphroditick, or male and female together; thereby denoting that essence, that is generative or productive of all things. And that learned and pious Christian bishop, Synesius, it seems, thought the expression so harmless, that he scrupled not himself to make use of it, in those elegant and devout hymns of his to God Almighty:

Σὺ πατὴρ, Σὺ θυσίμνης, Σὺ δ' ἄρρην, Σὺ δ' Ῥόδις.

Τὸ Πάτερ, Τὸ εὐς Ματέρ, Τὸ Μας, Τὸ Φεμίνα.

Besides these, there are also certain other Orphick verses, scattered up and down in Proclus, but cited altogether in Eusebius out of Porphyrius, in which the whole world is represented as one great animal, God being the soul thereof.

"Εἰ δὲ δῶμας βασιλείαν ἐν δ' τάδε πάλαι κυκλώμαται,
Πῦρ ήδ' ὄδεις, ἕν οὐνίς, ή αἰθήρ, νῦς τ' ἡ μαρφ.
Καὶ Μάτις, πρῶτος γενέτορ, ἵπ Βραχος πολυτερπόν.
Πάλα γαρ ἐν μεγάλῃ Ζυνίου τάδε σώματι κείται.
Τῷ δ̄ τῷ κεφαλῆς μὲν ἰδέω, ή καλὰ πρόσωπα,
Οὐδέποτε αἰγλήσει ήν χρόσεις ἀμφίς ἐθύμει ἐν
"Ἀγγέλων μακροπέρων περικαλλίες περῆσθαι, &c.

Omnia

Chap. IV.

asserted Monarchy.

Omnia regali sunt hac in corpore clausa, Ignis, & unda, & terra, æther cum noile dieque, (Consilium, primus geniter, cum numine amoris: ) Juppiter immenso sub corpore cuncta coeivit: En bujas caput eximium, multisque decoros Undique resplendens calum, cui pendula circun Aurea Cæstaries aefrorum lamina fundit: Sunt oculi Phæbus, Phæboque adversa recurrens Cynthia, &c.

Where probably that one verse,

Kai Mæris, τινὸς γενέτος, καὶ ἔχως πολύτροπος,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, (it signifying, that Mind and Love were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clap'd in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly appears, that according to the Orphick theology, though there were many gods and goddeses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of them all, one suprême Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that some of the ancient and learned fathers 1, conceiving it contradictory, for Orpheus at the same time to assert both many gods and one God, apprehended this to be a convenient falvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that Orpheus had by fits and turns been of different humours and persuasions; first a rank polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then afterwards a converted monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion, by reason of certain counterfeit Orphick verses in Aристobulus, made probably by some ignorant Jew; wherein Orpheus is made to sing a palinodia or recantation, for his former error and polytheism. But we must crave leave, with all due respect, to differ from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly appearing from that first Orphick exception in Proclus, that Orpheus at the same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things) and many generated gods and goddeses, that were all contained in it.

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphick fragments, as have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of Orpheus his hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy or one self-existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essential part of the Orphick theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the fame) a trinity also of divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphick cabala. Proclus upon Plato's Timeus, making an inquiry into Plato's demiurgus or opificer of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Platonists, of the doctrine of Amelius (who was contemporary with Plotinus, and who is said to have taken notice of what St. John the evangelist had written concerning the Logos, as agreeing with the Platonick and Pythagoric hypothesis *) after this manner: 'Αμελίου δι' τρεῖ τοιεία, τοῦ Δημογορφον, καὶ Νας τρεῖε, Βασιλείας τρεῖες, τοῦ 'Ολα, τοῦ 'Εχρην, τοῦ 'Ορούντα, διαφέρεις, δι' ήτοι, οὕτι R t

Clemens Alexandr. in Prefcriptio, Cap. VII. Cap. XVIII, XIX. p. 540.

2 Vide Eufeb. Preparat. Evang. Lib. XI.
A Trinity, part

Book I.

Amelius makes a threesfold demiurgus or opifex of the world, three minds and three kings; him that is, him that bath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the first is essentially that, which he is (or all perfection: the second is its own intelligible, but bath the first (as something distinct from it) and indeed partakes thereof, and therefore is second. The third is also that intelligible of its own, (for every mind is the same thing with its correspondent intelligible) but bath that which is in the second, and beholds the first. For how much sooner every being departs from the first, so much the obfcurer is it. After which Proclus immediately subjoins, τάς τῆς τριών νοικε ὁ ὁμομειρύχος ὑποτίθεται, τις περὶ τὰν Πλάτων, τριῶν βασιλείας, τις περὶ Ορφέω τεϊς, Φαντα, ἡ ὅλος, ἡ Κρώνος, ἡ ἀριστικὴ παρὰ αὐτῷ ὁμοοργὸς ὁ Φάντας ἢ τοῦ. Amelius therefore supposes thefe three minds and demiurgical principles of his to be both the fame with Plato's three kings, and with Orpheus his trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; but Phanes is suppos'd by him to be principally the Demiurgus. Where tho' Proclus (who had some peculiar fancies and whimfies of his own, and was indeed a cofounder of the Platonick theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible fuff with it) does himself affert a monad or unity, superior to this whole trinity; yet does he feem nevertheless rightly to contend againft Amelius, that it was not the first hypoftasis neither in the Platonick nor Orphick trinity, that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the second. And thus Proclus his master Syranus 1 had before determined, that in the Orphick theology, the title of Opifex did properly belong to Orpheus his πρωτόγονος Σέβης, or first-begotten God, which was the fame with Plato's Νοῦς or divine Intellef. Agreeably whereunto Proclus his conclufion is, τις μὲν ὁ ὁμοοργὸς ἢ τις Νοῦς Σέβης τῶν ὁλικομιῶν αὐτός, ἡ πρωτάς ἡ γεγόνεν ὁ Ὁφεάς καὶ Πλάτων, ὁ αὐτός ἀνατύτων συνομειρύχος Ζεύς, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπερνομιστῶν. Thus much may suffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the divine Intellef, which is the proper and immediate cause of the whole creation; and that it is one and the fame demiurgical Jupiter, that is praified both by Orpheus and Plato. Now besides this, it is observable, that Damafcius in his book περὶ ὁσιότητος, or concerning the principles (not yet publifhed) giving an account of the Orphick theology, tells us, amongst other things, that Orpheus introduced τριομοσφον Σέβης, a triform deity. To all which may be added what was before cited out of Timolheus the chronographer, that God had three names, light, counsel, and life; and that all things were made by one Deity under three several names. Where Cedrenus, the preferver of that excellent fragment of antiquity, concludes in this manner: ταῦτα Τιμολύθης εὐθυγράφω ὁ Χελεράφος, λίγον τον Ορφεα πρὸ τοῦ στῶν Χρόνων εἰπότα, Τριάδα ὁμοοσιου ὁμοομειρύχος

2 Vide Wolfi Excerpta ex hoc Opere Da.
CHAP. IV. of the Orphick Cabala.

γάρ γὰρ τὰ πᾶνα: These things Timotheus the chronographer wrote, affirming Orpheus, so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a coessential or consubstantial Trinity. Which, though otherwise it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that Timotheus was a Christian (especially in regard of that word ὄμοιος) yet by comparing it with what we have before alleged out of pagan writers, it appears, that so far as concerns an Orphick trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.

But we have not yet done with Orpheus and the Orphick theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-gout, which was in it, of making God to be all. As for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of Zeus or Jupiter; Δίὸς πάλιν ἐπὶς ἔτωχος, ἡδον, this universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God. Ζησὺς ὁ οὖν γαίης τύχη πεφύκε, all things were contained together in the womb of God: Ζησὺς καὶ θαλάσσα, Ζησὺς μίσσα, God is the head and middle of all things: Ζησὺς πάλιν γαῖν, &c. God is the basis of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all, (or the air that we breathe;) God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars. "Εν τε ἑμῖν βασιλείαν, there is one kingly (or divine) body; and

Πάλιν γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζησὺς πάλιν σώματι κυώνα, For all these things lie in the great body of God. And thus was the Orphick theology before represented also by Timotheus 1 the chronographer, δι' τὸν Σελήνος πάλιν ἐνιαίος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν πάλιν. All things were made by God, and himself is all things.

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humour as this, to resolve all things into God, and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of Plutarch's, out of his defect of oracles: Υπὸ πάντες γενόσως αἰτίοις ἔχοντο, οἱ μὲν θεός παλαιοὶ Θεολόγοι P. 436. χριστάς, τῷ ἐρείποιοι μοῦν τὸν ἐν καθ' ἑξισθείναι εἴλου, τὸ τὸν ἐν καθ' ἑξισθείναι εἴλου, τὸ ἐν καθ' ἑξισθείναι εἴλου. Ζησὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζησὺς μίσσα, Διὸς ὁ ἐν πάντα πέλαντα

tais 2 αἰσθανόμενος 2 θεοκός, ἐν ἑτε προσέβασαν ἀιτίας 2 οἴ 2 νεώτεροι τῶν 2 θεικοὶ προσεχεσμόμενοι, τενσονσί ἐκείνοις, τῆς καλῆς ἡ θεία ἀποπληθυνθείσης ἀρχής, ἐν σώματι 2 χριστάς σωμάτων, πληγάζεις τῇ 2 μετασωμάτων 2 κράτος τὴν καθ' τὸ σώματα. Whereas there are two causes of all generation (the divine and the natural) the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two (the divine cause) resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning, and middle, and that all things were out of God. Infasmuch that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But on the contrary their juniors, who were called Physici (or naturalists) straying from this most excellent and divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations and commixtures together. Where by the most ancient theologers

and poets, Plutarch plainly meant Orpheus and his followers, it being an Orphick verse, that is here cited by him, whereby he gives also an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called Physici, he could understand no other than those first Ionick philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hippo, and the rest, whom those degenerate Italks afterward followed, atomizing atheistically, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. So that here we have another confirmation also of what was before asserted by us, that the Ionick philosophers after Thales, and before Anaxagoras, were generally atheistical. And indeed from them the word Φυσικ, or Naturalists, came to be often used as synonymous with άθεος or Atheists. Now these two are here condemned by Plutarch for two contrary extremes; the one, who resolved all into natural and necessary causes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the divine cause, as guilty of atheism; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and necessary causes of things, resolved all into the divine cause, as it were swallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticism. And thus we see plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphick cabala, and the ancient Greekish theology, that God is all things.

Some fanaticks of latter times have made God to be all, in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God; they supposing the substance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very substance of God himself, and all the variety of things, that is in the world, to be nothing but God under several forms, appearances and disguises. The Stoicks anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in somewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the active principle of the whole corporeal universe, which yet (because they admitted of no incorporeal substance) they suppos'd, together with the passive or the matter, to make up but one and the same complete substance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal substance, distinct from the matter, have notwithstanding made all to be God also, in a certain sense; they supposing God to be nothing but a soul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire divine animal. Now the Orphick theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that first and grossly fanatick sense; as if they took away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, they so asserting God to be all, as that notwithstanding they allowed other things to have distinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphick verses was proposed by the maker of the world, to Night;

Πῶς δέμοι ἐν τι τὰ πάντα ἐπικα, καὶ χάρις ἐκκομοί?

How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a distinct being of its own? Where "Εν τι τὰ πάλα, all things one, or one all things, items to be the supreme Deity, or divine Intellect, as Proclus also interprets it, τὰ ὅλα περικον ἢ ζύς κἄ πάντα μοναδικός ἢ νοετός, κατὰ τῶν χρώματων, μετὰ

1 Rib. Fludd, M. D. in the Preface to his Philosphia Mosiaca; and Jacob Behmen.
CHAP. IV. Theology, that God is all.

Jupiter, who containeth the universe, and all things within himself, unitively and intellethually, according to these Orphick oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe. And this is χάρις ἐνυκτεν, in that fore-cited Orphick verse, *Every thing apart by itself*, the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphick theologers be charged with making God all in the second Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly affirming, as Damascius and others particularly note, οὗτος ἀσάματον, an incorporeal Deity. But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphick theologers did frequently call the world, the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either διότεσθε Θεό, as the Hermaick or Trifmegistick writers call it, the second God; or else, as Numenius and others of the Platonist speak, τότεν θεόν, the third God; the soul thereof being as well in the Orphick, as it was in the Pythagorick and Platonick trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secrete from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphick theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts: first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequently were in a certain sense himself; thus much being declared in those Orphick verses cited by Proclus 1 and others,

Πάντα ταῦτα καὶ φυσικα, αὐτὸς Θεός καὶ πολυγνος.
Μέλεν ἀπὸ μεγάλης προφητείας, πολυσέξαλα εἶχον.

Which Apuleius 2 thus renders,

Namque sinu occultans, dulces in luminis oras
Cuncta tulit; sacro versans sub peccore curas.

The sense whereof is plainly this: That God at first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world. The second is, because the world produced by God, and really exisiting without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickned and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphicke passage 3, Εὐ καὶ ωτοίς ωτοίς προφητείας — God passeth through and intimately pervades all things.

Now it is very true, that some Christian theologers also have made God to be all, according to these latter senses; as when they affirm the whole

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1 Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 95.
2 Libro de Mundo p. 25.
world to be nothing else but Deum explicantum, God expanded or unfolded, and
when they call the creatures, as St. Jerome and others often do, radios Deiatis,
theories of the Deity. Nay, the scripture itself may seem to give some
countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that of him, and through him,
and to him are all things; which in the Orphick theology was thus expressed;

Col. 1. 16. God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things; that in oωγη εκθεν τα
Col. 1. 17. πάντα, all things were made in him, as in the Orphick verses,—Δην ητος ετοχον
that τα παντα ει αωγη ποιησας, all things confit in him; that, in him we live
1 Tim. 6. 13. and move, and have our being; that God doth ζωοποιην πάντα, quicken all things,
1 Cor. 15. 28. and that he ought to be made, πάντα ει πανθ, all in all; which supposeth
him in some sense to be so. Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish
point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceive it was the
mistake and abuse of this one thing, which was the chief ground and ori-
ginal of the both seeming and real polytheism, not only of the Greekish
and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more
particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all
things, and consequently all things God, that therefore God ought to be
worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and
things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings, which
are superior to men. Consequentely whereunto, they did both αιωνιος
καιων, theologize or deify all things, looking upon every thing as having δηνο-
νων τι, something supernatural, or a kind of divinity in it; and also bestow
several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world,
and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and æther, Jupiter;
in the air, Juno; in the winds, Aeolus; in the sea, Neptune; in the earth
and subterraneous parts, Pluto; in learning, knowledge, and invention, Mi-
nerva and the Muses; in war, Mars; in pleasure, Venus; in corn, Ceres;
in wine, Bacchus; and the like.

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that Orpheus with his
followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged
one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; and conse-
quentially could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.

XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Poly-
theists amongst the ancient Pagans, Zoroaster and Orpheus, and clearly proved,
that they assered one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe,
that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious poly-
theism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme
and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether poly-
theism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans,
because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedency here to the
Egyptians; Lucian himself, who was by birth a Syrian, and a diligent en-
quirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians
and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians; and
before
before Lucian, Herodotus\(^1\), the father of history, reporting likewise, that the Egyptians were the first, that erected temples and statues to the Gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the first Polytheists and Idolaters, there is no question to be made, but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their polytheism and idolatry from the Egyptians. Herodotus affirms in one place \(^2\), that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another \(^3\), that εϊσοδον καὶ πάντα τὰ ὑμεῖα τῶν Σαβών έξ Αίγυπτος ἐξάληθον εἰς τὸν Ἑλλάδα, almost all the names of the gods came first out of Egypt into Greece. In what sense this might be true of Zeus itself, though the word be originally Greekish, shall be declared afterwards: but it is probable, that Herodotus had here a further meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekish gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we shall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, viz. 'Αθήνα, called otherwise by the Greeks Pallas, and by the Latins Minerva. For first, the Greek etymologies of this word seem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. Plato in his Cnlatylus \(^4\) having observed, that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of Homer, 'Αθήνα was nothing else but νοὸς or διάνοια, Mind or Understanding, personated and deified, conceived, that the first improvers of that name, intending to signify thereby divine wisdom, called it 'Αθήνα, as Ἠρῴος καὶ τον Ἑλλάδα, the Understanding of God, or the Knowledge of divine things; as if the word had been at first Θεόπον, and thence after transformed into 'Αθήνα. But being not fully satisfied himself with this etymology, he afterwards attempts another, deriving the word from νοοις τον θεόν, knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge; as if it had been at first Φιλόπον, and from thence changed into 'Αθήνα. Others of the Greeks have deduced this word απὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, because it is the property of wisdom, to collect all into one, supposing that it was at first 'Αθηνά. Others would fetch it from Θηλώς and Alpha privative, because Minerva or wisdom, though she be a goddess, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it, απὸ τοῦ μαλακοῦ φίλος, νοοις ἀντιλαμβάναι τον θεόν, because virtue or wisdom is of such a noble and generous temper, as that it isoms to subject itself to any base and unworthy servitude. Lastly, others would derive it, απὸ τοῦ αἰτήσεως, affirming it to have been at first Αἰτήσεων \(^5\). From all which uncertainty of the Greeks concerning the etymon of this word 'Αθήνα, and from the frivolousness or forcedness of these conjectures, we may rather conclude, that it was not originally Greekish, but exotical, and probably, according to Herodotus, Egyptian. Wherefore let us try, whether or no we can find any Egyptian word, from whence this 'Αθήνα might be derived. Plato in his Timeus \(^6\), making mention of Sais, a city in Egypt, where Solon sometimes sojourned, tells us, ὅτι τίς πόλις Σαις ἀγάπης ἤνω, Αρβύπποι μὲν τῶν νεῖπων Ναύθ, Ἑλλάδας ἐν οἷς ὁ Ἰτίος λόγος, 'Αθήνα, that the president or tutelar God of that city was called in the Egyptian language Neith, but in the Greek, as the same Egyptians affirm, 'Αθήνα. Now, why might not this very Egyptian word Neith, by an easy
Names of Greek Gods, derived from Egypt. Book I.

Easy inversion have been at first turned into Thien, or Θεί, (men commonly pronouncing exotick words ill-favouredly) and then by additional Alpha's at the beginning and end, transformed into \textit{Almik}. This seems much more probable than either Plato's Θείον, or Θαιόν, or any other of those Greek etymologies before-mentioned. And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, so do the Latins seem to have done the like, from this one instance of the word Neptune; which though Varro⁵ would deduce à nubendo, as if it had been Neptunus, because the sea covers and hides the land, and Scaliger with others, \textit{et à nubia}, from washing, this being the chief use of water; yet as the learned Bochart⁶ hath observed, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word Nephthus, Plutarch telling us, \textit{ὅτι Νεφθεσις καλεῖ τὴν γῆς τὸ ἵχαλα καὶ παρῴχους ὡς Σωλάςκος}, That the Egyptians called the maritime parts of land, or such as border upon the sea, Nephthus. Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the same Plutarch elsewhere⁷ writes, that as Isis was the wife of Osiris, so the wife of Typhon was called Nephthus. From whence one might collect, that as Isis was taken sometimes for the earth, or the goddes presiding over it, so Nephthus was the goddes of the sea. To which may be further added out of the same writer, that Nephthus was sometimes called by the Egyptians \textit{Ἀγριότης}, or Venus, probably because Venus is said to have risen out of the sea. But whatever may be thought of these etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious and superstitious, than the Egyptians, and consequently none was more polytheistical and idolatrous. Socrates, in his prais of Busiris, gives them a high encomium for their sanctity; and Herodotus⁸ affirmeth of them, that they were \textit{συναγερμοί} περισσώς μᾶλις πάλινῳ ἀδόξονως. Exceedingly more religious and more devout worshippers of the Deity, than all other mortals. Wherefore they were highly celebrated by Apollo’s oracle, (recorded by Porphyrius) and preferred before all other nations for teaching rightly \textit{αἰσθήσαι} ἑαυτών, that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happiness. But in the scripture⁹, Egypt is famous for her idols, and for her spiritual whoredoms and fornications; to denote the uncleanness whereof she is sometimes joined with Sodom. For the Egyptians, besides all those other gods, that were worshipped by the Greeks and other Barbarians; besides the Idols, demons and heroes; and those artificial gods, which they boasted so much of their power of making, viz. animated Statues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongst all the other Pagans, that they worshipped brute animals also, in one sense or other;

\[\textit{Quis nescit, Volupt Bithynica, qualia demens}
\textit{Egyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat}
\textit{Pars hec, illa paves saturam serpentibus ibin.}\]

Concerning which Origen against Celsus thus writeth; \textit{παρεὶ ὁ προσέλεξεν μὲν ἢτις}
[These words are not Origen's, but Celsus's.]

\[\textit{Vide Voilium de Origine & Progressa}
\textit{Idololatris Lib. II. Cap. LXXVII. p. 259.}
\textit{In Phleg. Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 9, 10. & Lib. IV. Cap. XXX. p. 283.}\]

\[\textit{De Iside & Osiride p. 366.}\]

\[\textit{Ibid. p. 355.}\]

\[\textit{Lib. II. Cap. XXXVII. p. 10.}\]

\[\textit{Revelat. XI. 8.}\]
But notwithstanding this multifarious polytheism and idolatry of these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the Elei in Herodotus, σωφράτων ἀνθρώπων, the wisest of men; and it is a commendation, that is given to one in the fame writer, that be excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals. Thus is it set down in the scripture for Moses his encomium, that he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians⁵; and the transcendency of Solomon’s wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the book of Kings, that it excelled the wisdom of all the children of the east-country, and all the wisdom of Egypt. Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian Magi, and the Chaldeans; and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon’s wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the Magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon’s time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world; and that the Greeks were then but little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses, that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh’s daughter out of Greece to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon’s time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Isocrates writes, that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first, that brought philosophy into Greece; and the latter of them is perstrunged by Xenophon, because Ἀργοῦν ἔρχεται Πατρίδος σοφίαν, not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates, (which was little else besides morality) he was in love with Egypt, and that munificent wisdom of Pythagoras. Now, as it is not probable, that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed, (so that we hear no more of Greek’s tra

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1 Lib. II. Cap. CLX. p. 151.
3 Acts VII. verf. 22.
4 1 Kings IV. 29.
5 Lib. I. p. 605.
6 In Euenio Basridis p. 430.
velling into Egypt upon the former account) but also that their ardour towards the liberal sciences did by degrees languish and abate; so that Strabo, in his time could find little more in Egypt, besides the empty houses and palaces, in which priests, formerly famous for astronomy and philosophy, had dwelt. Nevertheless, their arcane theology remained more or less amongst them unextinct to the last, as appears from what Origen, Porphyry, and Jamblichus have written concerning them.

The learning of the Egyptians was either historical, or philosophical, or theological. First the Egyptians were famous for their historic learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confessed in Plato to have had so much ancient records of time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted series of history from the beginning of the world downward, and therefore seem to have had the clearest and strongest perceptions of the Cosmogonia. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world's beginning was at first in a manner universal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Persians we have already manifested the same; and as Sanchoniathon testifieth the like concerning the Phenicians, so does Strabo likewise of the Indian Brachmans, affirming, that they did agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, οτι γενετος έ ναλσμυς και Φαελος, that the world was both made, and should be destroyed. And though Diodorus affirm the contrary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in reason to assent rather to Berosus, in respect of his greater antiquity, who represents the fene of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner, γενετος δε γενετος ει ναλσμυς έ το πον σκατσε ναλσμυς — του έ τον Βιλον, ου Δεκερμενεμεις, μερους τεροντος το σκατσε, χωριους γενετος έρασιν, αν αποκλησαν, και διαλεξαι του ναλσμυς — αποτελον αι του Βιλον λα βαν και ολον και σεληνην και τες πεντε πλανητας. That there was a time, when all was darkness and water, but Bell (who is interpreted Jupiter) cutting the darkness in the middle, separated the earth and heaven from one another, and so framed the world; this Bell also producing the stars, the sun, and the moon, and the five planets. From which testimony of Berosus, according to the version of Alexander Polybius, by the way it appears also, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are also celebrated for this in that oracle of Apollo, which is cited out of Porphyry by Eusebius,

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worshipping likewise in a holy manner one self-existent Deity. Wherefore, if Diodorus were not altogether mistaken, it must be concluded, that in the latter times, the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of Arisotle) did desert and abandon the tradition of their ancestors concerning the Cosmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet seem to have had a constant persuasion of the beginning of

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1 Lib XVII. p. 764.
3 In Timo. p. 514.
4 Apud Georg. Synccell. in Chronico p. 29.
it, and the firmeft of all other nations: they (as Kircher tells us) therefore picturing Horus, or the world, as a young man beardles, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourifhing vigour, but alfo the youngnefs and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be fufpected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus afterwards did; the contrary thereunto being fo confessed a thing, that Simplicius, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Moaffick history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but μυθί Amen, Egyptian fables. The place is fo considerable, that I fhall here set it down in the author's own language; Εἰ δὲ τὸν ξειδοκρίτην ἢδικοκλίαι λέγουσα, τὸ ἄξιον πλήρη, πλῆθος τοῦ ἀπορόντος τοῦ γῆν. Η δὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀριθμητική ξάκωκοκτείνως καὶ σκοτώς ἔτην τὰς ὀφθαλμοὺς, καὶ πλείων ζην ἐπιθυμεῖν ἔτην τῆς ἑαυτῆς. Εἰτα ποιήσαντο αὐτό το ήλιος, καὶ ἀκαθόριστοι ἀνά μέσον τοῦ Φωτός καὶ ὅλος μέσον τοῦ σκότους, ἐτάσσαν, καὶ ἐκάλυψαν οἱ θεοὶ τὸ Φως ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸ σκότος νύκτας, καὶ ἐγένετο ιερὸς καὶ ἐγένετο πρῶτος νῦν, καὶ οἶδήματα μιᾶς ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις τοῦ ξένου νομίμου καὶ καὶ χρόνου, ἵνα ἐπιτίθηται τῇ ἡμέρᾳ παράδεισις, καὶ ἀπὸ κακόν Αθεοπλημνὴ ἠλευθέρωσεν. If Grammaticus here mean the lawgiver of the Jews, writing thus, [In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and the earth was invisible and unadorned, and darkness was upon the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the water; ] and then afterward when he had made light, and separated the light from the darknes, adding, [And God called the light day, and the darknes night, and the evening and the morning were the first day:] I say, if Grammaticus think this to have been the first generation and beginning of time; I would have him to know, that all this is but a fabulous tradition, and wholly drawn from Egyptian fables.

As for the philosophy of the Egyptians, that besides their physiology, and the pure and mixed mathematicks, (arithmetick, geometry, and astronomy) they had another higher kind of philosophy also concerning incorporeal subftances, appears from hence, because they were the first afferers of the immortality of souls, their pre-existence and transmigration, from whence their incorporeity is necceffarily inferred. Thus Herodotus; πρῶτοι τὸν Εὐτερπ. 123. λόγον Ἀριστοκράτην εἰοι ἐνοχέλεις, ὡς ἐνδρεύοντο συρρή, ἀνάκτικος ἐτής τοῦ πάνω καὶ εὐπορίδιος, ἡν ἐνδρεύοντο συρρήντως εἰοι ἐνοχέλεις, ήτο κακά τινος εἰσαχθεῖν ἐνεργεῖν, &c. The Egyptians were the first afferers of the soul's immortality, and of its transmigration, after the death and corruption of this body, into the bodies of other animals successively, viz. until it have run round through the whole circuit of terrestrial, marine and volatile animals, after which (they say) it is to return again into a humane body; they suppo
ing this revelation or apocatafphs of souls to be made in no less space than that of three thousand years. But whether Herodotus were rightly catechized and instructed in the Egyptian doctrine as to this particular or no, may very well be questioned; because the Pythagoreans, whom he there tacitly reprehends for arrogating the first invention of this to themselves, when they had borrowed it from the Egyptians, did repreffent it otherwise; namely, that the defcent of human souls into these earthly bodies was first in way of punishment, and that their linking lower afterwards into the bodies of brutes, was only to fome a further punishment for their further degeneracy; but the
the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by Porphyrius in Stobæus, as also in the Hermetick or Trismegistic writings. Moreover, Chalcidius reports, that Hermes Trismegistis, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose: That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death. Which persuasion the Indian Brachmans also were embued withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no; τὸν μὲν δὲ θάνατον, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ψυχικῶς ἀνθίζει, τὸν δὲ Σάτανον γίνετο εἰς τὸν ὄντος θάνατον. That this life here is but the life of embryo’s, and that death (to good men) is a generation or birth into true life.

Strabo l. 15. p. 715.

Domicilia Vicentium, Dissertationes ap. Duns. And this may the better be believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because Diōdorus himself hath some passages founding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, ἵνα τοὺς αἰώνιαν διατρέψανεν μήλαντες καὶ ἀδικείεται τῶν εὐσεβῶν, as being to live ever in the other world with the pious. However, it being certain from this Egyptian doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did assert the soul’s incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an incorporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what Porphyrius writeth concerning Chrememon, will be answered afterwards.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which Diōdorus Siculus describes) had another ἀπόρηξις Ἱστολογία, arcane and recondite theology, that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others, as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristotel’s Exotericks and Acroamaticks. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted Ἴδρο-γενής, (which Horus was an Egyptian God) upon occasion of Celsus his boasting, that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity: Celsus (faith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country-learning, philosophize much about those things, that are accounted by them divine, whilst the idiots in the mean time bearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith: Celsus, I say, doth as if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with those idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology. Where the name Origen also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other Barbarian Pagans; οἵ τε εἰσούσι περὶ Αρχαίων αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ιδιῶν διατομῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ Περσῶν, &c. What we have now affirmed (faith he) concerning the difference between the wise men and the idiots amongst the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationably by those, that are

are ingenious, whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them, than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true likewise concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations, who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine. Neither can it be dissembled, that Origen in this place plainly intimates the same also concerning Christlikeness itself; namely, that besides the outside and exterior cortex of it (in which notwithstanding there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; else elsewhere observing this to be that wisdom, that St. Paul spake amongst the perfect. From whence he concludes, that Celsus vainly boasted, παρὰ γάρ οἶδα, For I know all things belonging to Christlikeness, when he was acquainted only with the exterior surface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing most notorious and observed by sundry other writers; as for example Clemens of Alexandria, a man also well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt; Αἰγυπτίων τοὺς ἐπίγειος τὰ παρακάτω ἀκεχιλεῖτο μυστήριον, οὐδὲ μηδεὶς τινὰ τῶν ζητοῦν εἰσήκουσαν ἔφεσον, αλλὰ μενοίς τε τοῦ μείλτσει ἐπὶ τῷ βασιλείῳ προεικοῖ, καὶ τῷ Στρομ. I. 5. ἐνεὼν τοὺς καθεύνοντας εἰπὼν δοκιμάται, ἀπὸ τὸ τῆς τεοπές, καὶ τῆς παιδίας, καὶ τοῦ γένους. The Egyptians do not reveal their religious mysteries promiscuously to all, nor communicate the knowledge of divine things to the profane, but only to those, who are to succeed in the kingdom, and to such of the priests, as are judged most fully qualified for the same, upon account both of their birth and education. With which agreeeth also the testimony of Plutarch, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the Egyptian Sphinges, ὀ περὶ μακράν ἀποδειξάμενον [Βασιλεῖς] De Iσ. ὡς ὁ Ὀλυμπίος τῶν ἔργων, εἶπεν ἔργῳ τῶν ἰδίων, μείον περὶ τῆς Φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεφαλής τὰ πολλὰ μνημόνια ἐστὶν 354. λόγως, ἀμφότερος ἐκφάνην τῇ αἰνίστας ἡ διαφάνεις ἤκουσιν ὡς πρὸ ἀμιλείς ἡ παρεκδόσει αὐτοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν σφίγγων ἐπικοινωνίας ἰκάνες, ὡς αἰσθητάνθη σοφία τῆς Φιλοσοφίας αὐτῶν ἰκάνης. When amongst the Egyptians there is any king chosen out of the military order, he is forthwith brought to the priests, and by them instructed in that arcane theology, which conceals mysterious truths under obscure fables and allegories. Wherefore they place Sphinges before their temples, to signify, that their theology contained a certain arcane and enigmatical wisdom in it. And this meaning of the Sphinges in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewise by Clemens Alexandrinus, δὲ τάτο τι η μμελείς τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὰς σφίγγας ἐθέραται, ὡς αἰνιγματάδες τὰ περὶ Ἰεων λόγος, καὶ ἀλαθοὶ ὁτοι. Therefore do the Egyptians place Sphinges before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obscure. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that the same Clemens gives another interpretation also of these Sphinges, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read; τὰν δὲ τοῦ φανείν τις δὲ καὶ φασίται τοῖς Σφίγγοις ἀγαμήμον, μιν ὡς προσωπικῶς καὶ συμμετοχής τοῖς ζητοῦσι, διεκινητεὶ ὡς ἀπαρατίτως ἐκεῖνοι τῶν αἰνιγμών, τοιεύω γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ὁλοκληρώθη καὶ ὁπείρας ἐν σφίγγῳ εἰσέβαλε τὴν εἰκόνα. But perhaps the meaning of those Egyptian Sphinges might be also to signify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared; to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably just to the impius, the Sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion. Moreover, besides these Sphinges, the Egyptians had
The Egyptians, besides their vulgar, Book I.

had also Harpocrates and Sigalions in their temples, which are thus described by the poet ¹,

_Quæque prenumt vocem, digitque silenla fluunt._

they being the statues of young men pressing their lips with their finger. The being the statues of which Harpocrates is thus expressed by Plutarch, 

_De Is. & Ofir._

_They is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but for the president of men's speech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient and inarticulate, and the regulator or corretor of the same; his finger upon his mouth being a symbol of silence and taciturnity. It is very true, that some Chriftians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian Harpocrates, as if the meaning of it had been this; that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing else but mortal men, but that this was a secret, that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth; and doubtless the meaning of those Egyptian Harpocrates was no other than this, that either the supreme and incomprehensible Deity was to be adored with silence, or not spoken of without much caution and circumlocution; or else that the arcane mysteries of theology were not to be promiscuously communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar. Which same thing seems to have been also signified by that yearly feast kept by the Egyptians in honour of Thoth or Hermes, when the priests eating honey and figs pronounced those words, _γυναικικη αληθινη, Truth is sweet_; as also by that amulet, which Isis was said to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was _φωνη αληθινη_, True speech.

This ἀπορρήτος θεολογία, this arcane and recondite theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by fables of allegories, and by symbols or hieroglyphicks. Eusebius informs us, that Porphyry wrote a book _Πειρέις ἀληθερομυματα Ελλήνων και Ἑλληνίων θεολογιας_, concerning the allegorical theology both of the Greeks and Egyptians. And here by the way we may observe, that this business of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its first and only rise amongst the Chriftians, but was a thing very much in use among the Pagan theologers also: and therefore _Cellus in Origen_ ⁵ commends some of the Chriftians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniously and handsomely. It is well known, how both Plutarch ⁴ and Synesius ⁵ allegorized those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, the one to a philophical, the other to a political sense. And the Egyptian hieroglyphicks, which were figures not answering to sounds or words, but immediately representing the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made use of by them to this purpose, to express the mysteries of their religion and theology, so as that they might be concealed from the profane vulgar. For which cause the hieroglyphick learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the same thing with their arcane theology,

¹ Ovid. Metam. Lib. IX.
² De Iside & Osride, p. 378.
⁴ De Iside & Osride.
⁵ De Providentia, p. 89. Oper.
or metaphysicks. And this the author of the questions and answers ad Orthodoxos tells us was anciently had in much greater esteem amongst the Egyptians, than all their other learning; and that therefore Mofes was as well instructed in this hieroglyphick learning and metaphysical theology of theirs, as in their mathematicks. And for our parts, we doubt not, but that the Menfa Isaca lately published, containing so many strange and uncouth hieroglyphicks in it, was something of this ἀπόφρατος θεολογία, this arcane theology of the Egyptians, and not mere history, as some imagine; though the late confident Oedipus seems to arrogate too much to himself, in pretending to such a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now as it is reasonable to think, that in all those Pagan nations, where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one supreme and universal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; so can it not well be conceived, what this ἀπόφρατος and ἀπόφρατος καὶ ἄνυμαρτόν θεολογία, this arcane and mysterious and enigmatical theology of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysicks concerning God, as one perfect incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected against this, save only that, which Porphyrius, in his epistle to Anebio an Egyptian priest, writeth concerning Charemon, Ἑλερομάνος μὲν γάρ, κἂν οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐδὲ ἀλλο τοί πρὸς Pr. Eu. Lib. 3. τῶν ὀρφανῶν κάλλος ἐγείρει ἐν ἀρχῆς λέγων τιθέμενος τὸς Ἀβραὰμ, οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἔσεσθαι. 4. πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν ἐγείρει, καὶ τῶν ἐντυπληρών τῷ Σοδάνῳ, &c. Charemon and others acknowledge nothing before this visible and corporeal world, alledging for the countenance of their opinion such of the Egyptians, as talk of no other gods, but the planets and those stars, that fill up the Zodiac, or rise together with them, their deans, and horoscopes, and robust princes, as they call them, whose names are also inserted into their almanacks or ephemerides, together with the times of their risings and settings, and the prognosticks or significations of future events for them. For be observed, that those Egyptians, who made the sun the Demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the stories of Isis and Osiris, and all those other religious fables, into nothing but stars, and planets, and the river Nile, καὶ ἄλλοι παῦσα εἰς τοῦ Φυεία, καὶ οὕτω εἰς ἀστράκας καὶ ζώας καὶ ἑρμηνεύουσας καὶ referred all things universally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living substances. Which passage of Porphyrius concerning Charemon, we confess, Eusebius lays great stress upon, endeavouring to make advantage of it, first against the Egyptians, and then against the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: It is manifest from hence, faith he, that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians deified nothing but stars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal principal or demiurgick reason as the cause of this universe, but only the visible sun. And then he concludes in this manner, See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that deifies nothing but senseless matter or dead inanimate bodies. But it is well known, that Eusebius took all advantages possible, to represent the Pagans to the worst, and render their theology ridiculous and absurd; nevertheless what he here urgeth against the Egyptians

* Inter Jullini Martyris Opera, Question. Mysteries Egyptian. publish'd at Oxford by Dr. The. Gah.

* This Epistle is prefixed to Jamblichus de
An Objection from Charimon answered. Book I.

...tians, is the least valuable, because himself plainly contradicts it elsewhere, declaring, that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgick reason and intellectual architect of the world, which consequently was the maker of the fun; and confessing the fame of the other Pagans also. Now to affirm, that the Egyptians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the senseless corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any ἀνυφήσιον συλογικά, any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been sufficiently proved) but also to render them absolute Atheists. For if this be not atheism, to acknowledge no other deity besides dead and senseless matter, then the word hath no signification. Charimon indeed seems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to some of them: and it is very possible, that there might be some Atheists amongst the Egyptians also, as well as amongst the Greeks and their philosophers. And doubtles this Charimon himself was a kind of astrological Atheist; for which cause we conclude, that it was not Charimon the Stoick, from whom notwithstanding Porphyrius in his book of abstinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians, but either that Charimon, whom Strabo made use of in Egypt, or else some other of that name. But that there ever was or can be any such religious Atheists, as Eusebius with some others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, besides dead and senseless matter, notwithstanding devoutly court and worship the same, constantly invoking it and imploring its assistance, as expecting great benefit to themselves thereby; this we confess is such a thing, as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a sottishnes and contradicitious nonse, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged some living and understanding deities or other; nor easily believe, that they ever worshipped any inanimate or senseless bodies, otherwise than as some way referring to the same, or as images and symbols of them. But as for that passage in Porphyrius his epitite concerning Charimon, where he only propounds doubts to Aneb the Egyptian priest, as desiring further information from him concerning them, Jamblichus hath given us a full answer to it, under the person of Abammon another Egyptian priest, which notwithstanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, because Ficinus and Scutellius not understanding the word Charimon to be a proper name, ridiculously turn'd it in their translations, optarem and gaude-rem, thereby also perverting the whole sense. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. Gale) run thus: Χαρίμων δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἄλλοι, τῶν περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀποταλεῖ πρῶτον αἰτίαν, τὰς τελευταίας αἰχμὰς ἐξήρωσεν, ἐκεῖ τὰς πληκτάς, καὶ τὸν Ζωτικόν, τὸς δὲ δεσπότα, καὶ ἁμαρτίας, καὶ τῶν λεγομένων χρηματικῶν γέμωνος παραδίδοις, τὰς μεριτὰς τῶν ἁρχών διερμοίκας ἀναφέρειν; τάτον ἐν τοῖς ἀληθευματικῶν μετατο προσντημι τῶν Ἐρμηκίων διατάξεως, καὶ τα περὶ αἰτίας τὰ φάσις, τὰ κεφάλαια, τὰ στάσις αἰχμάτως, τὰ μετεπερ οῖν τοῖς ἑχομεν κάτω τοῦ Ἀγαθήρου αἰτιολογίας Φυσικά τε θ' ἄρχετον τίνα πλάνα Ἀρ- ατικώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῖς τῆς φυσικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ τὸν νεφέα ἀπὸ τῆς Φώτευς ἐνυποκίνησιν ἐνίπτε ταῦτα μένως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ξύμων, νῦν τε καὶ λόγοι προσταγμένοι καθ' ἐκα- τός ὑπατος, ὑπὸς ἐνμυκετίος φασί τα ἐνυπόμενα. But Charimon and those others, who pretend to write the first causes of the world, declare only the last and iotob

lowest principles, as likewise they who treat of the planets, the zodiac, the deities, the horoscopes, and the robust princes. And those things, that are in the Egyptian almanack (or ephemerides) contain the least part of the Hermaical institutions, namely the phases and occultations of the stars, the increase and decrease of the moon, and the like astrological matters; which things have the lowest place in the Egyptian etiology. Nor do the Egyptians resolve all things into (senseless) nature, but they distinguish both the life of the soul, and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourselves, but also in the universe; they determining mind and reason first to have existed of themselves, and so this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven a living power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus and architect thereof. From which testimony of Jamblichus, who was but little junior to Porphyrius, and contemporary with Eusebius, and who had made it his busines to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally suppose (as Charon pretended concerning some of them) a senseless inanimate nature to be the first original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourselves, they acknowledged soul superior to nature, and mind or intellect superior to soul, this being the Demiurgus of the world. But we shall have afterwards occasion more opportunely to cite other passages out of this Jamblichus his Egyptian mysteries to the same purpose.

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to suspect, that the Egyptians were universally Atheists and Anarchists, such as supposed no living understanding Deity, but resolved all into senseless matter, as the first and highest principle; but all the question is, whether they were not Polyarchists, such as asserted a multitude of understanding deities self-existent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians A. Steucus Eugubius, and many other learned men, have thought to be unquestionably evident from the Hermetick or Trismegistick writings, they taking it for granted, that these are all genuine and sincere. Whereas there is too much cause to suspect, that there have been some pious frauds practised upon these Trismegistick writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline; and that either whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Christians, or at least several spurious and supposititious passages here and there inserted into some of them. Haec Censorhon*, who was the first discoverer, has taken notice of many such in that first Hermetick book, entitled, Pamander; some also in the fourth book, inscribed Crater, and some in the thirteenth called the sermon in the mount concerning regeneration; which may justly render those three whole books, or at least the first and last of them, to be suspected. We shall here repeat none of Censorbon's condemned passages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or sermon in the mount, which, however omitted by him, seems to be more rankly Christian than any other; κλέιν μει ταῦτο, τις ἡ τοιαύτης τῆς παλαιότερης; ὁ τι οὗ ποιεῖ, ἀθέτον ὡς, τελείως ἡ Ὑι. Tell me this also, who is the cause or worker of regeneration? The son of God, one man by the will of God. 

* Exercit. i. in Baron. Num. XVIII. p. 54.
All the Trismegistick Books

BOOK I.

Wherefore, though Alb. Kircherus\(^1\) contend with much zeal for the sincerity of all these Trismegistick books; yet we must needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at least the Peristander properly so called, and the sermon in the mount, that they were either wholly forged and counterfeited by some pretended Christians, or else had many spurious passages inserted into them. Wherefore, it cannot be solidly proved from the Trismegistick books after this manner, as supposed to be all alike genuine and sincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one supreme anduniversal Numen: much less can the same be evinced from that pretended Aristotelick book, De secreto parte divinæ sapientia secundum Ἐὑριτος, greedily swallowed down also by Kircherus, but unquestionably pseudepigraphous.

Notwithstanding which, we conceive, that though all the Trismegistick books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by some pretended Christians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wisdom was by some philosopher, and imputed to Aristotle; yet would they for all that, upon another account, afford no inconsiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans ascertained one supreme Deity, viz., because every cheat and imposture must needs have some basis or foundation of truth to stand upon; there must have been something truly Egyptian in such counterfeit Egyptian writings, (and therefore this at least of one supreme Deity) or else they could never have obtained credit at first, or afterwards have maintained the same. The rather, because these Trismegistick books were dispersed in those ancient times, before the Egyptian paganism and their succession of priests were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is so much insisted upon in them, been dissimulon from the Egyptian theology, they must needs have been presently exploded as mere lies and forgeries. Wherefore, we say again, that if all the Heraick or Trismegistick books, that are now extant, and those to boot, which being mentioned in ancient Fathers have been lost, as the τα χαίνα, and the τα διεγένεσαι, and the like, had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Christians, yet must there needs have been some truth at the bottom to give subsistence to them; this at least, that Hermes Trismegist, or the Egyptian priests, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one supreme anduniversal Numen.

But it does not at all follow, that, because some of these Heraick or Trismegistick books now extant were counterfeit or supposititious, that therefore all of them must needs be such; and not only so, but those also, that are mentioned in the writings of ancient Fathers, which are now lost. Wherefore, the learned Câfauon seems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of those Trismegistick books at most, he pronounces of them all universally, that they were nothing but Christian cheats and impostures. And probably he was led into this mistake, by reason of his too securely following that vulgar error, (which yet had been confuted by Patricius) that all that was published by Ficinus under the name of Hermes Trismegist, was but one and the same book Peristander, consisting of several chapters; whereas they are all indeed so many

\(^{1}\) In Obelisco Pamphilio p. 35. & in Oedipo Ἐὑριτος Clär. XII. Cap. III.
many distinct and independent books, whereof P"emander is only placed first. However, there was no shadow of reason, why the A"clepius should have fallen under the same condemnation, nor several other books superadded by Patricius, they being unquestionably distinct from the Pa"emander, and no signs of spuriousness or bastardy discovered in them. Much less ought those Trismegistick books cited by the Fathers, and now lost, have been condemned also unseen. Wherefore, notwithstanding all that C"a"f"a"b"o"n has written, there may very well be some Hermetick or Trismegistick books genuine, though all of them be not such; that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be such books, as were really Egyptian, and not counterfeited by any Christian, though perhaps not written by Hermes Trismegift himself, nor in the Egyptian language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there should have been any counterfeit Egyptian books, had there been none at all real; so that there were some real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered probable by these following considerations.

That there was anciently, amongst the Egyptians such a man as Tbolb, Theub, or Taut, who, together with letters, was the first inventor of arts and sciences, as arithmetick, geometry, astronomy, and of the hieroglyphick learning, (therefore called by the Greeks Hermes, and by the Latins Mercurius) cannot reasonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by general fame in all ages, and by the testimonies not only of Sanchonialbon, a Phenician historiographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and Manetho's Sebennytas an Egyptian priest, contemporary with PtoI. Philadelphus; but also of that grave philosopher Plato, who is said to have fojourned thirteen years in Egypt, that in his Philebus speaks of him as the first inventor of letters, (who distinguished between vowels and consonants determining their several numbers) there calling him either a God or divine man; but in his Phaedrus attributeth to him also the invention of arithmetick, geometry and astronomy, together with some ludicrous recreations, making him either a God or demon, ἡπειρα περὶ Ναυκερίων τῆς Ἀργούτινος. γενέσθαι τῶν ἑκατὸν παρθένων τῶν ἁλικιων, ἀνασηθαί τὸ ἄρων τοῦ ἱερόν ἐν τῶν τοῖς ὅροις τῶν ἄνδρων ἐκεῖ θεῖοι. I have heard (faith he) that about Naucratis in Egypt, there was one of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird Ibis was sacred, as his symbol or hieroglyphick; the name of which demon was Theuth. In which place the philosopher subjoins also an ingenious dispute betwixt this Theuth, and Thamus then king of Egypt, concerning the convenience and inconvenience of letters; the former boasting of that invention ὡς μνήμης ἀπὸ σοφίας Δε"μα"κας, as a remedy for memory, and great help to wisdom, but the latter contending, that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore was not so properly μνήμης as ὑπομνήματος Δε"μα"κας, a remedy for memory, as reminiscence, or the recovery of things forgotten; adding, that it would also weaken and enervate men natural faculties by flugging them, and rather beget δαιμωνίας, than ἀλήθεια, a puffy conceit and opinion.

of knowledge, by a multifarious rabble of indigestible notions, than the
truth thereof. Moreover, since it is certain, that the Egyptians were fa-
mous for literature before the Greeks, they must of necessity have some one
or more founders of learning amongst them, as the Greeks had; and Thoth
is the only or first person celebrated amongst them upon this account, in re-
membrance of whom the first month of the year was called by that name.
Which Thoth is generally supposed to have lived in the times of the Patri-
archs, or considerably before Moses; Moses himself being laid to have been
instructed in that learning, which owed its original to him.

Again, besides this Thoth or Thouth, who was called the first Hermes, the
Egyptians had also afterwards another eminent advance or restorer of learn-
ing, who was called διόνυς Αρμ, the second Hermes; they perhaps sup-
pposing the soul of Thoth, or the first Hermes, to have come into him by tran-
migration, but his proper Egyptian name was Siphosis, as Syncellus 1 out of
Manetho informs us: ΣΤπως, ο ή Βερων, η κ τους, Siphosis, (who is also
Hermes) the son of Vulcan. This is he, who is said to have been the fa-
ther of Tat, and to have been surnamed Τεχνης Μηθ, Ter Maximus, (he
being so styled by Manetho, Jamblichus, and others.) And he is placed by
Eusebius 2 in the fiftieth year after the Israelitish Exits, though probably
somewhat too early. The former of these two Hermes was the inventor of
arts and sciences; the latter, the restorer and advance of them: the first
wrote in Hieroglyphicks upon pillars, in Τη Σεργιοιη τη, (as the learned
Valerius 3 conjectures it should be read, instead of Σεργιοιη) which Syringes
what they were, Am. Marcellinus 4 will instruct us. The second interpreted
and translated those Hieroglyphicks, composing many books in several arts
and sciences; the number whereof set down by Jamblichus 5 must needs be
fabulous, unless it be understood of paragraphs or verses. Which Trismegis-
ivistick or Hermetick books were said to be carefully preferred by the priests,
in the interior recefts of their temples.

But besides the Hieroglyphicks written by the first Hermes, and the books
composed by the second, (who was called also Trismegist) it cannot be doubt-
ed, but that there were many other books written by the Egyptian priests
successively in several ages. And Jamblichus informs us, in the beginning of
his mysteries, That Hermes, the God of eloquence, and president or patron of
all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the
priests, insomuch, that the sofiyes vφημαλ ανφι διεφερεν, Εαυτοι πάντα
τα ιπεia αυτοι ημομαλα επιομαζότειν, they dedicated the inventions of their wisdom
to him, entitling their own books to Hermes Trismegist. Now though one reason
hereof might probably have been thought to have been this, because those books
were supposed to have been written according to the tenour of the old Herme-
tick or Trismegistick doctrine; yet Jamblichus here acquaints us with the chief
ground of it, namely this, that though Hermes was once a mortal man, yet he
was afterward deified by the Egyptians, (which is testified also by Plato) and

1 In Chron. p. 124.
2 In Chronico, p. 556.
3 Not. ad Ammian, Marcellin, Lib. XXII. 1 p. 157.
5 De Mystcr. Εγνυτορ. Seet. VII. Cap.
made to be the tutelar God, and author of all arts and sciences, but especially theology, by whose inspiration therefore all such books were conceived to have been written. Nay further, we may observe, that in some of the Hermaick or Trismegistick books now extant, Hermes is sometimes put for the divine wisdom or understanding itself. And now we see the true reason, why there have been many books called Hermetical and Trismegistical; some of which, notwithstanding, cannot possibly be conceived to have been of such great antiquity, nor written by Hermes Trismegist himself, viz. because it was customary with the Egyptian priests to intitle their own philosophick and theologick books to Hermes. Moreover, it is very probable, that several of the books of the Egyptian priests of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but the Greek; because, at least from the Ptolemick kings downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly spoken, as may appear from those very words, Hermes, Trismegist, and the like, so commonly used by them, together with the proper names of places; and because the Coptick language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, Plutarch ventures to etymologize those old Egyptian names, Isis, Osiris, Horus and Typhon, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that some of those ancient Hermaick books, written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or believed to be such by the Egyptians, and kept in the custody of their priests, were still in being and extant amongst them, after the times of Christianity, seems to be unquestionable from the testimony of that pious and learned father Clemens Alexandrinus, he giving this particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the transmigration of souls: The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philosophy of their own, which may be best declared by setting down the order of their religious procession. First, therefore, goes the Precentor, carrying two of Hermes his books along with him; the one of which contains the hymns of the gods, the other directions for the kingly office. After him follows the Horoscope, who is particularly instructed in Hermes his astrological books, which are four. Then succeeds the Hierogrammatae or sacred scribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his hands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphicks, as also with cosmography, geography, the order of the sun and moon and five planets, the chorography of Egypt, and description of Nile. In the next place cometh the Stolifex, who is to be thoroughly instructed in those ten books, which treat concerning the honour of the gods, the Egyptian worship, sacrifices, first-fruits, prayers, oaths, and festivals. And last of all marcheth the prophet, who is president of the temple and sacred things, and ought to be thoroughly versed in those other ten books called facerdotal, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole discipline of the priests. Wherefore, amongst the books of Hermes, there are forty two accounted most necessary; of which thirty fix, containing all the Egyptian philosophy, were to be learned by those particular orders before mentioned:
Hermaick Books acknowledged

Book I.

...tioned; but the other six, treating of medicinal things, by the Poëtophori. From which place we understand, that at least forty two books of the ancient Hermes Trismegist, or such reputed by the Egyptians, were still extant in the time of Clemens Alexandrinus, about two hundred years after the Christian epocha.

Furthermore, that there were certain Books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Trismegistical, (whether written by the ancient Hermes Trismegist himself, or by other Egyptian priests of latter times, according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only intitled to him) which, after the times of Christianity, began to be taken notice of by other nations, the Greeks and Latins, seems probable from hence, because such books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Christian writers and fathers, but also by Pagans and philosophers. In Plutarch’s discourse de Iside & Osiride, we read thus of them: "Eu de tais 'Ephys aruxiainias b'toxas, istorrh' iruxedhoxa, peri toun ierou eunomatos, oti tnu vou upi tnu tnu plu peri' boun tuxanumtv 'Oxon, 'Ellhnes de 'Apollonwv xalov, tnu de upi tnu vuvalavo, oti vou 'Oxeyv, oti e. Sarwv, oti de SoSi Agyvlois. In the books called Hermes’s, or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written concerning sacred names, that the power appointed to preside over the motion of the sun is called by the Egyptians Horus (as by the Greeks Apollo) and that, which presides over the air and wind, is called by some Osiris, by others Sarapis, and by others Sothi, in the Egyptian language. Now these sacred names in Plutarch seem to be several names of God; and therefore, whether these Hermaick books of his were the same with those in Clemens Alexandrinus, such as were supposed by the Egyptians to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or other books written by Egyptian priests, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way observe, that, according to the Hermaical or Trismegistical doctrine, one and the same Deity was worshipped under several names and notions, according to its several powers and virtues, manifested in the world; which is a thing afterwards more to be insisted on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that L. Apuleius Madaurensis, an eminent Platonick philosopher, and zealous affector of paganin, was the translator of the Alexandrian dialogue of Hermes Trismegist out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly published with Apuleius his works. And Barthius affirms, that St. Austin does somewhere expressly impute this version to Apuleius; but we confess we have not yet met with the place. However, there seems to be no sufficient reason, why Calvin should call this into question from the style and Latin. Again, it is certain, that Jamblichus doth not only mention these Hermaick books, under the name of Ἱερομίτων ὡς 'Ερμη, the books that are carried up and down as Hermes’s, or vulgarly imputed to him; but also vindicate them from the imputation of impertinence. Not as if there were any suspicion at all of that, which Casaubon is so confident of, that these Hermaick books were all forged by Christians; but because some might then possibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philosophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to set down the whole passage of Jamblichus concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS.
Now, by the
fe
notwithstanding
which
although
under
conceiving
the
Jamblichus
and
J.-csaa
whereas,
who
or
4
under
books,
found
indeed,
Latin
and
deed,
affirm
himself,
Hermes
left
Egyptian
1
by
Egyptian
books.
Jamblichus
of
the
journals
politic
precept:
metaphysics
had
the
philosophy.

Since
found
and
account
caufes
Eoty7,
able,
they
been
written
by
Hermes
Trifmegift
himself,
he
calling
only
v Erismas
Eri, the
books
that
were
carried
about
as
Hermes's.
But
that
which
he
affirmeth
of
them
is,
that
they
did
really
contain
the
Hermaical
opinions,
and
derive
their
original
from
Egypt.
Again,
whereas
some
might
then
possibly
fuspect,
that
these
Hermaical
books
had
been
counterfeited
by
Greek
philosophers,
and
contained
nothing
but
the
Greek
learning
in
them,
because
they
speak
so
much
the
philosophick
language;
Jamblicbus
gives
an
account
of
this
also,
that
the
reason
hereof
was,
because
they
were
translated
out
of
the
Egyptian
language
by
men
skilled
in
the
Greek
philosophy,
who
therefore
added
something
of
their
own
phrase
and
notion
to
them.
It
is
true
indeed,
that
most
of
these
Hermic
books,
which
now
we
have,
seem
to
have
been
written
originally
in
Greek;
notwithstanding
which,
others
of
them,
and
particularly
those
that
are
now
loft,
as
τά
Γενών, and
the
like,
might,
as
Jamblicbus
here
affirmeth,
have
been
translated
out
of
the
Egyptian
tongue,
but
by
their
translators
disguised
with
philosophick
language
and
other
Greek
things
intermixed
with
them.
Moreover,
from
the
forecited
paffage
of
Jamblicbus
we
may
clearly
collect,
that
Porphyrius
in
his
epiftle
to
Anecos
the
Egyptian
priest
(of
which
epiftle
there
are
only
some
small
fragments
left)
did
also
make
mention
of
these
Hermaic
writings;
and
whereas
he
found
the
writings
of
Chæremon
to
be
contradictitious
to
them,
therefore
defired
to
be
refoled
by
that
Egyptian
priest,
whether
the
doctrine
of
those
Hermaic
books
were
genuine
and
truly
Egyptian,
or
no.
Now,
Jamblicbus
in
his
answer
here
affirmeth,
that
the
doctrine
of
the
ancient
Hermes,
or
the
Egyptian
theology,
was
as
to
the
subftance
truly
repreftented
in
those
books,
(vulgarily
imputed
to
Hermes)
but
not
so
by
Chæremon.
Lastly,
Sr.
Cyril
of
Alexandria
informs
us,
that
there
was
an
edition
of
these
Hermaic
or
Trifmegiftick
books
(compiled
together)
formerly
made
at
Athens,
under
this
title, Ἐρωμαϊκα
περιτοιχιακα
βιβλια, fifteen
Hermaic
books.
Which
Herm-
maics,
Cafabon,2
conceiving
them
to
have
been
published
before
Jamblicbus
his
time,
took
them
for
those
Salaminiaca,
which
he
found
in
the
Latin
translations
of
Jamblicbus,
made
by
Ficinus
and
Scutellius;
whereas,
indeed,
he
was
here
abused
by
those
translators,
there
being
no
fuch
thing
to
be
found
in
the
Greek
copy.
But
the
word
Δυνατικα, (not
understood
by

1 These
fragments
are
prefixed
to
Dr.
Gal's
Edition
of
Jamblicbus
de
Myst. Egyptiar.

Contra
Julia,
lib.
[P. 51. Edi.
Spanhem.]
by them) being turned into Salaminiaca, Cafaubon therefore conjectured them to have been those Hermaick books published at Athens, because Salam in was not far distant from thence. Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaick books at Athens was made by some philosopher or Pagans, and not by Christians; this appearing also from the words of St. Cyril himself, where, having spoken of Moses and the agreement of Hermes with him, he adds, παντοτε δ' ὕ το το μνημι, ειδιας συγραφαι, ε συνθεσιν Αθηνει, τα ἐπίκην Ερμαικά πνευματικά βιβλία. Of which Moses he also, who compiled and published the fifteen Hermaick books at Athens, makes mention in his own discourse, (annexed thereunto.) For thus we conceive that place is to be understood, that the Pagan publisher of the Hermaick books himself took notice of some agreement, that was betwixt Moses and Hermes. But here it is to be noted, that because Hermes and the Hermaick books were in such great credit, not only among the Christians, but also the Greek and Latin Pagans, therefore there were some counterfeit writings obtruded also under that specious title; such as that ancient botanick book mentioned by Galen, and those Christian forgeries of later times, the Pamandar and Sermon on the Mount; which being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtless later than Jamblicbus, who discovers no suspicion of any Christian forgeries in this kind.

But Cafaubon, who contends, that all the theologick books imputed to Hermes Triuneus were counterfeited by Christians, affirms all the philosophy, doctrine and learning of them (excepting what only is Christian in them) to be merely Platonical and Grecanical, but not at all Egyptian; thence concluding, that those books were forged by such Christians, as were skilled in the Platonick or Grecanical learning. But first, it is here considerable, that since Pythagorum, Platonism and the Greek learning in general was in great part derived from the Egyptians, it cannot be concluded, that whatsoever is Platonical or Grecanical, therefore was not Egyptian. The only instance, that Cafaubon insists upon, is this dogma in the Triuneusick books, That nothing in the world perishes, and that death is not the destruction, but change and translation of things only: which, because he finds amongst some of the Greek philosophers, he resolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the Egyptians. But since the chief design and tendency of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-existence and transmigration of souls, which doctrine was unquestionably derived from the Egyptians; there is little reason to doubt but that this dogma was itself Egyptian also. And Pythagoras, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongst the Greeks, οδέν εδώ ρήματι οδέ φθείρεται τοίνυν, that no real entity (in generations and corruptions) was made or destroyed, according to those Ovidian verses before cited,

Nec perit in toto quicumque, mibi credite, mundo,
Sed variat faciemque novat. Nascique vocatur
Incepere esse aliquid, &c.

did in all probability derive it, together with its superstructure, (the
pre-existence and transmigration of souls) at once from the Egyptians. But it is observable, that the Egyptians had also a peculiar ground of their own for this Dogma (which we do not find insinuted upon by the Greek philosophers) and it is thus expressed in the eighth of Ficinus his Hermetick books or chapters:  

\[ \text{Si enim animal, mundus, vivens, semper \& suit \& ess \& erit, nihil in mundo mortale ess: viventis enim uniusessentialis partis, quae in ipso mundo, sit in uno eodemque animale semper vivente, nullus ess mortalitatis locutus.} \]

Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the sense is this; You are to believe the world, o Afelepius, to be a second god governing all things, and illustrating all mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal, and immortal; then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal, that always liveth. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that though Pythagoras first derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the same farther (as Plato tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the Barbarians) namely to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and resolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure and motion. But that there is indeed some of the old Egyptian learning, contained in these Trismegistick books now extant, shall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to speake of that grand mystery of the Egyptian theology (derived by Orpheus from them) that God is all. To conclude, Jamblicbus his judgment in this case ought without controversy to be far preferred before Cefanbon's, both by reason of his great antiquity, and his being much better skilled, not only in the Greek, but also the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to Hermes Trismegist did 'Ερμανίας ἑπεξεργάζεται, really contain the Hermaick opinions, though they spake sometimes the language of the Greek philosophers.

Therefore, upon all these considerations, we conceive it reasonable to conclude, that though there have been some Hermaick books counterfeited by Chriftians, since Jamblicbus his time, as namely the Pernander and the sermon in the mount concerning regeneration, neither of which are found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermaick books, which though not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but some of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the substantiae of them, contain the Hermaick doctrine. Such probably were those mentioned by the ancient fathers, but since lost, as the τά Θεωκ, which seems to have been a discourse concerning the Cosmogonia, and the τά Θεοκ, and the like. And such also may some of these Hermaick books
books be, that are still extant; as to instance particularly, the A aepleian dialogue, entitled in the Greek αἰτία καὶ τόγος, the perfect oration, and in all probability translated into Latin by Apuleius. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was so devout a Pagan, so learned a philosopher, and so witty a man, should be so far imposed upon by a counterfeit Trismegistic book, and mere Christian cheat, as to bestow translating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But however, whether Apuleius were the translator of this A aepleian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the spirit of it is not at all Christian, but rankly Pagan; one instance whereof we have, in its glorying of a power, that men have of making gods, upon which account St. A ustin thought fit to concern himself in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before Jamblichus his time, it must needs be included in his τὰ φιλομινα τοῖς Ἑλληνισταῖς, and consequently receive this attestation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekish, but the Hermaical and Egyptian doctrine.

There are indeed some objections made against this, as first from what we read in this dialogue, concerning the purgation of the world partly by water, and partly by fire; Tunc ille Dominus & pater Deus, primipotens, & unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores faetaque hominum, voluntate sua (qua est dei benignitatis) vitios refitens, & corrupta eritam revocans, malignitatem omnem vel alwione diluens, vel igne consumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit. When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the supreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always refitting vice, and restoring things from their degeneracy, will either wash away the malignity of the world by water, or else consume it by fire, and restore it to its ancient form again. But since we find in Julius Firmicus, that there was a tradition amongst the Egyptians, concerning the Apocatastasis of the world, partim per ναυακωμίου, partim per πυρετον, partly by inundation and partly by conflagration, this objection can signify nothing. Wherefore there is another objection, that hath some more plausibility, from that prophecy, which we find in this A aepleian, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian paganism (uttered in with much lamentation) in these words: Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum, sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima; then this land of Egypt, formerly the most holy seat of the religious temples of the gods, shall be every where full of the sepulchers of dead men. The sense whereof is thus expressed by St. A ustin; Hoc videtur dolere, quod memoria martyrum nostrorum templis eorum delubrisque succedent; ut vis, qui hoc legunt, animo nos averso atque perverso, patent a Paganis des cultos fugisse in templis, a nobis autem colis mortuos in sepulcris: He seems to lament this, that the memorials of our martyrs should succeed in the place of their temples, that so they, who read this, with a perverse mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worshipped in temples, but by us (Christians) dead men in sepulchers. Notwithstanding which, this very thing seems to have had its accomplishment too soon after, as may be gathered from.

1 De Civitate Dei Lib. VIII. cap. XXIII. p. 162. Tom. VII. Oper.
2 Mathesios Lib. III. cap. I. p. 34.
from these passages of Theodoret, υ' ἀλήθεια τῶν καλαίστερον Θεῶν τῶν μνημῶν, in De Car. G. A.
tίτων Αἰθρίων ξείλων (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοιάσας. Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those, who were, formerly called gods. And again, τῆς γεγονότητος τῶν θεών, αυτοκράτορος τούτων θεών, καὶ τῆς μονὴς ἐπαύνης πάντως δὲ τοῦ θεόν τοῦ θεοῦ μόρφων, &c. Our Lord hath now brought his dead (that is, his martyrs) into the room and place (that is, the temples) of the gods, whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs. Wherefore this being so shrewd and plain a description in the Asclepian dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem fulsome, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be: it very much resembling that complaint of Eunapius Sardianus in the life of Aegopus 1, when the Christians had demolished the temple of Serapis in Egypt, seizing upon its riches and treasure, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave divine honour to certain vile and flagitious persons deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. Austin entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepian passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the lepulchers and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made infiniti fallaci spiritus, by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit; they falsely then prefaging the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepian dialogue only anciieter than St. Austin, but it is cited by Laistantius Firmianus 2 also under the name of οἱ τίτλοις λόγος, the perfect oration, as was said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepian passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if Antoninus the philosopher (as the forementioned Eunapius 3 writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, καὶ τὰ ἑρείπα ταφεῖς γενισθαι, and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchers; why might not this Egyptian or Trimegistical writer receive the like inspiration or tradition? or at least make the same conjecture?

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepian dialogue, from Laistantius his citing a passage out of it for the second person in the Trinity, the Son of God; Hermes in eo libro (faith Laistantius) qui οἱ τίτλοις λόγος inscribitur, bis usus est verbis, οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ πάντων πυκντε, οὐ τείνοντες γενεακλάμασεν. Πει τοῦ εὐτρώπου ἐποίησε Θεόν, ὁφείλει καὶ αἰθετοῦ (αἰθετε ως θείοι νῷ δια το αἰθεμένωι αὐτοῦ, περί γαρ τότε ἢ πέτας τυχος αὐτῷ, αλλ' ὅτι εἰς αὐτῶν ὑποτείμπεστε καὶ ἢ τοῦ) ἐπεί τοῦ ἐποίησε, πρῶτον, καὶ μενον, καὶ ἐνα, καλεῖ ἐν ἑαυτῆς αὐτῷ, καὶ πληρήσας τοῦ πάνω τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐγκατέ τε καὶ παυν

1 In Vitis Sophistuarum p. 84, 85. Edit. 2 Divinar. Inflit. Lib. IV. cap. VI. p. 418. 3 Ubi supra, p. 76.
Which we find in Apuleius his Latin translation thus rendered; Dominus & omnium conformatior, quem recte Deum dici mus, à se secunda deum fecit, qui videri & sentiri posset; quem secundum [deum] sensibilis ita dixerint, non ideo quod ipse sentiat (de hoc enim an ipse sentiat annon alio dictum tempore) sed eo quod videndum sensus incurrerit: quoniam ergo hunc fecit ex se primum, & à se secundum, visibiliter est ei pulcher, utpote qui est omnium bonitatis plenissimus, quamvis eum ut divinitatis sine prolem, (for so it ought to be read, and not patrem, it being τονω in the Greek.) The lord and maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he had made a second god, visible and sensible (I say, sensible, not actively, because himself laith sense, for concerning this, whether he have sense or no, we shall speak elsewhere, but passively, because he incurs into our senses) this being his first and only production, seemed both beautiful to him, and most full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring. Which Laelianus, and after him St. Austin, understanding the perfect Word of God or eternal Λόγος, made use of it as a testimony against the Pagans for the confirmation of Christianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermaick book was genuinely Egyptian, and did represent the doctrine of the ancient Hermes Trismegist. But Dionysius Petavius and other later writers, understanding this place in the same sense with Laelianus and St. Austin, have made a quite different use of it, namely, to infer from thence, that this book was spurious and counterfeited by some Christian. To which we reply, first, that if this Hermaick writer had acknowledged an eternal Λόγος or Word of God, and called it a second God and the Son of God, he had done no more in this, than Philo the Jew did, who speaking of this same Λόγος, expressly calls it ὁ ἰδίος Θεός and πρωτόγονος ὁ άγαθος Θεός, the second God and the first-begotten Son of God. Notwithstanding which, those writings of Philo's are not at all suspected. And Origen affirms, that some of the ancient philosophers did the like; Multi philosophorum veterum, annum esse deum, qui cuncta creavit, dixerunt; atque in hoc concentuent legi. Aliquantum autem hoc adjicis, quod Deus cuncta per verbum suum fecerit & regat, & verbum Dei est, quo cuncta moderentur; in hoc non solum legi, sed & evangelio quodque confonat scribit. Many of the old philosophers (that is, all besides a few atheistick ones) have said, that there is one God who created all things, and these agree with the law: but some add further, that God made all things by his Word, and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and those write consonantly not only to the law, but also to the gospel. But whether Philo derived this doctrine from the Greek philosophers, or from Egyptians and Hermes Trismegist, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a question. For St. Cyril doth indeed cite several passages out of Hermaick writings then existing, to this very purpose. We shall only set down one of them here; δέ ποτέ ἐμι ἄρχοντα ἐπικειμένον ἐνθαματικού Λόγον τι πάντων ἐξ' ἑσότερος, θ' εἰς τινί πρώτη ἐνώμος, ἀρχής, ἀπόκαλε, εἰς ισότιον προαύοντα, καὶ εἰσόρατος, καὶ ἄρχων.
CHAP. III. by Laæntinius and St. Austin.

The world hath a governor set over it, that Word of the Lord of all, which was the maker of it; this is the first power over himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine son of the first omnipresent Being. Nevertheless the Author of the \(\text{\textit{etam}}\) \(\lambda \gamma \delta\), or Asclepian Dialogue, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is to plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how Laæntinius and St. Austin could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is farther manifested from other places of that dialogue, as this for example, \(\text{\textit{Aeternitatis Dominus Deus primus est, secundus est mundus; The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world.}}\) And again, Summis qui dicitur Deus rector gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum, omnemque rerum substantiam; The supreme God is the governor of that sensible god, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things. And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaic or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second God, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaic books published by Ficinus, and vulgarly called Pemander, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book, \(\text{\textit{δευτερος ὁ κόσμος, the world is a second God.}}\) After which followeth more to the same purpose; \(\text{\textit{περὶ τοῦ πάντων ὄντος, οἰκείου καὶ ἀγνώτου, καὶ ὑπάρχον τὸν ὅλον Ἰένως, δεύτερος ὁ κατ' ἐνότατον ὑπ' αὐτῷ ἐκφύεται καὶ ὡς ἐκ αὐτοῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ προφέρειος καὶ αὐτοκηρύσσειν ὃς ὑπ' ἐνότατον πολεοδ. The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal. So again in the ninth book, \(\text{\textit{πατὴρ ὁ ἵεσι τὸ κόσμῳ, καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὕφιος τῷ ἵεσι, God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God.}}\) And in the twelfth, \(\text{\textit{ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος ὕφιος ὁ μέγας ἵεσι καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ ἱεσιν, this whole world is a great God and the image of a greater.}}\)

As for the other Hermetic or Trismegistick books, published partly by Ficinus and partly by Patricius, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures, save only the Pemander, and the Sermon in the mount concerning regeneration, the first and thirteenth of Ficinus his chapters or books. Neither of which books are cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in Jambliechus his time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the self-same hand, since the writer of the latter (the sermon in the mount) makes mention of the former (that is, the Pemander) in the close of it. For that, which Casaubon objects against the fourth of Ficinus his books or chapters (entitled the Crater,) seems not very considerable, it being questionable, whether by the Crater any such thing were there meant, as the Christian Baptisterion. Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermie books, especially such of them
them as being cited by ancient fathers, may be presumed to have been extant before *Jamblichus* his time: we know no reason why we should not concur with that learned philosopher in his judgment concerning them, that though they often speak the language of philosophers, and were not written by *Hermes Trismegist* himself, yet they do really contain ὤξεις Ἰμμακές, Hermaical opinions, or the Egyptian doctrine. The ninth of *Ficinus* his books mentions the *Aclepians* dialogue, under the Greek title of ὁ τελεῖος λόγος, pretending to have been written by the same hand: χρίστος ὁ 'Αστράπης, τὸ τελεῖον ἀποδίδομα Λόγος, τῶν ὀνωργάκιων γνώσεως ἀκόλουθος, εἰκών, καὶ τοῦ περί αἰσθήσεως λόγου διέχειν. The meaning of which place (not understood by the translator) is this; *I lately published* (O *Afclepius*) *the book entitled* ὁ Τελεῖος λόγος (or the perfect oration) and now I judge it necessary, in pursuit of the same, to discourse concerning *Divine* judgement and the perfect oration, is cited by *Laertiius* 1. As is also the tenth of *Ficinus*, called the *Clavis*, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and consequently to the *Afclepius* likewise, but also to contain in it an epitome of that *Hermaical* book called τὸ γένικα, mentioned in *Eusebius* his *Chronicon* 2, τὸ χριστός λόγον, ὁ 'Αστράπης, τοῦ διὸ σημαδίῳ δοκήστω· τῷ Ἵλαριον ἐπει διὰ τῶν Γενεικῶν Λόγων, τῶν περὶ ἀνθρώπου λεγενδών ἐπὶ ἐπίτουρα. My former discourse was dedicated to thee, O *Afclepius*, but this to Tatius, it being an epitome of those *Genica* that were delivered to him. Which γένικα are thus again afterwards mentioned in the same book, ὃς ἰκνιότα εἰς τὸν Γενικήν, ὅτι ἐπὶ μίας ὑψώσεις τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς πάσαις ἔπαθεν ἐπὶ ὑψώσεις; HAVE ye not heard in the *Genica*, that all souls are derived from one soul of the univerfe? Neither of which two places were understood by *Ficinus*. But doubtles this latter *Hermaical* book had something foisted into it, because there is a manifest contradiction found therein; forasmuch as that transmigration of human souls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is afferted after the Egyptian way, ῥα καταδίωκτα ψυχὲς καὶ τὰς ἀσθένειας: THE punishment of the wicked, is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greatest error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books seem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the rest; as also does that long book entitled, ἀρχὴ κόσμου, the thirteenth in *Patricius*. Nay, it is observable, that even those very books themselves, that are so justly suspected and condemned for Christian forgeries, have something of the *Hermaical* or Egyptian philosophy, here and there interspersed in them. As for example, when in the *Pamander* God is twice call *ζητεομένος*, *male and female together*, this seems to have been *Egyptian* (and derived from thence by *Orpheus*) according to that elegant passage in the *Aclepians* dialogue concerning God; His ergo, qui fons est omnium, utroque sexis fecunditate plenissimus, semper voluuntatis sui pregnantis, parit semper quicquid voluerit procreare: *He therefore, who alone is all things, and most full of the fecundity of both sexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatsoever he pleaseth.* Again, when death is thus described in it, παρανοιακῶς τὸ σώμα εἰς ἀλλήλων καὶ τὸ ἐίδερ, ὡς ἔδεσιν, εἰς ἀφασία γνώσειν, to be nothing else but the change of the body, and the form or life's passing into the invisible: this agreeeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter, τὸ μεταξύθεννον Σάκαλον εἰςι, ἀλὰ τὸ μία σῶμα διαλοίδεια, τὸν ἡ ἔνδο κεῖ τὸ ἀφασίαν χαράν: *That death is nothing but a change, it being

being only the dissolution of the body, and the life or soul's passing into the invisible or inconspicuous. In which book it is also affirmed of the world, γινεται μας αυ-τη και εις εικα ημεραι το τη θεο-εις, that every day some part or other of it goes into the invisible, or into Hades; that is, does not utterly perish, but only disappears to our sight, it being either translated into some other place, or changed into another form. And accordingly it is said of animals, in the twelfth book, διαλυται, υιοι αναλυται, τα μεθ' ημεραι, that they are dissolved by death, not that they might be destroyed, but made again anew. As it is also affirmed of the world, that it doth αναφυλαι και τα ικανα αποτελει, make all things out of itself, and again unmake them into itself; και διαλυων απαται ουκειναι, and that dissolving all things it doth perpetually renew them. For that nothing in the whole world utterly perisheth, as it is often declared elsewhere in these Trismegistick writings, so particularly in this twelfth book of Piacmus, συμπασις το κοσμος αιμετοπληιτε, τα ημεραι αυτοι απαται μεταληται, ειναι τη φαστε και απαλυμαινον. The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it are alterable; and this so, as that none of these neither utterly perisheth, or is absolutely destroyed; και μεταλητηι τι δενυσει ηφαιμαι τη θα-ρατη, ει ναιληται τι τη θει; For how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God perishes or go to nothing? all which, by Cosaubon's leave, we take to have been originally Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterwards transplanted into Greece. Moreover, when in the Pemander, God is styled more than once, ους και ζωη, light and life, this seems to have been Egyptian also, because it was Orphical. In like manner the appendix to the sermon in the mount, called θυμομεν κρυπτη, or the occult cantion, hath some strains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterwards mentioned.

The result of our present discourse is this, that though some of the Trismegistick books were either wholly counterfeited, or else had certain supposititious passages insinuted into them by some Christian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the substance of them, do contain Hermical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one supreme Deity is every where asserted) we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. And herein several of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as first of all Justin Martyr 1, "Αμαρτωλογηθεν την θεον δυναμην, Ερμης δι ουαπος και Φαστες λεγει, αι δενυσει τη μεθρατη ρασει δε αυτανον". Ammon in his books calleth God most hidden, and Hermes plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impossible to express him. Neither doth it follow that this latter passage is counterfeit, as Cosaubon concludes, because there is something like it in Plato's Timæus, there being doubtless a very great agreement betwixt Platonism and the ancient Egyptian doctrine. Thus again St. Cyril, Hermes quoque Trismegistus unam Deum loquitur, eumque ineffabilem & inestimabilem conficietur; Hermes Trismegistus also acknowledgeth one God, confessing him to be ineffable and inestimable; which passage is also cited by St. Austin 2, Laetantius likewise; Thoth antiquissimus & inestimabilissimus omni gente- Lib. 1. pag. p. 226. O. De Idol. vni. [Divinæ Infliti. cap. nere 30. [Divinæ. VI. p. 42.].

Provid that the Egyptians acknowledged Book I.

nere Doctrine, adde ei in multarum rerum & artium scientia Trismegistii cognomen imponevet; hic scripsit libros & quidem multos, ad cognitionem divinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus majestatem Dei & singularis Dei afferit, iijdemque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, Deum & patrem. Ac nè quis nomen ejus requiret; quod illudesse dixit. Thoth (that is Hermes) the most ancient and most instructed in all kind of learning (for which he was called Trismegist) wrote books, and these many, belonging to the knowledge of divine things, wherein he afferts the majesty of one supreme Deity, calling him by the same names that we do, God and Father; but (left any one should require a proper name of him) affirming him to be anonymous. Last, St. Cyril hath much more to the same purpose also: and we must confess, that we have the rather here insifted so much upon these Hermack or Trismegistick writings, that in this particular we might vindicate these ancient fathers, from the imputation either of fraud and impotence, or of simplicity and folly. 

But that the Egyptians acknowledge, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not to be proved from these Trismegistick writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find cause) it otherwise appearing, not only because Orpheus (who was an undoubted asserter of monarchy, or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides Apollonius Tyaneus his affirmation concerning both Indians and Egyptians, before cited, Plutarch throughout his whole book de Iside & Osride, supposeth the Egyptians thus to have asserter one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him τὸν πρῶτον θεόν, the first God. Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddess Isis, was, ἰδίν τοῦ πρῶτον, ἵνα κυρία, καὶ υπότις γνώσις, οὗ ἡ Σίδης παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν, παραλογία καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ἄντα καὶ σωνία. The knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddess exhorted men to seek, in her communion. After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason, why they made the crocodile to be a symbol of him; μόνοι δὲ ζητῶν ἐν υγρῷ διακτήμεν, τοῖς ψεία υμῖμα λείων καὶ διαφανόν παρακαλοῦν, ἵνα βλέποιν μὴ βλασπήμην, ὅ τι πρῶτον Σίδης συμβαίνειν. Because they say the crocodile is the only animal, which living in the water, hath his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing, that belongs to the first God, to see all things, himself being not seen. Though Plutarch in that place gives also another reason why the Egyptians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity; οὐ μὴ ἔχει δὲ προκατέλεγες αὐτῶν στασὶς ἀμαρτίας ἀμάρτημα ἵνα τις ἤθελεν, ἀλλὰ μίμησις Σίδης λέγεται γνώσις μόνος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τοῦ, φωνῆς γὰρ ὁ Σίδης λόγος ἀπορροή; έστι, καὶ δὲ ἐξομιλίαν καὶ καὶ βιοσ τῆς ἐναντίον κατὰ διὰ. Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue. For the divine λόγος, or reason, standing.
not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs. In like manner Horus Apollo in his Hieroglyphicks 1 tells us, that the Egyptians acknowledging a παντοκράτωρ και κοσμόκρατος, an omnipotent being that was the governor of the whole world, did symbolically represent him by a serpent, in μάκαν αὐτὸ όμοιον μέγαν δεινόντος, ο πρωτοφθαλμός αὐτῷ εἰς τοῖς κόσμοις, they picturing also a great house or palace within its circumference, because the world was the royal palace of the deity. Which writer also gives us another reason, why the serpent was made to be the hieroglyphick of the Deity; Lib. i. c. 2. το γὰρ τριφθη χερσὶν τῷ εαυτῷ σώματι, σημαίνει, τὸ ἔως ὅσα εἰς τῆς θείας φυσικής ἰν τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμεν, τοῦτο πάλιν καὶ τῷ μείζον εἰς αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν. Because the serpent feeding as it were upon its own body, doth aptly signify, that all things generated in the world by divine providence are again resolved into him. And Philo Byblius 2, from Sanchoniathon, gives the same reason why the serpent was deified by Taut or the Egyptian Hermes, ὅτι δικάιωται καὶ εἰς Ιπποτῶν ἀναλίπτειν, because it is immortal, and resolved into itself. Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphick of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in Eusebius 3, ἤ το θέριον ὑπὸ Σινάτων, ὅτι ίερός ἐχών μάζων, that the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of an hawk. And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphick of the Deity, appeareth from that of Plutarch 4, that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at Sais, were ingraven these three hieroglyphicks, a young man, an old man, and an hawk; to make up this sentence, that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or Providence. But we have two more remarkable passages in the forementioned Horus Apollo 5, concerning the Egyptian theology, which must not be pretermitted; the first this, πάντα ἀρχής τῷ παντὸς κόσμῳ τῷ θύμῳ ἵνα πνεῦμα, that according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to wit, God. And again, δοκεῖ οὖν τῷ θύμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ μονογένεαν ἔλεος ἰσυγκεραίαν, it seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all confilts without God. In the next place, Jamblichus was a person, who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to Porphyry's his epistle to Anebo an Egyptian priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary account of their theology after this manner 6; ἄριθμός, ἑρθημένος, μετέφερες, καὶ καὶ ἕκαστὸν ὑπερπλομένος τοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δινάμεων τοῦ κοιχίων, ἀ τῶν φειδίως καὶ φύσεως ἔλεγχος, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς σχείρων δυνάμεων παρασεῖρον, αὐτοῖς Εὐτύχει τῇ ὑπερφυσικῆ γενεσί, ἔλεος καὶ σωματικός, καὶ ὑπερφυσικός, ἁγιωτάτος τε καὶ αμφότερος, ἐλάχιστος ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτῷ ἀναφαίνεται, ἀνεξάρτητος ἑαυτοῦ τεταρτού καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῷ Θεῷ περιέχει, καὶ διότι μὲν συνειληθεὶς ἐκείνη, καὶ μεταβαίνων That God, who is the cause of generation and the whole nature, and of all the powers in the elements themselves, is separate, exempt, elevated above, and ex-
Hermes deriv'd Matter and all Things  

Book I.

panded over, all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and transcending the same, immaterial, and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself, and in himself, he ruleth over all things and in himself containeth all things. And because he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and display the same from himself. According to which excellent description of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians affirming one God that comprehends all things, could not possibly suppose a multitude of self-existent Deities. In which place also the same Jamblicbus tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphick for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, so they pictured God, in loto arbore sedentem super lutum; sitting upon the lote-tree above the watery mud. Quod in-nuit Dei eminentiam altissimam, qua fit ut nullum modo attingat lutum ipsum. Demonstratque Dei imperium intellestual, quia loti arboris omnia sunt rotunda tam frondes quam fructus, &c. Which signifies the transcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; because both the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, representing the motion of intellect. Again, he there adds also, that the Egyptians sometimes pictured God sitting at the helm of a ship. But afterward in the same book, he sums up the queries, which Porphyryus had propounded to the Egyptian priest, to be resolved concerning them, in this manner; 

\[ \text{seg. S. c. 1.} \]

\[ \text{Ibid. p. 151.} \]

\[ \text{Cap. IV. p. 16c.} \]

\[ The Egyptians }
gyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or soul) and again they place a pure mind or intellect above the world. But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of coordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner; 'καὶ ἄτοις ἀνυφέλτων αἵρεσις τῶν τελευτῶν ἡ ἔρμη τῶν ἀρχῶν Ἀργυπλίων παραγματεία, ἂν ἐνὸς ἀφηγηθέν, καὶ ἀφελωμένως παρὰ τοῦ παλαιὸς αἰῶνα ἄφοί ἐνὸς διακευκάζοντοι, καὶ παραπλήκτως τῷ ἀφελώμενῳ στὺς ἑπτὰς ἐπικρατεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀριστῶν μέτεχν, καὶ τοῦ ἀποτάτου ἰδιοτάτου ἀνισταντος αἰτίας. And thus the Egyptian philosophy, from first to last, begins from unity; and thence defends to multitude; the many being always governed by the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where mastered and conquered by some finite and determined measure; and all ultimately, by that highest unity, that is the first cause of all things. Moreover, in answer to the last Porphyrian question concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and self-existent or made, Jamblicbus thus replies, ἦλθαν δὲ παράγοντα ἂν θεός ἀπὸ ἀυτοῦ ἑστάσες ὑποχρείας ἔκλατος. That according to Hermes and the Egyptians, matter was also made or produced by God; ab essentialitate iucundia ac sublimitate materialitate, as Scutellius turns it. Which passage of Jamblicbus, Proclus pag. 117. upon the Timaeus (where he affirms that God was ἀφελώμενος αἰτίας τῆς ὥλης, the unefiable cause of matter) takes notice of this manner; καὶ τῶν Ἀργυπλίων παραγμάτων τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φιλοσοφίαν ὅπερ τοι θεοὶ ἰδιοτάτες ἔστθεσαν, ὅτι ἐν τῆς ἀρχῇ τοῦ ὥλητα παραγάζεται βελτίωτα, καὶ ἐν τοις ἑκάστοις καὶ τοῖς Πλάτονοι τοῖς τολμητὰς περὶ τῆς ὥλης δόξαν ἅρμαν. And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or self-existent, but produced by the Deity: for the divine Jamblicbus has recorded, that Hermes would have materiality to have been produced from essentiality, (that is, the passive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity:) and it is very probable from hence, that Plato was also of the same opinion concerning matter; viz. because he is supposed to have followed Hermes and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if to be true, which the same Proclus affirmeth concerning Orpheus, ὅτι τὸ ὅρματος κατὰ τοῦτο τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ὑποτόμων ὑποτάσσεσθαι παραγάζεται τῆς ὥλης, that Orpheus also did, after the same manner, deduce or derive matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, that is, from the supreme Deity. We shall conclude here in the last place with the testimony of Damaclius, in his book of Principles, writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians, Ἀργυπλίως δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὐδάμος ὑδὴν ἀφρέθες ἤγορει οἱ δὲ Αἰγυπτίως καθ' ἑκάστας Φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξεύθεν κατά τὸν ἀλήθειαν κεκυρωμένως, εὑρότες οἱ Ἀργυπλίως δὴ τὸν λόγον· ὥστε ἐναντίον τοῦ μὲν μία τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐκ ἐπετείθησαν ἔγνωσιν ἱκερμόν, καὶ τοῦτο τε ἀναφώνεσσιν ἄτος. Eudemus hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians; but the Egyptian philosophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice-repeated: which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme Deity, that is incomprehensible.

But that the Egyptians amongst their many gods did acknowledge one supreme, may sufficiently appear also, even from their vulgar religion and theology; in which they had first a peculiar and proper name for him as fuch.

Hammon the Egyptian Jupiter.  

Book I.

such. For as the Greeks called the supreme God Zeus, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians call him Hammon or Ammon, according to Herodotus, whose testimony to this purpose hath been already cited, and confirmed by Origens, who was an Egyptian born. Thus also Plutarch in his book de Iside, τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἦσαν ταῖς Ἀιγυπτίων δόμαι τῶν Διῶν ἔνοχα, τοῦ Ἀμῶν, ὅ χαράκτειν ἡμῖν Ἀμμοις λέγομεν. It is supposed by most, that the proper name of Zeus or Jupiter (that is, the supreme Deity) among the Egyptians is Ammon, which we Greeks pronounce Hammon. To the same purpose Hesychius, Ἀμμοῖς ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἀριστοτλῆς, Amnous, according to Aristotle, is the same with Zeus. Whence it came to pass, that by the Latin writers Hammon was vulgarly called Jupiter Hammon. Which Hammon was not only used as a proper name for the supreme Deity by the Egyptians, but also by the Arabsians and all the Africans, according to that of Lucan:

Quamvis Athenopum populis Arabumque beatis
Genitus, utque Indis, unus fiet Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only Marmarica (which is a part of Africa, wherein was that most famous temple of this Ammon) was from thence denominated Ammonia, but even all Africa, as Stephanus informs us, was sometimes called Ammonis from this god Ammon, who hath been therefore styled Zeus Lybicis, the Libyan Jupiter.

Indeed it is very probable, that this word Hammon or Ammon was first derived from Ham or Cham the son of Noah, whose posterity was chiefly seated in these African parts, and from whom Egypt was called, not only in the Scripture, the land of Ham, but also by the Egyptians themselves, as Plutarch testifieth, ξυραια or Chemia, and as St. Jerome, Ham; and the Coptites also to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheless this will not hinder, but that the word Hammon, for all that, might be used afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the supreme God, because, amongst the Greeks Zeus in like manner was supposed to have been at first the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to signify the supreme God. And there might be such a mixture of herology or history, together with theology, as well amongst the Egyptians, as there was amongst the Greeks. Nay, some learned men conjecture, and not without probability, that the Zeus of the Greeks also was really the very same with that Ham or Cham the son of Noah, whom the Egyptians first worshipped as an hero or deified man; there being several considerable agreements and correspondencies between the poetick fables of Saturn and Jupiter, and the true scripture-story of Noah and Cham; as there is likewise a great affinity betwixt the words themselves, for as Cham signifieth heat or fervour, so is Zeus derived by the Greek Grammarians from ζωή. And thus will that forementioned testimony of Herodotus in some sense be verified, that the Greeks received the names of most of their gods, even of Zeus himself, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps

1 Lib. II. cap. XLII. p. 105.
2 Or rather Celsus in Origen contra Celsum, Lib. V. p. 261.
3 Tom. II. Oper. p. 354.
4 Lib. IV. ver. 517, 518.
7 Vide Bochart. ubi supra, Lib. I. cap. I.
Chap. IV. Hammon a hidden and invisible Deity.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometime worshipped by the Egyptians, under the name of Hammon; it having been in like manner sometimst worshipped by the Greeks under the name of Zeus. And the word very well agreeeth herewith, ἱμπώς in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence ὤνος Chamamn also was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, phylosopy, and theology all together. And that the notion of this Egyptian god Ammon was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived) is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it, according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both Manetho an ancient Egyptian priest, and Hecateus (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in Plutarch agree: Μανέθος δὲ ὁ Σαμβινίτης τὸ κειμένων οίνεσαι καὶ τῷ κρύβου ὑπὸ τάουτας οὐλήδαι τῆς φως: Ἠκατέως δὲ Ἀδείπτης Φως τέι- το καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τῷ μιᾷ τε λευκώ ἀπὸ τῆς Αιγυπτίας, ὅτι τινὰ προσαλαται, πρεσ- καλλίστων γὰρ εὑρίσκει τῷ φως: ἤδε τοῦ πρῶτον ὅτι ἀφαίρεται καὶ κειμένων ὅτα, προσ- καλλήσκει καὶ παρακαλυτες, ἐμφατι γενεῖται καὶ δυνάμει τούτου, Ἀμών λέγεις: Μα- netho Sebennites conceives the word Ammon to signify that which is hidden, and Hecateus affirmeth, that the Egyptians use this word, when they call any one to them that was distant or absent from them: whereas the first God, because he is invisible and hidden, they, as it were, inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call him Ammon. And agreeably hereunto, Jamblichus gives us this account of the true notion of this Egyptian God Ammon, ὁ ὀμιείνος ὁς, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προσάτης, καὶ το- φία ἐρχόμενος μᾶς ἐν τῇ γνώσει, καὶ τον πρῶτον τοῦ κειμένων λόγω δύναμιν εἰς φως ἔγνω, Ἀμών καὶ τῆς Αιγυπτίας γλάσσαν λέγεις: The demiurgical intellect, and presidant of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language, called Hammon. Wherefore we may conclude, that Hammon, amongst the Egyptians, was not only the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian Hammon was in all probability taken notice of in scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof. For thus we understand that of Jeremy xlvi. 25. The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel saith, behold I will ἅνε ὄνος (that is, not the multitude of Noe, but) Ammon (the God) of Noe, and Pharaoh and Egypt with her (other) gods and kings, and all that trust in him; I will deliver them into the bands of them that seek their lives, and into the bands of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon. For the understanding of which place, we must observe, that according to the language of those ancient Pagans, when every country or city had their peculiar and proper names, for the gods presiding over them or worshipped by them, the fe-
veral nations and places were themselves commonly denoted and signified by the names of those their respective gods. With which kind of language the scripture it self also complieth; as when the Moabites are called in it, the people of Chemosh, Numbers xxii. and when the gods of Damascus are said to have smitten Ahaz, because the Syrians finote him, 2 Chron. xxviii. Accordingly whereunto also, whatsoever was done or attempted against the several nations or countries, is said to have been done or attempted against their gods. Thus Moab's captivity is described, Jeremiah xlviii. Thou shalt be taken, and Chemosh shall go into captivity. And the overthrow of Babylon is predicted after the same manner, in the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. xlvi. Bell howeth down, Nebo howeth, themselves are gone into captivity. And also the same is threatened in that of Jeremy, ch. li. I will visit Bell in Babylon, and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath swallowed up, and the nations shall not flow unto him any more, for the wall of Babylon shall be broken down. Now Bell, according to Herodotus, was a name for the suprême God amongst the Babylonians, as well as Ammon was amongst the Egyptians; who notwithstanding by both of them was worshipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore as in these latter places, by the visiting and punishing of the Babylonians, so in that former place of Jeremy, by the visiting of Ammon, and the gods of Egypt, is understood the visiting of the Egyptians themselves; accordingly as it is there also expressed. No was, it seems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore Ammon the chief god of those ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called Ammon of No. As likewise the city No is denominated from this god Ammon in the scripture, and called both No-Ammon and Ammon-No. The former in the prophecy of Nahum, chap. iii. Art thou better than No-Ammon? or that No in which the god Ammon is worshipped? Which is not to be understood of the oracle of Ammon in Macedonia, as some have imagined (they taking No for an appellative, and so to signify habitation;) it being unquestionably the proper name of a city in Egypt. The latter in that of Ezekiel, chap. xxx. I will pour out my fury upon Sin, the strength of Egypt, and will cut off Hammon-No. In which place as by Sin is meant Pelusium, so Hammon-No, by the Seventy, is interpreted Diospolis, the city of Jupiter; that is, the Egyptian Jupiter, Harmon. Which Diospolis was otherwise called the Egyptian Thebes, (anciently the metropolis of all Egypt) but whose proper name, in the Egyptian language, seems to have been No; which from the chief god there worshipped was called both No-Ammon and Hammon-No; as that god himself was also denominated from the city, Ammon of No. And this is the rather probable, because Plato tells us expressly, that Ammon was ancietly the proper or chief god of the Egyptian Thebes or Diospolis, where he speaks of Theutb or Thoth the Egyptian Hermès, in these words: ἔστω τότε ὁ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἑλληνίδων Ἀμών ὁ Ἰσραήλ, Εἰρήνης Ἀμώνος Ἐλληνιδός τοῦ Ἰσραήλ, ὁ Ἰλών μεγάλης τῆς Ἱσραήλ, ὁ Ἰγνομόν τῆς Ἰσραήλ. Thamus was then king over all Egypt, reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof) which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and whose God was Ammon. But whereas the prophet Nahum (who seems to have written after the completion of that judgment

* This seems to be a mistake for Diodorus Siculus, who mentions it, Lib II. p. 69.

* Voff. de Idol. Lib I. cap. XXXII. p. 89.
taken notice of in Scripture.

judgment upon *No*, predicted both by Jeremy and Ezekiel describes the place, as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men 1 have concluded, that this was rather to be understood of Alexandria than Dipsolis, (notwithstanding that Alexandria was not then in being, nor built till a long while after, in Alexander the Great's time:) This may very well, as we conceive, be understood of Egypt in general, whose metropolis this *No* was; that it was situate amongst the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the Red and Mediterranean. And thus much for the Egyptian Jupiter, or their supreme Deity, called by them Hammon.

There is an excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity preserved by Plutarch 2 and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the Egyptians did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at *Sais*: 'Εγώ ἐγώ πάν τὸ γέγονεν, καὶ δό, καὶ ἱσόμενον, καὶ τὸ ἐγώ πάν ἐπέλεγεν ὅτι θυσίς ἀπεκάλυψεν, I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered. Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the sensile matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of Chereomon before mentioned and confuted; yet it is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the God here described is not a mere congeries of diffused parts, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddess Isis, which we shall also afterward make use of, Tibi, una, que es omnia; To thee, who being one, art all things. Again, in the Deity here described, there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite; the sense seeming to be this, I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but my self veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colours of the rain-bow (whose mild and gentle light may easily be beheld) and they are nothing but my simple and uniform lustring, variably refracted and abated; but my immediate splendour and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without being either blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description, which God makes of himself to Moses, Thou shalt see my back-parts, but my face shall not be seen. Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And Philo thus glosseth upon thofe words, αὐτόχρεις ἕν ἐσθί, τὰ αὐτέλθα, ὃς μετὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπον, τὸν ἀγαθομονίαν ἐόνα, τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐόνα, καταβαθμίζω. It is sufficient for a wise man to know God fugis à posteriori, or from his effects, but whosoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiance and splendour of his beams. Whereas, according to Philo, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of

of his power, goodness and wisdom, are called the back-parts of the Deity; so are they here in this inscription called the peplum, the veil and exterior garment of it, or else God himself veiled. Wherefore it is plain, that the Deity here described cannot be the mere visible and corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, that being all outside and exposed to the view of sense, and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But thirdly, this will yet be more evident, if we do but take notice of the name of this God, which was here described, and to whom that temple was dedicated; and that was in the Egyptian Language Neith, the same with 'Athm, amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; by which is meant wisdom or understanding; from whence it is plain, that the inscription is to be understood not of such a god as was merely senseless matter (which is the god of the Atheists) but a mind.

Athenagoras tells us, that the Pagan Theologers interpreted the Athm, or Minerva, to be the Phænix sent to pains of Hell, wisdom or mind passing and diffusing itself through all things; than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inscription. Wherefore it may be here observed, that those Pagan, who acknowledged the Deity to be a mind, and incorporeal being secret from matter, did notwithstanding frequently consider him, not abstractly by himself alone, but concretely together with the reft of his whole machinery, or as displaying the world from himself, and diffusing himself through all things, and being in a manner all things. Accordingly, we learn'd before from Horus Apollo, that the Egyptians by God meant a spirit diffusing it self through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they supposed that nothing at all could confift without God. And after this manner, Jamblichus in his Mysteries interprets the meaning of this Egyptian inscription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their priefly hieroglyphics, exhort men to ascend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity the maker of all, he adds, ὑπηρήσατο δὲ τῷ ταύτῃ τῷ θόδου ὁ Ερμής, ἡσυχας δὲ Βῆθης προφέτης Ἀγαθοί βασιλείας, ἐν αὐτών ἐγένετο ἀνεγερμαμένην, ἣν ἱππολυ- φιοις θρόνοις κατά Σωτησίων ἐν Διόνυσον, τότε τῷ Θεῷ ὄνομαν παρελθεῖν τῷ δικαίω διάλειται ποιμήν. Hermes also propounded this method, and By this the prophet interpreted the same to king Ammon, having found it written in hieroglyphick letters in the temple of Sais in Egypt; as he also there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuses himself through the whole world. And this was Neith, or Athena, that god thus described, I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal could ever uncover. Where we cannot but take notice also that whereas the Athenians of the Greeks was derived from the Egyptian Neith, that she also was famous for her peplum too, as well as the Egyptian Goddes. Peplum (faith Serapis) is the proper pallia palla feminina, Minerva consecrata; Peplum is properly a womanish pall or veil, embroidered all over, and consecrated to Minerva. Which rite was performed at Athens, in the great Panathenaicks, with much solemnity, when the statue of this goddess was also by those noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, cloathed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude, that the statue of the Egyptian Neith also, in

\[^{1}\text{Legat. pro Christianis, cap. XIX. p. 86.}\]

\[^{2}\text{De Myster. Ægypt. Sect. VIII. cap. V. p. 161.}\]
the temple of Sais, had likewise, agreeably to its inscription, such a pavement or veil cast over it, as Minerva or Artemis at Athens had; this hieroglyphically to signify, that the Deity was invisible and incomprehensible to mortals, but had veiled itself in this visible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the pavement, the exterior variegated or embroidered vestment of the Deity. To all which considerations may be added, in the last place, what Proclus hath recorded, that there was something more belonging to this Egyptian inscription, than what is mentioned by Plutarch; namely these words, ἡ ἄρα οὖν θεον κόσμον, ἐνθαρρυνόντα, and the sun was the fruit or offspring, which I produced; from whence it is manifest, that according to the Egyptians, the sun was not the supreme Deity, and that the God here described, was, as Proclus also observeth, θεός, a demiurgical deity, the creator of the whole world, and of the sun. Which supreme incorporeal Deity was notwithstanding, in their theology, said to be all things, because it diffused it self thorough all.

Wherefore, whereas Plutarch \(^1\) cites this passage out of Hecatetus, concerning the Egyptians, τὸ θέατον Θεόν τῷ Παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν κοσμοῦν, that they take the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing; the meaning of it cannot be, as if the first or supreme God of the Egyptians were the senseless corporeal world, Plutarch himself in the very next words declaring him to be ἄρα οὖν θεον κοσμοῦν, invisible and hidden; whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifest himself to them, called Hammon; as he elsewhere affirmeth, That the Egyptians first God, or supreme Deity, did see all things, himself being not seen. But the forementioned passage must needs be understood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the first God, and τὸ θεόν or the universe, were synonymous expressions, often used to signify the very same thing; because the first supreme Deity is that, which contains all things, and diffuseth it self thorough all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, Orpheus declaring, ἐν τι τὰ θαύματα, that all things were one; and after him Parmenides and other philosophers, ἐν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ, that one was the universe or all, and that τὸ θεόν was ἀπαντὴ, that the universe was immoveable; they meaning nothing else hereby, but that the first supreme Deity, was both one and all things, and immovable. And thus much is plainly intimated by Aristotle in these words, ἐν τῇ θεοτητί, ὡς ἄν μᾶς ἔσοντ’ ἄπειρον ἀπειρον. There are some, who pronounced concerning the whole universe, as being but one nature; that is, who called the supreme Deity τὸ θεόν or the universe, because that virtually contained all things in it.

Nevertheless τὸ πάν, or the universe, was frequently taken by the Pagan theologers also, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehensive sense, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its fecundity, God as displaing himself in the world; or, for God and the world both together; the latter being look’d upon as nothing but an emanation or efflux from the former. And thus was the word taken by Empedocles in Plutarch \(^2\), when he affirmed, ἂ τὸ πάν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἂλλ’ ἀλλήλων τε τὸν πάντος μεῖζον, that

\(^1\) De Inde & Offr. p. 354. Tom. II. Oper.  
the world was not the universe, but only a small part thereof. And according to this sense was the god Pan underllood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, nor as endued with a plastick nature only, (though this was partly included in the notion of Pan also) but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffusing it self through all; or for the whole system of things, God and the world together, as one deity. For that the Arcadick Pan was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governour of the same, appears from this testimony of Macrobius \(^1\); *Hunc Deum Arcadicos colunt, appellantes τὸν τῶς ἥλιον κήρων, non ὕψωρας dominum, sed universae substantiae materialis dominatorem.* The Arcadians worship this god Pan (as their most ancient and honourable god) calling him the lord of Hyle, that is, not the lord of the woods, but the lord or dominator over all material substance. And thus does Phernatus \(^2\) likewise describe the Pan of the other Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, senseless and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and presiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one system; the world being but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. *The lower parts of* Pan (that he) were rough and goatish, because of the asperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, because the other being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonick of the world: adding hereunto, that Pan was feigned to be lustful or lascivious, because of the multitude of spermatick reasons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be clothed with the skin of a libbard, because of the bepangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world, to live in a desert, because of the singularity of the world; and lastly, to be a good demon, by reason of the ὄνομα, αὐτοῦ λὸγος, that supreme mind, reason, and understanding, that governs all in it. Pan therefore was not the mere corporeal world senseless and inanimate, but the Deity as displaying itself therein, and pervading all things Agreeable to which, Diodorus Siculus \(^3\) determines, that Πάν and Ζέα were but two several names for one, and the same deity, (as it is well known, that the whole universe was frequently called by the Pagans Jupiter, as well as Pan.) And Socrates himself in Plato \(^4\) directs his prayer, in a most devout and serious manner, to this Pan; that is, not the corporeal world or senseless matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the supreme Deity diffusing it self through all; he therefore distinguishing him from the inferior gods: Καλλίπος Πάν, ὃ ἄλλος ὃς τής ἔως, δεινότερος κυρίως γεγέννημεν τόνωσιν, τό εὐθυνόν διὰ τὰ ἐξω τῷ ἔως εἰσιν, εἰσὶ μιᾷ μοι φώικα. O good (or gracious) Pan, and ye other gods, who preside over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that those external things, which I have, may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind, and that I may account him to be rich, that is wise and just. The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to Pan (that is, the supreme god) and the inferior gods both together. Thus we see that as well, according

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\(^{2}\) Lib. I. p. 7.  
\(^{3}\) Libro de Natura Deor. cap. XXVII. p. 203, inter Scriptor, Mythol. a Tho. Gale editos.  
\(^{4}\) In Phaedr. p. 338. Oper.
Chap. IV. Daemons lament the Death of great Pan.

To the Greeks, as the Egyptians, the first or supreme God, and τὸ ἔναρ, or the universal, were really the same thing.

And here we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable story of Plutarch’s in his Defect of Oracles, concerning daemons lamenting the death of the great Pan. In the time of Tiberius (that he) certain persons embarking from Asia for Italy, towards the evening failed by the Ecbinades, where being calmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one Thamous, an Egyptian mariner amongst them, and after the third time commanding him, when he came to the Palodes, to declare, that the great Pan was dead. He with the advice of his company resolved, that if they had a quick gale, when they came to the Palodes, he would pass by silently; but if they should find themselves there calmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ship arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon Thamous looking out of the hinder deck towards the Palodes, pronounced these words with a loud voice, ὁ μαῖνος Πάν τίθηκεν, the great Pan is dead; which he had no sooner done, but he was answered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain mixture of admiration. Plutarch, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how solicitous Tiberius the emperor was, first concerning the truth thereof, and afterwards, when he had satisfied himself therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great enquiry amongst his learned men, who this Pan should be. But the only use, which that philosopher makes of this story, is this, to prove that daemons having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longevous) yet were notwithstanding mortal; he endeavouring from thence to solve that phenomenon of the defect of oracles, because the daemons, who had formerly haunted those places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of Plutarch’s, it is much more probably concluded by Christian writers, that this thing coming to pass in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil daemons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour’s death, happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as sadly prefaging evil to themselves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkness, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had so long exercised over mankind; according to such passages of scripture as these, Now is the prince of this world judged; and having spoiled principalities and powers (by his death upon the cross) be triumphed over them in it. Now our Saviour Christ could not be called Pan, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal word devoid of all manner of life, or else as endued only with a plattick nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as Pan was taken for the λόγος τοποθετ. τῷ κόσμῳ, that reason and understanding, by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed, or for θέους ὀνομαζόντας δικαίον, that divine wisdom, which diffuseth itself through all things.
things. Moreover, Pan being used not so much for the naked and abstract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this visible corporeal world, might therefore the better signify God manifested in the flesh, and clothed with a particular human body, (in which respect alone, he was capable of dying,) Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could so well befit our Saviour Christ as this.

We have now made it manifest, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekish and European was derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wisdom, which as it did produce all things from it self, doth προωέλα ἐκ διν, contain and comprehend the whole, and is it self in a manner all things. We think fit in the next place to observe, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, viz. God’s being all things, is every where insinft upon throughout the Hermaick or Trismegistick writings. We shall begin with the Alephelian dialogue or the τίλατος λόγος, translated into Latin by Apuleius; in the entrance of which, the writer having declared, Omnia unus esse, & umnum esse omnia, that all things were of one, and that one was all things, he afterwards adds this explication thereof; Nomine hoc dixi, Omnia unum esse, & unum omnia, utpote quia in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creavit omnia? Nec inermibis unus est divus omnia, cuius membra sunt omnia. Hujus itaque, qui est unus omnia, vel ipsa est Creator omnium, in tota bac disputacione curato meminisse. Have we not already declared, that all things are one, and one all things? for as much as all things existed in the Creator, before they were made; neither is it improperly said to be all things, whose members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole disputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all. And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made; Iacirce non erat quando nata non erant, fed in eo jam tunc erant unde nati babuerunt; they did not properly then exist before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced. Again, he writes thus concerning God, Non spero totius majestatis efferelorem, omnium rerum patrem vel dominum, uno posse quamvis est multis composito nomine nuncupari. Hunc voca potius omni nomine, si quidem est unus & omnia; ut necesse est aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari. Hic ergo folus omnia, &c. I cannot hope sufficiently to express the author of majesty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never so many names. Call him therefore by every name, forasmuch as he is one and all things; so that of necessity, either all things must be called by his name, or be by the names of all things. And when he had spoken of the mutability of created things, he adds, Solus deus ipse in se, & a se, & circum se, totus est plenus atque perfectus, &que sua firma stabilitas est; nec in ipsis impulsi, nec loco moveri potest, cum in eo sunt omnia, & in omnibus ipse est solus. God alone in himself, and from himself, and about himself, is altogether perfect, and himself is his own stability. Neither can he be moved or changed, by the impulse of any things, since all things are in him, and he alone is in all things. Lastly, to omit other places, Hic sensibilis mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel
Chap. IV. upon God's being All Things.

vel corporum; que omnia fine Deo vegetari non possint: Omnia enim Deus, & à Deo omnia, & fine hoc, nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, & ipse, & per ipsum——Si totem animadverteres, veratatione perdividce, mundum ipsum sensibilium, & que in ea sunt omnia. à superiori illo mundo, quevis vestimento, esse censeas. This sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God; for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without God there neither was any thing, nor is nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him——And if you will consider things after a right manner, you shall learn, that this sensible world, and all the things therein, are covered all over with that superior world (or Deity) as it were with a garment. For the other Trismegetstick books of Ficinus his edition, the third of them called ἤδιξες λόγος, is thus concluded; τὸ γὰρ Θείον η ἑκάστα κατ' ὑπάρξεις, ὡς ἐξαναθεματίζετε ιν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ὁ Φῶς συγκατέστηκεν. The divinity is the whole mundane compages, or constitution; for nature is also placed in the Deity. In the fifth book written upon this argument, ἢ θεων Θείος Φωινάτατος ἦν, that the invisible God is most manifest, we read thus, ἢ ὅτε ἦν ἐν παλαιίστε στίχοις, ὡς ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἦν αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ πάσα ἡ λόγῳ ἄλλοι ἔθεσαν τὰ ὄντα, ἔρχοντας ἐν ἑαυτῷ. For there is nothing in the whole world, which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, be bath manifested; but the things that are not, be contains within himself. And again, ὡς ὁ αὐτομάτητος ὁ πολυπαρδῆς ὁ μάλλον αὐτός σοματικὸς οὐκ ἦν ὡς ἦν τοις ἔστιν πάλιν γὰρ ἄλλοι ἔστιν, ἥτ Anatomy ἔστιν τῷ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀλλου ὁμώμω τῇ πάλιν, ἡ τοις ἔστιν πάλιν. He is both incorporeal and omnincorporeal, for there is nothing of any body, which he is not; he is all things that are, and therefore he bath all names, because all things are from one father; and therefore he bath no name, because he is the father of all things. And in the close of the same book, ὢς ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ, ὡς ὁ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ. For what shall I praise thee? for those things which thou hast made? or for those things which thou hast not made? for those things which thou hast manifested, or for those things which thou hast hidden and concealed within thy self? And for what cause shall I praise thee? because I am my own, as having something proper, and distinct from thee? thou art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I do, or say, for thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not; thou art that which is made, and thou art that which is unmade. Where it is obversable, that before things were made, God is said νἀποτελεῖν, to hide them within himself; but when they are made, Φανερόν, to manifest and reveal them from himself. Book the Eighth, νοέν, ὡς ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὁ παλαιός ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, ἀρχὴ ἡ μὲν ἑκάστας πάντοτε ἡ θεός. Understand that the whole world is from God, and in God; for God is the beginning, comprehensions and constitution of all things. Book the ninth, μέλλων δὲ λέγω ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἀυτὸ λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἀποφαίνει, ἀυτὸς ἀπαραίτως ἐν τῷ ἐκείνῳ ἀυτῷ προσλαμβάνειν, ἐξ ὑπ' ἑπιτοίχως. I would not say, that God hath all things, but rather declare the truth, and say that he is all things; not as receiving them from without, but as sending them forth.
forth from himself. Again, afterwards in the same book, ἵνα ἐγείραι πώτερ ἱερον, ὅτε ἀπολείψθησαι τι τῶν ὄντων; ὕστατον εἰ λέγω τῶν ὑδάτων, λέγω τῷ Θεῷ: τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω τῷ Θεῷ εἴη, ἵνα ἐγείρῃ τοῦ ὄντος. There shall never be a time, when any thing that is, shall cease to be; for when I say any thing that is, I say any thing of God, for God hath all things in him, and there is neither any thing without God, nor God without any thing. Book the tenth, τι γὰρ ἐστι θεός, ὅ τι πάντα, ὅ τι ἀγαθόν, ὅ τι τῶν πάντων εἶναι εἴ τι οὕτως. ὅλα ὑπάρχεις αὐτῷ τῶν ὄντων. What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the subsistence of things that are? And again, ὅ Θεός, ὅ τι πάντα, ὅ τι ἀγαθόν, τῷ ἐνα χαὶ τῷ πᾶντα, God is both the father and good, because he is all things.

Book the eleventh, αὐτοφεισος γὰρ ἢν ἀλήθεια ἦν τῷ ἐγώ, ἀληθινόν ὅν ἔστι· ἵνα χρησιμωπώσαντι, πάντα δὲ τετελεσθεῖσιν ἀλλαγήν. God acting immediately from himself is always in his own work, himself being that which he makes; for if that were never so little separated from him, all would of necessity fall to nothing and die. Again, πάντα ἐστιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, ὥς ἡς ἐν τῷ πάντω νεώμενος, all things are in God, but not as lying in a place. And further, since our own soul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, τότε ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ ἐναύοντος ὑπὸ Θεοῦ, ὧν πάντως νομίζοντας πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐξιν, τοῦ κόσμου κτιστοῦ ἐκκον. You may consider God in the same manner, as containing the whole world within himself, as his own conceptions and cogitations. And in the close of that chapter, that, which is also thence cited by St. Cyril, is to the same purpose; ἀφαίρετος ο Θεός; εὐφημισμὸν ὅ τι τῆς αὐτῷ ὁμοιότητος· δι' αὐτὸ τέτο πάντα ἐπιστεύει, καὶ διὰ πάντων αὐτοῦ βλέπει: τοῦ ἐστι βασιλεύον τῷ Θεῷ: τότε δὲ αὐτῷ ὀφθαλμος, τὸ αὐτοῦ φανερεῖν ἑαυτῷ πάντων. Is God invisible? speak worthily of him, for who is more manifest than he? for this very reason did he make all things, that thou mightest see him through all things: this is the virtue and goodness of the Deity, to be seen through all things. The mind is seen in thinking, but God in working or making. Book the twelfth, ἦκασα τῷ ἀγαθῷ δαίμόνι τῆς λίγοτητος (ἰκείος γὰρ μάκαρ, ὦ τίμιος, ἀληθείας ὅ προσόνῳς θεός, τῶν πάντων καθενός, οὐκὶ λάγος ἐφιστολικός) ἧκασα γενά τοι παρ' αὐτὸ λίγοτης, ἵνα ἐστὶν τὰ πάντα. I have the good demum (for be alone, as the first begotten god, beholding all things, spake divine words) I have heard him sometimes saying, that one is all things. Again in the same chapter, ὅ τι συνάρχει κύριος ὑπὸ ποιμένος πρεσβύτερος ἵππων, ὅ τι συναρχεῖ τῷ τάξιν, ὅ βασιλεύει τῷ πάσχος, πληρομαί εἰς τῆς ζωῆς· ἣν ἄκιντον ἐν τῷ διά διά παύσεις τοῦ αἰώνος, ὅτε τῷ πάντως, ὅτε τῷ κατά μέρος, ὅ ἐν μέρῳ ἐν μέροις· This whole world is intimately united to him, and observing the order and will of its father, hath the fulness of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor shall be, any thing dead in the world. The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is said in scripture to quicken and enliven all things. τοῦ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, τὸ πάντως ἐν ἑαυτῷ πάσχει, ἥνια ἐστιν ὁ μήκος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν γόνοις, ὅτε τὸ ποιοῦσιν, ὅταν ποιεῖτο, ὅτε ἐγείρετο, ὅτε συνήθειν, ὅτε τὸ γόνον περί τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶ. πᾶν ἢκείν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ πάντων ὁ πρόποστος. This is God, the universe or all. And in this universe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about

about God, for he is all or the whole, (but those things belong to parts.) And the Arcane Can- tion, though that thirteenth book, to which it is subjoined, be supposi- titious, yet harps much upon this point of the Egyptian theology, that God is all: μενει γάρ τὸν τὰς κλήσεις ἁμαρτών, ἡ τὸ πάν, ἡ τὸ ἐν; I am about to praise the Lord of the creation, the all and the one. And again, All the powers, that are in me, praise the one and the all. Book the fifteenth, ἵνα τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ τὸ πάν, ἥτοι νὰ χρησιμοτεῖ τὸ πάν, πάλιν γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ δεῖ: If any one go about to separate the all from the one, he will destroy the all, or the uni- verse, for all ought to be one. Book the sixteenth, ἀρξόμενι τῷ λόγῳ ἔθνει, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεσάμενος, τὸν τῶν ἑλάσα διεσπορί, διοπτητῆν χ' πατέρα, χ' περίβολον, χ' πάντα ὃν τού ἅγιω, χ' ἐν αὐτοῖ τὸ πάντω; τὸ πάντων γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα ἐν ἑν, ἡ ἐν ἑν, I will begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord and maker and father and bound of all things; and subo being all things, is one; and being one, is all things: for the fulness of all things is one and in one. And again, μέγιτος τῷ Θεῷ πάντα ἐν τῷ ἑν, ἐν τῷ πάντω μεῖζον, πάντα ἀνα τῷ Θεῷ πάντα ἐν τῷ πάντω, οὕτω ποιεῖ: All things are parts of God, but if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore he making all things, doth, as it were, make himself.

Now, by all this we see, how well these Trismegistick books agree with that ancient Egyptian inscription in the temple of Sais, that God is all, that was, is, and shall be. Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly affording one God that was all things; it is altogether impossible, that it should acknowledge a multitude of self-existent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two several Egyptian names for one and the same supreme Deity; Hammon and Neith: but we shall find, that, besides these, the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions also; as of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis. For first, though Isis have been taken by some for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for Ceres or corn, by others for the land of Egypt, (which things, in what sense they were defied by the Egyptians, will be elsewhere declared) yet was she undoubtedly taken also sometimes for an univerfal and all-comprehending Numan. For Plutarch affirms, that Isis and Neith were really one and the same god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of Neith or Minerva at Sais, where the forementioned inscription was found, is called by him the temple of Isis; so that Isis, as well as Neith or Minerva among the Egyptians, was there described, as that God, who is all that was, is, and shall be, and whose veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but an univerfal and all-comprehending Numen. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inscription and dedication to the goddes Isis, still extant at Capua:

T I B I.
V N A. Q V Æ.
E S. O M N I A.
D E A. I S I S.
Where the goddess Isis is plainly declared to be πάντα, one and all things, that is, a universal and all comprehending Deity. And with this agreeeth also that oration of this Goddess Isis in Apuleius; *En adjun tus commota, Luci, precibus, rerum natura parentis, elementorum omnium dominas, numen* progenies initialis; sphaera numinum, regina marium, prima calitum, deorum deorumque facies uniformis; quae soli luminosa culmina, maris salubria sphaera, inferiorium deplorata silentia, mutibus meis dispensa. Cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multum totus veneratur orbis. Behold here am I, moved by thy prayers, Lucius, that nature, which was the parent of things; the mistress of all the elements; the beginning and original of ages; the sum of all the divine powers; the queen of the seas; thefirst of the celestial inhabitants; the uniform face of gods and goddesses; which with my beaks dispense the luminous heights of the heavens, the wholesome blasts of the sea, and the deplorable silences of hell; whose only divine power the whole world worships and adores, in a multiforment manner, and under different rites and names. From which words it is plain, that this goddess Isis was not the mere animated moon (which was rather a symbol of her) but that she was an universal Deity, comprehensive of the whole nature of things; the one supreme God, worshipped by the Pagans, under several names, and with different rites. And this is the plain meaning of those last words, *Numen unicum, &c, that the whole world worshippeth one and the same supreme God, in a multiforment manner, with various rites and under many different names.* For, besides the several names of the other Pagans there mentioned, the Egyptians worshipped it under the names of Hammon, Neith, and others that shall be afterwards declared. And thus was Isis again worshipped and invoked, as the unicum numen, or only divine power, by Apuleius himself, in these following words*; *Tu sancta humani generis sophitrix perpetua, dulcem matris affectionem misericordibus, fatorum inexteabiliter contorta retrahas litia, fortune tempestates mitigas, & stellarum noxios meas cobises: Te superti colunt, observant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondunt fidera, gaudent numina, servivunt elementa: tuo nutu spirant sphaera, &c. Thou holly and perpetual savour of mankind, that art always bountiful in cherishing mortals, and dost manifest the dear affections of a mother to them in their calamities, thou extricatest the involved threads of fate, mitigatest the tempests of fortune, and restrainest the noxious influences of the stars; the celestial gods worship thee, the infernal powers obey thee; thou rollest round the heavens, enlightenest the sun, governest the world, treadest upon Tartarus, or hell; the stars obey thee, the elements serve thee, at thy beck the winds blow, &c.* Where Isis is plainly supposed to be an universal Numen and supreme monarch of the world. Neither may this hinder, that she was called a goddess, as Neith also was; these Pagans making their Deities to be indifferently of either sex, male or female. But much more was Osiris taken for the supreme deity, whose name was sometimes said to have signified in the Egyptian language, πολυφωςλυμο, that which had many eyes; sometimes ἡμιτος ἵμηγος, ἡ ἀγαθοτητα, an alive and beneficent force; (and whose hieroglyphick was an eye and a scepter;) the former signifying providence and wisdom,
wisdom, and the latter power and majesty (as Plutarch tells us 1) who also is thus described in Apuleius, Deus deorum magnorum potior, & majorum summus, & summorum maximus, & maximorum regnator, Osiris: That God who is the chiefest of the greater Gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest. Wherefore the same Apuleius 2 also tells us, that Isis and Osiris were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words: 3 Quanquam connexa, ino vero unica, ratio Numinis, religiousque effet, tamen teletie discentes esse maximum: Though Isis and Osiris be really one and the same divine power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different. The proper notion of Osiris being thus declared by Plutarch, 4 to ρωττων κυριωτατον πάντων, η γαγαδον τοιτον ιοτι, that first and highest of all beings, which is the same with good. Agreeably whereunto, Jamblichus 5 affirmeth, ἄγνωστο ποιητος ἔν τοῖς ὁσιομο-ὕνοις, ὁτι God, as the cause of all good, is called Osiris by the Egyptians. Lastly, as for Serapis, though Origen 6 tells us, that this was a new upstart Deity, set up by Ptolemy in Alexandria, yet this God in his oracle 7 to Nicocrius the King of Cyprus, declares himself also to be a universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words, ἕκατον νόμον νομιμών, That Serapis was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world; so doth Plutarch 8 himself conclude, that Osiris and Serapis were ἐν οἴσι τινὶ ἐν μιᾷ δυναμισ, both of them names of one God, and the same divine power. Accordingly whereunto Diodorus Siculus 9 determines, that these three, Hammon, Osiris and Serapis, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, Porphyrius 10, it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested it self in the temple of this god Serapis, above all the other Pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons or devils: Τοις δὲ ποιηταῖς δαίμονας ἐκ ἐπισκοπῆς τοῦ Σεράπου ὑποτέλεσμα ἐν τοῖς θεο-άγοις μόνοις ἀδαπέστειται, &c. We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil demons are under Serapis, as their prince and head: this appearing (faith he) not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this God, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil demon, which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth and air. Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil demon or devil, that delivered oracles in this temple of Serapis as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affected to be worshipped as the supreme God.

The Egyptian Trinity; Euston, Book I.

Besides all this, Eusebius himself from Porphyrius informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of Cneph, whom they worshipped in a statue of human form, and a blackish sky-colour'd complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a scepter, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thrumting forth an egg out of his mouth. The reason of which hieroglyphick is thus given, δώτι λόγος δεισιδέρως και καταμίμησις, καὶ οὐ γεννώς, καὶ στις ωσπόσος, καὶ κατι βασιλεύς, καὶ κατι νοερός κινηταί, διὸ τῷ ἄρτεψ Ὀξίς ἐν τῇ κυρίλλη κινητικῷ. Because that wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out, but hidden and obscure. And because this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and because it is intellectually moved, signified by the feathers upon his head. Moreover, by the egg thrust out of the mouth of this God, was meant the world, created by the eternal λόγος, and from this Cneph was said to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians call Phtha, and the Greeks Vulcan; of which Phtha more afterwards. That the Egyptians were the most eminent affervers of the Cosmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cause the scholiasts upon Ptolemy thus perstringeth them, ἐφετείς ἐιδωλικαι λέγειν γίνον αἰτιότητι κόσμος, the Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the genesis or creation of the world. And Asclepius, an ancient Egyptian writer, in his Myriogenia, affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the sun was made in Libra. But that the Egyptians did not suppose the world to have been made by chance, as Epicurus and other atheistical philosophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them Cneph, is evident from this testimony of Porphyrius. Which Cneph was look'd upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cause the inhabitants of Thebais refused to worship any other God besides him, as Plutarch informs us in these words; εἰς δὲ τοὺς γραφός τῶν παραμενον ἡμῶν, τὸς μὲν ἄλλης συντεχνείᾳ τελείας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰσήθους τῶς θεολόγως κατακρίνασις, ὡς ζῷον θεόν ἐστιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ διὰ κακῶς αὐτοῖ τοῖς Κυρὶ οὐ εἰσήθους κατὰ τῆς ἐφανάκτως. Whisth the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax imposed upon them, for the nourishment of these sacred animals, worshipped by them, the inhabitants of Thebais only refused, because they would acknowledge no mortal God, and worshipped him only, whom they call Cneph, an unmade and eternal Deity.

Having now made it undeniable manifest, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme universal and unmade Deity, we shall conclude this whole discourse with the two following observations; first, that a great part of the Egyptian Polytheism was really nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions, as of Hammon, Neith, Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Kneph, to which may be added Phtha, and those other names in Jamblichus, of Euston and Emebp. And that the Pagans universally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed also by Apuleius, in that forecited passage of his, Numeum unicum, multiformis specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus venera-
CHAP. IV. Cneph (or Emeph) and Ptha.

veneratur orbis, the whole world worshippeth one only supreme Numen in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites. Which different names for one and the same supreme God might therefore be mistaken by some of the fottith vulgar amongst the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of these later times, for so many distinct, made and self-existent deities.

Neverthelaws, here may well be a question started, whether amongst those several Egyptian names of God, some might not signify distinct divine hypostases subordinate; and particularly, whether there were not some footsteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For since Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato, who all of them affester a trinity of divine hypostases, unquestionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may reasonably be suspected, that these Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed Athanagius Kircherus makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obelisk, that firft hieroglyphick of a winged globe, with a serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphick of a triform Deity, or trinity of divine hypostases; he confirming the fame, from the testimony of Abenephius an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaick fragment imputed to Sanchoniathon; the globe being faid to signify the firft incomprehensible Deity, without beginning or end, self-existent; the serpent the divine wisdom and creative virtue; and laftly, the wings that active spirit, that cherifeth, quickeneth, and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge; but the clearest footsteps that we can find any where of an Egyptian trinity is in Jamblichus his book, written concerning their mysteries; which whole place therefore is worth the setting down: Kat' alaw d'ét ακεύν προστάτης [Ερμης] Τοῦ τοῦ Ἡμῶν, τῶν ἔπερανων Τῶν ἡγήμων, οὐ Φωτόν ὦν ἐστι αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν νοῦτα, ἡ τάς ρεπτίς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἑπτάφεσα. Τάτη ἔθαν οἱ Ψειρές, ὥς οἱ Φωτος τοῦ πάσιν μάρχους προστάτης, ὅν τι Εἰκόνων ἴσον τινι, ἐν ο εἴ τρεῖον ἐπί τοὺς καὶ τοῖ συντα ποτόν, ὅθι ὃ, ἐκάλεσι σήμερας μόνος ἐπιφάνεστα. Ἡντι δὲ τούτοι—ὁ ὅμοιόμενος ὡς ὃ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σώφρον ἀλήθεια τε ἐκ σύνεσιν, καὶ τῆς Ἀθήνης τῶν κεκαλυκτέον ἔργων ἀληθείας ἐπί τινι, ἐν οικεσίας ἐκαθαρίσθη τοῦ Ἐμήν τις τοῦ Ἱφηνείου της τεκνηκής μένον ἑστιν ἐκ τῶν μεταδιδομένων τῶν θεών τῶν τῆς τῆς νοοῦ προστατικάς, ἐφικτων ἐκ πατημάτων, ὁμοίως ἐκ τῆς ἢ τῆς ἐπιστεύης ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας διάκρισιν. According to another order or method, Hermes places the god Emeph*, as the prince* and ruler over all the celestial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind understanding himself, and converting his cogitations or intellecums into himself. Before which Emeph*, he placeth one indivisible, whom he calleth Eicton, in* which is the first intelligible, and which is worshippeth only by silence. After which two, Eicton and Emeph*, the demiurgick mind and president of truth as* with wisdom it proceedeth to generations, and bringeth forth the hidden powers of the occult reasons into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially affects all things with truth, Ptha (which Ptha, the Greeks attending only to the artificial things thereof, call Hepheshus or Vulcan) as it is productive of good, Osiris, besides other names that it hath, according to its other powers.

* or Cneph.
powers and energies. In which passage of \textit{Jamblichus} we have plainly three divine hypostases, or universal principles subordinate, according to the Hermaic theory; first, an indivisible unity called \textit{Eisston}; secondly, a perfect mind, converting its intellections into itself, called \textit{Emeph} or \textit{Hemphsta}; and thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by several names, according to its several powers, as \textit{Phtha}, \textit{Ammon}, \textit{Oesris}, and the like: so that these three names with others, according to \textit{Jamblichus}, did in the Egyptian theology signify, one and the same third divine hypostasis. How well these three divine hypostases of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagorick or Platonick trinity, of first, \textit{τό ἐι} or \textit{τάγαθον}, unity and goodness it self; secondly, \textit{wis}, mind, and thirdly \textit{ψυχ}, soul, I need not here declare. Only we shall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reason or wisdom, which was the \textit{Demiuurgus} of the world, and is properly the second of the forementioned hypostases, was called also among the Egyptians, by another name, \textit{Cneph}; from whom was said to have been produced or begotten the god \textit{Phtha}, the third hypostasis of the Egyptian trinity; so that \textit{Cneph} and \textit{Emeph} are all one. Wherefore, we have here plainly an Egyptian trinity of divine hypostasis subordinate, \textit{Eisston}, \textit{Emeph} (or \textit{Cneph}) and \textit{Phtha}. We know not what to add more to this of \textit{Jamblichus}, concerning an Egyptian trinity, unless we should infill upon those passages, which have been cited by some of the fathers to this purpose out of Hermaic or Trismegistick books, whereof there was one before set down out of St. Cyril, or unless we should again call to mind that citation out of \textit{Damascius}², \textit{μεία τῷ ὅλῳ ἄρχῇ} σώτος ἄγνωστος ὑμμαμένος \textit{κύ} τότε τρῖς ἀναφανέμενον ὑπόσ, that according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and this three times repeated. Agreeably to which, \textit{Augustinus} \textit{Steuibus} produces another passage out of the same philosophick writer; that the Egyptians made, \textit{ὁράτῳ} ἄρχῃ σωτός ὑπὲρ πάσαν νόσειν, σώτος ἄγνωστος, τρῖς \textit{τοῦ ἐπιφανέστατος}, the first principle of all, is darkness above all knowledge and understanding (or unknown darkness) they three times repeating the same. Which the forementioned \textit{Steuibus} takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of divine hypostases in the Egyptian theology.

Our second observation is this, that the Egyptian theology as well as the Orphick (which was derived from it) affecting one incorporeal Deity, that is all things; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, so did the seeming polytheism of these Egyptians proceed also in great measure from this principle of theirs not rightly understood; they being led thereby, in a certain sense, \textit{Στοιχοιοί}, to perfor- nate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature, bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Not that they therefore worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as such, much less things not substantial, but mere accidents, for so many real, distinct, personal deities; but because conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worshipped in all things (such especially as were most beneficial to mankind) they did, according to that Asclepian and Trismegistick doctrine before-mentioned, call God

\footnote{¹ De Myfter. \textit{Aegypt. Sect. VIII.} cap. III. p. 158, 159.
² Vide Wofhil \textit{Anecdot. Graeca} p. 260.
Chap. IV.  cut in pieces by Typhon.

God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiser of them very well understood, that it was really one and the same simple Deity, that was thus worshipped amongst them by piece-meal, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by Plutarch; De if. & Of. Ἐκλησιακὸν ἤ Ἱσὺς εἶναι, καὶ ὁ Τυφών πολιμίωτερῷ τῇ Σεβ. καὶ ὁ Ἅγιοι καὶ ἀπάτων τετυφυμεῖ-351. νῦν, καὶ διὰ τών καὶ ἄγιοι τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων, ὅπως η Ἱσὺς συνάγει καὶ συντιθεί, καὶ παραπο- 

dεδώ τοις τελευταῖς ἱερώσεσι. Ἱσὺς is a Greek word, which signifies knowledge; and Typhon is the enemy to this goddess; who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth disfarrā and disperse the holy doctrine (of the simple Deity) which Ἱσὺς collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to those who are in- 
itiated into her sacred mysteries, in order to deification. In which words, Plutarch intimates, that the Egyptian fable, of Ὑψίς being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the disperation and distraction of the simple Deity, by reason of the weakness and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once) into several names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and understanding, that is, Ἱσὺς, makes up whole again, and unites into one.

XIX. It is well known, that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and pretending to a kind of divine inspiration, did otherwise embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain sense of religion, and the notions of morality, yet these notwithstanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the Pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon several accounts. As first, their attributing to the gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, passions and vices. Which abuse of theirs the wiser of the Pagans were in all ages highly sensible of and offended with, as partly appears from these free passages vested upon the stage;

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Excerpt, in Iux. 
[Ex Florile-
gio Stobaei 
apud Hugon. 
Grotium in 
Excerpt 
Cor. & Tragi-
cor. p. 334] 

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To this sense: Since mortal men are punished by the gods for transgressing their laws, is it not unjust, that ye Gods, who write these laws, should yourselves live without law? And again,

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Nulla


Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of the gods; for they can only be justly blamed, who teach men to do such things by their examples.

Secondly, the poets were further guilty of depraving the religion and theology of the Pagans, by their so frequently perverting and defying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of those gods, that were supposed to preside over them; that is, of the several divine powers manifested in them. This Plutarch 1 taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young men's reading of their writings, he thus feazonably cautions against the danger of it: τῶν τῶν ποιημάτων ἡ διάδοσις τῷ μὲν βλασφήμοις, τῷ γυναικεῖον πῶς τοις τῶν θεῶν ὑμνοῖς, οἱ ποιηταὶ.—καθως δὲ τοῖς τοῖς θεῶν ὑμνοῖς, οἱ ποιηταὶ, τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν ἰμένων Φάτνημεν τῇ ἐννοιᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ γυνάκεις τιμῶν, οὐ τοις δοτηροῖς εἰσι καθηγούμενις, ὑποκατάσταται προσακρημονεῖς. It is very profitable and necessary, if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we should understand how they use the names of the gods in different senses. Wherefore the poets sometimes use the names of the gods properly, as intending to signify thereby the gods themselves, and sometimes again they use them improperly and equivocally, for those powers which the gods are the givers and dispensers of, or the things which they preside over. As for example, Vulcan is sometimes used by the poets for that God or divine power, which presides over fire and the arts that operate by fire, and sometimes again the word is taken by them for fire itself. So Mars, in like manner, is sometimes used for the God, which presides over military affairs, and sometimes again it signifies nothing else but war. An instance whereof is there given by Plutarch out of Sophocles:

Τυφλὸς γὰρ, ἢ γυναῖκες, ὃς ὦ ἀξίων Ἀρχή,
Σως προσώπῳ, πάντα τυφλῆς νουχά.

Mars (O Mulieres) cæsus birtuto suis
Velut ore frendens, cuncta commiscet mala.

And we might give this other instance of the same from Virgil,

——Purit tota Mars impius orbe.

For the God of war, that is, the divine providence that presides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war itself that is there so styled.

Indeed we shall afterwards make it appear, that the first original of this business, proceeded from a certain philosophick opinion amongst the Pagans,

* De audiendis Poetis p. 22. Tom. II. Oper.
Pagans, that God was diffused throughout the whole world, and was himself in a manner all things, and therefore ought to be worshipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men, who carried it on thus far, by personating the several inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make such a multitude of distinct gods and goddesses of them. Which humour, though it were chiefly indulged by them, *ψευδαπώρια ἴστιν, οὐλ' ἕνεκεν τῆς πλούσιας καί πλαστῆς τῆς φαντασίας*, besides gratifying their own poetic fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous consequence, as the fame Plutarch gravely and soberly advises, in his book de Iside, it begetting in some gross and irrational superstition (that is, in our Christian language, idolatry) and carrying others on to downright impiety and atheism. But this will be afterwards also again insisted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we shall observe, that the poets did also otherwise deprave the theology of the Pagans, so as to make it look somewhat more Aristocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; first, by their speaking so much of the gods in general and without distinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, so as if it were managed and carried on, communi confilio deorum, by a common-council and republic of gods, wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their Jupiter, or supreme god, were no more amongst them, than a speaker of a house of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And secondly, (which is the last deprivation of the Pagan theology by these poets) by their making those, that were really nothing else but several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to its several powers manifested in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be so many really distinct persons and gods; insomuch as sometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with Jupiter himself. This St. Basil seems to take notice of, in his oration, ἰδίως γένος γονέων ἔμπροσθεν τῷ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὸ εὐθανασίαν, διότι καὶ μᾶλλον ἴνα, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πολλὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ διδασκόντως. But lest of all will we give credit to the poets, where they discourse concerning the gods, and speak of them as many (distinct and independent) persons, and that not agreeing amongst themselves neither, but fiding several ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another.

Notwithstanding all which extravagancies and miscarriages of the poets, we shall now make it plainly to appear, that they really asserted, not a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created gods. This hath been already proved concerning Orpheus, from such fragments of the Orphick poems, as have been owned and attested by Pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of those other Orphick verses, that are found cited

by Christians and Jews only (and we cannot reasonably conclude all these to be counterfeits and supposititious) amongst which we have this for one

There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the off-spring of this one. Moreover, when God, in the same Orphick fragments, is styled ἡΜπαρ-πάτωρ, both father and mother of all things (accordingly as it was observed before) that both the Orphick and Egyptian theology made the supreme Deity especially, to be ἀρρη-νος, hermaphroditical, or male and female together; this, as Clemens Alexandrinus 3 rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to signify, τοις μὲν ὑπτῶν γένεσιν, the production of things out of nothing, or from the Deity alone, without any pre-existent or self-existent matter.

But we shall pass from Orpheus to Homer. Now it is certain, that Homer's Gods were not all eternal, unmade and self-existent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a Genesis, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verse of his 4,

The ocean from whence the gods were generated; where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world superior to men, but principally (as Eusebius observes) the stars, Στέφναι αὐτις, ἐστιον, gods (faith he) are here put for stars. And as the same philologer further adds, the gods or stars do by a synchdoche signify all things, or the whole world, αὐτι τοι πάντων ἦς ἀπό μιρια, a part being put for the whole, accordingly as the same poet elsewhere 4 declares his lenfe, speaking likewise of the ocean,

Which was the original of all things, or from whence (not only the gods, but all) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full meaning of Homer was this, that the gods or stars, together with this whole visible world, had a temporary production, and were at first made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watry chaos. So that Homer's Theogonia, as well as Hesiod's, was one and the same thing with the Cosmogonia; his generation of gods the same with the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Mosaic Cabala, or tradition. And Eusebius tells us, that, according to the ancients, Homer's ἀπόθεσις, described II. s. was ἀνίμα τῆς καρμογενίας, an obscure signification of the Cosmogonia, or Cosmogonia.

Nevertheless

2 Stromatum Lib. V. p. 724.
3 Ibid. ver. 201 & 252.
4 Ibid. ver. 246.
thus generated from the ocean or watry chaos, yet this is to be understood only of the inferior Gods, and he is suppos'd to be distinguished from them, who in the same poet is frequently called, ο Ζεὺς κατ' εξοχήν, God by way of eminency, (to whom he plainly ascribes omnipotence) and Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, whom he styleth καρπίστων ἀπάντων, the most powerful of all, and πρῶτος Ζεὺς, the first and chiefest of the gods, and Ζεὺς πατέρ, and who, the highest of gods and governours, and whom he affir'meth infinitely to transcend the gods, II. τ. 

Τόσον εἰρήνει τ' εἰμί Ζεὺς, περὶ τ' εἰμί ἄνθρωπον.

And to reign as well over gods as men, II. ο. 

—ος τε Ζεὺς κ' ἄνθρωπον ἄνασστι. 

Lastly, whom he maketh to be πατέρα Ζεὺς, the father of the Gods as well as men; that is, nothing less than the creator of them and the whole world. He therefore, who thus produced the gods and stars out of the ocean or watry chaos, must needs be excluded out of that number of gods, so as not to have been himself generated or made out of it. Thus have we before observed, that ο Ζεὺς, or the gods in general, are frequently taken, both by Homer and other Greek writers, in way of distinction from ο Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, that is, for the inferior gods only.

It is true indeed, that others of the Pagan gods, besides Jupiter, were by the Latins in their solemn rites and prayers styled pateres, fathers; and as Jupiter is nothing else but Ζεὺς pater, contracted into one word, so was Mars called by them Mars pater, and Saturnus, Janus, Neptune, and Liber had the like addition also made to their names, Saturnus pater, Janus pater, Neptune pater, Liber pater: and not only so, but even their very heroes also (as for example, Quirinus) had this honourable title of father bestowed on them; all which appeareth from those verses of Lucilius.

Ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus divum, 
Ante Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars, 
Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithstanding which, here is a great difference to be observed, that though those other gods were called Fathers, yet none of them was ever called, either by the Greeks πατέρα Ζεὺς, or by the Latins, pater optimus divum, save only Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, the supreme Deity.

And that Homer was thus generally understood by the Pagans themselves to have ascribed a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from these following citations. Plutarch in his Platonick questions, Αναρράχεται Διὸ "Τονίον καλεῖ, προτέρον δὲ "Ο αναρράχον τῶν αρχικῶν ἀρχικὰς Ζεὺς, ὑπότον καθέτον πρωτοποιεῖ" Zenocrates called Jupiter, Hypatton, or the biggest; but before him Homer styled that God, who is the prince of.

1 Verf. 20. 
2 Verf. 291. 
4 P. 1007. Tom. II. Oper.
Hesiod's Theogonia to be understood

of all princes, ὑπατοὶ κραίστων, the highest of rulers or governors. Again, the same Plutarch de Iside & Osiride, Τῷ ὁ ὁμοίων αὖ ἀληθινῶς ὁ θεῖος ἰμμητος γέρανης, ὅπο τὸ μεν τὸν πρώτον ἔμφασις, τὸ δὲ τὸν ἀνθρωπόν, ὡς ὁμοίως τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ μέγατον καλῶς, ἵππῳ τὸ μὲν ὑπάτῳ τὸ κρατῶν αὐτῷ, τῷ δὲ μέγατω τὸν εὐκλείαν καὶ τῷ φανερῷ συμφωνήν. The Egyptians, when they described Osiris by those hieroglyphicks of an eye and a scepter, did by the former of them signify Providence, and by the latter Power; as Homer, when he calls that Zeus or Jupiter, who ruleth and reigneth over all things, ὑπατοὶ καὶ μέγατορ, seems by the word ὑπατον to denote his power and sovereignty, but by μέγατορ his wisdom and knowledge. To Plutarch may be added Proclus, who, upon Plato's Timæus, having proved that, according to that philosopher, there was τὸ κύριον πατρίδος ἤ τῷ ὀλίγῳ δημιουργός, one only maker of the whole world, affirms the same likewise of that divine poet Homer, (as he there styles him) ὡς ὁ δὴ πάντων πατέρας ὑπατον κραίστων καὶ πατέρα ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν αὐτοῦ ἀνωμαλίών, καὶ πατέρα εὐφημία τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς νόμοισι. That he also throughout all his poesy praises Jupiter, as the highest of all rulers, and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demiurgical notions to him. Whereupon he concludes in this manner, ὅτῳ τοῖς ὑμᾶς ἑλπικαίσεως τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἀνέφης, τῷ δὲ τοῖς ἰόντος δημιουργίᾳ ἀποκλίθωσιν. And thus we have made it manifest, that all the Greekth theology universally ascribes to Zeus, or Jupiter, the making of all things. Lastly, Aristotle himself confirmithe fame with his testimony, where he writes of the paternal authority after this manner, 

Πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τι ὑιόν τε,

The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from those that be reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them; as the senior is to the junior, and be that begotten to his off-spring. Where Aristotle's senile seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the Gods, because they were all his off-spring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of atheism.

As for Hesiod, if we had not already sufficiently prov'd from his Theogonia, that all his Gods (that is, his inferiour deities) were generated and made, as well as men, it might be made unquestionably evident from this verse of his in his Opera,

De Rep. L. 1. τοῦ τέκνων ἀρχὴ γαλικινήν ἐόν καὶ ὧν ὁμήρος ὁ ἔμμερος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑπερ τιτόντες τὸ παρεσεύτερον προφό τὸ νεωτέρον, καὶ ὁ γεννήτως προφό τὸ τέκνων. The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from those that be reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them; as the senior is to the junior, and be that begotten to his off-spring. Where Aristotle's senile seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the Gods, because they were all his off-spring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of atheism.

When the Gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated. Where the word ἐμάτωσε is thus interpreted by the Greek scholiasts, ἀπὸ τῆς

3 Ver. 108, 109, 110.
CHAP. IV. only of inferiour Gods.

αὐτὸς βίον and i. e. the Gods and men, were both alike made from the same root or flock. And though it followeth immediately after,

Χρύσων μὲν πρώτω θείων μερόπων ἀθρώπως
Αβάνατοι ποιήσαν δόματ' ἑκοντες.

That first of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal Gods; yet Moschobulus there notes, 'Αβάνατοι ποιήσαν, ὃς Ζεὺς μὲν ἐποίησεν, ὡς απὸ τῶν ἀλλων Φάσσεων, ὧν ἥγετα λεγεῖ δι' εὐαίσθησιν τῆς Θεός, τὸ τε ἐν τῷ ἑργαίτη πάντας τῆς ὄμοιεις ἀκαθήρου. The immortal gods made; the true meaning (faith he is), that Jupiter alone made this first golden age of men; as may be proved from other places in the same poet; and though he speak of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that, which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are several other instances of this poet's using Θεοί for Θεός, gods for god. But it is possible, that Hesiod's meaning might be the same with Plato's, that though the inferiour mundane gods were all made at first by the supreme God, as well as men, yet they being made something sooner than men, did afterwards contribute also to the making of men.

But Hesiod's Theogonia, or generation of gods, is not to be understood universally neither, but only of the inferiour gods, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter being to be excepted out of the number of them, whom the same Hesiod, as well as Homer, makes to be the father of gods, as also the king of them, in these words 2:

Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ κόσμως ἤγετ' ἐν Ἄβανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as Proclus writeth upon this place,

"Οὐ τε διὰ βροτοι ἄνδρες ἐμοι, &c.

By whom all mortal men are, δὲ τοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἐκ αὐτομάτως πάντα τοῦ Διὸν προσκυναντίναι, by whom all things are, and not by chance; the poet, by a Syriacacbe, here ascribing the making of all to Jupiter. Wherefore Hesiod's Theogonia is to be understood of the inferiour Gods only, and not of Ζεὺς or Jupiter, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himself therefore αὐτοφορός, self-existent or unmade.

In like manner, that Pindar's gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in these words;

"Ἐν ἄνδροις, ἐν Ζεὺς γένος, ἐκ
Μιῶς ὡς πνεύμων
Ματρός αὐτοφότεραι.

\[[p.120. Edit. Schmidii.]]

4 Hesiodi Opera & Dies, verf. 3.
Unum Hominum, unum Deorum genus,
Et ex una spiramus
Matre utrique.

There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the same
mother, or spring from the same original. Where by the common mother
both of gods and men, the scholiast understands the earth and chaos, taking
the gods here for the inferiour deities only, and principally the stars. ¹

This of Pindar's therefore is to be understood of all the other gods, that
they were made as well as men out of the earth or chaos, but not of that
supreme Deity, whom the same Pindar elsewhere calls Θεῶν πρῶτος, the
most powerful of the Gods, and τὸν πάντων κύριον, the lord of all things, and
πάλι αἰτίοι, the cause of every thing, and ἂμοιστικὴν Θεόν, that God who is the
best artificer, or was the framer of the whole world, and as Clemens Alexandri-
num tells us, τὸ πάντων, or the universe. Which God also, according to Pin-
dar, Chiron instructed Achilles to worship principally, above all the other
gods.

The sense of which words is thus declared by the scholiast, ἦγορέως τὸν με-
γαλόφωνον ἄγαμων καὶ μηκραιῶν δεισότην τὸν Δία, παρὰ τῆς ἀλλος Θεοὺς τιμῶν καὶ
cείςεπικο. That he should honour and worship the loud-sounding Jupiter, the lord
of thunder and lightning, transcendently above all the other gods. Which by
the way confines the opinion of those, who contend, that the supreme God, as
such, was not at all worshipped by the Pagans.

However, this is certain concerning these three, Homer, Hesiod, and Pin-
dar, that they must of necessity either have been all absolute Atheists, in
acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making senseless Chaos, Night and
the Ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore
of Jupiter himself too, that king and father of them; or else assert one only
eternal unmade self-existent deity, so as that all the other gods were gen-
erated or created by that one. Which latter doubtless was their genuine
sense; and the only reason, why Aristotle and Plato might possibly sometime
have a suspicion of the contrary, seems to have been this, their not under-
standing that Mofaick Cabala, which both Hesiod and Homer followed, of
the world's, that is, both heaven and earth's, being made at first out of a
watry chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. Peter, ep. II. ch. 3.

There might be several remarkable passages to the same purpose, pro-
duced out of those two tragick poets, AEschylus and Sophocles; which yet,
because they have been already cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexand-
drinus,

A Passage of Sophocles defended.

There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, air, and winds, &c. After which followeth also something against image-worship; that though this be such as might well become a Christian, and be no where now to be found in those extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been lost) yet the sincerity thereof cannot reasonably be at all suspected by us, it having been cited by so many of the ancient fathers in their writings against the Pagans, as particularly Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret; of which number Clemens tells us, that it was attested likewise by that ancient Pagan historiographer Hecataeus. But there are so many places to our purpose in Euripides, that we cannot omit them all in his Supplices we have this, wherein all men's absolute dependence upon Jupiter, or one supreme Deity, is fully acknowledged.

We have also this excellent prayer to the supreme governour of heaven and earth, cited out of the same tragedian:

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Σεὶ τῶν πάντων μεθέστη χρή,
Πέλαργον τε Φίδων Ζεύς ἔιτ 'Αίδας
'Ομαλαγόμενος τίς τίς
Σὺ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάντω, τοῖς ἐφιδιαίοις,
Σκυῖπῆσων τὸ Δίῳ μελαχρεῖξιον,
Χθώνῳ ἢ "Αἰδῷ μετέχεις ἁρπαγή.
Πείρασιν μὲν φοί βραχαῖς ἄνέργον
Ταῖς βαλαμίμεσις ᾠδοῖς πορωμαθεῖσι
Πάθει ἤμαρτον, τῆς μίθος κακῶν,
Τῷ δὲ μακάρῳ εἷς ξυσσαμόνικος
Εὐφρεῖν μόχθων ἀκάπτωσιν.

Tilli

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* Stromat. Lib. V. p. 717.
* Ver 734, 735, 736.
Euripides and other Greek Poets

Tibi (cuniferum domino) vinum,
Salsamque molam fere, seu Ditis,
Tu serv Jovis nomine gaudes:
Tu namque deos superos inter
Sceptrum taélas sublime Jovis;
Idem regnum terrestre tenes.
Te lucem animis infunde virum,
Qui scire volunt, quo data mentis
Lusia sit ortu, que causa mali;
Cui calicolum rite litando
Requiem sit habere laborum.

Where we may observe that Zeus and "Afo", Jupiter and Pluto, are both of them supposed to be names equally belonging to one and the same supreme God. And the sum of the prayer is this, That God would infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know, what is the root, from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them.

Lastly, there is another devotional passage, cited out of Euripides 1, which contains alfo a clear acknowledgment of one self-existent being, that comprehends and governs the whole world:

Στ τον Ατοφειν, στον ει οδηρω
Ῥομπρα, πιστων φωτι σεμπιλευπος
Όο πιε μεν φως, πιειο φοιαι
Νεξ αιολύχθειει ακρωτής τ' επρων
Ολακινδαλεχος αμφιχεεις

Thou self-sprung being, that doft all enfold,
And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold!
Who art encircled with resplendent light,
And yet ly'st mantled o'er in steady night!
About a horn, the exultant flarry fires
Dance nimbly round in everlasting gyres.

For this sense of the third and fourth verses, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphick passage

Πραγας ετηπεια

That God being in himself a most bright and dazzling light, is respectively to us, and, by reason of the weakness of our understanding, covered over with a thick cloud; as also with that in the scripture, clouds and darkness are round about him: I say, this sense we chose rather to follow, as more rich and august, than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good also; That successive day and night, together with a numberless multitude of stars, perpetually dance round about the Deity.

Aristophanes in the very beginning of his Plutus distinguishes betwixt Σεις and Σει, Jupiter and the gods;

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1 Apud Clement. Alexand. ubi supra, p. 717.
And we have this clear testimony of Terpander, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus¹, Ζεὺς πάντων ἀρχήν, Ζεὺς πάντων ἀρχήν, Thou Jupiter, who are the original of all things, thou Jupiter who are the governour of all. And these following verses are attributed to Menander²:

Τῶν οὖν πάνων κύριων γενεάτατον
Καὶ παθέρα, τῆς διικείσαι τιμῶς μόνον,
'Αγαθῶν τοιῶν εύγειν ὡς κύριορα.

Rerum universarum imperatorem & patrem,
Solum perpetuo colere suppliciter decet,
Artificem tantae & largitorem copie.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one of Hermesianax an ancient Greek poet, and another of Aratus, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where Ennius first appears deriving the Gods in general (who were all the inferiour deities) from Erebus and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

—Divumque bonumumque pater, rex;

both father and king of gods and men, that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of Chaos, himself being unmade.

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguishes betwixt Jupiter and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omnificent Deity,

Est profecto Deus, qui que nos gerimus, auditque & videt.

Which passage very much resembles that of Manlius Torquatus in Livy, Est caeleste numen, es magne Jupiter; a strong affeveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same Plautus in his Rudens clearly afferts one supreme monarch and emperor over all, whom the inferiour Gods are subservient to;

Qui gentes omnes mariaque & terras movet,
Ejus sien civis civitate callitum;
Qui est imperator divum atque bonumum Jupiter,
Is nos per gentes alium alia disparat,
Hominum qui faeta, mores, pietatem & fidem
Nofcimus.—

Cap. Art. 2.
Sc. 2.

² Stromat. Lib. VI. p. 784.
Qui falsas lites falsis testimonii
Petunt, quique in jure abjurat pecuniam,
Eorum referimus nonina exscripta ad Jovem.
Cotidie Ille seit, quis hic querat malum.
Iterum Ille eam rem judicatam judicat.
Bonos in aliiis tabulis exscriptos habet.
Atque hoc feelsh iili in animum inducunt suum
Jovem se placare posse donis, hodiis;
Sed operam & sumptum perdunt, quia
Nibil Ei acceptum est a perjuris supplicii.

Where Jupiter, the supreme monarch of gods and men, is said to appoint other inferior gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners and behaviours of men everywhere; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which Jupiter judges over again all unjust judgments, rendering a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked men conceive, that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious. Notwithstanding which, this poet afterwards jumbles the supreme and inferior gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governours of the world;

Facilium, quippe pius est, a Diis supplicans,
Quam qui feelstus est, incineret veniam fibi.

Pan. Att. 5. 
Sc. 4. 

Again the same poet elsewhere brings in Hanno the Carthaginian with this form of prayer addressing himself to Jupiter or the supreme god;

Jupiter, qui genus colis alique hominum, per quem vivimus
Vitale eum, quem penes spes vitaeque sunt hominum omnium,
Da diem hunc sospitem, quefo, rebus meis agundis.

In the next place, we have these verses of Valerius Soranus, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose, recorded by Varro;

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse deamque,
Progenitor genitrixque deam, Deus UNUS & OMNIS.

To this sense: Omnipotens Jupiter, the king of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genitrix, the both father and mother of those gods; one God and all gods. Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled progenitor & genitrix deorum, after the same manner as he was called in the Orphic theology μνησθομαι and ἄφενυναι, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenor of this Ethnick theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that when ever any inferior deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honoured.

Though

* De Lingua Latinâ, p. 71. Edit. 1581. in 8vo.
Chap. IV. in the Monarchy of the Whole.

Though the sense of Ovid hath been sufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit some other passages of his, as that grateful and sensible acknowledgment,

\[ Quod loquor & spiro, ceitumque & lumina solis \]
\[ Alpicio (possumque ingratus & immemor esse?) \]
\[ Ipse dedit. \]

And this in the third of his Metamorph.

\[ Ille pater restorque deum, cui dextra tristis \]
\[ Ignibus armata est, qui nutu concutit orbem. \]

Virgil's theology also may sufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgment of an omnipotent Deity, and from those verses of his before cited out of Æn. 6. wherein he plainly affirms one God to be the original of all things, as least as a soul of the world; Servius Honoratus there paraphrasing thus, \[ Deus est quidam divinus spiritus, qui per quatuor fusus elementa gignit universa; \] God is a certain spirit, which, infused through the four elements, begetteth all things. Nevertheless, we shall add from him this also of Venus her prayer to Jupiter, Æn. 1.

\[ O qui res hominumque delimum \]
\[ Aeternis regis imperii, & fulmine terres! \]

Which Venus again, Æn. 10. bespeaks the same Jupiter after this manner,

\[ O pater, O nominum divumque eterna potestas! \]

Where we have this annotation of Servius, \[ divumque, eterna potestas, propter aliorum numinum discriptionem; \] Jupiter is here called the eternal power of the gods, to distinguish him from all the other gods, that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Neither ought Horace to be left out, in whom we read to the same purpose, Lib. 1. Od. 12.

\[ Quid prius dicam solitis parentis \]
\[ Laudibus? qui res hominum & deorum, \]
\[ Qui mare & terras, variisque mundum \]
\[ Temperat horis. \]

\[ Unde nil majus generatur ipso, \]
\[ Nec viget quiesque similis aut secundum : \]
\[ Proximos illi tamen occupavit \]

\[ Pallas honores: \]

And again, 3. Lib. Od. 4.

\[ Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat \]

\[ Metamorph. Lib. XIV. verf. 172. \]
Where from those words of Horace, *folitis parentis laudibus*, it appears, that the one supreme Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as such, above all the other gods. And whereas those Pagans vulgarly ascribed the government of the seas particularly to Neptune, of the earth and Hades or Inferi (which are here called *trifia Regna*) to Pluto, these being here attributed by Horace to one and the same supreme and universal Deity; it may well be concluded from thence, that *Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto*, were but three several names or notions of one supreme *Numen*, whose sovereignty notwithstanding was chiefly signified by *Jupiter*. Which name is to be paid of *Pallas* or *Minerva* too, that signifying the eternal wisdom, that it was but another name of God also, though look'd upon as inferior to that of *Jupiter* and next in dignity to it; unless we should conclude it to be a second divine hypostasis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (probably not unknown to Horace) as also to that Scripture *Cabala*, *I was set up from everlasting*, or *ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth*, &c. But of this more afterward.

Lastly, we shall conclude with *Manilius*, who lived in the same Augustan age, and was a zealous opposer of that atheistical hypothesis of *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, as appears from these verses of his:

1. *Quis credat tantas operum fine numine moles,*
   *Ex minimis caecoque creatum fædere mundum?*

Wherefore he also plainly affirms one supreme Deity, the framer and governor of the whole world, in this manner, lib. 2.

2. *Namque canum tacita naturam mente potentem,*
   *Infusumque Deum caro, terrisque, fretisque,*
   *Ingentem equali moderantem fædere molem,*
   *Totumque alterno consensu vivere mundum,*
   *Et rationis agi motu; quam SPIRITUS UNUS*
   *Per cunctas habitas partes, atque irrigat orbem,*
   *Omnia pervolitans, corpusque animale figurat,* &c.

And again,

3. *Hoc opus immensu construellum corpore mundi*
   *Vis animae divina regit, facroque measu*
   *Conspirat Deus & tacita ratione gubernat.*

And lib. 4.

4. *Faciem cali non incidet orbi*
   *Ipse Deus, vulusque suos, corpusque recludit,*

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1 Lib. I. verf. 492, 493.
2 Verf. 61, &c.
3 Ver. 915.
Semper volvendo, sequi ipsum inculcat & effert;
Ut bene cognosci posset, monstreique videndo,
Qualis est, deceatque sias attendere leges.
Ipse vocat nostros animos ad systera mundus,
Nec patitur, quia non condit, sua jura latere.

Where notwithstanding, we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by Manilus to be the supreme Numen.

XX. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer concerning the religion of the Gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, That even all the minor gods of the pagans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same. But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore affluted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet affirmed one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Dithceists to be excepted, (such as Plutarch and Atticus) who, out of a certain softness and tendernefs of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up besides him, an evil foul or demon also in the world self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.

And indeed Epicurus is the only person, that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally affirmed a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded,

Naturam rerum, haud divinam mente coartam;

That there was no God the framer of the world. But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to affright a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he really, admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto, could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of Sir Edward Herbert, de religione Gentilium, Cap. XIV. p. 228.
of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he must have held it, had he really assered any gods at all, οί τε Επικούρου θεοί, σώθεται εἰς ἀτομων τεχνικαί, καὶ το οὖν ἐν τῇ σωταίς ἄναλτοι, τεχνικάκης τῶν Φυσοτοις ἀτόμων ἀποτελέσεις. Epicurus his gods being compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very constitution corruptible, are in continual labour and toil, struggling with their corruptive principles. Nevertheless if Epicurus had in good earnest assered such a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible; so long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wifdome (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst the Theifts, but Atheifts.

Thales the Milefian was one of the most ancient Greek philosophers, who that he admitted a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from that faying of his cited by Aristotle 1, θάλα θεον πλήρη, all things are full of gods. But that notwithstanding he assered one supreme and only unmade or self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laertius 2, προεξετέτοι θάλαν δέ θεος, αὐτίκον γὰρ: God is the oldeft of all things, because he is unmade. From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales his other gods were generated, and the off-spring of one sole unmade Deity.

Phercydes Syrus was Thales his contemporary, of whom Aristotle in his Metaphysicks 3 hath recorded, that he affirmed το γανάθην πρωτον ἄξων, that the first principle, from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but on the contrary descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laertius informs us 4, that this was the beginning of one of Phercydes his books, Ζών μὲν καὶ χρονός ἵν αἰι, καὶ χρω ων: Jupiter, and Time, and the Earth always were. Where notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading χρόνος here instead of χρονός, seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgment of one single and eternal Deity.

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheift as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the golden verses (though not written by him,)

'Αδελαντες μὲν χρωτα θεος νόμος, ως διάκεισθαι,
Τίμα, καὶ σιένο χρων ἔπεσιν' ἥνοις ἁγιοις.
Τέσ τε καταχειονει στε τα δαιμονιας, ἐνόμα ρησα.

Wherein men are exhorted in the first place to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestial daemons. And accordingly

Laertius

3 Lib. I. segm. 35. p. 21.
4 Lib. I. segm. 119. p. 76.
Laertius gives this account of Pythagoras his piety; *τιμᾶσ χιεόν δὴν ποιήσας ἑαυτοῦ τὰς ἱερὰς: That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour. And who these gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth *εἷς τοῦ ἔρωτος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὰς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεμονίας: That, they were, in part at least, the sun, and moon, and stars.

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and universal Numin, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the golden verses, which, whether written by Philolaus or Lytis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were undoubtedly and agreeable to his doctrine.

Ζητὶ πάντες, καὶ πάλλων τὰ κακῶν λόγιας ἀπολλάς.
Εἰ πάντα δὲξαίς οἴρω τῷ δείκτῳ κρείζας.

Jupiter arise, make just peace in your several names:
Omnibus utantur vel quonam demone munstra.

Upon which Hierocles thus writeth, τὸν τωπιν ἦν πάντες τοῖς τῷ πάντων, ἐκ τού τοίς Πλαγορείων τῷ τῷ Δίος, ἦν Εὐσεβική οὐρανικὴ σεμαίνειν ἔτος οὐρανίων τῷ πάντων ἡκέχοις, τῶν θεον τῷ πάντων ἐπέλαγος καὶ ἐπερέβος σὺν ἡμικριματοποιοῖς ἡμῖν, διὰ τῶν ὑμνάσματος, ἐν τού πάντων, ἐφοίρος αὐτοῦ τῶν δύναμις. This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgic nature. And they, who first gave names to things, were by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuaries; they by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things. Moreover, that this Pythagoric prayer was directed to the supreme Numin and king of gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his Protrepticks *ἐπὶ τοῖς μὲν μία μίας ἐν εἰκονίας τῶν ἐν τού τοίς ὑμνάσματος ἡμῖν, ἐν τού πάντων ἐπέλαγος καὶ ἐπερέβος σὺν ἡμικριματοποιοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐν τού πάντων, ἐφοίρος αὐτοῦ τῶν δύναμις. Here is an excellent exhortation of these golden verses to the pursuit of divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that Jupiter, who is the king of them. Moreover, the fame might further appear from those Pythagoric fragments, that are still extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were Moralists, in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity, which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle.

2 Segm. 27. p. 569.
5 These are publish'd by Dr. Tho. Gale in his Opuscula Veter. Moral. &c. Mytholog. Amsterdam. 1688. in 8vo.
Pythagoras his Monad

Book I.

It is true indeed, that the writer de Placitis Philosphorum doth affirm Pythagoras to have asserted two substantial principles self-existent, a Monad and a Dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a daemon, or a principle of evil; 'Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα Θεόν, κ' τάγαθ' ἂν, εἰς ἕν τῇ κοινῷ φύσις, αὐτός οἱ ἰεροὶ τὴν δ' ἀόριστω δύα ἄρμαν, κ' τῷ κοινῷ, &c. Pythagoras his first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a daemon or evil. But in another place expounded to be matter, τάλιν τὴν μονάδα κ' τὴν ἀόριστω δύα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδείκνυται, δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αὐτοῦ κ' εἰδικοῦ, (ἐπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός) καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ χωρίτικά τοίς κ' ὕλικον (ἐπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπατος κόσμου) Pythagoras his principles were a monad and infinite duality: the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter passive and matter. And Plutarch in some other writings of his declares, that the first matter did not exist alone by itself dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up that wicked daemon of his. And doubtless, this book de Placitis Philosophorum was either written by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagorian doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch’s, that God and a wicked daemon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent principles, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether Pythagoras by his Dyad meant matter or no; because Malebus or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagorean principles of unity and duality; τὸ αὐτόν τῆς συμμόρφωσις καὶ τῆς συμμετάδοσις, οὗ τῆς σωτηρίας τοῦ ὅλου τό κατὰ ταυτάτην ὄσον ἔχει τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἐν ὑπεράνωσις, καὶ γεφέν τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρη ἐν τοῖς ὑπεράνω, πρόκειται, πρὸς τοὺς μὲν τὸν ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ἰδιότητα τῶν διὰ τὴν τοῦτον λόγον καὶ µὲν αὐτοῦ τῆς συμμετάδοσις. The cause of that sympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in the things, and of the conservation of the whole, which is always the same and like it self, was by Pythagoras called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themselves, being but a participation of the first cause;) but the reason of alterity, inequality and unconstant irregularity in things, was by him called a Dyad. Thus, according to Porphyrius, by the Pythagorean Dyad is not so much meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the Monad and Dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato’s ζεύξεως and ἀπειροῦ, his finite and infinite in his Philebus; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.

CHAP. IV.

the sole Principle of all things.

However, if Pythagoras his Dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his Dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laertius tells us 1, that Alexander, who wrote the succession of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagorick Commentaries, ἀρχή μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν, μονᾶς ἤκιν ἐκ τῆς μονᾶς, ἀριστόν θάσκον, ὡς ἀνθρώπος τῆς μονᾶς αὐτὸν ἐκτείνον ὑποστήναι. That a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause. With which agreeeth Hermias 2, affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagorick mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage 3 out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean, in his book concerning nature, Α’ αρχή τῶν ὀντων, ἀρχή μὲν ὀντων ἁληθικα, μια. Κύων γὰρ εἰ ἀρχὴ 611. [p. 728.] τί εἰσὶν ἐν καὶ μόων. The true principle of all things was only one, for this was in the beginning one alone. Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novity of existence or beginning of duration. And indeed, however Ocelus Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius 4 records of him, where he gives an account of that he superfluous abstinance from beans; ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταχατομίας, καὶ σαλλον ἀμα συνεργών και συστεριμένων καὶ συσυντυμένων ἐν τῇ γη, κατ’ ὁλιγον γίνεσι καὶ διάκρισις συνη αί. σώμα το όμι γενεσίων, ῥευτιν ἀνακαθαρισμένων, τότε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς συμπεδόθη, αὐτοφράτης συνη αί καὶ κυάμας βλαστήσασθαι. That at the beginning things were con-founded and mingled together, the generation and feculation of them afterwards proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time also, from the same putrified matter, sprung up both men and beans.

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of divine hypostases; and therefore when St. Cyril 5 affirmenth Pythagoras to have called God ψυχοσ τῶν ὄλων κτίσματος, καὶ ψωμτον κυστον, the animation of the whole heaven, and the motion of all things; adding, that God was not, as some supposeth, ἵκτος τάς διακοσμήσεις, ἴτα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀφλατος, ἵπ παρὰ τόν θεόν, without the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole, this seems properly to be understood of that third divine hypostasis of the Pythagorick trinity, namely the eternal Psyche. Again, when God is called in Plutarch 6, according to Pythagoras, αὐτος ὁ νόος, mind it self, this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis; the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above Mind or Intellext. In like manner when in Cicero 7, Pythagoras his opinion concerning the Deity is thus repreffented, Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum & commen tam, ex quo animi nostrī carperentur; That God was a mind passing through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decreed or cut

1 Lib. VIII. Segm. 25. p. 507. 2 De Plac. Philosop. lib. I. cap. VII. p. 881. 3 Dr. Cadworth does not cite this Passage as it is in Clemens Alexandr. but as it is given by Euseb. Preparat. Evangel. lib. V. cap. XXIV. 4 In vita Pythag. p. 43. Edit. Kusleri. 5 Contra Julian. Lib. I. p. 30. 6 De Natur. Deor. lib. I. cap. XI. p. 2895. 7 Tom. IX. Oper.
cut out; and again, ex univerfa mente divina deliberato esse animos nostros; this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second divine hypothesis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him τὸ ἴχθος and μόρος, a Unity and Monad; and also, as Plutarch \(^1\) tells us, τὸ ἄγαθον, goodness it self. Aristotle plainly affirmeth, that some of the ancient theologers amongst the Pagans made ἵχθος or love to be the first principle of all things, that is, the supreme Deity; and we have already shewed, that Ὀρφέας was one of these. For when ἵχθος πολυτετής and πολύμνη, delightful Love, and that, which is not blind, but full of wisdom and counsel, is made by him to be αὐτοτελς and προεξετάτως, self-perfect and the oldest of all things, it is plain, that he supposed it to be nothing less than the supreme Deity. Wherefore since Pythagoras is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphick principles, we may from hence presume, that he did it in this also. Though it be very true, that Plato, who called the supreme Deity τάγαθον, as well as Pythagoras, did differ from the Orphick theology in this, and would not acknowledge Love for a name of the supreme Deity; as when in his Symposion in the person of Agatho he speaks thus: Φιλόσωφος πολλὰ ἀλλὰ ὁμολογῶ, ταύτα τό ἡμιμολογῶ, ὡς ἤρεσ κρειπεν ἡ ἑαυτῷ ἀριστερᾶς οὐκ ἐαυτῆ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖν ἑαυτῷ, ἐκεῖν ἑαυτῷ; Though I should readily grant to Phedrus many other things, yet I cannot consent to him in this, that Love was older than Saturn and Iapet; but on the contrary I do affirm him to be the youngest of the gods, as he is always youthful. They, who made Love older than Saturn as well as Iapet, supposed it to be the supreme Deity: wherefore Plato here on the contrary affirms Love not to be the supreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior God, or indeed, as he afterwards adds, not so much a god as a daemon, it being a thing, which plainly implies imperfection in it. Love (faith he) is a philospher, whereas Ὀρφη πολλὲς Φιλοσοφίας, ἀδικομοι σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἐν γας, no god philosopizeth, nor desires to be made wise, because he is so already. Agreeably with which doctrine of his, Plotinus \(^2\) determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called souls; τῶν ψυχῶν, ἄφροδίτη καὶ τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ τῶν ἄφροδιτῆς γενέσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἤρεος ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς νυνόμενος ἔργον κατὰ φύσιν ἴχθος ψυχῆς, ἔναντι ξυλεῖς, δυνατός πάρα πάσης καὶ καλῆς κοραλίων ὑπάρχων ὑπάρχων ὑπάρχων ὑπάρχων ἀλά ψυχῆς ἀλά ἐναντίον ἑαυτῆς, ἐναντίον ἄμαξαν ἑαυτῆς, ἑαυτῆς ἄμαξαν ἑαυτῆς, ἑαυτῆς ἄμαξαν ἑαυτῆς. Every Soul is a Venus, which is also intimated by Venus her nativity, and Love's being begotten with her: wherefore the soul being in its right natural state loves God, desiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love; but when it descends to generation, being courted with these amorous allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its divine and heavenly love for another mortal one; but if it again shake off these lascivious and wanton loves, and keep it self chaste from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought. But the reason of this difference betwixt the Orpheists and Plato, that the former made Love to be the oldest of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or daemon, proceed only from an equivocation in the word Love. For Plato's Love was the daughter of Penias, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of πλούσιον or riches; and being so as it were composed

\(^2\) Libro de bono vel uno, Ennead. VI. Lib. IX. cap. XII. p. 708.
pounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, accompanied with grief and pain. But that Orphick and Pythagorick love was nothing else but πάθος and εὐπορία, infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself, which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity; according to which notion also, in the Scripture it self, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there ἀγάπη, but ἀγάπην. But to say the truth, Parmenides his love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle) seems to be neither exactly the same with the Orphick, nor yet with the Platonick love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods; which appears from Simplicius* his connecting these two verses of his together in this manner:

Ἐν ᾧ πάθος τῶν δαιμόνων ὀς πάλιν μυθερώ,

πρὶν περίτοιο Ἐν άναίν Εἰσι Φησι, λέγων,

In the midst of these elements is that God, which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus: God first of all created Love, before the other gods. Wherefore by this love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastick nature, which though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a secondary or created god; before whose production, necessity is said by those Ethick theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that divine spirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method for good (that is, by love) in that confused and floating chaos.

But Pythagoras, it seemeth, did not only call the supreme Deity a Monad, but also a Tetrad or Tetrachys; for it is generally affirm'd, that Pythagoras himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porphyry and Jamblichus and others write, that the discipiles of Pythagoras swore by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them the doctrine or Cabala of this Tetrachys. Which Tetrachys also in the golden verses is called πηγὴ αἰώνων φωτος, the fountain of the eternal nature, an expression, that cannot properly belong to anything but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles, ἔνε ἐν ὑποτάσσεν ο ὀμό το τετράκατος, ὡς τοῦς, ὡς ἀγάπης ἄναίνει, ἐν ἑνεσί, ὡς ἐφαμεν, ἐν δυναμεῖς πάντων, ὅς φίλει η Τετράκατ, ὅς θεοὶ λέγει, αἰτιω το ἀναίνει, καὶ αἰσθαντω Θεό. There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetrachys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible God, that is, of the animated world or heaven. Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists endeavour to give reasons, why God should be called Tetrach or Tetrachys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as

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* Physicor. Lib. I. cap. II. III. p. 446.  
* Comment. in Aurea Ca. mina Pythag. p. 170, 171.
for example; First, because the Tetrad is διάφορος, δευτερο, the power of the Decad, it
evitably containing the whole Decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but
the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four,
added all together, make up ten. Again, because the Tetrad is an arithmetic-
tical medity betwixt the Monad and the Hebdomad; which Monad and Heb-
domad are said to agree in this, that as the Monad is ingenit or unmade, it
being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the Hebdomad said to be,
not only παραθετος, but ἀμφιτος, a motherless, as well as virgin number. Where-
fore the Tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit Monad, and the mo-
therless virgin Hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetter, say
they, must needs be a very mysterious number, and fitly represent the Deity.
Whereas indeed it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is be-
gotten by the multiplication of another number; as the Hebdomad therefore
do not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or be-
gets nothing at all within the Decad, for which cause it is called a virgin.
Again, it is further added, that the Tetrad fitly resembles that, which is
solid, because, as a point answers to a Monad, and a line to a Dyad, and a
superficies to a Triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so
the Tetrad properly represents the solid, the first pyramid being found in it.
But upon this consideration, the Tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the
incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things
being all so tripping, slight and phantastical, and it being really absurd for
Pythagoras to call his Monad a Tetrad; the late conjecture of some learned
men amongst us seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras his
Tetradys was really nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name
of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, consisting of four letters or con-
sonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides
his travelling into Egypt, Persia and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is
affirmed by Josephus, Porphyryus and others, to have conversed with the He-
brewns also) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton,
since it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their Jove being cer-
tainly nothing else. And indeed it is the opinion of some philologers, that
even in the Golden Verses themselves, notwithstanding the seeming repugnancy
of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetradys or Tet-
grammaton; that is, Jove or Jehovah, the name of God, being put for
God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews נון יההו
ושם, that God and his name were all one; as if the meaning of those words,

were this; By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himself
or] the fountain of the eternal nature to our human souls; for these, according
to the Pythagorick doctrine, were said to be ex mente divina carptae & del-
bites, i.e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the divine
mind.

p. 209, 210. & Theophili GAle in his Curta of
2 Cicer. de Natu. Doer. Lib. l cap. XI.
the GentiLs, Part II. Lib. II. cap. VIII. p. 2895. Oper.
Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's; idê òl òrapòs, ena te eýmæ lógoi tòv tòv Ólon Òoun, kòpovou èrçhí érgasthun te tòv oul tòv diámewen, Órho-ùpòs òrò òpòs, òuoi cuòsótpous tòv Ólon xkòv kuvolov pàvov xíwos períklai te ta pàvov pàv autè xkòv tìn ék te mú òlòpò eis tò eúwai xíwos lókòttà Fávlès: Bebold we see clearly, that Pythagoras held there was one God of the whole universe, the principle and cause of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of non-entity into being.

Next to Pythagoras in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatick sect of philosophers, who, that he was an affirmer both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verse of his before cited, and attested both by Clements Alexandrinus 1, and Sextus the philosopher.  

Εἰς Θεοῦ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ὑπὸ αὐθρόπων μὲν ἕξιν,

There is one God, the greatest both amongst gods and men. Concerning which greatest God, this other verse of Xenophanes is also vouchèd;

Καὶ αὐτάνωθεν ποιών τὸν, θεοὶ πᾶν πρᾶξανεν.

That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind. Besides which, Cicero 2 and others tell us, that this Xenophanes philosophizing, concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it εν ὑπὸ πᾶν, one and all, as being one most simple Being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes his Theosophy, or divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus in this manner; Μιαν δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτῳ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ πᾶν, ὃς ἐτε πεπερασμένως ἐτε ἄπειρον, θεομομενον ἐτε προμενέων, Ευθράντι τὸν Καλόφανα τοῦ Παντοκράτορος αὐτον τῷ Παρθένῳ, ἐν ὑπὸ πᾶν, ψυχὴν ἐφαινομένην εἰς τὸ καρπόν τοῦ πάντων χρησμοῦ καὶ θεοῦ, Θεον ἔργων ἐν διεύθυνεν—καὶ ἐτε ἄπειρον ἐτε πεπερασμένος εἰς τὸ καρπόν τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ψυχῆν, ἔργων ἐν διεύθυνεν τῷ πάντων γενεσιν. 


Cicero 2

Heraclitus his God,

Book I.

faith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understandeth not this of that rest which is opposite to motion, and which belongs to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary. From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes suppos'd (as Sextus the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we understand, that *Aristotle* 1 dealt not ingenuously with *Xenophanes*, when from that expression of his, that God was οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, or ψεύδη-μορφα, he would infer, that *Xenophanes* made God to be a body, and nothing else but the round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same *Xenophanes*, ἀπὶ ὃσι ὥσιν εἶναι ἔτι περικοπᾶς, that there were infinite suns and moons; by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as *Cicero* tells us 2. Wherefore, as *Simplicius* resolvs, God was said to be οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, or ψεύδη-μορφα, by Xeno- phanes, only in this sense, as being πατριχόν ἄνθρωποι, every way like and uniform. However, it is plain, that *Xenophanes* affirming one God, who was all, or the universe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent Deities.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician) and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictions may be true; and his writings were accordingly, as *Plato* intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense. For first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained 3, that all things did flow, and nothing stand, or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the pre and post-existence of human souls in these words, τάξις τοῦ ψυχῆς μονητινα αὖτειν ἔνει ποτὶ ἐν τῷ διεικταίοι τούτῳ. But by me, and *Cicero*, my soul seems to vaticinate and presage its approaching dissolution and freedom from this its prison; and locking out, as it were, through the cracks and cranies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and confipated of phlegm, choler, serum, blood, nerves, bones and flesh. And not only so, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which *Stoicks*, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, to the next conflagration, did deny; ἄλλα τὸ σώμα ἐν τῷ ιεραμοῦν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυ- χῆ ως ὀσίαν ἀοίδων ἄνθρωποι ζωον, ψυχη εἰς ζωον ἀναπτύκτων μεταφέρεται. ᾧ ἤμι, ὦ κατακάθισον ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ οἰκήματος ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις. This body shall be fatally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those ethereal houses shall receive me, and I shall no longer

2 Vid. Libr. de Xenophane, Zonone & Gorgia, cap. IV. p. 843, 844.
5 Vide Platon. in Convivio. p. 521.
longer converse with men but gods. Again, though Heraclitus affronted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoicks, who followed him in this and other things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus, εἰ ἦσαν τειλαίω καὶ δυσείστατοι άβλεις κατόφθωντων οὐκοκολα ἢδεῖκα, καταύρα τομοτα, καταρτισμένα, καταπλακτοτο σφαλμένος, κατασφάλειας μοι ψεύδω, εἰ τιμήλεγοι μοι μέθ, δοείδαι με λυπη, δοείδαι με άγνω, κατά τόμων αυτών καὶ αύτως ισοποιώνται, ερωτη ισοτάτων. I have also had my difficult labours and conflicts as well as Hercules; I have conquer’d pleasures, I have conquer’d riches, I have conquer’d ambition; I have subdued cowardly and flattery; neither fear nor intemperance can control me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the victories, for which I am crowned, not by Eurythymus, but as being made master of my self. Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religiousist, he supposing, that firey matter of the whole universe animantem effe & Deum, to be an animal and God. And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which Aristotle recordeth of him, that when some paffing by had epipeid him fitting in a smoky cottage, he bepake them after this manner, Introite, nam & hic dies sunt, Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also; he supposing all places to be full of gods, daemons and souls: so was he an undoubted affirter of one suprême Numen, that governs all things, and that fuch as could neither be represented by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus in this manner; άλλ’, ἕγαν οἱ δοκείνται, δοικαζειν ἠμας ἵνα τι ἤστω ὁ Θεός, τι ν’ ἤστω ὁ Θεός; εἰ τοις ναις ἀποκελεσμένος; τοῦτο οὖν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἰδεῖτε -- ἀπαίδευτοι, ἔν τι ὄντι ἐν ἑνὶ ἐν θεῷ Χειροκροτοῦτο, τι οὔ, θεῷ βασιν ἐκεῖ ἕκεν ἑκεῖ, εἰ καὶ τερεσκεόταν ἀλλ’ ὄν πόντον αὐτὸς ἔστιν, ζωίς καὶ κύριοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ πεποιημένοι. But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accuiming of impiety: tell us where God is? Is he shut up within the walls of temples? is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a story God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no basis or fulcrum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals and stars being his temple? And again, τις εἰ μέν εὐθείας, Εὐθυκλεῖς, τοῦ μόνον οὐδα θεόν; εἰς εἰ με ἐρήμω ώς θεόν βουμενεν, εἰς εἰς θεόν; εἰς εἰ ἐρήμω μη θεόν, θεόν ἐγώ; οὐκ εἴπων θεοὺς μαρτύρες; οὔ, θεοὶ μαρτύρες, οὐκ ἠλήθεν μοι αὐτῷ καὶ θεῷ μαρτύρες, ἐπί αὐτῷ μαρτύρεις, γι' ὅλη κατεσφασίας, μαρτύρει σελερα ο κύκλος, τεκνίων ἐρήμων μαρτύρναι; Am I impious, O Euthycles, who alone know what God is? Is there no God without altars? or are those the only witnesses of him? No, his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun; night and day bare witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him.

In the next place, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian philosopher comes to be considered, whose predecesors of the Ionick order (after Thales) as Anaximander.

1 Apud Lubinum, ubi supra, p. 59. 481. Tom. II. Oper.
manner, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as hath been already observed) Materialists and Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance besides body, and resolving all things into the motions, passions, and affections of it.

Whence was that cautious advice given by Jamblichus, Prefias, in the Italic philosophy, to scrupulous minds, to contemplate corporeal substances by themselves, before the Ionick, which principally considers bodies. And Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionicks, who went out of that road; for seeing a necessity of some other cause, besides the material (matter being not able so much as to move itself, and much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring it self into an orderly system and compages;) he therefore introduced Mind into the Cosmopoeia, as the principal cause of the universe; which Mind is the same with God. Thus Theophrastus, speaking of Anaxagoras, said, 'He was the first (that is, amongst the Ionick philosophers) who brought in Mind and God to the Cosmopoeia, and did not derive all things from senseless bodies. And to the same purpose Plutarch in the life of Pericles, says, 'The other Ionick philosophers before Anaxagoras made fortune and blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous and necessary motions of the matter, to be the only original of the world; but Anaxagoras was the first, who affirmed a pure and sincere Mind to preside over all.' Anaxagoras therefore suppos'd two substantial self-existent principles of the universe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, such as those of Empedocles and Democritus, which was the most ancient and genuine atomology; but similar, such as were severally endowed with all manner of qualities and forms, which physiology of his therefore was a spurious kind of atomism. Anaxagoras indeed did not suppose God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was πνήμα αρχή, the principle of its motion, and also τὸ ἄληχον αἰτία, the regulator of this motion for good, and consequently the cause of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony of the world; for which reason this divine principle was called also by him, not only mind, but good; it being that, which acts for the sake of good. Wherefore, according to Anaxagoras, first, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of similar and qualified atoms, self-existent, without either order or motion: secondly, the world was not afterwards made by chance, but by Mind or God, first moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it so, as to bring it into this orderly system and compages. So that τὸ πνήμα, Mind, the first maker of the world, and τὸ βασιλεῖα ἄρκη τῆς ἐπίστησις, Mind, that which still governs the same, the king and sovereign monarch of heaven and earth. Thirdly, Anaxagoras his Mind and God was purely incorporeal; to which purpose his words recorded in Arist. Phys. l. 35, "αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς ἐπίστησις, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἐπίστησις, ἀλλὰ τῷ κατεύρηκτῳ ἄλλῳ, μετεχθεῖν καὶ ἀπό τῶν κριμάτων, εἰ τριέμενον τῷ ἰδίῳ κάθε καθαίρεται μοιρὰ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ συνώμου."
Chap. IV. the Maker of the whole World.

Indeed it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans, because it is certain, that though he asserted infinite Mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the same; the true ground whereof was not other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably concluded the same of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which his ungodling of the sun, moon and stars, was then look’d upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings superior to men, and if the sun, moon, and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this, but even those two grave philosophers Socrates and Plato did the like; the first in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into atheism, in this manner: εἰ μὴ καὶ ὥσ παν τεκτόνη καὶ λέγωμεν ὡς εἰς σέ, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέρεται, ἐπὶ τοῦ τε καὶ σιδήρου, καὶ ἄρα καὶ γῆς ὡς ἐν καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀναπτειμένων ἐν λίγον, ὡς γὰρ τε καὶ λίθος ὡς ταῦτα αὐτὰ, καὶ ὅπως τῶν ἀναπτειμένων προφητείων Φρονίμων διδασκῶν. When you and I, endeavouring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon, stars and earth, as gods and divine things, our young men presently, being principled by those new philosophers, will reply; that these are nothing but earth and stones (senseless and inanimate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs. Where we may observe these two things; first, that nothing was accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior Gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or

* Or rather Plato, p. 361.
Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he ascertained an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in theism, and who did not so fully, as he ought, adhere to his own principles. For whereas, to ascertained Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to ascertained final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly be- take himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loss; then only bringing in God upon the stage. Socrates his discourse concerning this in Plato's Phædo is very well worth our taking notice of: Hearing one sometime read (faith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, ὃς νῦν ἐγώ ὁ διανοημένος τε καὶ ταύτων ἀναψεφίζω, that Mind was the order and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased herewith, concluding, that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible; and therefore the causes even of the things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the τὸ βιγδιγνωκότοι, which is absolutely the best. But when afterwards I took Anaxagoras his book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned, but only from airs, and ethers, and waters, and such like physical and material things. And it seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly of my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cause thereof, which was no other than this, because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to my self most just, rather to submit to their sentence and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Boeotians, carried thither ὑπὸ δυνάμεως τὸ βιγδιγνωκότοι, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of philosophers (faith he) do not seem to me, to distinguish betwixt the true and proper cause of things, and the cause fine quæ non, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that power, which orders all things for the best, (as having διανοημένος αναψεφίζω, a divine force
CHAP. IV. to Material than to Mental Causes.

in it;) but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together; το γε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δίον, ἃ ἂν ἔστω ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing.

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the cause of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a tangle of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predecefsors, still hanging about him, who resolved all the phenomena of nature into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophick humour of some in this present age, who pretending to assert a God, do notwithstanding discard all mental and final causality from having anything to do with the fabric of the world; and resolve all into matter necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli and friate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they are not near so good Theists as Anaxagoras himself was, though so much condemned by Plato and Ariosto; forasmuch as he did not only assert God to be the cause of motion, but also the governor, regulator and methodizer of the same, for the production of this harmonious system of the world, and therefore τὸ εἰ πᾶ πάντα τοῖς αἰθίων, the cause of well and fit. Whereas these utterly reject the latter, and only admitting the former, will needs suppose heaven and earth, plants and animals, and all things whatsoever in this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted merely from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at first impressed upon the matter, and determin'd to vortex.

XXXI. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall not scrupulously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes his auditor, and a philosophick poet likewise, but who conversing much with two Pythagoreans, Amenias and Diochotes, was therefore look'd upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagorick sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many Gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithstanding which, he plainly asserted also one supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, θεός ὁ πάντων, the cause of all those other gods, of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called, τὸ πᾶν, one that was all, or the univerfe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also ἀκρόν και ἐκδόν, immovable.

Now though it be true, that Parmenides his writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically; as if he had asserted the whole corporeal univerfe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation and action; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a mad man: yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the opinions
Parmenides his supreme God, Book I.

opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides his poems, (then scarce, but since lost) affirms us, that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that he wrote τοι την Φυσικαν τοιχειαν, αληθειατην, or περι της Θειας ορετικας, not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens, or the divine transcendency: adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish τοι την Θειαν φανερον, natural things from supernatural; yet the Pythagoreans, and Xenophanes, and Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, did all διαφωνεων, handle these two distinctly; καιπερ την αναφεραν αναλογιας των πολλων, however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many; for which cause they have been most of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicius informs us, Parmenides pronounced two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him ἀληθεια, truth; the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called ἐξαιρετικας, opinion. The transition betwixt which was contained in these verses of his:

Έν τω δοι παρμε οίκου λόγων ἐπει δόμα
'Αμφις ἀληθειας' ἐξαιρετικας δ' ἀπο τῶν βεβαιες
Μάθαιν' κόσμου ἐμοί ἐπεις ἀπατηλον ἀκλων.

In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides asserted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming that God did τας φυσικας πεμπειν ποτε μην ειν της ἑμφασις εις το αιτιον, ποτε δια αναπαλιν, sometimes send and translate souls from the visible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible. From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides asserted his one and all immoveable, he spake not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Aristotle himsefl, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides his senfe, that he might have a fling at him in his Physicks, yet could not altogether difemble it. For when he thus begins, There must of necessity be either one principle or many; and if there be but one, then must it either be immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, άληθεια της φυσικας, as the Naturalists or Physiologers; he therein plainly intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as Physiologers. And afterwards he confesses, that this controversy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elwewhere, writing concerning Parmenides and Melissus after this manner; ει μετ' αληθειας καλως, τοι την Φυσικας μη διπλωντιν λεγειν, το γαρ ειναι αγνωστον δια των αγνωστων αναλογιας, μελλων, ειν εταιρεις μη περιτεους, της Φυσικας ἐπικεφαλος. Though it be granted, that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well; yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there.

there is something unmade and immovable, does not so properly belong to physics, as to a certain other science, which is before it.

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes his master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immovable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers styled, first τὸ ἅμα and μονα, a unity and monad, because they conceived, that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things, must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus in Simplicius 1 declares their sense; ἐξτης ἡ πρώτη μάμων τῶν πάνω τῷ ὑπὸ τῆς τῆς τῆς αὐτῶν πάνω, τῷ τῷ αὐτῶν μεγαλομέρειον νῦν οὖν τοῦ ὑπέραινον. These ancients affirmed, that the one, or unity, was the first principle of all; matter itself, as well as other things, being derived from it; they meaning by this one that highest or supreme God, who is over all. And Syrius to the same purpose: ὁ Σιρίους εἰκόνις οὐράνιος ἐν τῷ θεόν ἕλαγον, ὡς εὐποτά τῆς ἀριστοτής αὐτῶν, τῷ πανηγυρίῳ τῷ ὑπεραινον. Those divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise be was of being and life. And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides his ἐν δὲ, one Ens, was a certain divine principle, superior to mind or intellect, and more simple. λέγει δὲ ἡ τοῦ πάνω πάνω αὐτῶν, διὸ γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι κατὰ τοῦ νοεῖ, καὶ τὸ πάνω καὶ τὸ μία ὑπὸ εὐνοούσα ὑμνημενούς κατείλησικα, καὶ ἦν ἀριστερών, τῷ εἶναι τοῦ Παρμενιδίου εὐδοκία. It remaineth therefore, that that intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiously and in a way of unity, I say, that this was Parmenides bis one Ens or Being.

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his ἐν δὲ, τὸ πάνω, bis one Ens or first most simple Being, all, or the universe; because it virtually contained all things, and, as Simplicius writes, πάλιν διακοσμημένος ἐναφαίνειται ὡς αὐτῷ, all things are from this one, distinctly displayed. For which cause, in Plato’s Parmenides, this one is said to be, ἐπὶ πᾶλα πολλὰ ὑδαίνα μεμνημον, distributed into all things, that are many. But that Parmenides by his ἐν δὲ πάνω, one and all, or the universe, did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from hence, because he called it ἄδικον, and indivisible, and, as Sim- 1 Phys. F. 17: plicius observes, supposed it to have no magnitude; because that, which is per-rectly one, can have no parts.

Wherefore it may be here observed, that this expression of ἐν δὲ πάνω, one being all, hath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity, that one most perfect and most simple being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it athetically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but one and the same matter diversely modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle’s in his Metaphysics, ὅσοι μὲν ἐν τῷ εἶναι τῷ πάνω καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν ἐδείκνυεν ὡς ὁ λόγος τοῖς ἔθεσι, ἦς Λ. 1 c. 7. [P. τάξις εὐμακάκη ὡς ρέματος ἔχουσαν, ὅλον ὁτι πολλοῖς αὐτάτων, They, who 274. Tom. affirm one to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and in this corporeal and ended with magnitude, it is manifest, that

F. 31 Gr. [Comment. in Phyfic. Ariflotel.]

Parmenides his Trinity

Book I.

they err sundry ways. But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that, the atheistical affirers of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them suppose their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one most simple, perfect and immutable being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are said to have affirmed ὅ ῃ is, that one was all, or that the universe was but one thing, might possibly have taken both those senses together (which will also agree in the Stoical hypotheses) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theists, who supposed an intellectual fire to be the first principle of all things.

And though Aristotle in his Physicks quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable principle: yet in his Metaphysicks himself doth plainly close with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one incorporeal and immoveable principle of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immoveable nature: ἐπει καὶ ὁ ἄλφα τοῦ ἡλίου, λίγον ἀλλὰ χρόνος καὶ ἄνω, ἐπεὶ περάσαμεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ οὖν τῷ ἔντον ὑπὸ κατοικῶν ἀπὸ. If there be any such substance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we shall afterwards endeavour to show that there is) then the divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and most proper principle of all. But left any shoulf suspect, that Aristotle, if not Parmenides also, might, for all that, hold many such immoveable principles, or many eternal, uncreated and self-existent beings, as so many partial causes of the world; Simplicius assures us, μὴ γεγονόντα ὅ ὅ, ἐν τολῶ καὶ ἀνών τοῦ κόσμου λέγοντο, i.e. that though divers of the antient philosophers affirmed a plurality of moveable principles (and some indeed an infinity) yet there never was any opinion entertained amongst philosophers, of many, or more than one, immoveable principles. From whence it may be concluded, that no philosopher ever affirmed a multitude of unmade, self-existent minds, or independent deities, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed Plutinus seems to think, that Parmenides in his writings, by his τὸ ὅ, or ens, did frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, there being no true entity (according to him) below that, which understands; (which mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to a sphere, because it comprehends all within itself, and because intellect is not from without, but from within:) But that when again he called his On or Ens one, he gave occasion thereby to some, to quarrel with him, as making the same both one and many; intellect being that, which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides his whole philosophy (faith he) was better digested and more exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledged three unities subordinate, or a trinity of divine hypostases; ὅ παρ Πλατων

2 In Phyf. Ariftotel. fol. 17.
of Divine Hypostases.

Wherefore Parmenides thus asserting a trinity of divine hypostases, it was the first of those hypostases, that was properly called by him, ἐν τῷ πᾶν, one the universe or all: that is, one most simple being, the fountain and original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, ἐν τολά ὑπακοή, one-many or one-all things; by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect mind. And of those was Parmenides to be understood also, when he affirmed, that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and sensible things, which, as the Heracliticks rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aristotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unless there were some immutable, necessary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the same Aristotle also declares, the true meaning of that controversy betwixt the Heracliticks and Parmenideans, Whether all things did stand, or some things stand? was the same with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles, that were immutable? and consequently, whether there were any such thing as science or knowledge which had a firmitude and stability in it? For those Heracliticks, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and sensible things, did with good reason consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and constant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular sensibles, (as Aristotle writes) nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and stability of science, did as reasonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular sensibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science, but also, as they are contained in the divine intellect, to be the principles and causes of all other things. For thus Aristotle declares their sense, αἶτια τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, and again, τῷ τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑκατόν τῶν ἳκτιῶν, the ideas are the causes of all other things; and, the essence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themselves derive their essence from the first unity: that 

those ideas in the divine understanding being look'd upon by these philosophers, as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans Numbers, we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly monstrous paradox or puzzling Grippus of theirs, that Numbers were the causes and principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a monad or unity: Aristotle somewhere intimating this very account of that assertion, τοις ἀριθμοῖς αἰτίαι ἐξα ποις ἄλλοις τῆς άθανατος, that Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things, namely, because τὰ ἐν θεῖς ἀριθμοῖ, the ideas were numbers. Though we are not ignorant, how the Pythagoreans made also all the numbers within the decad, to be symbols of things. But besides these two divine hypostases already mentioned, Parmenides seems to have asserted also a third, which, because it had yet more ality, for distinction fake was called by him, neither ἐν τῷ πάντω, one the universe or all; nor ἐν πάλτω, one-all things; but ἐν κάθε πάντω, one and all things: and this is taken by Plotinus to be the eternal Psyche, that actively produceth all things, in this lower world, according to those divine ideas.

In Aristotle. Phys. But that Parmenides, by his one-all immoveable, really understood nothing else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verses of his cited by Simplicius, but not taken notice of by Stephanus in his Poësis Philosophica, of which we shall only set down some few here.

---Ωκ ἀγάπας τοι ἔνο πάντω ἀνώλιθρου ἐς ἱνν
Οὐκαντο τῇ, ὅδ' ἐγέρεις, ἐπεὶ ἔνο ἠγάπας ἐς ἲν
ʼΕν συνεχής, Τῷ ἔνο πάντω διόγεις αὕτη;
Αὐτῷ ἀκαίνες μεγάλως ἐν πειρατεί δησμῷ,
Ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐν μένοι, καὶ ταὐτὸ τε κείται: &c.

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one single, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity, without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different from that flowing succession of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as Parmenides; from whom it was also afterwards received and entertained by the best of the other Pagan philosophers; however hath been of late so much decried, not only by Atheistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as non-sense and impossibility.
Chap. IV. Finite; Melissus his Infinite.

It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one immovable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did; yet Melissus declared, that his $\text{simple.} \text{ Ar. one Ens must needs be devoid of body, because if it had any crassities in it, it Phys. f. 19. would have parts.}$ But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immovable that was all, $\text{finite or determined, but Melissus } \text{ infinite;}$ which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavoured in a different way, to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner; $\text{Gen. xvi. 17.}$ as $\text{Philo-}$

paraphrase:

1. It is well known that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one immovable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did. Yet Melissus declared that his simple one Ens must needs be devoid of body, because if it had any crassities in it, it would have parts. But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immovable that was all, finite or determined, but Melissus infinite; which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavored in a different way, to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner.
of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immovable. From which of Simplicius it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God \( \text{αἰτιωθομένον, finite and determined}, \) was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly suppoed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which \( \text{πάνω} \) is taken by Plato, as opposite to \( \text{ἀπεισόμενος} \), and for the greatest perfection, and as God is said to be \( \text{πάνω καὶ μικροὶ πάλιν, the term and measure of all things}. \)

But Melissus calling God \( \text{ἀπεισόμενος, infinite} \), in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking. We have the rather produced all this, to shew how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him. Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the \( \text{τὸ θεῖον, the divining thing of all} \) yet Melissus his \( \text{ἀπεισόμενος}, \) or \( \text{Infinite}, \) was the true Deity.

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides his scholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he meaning thereby nothing else but the supreme Deity. For though it be true, that this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments against the local motion of bodies, proceeding upon that hypothesis of the infinite divisibility of body, one of which was famoufly known by that name of Achilles, because it pretended to prove, that it was impossible (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed Achilles ever to overtake the creeping snail; (which arguments of his, whether or no they are well answered by Aristotle
d, is not here to our purpose to inquire) yet all this was nothing else but \( \text{latus ingenii, a sportful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtil logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavour also to shew, how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates by his one immoveable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristoxel writing thus concerning him; \( \text{τὸ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζηνοῦ λέγειν, ἢτε καίνιθεικεῖν, ἢτε καίπερ εἰκὸς, Zeno by his one Ens, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God. Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme and most powerful of all, or as an absolutely perfect being; \( \text{ἐὰν εἰ
to Θεός} \), and much needs be one. Which argument was thus pursued by him; \( \text{τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Θεῷ δύναμις κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι ὅστις}
\text{καὶ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι, utque nullus quidquam habeat, necesse est quod, si
\text{non, Θεός} πλείους ἐν θεῖοι, ἐν μιᾷ ἐν τοῖς μισθοῦς κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ
\text{καὶ τὸ, ὅτι ἐν Θεῷ ποιεῖν} \text{μὴ κρατήσθαι} \text{νυν, τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι ἐν}
\text{Θεῷ} 
\text{ποιεῖν} \text{μὴ κρατήσθαι} \text{νυν, τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι ἐν}
\text{Θεῷ} 
\text{ποιεῖν} \text{μὴ κρατήσθαι} \text{νυν, τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι ἐν}
\text{Θεῷ} 
\text{ποιεῖν} \text{μὴ κρατήσθαι} \text{νυν, τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι ἐν}
\text{Θεῷ}
Chap. IV. of one God; from the Idea.

τὸν τούτον ἐν θεῷ, ἵνα μόνον ἐκάθισεν τὸν θεὸν ὡς γὰρ ἦς πάντα σῶμα ὑμῶν οὐκ ἔναν βελάτων. This is God and the power of God, to prevail, conquer and rule over all. Wherefore by how much any thing falls short of the best, by so much does it fall short of being God. Now if there be supposed more such beings, whereof some are better, some worse, those could not be all gods, because it is essential to God not to be transcended by any; but if they be conceived to be so many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the best, one equal being neither better nor worse than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then can there be but one. And indeed otherwise he could not be able to do whatever he would.

Empedocles is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which must be understood of his metaphysicks, because in his physiology (which was atomical) he seems to have transcended him. Now that Empedocles acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what hath been already cited out of his philosphick P. 26. poems. Besides which the writer De Mundo ¹ (who, though not Aristotle, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles derived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity: τὰ γὰρ δ’ οἷς Μοῖχοι ἀ-

Πάνθ᾽ ὄσα τ’ ἦν, ὄσα τ’ ἔστιν, ὃς ὄσα τ’ ἐστὶν, ὃς ὄσα τ’ ἐστιν, ὃς ὄσα τ’ ἐστιν. All the things, that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may truly be called the works of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of whom, according to the physical Empedocles, proceed all things that were, are, and shall be, viz. plants, men, beasts and gods. Which notwithstanding we conceive to be rather true as to Empedocles his sense, than his words; he affirming, as it seems, in that cited place, that all these things were made, not immediately out of God, but out of contention and friendship; becafe Simplicius, who was furnished with a copy of Empedocles his poems, twice brings in that cited passage of his in this connexion:

Ἐν δὲ κόσμῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄμορφα πάντα πέλτονται,
Σύν ὁ ἔχθι ἐν Φιλόσοφοι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις πολεῖται,
'Εκ τῶν γὰρ πάνω ὅσον ἦν, ὅσα τ’ ἐστὶ, ὃς ὄσα τ’ ἐστι,
Δύναται τ’ ἐπιθύμησιν, νὸς ὄσας ἐπὶ γνωσεῖς,
Θὰ ὄντως τ’ ὃς ὄσας ἐπὶ γνωσεῖς, ἢ ὄσας ἐπὶ γνωσεῖς,
Καὶ τ’ ὃς ὄντως ἐπιθύμησις περίπου θὰ ἥκῃ.

Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together by friendship; from which two (contention and friendship) all that, was, is and shall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds and fishes, and last of all, the long-lived and honourable gods. Wherefore the sense of Empedocles his words here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, viz. plants, beasts, men and gods, was made from contention and friendship.

Empedocles his Many Gods.

Book I.

friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called Τὸ ἑν, or the very One; the writer De Mundo might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but Gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles his sense, appears plainly from Arisotle in his Metaphysics, Τὸν μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] αρχήν τινά τῆς Θεοῦς.

Moreover, according things, we see the friendhip, Aristotle.

This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wise of all other things, because he cannot know the elements, because he hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that, which is like: himself writing thus; We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention. But to let this pass; Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendhip, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted, (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendhip themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the original of all things under the name of Τὸ ἑν, the very One, and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doublets the stars and daemons.
Moreover, we may here observe, that according to Empedocles his doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and daemons (which he supposed alike laprable) was derived from that \( \varphi \text{vios} \), discord and contention, that is necessarily contained in the nature of them, together with the ill use of their liberty, both in this present and their pre-existent state. So that Empedocles here trode in the footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus loudly fang forth in his poems;

\[
\text{Horum de numero quidam praestantia novat}
\]

Plurima, mentis opes amplas sub peitore servans,
Omnia veftigans sapientiam dotat reperta, &c.

XXII. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly afferted one supreme and univerfal Numen, though doubtless acknowledging withal, other inferior gods. Philo in his book De mundi Opificio, writing of the Hebdo-

mad or Septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythagorean philosophers, it was called both a motherless and a virgin number, because it was the only number within the Decad, which was neither generated, nor did it self generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity, \( \text{a Ûčαγροθες τὸν ἀριθμὸν τότῳ ἐξομολογεῖ τῷ θεῷ τὸν αὐτοκτόνον.} \)

The Pythagoreans likened this number to the prince and governour of all things, or the supreme monarch of the univerfe; as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was before taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean; \( \text{ἐλπὶ γὰρ, θεῷ, ἢρμών ἄρησαν ἀπάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἰδίων ὁ θεὸς, ἰδίων ἄρης ἀπειρον, ἰδίων τῶν ἀρχῶν. God (faith he) is the prince and ruler over all, always one, stable, immovable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else. To which may be added what in Stoibus is further recorded out of the same Philolaus; \( \text{ὅτι ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνων, καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνων διαμένει, ἵνα ὑπὸ θεοῦ τῷ συλλογικῷ καὶ κρατικῷ κυβερνήμενος.} \)

This world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best. Where notwithstanding he feemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again, \( \text{ὥτε καλὸς ἦκεν ἐλεγε, κόσμῳ ἴδιον ἴνα ἐνεργεῖν ἐκ τοῦ γενεσίων.} \) Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effeit of God, and of successive generation.

Jamblichus, in his Protrepticks, cites a passage out of Archytas another Pythagorean, to the same purpofe; \( \text{διὰ καλότα ἐξελεγε, κόσμῳ καὶ κρατικῷ κυβερνήμενος.} \)

Whofoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the fame principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and be foul clearly perceive, that God...
is the beginning and end, and of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason. Upon which words of Archytas \footnote{Timaeus de Animâ Mundi, p. 566. inter Scriptor. mythologic. \textcopyright{} T. o. Gale ecdot.} Jamblichus thus glosseth: Archytas here declares the end of all theoretical speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head. Adding \textit{ταιτητι ἐπισηνα το ένος, τιλέω ει τι πάντα δεινάμει, καὶ καθυπεράται} εἰς, \textit{ὅτι πάντα διόπαις}, that this knowledge of the first unity, the original of all things, is the end of all contemplation. Moreover, Stobaeus cites this out of Archytas his book of principles, \textit{π. τις}. That besides matter and form, \textit{ἀναγκαστήρας τινα εἰμιν αἰτίας}, τῶν \textit{καταγείνοντος εἰς} τῶν μορφῶν, \textit{ταῦτα δὲ τῶν πρώτων δυνάμεις}, \textit{καὶ καθυπεράται} ἐις, \textit{ὅτι πάντα διόπαις} \textit{εἰς τινάς διόπαις}. \textit{ὅτι τίς}. There is another more necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is called God. So that there are three principles, God, Matter and Form; God the artificer and mover, and Matter that which is moved, and Form the art introduced into the Matter. In which name Stobean exception it also follows afterwards, \textit{ὅτι} νῦν τα πρώτα εἰς το 

Ocellus also in the same Stobaeus thus writeth, \textit{οἱ ἡμέρας τα μεν οὐκ} \textit{εἰς τοιαύτης} 
\textit{ταύτας ο} \textit{αἰτίαν μεγαλούς} \textit{θεοὺς, ταύτας ο} \textit{αἰτίαν ὄνομα. Περὶ τῆς καὶ τῆς πόλεως ομώνυμα, ταύτας ο} \textit{αιτίαν νῦμα}. \textit{Life contains the bodies of animals, the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane harmony is God. And to the same purpose Aristeus, ὡς ὁ τεχνητὸς πολι 

P. 32. \textit{Lib. I. cap. XVI.}

P. 45.

P. 8.

\textit{Timæus Locrus, a Pythagorean fenior to Plato, in his book concerning nature, or the soul of the world, (upon which Plato's Timæus was but a kind of commentary) plainly acknowledgeth both one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, and also many other gods, his creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close thereof, writing thus concerning the punishment of wicked men after this life, ἂπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περίοδῳ ἐγεῖναι σωμίκρυς, εὖ δι' ἀλμας παλαμομάθης ξύνιος τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ανθρώπων ὡς ὄ ταυτῶν ἀρέσκοις θεοὶ ἐπιτελεῖ διόροις κόσμων κυματοποιήσων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῷ κύριῳ τῷ ἁθλοτόν, τῶν τε θαλας ἑαυτῷ ὑπερβαίνοντο ποινακώ τοῖς ἁρμαίοις ἀρέσκοις τῷ αἰῶνι. All these things hath Nemechis decreed to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs; to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is complicated and made up of gods, men and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea. In which words of Timæus there are these three severable points of the Pagan theology contained; first, that there is one}
one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and who made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to daemons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes use of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of *Timaeus* Locrus the supreme God is often called ὁ Θεὸς, and sometime ὁ διαίμων, *God in way of eminency*; sometime Νόμος Mind, sometime ᾱγαθός, *the very Good*. sometime ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν, *the Principle of the best things*, sometime ἀξιμακρύς τῷ βελτίων, *the Maker of the better*, (evil being supposed not to proceed from him;) sometime κράτιστον αἰτίων, *the best and most powerful Cause*; sometime ἀξιωτάτου, *the Prince and Parent of all things*. Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated God; ὁ Θεὸς ἀριστων ὁ νόμων θεών, τῶν ἵππων κατά τὸν γενεάν, ἂν πάντα δικαίαν ὑπὲρ ἄλλων αἰτίων, ἵνα τὸν αὐτὸν εὐημερίαν ζῶ, εἰποκινεῖτο αὐτὸν διὰ λίπους* God willing to make the world the best, that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be despoiled by any other cause but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended. Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning, πρὸς ἀρχών γενέσθαι, λογος ἵναι ιδία τε ἣν ὄλλα, ὃ ὁ Θεὸς ἀξιμακρύς τῷ βελτίων, before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best. Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this *Timaeus* held not the world’s eternity; wherein he followed not only *Pythagoras* himself (as we have already shewed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom *Aristotle* pronounces without exception, γενότι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον, that they generated the world. *Timaeus* indeed in this book seems to affrait the pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites a passage out of him looking another way, ἀλλ’ ἀλλακτιζόμενον ὡς μέτωκον ἀρχὴν ἐκ παραδοσίας ἐκ τῶν αἰτίων τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἱερών τῶν πάντων. *Met. L. 1 c. 7.*

*Strom. 5. p. 604.* [p. 719, Edit. Ponteri]
It hath been already observed, that Onatus, another Pythagorean, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time affirming, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Numen, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these affections is contained in these following words: τοι δὲ λέγοντες ἕνα θεόν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλὰς αἵματάσσοντες τὸ γεγομένον άφθορά τις θείς ὑποτέχει ἐν συνθέσει. λέγω δὲ τοῖς άρχαις καὶ θεοτείναι τοῖς θεοίς, ἢ πατέρας ἢ καθυπερτέρους εἶμεν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις θείς πολὶ τῶν προτέρων ἢν πολλῷ ἡμῖν ἡμοῖς ἐχόμεν ὡσπερ λατρεύσαμεν τοῖς θεοῖς, ἢ συμμετέχοντες πολὺ στρατηγοῦ, ἢ πολλῷ συναρμολογοῦντες πολὺ τὰ πάντα ἢ λατρεύοντες ἢ συναρμολογοῦντες πολὺ τὰ πάντα, ἢ ἔχοντες θέους ἢ ἐπικοινώνειν τῷ καθολικῷ καθηγομένου κοινῷ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἐγώ ἢ ἐμὲ τοῖς άρχαις, τοῖς τῶν αρχαίων ἄλλοι ἐκτένεις δυνάμει συναρμολογήται τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολὶ τῶν ἐγών ἢ ἐμὲ τοῖς άρχαις, ἢ τῶν αρχαίων ἄλλοι ἐκτενείς δυνάμει συναρμολογήται τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολὶ τῶν ἐγών ἢ ἐμὲ τοῖς άρχαις, ἢ τῶν αρχαίων ἄλλοι ἐκτενείς δυνάμει συναρμολογήται τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολὶ τῶν ἐγών ἢ ἐμὲ τοῖς άρχαις, ἢ τῶν αρχαίων ἄλλοι ἐκτενείς δυνάμει συναρμολογήται τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολὶ τῶν ἐγών ἢ ἐμὲ τοῖς άρχαις, ἢ τῶν αρχαίων ἄλλοι ἐκτενείς δυνάμει συναρμολογήται τοῖς ἀρ...
And as the supreme God is here called by Onatus the Coryphaeus of the gods, so is he in like manner by the writer De Mundo styled the Coryphaeus of the world, or the Precentor and Prefultor of it, in these words: καθάπερ εν χορᾷ, κορυφαίῳ καθάειναι, συναπεχεί πάς ο χορός ανδρόν, ετοι ὡς κέρατοι, εν διαφόροις φωναῖς δυτικαῖς κ' ἐκβασίαις, μίαν αρμοδιὰν ἠμιμελή κοριεόντων έτος έχει ήτι τὸ το σύμπαν διήπται; περὶ γαρ ὁ ἀνθρώπου ἱδόσιμον ὑπὸ τού θεραπεύουσαν κορυφαίῳ προσαχρέοντας, κεκίνηται μιν τα ἧματι αἰών κ' τό σύμπαν προκείτοσι. As in a chorus, when the Coryphaeus or Precentor hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every one their part, some in higher and some in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; so in the world God, as the Coryphaeus, the Precentor and Prefultor, beginning the dance and music, the stars and heavens move round after him, according to those numbers and measures, which he prescribes then, all together making up one most excellent harmony.

It was also before observed, that Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of Anaxagoras (who were both of them Atomists in their physiology) did affect the world to have been made at first, and still to be governed by one divine Mind; which is more than some Atomists of ours in this present age, who notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists, will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place, mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that sect called Megarick, and who is said to have been Plato's master for some time after Socrates his death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laertius: οτέ ἐν τὸ έγκλήματα, πολλοὶ διόματι καλόμεθα, ὥσπερ μὲν θεόν, ἠκροτοὶ, ὥσπερ τὰ λοιπά, τὰ δὲ άγιοι, κατά τινα ένεπιμερή: έτοι τυπική άλλοι, κατὰ τινα άγιοι, κατὰ τινα διάμορφοι. Which we understand thus, That Euclides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmenides) made the first principle of all things to be the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all, that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity: that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle. And thus do we also understand that of Cicero, when he represents the doctrine of the Megaricks after this manner, Id bonum solum esse, quod esset Unum, & Simile, & Idem, & Semper; to wit, that they spake this concerning God, that Good or Goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also One, and Like, and the Same, and Always, and that the true good of man confineth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, το έν and τ' άγιοι, the One and the Good, and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the divine Nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antisthenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynick; for he, in a certain physiological treatise...
Antifthenes his One Natural God. Book I.

Cic. De N. D. creatif, is said to have affirmed, *Effe populares deos multos, sed naturalem unum; that though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God: or, as it is expressed in Latianus, *Unum effe naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes & urbes suos hancate populares; That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular ones. Wherefore Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero ¹ quarrels with this Antifthenes, as one, who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of Antifthenes is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning some other gods of theirs, that were or might be look'd upon as absolute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins Jove, the Egyptians Hammon, the Babylonians Bel, the Scythians Pappaeus; these were indeed many popular gods, and yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same Pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their several territories, as Jupiter in the heavens, Juno in the air, Neptune in the sea; or as being chief in several kinds of functions, as Minerva for learning, Bellona for war, &c. (for this Aristotle takes notice of in his book against Zeno ², κατα τον νόμον, πολλα πραιτης αλλαγόν ο εις, That according to the laws of cities and countries, one god was best for one thing, and another for another) Antifthenes here declared concerning these also, that they were indeed many popular, or civil gods, but all really one and the same natural God.

To Antifthenes might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by Laertius ³, that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her superstitiousness, he thus spake her; *δι πολλης, ἡ γυναι, μὴ πιστευς θεον ὑπεκτινείς, (πόλια γυναι συν αὐτοὺ παίζει) ἀγγελεύεσας, ὅταν παρακαλάτωσιν; Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving your self uneasily, in the sight of that God, who stands beside you; for all things are full of him: thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that Socrates died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans; and Tertullian ⁴, for one, writeth thus of him, *Proprieter damnatus est Socrates, quia deos defiruebat; Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyed the gods. And indeed that Socrates asserted one supreme God, the maker and governour of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be doubted. In his

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his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon’s first book of Memoirs 1, he convinced him that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by Mind and Counsel; nor we spectators to such matters: or, his life, Am I now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise artificer, who also was a lover of animals. And so he endeavoured to persuade him, that that mind and understanding, which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water, which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe: for if we suppose the first to be the second, and so on, we shall never know why all these things are, unless we make a beginning of something higher. Do you think that you only have wisdom in yourself, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and of every other thing, that your body is compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them, which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy, you have, some way or other, luckily got and snatch’d unto your self, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance? And when Aristodemus afterward objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers, which made all other human things, Socrates thus replies, for you are not such men, or such wise men, as to see any thing, unless you have some mind to see in you, as you have, in your own thoughts, which rules over your body; so that you might for the same reason conclude your self to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance. Again, when he further disputed in this manner against the necessity of worshipping the Deity, as χ υπερθε το διαμιστο, δι Σωρατες, αλλα’ έκεινο μεγαλαπροετερου ήγεματι, ή ως τις έπει άρα Θεοπαγια προτεθεια. I defy not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him: Socrates again answers, φερ μεγαλαπροετερου αξιοι σε θεοπαγιον, τοσοτε μαλλον τιμη ουτον. How much more the magnificient and illustrious that being is, which takes care of you, so much the more, in all reason, ought it to be honoured by you. Lastly, Aristodemus discovering his disbelief of providence, as a thing, which seemed to him incredible, if not impossible, that one and the same Deity should be able to mind all things at once, Socrates endeavours to cure this disbelief of his in this manner: ο αγαθων κατομαναι, οτι ο σος μεσ άνω το σου όγκο με σαε ελεγαται μελαχροιναι, ουδεις ως χρη και των εται προετοι το πασχαι άπως ου αυτη εδη η η απο τοιαυται και μη το σου μετομεν δουλαιη, ιπται πολλα σαδικα έκκειται, τοι έτε το Θεον διαλομον αδυνατον ειναι αμα πασχαι όμως. Consider, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it every way as it pleases, why should not that wisdom, which is in the universe, be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can Fff discern

1 P. 573. Oper. These Words are not Socrates’ to Aristodemus, but Aristodemus’ to Socrates.  
2 P. 574.  
3 P. 575.
That Socrates was a Martyr for Book I.

discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places? And then he concludes, that if Arisblodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, that there are no secrets equal to the Creator: for they, who have clients, and have no secrets to hide, will be the first that will be convinced, that God is such, as that he can, at once, see all things, and bear all things, and be present everywhere, and take care of all affairs. Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemeus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity, which governs the whole world: "The other gods reporting us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who continually supplieth us with them, he, though he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his light: as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that, which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen; and the same is manifest in all things, to all, and in the great work of the Deity, which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects. Where we have the Deity, as also before, plainly put for the supreme Deity. And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here, concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any pudor or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates his thus clear acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow, that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the Pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his, (when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Asclepius: for which Origen thus perfringeth him, ιεν τημακατ Φιλοσοφουσιες περι την ψυχης και την διαγωγη της καλας Θεοσεως διεκελδουσε, και την αττητης τη μεγαθα μετω αυτος ο Θεος και φαινομεν, τυτελη Θεος και αμηστη, αλεκτρουσι τη ασκυλπιον απολυμανας. And they, who had philosophized so excellently


P. 633.
concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from these great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Æsculapius. Where notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gros and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere, for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior daemon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking, that he looked upon Æsculapius no otherwise than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his providence over the sickness and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistick sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him, at once, of all diseases by death. However Plato informs us, that Socrates, immediately before he drank his poison, did εὐχαρίστῃ τοῖς θεοῖς, τήν μελέτην τῶν ἑθῶν ἐκείς εὐτυχίας ἔχων, pray (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior Gods both together, as in Plato's Phaedrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him. And Xenophon, in his Memoirs, informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country; he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion, of Socrates his being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand, what that accusation of impiety really was, which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's Euthyphro, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prison, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prison for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had caltrated his father Caelus for some miscalculations of his, Socrates thus bespeaks him: Ἀράγε, ὦ Ἐθυφρό, οὐδὲν ἐγὼ ἔναν ὄρμα τὸ γραφαὶν εἶναι, ὡς τὰ τειχώτα ἡμεῖς ἔχομε περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγων, μυθεῖσιν πῶς ἀποδικωμαί, &c. Is not this the very thing, O Euthyphro, for which I am accused? namely, because when I hear any one affirming such matters as these concerning the gods, I am very loth to believe them, and sick not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among the gods, and that those other things were also done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? Such as the Peplum or veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaicks is with great pomp and ceremony brought into the temple, &c.  

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1 Vide Orig. adver. Celfum, Lib. VII.  
2 Vide Orig. adver.  
3 Lib. IV. p. 634 Oper.  
4 P. 49.  
5 Vide Orig. adver. Celfum, Lib. VII.  
Plato also a real Polytheist;  Book I.

into the Acropolis, is embroidered all over with? Thus we see, that Socrates, though he affirmed one supreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding, other inferior created gods, together with the rest of the Pagans, honouring and worshiping them; only he disliked those poetick fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar,) in which all manner of unjust and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reason, why he was then accused of impiety and atheism.

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato really affirmed one only God and no more, and that therefore, whencesoever he speaks of gods plurally, he must be understood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only in a way of politick compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a passage cited out of that thirteenth epistle of Plato's to Dionysius, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his serious epistles, and such as were written according to the true sense of his own mind, might by his friends be distinguished from those, which were otherwise; τοις μεν γὰρ συναδείας ἐπίσκοπον Θεός ἀρχεῖ, τοι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας. When I begin my epistles with God, then may you conclude I write seriously; but not so when I begin with gods. And this place seems to be therefore the more authentic, because it was long since produced by Eusebius to this very purpose, namely to prove, that Plato acknowledged one only God; ἐκάστος δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶδος, καὶ καὶ νῦν ὡς Ὁλλαἱ, τῷ τῶν πολισσῶν ἐκδόντες ἐπισκόπους, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπισκόπους, ἐν ἡ σύμβολα διδόντων, τῶν τε διὰ σπέρματος αὐτῷ γεγομένων, καὶ τῶν ἀλλὰς ἀπερίματον. It is manifest, that Plato really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods plurally, from that epistle of his to Dionysius, wherein he gives this symbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write seriously, namely, when he began his epistles with God, and not with Gods.

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifested out of Plato's Timæus, that he did in good earnest assert a plurality of gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, in whom there is an honour and worship from men due; he therein declaring, not only the sun, and moon, and stars, but also the earth itself (as animated) to be a god or goddes. For though it be now read in our copies, τὰν εἰματον, that the earth was the o'dest of all the bodies within the heavens; yet it is certain, that anciently it was read otherwise, τὸν ἐξ ἐκτὸς τῶν, the oldest of the gods; not only from Proclus and Cicero, but also from Laertius, writing thus: γὰρ δὲ προσεβάλατον λέγεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ἑρωστήριῳ Θεον, γινόμενον δὲ δημιουργητε, ὡς νῦν καὶ πρότερον ποιεῖται, ήπειραί ta tò μέγα, καὶ κατά τη κράτος μετά τοῦ μέγα. Though Plato's gods were for the most part fiery; yet did he suppose the earth to be a god or goddes too, affirming it to be the oldest of all the gods within the.

P. 40. Ser.
Nevertheless a Monarchist.

the heavens, made or created to distinguish day and night, by its diurnal circumvagration upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world. For Plato, when he wrote his Timeus, acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is said to have admitted its annual too. And the same might be further evinced from all his other writings, but especially his book of laws (together with his Epinomis) said to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much inflicts upon the godships of the sun, moon and stars; and complains, that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate stones and earth; as also he approves of that then vulgarly received custom of worshipping the rising and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himself: *Ανατελεσθε τε προς θελως, γε προς θυμως ινως, προσχωλεις αμα κε προσκυνης *Ελληνος τε κε Βαρθεραυ παυλων, εν συμφορες παντοιες ερχομαιν κε ευπραγωςις, εσι ερειας κε ενω ως εν ειπτ ηοι. The prostrations and adorations, that are used both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their prosperities as adversities) declare them to be unquestionably esteemed gods. Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude, but that this thirteenth epistle of Plato to Dionysius, though extant, it seems, before Eusebius his time, yet was supposititious and counterfeit by some zealous but ignorant Christian: as there is accordingly a Νοθείλαι, or brand of baftardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato's works.

However, though Plato acknowledged and worshipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no Polyarchist, but a Monarchist, an affirter of one supreme God, the only αυτος, or self-originated being, the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all those other gods. For first, it is plain, that, according to Plato, the soul of the whole world was not it self eternal, much less self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from these words of his; την θυρφιν κε ντοι Πλατ. Tim. p. νωρ υφευγεν επιχειρους λιτεονι, έτος ευρονικιαλον κε θοι θεοετελην. έν δε εν γενετε ριχεαλην ολει σοις εσομαι. God did not fabricate or make the soul of the world, in the same order that we now treat concerning it, that is, after it, as junior to it; but that, which was to rule over the world, as its body, being more excellent, he made it first, and senior to the same. Upon which account Aristotle quarrels with Plato as contradicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a principle, and yet supposed it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven: *αλλα μην οταν Μετ. Πλατουι γε οσιον τε λεγειν, ων ειται αρχη τω εικος εικος εικος ατομ ανατολην, ου εστον γελα κε Παλιον έν τε σοις ψυχει. Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself; for which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato affirter a double Psyche, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in times;
all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars and daemons, must needs be so too. But let any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall observe, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of anwer to that quære, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds, (as some philosophers had maintained,) or only one? he resolving it thus, πέτερον ὑπὸ ὁμού ἐκ χραμοῦ προ- σειρικους, ὑ πολλάς χα αἵρεσις λέγειν ὑπὸ ὁμοτερον; ενα, εἰτερ καθα τὸ παράσηπμα δε- δυμενημενω τίς το γαρ περιέχον παίλα ὁπότα νοστα ὁμο, μεθ' ἐτέκες διετερον ἐκ τον ποιν ἑι, ἤ, ἢ ὑπὸ τὸκατὰ τὴν μάνωσιν, ὅμοιων ἢ τοι παίκτειν ὅμων, διὰ τάκτα ἐπε τοῦ, υτ αἵρεσις ἐποίσεις τὸ ποιῶν κόσμικ, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁδι μονογενὲς χραμός γίγνοιτο, ἐπ τε χα ὑπαίτω. Whether have we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven, (or world) or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten. His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his Timæus and elsewhere, ὁ Θεός, God, or the God, by way of excellency; sometimes ὁ Δημιουργός, the Architect or Artificer of the world; sometimes ὁ Πνεύματα Χα Πατὴρ τοῦ τοι παίτος, the Maker and Father of this universe, whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar; again, ὁ πατέρ τοῦ Θεός, the God over all, τῆς Φύσεως κλής, the Creator of nature; το παίδος Ἀρχή, the sole Principle of the universe; τῶν πάλαι Ἀτομ, the Cause of all things; ης πάλαις βασιλείς, Mind, the king of all things; ης αὐτογαμότος παίτος κορωπαν διὰ πάντων ἡω, that sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things; το παίδος Κυβερνητικός, the Governor of the whole; το ὁν ἀρετόν, γενεῖν δε ὅν ἔχον, that which always is, and was never made; ο πατέρ τοῦ Θεός, the first God; ὁ μέγιστος Δαίμων, and ὁ μεγίστος θεός, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; ο θεὸς γνώσις, he that generated or produced the sun; ὁ γιοι, οραϊν νῆ ὄντες, ἢ παίτα το ἐν ὑμνοι ὕπο το ἐν, καὶ ὕπο το ὄπλα εἰργάζεται, he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth: again, he by whose efficiency the things of the world ὑποτερον ἐνεσίον, προτέρον ἐν ὄνο, were afterwards made when they were not before; or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being. This philosopher somewhere intimating, that it was easy for God to produce those real things, the sun, moon, stars and earth, &c. from himself, as it is for us to produce the images of our selves and whatsoever else we please, only by interposing a looking-glass. Lastly, he called ὁ παίτα τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰργάζεται, καὶ ἐναύθω, he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself; the meaning whereof is this, he, that is αὐτοφυς, (as the same Plato also calls him) a self-originated Being, and from
no other cause besides himself, but the cause of all other things. Neither doth Laelantius Firmianus, himself refuse to speak of God after this very manner; that he ipsum fecit, and that he was ex ipso procreatus, & prop-terea talis, qualem se effe voluit; that he made himself; and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be. Which unusual and bold strain of theology is very much infisht upon by Plotinus, En. 6. L. 8. in his book, Περὶ τῆς ἑκάστης τῆς ἑαυτοί, concerning the will of the first One, or P. 749, [ap. XIV. p. 750.] unity; he there writing thus of the supreme God, αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ, καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς; He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself. And again, αὐτὸς ἐστι οὗτος ὁ ποιών ἑαυτόν, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ταῖς ἑτέραις ἑαυτες, αὐτῷ ἐσείς αὐτός. This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself; (in a certain sense) for he was not made that, which another willed him to be, but he is that, which he willeth himself to be. Moreover, αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ὤτε πάντες, τότε δὲ ἦν ὑποτάσσει αὐτον, εἰτε ἐνεχεια P. 751. μένουαι, δὲ εἰς εὐεργείαν αὐτός, αὖλα ἄλλα μέν ἑαυτός, εἰτε εἰς εὐεργείαν αὐτός, ἐν δὲ ἆρα ἀσυμβέβημεν ἐνα, ἀὖλα εἰς εὐεργείαν αὐτός καὶ αὐτός ἑλεύσε, &c. The supreme Deity looking himself as a pure light, is himself what be loved; thus, as it were, being and getting and giving subsistence to himself, being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy; so that God is not that, which he happened to be, but that which he willeth himself to be. Thus also a little before, ἀνακτόν eis ἐν τὸν βάλειν και τὸν ἑστίν τὸ δ ἑλεύσε P. 748. αὐτῷ, ἀνάχρην ἀρα τὸ ἐναίπται αὐτῷ, δι' αὐτοῦ πεποινκαί αὐτῶν, ὁ λόγος αἰνεῖν εἰ γὰρ ὁ βάλειν παρ' αὐτῷ, οὔ οὖν ἑαυτῷ, αὐτὴ δὲ ταυτὰ τῇ ὑποτάσσει αὐτῷ αὐτῶν ἢ τις ὑποτάσσεις ἢ μὴ αὐτῶν, δι' εἰς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν εἰς τὸν ἑστὶν, ἀὖλα ἢ μὴ ἑλεύσε αὐτῶν. We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the first being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that He made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the fame with his hypostasis or substance; he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willeth himself to be. But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here let down yet one or two passages more of this philosopher's concerning it; ἐκ τῆς βαλλειν αὐτῷ ἡ P. 747. ἐστιν, ἀὖλα σώσειν αὐτῷ τῇ ἑαυτῷ ἡ ἑλεύσει καὶ ἐκ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ λακεύει, δι' αὐτῷ ἑλεύσει αὐτῷ ὑποτάσσει καὶ σύναρμον. αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ, ἑλεύσε αὐτῶν εἰκόνι, καὶ τότε ὁ ὄρος ἐστὶ καὶ ἑλεύσε καὶ αὐτῶν ἐν πάντων ἑστιν, καὶ τότε ἐκ ἑλεύσε καὶ αὐτῶν ἐν καὶ τὸτε ἐς τοῦ ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ὑποτάσσει ηλεύσε, ἀὖλα δὲ τῷ ὑπελήθη δι' τό γὰρ ἐν καὶ ἑλεύσει, τἐτο ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἐνα ἑσάξει ἑνεβάλει καὶ ἑτέρῳ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ἑσάξει τῷ τῷ φύσει ἐν αὐτῶν μήτε ἢ μὴ τοῦ τῆς Γοργωνίας, μὴτα ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τῷ μέμφοδει, ὡς ὅπο ἀνάγκης τότε οὗ τὸ ἐστι, τῷ αὐτῶν εἰκόνι, ὅτε αὐτῶν εἰκόνι, τῷ τῷ τῶν ἑλεύσε αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ ἑσάξει θελασία αὐτῶν. The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is) and that he would will to be another: For what could

could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should suppose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain, that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good, there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such. Lastly, Paulus Euhelius, who also wrote to the Philippians, says: To the phúc of the power of God, who hath in his power both to will and to do according to his good pleasure. Now God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or be himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce anything that was not before. And now we may in all probability conclude, that Laelanius derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus; which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word autogenes, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans, seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened, by chance, to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and choose to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, that God causeth himself and all things, but also to shew how punctually precise, curious and accurate some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonick, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists; yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For first, whereas, in his tenth book of Laws, he professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstanding there ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, or proper cause of all that motion, which is in the world. And this is all the god, that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently affirms, above the self-moving Psyche, an immovable and standing Nous or Intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world. And lastly, above this multiform Intellect, he plainly affirms yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ὑπό,
properly the King of all things.

in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and τάγαθνο, goodness itself, as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite secundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly in his second epistle to Dionysius does he mention a trinity of divine hypostases, all together. Now the words ὁ Θεός and τὸ Θείον, God and the divinity in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Πσυχε; nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that, which is properly called by the Platonists πηθα τῆς Στοιχείων, the fountain of the Godhead, and by Plato himself, ὁ πάλιν βασιλεῖς, περὶ ἐν πάσαις ἐν, ὡς ἀνακάκτην πάντα, ὡς αὖτιν πάλιν τῶν καλῶν. The king of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things.

And this first divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly ἀνωτέρως, the original Deity, is largely insinuted upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his Politicks, under the name and title of τάγαθνο, the good; but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also, a heavenly God, and said to be the offspring of this highest good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, ὁ τοι ἐντὸς εὐμμυρό τόπου, πρὸς τε ἐνν, ὥς τα θέματα, τὸ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀράμα πρὸς τε ὁμοιο ής τα ὄρομα, ὃς ἡ ἐνθα πάνταν, ὧς οἷν πάλιν τῶν καλῶν. This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sense and sensible. For, as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it; nor is that light, by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only ἀλλοίωσι, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only ἀγαθότερος, a boniform thing. Again, As the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest good, not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings. Οὕσεϊς ὁ ἐντὸς τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν ιδίαις τῆς οὐσίας, προσθείαις δυνάμεις ἐπερχόμενος. This highest good being not itself properly essence, but above essence, transcending the same, both in respect of dignity and power. Which language and conceit of Plato's some of the Greek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as to apply it to the whole Trinity, when they call God ίπτερον, or superessential. But the meaning of that philosopher was, as we conceive, no other than this, that this highest good hath no particular charactertistick upon it, limiting and determining of it, it being the hidden and incomprehensible source of all things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first divine hypostasis of the Platonick trinity is by that philosopher called, τὰτ ὑμεῖος, ὃς αὖτιν πάλιν πάντα, The father of the prince, and cause of all things. Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondency betwixt the

Platonic philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypothesis of both their trinities (called also sometimes λόγος by the Platonists, as well as νεόν) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socraetic too, (though it seems there was not so good correspondence betwixt them;) which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledge a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen; as this particularly, "ὅπαντα στιςν υἱῷ ἀπῆλθεν, ως κεῖν μέρας τις, υἱὸς θεοῦ Φανερός, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ μνήμην ἔφανε." He that both agitates all things, and establisheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous.

XXIV. In the next place we come to Aristotle: who, that he acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) appears from his using the word so often primarily. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethics; "οἱ δὲ τελείως εὐθυμοιοι, οἵτινες οὖν ἐνεργεῖαν, καὶ ἐνέχθαι διὰ τοῦ Τυκεόν τοὺς ἀλλος μάλιστα ὑπελείφαμεν μακαρίους χρηματίους χαίρειν πράξεως ἄν ποιεῖς αὐτοὶ χρείασθε αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς ἀκιδίας; οἱ χειρὸς φαντάσται συναλλαγῶνις καὶ παρακαλεῖσθαι ἀποδίδοντες, καὶ δοκεῖ πάντα ταῖς ἀνάθησις; ἂν μετατρέψεως τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ κατονάως, καὶ τοὺς κατὰ ταῖς ἐνεργείας; τῶν δὲ διότι τοῖς ἀντικροτοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε κακοῖς νόμοις, ὃ τοιοῦτον εἰ δὲ κυρίως τοῖς κακοῖς, οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰς οὔτε κυρίως τοῖς κακοῖς, οἱ φύσιν ὑπαίτιος οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι καὶ ἐξελθέντως οἱ φυλής εἰς τὸν ἂν ζωὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ μηδὲν μᾶρ τοῖς ἀπιθανοῖς αὐτοῖς; καὶ ἐνεχθῆς ἡμῖν, ἡ γὰρ τὰ καθεύδην, οὕτως τοῖς ἐνεχθέντοις τοῖς δὲ ζωτικῶς τὸ πράξεως αὐτοῖς, ὅτι δὲ μάλλης τοῖς ποιεῖν, τὶ λειτυται πλὴν Στείρες; Τότε φησιν ἡμῖν τὸ ποιεῖν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸν ἀλλὸν καὶ πᾶν ἐργῶν." That perfect happiness is a speculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifest from hence, because we account the gods most of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute to them? Whether those of justice amongst one another; as if it were not ridiculous to suppose the gods to make contrats and bargains among themselves, and the like. Or else those of fortitude and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter seithal. Or those of liberality; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods, to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lusts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to be; unless we should suppose them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations, be taken away from that which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation? To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy.

to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness. Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his, ζῷον τε πώτερα κατακρήσα τινάς, All men suppose the gods to live, and from what follows in him, that opinion of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politicks, writing of the means to conferve a tyranny, as he calls it, lets down this for one amongst the rest; έστι δὲ τὰ πέρα τῆς θεώς, προσέτοια αἰτὶ παντεύονται το τυχείν τὸ παραλάβην ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶν, τὸ δὲ δυσακόμοι νομίζοντο εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ φυσικάν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπικελέστειν τιναν, ὡς συμμάχους ἐχοντας άς τοις θεοῖς. For a prince or monarch to seem to be always more than ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the gods: because men are left afraid of suffering any injustice from such kings or princes, as they think to be religiously disposed, and devoutly affected towards the gods. Neither will they be so apt to make conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants. Where the word δυσακόμοι seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a δυσακόμοι, as a meer politician. Likewise in his first book de Caro, he writeth thus; πάντες δὲ δημοκριτοὶ προς θεόν ἔχουσιν ὑπολείψιν, γίνοντες τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ παραλαβοντος, ή δὲ δημοκριτοὶ προς θεόν, ἢ δὲ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ παραλαβοντος. C. 5. All men have an opinion or Tom. 1. persuasion, that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well Barbarians as Grecians, attribute the highest place to that which is divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodaate to immortal gods. Wherefore if there be any divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements. And in the following book he tells us again, that it is most agreeable τοι μνεία προς τὸν Θεοῦ, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible. Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally μνεία, a vaticination in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μνεία or vaticination of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon daemons, as Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his Metaphysicks, speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in ζῷον τε νὰ διαμέθαν, animals and demons, and elsewhere he infinuath them to have airy bodies, in these words;

Lib. V. Cap. VIII. p. 329. Tom. VI. Oper.
words; inquit esse υαρ ἀν τις, η̣ ἀλλὰ τίς αἰτία, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄξιον ψυχή, τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζωῶν 
belɛtтяν ἢ, ἰ̣ ἀπανωτέρα. Some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that 
is in the air, is better and more immortal than that in animals. However, whether Aristotle believed these lower daemon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely the intelligences of all the 
several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty seven in number, he 
must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppute another fort of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, 
where, according to him, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, nor time; in these words; ὅτι ἐν τῶν τὰ ἀκόλουθα, ὡς ἁρμόνια αὐτὰ πεσὺ γνωρίζων, 
οὐ εἰς ὅνες ὡς ἂνημι μεταβολή, τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑκατέρων τειχώμων Φεραί, ἀλλὰ ἀκολουθοῦσας ἐπὶ ἀπαραίτητον διατελεῖ τῶν ἀπολοίων οἰκών. 
They, who exist there, are such as are neither apt to be in a place, nor to wax old 
with time, nor is there any change at all in those things above the highest sphere; 
but they being immoveable and unalterable, lead the best and most self-sufficient life, 
throughout all eternity. But this passage is not without suspicion of being 
supposititious.

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did assert one supreme and uni-
versal Numen, is a thing also unquestionable. For though it be granted, 
that he useth the singular Θεός, as likewise τὸ Θεῖον and τὸ δαμαίνον, many times 
indefinitely, for a god in general, or any divine being; and that such places as 
these have been oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if Aristotle had 
meant the supreme God in them; yet it is nevertheles certain, that he 
often useth those words also emphatically, for one only supreme God. As 
in that of his Metaphysics, ό, τι γὰρ Θεός δοκεῖ το άίτων πάσιν εἶναι καὶ αἰχή τις: 
God seemeth to be a cause and certain principle to all things. And also in his 
De Anima, where he speaks of the soul of the heavens, and its circular motion: ἄλλα μὲν ψυχῇ ὑπὲρ τῆς βλάτιαν σέρειαν ὃ ἑκέριν τὸν Θεῖον διὰ τῶν κύκλων πολλῶν Φε-
ρεῖαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁτι βίλικον αὐτῇ τὸ κύκλω τι μένει, κυκλῳ δι᾽ έτῶς ἡ πάλαιος. 
Neither is that a good cause of the circular motion of the heavens, which they 
(that is the Platonists) call the τὸ βίλικον, because it is better, that it should be so 
than otherwise; as if God therefore ought to have made the soul of the world 
such, as to move the heaven circularly, because it was better for it to move so 
than otherwise: but this being a speculation that properly belongs to some other 
science, we shall no further pursue it in this place. Thus afterwards again, in 
the same book*, συμβαίνει δι᾽ Ἐπεδοκείας γε το άφοιν-αλον εἰς τὸν Θεῖον, μόνω 
γὰρ τῶν σώζων ἐν ἑλήμενοι, τὸ Νεώκα, τα δὲ ἔφθασαν πάντα, εἰ πάντως γὰρ ἔκαστον. 
It follows from Empedocles his principles, that God must needs be the most un-
wise of all, be alone being ignorant of that (out of which all other things are 
compounded) νεώκα, or contention (because himself is nothing but Φιλα, 
unity and friendship) whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, 
they being compounded of all. Which same passage we have again also, in 

* Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 16. Tom. II. Oper,
Chap. IV. of one universal Numen.

is Metaphysicks 1, from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To these might be added another place out of his book of Generation and Corruption 2, to ὅλος γεννεώμενον ἡ ἡμέρα, ἀνελική τῶν γενικῶν γίνεται: God bath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation. Lastly, τὸ διαφορέσον is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not for the divinity in general, or any thing that is divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetorick to Alexander, ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ διαφόρος τῶν κατὰ κόσμον, ἢμις οἱ μεγίστες τιμῶν ὡς τὸ διαφορέα τυχοῦσι: This is that, wherein we men differ. From other animals, having received the greatest honour from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason.

Over and besides which, Aristotle in his Metaphysicks (as hath been already observed) professedly opposeth that imaginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existant deities; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because ἅπαξ ἐρχόμενον. In veritate, all things are plainly co-ordered to one, the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas if there were many principles or independent Deities, the system of the world must needs have been ἐμεμοιαζόμενον, incoherent and insupporting, like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent interjections. Whereupon Aristotle concludes after this manner, τὰ δὲ οἷάν ἐν βασιλείᾳ κανονὸς πολιτευθέντα,

Οῖς δὲ ἄρα Πολιορκασιν Ἠς Κόλοβοι.

But things will not be ill administered (which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) wherfore there is one Prince or Monarch over all. From which passage of Aristotle’s it is evident, that though he asserted Πολιορκία, a multiplicity of gods in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied Πολιορκείαν and Πολιορκίαν, a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy, that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore though Aristotle dealt much upon that whimsey of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immovable minds (now commonly called intelligences) as there are movable spheres of all kinds in the heavens, (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles;) yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have derived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which, as Simplicius expresseth it, is ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, the principle of principles; and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the primum mobile, or highest sphere, contains all the lesser spheres within it: because otherwise there would not be Ἠς Κόλοβοι, one prince or monarch over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polykœran or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus represents Aristotle’s senfe, it is not conceivable, that so many independent [Cap. IX.]

Aristotle's first immoveable Mover. Book I.

Pendent principles should thus constantly conspire, προς τα μεταξυ των τω ποιητών ἀρχών συμφωνών, into one work, that agreeable symphony, and harmony of the whole heaven. As there could not be any reason neither, why there should be just so many of these intelligences, as there are spheres and no more; and it is absurd to suppose, καλά συναφέως τοις ἀρχαῖς ῥώνα, that the first principles of the universe happened by chance.

Now this highest principle, as it is αὐτός τε, an immoveable essence, is by Aristotle in the first place supposed to be ἀρχή κυρίως, the principle of motion in the universe, or at least of that chiefest motion of the primum mobile or highest sphere, (which according to the astronomy of those times seems to have been the sphere of fixed stars) by whose rapid circumvolution, all the other spheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round, from east to west. And accordingly the supreme Deity is by Aristotle called τὸ πρῶτον καινὸν αἰτίαν, the first immoveable mover, or the mover of the primum mobile, and whole heaven. Which first mover being concluded by him to be but one, he doth from hence infer the singularity of the heaven or world, τὸ μὲν ἄρα τὸν κόσμον ἀρίθμησε, τὸ πρῶτον καινὸν τοῦ ἄρα ἐστι νομισάον ἀρίθμησε, τὸ καινὸν ἀρίθμησε, τὸ τοῦ καινού ἄρα ἐστὶ νομισάον ἀρίθμησε. There is one numerically first immoveable mover and no more; and therefore there is but one heaven or world. In which doctrine of Aristotle's, there seems to be a great difference betwixt his philosophy and that of Plato's; in that Plato makes the principle of motion in the heavens and whole world to be a self-moving soul, but Aristotle supposeth it to be an immovable mind or intellect. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's explication of himself, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover being understood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, ὡς ἐστὶν, as being loved. Which conceit of his Proclus upon Plato's Timaeus perceiving after this manner; τοῖς παντικοῖς οἱ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπιστήμους ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου, γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἀριθμοῦ, τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πρῶτου ἐμφανέστατος αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόσμου καθηκόντων, ἐν τούτῳ ἦν ἔμφασιν ἠμφασιν εἰς αὐτῶν, ἐν τού τινι προτότοις. Thus Proclus upon Plato's Timaeus.

Some of the ancients converting the world to mind (or intellect) and making it move only by love of that first desirable, acknowledged nothing at all to descend down from Mind (or God) upon the world; but equalized the same with other amiable things, amongst sensibles, that have nothing generative in their nature. Where Proclus seems to suppose Aristotle to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto shall be evidently proved afterwards. In the mean time it is certain, that Aristotle, besides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally, or as being loved, must needs suppose another immediate mover of them, or efficient cause of that motion; which could be nothing but a soul, that, enmoured with this supreme mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which seems to be nothing but Plato's doctrine disguised; that philosopher affirming likewise, the circular motions of the heavens, caused efficiently by a soul of the world in his Timaeus, to be,
IV.

And principle,—Which Platonick conceit found entertainment with Boetius, who writing of the soul of the world, represents it thus;

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity, in the same Boetius his language, that,

———Stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.

Being itself immoveable, it causeth all other things to move. The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.

Nevertheless this is not the only thing, which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest immoveable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the primum mobile, and that no otherwise than as being loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as Anaxarogas, affected it to be also, that without which there could be no such thing as well; that is, no order, no aptitude, proportion and harmony in the universe: He declaring excellently, that ει μη ἐκείνο παρα το αἰσθητα ἄλλα, εκ εκείνου ἄρχει ἄλλα ἀει το το ισχυ ἄρχων, Unless there were something else in the world besides sensible, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end. And again in another place already cited 3, το εις καλος ἐπει ος οτι προς ἐκ τε γνω, &c. αυτο αυτον αυτο ταυτω το εκτοτ ειρεγει προς καλοι ἐκις. It is not at all likely, that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world, nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune. Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxarogas, concludes, that it is Nous or Mind, which is properly αυτον το καλος καθεος, the cause of well and right, and accordingly does he frequently call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming likewise, that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of an army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato,

2 Lib. X. p. 669. 3 Ibid. Lib. XIV. Cap. X. p. 484, 485.
"Mind according to Aristotle, Book I.

Plato, το ἄγαθον χαράμως, the separat good of the world, in way of definition from that intrinick or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself: 'Εστιν υπ᾽ ἐν τῇ ὁλῇ, ὅταν τὸ ἄγαθον χαράμως ἀριστήμενον τι, ὁ ἄριστος καὶ ὁ ἄριστος, ἡ τῶν τάξεων ἡ ἀριστοτέως ἀριστερά τρίτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρώγγος, καὶ μᾶλλον ὁ ὄρος, ἡ γὰρ ὄρος διὰ τῶν τάξεων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖν ἡ διὰ τῶν ἐν συνεστάσεω συνιστά: ποιεῖται γὰρ συνεστάσαι συνιστά. It is to be considered also, what is the good, and best of the universe; whether its own order only? or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consistseth both in its order, and likewise in its general or emperor, but principally in this latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co-ordered together with God, and respectively to him. Wherefore since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name soever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that well and fit, that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final cause of motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras for maintaining Ναν ἐνεκαὶ καὶ τὸ κόσμου καὶ τὸν τάξεων ποτόν, that mind is the cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world: and when himself positively affirms, ἐν τοιούτῳ ἀριστείηται ὁ συνεστάσας καὶ Φύσις, that from such a principle as this, depends the heaven, and nature. Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insuffited on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the instrument of the divine mind. He also somewhere affirmeth, that if the heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his Physicks, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes nevertheless, ἀνάγκη νῦν αἰτία καὶ Φύσις νῦν τοῦδε παρὰ τοῖς παρὰς, that mind together with nature must of necessity be the cause of this whole universe. For though the world were never so much coeternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himself thus generously resolving, ἐνυποθέσαν εἶναι νῦν προερχόμενον καὶ κατέχει τὸ Φύσιν τὸ χρόνον, that though some (that is the Atheists) affirm the elements to have been the first Beings, yet it was the most reasonable thing of all to conclude, that Mind was the oldest of all things, and senior to the world and elements; and that, according to nature, it had a princely and sovereign dominion over all. Wherefore we think it now sufficiently evident, that Aristotle's supreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cause of motion; but also was the efficient cause of this whole mundane systen, framed according to the best wisdom, and after the best manner possible.

For perhaps it may not be amiss here to observe, that God was not called Mind by Aristotle, and those other ancient philosophers, according
to that vulgar sense of many in these days of ours; as if he were indeed an
understanding or perceptive being, and that perfectly omniscient, but yet
nevertheless such, as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by
any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, ac-
cording to those ancient philosophers, that, which acts without respect to
good, would not be so much accounted mens as dementia, mind, as madnefs
or folly; and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together
with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have
been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But
Aristotle and those other philosophers, who called the supreme God Νός; or
Mind, understood thereby that, which of all things in the whole world is
most opposite to chance, fortune, and temerity; that which is regulated by
the ὅ καλός, the well and fit of every thing, if it be not rather the very
rule, measure and effence of fitnefs itself; that which acts all for ends
and good, and doth every thing after the best manner, in order to the
whole. Thus Socrates in that place before cited out of Plato's Phædo, in-
terprets the meaning of that opinion, that Mind made the world, and was the
cause of all things: ἡ μαρτυρία, εἰ τοῦτο ἦτος ἡ χρη, τὸν οὐν πάλαι καλοῦν, καὶ ἐκατα
τιπποί τὸν διὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἢ τότε ἤτοι θεσμός ἢ τὸν Εὐσημερεῖν, That therefore every thing might be concluded
to have been disposed of after the best manner possible. And accordingly Theo-
phrafus, Aristotle's scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner,
tο πώς το αἰτία τῆς ἀντιπαραλλαγῆς. That first and divine Being
of all, which willeth all the best things. Whether of these two hypotheses
concerning God, one of the ancient Pagan philosophers, that God is as essen-
tially goodnes as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency
and fitnefs itself; the other, of some late professors of Chrifitianity, that he
is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omnifcient; I fay, whether
of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Chrifitianity, we shall leave
it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame
of nature, and fabrick of the world, impute even the very fitnef{e of
things themselves a'fo to the divine efficiency, (nor indeed can there well
be any doubt of any thing fave only the matter;) partly from his affirming
God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commen-
ting this doctrine of Anaxagoras, άου τῷ καλῷ, αἰτία καὶ ἀείσκον εἰκόνα τῶν ὅτινος Μετ.1. c. 3
νοῦ. That Mind was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of[P. 266.
these things themselves. However, that Aristotle's inferior gods at least, and
therefore his intelligences of the lower spheres, which were incorporeal
fitnaces, were all of them produced or created by one supreme, may be fur-
ther confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetorick, το ἀμαρτίαν ἴδαν Λ. 2. c. 23.
τῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν Ἰδιός, ἐν Ἰδιός ἰδέως, The divinity is nothing but either God or the[P. 785.
tom. IV. work of God. Where Ἰδιός is unquestionably used in way of eminency for
the supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle's before cited, to
which sundry more might be added, as, πάλαι ἡ χρή τ' αγαθά ἐν Ἰδιός, καὶ τοῦ Ἰδιός ἰδέως
καὶ ἰδέως, God posseseth all good things, and is self-fufficient: and again where[P. 255.
he speaks of things, that are more than prafite-worthy, τοῦτον δι' οὕτω τῷ Ἰδιός
H h h

x24; Oper.]
Furthermore, Aristotle declares, that this speculation concerning the Deity does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematicks; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematicks, and theology or metaphysicks: the former of these, that is, physiology, being conversant περὶ ἀκόης ἀρχῆς, συνεργασίας, about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable; the second (viz. geometry, or the pure mathematicks) περὶ ἀκοής καὶ, καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ, about things moveable indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves; but the third and last, περὶ ἀρχηγοῦ καὶ ἀκοής. Concerning things both moveable and separable from matter, that is, incorporeal substances moveable: this philosopher there adding, εἰ μὴ εἰς τὴν τεῖς ὑστα παρὰ τὸς φύσις συμπηγμένον καὶ σύστημα ὑμᾶς ἀτὴν ἄτομον, καὶ συνηγματικά πρῶτα. That if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any moveable substance, the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other. Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysicks the most honourable of all the speculative. Now the chief points of the Aristotelick theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not inge- nit or unmade, according to that in his book against Xenophanes *, οὐ δὲ ἀναρκῆς ἀνακοῆς πάλαι ἔχει, οὐ δὲν καλεῖ γιγαντιῶν ἡμῖν ἢ ξύριον ἢ ξύριον. There is no necessity, that all things should be unmade, for what hinder it that some things may be generated from other things? Yet there must needs be something eternal and unmade, as likewise incorruptible, because εἰ πάλαι οὐσίας Θεοῦ, πάλαι Θεοῦ. If all substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing. Which eternal, unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible substance, according to Aristotle, is not fenealec matter, but a perfect mind. Secondly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, καὶ οἰκομενὸν Ὄνος ἀκόης, separate from sensibles, and not only so, but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise, ἀκόης, καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ, and ἀμφῶς; and ἀμφῶς, indivisible, and de- void of parts, and magnitude. Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients, who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Plotinus) into ἀναρκηεικα, καὶ αἰνηαρκηεικα, ἄνηκας, and ἄνηκας, extending or unex- tended substances. Which doctrine, whether

true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly, in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles. Because the divine Mind being (at least in order of nature) prior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within itself. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all intellect to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects within itself. Lastly, that God being an immovable substance, his ousia is ἡμερ. Met. Lib. 14. ἡμερος, his essence and act or operation the same; δια το αυτω ουσιαν τουχτων της ημερος. ousia εν τε χειριν, there must therefore needs be some such principle as this, whose essence is act or energy. From which theorem Aristotle indeed endeavours to establish the eternity of the world, that it was not made in υποτε, και ανατολικα, ἐν ὑποτε, και εν μυατοσ, from night, and a confused chaos of things, and from nothing; that is, from an antecedent non-existence, brought forth into being; because God, who is an immovable nature, and whose essence is act or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of Aristotle's perhaps would not be inconsiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elsewhere. However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though asserting the world's eternity, nevertheless derived the same from God, because he would prove this eternity of the world from the essentl energy immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle with this short summary, which himself gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the tradition of his Pagan ancestors; παρακαινεια υπο των αρχαιων και παλαιων, ὡς ἐν τοις εἰσιν τουτων, και περιεχει το θειον τον ἄλλον φύσιν, το δε λοιπα μοιχισας ὡς πρακ-οτρ. ousια προς την περιστος των πολιων, και την εις τους νομες και το συμβολον χρονιν αυτον. P. 483.] τεραποδες εις το χαρα τουτων και των διανομων ζωων ροιων της λακυρις, και τουτως ἔτερον αναλογικαι και παραπλησια. It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient times, that the stars are gods also; besides that supreme Deity, which contains the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and political ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As for example, that these gods are of human form, or like to other animals; with such other things as are consequent hereupon. In which words of Aristotle these three things may be taken notice of. First, that this was the general persuasion of the civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one to θειον, which comprehends the whole nature. Where το θειον is by Aristotle plainly taken for the supreme Deity. And his own senfe concerning this particular is elsewhere thus declared after the same manner, where he speaks
of order, harmony, and proportion; Σεις γάρ ὅτι τούτο δυνάμεις ἕγεν, ητὰ καὶ τὸδὶ σωνίξα τὸ πάν, this is the work of divine power, which also contains this universe. Which Divinity containing and comprehending the whole nature and universe, must needs be a single and solitary. Being, according to that expression of Horace before cited,

Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum;

That, which hath nothing like it, nor second to it. The next thing is, that according to the Pagan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities also, that is, understanding beings superior to men; namely the animated stars or spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotle's philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immovable Minds or Intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the Pagan religion and theology, those two things only excepted, were fabulous and fictitious, invented for the better persuasion of the vulgar to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil laws; amongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those gods are all like men or other animals; and therefore to be worshipped in images and statues of those several forms; with all that other fabulous sarrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which being separated from the rest, the νάτερ οὐκα, or ancient tradition of their Pagan progenitors, would remain comprized within those two particulars above mentioned; namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.

To Aristotle may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and arrivalls, they being Plato's successors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and succeffor. Concerning the former of which it is recorded in Cicero, that agreeably with Plato, he asserted vim quandam, quam omnia regantur, eamque animalem, one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed; by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring, ενελεκτερ τοισ εκεινοις cognitionem deorum, to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods; as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those Epicurean gods, which were all suppos'd to be independent and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheists. And Xenocrates his theology, is thus represented in Stobæus, τὸν Νομάδα καὶ τὴν Διανομήν, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἀρχαία πατρὸς ἱχθεύων τάξιν, καὶ παροιμίαν ἡπείρας, καὶ Πειγεῖν, καὶ Νομι, ἢτις ἐστὶν αὐτῶν περιοδης ἔσχος θεός, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπεκδοκοῦ σωματοσ ηγεῖται, τὴν ιεράν καὶ τὴν κατὰ τοὺς πνεύματα, &c. That both a Monad and Dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth Zen and Mind,
Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the soul of the universe: besides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he afferted also certain sublunar gods, viz. the invisible daemons. Where instead of the Platonick trinity, Xenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind, the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus, besides others, cited out of his Metaphysics, ἦσα γὰρ πάντων ἄρχων, δι' τῆς ἔνωσεν καὶ ἑκτὸς διὰμίαν, There is one divine principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain.

XXV. The Stoicks and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysipus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode; they in like manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only διάπαντος, distant and extended, but also ἀντίστοιχος, resisting and impenetrable. So that, according to these Stoicks, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is, substances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were ἄνω μέταβλητες, καὶ κτισμοὶ, a more thin and subtile body, and πνεῦμα θεῖον, a hot and fiery spirit: it being supposed by these philosophers, that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoicks acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next conflagration, (unless perhaps they should be crushed and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the down-fall of some tower, steeples, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them. (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a mere figure of poets, (insomuch, that Epicurus himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon), yet others granted, that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandred up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem to have been all of this persuation, that the frightning of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysipus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republicck such affrightfull stories of punishments after death, ἐν ἐφύλω ἀποστρατευτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν Στοίχων Φῶν, τῶν ἄδεια, τῶν Κεφαλῶν, evildo. Stoic. Rep. 3 Επιστ. p. 1040.

1 These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Plutarch, Libro de Repugnantibus Stoicorum, p. 1052. Tom. II. Oper.

2 Arrian. in. Epicet. Lib. III. Cap. XIII.

p. 293.
The Stoicks, Corpoerealists; Book I.

Thus ergo, that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of divine punishments and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frightening of children from doing unhappy tricks, with those bugbears of Acco and Alphito. But how fondly these Stoicks doated upon that hypothesis, that all was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and sound, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and none, months and years, were bodies with them. And not only so, but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca ¹, Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt & quae animi, nam & hic corpus est; The goods of a body are bodies; now the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too. And with as good logick as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise: Animam confit animal esse, cum ipsa officiat, ut simus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus taliter se habens, ergo animal est: It is manifest, that the soul is an animal, because it is that, by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul so and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too. Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters of logick) made; and how they were befuddled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoicks were such sottish Corpoerealists, yet were they not for all that Atheists; they resolving, that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance, yet was not first of all begotten out of fenfelefs matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and the maker of the whole mundane system. And therefore as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained, that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but divina mente, by a divine and eternal mind every way perfect. From which one eternal mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from fenfelefs matter; Prudentiam & mentem à dis ad homines pervenisse ², that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity. And that Ratio nihil aliud est, quàm in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus merita ³, Reason is nothing else but part of the divine spirit merged into a human body: so that these human souls were to them no other than μείζων Σείων και ἀποστάσεως ⁴, certain parts of

¹ Epist. CVI. p. 399. Tom. II. Oper. ³ p. 3000. Tom. IX. Oper.
of God, or descriptions and avulsions from him. Neither were the reasons, by which the Stoicks would prove the world to have had a divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those, which have been used in the latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius his Annals, or Homer's Iliads might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many forms of letters, confounded all together; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any phantastick poem made by men. And since we see no houfes or cities, no books or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think, that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognition of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, nisi ea uno divine, & continuato spiritu continerentur, were they not all contained by one and the same divine spirit: which is the most obvious argument for the unity or oneliness of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either the world itself, or something presiding over it, was a principio sapientis, wise from the beginning, or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, Natura fue quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit, nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of; and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; ita in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid & perfici, so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect, reach'd unto. Necessa est presbiantem aliquid esse naturam, qua nihil esse melius; since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better, at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner; Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem & rationem? Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain, that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituality from the air? Illud autem, quod vincit hac omnia, rationem, mentem & conjilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde sublatus? An aerata mundus habebit omnia? Hoc numquid plurimi dixerint non habebit? But that which far transcends all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those other things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us? Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est experis, id generare ex se potest animantes compotes rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis: Nothing that

that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generates such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual. Which argumentation is further set home by such similitudes as these; Si ex oliva modulato carentes tibicinum nascantur, non dubitare, quin esset in oliva tibicinis quaedam scientia. Quid si platani vidiculas ferrent num-
mcrofo fonantes, idem seilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur niger
mundus non animans sajitenque judicatur, cum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes? If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plain-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical, either skill or nature, in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wise (or to have something in it which is so) since it produces such beings from itself? And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta’s here to have been a smart and witty repartee; Quae est Socrates, unde animant arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Er ergo quero, unde
orationem? unde numeros? unde canus? nisi verò loqui solem cum luna putemus, cum proprius-accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras ex-
siimitnati. Socrates demandeth, whence we snatch’d soul, life, and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (faith he) whence did we snatch speech, music, and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygic; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceived. Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of Academick wit, without any solidit in all at it, as shall be manifested afterward. Lastly, the Stoicks endeavoured to prove the existence of a God after this manner, Ut nulla pars corporis nostri est, que non sit minor quam nosophetis sumus, sicmundum universum pluris esse necessum esse quam partem aliquam univer-
s: As there is no part of our body, which is not inferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the whole universe needs be supposed to be better and more perfect than any of the parts thereof. Wherefore since it is better to be ended with life and understand-
ing, than to be devoid thereof, and these are pure perfections; they being in some measure in the parts, must needs be much more in the whole. Nullus sensus carentis pars potest esse senciens; No part of that, which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it. And it is a madness for any man to suppose, Nil in omni mondo melior esse quam se, that there is nothing in the whole world better than himselyf, or than mankind, which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercise his jeering Academick wit after the same manner as before; Ille si placent, jam efficius, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur, &c. Illo modo eiam diveterit, mathematicos, musicos, omnia denique destructa referens, possumo philosophus erit mundus. By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all a philosopher. But neither this objection of his nor that former have any firmitude at all in them: because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole; and therefore whatsoever there is

\[1\] Id. ibid. Lib. III. Cap. XI. p. 3064. Tom. IX. Oper.
of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those things there mentioned by Cotta, (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that, which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

By such arguments as these (besides that taken from the topick of preference and divination) did the ancient Stoicks endeavour to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a meer platick or methodical and sensibles, but a conscientious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a meer heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, ended with a sphericall principle only; but an animal informed and inlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being Corpo-
rrealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the Hege-
monic of the mundane soul; yet was the God of the Stoicks properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind and understanding, or in Seneca's language, that ratio incorporalis, that rules the matter of the whole world. Which Stoical God was also called as well T'αγοθονεσ, as Νοε, good as mind; as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in Clemens Alexandrinus:

{T'αγοθονεσ εκ των μετατρήσεων τους ουσιών άνθρωπων 
Τεταράμιον, όλος, όλων, ευστέθος,
Κρατούν έκ νου, τελείωμα, καλόν, έσω, &c.}

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoicks Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the oneliness of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity, supposèd and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence, Plutarch would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds:

χ' μεν ταύτα ἀλλα των Στοικών τις αὐτῷ ὄντως, παθωσμένων τὸς Εὐμαρσίον μὲν μένιν καὶ D. Def. Or. Περίοναι, χ' δ' πολλοί Δίας χ' Ζέυς έσται, πλείστων ὄντων κόσμων; τίς γαρ ἄνθρωπος, p. 425. πολλοίς εἰσιν Δίας, τις πλείστως δει κόσμων, καὶ μὴ καθ' έκαστον ἄληθεν προτότου καὶ σωμάτων τις έν Ζέον, όσον τι παρόν, όμοιον επόμενον καὶ παράνειν έπομενον, &c. Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoicks here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one fate, and one providence, and one Jove, (or independent Deity) were there many worlds? For what necessity is there, that there must be more Zens or Joves than one, if there were more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe, 

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called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds? Or what binders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God, himself inspecting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and sfermatick reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universe, be all governed by one reason, and be ordered together in reference to one principle? In which place these two things are plainly contained; first, that the Stoicks unquestionably affirfed one supreme Deity, or universal monarch over the whole world; and secondly, that Plutarch was so far from giving any entertainment to the contrary opinion, that he concluded, though there were ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet they were all subject to one supreme, solitary, and independent Deity.

But however, though these Stoicks thus unquestionably affirfed one sole independent and universal Numen, the monarch over the whole world; yet did they notwithstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding, πάντα μετὰ ἑαυτῶν θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων, That all things were full of gods and demons. And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpafted and outstripped them therein. Plutarch, making mention of their τοῦτον πλήθος θεῶν, their so great multitude of gods; and affirming them, ἐμπληκόντων τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τοῦ θεάου, τῶν γάρ, τοῦ αἰεώ, τῆς θάλασσας, to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods. Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the sfermatick reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch in his defect of oracles, writing of the mortality of daemons, τῶν Στοικῶν γυμνάκης, ἡ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων τῇ λέγον ἄγειν ἔχοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ἔτι οὐ τοῦτον τὸ πλήθος ἐν Χρυσίμενος αἰώνος καὶ ἀφταρτος, τῶν δὲ ἀλλάκτας καὶ γεγονόντας καὶ θαρσοῦσαι νομίζων: We know the Stoicks to maintain this opinion, not only concerning demons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed. Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of daemons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoicks maintained the same as well concerning gods as daemons; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives, and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroy’d. To the
CHAP. IV. One Eternal and Immortal God.

the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions P. 1075.

against the Stoicks, Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκτοί (ὡς ἐν εἰπεί) τῷ λόγῳ Ἡθῶν, τοῦ θρόνου, τοῦ ἐπὶ, τοῦ άέα, τοῦ Θάλαττα, ὑθένα τῶν τοστῶν ἀθαρστον, ὑπὸ ἀληθών ἀπολογισμοῖς, πλὴν μόνον τῷ Δίῳ: εἰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἁλλαξ ἀλλωσυλίσκει τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀκε. ταῦτα θ᾽ ὡς ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀπότων συλλογήζομεν ἐχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς ὄργασιν ἐπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοί μέγα βοῶσεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν, ἤς προονέοις, εἰμαρτέον, τι καὶ φύσεως γραμμασι, διάρρησιν μέγας, τῶν θεῶν ἀπάντας εἶναι γεγονότα, καὶ Θεορησμοὶς ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τῆς κατά αὐτὰς, ὡς περὶ κυρίων πνεύμων ὄντας: Χρύσιππος and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they confine all the rest; thereby making him to be a bellwether and devourer of gods; which is as bad, as if they should affirm him to be corruptible, it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preferred by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoicks, but it is a thing, which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated, (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things. This indeed is essential to the Stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compages shall be dissolved by fire; so that no other Deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoicks and the other Pagan Theists; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one supreme universal Numen, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the Stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only γεγονότες, but also θεορησμοί, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated; all the Stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and condensed into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoicks all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone, (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself) who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chrysippus in Plutarch affirmeth, οἰκεῖοι τῷ μὲν ἀθαρσίῳ τῶν Δια χρυσιππος Ζεὺς ἡθῶν, τῷ δὲ ψυχῇ τῶν Πρώτων, ὅταν ἐν ἐκπορίας γενιται, μόνον ἀδίκως εἶναι [De Repugn., Stoicor.] τῶν Δια τῶν θεῶν, ἀναρχομείνῃ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων, ἡτα ὑμῶν γενομένων, ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέριος ἡθῆς διατελεὶ θρόνοῖς. That as Jupiter and the world may be referred to a man, so may providence be to the foul: when therefore there shall be a conflagration, Jupiter of all: the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himself into providence; and so both together remain in that same ethereal substance. Where notwithstanding Jupiter

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Neither

piter and providence are really but one and the same thing. And Seneca writeth thus concerning the life of a wise man in solitude, Qualis futura
eft vita sapientis, si fine amicis relinquatur, in custodia confectus, aut in
defertum littus ejusce? Qualis ef Jovis, cum resoluto mundo, & DII IN
UNUM CONFUSIT, paulisper cellante natura, acquiescit ficti, cogitationibus suis
traditus: If you ask, what would be the life of a wise man either in a prison,
or desert? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being re-
solved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the course of
nature ceasing, be rested in himself, conversing with his own cogitations. Arri-
anus his Epistolas likewise, speaking of the same thing, ironically intro-
duces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration as now left quite
alone, after this manner: Τάλας ἤγε, ὡς τήν Ἰππαν ἦκο, ὡς τήν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς τήν
Ἀπόλλωνα, ὡς ἄλος ἡ Ἀθήνα, ὡς ἀνθρωπόν. Alas, I am now left all alone; I
have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me; neither brother nor
son, nor nephew, nor kinsman (neither God nor goddes) to keep me company.
He adding also, according to the sense of the Stoicks, that in all these suc-
cessive conflagrations, ζών κατός ιαντίς σύνεται, καὶ πουράζεις θ' ιαντίς, καὶ εἰσὶ
tην δοίκησιν ιαντί, καὶ εἰς ἐπιφάνεια γινεται πρεπεσις ιαντίν; Jupiter being left
alone, converseth only with himself, and rests in himself, considering his own
government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself. And thus
have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoicks acknowledged
only one independent and self-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which
was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate
vicissitudes of time, the decreator of them; he then swallowing them up,
and devouring them all into himself, as he had before produced them toge-
ther with the world out of himself.

It is granted, that these Stoicks as well as the other Pagans did religi-
ously worship more gods than one, that is, more understanding beings lu-
perior to men. For it was Epistolas his own exhortation, εἰς Ναοῖς, pray
to the gods. And the same philosopher thus describeth the disposition of
a person rightly affected, θαλας εἰδών τι μοι καθάλοιν πρὸς τάς Ναοῖς, I would willingly
know, what is my duty, first to the gods, and then to my parents, and other rela-
tions. And they are M. Antoninus his precepts, Λοίδα Ναοῖς, reverence the
gods, and ἐπέμνησεν ταῖς ἱππασίας ἰππασίας. In every thing implore the aid and assistance
of the gods. And accordingly in that close of his first book, himself does
thankfully ascribe many particular benefits to the gods in common: πυν
τῶν Ναοίς τὸ ἀναγνώστη πάπτης, &c. I owe to the gods, that I had good progeni-
tors and parents, &c. Where, amongst the rest, he reckons up this for one,
that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetorick; be-
tcause these would probably (had he succeeded in his purfuit of them) have
hindred him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enu-
meration, he concludes thus, παίζειν νῦν ταῦτα Ναοίς θυσίας καὶ τόχος δείπνω,
For all these things need the assistance of the gods and fortune, viz. because
they are not in our own power.

1 Apud Arrian, Lib. I. Disert. I. p. 84. 4 Lib. VI. §. 23. p. 183.
3 Lib. VI. §. 30. p. 190.
Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common, (as the donors of them,) which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epicurus makes reason in men to be a gift of the gods; L. 3. c. 24. ἐσφρ. αὐτῷ τειμέναι καταδυσμένοις διέτησεν ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν; Is reason there. [Apud Arn. p. 329.] and when he again imputes virtue to them; Haft thou overcome thy lust, thine intemperance, thine anger? τὸ ὕπόκορον αἰτοῦ Ἐπικοῖος, ἢ ὑπατεία ἢ ὑπάρχει Θεοὶ L. 4. c. 3. ἔργα, ταῦτα εἰ δὲ αὐτῷ γίνεται κατὰ τὸν Θεόν, How much greater cause then [Pag. 368.] haft thou of offering sacrifice, than if thou hadst got a conjurship or pretorship? for those things come only from thyself, and from the gods. Though the reason of these speeches of theirs seems to have been no other than this, because they took it for granted, that those understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, were all of them the instruments and ministers of the supreme God in the government of the world; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concerns of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indiscriminately: as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly, ταῦτα τῷ Θεῷ Φίλιππα, if God will have it so, let it be so, (Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 29. and l. 4. c. 4.) and sometimes again plurally, ταῦτα Φίλιππα τοῖς Θεοῖς, if the gods will have it so.

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoicks, they worshipped for all that one supreme, that is, one universal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world; ὁ τῶν Θεῶν, L. 9. ὅλως Φύσις πρεσβευτάξει Θεῶ, the nature of the whole, the oldest of all the gods; [S. L. pag. and η τῆς ἄλος διδάκτῳ Φύσις, that nature which governs all things; τὸν ἄλος, τούς διδάκτους λόγος, that reason which governs the subsistence of all; o δὲ τῆς θείας δικομοῦ λόγος, ἢ δὲ τακίζε τού αἰώνος κατὰ περὶ δὲ- [Pag. 213.] ταχύνων ὕπομονήν τοῦ πάντος, that reason which passes through the subsistence of the universe, and through all eternity, orders and dispenses all according to the pointed periods. Somtimes he called τὸ τῶν ὅλως Φίλιππα, the cause of all things; [Pag. 213.] sometimes τὸ κάσαμ υἱομοιούς, the hegemonick and ruling principle of the Ant. l. 9. whole world, and ὁ ἑρμαντὸ τὸ νοστίμω, the prince of the world. Again, o δὲ- [Ant. l. 7. §. οἰκοῦ τούθα, the governor of the whole, as in this of Epicurus; o χαλός καθοδεῖς ἐπιθέτως τῇ ἐκκυκλυσίᾳ τοῦ ἔλασι, καθέπερ οἱ αἰγάδεις τοιαῦται ποιοῦνται. 366.] τόμος τοῖς σώλωσι, a good man submits his mind to the governor of the whole l. 1. c. 12. universe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city. Also o δικαίωσον, [Apud Arn. an. p. 118.] the orderer of all; in this other religious passage of the same philosphers, τὸ παντοδεῖς, τοίς μαρτσίοις ὑγείᾳ ἐπὶ σώλωσιν ὡς γίνεται τῶς δὲ γίνεται τὸς τὴς ἀλεξίας, αὐτὰ ὡς τὸ ἀναλάβω, to be instructed is to will things to be as they are. made, and how are they made? as that great disposed of all hab appointed. Again, the supreme God is sometimes called by them, τὸ πρόχα τοῦ ἔλασιν οὐσίαν, that intellectual principle, which contains the whole, as in this instruction of
The Stoicks honoured  

L. 8 § 45. of M. Antoninus, μὴ μόνον συμπάντων τῆς περίπετος λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφωνεῖν τῷ περί-
κόσμῳ πώλην νόμον, that, as our bodies breathe the common air, so should our souls suck and draw in vital breath from that great mind, that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the same. He is

Aetn. p. 125. [Lib. V. § 30. also called by them οὐκ ἄλλον ἔρντα καὶ διάνοιαν, the mind and understanding of the
whole world, μία πάντων πύην νοημ, one intellectual fountain of all things; ]

Aetn. p. 257. and lastly, to name no more, ἔνας τὸ διά πάντων, καὶ ἄλλοι μίας, καὶ νόμος εἰς, one God through all, one substance, and one law. Which supreme God was commonly called also by the Stoicks, together with the generality of the

[Sec. 9. p. 231. other Pagans, ὁ Θεός, or God, emphatically and in way of eminency, as in this of Epictetus, μὴ ἄλλον Θεόν, ἢ ὁ Θεός Θεῖς, καὶ τίς σιν καλοῦν, will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee?

L. 2 c. 18 [Pag. 225.] And again, ἡμιτον καλὸς θανάτοι τῷ Θεῷ, ἐπιφάνειον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαρὸς
σειτού γενεσί, καὶ μετὰ τῷ Θεῷ, αφετὲρ to seem fair to God, desire to be pure with thy pure self, and with God. Also where 4 he speaks of the regular course of things in nature, τεταμάτων, καθάπερ εἰς προστάτας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ εἰπη
tοις φυσικῶν ἔνδοειν ἀνθρώποι, ἐπι τῆς βασιλικὴς βασιλείας. That it proceeded orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God; when he bids the plants to blossom, they blossom; and when to bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit. To which innumerable other instances might be added. And Zeus or Ju-

Epíst. p. 251. p. 255. p. p. apud Arri-
[An. Lib. II. Cap. XXIII.] whence the government of the whole world is called by them Διὸς διόνυσος, the government or economy of Jupiter. Last, this supreme God is sometimes distingiuished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; as in this of Epictetus, Εὐδοκεῖον τῷ θεῷ, τῷ ἐπιφανοι καθαρῷ, τῷ τρισθήναι, τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῆς
μετ' ἑαυτῶν, ίερεῖ, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those, who are next after him; that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So likewise, where he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power, ἀλλὰ ὁ Διὸς θαρσεῖν κατὰ, ἐπι τῆς ἄλλως Θεός, ἐπιτελείας, ἐπιτελεῖς παράδος, ἐπιτελείς κυρίωςτοσαν,

L. 4 c. 12. [Pag. 426.] Let Jupiter alone with these things, and the other gods, deliver them up to be ordered and governed by them. And so again, where he persuadeth one, that places his happiness in those things without him, καθάρσει καὶ στὼς, καὶ τῆς διάκυκλος ἀνδρον, τὸν Διὸς τῆς Θεοῖς ἄλλης. I then shall fit lamenting, and speaking evil of every one, even Jupiter himself and the other gods.

And it must in reason be supposed, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen of the world, was honoured by these Stoicks far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as

De N. D. l. 4 p. 225. Galla. well corruptible, mortal, and annihlable, as they were generated or cre-

[Lamb.] p. 225. For though Cicero's Luclius Balbus, where he pretends to represent
[Cap. XXX. Pag. 2999. Tom. IX. Op. I.] the doctrine of the Stoicks, attribute the very first original of the world to

the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of
the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent)
Deities, than of the Stoicks, who asseritd one only eternal God; and sup-
pofed, in the reiterated confagurations, all the gods to be melted and con-
founded into one, fo that † Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up
the world again, as alo all those other gods out of himself. And thus does
Zeno in Laertius 1 defcribe the Cosmopedia, τον Ἀτέμνον ἰδέαν, ἠτότισ
That God at firft being alone by himfelf, converted the firfl fubflance of the
world by degrees into water, that is, into a craffer Chaos; out of which wa-
ter, himfelf afterwards, as the spermatick reafon of the world, formed the ele-
ments and whole mundane fystem. And Cicero himfelf elsewhere, in his de
Legibus 2, attributes the firft original of mankind caufiouly, not to the
gods in common, but to the supreme God only, Hoc animal providum, &c.
quem vocamus hominem, preclara quadam conditione generatum effe, à SUMMO
DEO: and this, rather according to the fenfe of the Stoicks, than of the Plato-
nifts, whose inferior generated gods also (being firft made) were fupposet
have had a stroke in the fabrefaction of mankind, and other animals. Thus
Epifletus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the
one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Chriftians,
their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and
not to right knowledge; (as M. Antoninus likewife ascribes the fame to ψυλι
παράδεικτες, meer obftrucfion of mind) υπὸ μανιας μνου δυναται τις ἵπτω διακτήθων, ηρ
νυν θεος: of Γαλιλαιος, υπὸ λογος δὲ ηρ αποδεικτες υπες διονισιος μαθει, υτι ο Θεος παλη
πεποιηκε τον λαμποτες, κατον τον λαμποτες. Can some be fo affeeted out of mad-
ners, and the Galileans out of custom? and can none attain thereunto by reafon
and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the
whole world itself perfect and unindefferable; but the parts thereof for the use
of the whole, fo that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the
whole. Thus he again elsewhere demand, τον ἐν ημι τε παποης, καρπις δὲ
tis, &c. Who made the fun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the feafons of
the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having re-
ceived all from another, even thy very felf, doft thou murmur and complain
againft the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not
bring thee into the world? fενε θεος the light? before fense and reafon upon
thee? Now the fun was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore
he being made by another, all the rest of their gods mufi needs be fo too.
And thus is it plainly expreffed in this following citation, ει τις τον ὀμυματι τυτων ἱ
συμπαθηται κατ’ αξίαν δυνατο, ϊτι γεγόναμεν υπὸ τω θεω παπτες προηγμένος, ηρ [P 50 Vide
Θεος παπτο ειτε των τ ἀνθρωπων των Θεων, είπον αργος, ητε τατετου ειναινηπο
περι ἑαυτοι Θεος. If any one could be thoroughly fenfible of this, that we are all made
by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father
both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himfelf, knowing that he
is the fon of Jupiter also. Where Θεος is plainly put for the supreme God,
and Θεοι for the inferior gods only. Again, he thus attributes the making of
man and government of the whole world to God, or † Jupiter only. Θ Θεω;
παπτες

2 Lib. VII. segm. 136. p. 450.
And that these Stoicks did indeed religiously worship and honour the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from sundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epictetus, εἷς μὲν ἀδελφός ἔχω, πλευράματι ὑπ' ὑμῖν τῷ Θεῷ, ζηνίκα αὐτῷ τὰς ἀντιλακίδες, ὡς ἕδεις δεξιαρχούσαι μὲ δύνασαι. No man hath power over me, I am made free by God, (by becoming his subject) I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself. And again, τάτα ἐπιτεθέντων οὐκ εὐθύνων, ὡς εἰσίν ἐν θεῷ, ματὶ παρέχων τὰ τὰ ἀντιλάκια, ὡς ἐξέφευγεν. These things would be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God; Have I transgressed any of thy commandments? have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requiredst?

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governour of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epictetus somewhere thus bespeaks the supreme God, μὴ τις ἵμαρσες ζεί τὰ δικαίχες, ζείναι δι' ἐναλλοίς, ἀλλ' ἔγω ἵμαι τὰ πάντα ἔγω μεν ζείταίς Τίθνοις ἀλλὰ χάριν ἔν ἡμῖν, ζείναι ἐν θεῷ, ἔγω τοῦ ἐπιθέρματος ἀνεκείμην μὴ μετά τοῦ ἔνα άριστος εἰς ῥεῖ, ζείναι τὸ προσόπο τὸ σοφοῦ, τὸ εἰσίν ἔπειτις εἰς ἡμέρας, μετά τοῦ ζείταίς εἰς σημαίνεις, καὶ με υἱοί τῶν ζείταίς αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς πανθεοῦσι, αἰτίαις ἐν τοῖς περίπολοις τοῦ ἐν θεῷ, τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦ τοῦ ζείταίς. Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldst have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magistracy, or had any dignity, because thou wouldst not have me, and I never desired it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requiredst? Was I ever so long as I had the power of thy government? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honoured me so far as to let me keep the seat with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death seize upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things. He likewise exhorts others after this manner, τὸλομεῖν ἀντιθέλεις πρὸς τὸ θεόν εἰσίν, ὃς χάριν μοι λατρεύνει ὡς ἐν θείον, ἐφορμομόνοις ζείταίς, ιερὰ εἰς αὐτὸν παρεστάμενοι τῶν σοὶ δεξιόντων, ὡς ζείταίς ἀγα, ὡς ζείταίς εἰσίτα χείρεσ, ὡς υἱοὶ με 

1 Apud Arrian, Lib. III. Cap. V. p. 274.
The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and affliance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus, Καρπαμίμαλα εἴς τοῦ τοῦτον ἵκον ταῦτα οὖσαν. Λ. 2. c. 19. τολείαν ὑπὸς ἑλεοῦσας, εὐδοκιμεῖσθαι, εἰς τὸν Ἀφρόδητα, ὅποι πρὸς ἰμαμός τῷ μεγάλῳ. My design is this, to render you free and undisurbed, always looking at God, as well in every small, as greater matter. Again the same Stoick concludes, ἅν ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ ἑλεοῦσας Λήστη, Φιλοτάκη, ἐντυγιμένον, &c. η ἐνημέρωσι τῶν ἀποθέοντά, εἰς ἰκανόν προσπονοῦσα, τῷ ἰκανόν προτάγμα, καθωσιμένον. A man will never be able otherwise to expell grief, fear, desire, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments. And he affirmeth of Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so long since observed by him, τὸν Δία αὐτὸν πάλαι Λ. 3. c. 24. εἰς τὸ γαλακτείον, & εἰς ἰκανόν ἀφρόδητα ἐφαρμάσας ἐπανάληθη, that as he called Jupiter, or Π. 330], the supreme God, his father, so did he whatsoever he did, looking at him. Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τὸς συμβαίνει, to those that live with us; and another πρὸς τὸν Θεόν Λ. 8. § 23. αἰτήματα αὕτης ἐξ ἱκανοῖς παύειν πάλαι, to that divine cause, from which all things [Sect. 27. p. happen to all. As likewise he affirmeth, ἃν ἄριστον τούτο τῆς ἐπι τοῦθεν Λ. 3. § 11. συμβαίνειν ἐπεξερείς, that no human thing is well done without a reference to God. And he excellently exhorteth men, εἰς τοῖς προσευκταί, τῶν προσευκτητάτων, § 79. ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μετακαθίσαι ἐπὶ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς συν μηνηῆς τῷ Θεῷ. To be § 10. p. delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, § 11. p. tending to a common good, or the good of human society; together with the remembrance of God. Lastly, he declareth his own confidence in the supreme Deity in these words; Σεβάσθι τῷ διονυσί, I trust and rely upon the [Sect. 10. p. governor of the whole world.

This may be concluded also from their thanking the one supreme God for all, as the author of all good, and delightfully celebrating his praises. Epictetus declares it to be the duty of a good man, γὰρ ἐν εὐθείᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάλαι τὸ Θεό, to thank God for all things. And elsewhere he speaketh thus: εἰ Ι. 4. c. 7. οὐχίσωμεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἵκους, ᾧ κοινῶς ᾧ ἡδίᾳ, ἡ ὑμεῖς τῷ Θεῷ, ἡ εὐφημεία Πag. 401]. εἰς ἑπεξερεύσοι τῇ κρίσιν, εἰς ἵκους καταφύλασας, ᾧ θεωρίας, ᾧ ἐθνικής, ἡ ἑκατονθ. Πag. 127]. τοῦ ὄρους τοῦ εἰς τὸν Θεόν, μὲν γαρ ὁ Θεός ὅτι θεωρία κεφαλαίων ἐποίησε, εἰς ἵκους τῷ θεωρίας, οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐποίησε τοῦτο, ἵνα τῇ καθευδοσείᾳ καταφέρῃ τοῦτο εἰς εὐφημείαν ἑαυτοῦ, ἡ τοῦ μέγατον ἡ σειστάτων ὄρους θεομενή, ἢ τῇ δύναμιν ἑαυτοῦ τῷ παραξενοθείκι ἔκπειν τῇ βίῳ, ἢ καὶ τὰ τούς ἄνδρας, ἢ τὰ τοὺς κυρίους, ὅπως ἐν πολλοῖς εἰς, ἕνεκεν μὲ δεὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Had we understanding, what should we do else but both...
lickly and privately praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him? Ought not they, who dig, plow, and eat, continually sing such a hymn to God as this? Great is that God, who gave us these organs to cultivate the earth withal; great is that God, who gave us hands, &c. who enabled us to grow undiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise God for the faculty of understanding all these things. What then if for the most part men be blinded, ought there not to be some one, who should perform this office, and sing a hymn to God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God, that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, called by them phanacies. To this purpose is that of Epictetus, μή ταύτα ὁ θυγατρός εἰς τὸν θρόνον, ύπερ βασιλείας, ύπερ ἐλεοδοχίας, τῷ Θεῷ μέρισμα, ἐνείξας ἐπικελύπτει βουθίαν ἵππον αὐτὸ ἐπαφάτειν, ὡς τοὺς Διομήδης ἐν χιμώνι ὑπεπέρασε. This is a great conflict or contention, a divine enterprise; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God, call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Caflor and Pollux in a tempest. He commands also this form of devotional address, or divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes his litany, to be used frequently upon occasion: "Αργύριον, Ω Ζεύς, Ω Ω Ω πετρωμένον ὅποιο πόθεν ὑπεραφάτει εἰς τοὺς θυγατρούς καλώς, Ω Ω Ω Ω ἐπαφάτειν; Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow. Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two several names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no less truly and faithfully than elegantly thus rendered by Seneca:

Duc me parenst,セルフque dominatur poli,
Quocunque placuit, nulla parente est mora,
Assum impiger; fac nolle; comitabor gemens,
Malusque patriar, quod patri licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe, that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him; the rather, because it hath been but little taken notice of. And the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse: which he must owe to the mufe of my learned friend Dr. Dupont.

Hymn to the Supreme God.

Chap. IV.

Ἐκ ἣς γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ἥχῳ μῖμιμα λαχάντες
Μενον, ὅτα ζωή τε ἐγις ἑκεῖ θυπῇ ἐπὶ γαῖάν,
Τῦ σε καθώραινον ἡ σου κράτῳ αἰνέρνων.
Σοὶ δὲ πᾶσα ἡ κόμῳ ἐλεομενοι τοίνυν γαῖας
Πρέσβεια, ἥκεν ἄγνος, κέ ἐκαίν ὑπὸ σεο κρατεῖται.
Τῶν ἑχεις ὑπερεχύν ἀνάκτοις ὑπὸ χερσίν
Ἄμφικην πυρόντα, αἰείωνα κεραυνο.
Τῆς ἡγαί ὑπὸ πλήθος φύσεως πάντ' ἐρήμωσι,
Ὄῳ συ κατευανείς κοινῷ λόγῳ, δει διὰ πάλιν
Φαιτα μιραμένοι.

"Ος τόσον γεγομένος ὑπάλλος βασιλεύει δια τοίνοις;
Οὐδὲ τι γίνεται ἐγκαὶ ἐπὶ ἐνυῖ Δία χαίρων,
Οὔτε κατ' αἰζεροῦ Ἐξιδον σέλον, ὡτ' ἐπὶ ὑπόρολ,
Πλῆν ὑπόσα ἐξεις κακοὶ σφετερίζου ἀνίκαις,
Καὶ κακεῖς τὰ ἄκουσμα κέ δ' Ἐθήλα σοὶ Ἐθήλα ἤμον.
"Ὄῳ δ' ἐγαι ἐς εἰς πάλιν συνηρμακαὶ ἐθήλα κακοίνων,
"Ὅτῳ ίνα γύνειν πάλιν λόγῳ αἰεὶ ἵπτων.

"Ου φνύροντε ἔνως οὐσι Θεοτῶν κακοὶ εἶσιν;
Δύσμοιροι, ὅτι ἀγαζοῦν μὲν αἰεὶ κύσιν πεδέοντες,
Οὔτ εὑρόντι θεῦ κοινών νόμον, ὡτ' ἐκυπένην.

"ὦ μεν πεθάμενοι σὺν χοίρε ἐκβλοῦ ἐχαίνεν,
Δυσίνοποι, ὅτι αἰδοίμοις αὖν καλῆ Ἀλλα ἐπ' Ἀλλα
Οἱ μὲν υπὲρ δόξης σκέπῳ ὑστερίζου ἔχοντες,
Οἳ ἐπὶ κρυσάκης τετράμβευκεν ὑδάει κόσμος,
"Ἀλλα δ' εἰς ἁίους, κέ σωματε ὑδία ἱγνα,
Ἀλλα Ζεὺς πάνθεφε, κελαφεῖς, ἀρχείφαχνε,
Ἄνθεάται μῦν ἀπειρασίας ἀπό λυρείς,
"ᐖ οἳ πάντες σκέπάσαν ψυχῆς ἀπό, δος χερώνοις
Γνώμης, δ' ἃ τοι τεδ' ἑν πέρτης κατά πάλια κυμενος.
"Ὅφ' ἄν τιμήσαντες αμελεώσας σε τοιμα,
Τυμωνίας τὰ σα ἑργα δινεκες, ὡς ἐπίσκεκε
Θυτοῦ ἑνάλε: ἐπει τε βροτοὶ γέρας ἄλλοτε μετον,
Οὔτε Θεοῖς, η κοινῷ ἐξ νόμου ἐν δικῆ ὑμεῖν.

Magne pater divum, cui nomina multa, sed una
Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter autor
Naturae, certa qui singula lege gubernas!
Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus agris
Cumdis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
Nos sumus, aeterna quasi imago vocis & eco
Tantium, quotquot bumi spirantes repimus; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum & robur fine fine celebans.
Quippe tua bic totus, terras qui circuit, orbis
Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultrò
Invictis telum manibus tibi tale ministrum,
Anceps, ignitum, baud moriturum denique fulmen.
Idu etenim ilius tota & natura tremiscit;
Illo & communem rationem dirigis, & que

K k k 2

Mundi
Cicero no Asservor

Book I.

Mundi agitat molem, magnò se corpore miscens:
Tantus tu rerum dominus, restorque supremus.
Nec fine te satium in terris, Deus, ant opus ullam;
Aethere nec dio fit, nec per carula ponti,
Errere asta suo, nisi quæ gens impia patrat.
Confusa in séte tu dirigis ordine certo;
Auspice te ingratis & insta sua gratia rebus;
Pouice harmonia, tu felicet, omnia in unum
Sic bona mixta malis compingis, ut una resurgat
Cunctorum ratio commumis & usque perennans:
Quam refugit, spernitus hominum mens laeva malorum.
Heu miseris! bonâ quorum semper & optant,
Divinarum tamen haec communem & denique legem,
Nec spectare oculis, nec fendo attendere curant:
Cui si pararent poterant traducere vitam
Cum ratione & mente bonam: nunc sunt feruntur
In mala præcipites, trabit & sua quemque voluptas.
Hunc agit ambitio, laudisque immensa cupidio,
Illum & avaritates, & amor sebanus habendi,
Blanda libido alium, venerisque licentia dulcis:
Sic aliò tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.
At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atri,
Da sapere, & mentem miseris mortalibus aufer
Infamam, banc tu pelle pater; da appendere posse
Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite guberneas:
Nos ut honorati pariter, tibi demus bonorem,
Perpetuis tua saæta bymnis praetra canentes,
Ut fas est homini; nec enim mortalibus ullam,
Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,
Quam canere aeterno communem carmine legem.

XXVI. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content ourselves only to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom those would suspect to have been a Sceptick as to theism, because in his De natura deorum he brings in Cotta the Academick, as well opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoick, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatick and hearty Theist; as for example, this in his second book De Divin. 1. Ebe praftantem ali- quam æternamque naturam, & eam sufficiendam admirandamque hominum generis, pulcriterudo mundi, ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri: That there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the pulcritis the world, and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess. And this in his oration de haruspicum response 2: Quis est tam vecors, qui sum suspexerit in caelum, Deos esse non sentiat, & ea que tanta mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte ullo, ordinem rerum ac viciss-

of many independent Gods.

studinem persequi posset, catus fieri puter? Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance? To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophick writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words; Qui requirunt quid quaue de re ipsi sentientius, curiosiss id faciant quam neceffe es. Non enim tant auctoritates in disputando quam rationis momenta querenda sunt. Quin estam obse plurumque ipsis, qui dixeret volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere professentur. Definunt enim suum judicium addibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident: They, who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value. Nevertheless, Cicero in the close of this discourse De natura deorum (as St. Austin 1 also observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propenfe and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not affent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point, himself being rather a Platonic than a Stoick) yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureifm of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta. Wherefore Augustinus Stecibus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as atheistical, but as seeming to favour a multitude of independent gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus; Ut perpetuos mundi effe ornaus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum: For the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods: And a diis immortalibus bominibus previum effe, &c. That the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them. And that place before cited, Dico De providentia deorum mundum & omne mundi partes initio constitutis esse; I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods. And lastly, where he states the controversy of that book De N. D. thus: Utrum dii nibil agant, nibil moliantur? An contra ab his & a principio omnia facta, & constituta sint, & ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur? Whether the gods do nothing at all, but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed by them? Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first

from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way

of eminency; as Ipsis Deo nihil minus gratum, quam omnibus patere ad se

placandum & colendum viam: Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than

that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the collinefs of fa-

crifices) to worship and appeafe him; and Nifi juvante Deo, tales non fierunt

[Cap.LXV. Curius, Fabricius, & c. Curius and Fabricius had never been fuch men as they

were, had it not been for the divine afifiance. Again, Commoda, quibus utiur,

lucemque quid fruimur, spiritumque quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari auque imper-

tiri vidimus; We muft needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light

which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God.

And to mention no more, in his verfion of Plato's Timeus', Deos alios in

terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquis mundi partes spargens Deus quaet ferebat;

God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were fow fome

gods in the earth, fome in the moon, &c. Moreover, by his making fuch de-

scriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and fingularity, as in his Orat.

[P. 556. Lamb. pro Milone, Efs, ef profeélto illa vis; neque in his corporibus, atque in hac imbe-
cillitate nostra, inef quiddam, quod viget & fentiat, & non inef in hoc tanto

natura tamque praecario motu. Nifi forte idcirco efe non putant, quia non ap-
paret nec cernitur: proinde quaet nosquam ipfam mentem, qua sapimus, qua pro-
videnmus, qua hac ipfa aqímus & dicimus, videre, aut plané qualis & ubi fit,
fentire po funmus. There is, there is certainly fuch a divine force in the world;

neither is it reasonable to think, that in thefe gros and frail bodies of ours

there fhould be fomething, which habit life, fenee, and understanding, and yet no

such thing in the whole univerfe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there

is none, because they fee it not: as if we could fee our own mind, (whereby we

order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and fpeak thus) and perceive

what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged. Where, as there is a strong

afleveration of the exiftence of a God, fo is his fingularity plainly implied,
in that he fuppofes him to be one mind or foul acting and governing
the whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tufculan Ques-
tions,

Nec vero Deus ipfe atio modo intelligi potef, nifi mens foluta quædam, & liber,

segregata ab omni concretrione mortalì, omnia fentient & movens: Neither can

God himfelf be understood by us otherwife, than as a certain loofe and free

Mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all

things. So again in the fame book, Hac igitur & alia innumerabilia cum
cernimus, poftimusque dubitare, quin bis præfì aliquis vel effetor, fi hac nata

funt ut Platoni videtur; vel fì femper fulerint, ut Ariftoteli placeat, moderator

tanti operis & munieris? When we behold these and other wonderful works of

nature, can we at all doubt, but that there prefideb over them, either one maker

of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or elfe, if they always were,
as Ariftotelis fepofetb, one moderator and governour? And in the third De Le-
gibus, Sine imperio nec domus illa, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum

genus flare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipfe mundus potef. Nam & bis Deo

paret, & buic obediet maria terreæque, & hominum vita juftiss supremae legis

ostemperat: Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation, nor

mankind in general, nor the whole nature of things, nor the world itself could

fubft. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him,

and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law. Else-

where

[1 Cr. XIII. p. 4034. Tom. X. Oper.
where he speaks of Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat binc injuste suo tur. & L. t. demigare; That God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart hence without his leave. Of Deus, cujus numini parent omnia; That God, whose divine power all things obey. We read also in Cicero of sumnum or supremum Deus, the supreme God, to whom the first making of man is properly imputed by him; of Sumnum rectoris & domini Numem, the divine power of the supreme Lord and governor; of Deus praepotens, and verum omnium praepotens Jupiter. The most powerful God, and Jupiter, who hath power over all things. Of Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, sicut animus humanus id corpus cui praepotit est; That chief or principal God, who governs the whole world in the same manner as a human soul governeth that body, which it is set over. Wherefore, as for those passages before objected, where the government of the world, as to the concerns of mankind at least, is ascribed by Cicero to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no other account but only this, because the supreme God was not supposed by them to do all things himself immediately in the government of the world, but to assign certain provinces to other inferiors gods, as ministers under him; which therefore sharing in the economy of the world, were lookd upon as co-governors thereof with him. Thus when Ballus in Cicero, to excuse some seeming defect of providence, in the prosperous of wicked and the adversities of good men, pretended, Non animadvertere omnia Deos, ne reges quidem; That the gods did not attend to all things, as neither do kings; Cic.-De N. D. 1. ta amongst other things replied thus; Fae divinam mentem esse dijentem, 3; calum versantem, terram tuentem, maria inderantem, cur tam multis deos nihil agere & cessare patitur? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos atiosos deos praefecit, qui à te, Balbe, innumerabit explicat quin? Should it be granted, that the divine Mind (or supreme Deity) were dissatisfied with turning round the heavens, observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other gods to do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoicks, are innumerable? Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have provided for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution, this doubtless is to be understood according to the Platonick hypothesis, that the gods and demons being first made by the supreme God, were set a work and employ'd by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is said by Cicero to have been made by the providence of the gods, this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, according to whose likenesses or image the world and man are said to have been made; that is, of the trinity of divine hypostases, called by Anselmus Plato's three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists the first and second and third God, and the χαίρων αίτων, and ό δευτερον αίτων, &c. the first and second cause, &c. And it may be here observed, what we learn from S. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavoured to justify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Mofaick writings themselves, Sois ἵπποις ὑποποικοινίας Contra Jul. τον τὸν ὀλον Φάνας Σενν, ποιήσωμεν ἄθυδαν καθ' εἰκόνα ημᾶς ἡμᾶς καθ' ἔμοιας, they 1. 1. suppositors.


Tom. IX. Oper.
suspicious, that the God of the universe being about to make man, did there be-
speak the other gods, (τοῖς μεθ’ ἰωτὸν δεύτεροι οἱ τοῦ μετὰ τοῦ, which were secondary
and inferior to him) after this manner. Let us make man according to our own
image and likeness. Which S. Cyril, and other Christian writers understand
of the trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image
the world and man is said by him to have been made, and which, (though
one of them were properly called the Demiurgus) yet had all an influence
and causality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed)
not so many independent and self-originated deities, but all derived from
one first principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to
be suspected upon that account, to have been an affirmer of many indepen-
dent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since in so many
other places of his writings, he plainly owns a divine monarchy.

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro his equal, a man
famous for polymathy or multiform knowledge, and reputed unquestion-
ably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Ro-
mans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one and forty books concerning
the antiquities of human and divine things; wherein he transcended the
Roman Pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many
points of their religion. In which books he distinguished three kinds of
theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and
the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodated to the theatre
or stage; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to cities
or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the
doctrine of Scævola, that learned Pontifex, concerning three sorts of gods,
poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical
theology, it was cenured after this manner by Varro; In eo sunt multa contra
dignitatem & naturam immortalem sìda. In hoc enim òst, ut Deus alius ex
capite, alius ex femore òst, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc ut Dii fu-
rati òst, ut adulterauerint, ut servierent homini. Denique, in hoc omnia Diis
attribuantur, que non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem
cadere possent. That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things
contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one
god being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from
drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c.
and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men,
but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them. And as for the se-
cond, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be
above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient,
there should be another theology calculated, more accommodate for them,
and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that
which is called civil. For he affirmed, Multa esse vera, que vulgo seire non
sit utile, & quodam, que tamen falsa sunt, alter eximiae popullam expediat;
That there were many things true in religion, which it was not conve-
nient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false,
yet it was expedient they should be believed by them. As Scævola, the Ro-
man Pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know,
that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. Expedire
igitur existimavit (faith St. Auffin of him) falli in religione civitates, quod di-
cere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipsi Varro non dubitavit. Sceavola there-
fore judges it expedient, that cities should be dedicated in their religion; which
also Varro himself doubteth not to affirm in his books of divine things. Where-
fore this Varro, though disapproving the fabulous theology, yet out of a
pious design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to affect, as much as he
could, the civil theology, then received amongst the Romans, and to vindic-
ate the same from contempt: yet nevertheless so, as that, Si eam civitatem
novam consistorubet, ex naturæ potissim formulâ, deos & deorum nomina fe suiffè
dedicatur, non dubiter confiteri: If he were to constitute a new Rome him-
sclf, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names
of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural
theology. Now what Varro's own fene was concerning God, he freely de-
clared in thele books of Divine Things; namely, that he was the great
foul and mind of the whole world. Thus St. Auffin, Hi soli Varroni viden-
tur animadvertisse quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, nonn ac
ratione mundum gubernantem: These alone seem to Varro to have understood
what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by
motion and reason. So that Varro plainly affirfed one supreme and univerfal
Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Auffin conceives) that he called him a
soul, and not the creator of soul, or a pure and abstract mind. But as
Varro acknowledged one univerfal Numen, the whole animated world, or
rather the fole thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by feveral names,
as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune, and the like: so did he also
admit (together with the rest of the pagans) other particular gods, which
were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with souls superior to
men: A summo circuitu cali, usque ad circulum lunaë, æberaeas animas esse
astra ac fyllas, eosque cœlestis deos, non modo intelligi effe, fed etiam videri:
inter luna vero gyrum & nimborum cacuminæ æreas effe animas, sed eas animo
non oculis videri: & vocari heroas, & lares, & genios: That from the
biggest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal
souls or animals, the stars, which are not only understood, but also seen to be
celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the
air, there are aerial souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet
are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii. So that, ac-
cording to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himsfelf also deter-
mined, anima mundi, ac partes ejus; first, the great soul and mind of the
whole world, which comprehendeth all; and secondly, the parts of the
world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be wor-
shipped cœlitibus, more purely and chastely, without images, as they were by
the first Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding; Que
primi simulacra deorum populi populerunt, eos civitatesibus suis & metuem dem-
pulsa & errorem addidisse: prudenter existimans (faith St. Auffin) deos faciè
pose in simulacrorum soliditate contenti: That those nations, who first set
up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add
error
error to them; be wisely judging, that the feppery of images would easily render their gods contemptible.

L. Annuus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Chrift and his Apofles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly afser an supreme, he not only speaking of him circularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such; as when he calls him Formatorum universi, restorcm & arbitrum & custodem mundi; ex quo fuppenfa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani hujus operis dominum & artifecm; cui nomen omne convenit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditum, & fe fuffinientem sua vi; cujus confia fuit mundo providetur, ut inconciffus eat, & aets fuos explicit; cujus decreto omnia funt; divinum spiritum per omnia maxima & minima equali intentione diffufum; Deum potentem omnium; Deum illum maximum potentifimumque, qui ipfe vebit omnia; qui ubique & omnibus praefto eft; cali & deorum omnium Deum; aqua ifa numina, quae singulara adoramus & colimus, fuppenfa funt; and the like. The framer and former of the universe, the governor, defpifer and keeper thereof; him, upon whom all things depend; the mind and fpirit of the world; the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose fpirit we live; who is in all his parts, and fuffinient himself by his own force; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and carried on in its course constantly and uninterrupted; by whose decree all things are done; the divine fpirit, that is diffufed through all things both great and small with equal intention; the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and moft powerful God, who doth himfelf support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are fuspended all thefe other divine powers, which we fingly worship and adore. Moreover, we may here observe from St. Austin, that this Seneca in a book of his againft fuperfitions (that is now loft) did not only highly extol the natural theolofy, but also plainly cenfure and condemn the civil theology then received amongft the Romans, and that with more freedom and vehemency than Varro had done the fubl nous or theatrical and poetical theology. Concerning a great part whereof he pronounced, that a wife man would observe fuch things, tanquam legibus jufla, non tanquam diis gratia; only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising civil obedience) but not at all as grateful to the gods.

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the fame natural theolofy, and fets down this, as the generally received notion or definition of God, Deum effic spiritum omnibus partibus immittum, That God is a spirit mingled with and diffufed through all the parts of the world; he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an Atheift, notwithstanding that he verbally afsered gods, because he denied a God according to this generally received notion, he beftowing upon his gods a circumftribed human form, and placing them between the worlds. And the junior Pliny, though he were a perfeccor of the Christians, he concluding, qualecunque
qualecumque esset quod sacerentur, perviscacia certe & inflexibilem oblationem debere semiri: that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstubility ought to be punished; and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the Pagan gods, and lastly to blaspheme Christ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his pungent oration to Trajan, where he is called Deus ille, qui manifestus ac presensolum ac videt infidet; that God, who is present with, and inhabits the whole heaven and stars: himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof, and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in way of eminency; as in these words, Occultat utrorumque femina Deus, & plerumque honorum malorumque causae sub diversis specie latent: God hideth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguised to men. L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagan endeavoured to confirm their religion by, as well as they did by those of Apollonius, both in sundry places of his writings plainly assert one supreme and universal Numen: we shall only here set down one: Cum summus deorum cuncta habeat non folum cogitationum ratione consideret; sed prima, media, & ultima obseat compertaque intime providentiae ordinationis universitate & constantia regat: Since the highest of the gods does not only consider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also passes through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence. Last, Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the restitution of paganism, declared the Pagan to worship one and the same God with the Christians, but in several ways; he conceiving, that there was no necessity God should be worshipped by all after the same manner. AErum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari: eadem spectamus astra; commune colunt est; idem nos mundus involvit; quid intersit, qua quique prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest percursiri ad tam grande secretum. We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the same thing, which all men worship; as we all behold the same stars, have the same common heaven, and are involved within the same world. Why may not men pursue one and the same thing in different ways? One path is not enough to lead men to so grand a secret. The scene whereof is thus elegantly expressed by Prudentius:

Unonones sub sole sit, vegetamur eodem
Aere, communis cunctis viventibus aura.
Sed quid sit qualisque Deus, diversa secuti
Quarimus; atque viis longe diustantis unum
Unus ad occultum; sius est nos cuique genti,
Per quod iter properans eat ad tam grande profundum.

And again afterward,

Secretum sed grande nequit rationis opertum

L1L2

And the beginning of Prudentius' his confutation is this,

Longè aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum
Anfrætus dubios habet, & perplexus errat.
Sola errore caret simplex via, necia sitsi
In diverticulum, bivis nec pluribus ancps, &c.

We shall now instance also in some of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book De Mundo were not Aristotle, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from some passages thereof; as where he approves of sacrificing to the gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men: as also because Apuleius would not otherwise have translated so much of that book, and incorporated it into his De Mundo. He therefore does not only commend this of Heraclitus, in ἕκαστω καθ' ἑαυτόν, καθ' ἑαυτόν, a thing that there is one harmonious system made out of all things, and that all things are derived from one; but doth himself also write excellently, concerning the supreme God, whom he calleth τὸν τῶν ὅλων συνεκληρωμένον θεὸν, the cause, which containeth all things, and τὸ τῶν νόμων κυριότατον, the best and most excellent part of the world; he beginning after this manner; ἐξαιτίας καὶ τῆς λογίας τῆς πάντως ἑαυτῶν ἄνθρωπων, ὡς ἔκαστο δὲ ταύτα ἐκ τῆς θεοῦ πηγῆς, οἴκηται ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδή ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδή
and Plutarch; their Testimonies.

Chap. IV.

dothat σύνεχει τοῦ τῶν ὀλίγων αἵματαν τα μυστήρια, contain the harmony and safety of the whole. And lastly he concludes, ὅπως ἐτοι νὰ ἐκφεύγῃ, ἐν αἴματι το[. 864] χὶ ἐνεργοῦ, ἐν χαγή κορυφαῖς, ἐν τέλει νόμοι, in creating the gods, tοῦτο Νομοί ἐν κόσμῳ. That what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the Coryphaeus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world. There being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the divine government and steer-age of the world is most easy and facile; for as this writer adds, God being himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and disposes all things.

Plutarchus Cheronensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter’s being ingenit or un-created, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and daemon self-existent, upon this ground, because ! τὴν κακίαν γεγονός κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ προνοίαν, ὅπερ τὸ θεόν ἐστιν χαμένος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πάντων βολίκην, πασῶν ἐστίνας ἄτοκες ὑπεξιλαμβάνει. There is no greater absurdity imaginable, than that evil should proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet. In which respect he was before called by us a Ditheist. Plutarch was also a worshipper of the many Pagan gods, himself being a priest of the Pythian Apollo. Notwithstanding which, he unquestionably affirmt a one sole principle of all good, the cause of all things (evil and matter only excepted) the framers of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him, God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth ¹ ὅτι γεωργεῖν τῶν θεῶν, that God doth always att the geometrian; that is, do all things in measure and proportion: and again, διὰ καθ’ ἀρχαίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ καλαντικάλεσθαι, that all things are made by God, according to harmony; and that ὁ Θεὸς ἀρχαίας καλεῖται καὶ μεγάλις, God is called a harmonist and musician: And he hath these epithets given him, ὁ περατός θεός, the great God; and ὁ ἀνομάτωμος θεός, the highest or uppermost God, and ὁ πρωτός Θεός, the first God, and ὁ ἀδριατός Θεός, the unmade self-existent God; all the other Pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, πελαγός τοῦ καλοῦ, the sea of pulchritude: and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently describ’d by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphick inscription. Lasts, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, ὅπως μὴ παρ’ ἕκατ’ ἐστιν, εὐχείμεθα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἕπειτα.

Dia Chrysiolemon, a sophist, Plutarch’s equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless affirmteth, βασιλέως τὸ ἔλεος, that the whole world is under a kingly power or monarchy, he calling the supreme God, [Ed. Norell.] sometime, τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοῦ μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέα τοῦ ἄρχοντα καὶ πατήρα. P. 210.

the common king of gods and men, their governor and father, τὸ ἱερὸν κατοικίαν Ἱθα, the God that rules over all, τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ μέγιστον Θεὸν, the first and greatest God, καὶ κατηγορεῖ ὡς προστάτη τοῦ ἱεροῦ, καὶ παλαιτόν ἔμφασθαν ἡ κόμης, & ccc.

The chief president over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and world, as a wife pilot doth a ship, τοῦ τῶν εὐμακαρίων ἡμέρας, καὶ τῆς οἰκίας εὐπορίαν ὁποιοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὁλοίς εὐπρεπίαν ὁποίας, the ruler of the whole heaven, and lord of the whole essence; and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepsis in the minds of men concerning him, περὶ τὸ διὸν τῆς τοῦ καθεύ Φύσος, γυ µάλιστα τῶν πάντων ἀγαθῶν, πρὸς τὸν παραπάνω οὐκέτα, καὶ εἰσεύθυνος καὶ τῆς πάναθρων ἀνθρώπων γίνετο ὁμοίως ὁμοίως μὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδον, ὁμοίως μὲ τὰς Βαρβάρους, ἀπαρχίαν καὶ ἐρμίδος ἐν πάλι τῶν λογίων γιγαντίων κατὰ φύσιν, αὐτοὶ γεννηθέντα καὶ μυθώμενοι. Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme ruler over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher. The meaning whereof is this, that men are naturally poifitied with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme governor of the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men, many other intellectual beings, which thefe Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no Atheiff, and what his religion was, may plainly appear from this one passage out of his third book De Uso Partium, to omit many others; Αλλὰ γὰρ ίσος εἰ ἔπρεπον τοιοῦτον μικρούνοιμον βοηθήματον, οἱ σωματικάνθες θρόνος ἄνθρωπος μὴ συνερφονεῖνι, καὶ μικροῦς Φαίη ἵνα ἔχον, οὐ ἐγὼ της ζημίας θεωροῦντος ηλίκαι ὑπὲρ ἀλλοιοῦν τυπικόν, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτο ἔσων τοῦ θέλεων ἐκδείχειν προκήρυκος εἰ ταύρων εὐκακτέων αὐτῆς παρακάλλεως κατὰ θυσίαν, η τὸ ἀλλὰ μικρὰ μήκανος θυσίαμα καὶ καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' εἰ γονίων μὴν αὐτός προτότοκος, ἐπιτέκτοι εἰ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοιοῖς ἐξηγησαμένοις, οἴον μὲν εἰς τὴν σοφίαν, οἴον δὲ τὴν ὁμορραγίαν, ὅπως ἐν τῷ προκήρυκε, τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἱδίου κτεταλείπα τοῦ ἑνδέχεσθαι κόσμου, καὶ ἠθεομεν Φθειών τοῖς ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελειώτητος χρειάστηκεν ἴνα διώξηται τιθέμεν, τοπικὴ τοῦ ἀρχῶν ἢ γεννεῖται τοῦ ἀρχῶν οἷον μὲν γὰρ θεοῦ, ἀρχος σοφίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ διάσχισι παρὰ ὁ προεικότερε, δυσάμενος ἀπεικότης. Should I any longer infest upon such brutish persons as those, the wife and jober might justly condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which I compose as a true hymn to the praise of him that made us; I conceiving true piety and religion towards God to consist in this, not that I should sacrifice many beateans, or burn much incense to him, but that I should myself first acknowledge, and then declare to others, how great his wisdom is, how great his power, and how great his goodness.

For that he would adorn the whole world after this manner, envying to nothing that good, which it was capable of, I conclude to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness, and thus let him be praised by us as good. And that he was able to find out, how all things might be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of that greatest wisdom in him. And lastly, to be able to effect and bring to pass all these things, which he had thus decreed, argues an injurable power.

Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dissertation, gives us this short representation of his own Theology; Βέλτιστον δὲ σοι δείξω τὸ λιθογράφου σαβεττερὸν ἔργον. Ἐνθει μεγάλου ἁγίων καὶ βοσπορίων ἡμαρμάριν πρὸς μίαν ἡμίον βασιλείαν τού κατοικίαν.
Chap. IV. Maximus Tyrus, Aristides.

Aristides the famous Adrianean sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more: he, after his proem, beginning thus; Zeus too πάντα ἐσοπτεί, ἵνα Δίος ἐστὶν ἐγείρα σοτα ἑτι πάσα, ἵνα πολιμος, ἵναι, ἵνα ἔλημη, ἵνα ἐκτὼν μεταξὺ ἄνω, ἵνα ἐκτὸς ταῦτα. ἵνα θεοὶ ἱδροται, ἵνα θαυμάσαι, καὶ ἵνα τὸν θεοὺς λατεῖναι. Ἐπιστεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πρωτοστάτου αὐτοῦ ἐκτων Κηπίς εὖ καὶ ἀκραίᾳ, ὡς αὐτὸν, ἐργαζόμεθα, ὡς ἔργοισιν, ἵνα ἐν εἰσήκωλθο ἰδέα τιμίων, ἵνα ἐκάθισέτες Ζεὺς, καὶ μὴ τὸν κνωσόμενον ἐκτὸς ἑαυτῶν Θεῶν: ὁ μάλλον για τὴν ἑγεῖς τα πάντα προσευδότερος χάρις τινί καταλεῖ πεῖ ἔτι, καί τῶν γιορθέων τῶν προσόντων ἀλλὰ ἔδιδε ἑαυτόν προσευδότερος καῖ ἐκτείνων, καὶ ἐκτείνων καῖ ἐκτείνων, ὡς ὀφθαλμῷ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκτείνων. ἔτι προσευδότερος ἐκτον Κηπίς, ἐκτείνων, ἐκτείνων, ἔτι, καὶ τῶν γιορθέων τῶν προσόντων ἀλλὰ ἔδιδε ἑαυτόν προσευδότερος καὶ ἐκτείνων, καὶ ἐκτείνων καῖ ἐκτείνων, ὡς ὀφθαλμῷ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκτείνων. ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτείνων, ἐτοι ἑκτεί

Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, and what are between these, and gods and men and all animals, whatsoever is perceivable either
by sense or by the mind. But Jupiter first of all made himself; for he was not educated in the flowery and odoriferous cases of Crete, neither was Saturn ever about to devour him, nor instead of him did he swallow down a stone. For Jupiter was never in danger, nor will he be ever in danger of any thing. Neither is there any thing older than Jupiter, no more than there are sons older than their parents, or works than their opificers. But he is the first and the oldest, and the prince of all things, he being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world. And again, as if the gods were in the beginning of all things, and Jupiter was the oldest of all, he made in the beginning of all things, and the prince of all things, he being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world.

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianitatis, whether Platonists or Peripatetickst, though for the most part they asserted the eternity of the world, yet universally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the cause of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damascius and others, held also a trinity of divine hypostases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus; who not withstanding that he derived matter and all things from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book inferibed against the Gnosticks: χρησον αριστον μην αυτου πειραται γνωται, μη μενον οι αυτον νομιζον άριστον δυσοδοι γνωστοι, αυτο οι αυτων αριστοι, αλλα η αθεοποτικα ελλες αναφερον, οι αθεοποτες αγαθες ευθυς πως δι' αυτου μελετος, τος ημερων τινα των πειρατων, ψυχας μακροποταινει ειναι ου τον αν τον ουτως υμειν θεον, υφικεται τον τον μεγαν τον εικε βασιλειαν.
not to be contracted into one.

Every man ought to endeavour with all his might, to become as good as may be, but yet not to think himself to be the only thing that is good, but that there are also other good men in the world, and good demons, but much more gods; who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet look up to that superior, and most of all, the prince of this universe, that most happy soul. From whence he ought to ascend yet higher, and to praise those intelligible gods, but above all that great king and monarch, declaring his greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods, which are under him. For this is not the part of them, who know the power of god, to contract all into one, but to show forth all that divinity, which himself hath displayed, who remaining one, makes many depending on him; which are by him and from him. For this whole world is by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also doth every one of the gods in it. And Themistius, the Peripatetick, (who was so far from being a Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perstringes our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a God) doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipp'd by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions: ταῦτα ὅμως γὰρ χαίρει τῷ τοιούτῳ τοῦ τοῖς αὔτῶν ἄχρητος.\[Orat. 11: \] [P. 156. edit. Harduni.] The author and prince of the universe seems to be delighted with this variety of worship; he would have the Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks another, and the Egyptians another; neither do the Syrians (or Christians) themselves all agree, they being subdivided into many sects.

We shall conclude therefore with this full testimony of St. Cyril, in his first book against Julian; ἀπαντῶν ἑναργῶς, ἔτι οὑ τὸι τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ φιλοσόφῳ εἰμιδόσιν, ἦν μὲν ἔδεικνυ Θεὸν ἐνεχθὸς ὑπομολογεῖν, τὸ τῶν ὄντων δημιουργόν, ἔτι πάλιν ἐπεκεῖνα κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸι, νοεῖτο καὶ αἰτιᾶτο: It is manifest to all, that amongst those, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged, that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and sensible.

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only, amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most sottish vulgar amongst them, who, as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the Pagan theology (hereafter to be declared) that many of their gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run cur-
rent amongst the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at least, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the Poets and Mythologists, who were the chief instructors of them. Thus Aristotle in his Politicks, writing of musick, judgeth of mens opinions concerning the gods from the poets, "οἰκοτείνων δὲ ὑπὸλογίῳ ἡ ἐχθροε ἔφεί τοι ἦν, καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ζέας αὐτὸς ἦν καὶ καθὼς εἶ τοι πειναί. We may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods, from hence, because the poets never bring in Jupiter singing or playing upon an instrument. Now we have already proved from fundry testimonies of the poets, that (however they were depravers of the Pagan religion, yet) they kept up this tradition of one supreme Deity, one king and father of gods: to which testimonies many more might have been added, as of Seneca the tragedian, Statius, Lucan, Silius Italicus, Persius, and Martial, but that we then declined them, to avoid tediuofnes. Wherefore we shall here content ourselves only to set down this affirmation of Dio Chrysostomus, concerning the theology of the poets; ὡς ὡς ἔννομοι οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ τάς τις, τοῦ περί τοῦ θεοῦ ποῖερα καλὸς· συλλεξομεν ἀκομοῖς τοῦ λεγομεν γίνεται, καὶ γὰρ τις ἡ μεγαλία, οἱ πειθόμενοι οἱ ἁθρωποί Διὸς ἀκομώτις ἤδηταίς ὑμείς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ποῖερα αὐτὸν ἢν ἄκυρος περασαγέμεν ἐν τοις εὐκαίριισ. All the poets call the first and greatest God, the father, universally, of all the rational kind, as also the king thereof. Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erelit altars to Jupiter king, and flict not to call him father in their devotions.

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politicks: 1 τὰς λεγεῖν Ζεὺς βασιλεύεισαι, That all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power; or, that there is one supreme king and monarch over the gods. And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole Pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other gods: Εἰ συναγωγῶν ἐνκαλεῖται τῶν τεχνῶν τάς τις, καλέως ἀπο τοῖς συμβολαῖς διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, οἰς ἀλλὰ μὲν ἂν τοῦ γραφείᾳ εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀγαλματισμοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ποιητικὸν ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ ἄλλος ἄλλες ἄλλες, καὶ δὲ μᾶκτον ἡ συνθέσις τοῦ Ἐλπίδος, ἢ τοῦ 'Επερέασθος, ἀλλὰ ἄλλας ἄλλας ἀλλὰ μὲν τοῖς ἀλλὰ μὲν τοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ φιλοσοφῷ τοῖς αὐθόρους, πάλιν δὲ πάλιν διαφορέρεσαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τάς, εὔ το τὸν ὁλιγόν, καὶ τὸ ἀίφονον, τοῦ καλὸν τόμος μὲν γὰρ δὲ καὶ ὅπερ δὲ καὶ κατὰ φιλέαν διαστώματα καὶ συμπαρασύμμακα μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένοις γίνεις, ὁμολογεῖν εἰς τούτοις, ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς δὲ παλιντέλεις, ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς δὲ εἰς σύμμοις, ὡς ἀνήφαιρον δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἀρωμένω τοῖς καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀναφέρεσαι, ἀναφέρεσαι, ἀναφερεῖ, τὴν ΘΕΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΘΡΗ, καὶ Θεοὶ παλιν τοῖς παλιντέλεις, συνάγεται τὰς τοῦτα δὲ ο Ἐλπίς λέγει καὶ ο Εἰρήνη λέγει, καὶ ο Περίπλος καὶ ο Σάλονα, καὶ ο Σωφίς, καὶ ο Ἀστρίς. If there were a meeting called of all these several trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their senses concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No nor the Scythian neither.

neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor lastly any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, That THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent, and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise. Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrins, that the generality of the Pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate, as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before cited out of Dio Chrysostomus, περὶ δὲ Σεωύ τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων θεοῦν, δόξα Ora. 12; και ἐπικοινωνία τῶν θεῶν βλέποντα, ὑμῖν, ὁμοίως ἐκ Ελλήνων, ὁμοίως ἐκ Ἑβραίων π. 201. ενω, &c. That concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that prince of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind, as well Barbarians as Greeks. Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God, than of many gods.

It hath been already observed, that the several Pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zev, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Cicero's De natura Deorum 1, Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis, the form of the Capitoline Jupiter with us Romans is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with the Africans. The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Herodotus tells us, was Pappēus or father. The Persians likewise had their Zaš ἀνωτέρω, as Xenophon styles him, their country-Zeus or Jupiter (namely Mithras or Oromasdes) who in the same Xenophon is distinguished from the sun, and called in Cyrus his proclamation in the Scripture, The Lord God of heaven, who had given him all the kingdoms of the earth. Thus the Babylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of his) to have been that God, who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that Baal (which is the same with Bel, and signifies Lord) was first amongst the Phenicians also a name for the supreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Bel sāmen, The Lord of heaven. As likewise that Molech, which signifies king, was, amongst the Ammonites, the king of their gods; and that Marnas (the chief God of the Gazites, who were Philistines) and signifies the Lord of men, was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called the Father of gods and men.
Origin contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those Pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans really to have meant τὸν θεὸν ἐν πᾶσι, the God over all, by those several names: which yet Laelantius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the Capitol, he endeavouring to confute it after this manner: Vana est persusio eorum, qui nomen Jovis summo Deo tribuant. Solent enim quidam errores suas hac excusatione defendere ; qui convivit de uno Deo, cum id negare non possunt, ipsum colere affirmant, verum hoc si plure ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdius? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjugis filiique, colit non solet. Unde quid sit apparat, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec Minerva est aula nec Juno. It is a vain persualion of these, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some are wont thus to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, be being called by them Jupiter: than which, what can be more absurd? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva nor Juno. The ground of which argumentation of Laelantius was this, because the great Capitoline temple of Jupiter had three Sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof; Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left; according to that of the poet:

Trina in Tarpeio fulgent confortia templo.

Which Juno, according to the poetick theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, and Minerva his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from his own brain. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mixture of the mythicall or poetical theology, together with the natural, as almost every where else there was, to make up that civil theology of the Pagans. But here (according to the more recondit and arcane doctrine of the Pagans) these three Capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may be understood to have been nothing else but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations; Jupiter signifying the divine power and sovereignty, as it were seated and enthroned in the heavens; Minerva, the divine wisdom and understanding; and Juno the same Deity, acting in these lower parts of the world. Unles we would rather, with Macrobius, physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle æther, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one God, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.

Nevertheless it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius 1 hath already observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this Capitoline trinity, aimed at; namely, a trinity of divine hypostases. For these three Roman or Capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dar-danus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins Dio Peneates, which Macrobius thus interprets, 2 Dio per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi posse demus, that is, the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being; but Varro in Arnobius 3, Dix, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intinis penetralibus cali, the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven; so were they called by the Samothracians Kàsègos, or Cabiri, that is, as Varro 4 rightly interprets the word Seoi dwalei, or divi potes, the powerful and mighty gods. Which Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew דַּקְרָא, gives just occasion to suspect, that this ancient tradition of three divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva, (which, as Varro 5 interprets it, was, that wherein idea & exempla rerum, the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things were contained) fitly expressing the divine Logos; and the third Juno, called amor ac delicium Jovis, well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the divine Spirit.

But Laëstadius hath yet another objection against the Roman Jupiter's P. 63, being the supreme God; Quid? quod bujus nominis proprietas non divinarum vim sed humanam exprimit? Jovem enim Junonemque a Juvando esse dictos Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quos Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minime convenit, quia Juvarum nominis est, &c. Nemo sic Deum precatur, ut se adjuvet, sed ut servet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nomine Jovis virtutem summe potestatis immittit. What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a divine, but only a human force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike a juvando, that is, from helping: for Juvans Pater, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it properly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God, to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of, &c. Wherefore he is not only unskilful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God. But as this of Laëstadius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not Juvans Pater, but Jovis pater; Jove the father of gods and men; which Jovis is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however thee Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination.

2 Saturnal. Lib. III. Cap. IV. p. 91.
3 Apud Auguflinum de Civitate Dei, Lib. XII. p. 750, 751.
4 VII. Cap. XXVIII. p. 141. Tom. VII. Oper.
nation. Wherefore, as there could be no impiety at all in calling the supreme God Jupiter or Jovis, it being that very name, which God himself chose to be called by; so neither is there any reason, why the Latins should not as well mean the supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did unquestionably by Zeus, which will be proved afterwards from irrefragable authority.

Especially if we consider, that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that Capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senilefs statue, but that God, who was there worshipped in a material statue) of Optimus and Maximus, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero in his De Nat. Deorum¹, Jupiter à poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, à majoribus autem noftris optimus maximus. That same Jupiter, who is by the poets styled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best, the greatest. And in his Orat. pro S. Rojcio², Jupiter optimus maximus, cuius nuntium arbitrio calum, terra, mariaque reguntur; Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose back and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed. As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyric oration, parens hominum deorumque, optimi prius, deinde maximi nominc colitur: The father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest. Moreover Servius Honoratus informs us, that the Pontifces in their publick sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words; Omnipotens Jupiter, seu quo alto nomine appellari volueris; Omnipotens Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called. From whence it is plain, that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipotent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Hetrurians, who are by him distinguished from philosophers, as a kind of illiterate superfluous persons (in these words, Hæc adhuc Etruscis & philosophis communia sunt, in illo dissentient) had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme monarch of the universe. For first he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner; Fulmina dicunt à Jovis mitti, & tres illi manubias dant: Prima (ut alium) monet & placata est, & ipsius confilio Jovis mittitur. Secundum quidem mittit Jupiter, sed ex confilii sententia; duodecim enim deos advocat, &c. Teritiam idem Jupiter mittit, sed adhibitis in conflilium diis, quos superioris & involutos vacant, quæ vasa, &c. The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without barm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods: and this utterly washes and destroys both private and publick states. And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify, that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partnership with others, and when the necessity of the case required. Adding in the last place, Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etrusci) Jovem qualem in Capitolio, & in ceteris aditus

¹ Lib. II. Cap. XXV. p. 2992. Tom. IX. Oper. ² Cap. XLV. p. 948. Tom. III. Oper.
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edibus colinm, mittere manu sua fulmina; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt, custodem restorenque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani bujus operis dominum & artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Neither did these Histrorians believe, that such a Jupiter, as we worship in the Capitol and in the other temples, did fling thunderbolts with his own hands, but they understood the very name Jupiter, that we now do, the keeper and governor of the universe, the mind and spirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every name belongeth. And lastly, that the vulgar Romans afterwards, about the beginning of Christianity, had the fame notion of Jupiter, as the supreme God, evidently appears from what Tertullian hath recorded in his book ad Scapulam, that when Marcus Aurelius in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Christian soldiers made to God, had obtained refreshing showers from heaven in a great drought; Tunc populus adclamans JOVI DEO DEORUM, QUI SOLUS POTENS EST, in Jovis nomine Deo nostro testimonium reddidit: That then the people with one consent crying out, thanks be to JUPITER THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of Jove or Jupiter give testimony to our God. Where, by the way we see also, that Tertullian was not so nice as Laelianus, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their Jupiter to have meant the true God.

As nothing is more frequent with Pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the fame was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian in his book de Testimonia Anima.², and his Apologet.³ influenceth in several of these forms of speech then vulgarly used by the Pagans, as Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, Quod Deus voluit, Si Deus voluerit, Quod Deus dederit, Si Deus dederit, and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix, Cum ad column manus tendunt, nihil aliud quam Deum dicunt, Et magnus est, & Deus verus est, &c. vulgi iste naturalis sermo, an Christiani confentiis oratio? When they stretch out their hands to heaven, they mention only God; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true; and, if God grant (which is the natural language of the vulgar) are they not a plain profession of Christianity? And lastly Lasionius, Cum jurant, & cum optant, & cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant; adeo ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis poetribus erumpit: When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether they will or no. And again, Ad Deum confugiunt, à Deo petient auxilium, Deus ut subveniat orator. Et si quis ad extremum mendicandi necessitatem redactus, viatum precibus exspectat, Deum solum ostentatur, & per ejus divinum atque unicum munen bonum sibi misericordiam quaerit: They fly to God, aid is desired of God, they pray that God would help them; and when any one is reduced to extreme necessity, be

³ In Ostavio, Cap. XVIII. p. 171. edit. Gronov.
³ Lib. IV.
² Cap. II, p. 55; Oper. edit. Venet. 
¹ Cap. XVII. p. 175.
be begs for God's sake, and by his divine power alone implores the mercy of men. Which same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato's Timaeus, where he observes, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods:

Moreover, we learn from Arrianus his Epitētus, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now so long in use in the Christian church, Kyrie Eleison, Lord have mercy upon us, was anciently part of the Pagans litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins, or both. For not to urge that passage of the πάσης ἡλικίας, or Aselcin Dialogue, cited by Latianus, where we read of ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάσης ἡλικίας, the Lord and maker of all, Menander in Justin Martyr, so likewise the supreme God, τὸν θεὸν πάσης κύριον πρεσβύτατον, the most universal Lord of all. And Osiris in Plutarch is called ὁ παλιός Κύριος, the Lord of all things. And this is also done absolutely, and without any adjection, and that not only by the LXX, and Christians, but also by Pagan writers. Thus in Plutarch's de Iside & Osride, we read of τοῦ παλιοῦ, καὶ ΚΥΡΙΟΤ, καὶ

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wrote γρατως, The knowledge of the first Intelligible, and the Lord, that is, of the supreme God. And Oromasdes is called ὁ Κυριος, the Lord, in Plutarch’s life of Alexander; as Nēs alfo, Κυριος, by Ariftole, that is, the supreme ruler De An. 1. 1. over all. Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle ad Hermian, &c. tells his first divine hypothesis, or the absolutely supreme Deity, τὸ ἄνω Πατερ, or τὸ ἄνω Κυριος, The father of the prince, and cause of the world, (that is, of the eternal Intelligible) the LORD. Again, Jamblicbus writeth thus of the supreme God, διὸ ὁμολόγει διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἀγαθοῦ ζητεῖν, It is confessed, that Vit. Pyth. p. every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord, that is, the supreme God. 89.

which words are afterwards repeated in him also, p. 129. but deprived in the printed copy thus, διὸ ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς τῷ κυρίῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς. Lastly, Clemens Alexandrinus tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversly, namely, τοῦ Εν, τοῦ Αυτοῦ, τοῦ Νασ, τοῦ Οὐράνου τοῦ Κυρίου, Either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgus, or the Lord. Wherefore, we conclude that this Kyrie Eleison, or Domine Misereure, in Arrianus, was a Pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius the emperor’s Stratagemata it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Rigalt. Glof. Eleison was wont to be sung also by the Christian armies before battle.

And that the most sottishly superfluous and idolatrous of all the Pagan, and the worshippers of never so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numen, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his Apotheosis, in these words:

Ecquis in Idilio recubans inter sacra mille,
Ridiculique deos venerans, sale, ceipite, thure,
Non putat esse Deum summum, & super omnia solum?
Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, & Cythereis,
Portentisque aliis, sumantse conseret aras;
Attamen in ccelum quoties suspexit, in uno
Constituit juss omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis instruida ministris.

Verf. 254.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his Cratylus, where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word Σεβη, wri-
teth in this manner, concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece; that they seemed to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they per-
ceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them Σεβη, from Σεβι, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of Σεβο upon them likewise. Which passage of Plato’s Eusebius somewhere would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inani-
mate; plainly contrary to that philosopher’s meaning, who as he no where affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous, as to worship

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The Sun, according to Macrobius, Book I.

...sensible and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary; so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods, (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings;) yet does it not therefore follow, that those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and Ether animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero.

Vides sublime funum, immoderatum aetheris,
Qui tenero terram circumveellus amplestitur:
Hunc summum babelo divum, hunc perhibebi Foemus.

As also that others of them conceived, that subtil fiery substance, which permeates and pervades the whole world, (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely the Heracliticks and Stoicks. And lastly, since Macrobius, in the person of Vettius Prætextatus, refers so many of the Pagan gods to the sun; this renders it not improbable, but that some of those Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned 2. "Hanc unumit argenti, xicmum purum, O omnipotent fun, the mind and spirit of the whole world, &c. And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoick, and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless, we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius his design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend this, either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity, (as some have conceived;) nor yet to reduce that multiplicity of Pagan gods, by this device of his, into a seeming monarchy, and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the deit dunitaxai, qui sub calo sunt, that is, the lower sort of mundane gods; and undertaking to shew, not that all of these neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For, what Macrobius his own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio's dream, where the highest sphere and starry heaven was called Summus Deus, the supreme God; Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavit, non ita accipendum est, ut iste prima causa, & Deus ille omnipotentissimus existimetur; cum globis ipses, quod calum est, anima fit fabrica, anima ex mente proceffet, mens ex Deo, qui verè summus est, procreata fit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad ceterorum ordinem, qui subjexit sunt; Deum vero, quod non modo immortale animal ac divinum fit, plenum inclyte ex illa purissima mente rationis.

Chap. IV. not the supreme Deity.

rationis, sed quod & virtutes omnes, quæ illum primum omnipotentiam summatis sequuntur, aut ipse faciat, aut contineat; ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, & apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima. That the outer sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first cause, and the most omnipotent God of all. For this starry sphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from a perfect mind or intellect; and again, Mind was begotten from that God, who is truly supreme. But the biggest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods, that are contained under it; and it is styled a God, because it is not only an immortal and divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest Mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all those virtues, which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologers is the soul of the world. Wherefore though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great God, and probably would not shrink to call him Jupiter, nor ἀλλ' ἀρχόντας neither (in a certain sense) omnipotent, or the governor of all, nor perhaps Deum summum, as well as the starry heaven was so styled, in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he was far from thinking the sun to be privam causam, or omnipotentiissimum Deum; the first cause, or the most omnipotent God of all. He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and lastly, above that mind a God, who was verè summus, truly and properly supreme, the first cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods. Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized, affenting a triinity of archangelic or divine hypostases. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also further declared by him after this manner; Deus, qui prima causa est, & somn. Scip. vocatur unus omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, principium & origo l. t. c. 14. est. Hic superabundanti majestatis facunditate de se mentem creavit. Hae mens, quæ Nis vocatur, quæ patrem insignit, plenam similitudinem servat autoris, animam verò de se creat posteriora respicientes. Rursus anima partem, quam intueitur induitur, ac paulatin regredienti respectu in fabricam corporum, in corpore ipsa degenerat: God, who is and is called the first cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; be by his superabundant facundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind, from whence it was begotten; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabric, and acteth upon body. Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us, that Summi & principis omnium Dei nullus simulacrum fuisse antiquitas, quia supra animam & naturam est, quo nihil fac ess de fabulis pervenire; de his autem ceteris, & de anima, non fuisse se ad fabulosam convertunt: The Pagan antiquity made no image at all of the biggest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intimated. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those
The Sun, not the Persian Jupiter. Book I.

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all Pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the Sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eubulus, (who wrote the history of Mithras at large,) acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it, (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world) as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed not only by Herodotus, distinguishing their Jupiter from the Sun, but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus his being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers, first to the Zeis παργως, the Persian Jupiter, and then to the Sun, and the other gods.

The Ethiopians in Strabo’s time may well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet did they not only acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such as was distinct from the world, and therefore invisible, he writing thus concerning them, Θεον νομιζον τον μεν ασκαναον, ταυτον δε εισιν τον ατιον των ποιησιων, τον αι θυσιαν, αληθους των, ας και επτεσον των τερειας και βασιλειας θεον νομιζον. They believe, that there is one immortal God, and in this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also. And though Cæsar* affirm of the ancient Germans, Deorum numero eos solos ducent, quos cernunt, & quorum opinus operi juvantur, Solen, & Vulcanum, & Luman; yet is he contradicted by Tacitus, who, coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded, that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of Thou, first, and

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* Apud Porphyr. de Antro Nymphae. p. 233, &c.

and then of Theautes, and Theutates. Lastly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chineses, Siameses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru, Mexico, Virginia, and New England, (some of which are sufficiently barbarous) acknowledge one supreme or greatest God; they having their several proper names for him, as Parmicer, Betisfo, Wiracocha, Packacamac, Vitziliputzi, &c. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus Achaia: De proc. In-Hoc commune apud omnes penes Barbaros et, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum fuc-dor. Sal. 1. 5. premum & summi bonum stateatur; spirituum vero quorumdam perverorum non obscusa opinio sit, qui a nofris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur & quis ille summus, idemque fempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt, per omnia docierti debent; max quantum ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris angelis, absoluta poffima cacadeamonum. This is common almost to all the Barbarians, to confess one supreme God over all, who is perfectly good; as also they have a persuasion amongst them of certain evil spirits, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. Wherefore they ought to be first well instructed, what that supreme and eternal maker of all things is, whom they ignorantly worship, and then how great a difference there is betwixt those wicked demons, and his faithful ministers, the angels.

XXVIII. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zealous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several Pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancients Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch's in his book De Iside, where defending the Egyptian worship, (which was indeed the main design of that whole book) but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a God, he writeth thus: "γάρ ὁ λόγος, οὗ ἡ πρῶτος ὁ Θεός, τεῦχος ἡ διωρισμένη ἡμῖν ἡ παραπάσας αἰωναῖς λήγοντας διάφορας ἱεραπλήθους ἱεραρχίας, ἑνὸς ἐνοχιομενοῦ, ἥν ἐπείρας παρ' ἐπείρας, ὑπὸ Βαρδέφιος ἡ Ἑλληνικός, ὑπὸ νοετικὸς ἡ βαθείας ἀλλὰ ὀπερ ἀληθινῆς, ἀλλὰ σελήνης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχοντικαὶ, καὶ γῆ, καὶ ἕκαστα, καὶ πᾶσιν οἰωνικαῖς ἀλλὰ ἰδιωτικὰ προκειμένα, προκειμένα τοῦ Ἔνων λόγου, τοῦ ἙΝΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΤΟΥ τοῦ ταὐταυσμοῦ καὶ ΜΙΔΩΝ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ἐντείνουσας, καὶ ὑποκατάστασιν ἑπείρας ἐπὶ πᾶλιν τετεχμένης, ἐπείρας παρ' ἐπείρας κατὰ νόμο τοῖς γεγονόις τιμᾶτο καὶ προσφαράγιας καὶ συμβόλων χρωμάτω καὶ συμπλήρωμα, oi μὲν ἀνθρώπους, oi δὲ τραύματος, ὑπὸ τῆς εἰκός φαναι ὀφθαλμῶν ἐν αἰώνοις. No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a God, but they, who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations; as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subdient ministers thereof, having bad several names and honours bestowed upon them by the
the laws of several countries have been every where worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on mens understandings to divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of calling men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or atheism. Where Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the Pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consist in nothing else, but the worshipping of one and the same supreme mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its ὑπεροι δεόμεν οἱ πάσα τα πολεμίων, its subervient powers or ministers, appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the Pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his, where he writeth of Hannibal: Necio an mirabilior fuerit in adversit, quam secundus rebus. Quippe qui misit in colluviones omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, alii PROPE dii essent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla seditio existerit. I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity, who having a mixt colluviae of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them all together in one common bond, that there happened no sedition at all amongst them. Where Livy plainly intimates, that though there was as great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies among the Pagans, as if they had worshipped several gods, yet the gods of them all were really the same, namely, one supreme God, and his ministers under him. And the same Livy elsewhere declares this to have been the general opinion of the Romans and Italians likewise at that time; where he tells us, how they quarrelled with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being cenfor, and building a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble-tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publickly in the senate-house in this manner, Quod ruinis templorum templam adificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique: That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not everywhere the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others.¹

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together

¹ Lib. XLII. Cap. III. p. 1113.
Chap. IV. Aesclepiades, his Symphony of Theologies.

gether with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch sets himself industriously to maintain it, in that formentioned book de Iride; so was it further cleared and made out (as Damaerius informs us) by two famous Egyptian philo-

sophers, Aesclepiades and Heraicus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since lost: Ἀρχιστάζοντες δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἐλευθέριος ἄνθρωπος ἰδοὺ ἀρχηγεῖς ἰσόγεις ὃς ἐν Ἀρχιστάζοντε ἐν λόγοις, ως ἐν καὶ ἀνετῶς μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρ

[ Vide Wollii Anecdoa 
Greca, Tom. 

ς. 

καὶ ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζο

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καὶ ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζο
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νθάν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζοντα, τῷ ταῖς ἱερεῖς, τοῖς ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζο

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καὶ ἦλθαν μὲν μία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, σὲ τὸν Ἀρχιστάζο
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Pagans held the whole

quiquid omnes colunt, unum putant, that all religions agreed in this, the wor-
ship of one and the same supreme Numen: and the second thus, Varios
custodes urbis mens divina distribuit; that the divine Mind appointed divers
guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries. He there-
adding also, that fuitus cuique moes, sicnu cuique jus, that every nation had
their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these; and that these ex-
ternal differences in religion ought not to be fixed upon, but every one to
observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental
points of the Pagan theology may be thus expressed; first, that there is one
self-originated Deity, who was the δημιουργός; or maker of the whole world;
secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously wor-
shipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwith-
standing all made or created by that one. Stobæus thus declareth their
sense: το πλῆθος τῶν Θεών ἠγέων ἢ το δημιουργό, ἢμα το κόσμον γενόμενον. That
the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together
with the world.

XXIX. And that the Pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge
one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because
they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer de Placitiis
Philos. and out of him Stobæus, οί μιν ἀλλα πάντες έν ζώοις τον κόσμον έν προ-
νοις διερώτων Αίκητος δι ζημίους του Επίκηρος, η δε τα άτομα εικό-
νηται η το κόσμον, δι τις ζωομον δι περιον προσφίλει. Φιλός δι τινι ἀλήθειᾳ. All others
assert the world to be an animal, and governed by providence; only Leucippus,
Democritus and Epicurus, and those, who make atoms and vacuum the prin-
ciples of all things, dissenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be ani-
mated, nor yet to be governed by providence, but by an irrational nature.
Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Goffendus,
who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as
one who approached nearer to Christianny than all the other philosophers,
in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the
language and notions of those times, to deny the world’s animation, and
to be an Atheist or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all
the Pagans, who then asserted providence, held the world also to be anima-
ted: neither did Epicurus deny the world’s animation upon any other acco-
t than this, because he denied providence. And the ground, upon
which this opinion of the world’s animation was built, was such as might
be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Plo-
tinus, according to the sense of the ancients: ἄτομον τον χρόνων χρόνος λιγεν,
τοι η δε μερες σωμάτος ἐχομεν το πάλαις, ψυχήν ἐχοντων πως γὰρ ἄν το μέρος ἐχει,
αύτος το πάλαις ὀλείς; It is absurd to affirm, that the heaven or world is
inanimate, or devoid of life and soul, when we ourselves, who have but
a part of the mundane body in us, are endued with soul. For how could
a part have life and soul in it, the whole being dead and inanimate? Now,
if the whole world be one animal, then must it needs be governed by
one soul, and not by many. Which one soul of the world, and the
whole mundane animal, was by some of the Pagan theologers (as
namely
namely the Stoicks) taken to be the πρῶτος Θεός, the first and highest God of all.

Nevertheless, others of the Pagan theologers, though assenting the world's animation likewise, yet would by no means allow the mundane soul to be the supreme Deity; they conceiving the first and highest God to be an abstract and immovable mind, and not a soul. Thus the Panegyrist, cited also by Gyraldis, invokes the supreme Deity doubtfully and cautiously, as not knowing well what to call him, whether soul or mind: Τε, jumne rerum fator, cujus tot nomina sunt, quot gentium linguis esse voluisti; quem enim te ipse dici velis, seire non possumus: five in te quaedam vis mensque divina est, que tota infusa mundo omnibus miscearum elementis, & sine ullo extrinsecus accedente vigoris impulsi, per te ipse movearisi; five aliqua supra omne calum potesias es, que hoc opus totum ex altiore naturae arcis deficiatas: Τε, inquam, oramus, &c. Thou supreme original of all things, who hast as many names as thou hast pleased should there be languages; whether thou best a certain divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou best a power elevated above the heavens, which lookest down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke, &c. And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently δύτις; Θεός, the second God. Thus in the Aesleopian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and maker of all said to have made a second God visible and senible, which is the world.

But for the most part, they who assented a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal principles, or divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving, that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be νοημα in order of nature before it, an Intelligible before Intellect. Which first Intelligible was called by them, το ἐν and τάγγα τοῦ, the One, and the Good, or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the Tagathon, or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them ὁ πρῶτος Θεός, the first God, and τῆς or Intelligē ὁ δύτης; Θεός, the second God; so was the mundane soul and animated world called τῆς Θεώς, the third God. Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's Timaeus, Νύμενίου μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀναμνήσεως Θεάς, Ραγ. 93. ταῖτερα μὲν καλεὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δύτησιν, ποιήμα δὲ τοῦ τρίτου τὸ γάμα κάλδος κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἦς Θεός, ὡς ὁ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἑνωμένος αὐτὸς, ὅτι πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δύτης Θεός, τὸ δὲ εὐμερενήσιον ὁ τρίτος: Numenius praising three gods, calls the father the first God, the maker the second, and the work the third. For the world, according to him, is the third God; as he supposes also two opificers, the first and the second God. Plotinus in like manner speaks of this also, as very En. 3. 4. 5. familiar language amongst those Pagans, ὡς ὁ κάμως Θεός, τῆς σούνιας λέγειν, § 6.

τῆς, and the world, as is commonly said, is the third God.

O o o But
But neither they, who held the suprme Deity to be an immoveable mind or intellect, superior to the mundane soul, (as Aristotle and Xenocrates) did suppose that mundane soul and the whole world to have depended upon many such immoveable intellects self-existant, as their first cause, but only upon one: nor they, who admitting a trinity of divine hypostases, made the suprme Deity properly to be a Monad above Mind or Intellect, did conceive that intellect to have depended upon many such monads, as first principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From whence it plainly appears, that the Pagan theologers did always reduce things under a monarchy, and acknowledge not many independent deities, but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it hath been already declared, that those Pagans, who were Trinitarians, especially the Platonists, do often take those their three hypostases sub-ordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together, for the τὸ Θεῖον, or one suprme Numen; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the Pagan theologers; first, that according to them generally the whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused thorough it all: inasmuch that Aristotle himself taxes those, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much soever some of them supposed the suprme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore conceive, either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that from the world, so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence upon it; but as all proceeded from this first cause, so did they suppose that to be closely and intimately united with all those emanations from itself, (though without mixture and confusion) and all to subsist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in his Platonick Questions, propounds this amongst the rest, Τί οὖν τῶν ἀνωτάτων τῶν πάθων ἢ ποιημέν ἀποστίων; Why Plato called the highest God the father and maker of all? To which he answers in the first place thus, τῶν μὲν Θεῶν γενόμεν ἢ τῶν αὐθεντῶν πατή ἢ τοῦ ποιημένος ἢ τῶν αὐθέντων. That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the world. But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: ἵππαρκες ἐνδέχεται τῶν γένεσιν ἢ ποιημένον ἢ ποιημένος, ὡς ἀκούσάμεν ἢ ὠφάσης, ἢ λόγος ἐκμεταξύ ἢ ἀνθρώπων, ἀπολλαχιαι τὸ γενόμενον ἐργον ἀπὸ ὧν τὴν γεννασθείς ἀρχή ἡ ἐκαθεμία ἵππαρκαί τοι τεκνωθείς, ἢ συνεχίζει τὴν ζωήν, ἀπόσπασία καὶ μόροι δεον τοι τεκνώσαθαί. Επεί τούτων ὑπέρ πράξεως πάσης ἢ κόσμος, ἢ οὐκ ὑπερσύμφωνος ποιήματον τοίχως, ἢ λεπτοί ἐγένετο ὡς ἡ ζωή ἕργαττοί ἐν ζωής ἵππαρκαί.
The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this Pagan polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, viz. Whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo plainly understood the Pagan polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God, (the Maker and Lord of the whole world) and of his ἐκόμενος ἀρχων, his innumerable assistent powers, both visible and invisible, he adds, καλαπλαγέλες ὑπαίτε τῷ ἱερῷ τῶν κόσμων φύσις, ἢ κόσμῳ ἓκου ἠκτισμέναι, ἢλλὰ ὑπὸ Ἀρχον. [Page. 345.]

Therefore some men being struck
with admiration of both these worlds, the visible and the invisible, have not only deified the whole of them, but also their several parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, they not scrupling to call these gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moses reputed in those words of bis, Thou Lord the king of gods; he thereby declaring the transcendency of the supreme God above all those his subjects called gods. To the same purpose Philo writeth also in his Commentary upon the Decalogue, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὸν τοιαύτην πρεσβυτέρον ἀποστάμεθα, τοὺς ἀδελφόν μην προσκυνώμεν, έι πάσης καθαροτέρας καὶ ἀληθινωτέρας θέλωρ αἵλαχο, ἀδίσταχ οὐ κατοικίαν τα πρόμενα, καθ' οὗ γένεσθαι, έπει καὶ παθὴς ἀπίστως λοιπὸς τῶν ἄλων γὰρ πρῶτον τῶν άνθρώπων παράγεις κυρίες τελεσίων εἰς αὐτοῖς, έι τὸν αὐτοῖς νομίζειν τε έι τιμᾶν Σεβον. Wherefore removing all such imposture, let us worship no beings, that are by nature brothers and germane to us, though ended with far more pure and immortal essences than we are. For all created things, as such, have a kind of germane and brotherly equality with one another, the maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only bighest God. And again afterwards, ὅσοι μὲν πάλιν, έι σελήνεις, ἀναπαύσεις τελεσίων τε κάσμων, ἀναπαύσεις τοις ἐπαύσεις αὐτοῖς ἐπεφυγᾶς Σεβον προφορολογεῖν έ siècleνται, διακαταστάντες τοὺς ὑπάρχους τε λείψεως τε εὐσεβῶς σημειώσεις. They, who worship the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince; whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the Pagan polytheism confisfted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

Flavius Josephus, in his Judaic Antiquities, extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him, περὶ αὐτὸς τὸν τοιαύταις Σεβον ἀποφημάθαι δικλησία τῶν ἄλων τοις, which some would understand in this manner, that Abraham was the first, who publickly declared, that there was one God the Demiurgus or maker of the whole world; as if all mankind besides, at that time, had supposed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of those words is this, that Abraham was the first, who, in that degenerate age, publickly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the one only God, and alone to be religiously worshipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the same writer, ἡ καλὸς ἡκει ἀπὸ τοις τιμῶν τοὺς τοιχαρίστας ἀπόνυμες, to whom alone men ought to give honour and thanks. And the reason thereof is there also set down, τοὺς δὲ λαότας, ἐι ἀπὸ τὸ πάντα εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσευχήν τοὺς παράξενον ἐκχαστείν, καὶ κατ' οἴκειαν ἐκείνῳ. Because all those other beings, that were then worshipped as gods, whatsoever any of them contributed to the happiness of mankind, they did it not by their own power, but by his appointment and command; he infatnishing in the sun and moon, and earth and sea, which are all made and ordered by a higher power and providence, by the force whereof they contribute to our utility. As if he should have said, that no created being ought to be religiously worshipped, but the Creator only. And this agreeth
agree with what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham, that he called
upon the name of the Lord, יְהֹוָה ָּלָה, the God of the whole world; that is, Gen. 21. 23.

he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that
time did, but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and con-
tained the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place,
בְּנֵית יְהֹוָה לְהָרוּת יְהוּדָה רְאוּ לְפִיתַּר יְהוּדָה יִשְׂרָאֵל יִצְוָאָה לְפִיתַּר יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲלֵהוּ יְהוָה יְהוּדָה. De Idol. c. 1. § 7.

Moreover, the same Josephus afterwards in his twelfth book 1 brings in Aristaeus (who seems to have been a secret professed Greek)
pleading with Ptolemaeus Philadæphus, in behalf of the Jews, and their li-
iberty, after this manner; "τοὺς βασίλειας ζήσαντας, τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν,
τοὺς γὰρ ἐπισκόπους ταυταίας ἦσαν, καὶ τούς καὶ οὐκ ἐνεμεῖς σεβόμεθα. Ζῶνα κακούς αὐτῶν,
εὐπρέπειαν ἄκουσαν τοὺς συμπαθόντας τῷ ζῷον, τοὺς ἐπικίνδυνοι αὐτῶν νοότατοι: It would well
agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that mi-
ferable captivity, which they are under: since the same God, who governeth your
kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both
they and we do alike worship the God, who made all things, we calling him
Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore for the honour of that God,
whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the li-
berty of returning to their native country. Where Aristæus also, according to
the fene of Pagans, thus concludes; Κοιν. Ο' king, that I intercede not for
these Jews, as having any cognation with them, πάντων δὲ αὐθεντῶν οἰκειότητας
ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Ζεύς, καὶ ποικίλων αὐτῶν ὑπάρχουσιν τοῖς εὐθύνοις, ἓτο τότε καὶ οἱ παρακάλω,
but all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing, that he is delighted
with beneficence, I therefore thus short you.

As for the latter Jewish writers and Rabbins, it is certain, that the gen-
erality of them supposing the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and
universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his
ministers, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halaeoth 2
describeth the rife of the Pagan polytheism in the days of Enos,

In the days of Enoch, the sons of men grievously erred, and the wisemen of that age be-
came brutish, (even Enoch himself being in the number of them;) and their er-
ror was this, that since God had created the stars and spheres to govern the
world, and placing them on high, had bestowed this honour upon them, that they
should be his ministers and subservient instruments, men ought therefore to praise
them, honour them, and worship them; this being the pleasure of the blessed
God, that men should magnify and honour those, whom himself hath magnified
and honoured, as a king will have his ministers to be reverenced, this honour re-
dounding to himself. Again, the same Maimonides in the beginning of the
second chapter of that book writeth thus; בְּנֵית יְהוָה לְהָרוּת יְהוּדָה רְאוּ לְפִיתַּר יְהוּדָה יִצְוָאָה לְפִיתַּר יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲלֵהוּ יְהוָה יְהוּדָה. De Idol. c. 1. § 7.

1 Cap. II. § 11. p. 526. Tom. I. Oper. 2 i. e. De Idololatria, Cap. I. § 1. p. 3.
The Pagans many Gods

The foundation of that commandment against strange worship (now commonly called idolatry) is this, that no man should worship any of the creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor sphere, nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any thing made out of them. For though he, that worships these things, knows, that the Lord is God, and superior to them all, and worships those creatures no otherwise than Enos and the rest of that age did, yet is be nevertheless guilty of strange worship or idolatry. And that, after the times of Enos also, in succeeding ages, the polytheism of the Pagan nations was no other than this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides (in his More Nevochim) to have been the universal belief of all the Hebrews or Jews; and which it is well to shew here, and to shew more at large by itself, than is here shew'd.

You know, that whatsoever committed idolatry, he doth it not as supposing, that there is no other God besides that which he worshippeth, for it never came into the minds of any idolaters, nor never will, that that statue, which is made by them of metal, or stone, or wood, is that very God, who created heaven and earth; but they worship those statues and images only as the representation of something, which is a mediator between God and them. Moses Albelda, the author of the book entitled יועל פְּרוּם, מִזֶּה יִשְׂרָאֵל Gnolath Tamid, resolves all the Pagan polytheism and idolatry into these two principles, one of which respecteth God, and the other men themselves: he being in his Meditations of Israel, which two books he has published, with that of the Andalusian, doth very wisely speak of the latter, and says, that the idolaters first argued thus in respect of God; that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have communion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the bands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves; that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstractly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon. Joseph Albo, in the book called Ik-karim, concludes that Abab, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judab worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely that the supreme God was honoured by worshipping of his ministers, and that there ought to be certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men.
worshipped as Mediators.

Ahab, and other kings of Israel and Judah, and even Solomon himself, erred in worshipping the flars, upon those two accounts already mentioned out of Maimonides, notwithstanding that they believed the existence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they should honour God in worshipping of his ministers, and partly worshipping them as mediators betwixt God and themselves. And the same writer determines the meaning of that first commandment, (which is to him the second) Thou shalt have no other gods before my face, to be this, Thou shalt not set up other inferior gods as mediators betwixt me and myself, or worship them so, as thinking to honour me thereby. R. David Kimchi (upon 2 Kings 17.) writeth thus concerning that Israelitish priest, who, by the king of Assyria's command, was sent to Samaria to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worship the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards said, that they both feared the Lord, and served their idols;) if they had altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkned to him, that being a thing, which all those eastern people were educated in from their very infancy, insomuch that it was a kind of first principle to them. Wherefore be permitted them to worship all their several gods, as before they had done; only be required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of Israel, (as the supreme) for these gods could do them neither good nor hurt, otherwise than according to his will and pleasure: but they worshipped them to this purpose, that they might be MEDIATORS betwixt them and the creator. In the book Nitzachon, all the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans is reduced to these three heads; first, when they worshipped the ministers of God, as thinking to honour him thereby; and secondly, when they worshipped them as orators and intercessors for them with God; and lastly, when they worshipped statues of wood and stone for memorials of him. And though it be true, that Isaak Abrabanel (upon 2 Kings 17.) does enumerate more species of Pagan idolatry, even to the number of ten, yet are they all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and there is no such thing amongst them to be found, as the worshipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, those Rabbinick writers commonly interpret certain places of the scripture to this sense, that the Pagan idolaters did notwithstanding acknowledge one supreme Deity, as that Jeremiah 10. 7. Who is there, that will not fear thee, thou king of nations? For amongst all their wise men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they be become all together brutish, and their worshipping of stocks is a doctrine of vanity: as Maimonides thus glosseth upon those words, As if he should say, all the Gentiles...
Pagans Knowledge of one Supreme Book I.

tiles know, that these are the only supreme God, but their error and folly consists in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods, to be a thing agreeable to thy will. And thus also Kimchi in his Commentaries, who makes, that the text readeth, פַּגַּנִּים יְבַעְקֵרָה הָעָדִים, רָמַיָּה רֵחֵם יְשַׁאֲר הָאָדָם וּבְאֶזֶר הָאָדָם, עָלִים בּוֹלְכֵם עָדִים בֲּכֵלָה. מֶלֶךְ עָבְדֵנָה מַכְלֶה אֵמוֹתָוּ שָׁעִירָה, וַעֲמַדְתֶּם, יַעֲשֶׂה הַמַּעֲבָדִים, עֵמֶק הַמַּעֲבָדִים, וְאַל תְּעַשֶּׂף עֵמֶק הַמַּעֲבָדִים. Who will not fear thee? For it is a great error, that even the nations themselves, who worship idols, should fear thee, for thou art their king; and indeed amongst all the wisemen of the nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worship the stars other wise than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wise men know, that an idol is nothing; and though they worship stars, yet do they worship them as thy ministers, and that they may be intercessors for them. Another place is that, Malachi i. 11, which though we read in the future tense, as a prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews understand it of that present time, when those words were written, From the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts. But ye profane it, &c. Upon which words R. Solomon glosseth thus, מַעְבַּדְתֶּם יְבַעְקֵרָה הָעָדִים, רָמַיָּה וְיְשַׁאֲר הָאָדָם. The Pagan polytheists and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idols worshipped by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles. And Kimchi agreeth with him herein, אֲשֶׁר פַּגַּנִּים עָבְדֵנָה עָלִים בּוֹלְכֵם מַכְלֶה אֵמוֹתָוּ שָׁעִירָה. And Kimchi agreeth with him herein, although the Pagans worshipped the host of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them. Whether either of these two places of scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, it is evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of scripture, which seems to found more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbi Solomon and others, Psal. 65. 6, where God is called מַעְבַּדְתֶּם יְבַעְקֵרָה Hallelujah! Their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were
were supposed by the Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels, and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual: for thus Maimonides expressly; "The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and ended with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do. And this they would confirm from that place of Scripture, Neh. ix. 6. Thou, even thou art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their hosts, the earth with all things that are therein, the seas and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all; and the hosts of heaven worship thee: the host of heaven being commonly put for the stars.

XXXI. But lastly, this same thing is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the New Testament also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the knowledge of the true God, that is, of the one only self-existent and omnipotent Being, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul in his epistle to the Romans 1 tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did ἀληθέας ἐν ἀδικία καλέσαν, hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same. Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unacquainted of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however, by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as is afterwards declared; ἐν ἔνδοξον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστιν ἐν ἐπιγνώμη, They liked not to retain God in the cognizance, or practical knowledge of him. Where there is a distinction to be observed between ἔστιν and ἐπιγνώσθη, the knowledge and the cognizance of God; the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into polytheism and idolatry; which is the meaning of these words, μεταλαβαν τὴν ἀληθείαν τῷ Θεῷ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστῳ, They changed the truth of God V. 25. into a lie. Again, the same Apostle there affirmeth, that τὸ γνώσθη τῷ Θεῷ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. That, which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having shewed it unto them. There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made. Moreover, this Apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that sense, which he giveth of them,
Pagans Knowledge of the True  

Book I.

V. 21.

De decal. p. 753.

Diœi γράντες τὸν Θεόν, ὡς ἦν Ἰσδασαυ, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, because they fell into polytheism and idolatry. Though the Apostle here instanceeth only in the latter of those two, their changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things. The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossness of all their religious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly declareth; θῶν μᾶν ἁλόν, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸ σώματικά ὅρανε το καὶ κύμα, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλοχερεστάτων μετων ὡς θεοῦ πράξεωι τε καὶ ἱεραπετηα σκευεις, διαμαρτάνας μὲν (πῶς γὰρ ἦν, τῆς ὑπηκοος τῷ ἀγαθος, σεμιάντος σέμιαντος), ἀνέστη τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐδικοῖς, τῶν ἐξαίλια καὶ λίθοις, αφημούν τε καὶ χρῶν, καὶ ταῖς ἔρωταις ὑλας μεσοκάλλος, &c. Whosoever worship the sun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world, and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unquestionably err (they honouring the subjests of the prince) but they are guilty of the left iniquity and injustice than those, who form wood and stone, gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues to worship them, &c. of which assertion he afterwards gives this account, τὸ γὰρ κάλλην ἡμετρα τῆς ψυχῆς ἄτρομον, τῶν ἑρετικῶν τοῦ σώματος, because they have cut off the most excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of the ever-living God, by means whereof, like unballasted ships, they are tossed up and down perpetually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe harbour. And from hence it came to pass, that the polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping of inferior gods (as stars and daemons) was vulgarly called also by the Jews and Christians idolatry, it being so denominated by them a sabbath specie. Lastly, the Apostle plainly declares, that the error of the Pagan superstition universally consisted (not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but) in joining creature-worship, as such, some way or other, with the worship of the creator; ἑστηκότεω καὶ ἐλεγείνην καὶ λήπτην τῆς κληρονομίας τῶν κληρονόμων, which words are either to be thus rendred; They [religiously] worshipped the creature, besides the Creator, that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth concerning this.

Met. l. i. c. 6. Plato, that he did τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τῆς αὐθορμός παρὰ τὰ περάγματα πάσας, (not make numbers to be the things themselves, as the Pythagoreans had done, but) unity and numbers to be besides the things; or τὸς αὐθορμός παρὰ τὰ ἀληθέα, numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles: he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τοῦ ἒν, the ideas contained in the first intellect (that was Plato's second divine hypothetical) as also by τὸ ἐν, οἷς εἶκος πάντες εἶχον τὸ τῆς ἐννοια, that ipsum unum, or unity, which gives being to these ideas, is understood Plato's first divine hypothetical. Or else the words ought to be translated thus; And worshipped the creature above or more than the creator, that preposition παρὰ being sometimes used comparatively, so as to signify excels, as for example in Luke xiii. 2. Think you that these Galileans were εἰκόταται παρὰ πάσαις τῆς Γαλατίως, sinners beyond all the Galileans? And ver. 4. Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were ἐοικέται παρὰ πάσαις, debtors above all the men, that dwelt in Jerusalem? According to either of which interpretations, it is supposed,
Chap. IV. God, testified in Scripture.

posed, that the Pagans did worship the true God, the Creator of the whole world; though they worshipped the creature also, besides him, or (perhaps in some sense) above him, and more than him also. But as for that other interpretation of ἔνιω ἅρμα, which Beza chose rather to follow, that they worshipped the creature, the Creator being wholly passed by, this is no true literal version, but only a gloss or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain preconceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God or Creator, but universally transfer all their worship upon the creature only. But in what sense the Pagans might be said to worship the creatures, above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (because it is not possible, that the creature, as a creature, should be worshipped with more internal and mental honour than the Creator thereof, look'd upon as such) we leave others to enquire. Whether or not, because when religious worship, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpretation and account, such may be said to worship the creature more than the Creator? Or whether because some of these Pagans might more frequently address their devotions to their inferior gods (as stars, demons and heroes) as thinking the supreme God, either above their worship, or incomprehensible, or inaccessible by them? Or lastly, whether because the image and statue-worshippers among the Pagans (whom the Apostle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to sensible objects, and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought, that the Apostle here taxes the Pagans merely for worshipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worshipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtless their fin was, that they gave any religious worship at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be said, that they also worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we see plainly, that the Pagan superstition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) consisted not in worshipping of many creators, but in worshipping the creatures together with the Creator.

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration, which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagittick court, beginning after this manner: To men of Athens, I perceive, that ye are very way more than ordinarily religious; for the word ἰδιοπάθειας seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus capture benevolentiam, conciliate their benevolence, with some commendation of them, but also very unlikely, that he would call their worshipping of the true God by the name of superstition, for so it followeth: for as I pass'd by and beheld your sacred things (or monuments) I found an altar with this inscription, Αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς ὁ Θεὸς, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. It is true, that both Philostratus and Pausanias write, that there were at Athens, 'Αύτοτον Θεόν θείων, altars of unknown gods: but their meaning in this might well be, not that there were altars dedicated to unknown gods

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plurally, but that there were several altars, which had this singular inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this scripture-record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian's works, intitled Philopatris, where Critias useth this form of oath, Νή τοῦ Ἀργούν ἐν Ἀθήναις, No, by the unknown god at Athens: and Tryphon in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus, Ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀργοὺν ἐφεύρομεν, ή προκεκυκτοῦσιν, χεῖρας εἰς ἄργαν ἐκθειοῦσι, τότε εὐχαριστοῦμεν, ὡς καταξιοθεῖτο, &c. But we having found out that unknown God at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power. Which passage, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul's oration, ὥστε ἀγαθῶς εὐσεβείη, τῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καθαροῖς ὑπηρετῶν, Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the Unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth. From which place we may upon firm scripture-authority conclude these two things; first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who in all probability was therefore styled by them, Ἀργοὺς Θεόν, the Unknown God, because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom Josephus against Appion 3 writeth thus, that he is ἐναντίον τῶν μόνων ἡμῶν γνωσίμος, ὅποιος ἐν καθαρῷ ἄγνωστον, knoeable to us only by the effects of his power, but as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible. But when in Dion Cassius the God of the Jews is said to be ἐστι καὶ ἐννοεῖ, not only invisible but also ineffable, and when he is called in Lucan, Incertus Deus, an Uncertain God, the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forbear amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans sometimes sacrificing προσεύχομεν Θεῷ, to the proper and convenient God, without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to preside over several things) left they should be mistaken, in not applying to the right and proper God, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unfruitful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard of their polytheism and idolatry. The second thing, that may be concluded from hence, is this, that these Athenian Pagans did εὐσεβείη, religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth; and so we have a scripture-confutation also of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.

Lastly, St. Paul citing this passage out of Aratus a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

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For we are his off-spring, and interpreting the same of the true God, in whom we live and move, and have our being; we have also here a plain Scripture-acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was sometimes at least meant the true God. And indeed that Aratus his Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor in Arcadia, but the maker and supreme governor of the whole world, is evident both from the antecedent and the subsequent verses. For Aratus his phenomena begins thus,

Ex Dios archon (which in Tully's version is ab Jove munarum primordia) and then follows a description of this Zeus or Jupiter:

To this sense; Him, of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, be permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy: for we also are his off-spring. Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus; πάνω πρεπόν το Αρατός τη των άτων διηνισκόντοι μελλων Ατην, τον παλαιό τότων θεον δημιουργόν, Δία, ει πρώτος προσφωνίνε Ούρσ τε τω την δημιουργον άκυρον Αρατός being about to declare the position of the stars, doth, in the first place, very decorously and becomingly invoke Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood all the Demiurges of the world; or, as he afterwards expresseth it, ο το πάλιον δημιουργος Θεος, the God who made all things. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the Apostle, τό γαρ γένος ἐσμύν, may be understood also in another sense, of the Zeus θυμισίος, the physical Jupiter; that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason, as we conceive, but only to shew his philological skill. However this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of those words, περί το πατήρ ανθρώπων τι θεότητι ει γαρ αυτος ταύτα ἐδημιουργησε προς το τοις ανθρώπων βιωθήσεις, αυτό δι' ηλεώσεις, αυτον πατήρ θ' δημιουργον ἐπιγείοις. This agreeeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may well be called his, and also style him our father and maker. And that this was the only notion, which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words; as,
Who, as a kind and benign father, showed lucky signs to men; which to understand of the air were very absurd. And,


For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year.

And from this,

Therefore, as he always propitiated and placated both first and last, Upon which the scholiast thus, ἂν δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν θεῶν, τῷ τὸν μιν πρῶτον σωμάτιν εἶναι, ἔτειρα δὲ ψωμώ, καὶ τρίτων Διός σωμάτω. This perhaps refers to the libations, in that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the Saviour. From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the Saviour, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus;

Where the supreme God is saluted, as the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind.

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus his context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St. Paul and the Scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also. Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus, for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise, Ἐρωτεύωσθε Ἰππία Ζεὺς, κατὰ τὰς ἁρφασ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐστὶ τὸν παῖδα, Rain, rain, O good (or gracious) Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians: upon which the emperor thus, Ὑπὲρ τίνος θεοῦ, καὶ ἐνεχθαίνει, ἐν ἀπλαῖς καὶ ἐλεύθεραι: We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and freely. And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter, that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We know nothing, that can be objected against this from the Scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul, In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God. But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to

I. 5. § 5. [§ VIII. P. 146.]

Corinth. I. 21.
such a practical knowledge of God, as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.

XXXII. But in order to a fuller explication of this Pagan theology, and giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on; first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues and symbols, sometimes abusively called gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polygonous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of Origen, that not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other Barbarian Pagans, had, besides their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath been given by us of their philosophick theology. Where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Augustin concerning both these, Et civilis & fabulosa ambæ fabulosa sunt, ambæque civiles; That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous. And by their more arcane or recondite theology, is doubtless meant that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but most expressly by Antisthenes, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoicks; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by Scaevola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; and that there was another theology besides it, called by them natural, which was the theology of wise men and of truth: nevertheless granting a necessity, that in cities and commonwealths, besides this natural and true theology (which the generality of the vulgar were incapable of) there should be another civil or political theology, accommodate to their apprehensions; which civil theology differed from the natural, only by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it, and was therefore look'd upon by them as a middle, betwixt the natural, and the fabulous or poetical theology.

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil allo, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to dissimile
and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetick fables of the
gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural
and philosophick; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by
them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only gen-
erate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Nu-
men, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a
grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into
their civil theology, yet are they tax'd by St. Austin for suffering the statue
of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the Capitol for a religious monument. And
however this differ'd nothing at all from that arheilick doctrine of Ene-
merus, That all the gods were really no other than mortal men, yet was it to-
lerated and conniv'd at by the politicians, in way of necessary compliance
with the vulgar, it being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any fuch
living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Info-
much, that Callimachus, who would by no means admit of Jupiter's fe-
phalus, either in Crete or Arcadia (but look'd upon it as a foul reproach to
him) for this reason,

Σι δ' ο θεός, ισι γεφ αιτι,

Because he was immortal and could never die; did notwithstanding himself
attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen and others
observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent
Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly ret-
tain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter
was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole
world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, ac-

Zευς ἰτι, Ζευς ιτι, Ζευς ἐσται—

Again the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetick, had not
only many phantastick gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of
independent deities; it making several supreme in their several territories
and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over
the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and
hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learn-
ing, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war; and so for
all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though
it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior
deities subordinate to one supreme; yet did it neither allow of more inde-
pendent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natu-
ral, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without,
and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro, concluded to be no other than first, the soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, daemons, and heroes: Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by Pagan writers (as Cicero and others) under the name of Dii Poetici, that is, not philosophical, but poetical gods, and Dii Commentarii and Pii, that is, not natural and real, but feigned and fictitious gods. They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient Pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together, in one general acknowledgment of an invisible Being, the Maker of the world, but that they should be distinct and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and sottish vulgar might sometimes mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, according to several notions of him; and his several powers and effects: Jambllichus himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much:

φησινεργατος νοες, &c. την αραην των κεκαυματων λαον δυνατων εις φος αρων, Αμών κατα την των Δισελίας γυλασθας λάγετι, συντελευς ντι αλευΘους ινας ντι τεχνηκος Φθα, άργεθου δε ποιητικος αντι Πυθαν κυβελης, ου άλλας δε άλλας δυνατοτης τε σοι ειρηνης, επωνυμος ενειν. The demigurical Mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power of the occult reasons, contained within itself, into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially effecteth all things with truth, Pytha; as it is productive of good things, Oriis; besides which it hath also several other names, according to its other powers and energies: as namely, Neith, (or according to Proclus his copy, Νειθα, Νειθας) the tutelar god of the city Sais, from whence probably the Greek 'Abita was derived, (the Athenians being said to have been at first a colony of these Saites) and this is the divine wisdom diffusing itself thorough all. So likewise Serapis, which though some would have to be the same, is by others plainly described as an universal Numen. As Arilides in his eighth oration upon this god P. 95. Serapis; Οι μεν δι της μεγαλης προς Αμωνιν πολεως πολιτας, ή εκα της ακολοουθης Διας διε και απολειναι πολεμικα περιτη άλλα δια πολτων εκει, ή το παι πεπληρωμε των χρω άλλων Θεου διεστοι, και δυνατης εις και τιμης, ή άλλας εις άλλας άνθρωπα κακων, δι αποτελεσματων πολτων, αποστα χρων περιτα τε εκείνοις. They, who inhabit the great city in Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only Jupiter, be being supposed to be no way defective in power, but to pervade all things; and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honours of

Chap. IV. their real and natural Gods. 479

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The Supreme God Polyonymous, Book I.

The other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the Coryphæus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants. Cnepb is also described by Eusebius that divine intellect, which was the demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch said to be εὐγενής or unmade; so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was Eneph and Eizôn in Jamblicus; though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of divine hypostases. Lastly, when Ἱδη, which was sometimes called Multimammæa, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius, Summa numinum, prima cælitum, deorum deorumque facies uniformis, cuius nomen unicum multitormi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis; as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth the intimate, that all the gods and goddesses were compendiously contained in her alone, and that she (i.e. the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole Pagan world. Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by Damæcius, the philosopher, that, τὸ κοινὸν δείκτην εἰς πολλῶν τῆν διήνυσσά, They multiplied the first intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods. Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of πολλῶν όνοματος commonly given to him, the god with many names. Which many proper names of his Macrobius insinueth upon his Saturnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Diana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled Polyonymous as well as her brother the sun. And lastly, the earth, besides those honorary titles, of bona dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, the good goddess, and the great goddess, and the mother of the gods, was multiplied by them into those many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpina, and Ops, &c. And for this cause was she thus described by Ἔσβυλος:

Καὶ Γαῖα πολλῶν ὄνομάτων μοιὴν μίαν

Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous amongst them; and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned

* De Hidæ & Osride, p. 357. Oper.
* MS. πολλὸς παρών ἄρεων.
learned Grammarians Hesychius intimates, upon that word ἐπως ἡμών, ἡ μονήν ὑμᾶς ἦς εἰκῆ, καὶ ἐπίθεσιν ἀπολύειν, they called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo; where, by the Monad, according to the Pythagorean language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans πολυώνυμον, the Being that hath many names. And accordingly Cleanthes thus beginneth that forecited hymn of his to him,

Κύδις ἄνωτάν, πολυώνυμον.

Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names. And Zeno, his matter, in Laertius 1, expressly declareth, ὁ θεὸς πολυώνυμος ἐπηγγείλεις ὑμῖν πειθήν τῶν ἐδώματίς: God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues; whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo 2, Ec de istringstreami ἐστι, καὶ τοιούθεν τοῖς πάσιν ἐπὶ τούς αὐτοῖς νοείμα. God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him. Quecumque voles (laith Seneca) illi pròpria nomina aptabiles, vim aliquam effectumque celestium rerum continentia. Tot appellatones ejus posuent esse quod munera: You may give God whatsoever proper names you please, [Cap. VII. p. 427. Tom. I. Oper.] so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things: He may have as many names, as he hath manifestations, offices and gifts. Macrobius 3 also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determins, Unius Dei effectus varios propriis cenfendos esse (or as Vossius corrects it, cenferei) numeribus, That the various effects of one God were taken for several gods; that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurensis 4, before cited out of St. Augustine, Hujus virtutes per mundum opus diffusae nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quaedam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamus. The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him wholly, we leaving out nothing of him. With which latter words seemeth to agree that of the Poet, wherein Jupiter thus befeaks the other gods;

Calicole, mea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas
Officiis divisa facit.

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many Pagan gods were but the several divided members of the one supreme Deity, whether, because according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but several personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one supreme.
Now the several names of God, which the writer De Mundo instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these;_Bravoio, and and_Apastoio, the Thunderer and Lightner, _Yivos, the Giver of rain, _Eunomio, the Befower of fruits, _Publio, the Keeper of cities, _Munies, the Mild and Placid, under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth; together with many other such epithets, as _Flavio, _Avio, _Eraticio, _Iropesio, _Cetavoio, _Paulmioio, &c. and lastly, he is called _Satia and _Eunivio, Saviour and _Afferter. Answerably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him also by the Latins, as _Vitor, _Invidiu, _Optitus, _Stator; the true meaning of which last, (according to Seneca) was not that, which the historians pretend, _quod post _votum _sarcipiam, acies Romanorum fugientium fetic, because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand; fed _quod _fanti _beneficio _ejus _omnia, but because all things by means of him stand and are established. For which fame reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us) _Centupeda, as it were, _standing upon an hundred feet; and _Tigillus, the beam, prop, and _fupporter of the world. He was flyed also by the Latins (amongst other titles) _Almus and _Rummus, i. e. He that nourisheth all things as it were with his breasts. Again that writer De Mundo addeth another fort of names, which God was called by; as _Anxius, _Necetity, because he is an immovable defence, though Cicero gives another reason for that appellation, _Interdum _Deum _necesfntatem _appellant,quia _nibil _alter _effe _poftis, _aque _ab _eo _cunctitatum _fit; they sometimes call _God _Necetity, because nothing can be otherwise than as it is by him appointed. Likewise _Eumauio, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unbindedly. _Peregraio, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined,) _Mopio, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. _Adtrio, because his power is such, that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable, (as he calls it) of the three fatal sisters, _Clotho, _Lachos, and _Aropro, according to him, meant nothing but God neither, _tavio _di _pavio _ex _ti _vllio _ti, _pavio _of _Oeis, _kastpio _of _of _repaio _Platuio _Foio, _All _this _is _nothing _else _but _God, _as _the _noble _and _generous _Plato _also _intimates, _when _he _affirms _God _to _contain _the _beginning, _and _middle, _and _end _of _all _things. _And _both _Cicero and _Seneca _tell _us, _that, _amongst _the _Latins, _God _was _not _only _called _Fatum, _but _also _Natura, _and _Fortuna. _Quid _alio _def _natura _or _Seneca _quart, _Deus, _& _divina _ratio, _toti _mundo _& _partibus _ejus _inferia? _What _is _nature _else, _but _God and the divine _Reason, _inferred into the whole world and all its severall parts? _He _adding, _that _God _and _nature _were _no _two _different _things, _than _Annæus _and _Seneca. _And, _Nonmnquam _Deum _fayis _Cicero _Fortunam _appellant, _quod _cifit _multa _improvisa, _& _nee _optimma _nobis, _propic _obfcuritatem _ignorationemque _cafarum; _They _sometimes _call _God _also _by _the _name _of _Fortune, _because _he _surprizeth us _in _many _events, _and _bringeth _to _pass _things _unexpected _to _us, _by _reason _of _the _obfcurity _of _causes _and _our _ignorance. _Seneca _thus _concludes _concerning _thefe, _and _the _like _names _of _God, _Omnia _ejusdem.
Chap. IV. according to his universal Notion. 483.

ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, varie utentis sua potestate; these are all names of one and the same God, variously manifesting his power.

But concerning most of these aforesaid names of God, and such as C. D. 1. 7, are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Austin, that they had no c. 11. such appearance or shew of many distinct gods; Hec omnia cognomina im. [P. 131.] puerunt uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res, etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt, &c. Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tegillus another, and Ruminus another, &c. Wherefore there are other names of God used amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts; first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature; and secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Harmostes of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of Orpheus 2 (or Onomacritus)

Aemioniv κόσμῳ κυβικον Φιλοπαύγμον μοιγη;

So have we before showed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously; and as being still kept in tune, acted and governed by the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that of Orphick passage,

Βόσκων ασβεστων γενεω, ἡ ἀτείγων γαῖας,

Pascens humanum genus, ut fine limite terram.

And this Pan Socrates, in Plato's Phaedrus, plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. Pan therefore is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one Pan, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in a manner all things.

Again, JANUS, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of Martial 3.

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Nitidique sator, pulberine muni.


And
And again in this of Ovid;

Quicquid ubique vides, calum, mare, nubila, terras,
Omnia sunt nostra clausa patente manu:
Me penes est unum valet custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the mere sensel-
less and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it.
And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to
this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the begin-
ing of all things. St. Austin concluding him to be the same with Jupiter,
therefore quarrels with the Pagans (that is, with their civil theology) for
thus making two gods of one: Cum ergo Janus mundus sit, & Jupiter mun-
dus sit, unusque sit mundus, quare duo die sunt Janus & Jupiter? Quare seor-
sum, baprit templo, seorium aras, diversa sacra, diffimilia simulaebras? Si
prop era, quia alia vis est primordiorum, alia caufarum, ex illa Jani, ex iife
Iovis nomen acceptit: nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat po-
tefates, aut duas artes, (quia singularum diversa vis est) idem duo dicuntur
artifices? &c. Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world,
and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two gods? Why
have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct sacred things, and
statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the
force of causes another, he is therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupi-
ter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts
about different things, be therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there
any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the
beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted
two gods? Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world,
this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind
of the world, as St. Austin himself elsewhere declares; Sit Jupiter corporei
biji mundi animus, qui univer fam ifam molem, ex quatuor elementis con-
fruetam atque compaflam, impet & movet; Let Jupiter be the mind of this
corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded
and made up of the four elements. Nevertheless, as the soul and body both
together are called the man, so was the whole animated world, by the Pa-
gans, called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin,
though it be good against the Pagans civil theology, yet their other arcane
and natural theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all
to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several
names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being
really but different names for one and the same supreme God, that con-
jecture of Salmafius seems very probable, that the Romans derived their
Janus from ZveS, the Æolian Jupiter.

GENIUS was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this
was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things,
Chap. IV. Names of the supreme Deity.

appears from this of Festus, Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obiineret rerum omnium genendarum; They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things, Genius. And St. Austin also plainly declareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God; Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, Genium effer unius.*

jusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic eftigitur, quem appellat Jovem. And afterwards, Refat ut eum singulariter & excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc Jovem. When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one, a Genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world, to be God; he plainly impleth, that is the universal Genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter.

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular Deity, but the universal Nomn of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where commending the ferility of Italy, he writeth thus; unde ad Examantum potest pia teta notlaeit tae Kronis tui us parei, at un uw Rom. Ant. adiuncun fuper, uno, uo inae tae pares tae uo atralvatae, deitie, ac piuaerntu: aedtus, indi. 1. p. 4.

Xenou autem dein kley, os E/lynes a'fco, cest Kronon os, Pape, tae Pape, ede Pape,Steph. luefr ton to usmea Poesi, deitie teo tis vounas. Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfetter of all happiness to men, whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos as the Romans; be being either way such a god, as comprehends the whole nature of the world. But the word Saturn was Hetturian (which language was originally Oriental) and being derived from την, signifies hidden; so that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans Deus Latius, the hidden God, as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is Latia Saturni, and the land itself (which in the Hetturian language was Saturniae) is in the Roman Latium; from whence the inhabitants were called Latins, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous Theology, is plain from hence, because he is therein said to have been his Father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same universal Nomn? To which there are severall Answers. For first, Plato who propounds this difficulty in his Cratylus, solves it thus; That by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which Chronos is interpreted to be) as Chronos also depended upon Uranus or Caius, the supreme heavenly God, or first original Deity. So that Plato here finds his Trinity of divine hypostases, archical and universal, TaeTae, Nuc, and Puxit, in Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus; TVCaius, Saturn, and Jupiter. Others conceive, that according to the plainer and

and more simple sense of Hesiod's *Theogonia* that Jupiter, who, together with Neptune and Pluto, is said to have been the son of Saturn, was not the suprême Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the *Æther*, as Neptune was the sea, and Pluto the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by *Chronos* or Saturn the son of *Uranus*; that is as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the suprême heavenly God. But the writer *De Mundo*, though making Jupiter to be the first and suprême God, yet (taking Chronos to signify inmenity of duration, or eternity) will have Jupiter to be the son of Chronos in this sense, because he doth θέων εί άθεόν αριστον είναι, and continues from one eternity to another; so that Chronos and Zeus are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think, that no ingenious and learned Pagan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. *Austin*, from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn his devouring his male-children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometimes thus defined by them, as St. *Austin* likewise informs us, *Sinum quidam nature in seipso continens omnia, A certain bosom, or deep hollow, and inward recess of nature, which containeth within itself all things.* And St. *Austin* himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagans *Jupiter* and Saturn were really but one and the same *Numen*. *De Civ. D. I. 7. c. 13.* Wherefore we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the suprême God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that secret and hidden power, which comprehends, pervades, and supports the whole world; and which produces the seeds or seminal principles and forms of all things from itself. As also Uranus or *Cælus* was plainly yet another name for the same suprême Deity; (for the first divine *hypothesis*) comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true, that *Minerva* be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the *Æther*, (as shall be shewed afterwards,) yet was it often taken also for the suprême God, according to his most general notion, or as a universal Nurnen diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as *Athena* amongst the Greeks, and *Minerva* amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Nurnen, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, *I am all that was, is, and shall be*. And accordingly *Athenagoras* tells us, *that Athena of the Greeks was, ἡ σοφίας διὰ τὸν ἔνθιλμα* *Wisdom passing and diffusing itself through all things: as in the book of Wisdom it is called, ἡ σοφίας τῆς άθροίας, the Artificer of all things, and is said ἀνάκηντρον, διὰ τὸν ἐνθιλμα, to pass and move through all things. Wherefore this Athena*

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2 *De Civit. Dei. Lib. VII. Cap. XIII. p. 132.*  
3 *Legat. pro Christianis. Cap. XIX. p. 86.*
**CHAP. IV. Other Names of God.**

Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite Mind, the original of all things; or else a second divine hypostasis, the immediate off-spring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus Arístides in his oration upon Minerva, πάντα μὲν ὑπὲρ τὰ καλὰ 

λέγει Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ διὸ ἵνα τᾶς δικαίως ἔχῃ τὰς δικαιοδοσίας τε καὶ τὸν καλὸν θεὸν, τὸν θεὸν ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ ἀληθεῖ 

πάντα γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅμοιῳ πάντας τὰς δικαιοδοσίας ταῦτα ἀλλὰ ἀληθεῖ 

πάντας εἰς τὸν μὲν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν, τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν 

λέγει τὸν τὰς δικαιοδοσίας ταῦτα ἀλλὰ ἀληθεῖ 

πάντας εἰς τὸν μὲν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν, τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν.
God called Urania; Book I.

Moreover Urania Aphrodite, the Heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same with that *Eros*, or *Love*, which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle, made to be the first original of all things: for it is certain, that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Paulyanias in Plato's Symposium, *μάν γά τι πρεσβύτερον καί ἀμετρῶν Οὐρανός Συνάγητε, ὅν δὲ καὶ ξαφνίως ἐπονομάζομεν* ἐν νεοτέρα, Δίός καὶ Δίσεω, ὅν δὲ πάθησον καλείσθην ἀμφιφόροι δὲ καὶ Ἑρωίς, τού μὲν ἐπίρης συμεργόν, πάθησθαι ὤργας καλείσθην τοῦ δὲ ἑρώιν. There are two Venus's, and therefore two Loves; one the older and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two loves, answering to these two Venus's, the one vulgar and the other heavenly. The elder of these two Venus's is in Plato laid to be senior to Japet and Saturn, and by Orpheus the oldest of all things, and πρῶτος γενετός, the first begetter of all. Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations *Mylitta* or *Genitrix*, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's ὁ πρῶτον καλὸν, the first fair; the cause of all pulchritude, order and harmony in the world. And Paulyanias the writer tells us, that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venus's or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἐν τῷ νευρίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀπαλαμβάνω τὸν σωμάτων, because the love belonging to it was pure and free from all corporeal affections: which, as it is in men, is but a participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And thus is Venus described by Euripides in Stobæus, as the supreme Numen:

To this sense; *Do you not see, how great a God this Venus is? but you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she, which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conspire together, &c.* But by Ovid this is more fully expressed; in his *Fistorum*:

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2 In Bocadic. Lib. IX. Cap. XVI. p. 742. 4 *Lib. IV. verf. 91.*
CHAP. IV. the heavenly Venus, or Love.

Ilia quidem totum dignissima temperat orbem,  
Ilia tenet nullo regna minora Deo:  
In quaque dat caelo, terrea, natatibus undis;  
Perque suos initus continet omne genus.  
Ilia deos omnes (longum enumerare) creavit;  
Ilia fatis causas arboribusque dedit.

Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boetius, a Christian philosopher and poet, in this manner:

De Conf. l. 2,  
Met. 8.

Quod mundus stabili fide  
Concordes variat vices,  
Quod pugnantia femina  
Fædus perpetuum tenent;  
Quod Phoebus rofum diem  
Curru provebit aureo; &c.  
Hanc rerum fieriem ligat,  
Terras ac pelagus regens,  
Et coelo imperitans, AMOR, &c.  
Hic si frona remiferit,  
Quicquid nunre amat invicem,  
Bellum continuo geret.  
Hic sanato populos queque  
Fædus fadero continet;  
Hic & conjutii facrum  
Caftis neeit amoribus, &c.  
O felix hominum genus,  
Si vestros animos AMOR,  
Quo caelum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania, or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called Ἀπόσφιξ, and by the Latins Venus verticordia, pure and chaste Love, expulsive of all unclean lusts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as Valerius M. tells us, (L. 8. c. 15.) quo facilius virginitum mulierumque mentes à libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur; to this end, that the minds of the female sex might then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity. We conclude therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes amongst the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration. For Zeno in Laertius tells us, that the supreme God was called Ἡρακλέως or Vulcan, κατά τον ἵππο τεχνικον πιγ διότοις.

Lib. VII. segm. 147, p. 458.
Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, Book I.

De Ben. l 4.
c. 8.

Furthermore, Seneca gives us yet other names of the supreme Deity, according to the fenate of the Stoicks; Hunc & liberum patrem, & Herculen, ac Mercurium nostri putant, Liberum Patrem, quia omnium parentis, &c. Herculen, quod vis ejus invicta fit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerique, & ordo, & scientia. Furthermore, our philosophers take this author of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, because he is parent of all things, &c. the second, because his force and power is unconquerable, &c. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge. And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these, Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cælus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephaestus, Libcr Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme universal and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But besides these, there were many other Pagan gods called by Servius dii speciales, special or particular gods; which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods) much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names or notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which it is certain, that according to the more arcane doctrine, and Cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were accounted but dii poetici & commentitii, poetical and fictitious gods; and they were really esteemed no other, than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. For first, as to Pluto and Hades, called...
also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis, (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of Dives to answer the Greek Pluto) as Balbus in Cicero attributes to him, omnem vim terrenam, all terrene power, to others commonly assign him the regimen of separate souls after death. Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of the divine providence, which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death. This Ficinus observed upon Plato's Cratylus, animadvertere praeter ceteras, Plutonum hic significare præcipuè providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem: You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of divine providence, which belongeth to separate souls. For this is that, which, according to Plato, binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the best vinculum of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights, which they there enjoy. And thus is he also to be understood in his book of laws, writing in this manner concerning Pluto; Καὶ ἄνδρεων τινι πολεμικοί αὑτῶν Λευκός Lib. 8. τοῦ τάκτος θεοῦ ἄλλα τιμίαν, ὡς δὲ αὐτί τοῦ τοῦ κυρίων τριστήνων, κοινωνία γενόμενος ἐκ τικτήν, καὶ τοῖς οὖν τοῖς ἀφετέροις, ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖν συνάγοντες τοῖς οὖν συνάγοντες. Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this God Pluto, but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissipation or separation of them. Pluto therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the divine providence, that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies. And upon this account was Pluto styled by Virgil*, the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer de Mundo* to be understood, when he tells us, that God or Jupiter is ἰεράς τε καὶ θυσίν, πάσης ἡμετέρης ἡμέτερης, ἀπὸ πάντων αἰώνων αἰώνιος ὁ. Both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, therefore, as he is the cause of all things. Plato therefore is Zeus χρήματος, or καλόταχθιος, the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean) Jupiter; and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Pluto and Neptune, is properly Zeus χρήματος, the heavenly Jupiter, God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage, which Julian* cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus.

Εἰς Ζεὺς, εἰς Πολεμίδας, 

Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God. As also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful, whether he should call the supreme God (τοῦ πάθησες πάντων, that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades:

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Whether thou badst rather be called Jupiter or Pluto.

Lastly, Hermeias the Colophonian poet, in those versets of his (afterward to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place, (with many other Pagan gods) to be really one, and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas, (at least according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans,) is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobæus 1, and Zeno in Laer-"?

De N. D. 1.3.
[Cap. XXV. p. 3090.]

To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero: Sed tamen his fabulis spretis ac reprehendi, Deus pertinens per naturam curjusque rei; per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, quî quæque sint, &c. But these poetick fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand, how God passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres, (and Pluto) through the seas Neptune; and through other parts of the world by other names: so that all these titular gods were but so many several denominations of one supreme Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology, Neptunum esse dicit animum cum intelligentiâ per mare pergentem, idem de Ceres: their meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth. Lastly, to name no more, Maximus Tyrius agreeth alo herewith, καλει του μεν Δια των πεπεπτετων, &c. του δε Ποσεδω, πνευμα δια γνης κυ Θαλατης ιου, οικονομου αυτων των τατον κυ των αρχων. You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, &c, and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony.

Lastly, that these three Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, were not three really distinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God, (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans) is thus plainly declared by Pausanias in his Corinthiacks 2; he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes, (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: τρεις δε εφθαλμοι ζην ις τοι τι των τεμπαιριον αυτων Δια γαρ εν έρωτι βασιλειαν, ετως μεν άγος καινος παιδων ετων ανθρωπων, ου δε αρχην Φασιν υπο γης, ιτω ιππος των Όμηρον Δια ουμαζου κυ τουτον, Ζης τε κακοχειοντος, κυ ιπποι Πετειφονιν. Aigylus δε ο Παυσανιας καλει Δια κυ του Θαλατης. Τρεις ου εφθαλμοι απαιτεται εφθαλμοι δις δε των οπανθας, απαιτα ει τας τρις τας ουπαμεις ουπαμεις αξις κυ του αυτου τουτο Θεου: Now that this statue of Jupiter was made to have three eyes, one may guess this to have been the reason; because first the

2 Lib. VII. Serm. 147. p. 438.
3 Lib. II. Cap. XXIV. p. 166.
common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is, said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer, called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter together with Proserpina. And lastly, Æchylus, the son of Euphorion, calls that God, who is the king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statue made Jupiter with three eyes, to signify, that it is one and the same God, which ruleth in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth. Whether Pausanius were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself, and other ancient Pagans acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who ruleth over the whole world. And since both Proserpina and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune; we may well conclude, that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpina, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobæus, and Zeno in Laertius. And St. Austin propounding this quære, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister, makes the Pagans answer thus to it, Quia Jovem (inquit) in aethere accipiamus, in aere Junonom; because we call God in the other Jupiter, in the air Juno. But the reason, why Juno was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero, Effeminabant eum, Junonique tribuerant, quod nihil ost aere molius; they eximiated the air, and attributed it to Juno a goddess, because nothing is softer than it. Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular God, and then it was nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme God, as passing through the (higher) aether, which gave occasion to St. Austin thus to ob. C. D. I. 4. jeft against the Pagan theology; Si etheris partem superiorem Minervam tenere dicitur, & cæ occasione fingere poetas, quod de Vovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipfa petius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior? If Minerva be said to possess the biggest part of the aether; and the poets therefore to have esteem'd her to have been begotten from Jupiter's head, why is not she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter? Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea, and Juno in the air, so by the same reason, they may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme God also worshipped in them both, (as well as in the other parts of the world) and that under those names of Apollo, and Diana. Thus the Pagans appointing a God to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating

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1 Ubi supra.
2 De Nativ. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVI.
3 De Civit. Dei, Lib. IV. Cap. X. p. 74.
Many other Pagan Gods, in St. Austin; Book I.

concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto) thus declareth; 

Plato, Persephone, Ceres, & Venus alma, & Amores,
We shall add, in the last place, that St. Austin, making a more full and particular enumeration of the Pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods, (which are not now commonly taken notice of,) does pronounce univerally of them all, according to the sense of the more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same Jupiter; Ipsé in aether fit Jupiter, ipsé in aère Juno, ipsé in mari Neptunus, in inferioribus etiam maris ipsé Salacia, in terra Pluto, in terra inferiori Proserpina, in focis domesticiis Vesta, in fabrorum fornae Vulcanus, in divinantisibus Apollo, in merce Mercurius, in Jano initiator, in Termino terminator, Saturnus in tempore, Mars & Bellona in bellis, Liber in vinès, Ceres in frumentis, Diana in silvis, Minerva in ingenis. Ipsé fit postremò etiam illa turba quoque plebeiorem dorum, ipsé praëfet nomine Libri virorum feminibus, & nomine Libræ femalem. Ipsé fit Diospiter, qui partum perdácit ad diem; ipsé fit dea Menæ, quam praëfecerunt menftruis faminarum, ipsé Lucina, qua à parturientibus invocatur, ipsé opem ferat nafeentibus, excipientes eos sine terra, & vocetur Opis. Ipsé in vagitum es aperiat, & vocatur, Deus Vigilans, Ipsé leget de terra, & vocatur dea Levana. Ipsé cunas iacentur & vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipsé in deabus illis, que fata nafeentibus canunt, & vocantur Carmentes. Praëfet fortuitus, voceturque Fortuna. In Dea Ruminam mamnam parvulis immulcet. In Dea Polina potionem immiscat. In Dea Educa eam prebeat. De pavorre infantium Pavenia nuncuptetur. De spe que venit Venilia; de voluptate Volupia. De aëri Agenoria. De stimulis, quibus ad minus aërum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Sperna dea fit, strenuum faciendo. Numeria que nuncupare doceat; Camæna que canere. Ipsé fit & Deus Confus praebendo confilia; & Dea Señita sententias inspirando. Ipsé dea Juventas, que pos pretexiti excipiat juvenilis aetatis exordia. Ipsé fit Fortuna Barbatæ, que adulos barba induit, quos honore voluerit. Ipsé in Jututino Dee conjungat jungat; & cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipsé invocetur & dea Virginenæ invocetur. Ipsé fit Mutinus, qui est apud Graecos Priapus; fit non pudet. Haec omnia que dixi, & quæcumque non dixi, bi omnès dixi deaque:

\[ S \]"
fit unus Jupiter; five sifnt, ut quidam volum, omnia ipsa partes ejus, sicut eis
videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; five virtutes ejus, quae senentia
velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est. Let us grant, according to the Pa-
gans, that the supreme God is in the æther Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the
sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in
the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domeick hearths Vesta; in the
smiths forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffick and merchandise Mer-
cury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in
time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the
corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also
that troop of plebeian gods, let him preside over the seeds of men under the
name of Liber, and of womens under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter,
that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Mena, whom they
have set over womens monthly courtes; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in
child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infants; let him be
Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Le-
vana, which is laid to lift them up from the earth; and the goddesses Cunina,
that defends their credales; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretell the
fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as presiding over fortuitous events; let
him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina,
which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which educates it meat; let him be cal-
led the goddesses Pavenia, from the fear of infants; the goddesses Venilia, from
hope; the goddesses Volupia, from pleasure; the goddesses Agenoria, from acting;
the goddesses Stimula, from provoking; the goddesses Strenua, from making strong
and vigorous; the goddesses Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddesses
Camena, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Confus, as giving counsel;
and Dea Sentia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddesses Juventas,
which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which upon
some more than others liberally bestowed beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus,
which joins man and wife together; and Dea Virginensis, which is then in-
voked, when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also
(which is the same with Priapus among the Greeks) if you will not be ashamed
to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not
mentioned) be one and the same Jupiter, whether a parts of him, which is
agreeable to their opinion, who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as
his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great Pagan doctors.

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writ-
er, G. I. Vossius, may not here stand in our way, or be a prejudice to us,
we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book de
Theologia Gentili, and freely to cenfure the same; where, treating concerning
that Pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus 1: Ex philosophica de diis doctrina,
Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Helpemus. Sed ex poe
tica ac
civilis, supra hos cos celos flaturantur mentes quedam a fyderibus diverse: quomodo
Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, ceteraque Deos Consentes, considerare
jubet Apuleius. Quippe cos, (inguit) natura vilibus nostris denegavit: necnon
tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemptur, acie mentis acris contempla-

plantes. Quod apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Confentes intelligi, non corpora celestia vel subcelestia sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicum? According to the philosophick doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the Moon, or Lucifer, or Hefperus; but according to the poetick and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Confentes; be affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (faith Vossius) than that the Dii Confentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds. Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks: first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophick theology of Scæwola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiologick only; (which physiologick theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us.) For the philosophick theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the principal part thereof was the affecting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this philosophick and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer or Hefperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophick theology, both of Scæwola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiologick only, but (in another sense) as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it, philosophy being that properly, which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophick theology therefore was opposed, both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only. Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was propely nothing but the law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction and fabulosity. Poetarum ipsa sunt, saith Cotta in Cicero 1; nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores, non fabularum. Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities) and not of fables. But the main thing, which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the Confentes, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings supercelestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius his de Deo Socratis, who was a Platonick philospher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither: which yet ought not to be thought any deroga-

Apuleius his Reduction of the Book I.

gation from this eminent philologer, (whose polymathy and multifarious learning is readily acknowledged by us) that he was not so well versed in all the niceties and punétilio's of the Platonick School. For though Apuleius do in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve Confentes, and others, which (he faith) we may animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in its rebus, quibus eorum singuli curant; make a conjecture of by our minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from those things, which each of these take care of: yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology, is manifest from hence, because in that very place, he declares as well against superstition, as irreligious prophane. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural, and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavours to do in the Platonick way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy. Hos deos in sublimi ætheris vertice locatos, Plato existimat veros, incorpores, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æternos, corporis contagione sub quidem naturalis remotis, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porreto, &c. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid geraendivse, nulla vicc ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum Plato celesti facundia praedicta, frequentissimè predict, bunc solum maesteri incredibili quadam nimietate & ineffabilii, non possa penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel medicis compreendi. All these gods placed in the highest æther Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? Since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excess of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible. From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that according to him, the twelve Confentes, and all the other invisible gods were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetick gods contained in those two verses of Ennius,

Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars, Mercurius, Jove, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo.

and the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the divine Intellect (and his second hyposphaire) derived from his first original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his Timæus, καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν κόσμων, εἰκόνα τινς ἔχει, This sensible world
world must needs be the image of another intelligible one. And again afterwards, in the same manner as sensible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, this great animal of the world, framed it? Certainly, we must not think it to be any particular animal, for nothing can be perfect, which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let us therefore conclude it to be that animal, which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the same manner as this sensible world doth us, and other sensible animals. Wherefore Plato himself, here and elsewhere speaking obscurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder, it many of his Pagan followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the civil and poetick gods of the Pagans (I mean their gods, properly so called invisible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Neither was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the Pagan theologers did the like; as for example, Julian in his book against the Christians; Θεως υμᾶς ὁ Πλάτων τῆς ἑμφάνεις, κλείω, κηκήσις, ἄριστος, κῇ δραμαν, ἀλλ' ἐντὸς τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰνώνοις' ο Ποιήσομαι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἑλθαί, τοῦ ποτήρι ἐκ τῷ μὲν Φαομεθάν, ἐκ πάλιν, ἡ Ποιησαμένοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὑμῶν σέλειν, κηκήσις οἱ τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐκαστοῦ εἰσόνοις εἰσὶ τῶν νομῶν ἕνες ἐν τῇ ἀφαιμι, θεοῦ ἐνσάλος, ὑμᾶς ὑπάναγος, ζῇ εἰς τὴν ἑιμικροτὴν, ἐνφεύγοντος, Πλάτων ἑιτε ἐκαστὸς εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον ἑιμικροτην, θεοῦ, πρὸς τὰς ἀφαιμι-λέγον, θεοῦ, τῶν ἑμφανῶν ἐμφανίσικαν κωνοῦς δὲ ἀφαιμικροτην ἑιμικροτην ἐκτὸς ἐστιν, τὸ πρόσωπον ταυτῷ ἐκείνῳ, κηκήσις, ἐκ πάλιν, ἐκ τῶν μικρῶν ἀποκεφάλασθαι, ταῦτα ἐπὶ τὴν ἑιμικροτην, τὸν ἑιμικροτην πρὸς τὰς ἀφαιμι-λέγον, θεοῦ, τῶν ἑμφανῶν ἐμφανίσικαν κωνοῦς δὲ ἀφαιμικροτην ἑιμικροτην ἐκτὸς ἐστιν, τὸ πρόσωπον ταυτῷ ἐκείνῳ, κηκήσις, ἐκ πάλιν, ἐκ τῶν μικρῶν ἀποκεφάλασθαι, ταῦτα ἐπὶ τὴν ἑιμικροτην, τὸν ἑιμικροτην πρὸς τὰς ἀφαιμι-λέγον, θεοῦ, τῶν ἑμφανῶν ἐμφανίσικαν κωνοῦς δὲ ἀφαιμικροτην ἑιμικροτην ἐκτὸς ἐστιν, τὸ πρόσωπον ταυτῷ ἐκείνῳ, κηκήσις, ἐκ πάλιν, ἐκ τῶν μικρῶν ἀποκεφάλασθαι, ταῦτα ἐπὶ τὴν ἑιμικροτην, τὸν ἑιμικροτην πρὸς τὰς ἀφαιμι-
The intelligible Gods, of Julian Book I.

to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But however
the matter be, the skillful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas
have been rejected by Plato's own disciples; Aristotle disdaining them as
figments, or at least such, as being mere notions could have no real causa-
liety and influence upon things. But the meaning of this Pagan theology
may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus fur-
ther objecteth against it; προσεπάνει δι' οίτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν ὡς τῶν ὑπο-
κριτικῶν ἑνώμενος εἰνάν τοῦ ἔθους Σεβάστου, ο γών ή ξυραφης τεχνητάνθηκεν, οτε τοῖς κατά
η ἀυτός διαμολύνης ἐνεχύφας, ταύτῃ τε καθιστῶν ἱπερερμομένος ἐστιν ο δήμιος Σεβάστου,
πᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ γεγένηται ὕπος αὐτής, συνυπάρχου τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐνυπάρχου αὐτῷ, πᾶς, εἰπέ
μοι, τῇ ἄγνωστῳ τούτῳ συνυπάρχει τῷ γεγονότι, ἐνυπάρχει ὁ κατὰ τοῖς τρόποις;
ημέρας μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητόν ἄντα τῶν τῆς Θείου λόγου, συνυπάρχειν συναίνεισι τῷ Φώτω 
ίδιῷ ἐνεργοτομεθα, ἵνα ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, περιελθεί αὐτῷ γεγονός ἐν αὐτῷ; ο ἐν γάτη τῆς 
Πλατωνίδεως ἐφιπποτεῖς του οἰκετέος, αὐτοῦ ο μήν εἴπαι φησί τῷ ἀκατά 
Σεβάστου ἐνυπάρχει αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ ἐν αὐτῷ γεγονόται τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ γεγονόται, τὰ ποικίλα 
νομοὶ καὶ συνέχεια. The sense whereof seems to be this; Julian addeth, that the God of the 
universe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the Demiurgus, both of these
sentible, and of the other intelligible things. If therefore the ingenti
God be alike the creator of both, how can be affirmed those things, that are cre-
ated by him, to co-exist with, and inexist in him? How can that, which is
created, co-exist with the ingenti God? but much less can it inexist in him.
For we Christians indeed affirm, that the unmade Word of God doth of
necessity co-exist with, and inexist in the father, it proceeding from him, not by
way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonick trifles,
acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenti, affirmeth, notwithstanding, these
things, which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; ibis ming-
ling and confounding all things. Where notwithstanding, Julian, and the
Platonick Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the in-
telligible and archetypal world (which is the first ὑπό, or Intellekt) pro-
ceeding from the highest hypothesis, and original Deity, by way of necessary
and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the
Christian λόγος; and therefore might, with as little absurdity, be said to
exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian,
exthervise in that book of his, accommodates this Platonick notion also to
the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as Apuleius had done before,
he writing of Αἴεικουλαπιος, after this canting way; ἡ γαρ Ζεύς, εἰ μὲν τοῖς νομοῖς
ἐν τούτῳ τοῦ Ἀσιλρατοῦ ἐρωτηθαί, εἰς τοὺς γάρ διὰ τὰς ἅγια γενικὰς ἄξαις ἔχοντων
τοῖς εἰς γάρ ήν ἀναπαύσιν δήπορον, τὸν οὕτως έσεσθαι μὲν εἰς ἀναθεσίν ἀλλιν ἐπὶ τῷ
'Επιδαύρων Ἐφύναν, &c. Jupiter, amongst the intelligible things, generated out of
himself Αἴεικουλαπιος, and by the generative life of the sun manifested him here
upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, first
about Epidaurus, and from thence extending his salutary power or virtue over
the whole earth. Where Αἴεικουλαπιος is, first of all, the eternal idea of the me-
dicinal art or skill generated by the supreme God in the intelligible world;
which afterward, by the vivifick influence of the sun, was incarnated, and
appeared in a human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine of that Julian,
who was so great an oppofer of the incarnation of the eternal Logos, in

our Saviour Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal, (of which the archetypal world consisted) first invented by Platonick Pagans, after the times of Christianity, as some might suspect; but that there was such a thing extant before amongst them also, may be concluded from this passage of Philo's: *De Confus. l.*

Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world composed, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only defined the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods. Where Philo seems to call of a double fun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the divine Intellect *vnoi*, *Seis*, intelligible gods; as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, *Seis ymheiv vnoi*, to praise the intelligible gods, that is, the divine Intellect, which, as he elsewhere writeth, is both *is y' poxai, one and many.*

We have now given a full account of Apuleius his sense in that book *De Doe Socratis*, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to assert a multitude of substantial and eternal deities or minds independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophick theology; and this according to Plato's principles. Wherein many other of the Pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, concurred with him; they making the many Pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the divine intellect, (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world) which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonick philosophers, thus to talk of the divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons and gods; it being their humour thus upon all sorts occasions to multiply gods: yet nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their Pagan polytheism,

* Vide Ennead. V. Lib. VIII. Cap. IX. p. 550.*
lytheism, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but υπομονή, conceptions in the mind of God, or the first Intellect, (though not such flight accidental and evanish ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are) and consequently not to be so many distinct substances, persons, and gods, (much less independent ones) but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their dio. nobiles, and dio majorum gentium, their noble and greater gods (which were the Consentes and Seleēi) hath been already showed out of St. Austin, from Varro, and others; as namely, Deus Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Deus Levana, Deus Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Educa, Diva Paventina, Deus Venilia, Deus Agenoria, Deus Stimula, Deus Sirena, Deus Numeria, Deus Confus, Deus Sentia, Deus Jugatinus, Deus Virginensis, Deus Mutinus. To which might be added more out of other places of the same St. Austin, as Deus Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Deus Manturna, Deus Pater Subregus, Deus Mater Prema, Deus Pertunda, Deus Rufina, Deus Collatina, Deus Valonia, Deus Seia, Deus Setitia, Deus Tutilina, Deus Nadotus, Deus Volutina, Deus Patelena, Deus Hostilina, Deus Flora, Deus Laeturtia, Deus Matura, Deus Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these Pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very small, mean, and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was μηδέν ἄρα, nothing at all without a God to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion, that divine providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest, that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or understanding beings eternal and unmade, really existing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. How could any possibly persuade themselves, that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit; which, for example, essentially presided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing else? another over the sweeping of houses? another over ears of corn? another over the husks of grain? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like? And the cane is the very name for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them) the Consentes, and Seleēi; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many substantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the divine power and providence perforated, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already shewed
frowned, that the more high-flown and Platonick Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these Confentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else, but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world, (which is the divine intellect) that is indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things: whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world; as Seneca expressly affirmeth, not only concerning fate, nature, and fortune, &c. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, (before mentioned by him) that they were omnia ejusdem Dei nominia, variè utentis sud potestate, all names of one and the same God, as diversly using his power; and as Zeno in Laertius concludes of all the rest: or else, (which amounts to the same thing,) that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously perlonated and deified; as the Pagans in Eusebius apologize for themselves, that they did θεοσεῖον τὸς ἀριστῆς Pr. Ev. l. 3, δυνάμεις αὐτῶ τοι ἐπὶ πατρί, deify nothing but the invisible powers of that God, c. 13. p. 121, which is over all. Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other ὑπογιοι δυνάμεις, subservient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind, (commonly called daemon,) therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subservient spirits or daemons collectively; as perhaps in this of Eusebius, πάντα τὸν ἐνύπνον πνεύματι; ἡν αὐτῶν L. 1. c. 1, δεκτα, καὶ βελτίως, ἡ τῶν Αἰείων οί μὲν ἐκ ἕναντιν ὁ Σελήνη παράδειγμα τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλαὶ p. 85, τῶν Αἰείων. When will Zephyrus, or the west-wind, blow? When is seeming good to himself or to Æolus; for God hath not made thee steward of the winds, but Æolus.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole Pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their Πολυούσια was in great part nothing else but Πολυονομία, their πολυκείμην, or multiplicity of gods, nothing but the polynomy of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of; first, that, according to the Pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo, that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as τῷ παντὸς κόσμῳ τῷ ἐνυπνῷ πνεύμα, a spirit pervading the whole world; as likewise they concluded ἀντὶ τῆς μνήμης τῶν σαβεττάων, that nothing at all was without God. Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynick, in Laertius, αὐτῶ πάλιν πάλιν, All things are full of him. And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals; τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ ἐνυπνῷ, in the ψυχῆς τῷ ἐνυπνῷ, the αἰλός, ἐν μᾶλτῳ ἐνυπνῷ, ὁ τῶν ἑρώων περιέχει τῶν ἑρώων, τῶν ἑρώων, τῶν ἑρώων, τῶν ἑρώων. What

1 De Beneficiis, Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 427.
3 Lib. VII. segm. 147. p. 459.
4 Oper. Arist. p. 492.
5 Lib. I. cap. 1.
What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets. Sextus Empiricus thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italick philosophers: 

μὴ μὲν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς σειας ἐναι τινα κρινώμε; ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων ἐν γογ γεγονέων πιεύμα τὸ διὰ πάντως κόσμῳ δύνα, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἑνώς πρὸς ἑκάτων. That we men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof. Clemens Alexandrinus writeth thus of the Stoicks, διὰ πάντως υλίκας καὶ τὰς ατμομάτας τὸ ζωὸν ἀκίνητο λέγειν; They affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the universe, and even the most vile parts thereof, which that Father seems to dislike; as also did Tertullian, when he represented their doctrine thus; Stoici volunt Deum sic per materiam decururijfe, quomodo mel per fa- vos, the Stoicks will have God so to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs. Strabo testifieth of the ancient Indian Brachmans, πειρατῶν τών ἔλαλουν ὁμολογεῖν, ὃν γὰρ χρητος οὐ καρπον ὅ ὁμοφαφτος λίγων κρείσας, ὅ τε διοικομένα λατρεύον ἐνοποιούσι διός, ἡ γάρ ἀπατητικήν αὐτόν. That in many things they philosophized after the Greekish manner, as when they affirm, that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it. The Latins also fully agreed with the Greeks in this: for though Seneca somewhere a propounds this question, Utrum extrinficus operi suo circumfusus sit Deus, an iotti inditius? Whether God be only extrinsically circumfused about his work, the world, or inwardly infinuating do pervade it all? yet himself elsewheres antiquates it, when he calls God, Diviniz Spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, equali intentione diffusum: A divine spirit, diffused through all things, whether smallest or greatest, with equal intention. God, in Quintilian's 4 theology, is spiritus omnibus partibus immittus; and Ille ficut per omnes verum naturae partes spiritus, a spirit which infinuates itself into, and is mingled with all the parts of the world, and that spirit, which is diffused through all the parts of nature. Apuleius, likewise affirneth, Deum omnia permeare, That God doth permeate all things; and that Nulla res est tam praestantius viribus, quae vidimur Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit; There is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the divine aid or influence. And again, Deus praestantissim, non jam cogitationem sula, sed oculi, & aures, & sensibilitis sublantia comprehendid; That God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things. Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pa- gans, determineth, that Nulla pars elementi fine Deo est, That there is no part of the elements devoid of God. And that the poets fully cloased with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, Jovis omnia plena & the µεσαί ἐν Διὸς πάσαν µιν ἀγαθαί, &c. e. c. All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God; as also from this of Virgil,
Lastly, we shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the World, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be ὑπερ μεμιγμένος, unmingled with any thing; nevertheless Cratyl. p. 413. concluded, οὔτως πάντα κοσμεῖν τα πράγματα εἰς πάντα Ἀαίνα, that he did order and govern all things, passing through and pervading all things; which is the very fame with that doctrine of Christian theologers, τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς πάντα ἀμοιγμὸς δίκαιος, that God permeates and passeth through all things, unmixedly. Which Plato also there, in his Cratylus, plainly making δίκαιον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from δικάω, i. e. passing through all things, and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus his theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus his own) in these words; ὅσοι γὰρ ἔχουσιν τὸ πᾶν ἐναὶ εἰς πολίκες, τὸ μία πολὺ ἀυτὸ ὕπολαμβάνειν τοιοῦτον τῇ ἑνίοι, οἷον ἄλλοι, ἡ χορίν' εἰδε ἐν τῷ παντὸς ἐνιαίο dieβίου, δι οἷα πᾶντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι. ἤναι δὲ τὰ χίον τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἕξει ἃ πᾶντες ἔχουσιν ἢ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ ὄντος ἡμᾶς πᾶντες, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατον τῷ ἐναι ἀνάλλοις, ἢ γαρ ἐν ὄνισθα οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἃ πᾶντες, οἷον ἄλλοι, ἢνοικεῖσθαι οὕτως ἢ ἀλλίπον τοῖς ἕξεις, ἢνοικεῖσθαι οὕτως ἢ ἀλλίπον τοῖς ἐναίοις, τἀτό τὸ ὄνομα ἐκείνην ἀλλίπον δίκαιον, ἔκτισαν ἄλλοι, τὸ τε καὶ δύναμιν προσέλαβον. They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something, which passeth through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtle thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtle, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and must be most swift, that it may use all things, as if they stood still, that so nothing might escape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called δικαιον, quasi διμινθ; the letter Cappa being only taken in for the more bardsome pronunciation. Here we have therefore Heraclitus his description of God, namely this, τὸ λεπτότατον ὣς τὸ τάχιστον, δι οἷα πᾶντες διείναι, δι οἷα πᾶντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι, that most subtle and most swift substance, which permeates and passeth through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made. Now, faith Plato, some of these Heracliticks fly, that this is fire, others that it is heat; but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes, with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all.

Wherefore this being the universally received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicerō's language*, no wonder, if Deus pertinens per naturam cuiusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, &c. if God pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres. in the sea Neptunus, in the air Juno, &c. And this very account does Paulus Orosius (in his historick work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. Austin) give of the.

the original of the Pagan polytheism; Quidam, dum in multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscrato timore, sinumerunt: That some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscriminate fear, feign'd many gods: in which words he intimates, that the Pagans many gods were really but several names of one God, as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, The Pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world) but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitick inscriptio often mentioned, I am all; that was, is, and shall be. And the Trismegistick books insinuating so much everywhere upon this notion, that God is all things (as hath been observed) renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and supposititious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain δόξας Ἐρωτικ, some of the old Theutical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphick verfes themselves running much upon this strain, and the Orphick theology being thus epitomized by Timothus the chronographer; That all things were made by God, and that himself is all things. To this purpose is that of Ἀσκύλου,

Zeux ἐσ' ἐκ θεοῦ, Ζεύς δὲ ἡγ' ἡμῶν, Ζεὺς δ' ὁ παράσιον.
Zeus τοι τὸ πάνια, χά, τι τῶν δ' ὁ ὑπὲρείποιν.

Et terra, & æther, & poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cunæla solus, & aliquid sublimius.

And again,

Ποτὲ μὲν ὄς πῦς θεὸς
Ἀπλασθοῦν όμήν, ποτὲ δ' ὑδάς, ποτὲ δ' γ.ο.φ.α.
Καὶ ψηφιν αὐτος γινελαι παξιμιφερτρ
Ἀνέμω, νεφει τε, καταφαυ, βρουτη, βροχη.

Nunc ut implacabilis
Apparet ignis: nunc tenebris, nunc aquae
Par ille cerni: simulat interdum feram,
Tonitrura, ventos, fulmina, & nubila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins,

Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.

Whereunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher¹, Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, quod non vides, totum. And² Sic solus est omnium, opus

Theology, that God is all things.

Chap. IV.

What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but also within. Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans, who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple Monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing, that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agreeeth the author of the Aescleian Dialogue, when he maketh Unus omnium, and Creator omnium, One all things, and the Creator of all things, to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made, In eo jam tunc erant, unde natus habiturum; They then existed, from whom afterwards they proceeded. So likewise the other Trismegistic books, when they give this account of God's being both all things that are, and all things that are not, τα μεν γὰρ ὄντα ἐμφανίζεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἐκεῖν ἐν λιθῳ, because those things, that are, be both manifested from himself, and those things, that are not, be still contained within himself; or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth κρύπτει, hide them and conceal them in himself. And the Orphick verses gave this same account likewise of God's being all things, Πᾶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, &c. because he first concealed and hid them all within himself, before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light: or because

Ζηως δ' ειν γαστησι σπρα πεσυνι,

before they were produced, they were all contain'd together in the womb of God.

Now this was not only a further ground of that seeming polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonomy of one God, and their perfonating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomenon in their theology, namely, their perfonating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddeses upon them. It was before observed out of Mosebopolus, that the Pagans did in οἴνουλο οἴα τὸν δύαμιν ἔχου, καὶ τὸν ἑπέσταθα τὸτε Σελήνιος μόνος εἰν, call the things in nature, and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name. As for example, they did not only call the god, which presideth over those arts that operate by fire, Hephestus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysus or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the same universally of all the rest. Thus L. 5.[p.236.] Arnobius, in his book against the Pagans, in usu sermonis veftri, Matriem pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua Neptunum, Liberum Patrem pro vino, Cerelem pro pane, Minervam pro fiamine, pro obscuris libidinis Venerem. Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the ef-
ficient cause, and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken also in this sense, Sine Ce-
of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things saludiferously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by beffowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpina, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, &c. and dividing the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it, they call these the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one day, and the other another. We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own, (which Ammianus Marcellinus 1 seems principally to call spiritus elementorum, the spirits of the elements, worshipped by Julian) and upon that account to be so many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the immediate parts of these were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his Cratylus etymologizeth Dionysus from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls the fruits of the earth tv kAei De Leg. p. 788. μέλα, the gifts of Ceres, doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth, that a city ought to be ἄνευ καθηγούς De Leg. 1.6. κυραρχημένην, ἐ λαυνόμενη νὺν δίνον κεχρυμένη ζεί, κολακίζομεν δε υπὸ υδατον τε ιδίου ζύδων καλην κοιτών λαχνίων, ἄγαθον πόμα καὶ μιτρῶν ἀπεργάζομαι θυσίαν τε μεταφέρων, as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corrected by another sober god, (that is, by water) both together make a good and moderate potion. Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents, and affections of things in nature, were by these Pagans commonly personated and deified; as Time, in Sophocles his Electra 2, is a god; Χρόνος γαρ εἰμαρχή θεὸς, for Time is an easy god; and Love, in Plato's Symposium, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn το Ἑρωτικόν τυλικώτατον θυία το τοιαύτα θεῶν, to Love, being such and so great a god. Though the same Plato, in his Philebus, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddefs too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech; το δ' ἐμπιστεύεται, δεῖ προτατέχει, αἰτία χάριν τοῦ ζωῆς καὶ οὐκ εἰς κατ' ἀείθετον, ἀλλὰ πείτι τὸ μεγίστον καὶ οὐκ ὡς ἑπεξεργάζεται ἠ μνημεῖον. My fear, O Protarchus, concerning the names of the gods is extraordinary great: wherfore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing. Wherefore it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sense or other deify or theologize all the parts of the world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused thorough all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by personating the things of nature severally, and

1 Vide Lib. XXI. Cap. I. p. 263.
and bestowing the names of gods and goddeses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two forts of things: first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus Cicero, \textit{Multae aliae naturae deorum ex magnis beneficiis co- rum, non fine causa, & \\ ad Graeciae sapientibus, & ad majoribus nostris, constituta nominataque sunt}: Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them. The reason whereof is thus given by him; \textit{Quia quicquid magnum utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non fine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur}: Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the divine goodness. Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprizing; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent, \textit{Magnorum fluminum capita venerarum: subita & ex abditis vafti amnis eruptio aras habet}: volun- tur aquarum calentium fontes; \& magna quaedam vel opacitas vel immensa altitude facravit. \textit{We adore the rising heads and springs of great rivers: every sudden and plentiful eruption of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.}

Now, this is that, which is properly called the \textit{Physiological Theology of the Pagans}, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the affections of substances. A great part of which \textit{Physiological Theology} was allegorically contained in the poetick fables of the gods. \textit{Eusebius} indeed was of opinion, that those poetick fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous: \textit{tomiath }η τα της παλαις \textit{seellogias, }η μεταβαλλαιτες νοι τωις, χθες η πρωι επιφυτεες, λογικωτεροι τη Φιλοσο- \textit{feon αρχηες, της θυ Φυσικωτερα της τεωη θεων εδωκαν εινηχυσιας, σεμνωτερας ερυθρωνεις \textit{seellogias τους μαδρες προσεπτωνασις, }&c. \textit{Theopneusti οι }εν ομεις οιδε η παιδοιοι, \textit{αμαρτημα παθουμωθες, επι Φυσικας αισθατης η }θεωη της μεθε ρετεκεσιας}: Such was the ancient \textit{theology of the Pagans} (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upholders have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might thereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those poperies of their fore- fathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them, have gone about to cure them thus by physiological interpretations. Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetick mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as \textit{Porphyrius} and others, did excogitate and devife certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; \textit{Origen}, before both him and \textit{Porphyry}, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did \textit{τηι τητων απολογημαιναι ιτ' αλληροις καταφελων, apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories.}

\textit{But}
But long before the times of Christianitie, those first Stoicks, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chryfippus, were famous for the great pains, which they took in allegorizing these poetick fabes of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero thus; Magnam molestiam suscepit & minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deinde Chryfippus, commenititarum fabularum reddere rationem, & vocabulum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profepio confineam, longe alter rem se babere atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui Did appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras Deorum. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chryfippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing which they confessed, that the matter was far otherwise than according to men opinion, in as much as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but the natures of things. From whence it is plain, that, in the poetick theology, the Stoicks took it for granted, that the natures of things were personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philofical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen also gives us a taste of Chryfippus his thus allegorizing, in his interpreting an obscene picture or table of Jupiter and Juno, in Samos; ἐγείρε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐκατο τοὺς συγγράμματας ὁ σεμὼς Φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τῆς σπερματικῆς λόγος τῶν θεῶν ἡ χιλιαραθησία, ἦγει ἐν ἔκατοι, ἓς καλοκόμουν τῶν ὀλίου ὑπὸ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῇ κατὰ τῶν Σάμων γραφή, ἡ Ἅρμα, ἡ ὁ Ἐδώρ ὁ Ζέως. This grave philosopher, in his writings, faith, that matter having received the poetick reaons of God, containeth them within itself for the adornment of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies Matter, and Jupiter God. Upon which occasion that pious father adds, ξὶ διὰ πάντα ὧν ἄρσει, ἦ διὰ τὸς τῶν μάθης ὑπὸ ἄλλος μάθης, ὡς μέχρις αὐτομάτως Ἤθορευς διὰ καλει τὸν ἐπὶ πάντοις, ἀλλὰ καθαρά εὐσέβειας εἰς τὸν ἐγκατεύθυντο ἀνακοεῖτε, ὡς μέχρις αὐτομάτως χαλαρωτεῖ τα Ἑλλη. For the sake of which, and innumerable other such like fables, we will never endure to call the God ever by the name of Jupiter, but, exercizing pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile divine things with impure names. And here we see again, according to Chryfippus his interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real God, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetick god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonies, that many of these poetick fables, according to their first intention, were really nothing else but phyfology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified. Plate himself, though no friend to these poetick fables, plainly intimates as much, in his second De Rep. Σεμωνος, φιλοσοφους, οὐκές ὁμοίως πεποιημεν, ο παραδείγματος εἰς τὴν κόλα, ήτ ἐν ὑπονομίας πεποιημεν, ήτ αἰει ὑπονομον. ο γὰρ νέο, ήν ὁδὸς τε κρίνειν ο, τι τε τοῦν κατ' ο μον. The fightings of the gods, and such other things, as Homer hath feigned concerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonweal, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge, when it is an allegory, and when not. And it appears from Dionysius Halicarnass. that this was the general opinion concerning the Greece fables, that some of them were phyfically, and some tropologically allegorized.

* De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXIV. p. 3089. Tom. IX. Oper.

**Note:** The last line of the text is marked as a footnote, indicating that it is a reference to a specific page and section of a work.
This Physiological Theology

Book I.

Neither ought this physiologically theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in perforating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded with that philosophical theology of Scacvola, Varro and others, (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real) it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humour it was perpetually to perforate things and natures. But the philosophick theology, properly so called, which, according to Varro, was that, de qua multis libris philosophi reliquem satis; as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature, (which therefore were called natural) namely one supreme universal Numan, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his animos esse, other inferior understanding beings his ministers created by him, such as stars and demons, so were all those personated gods, or natures of things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.

St. Austin often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same: as in his 49th epistle; Neque illinc excusant impii sua sacrilega sacra & simulachra, quid elegantiar interpretantur quidque significat: omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam referitur, non ad creatorem, cui uni debetur ser- vitus

2 Afreromice. Lib. I. Verf. 137. 4 Epif. CII. Quafl. III. §. XX. p. 212.
vitus religionis, illa que uno nomine Latria Graeci appellatur. Neither do
the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence,
because they elegantly (and ingenioufly) interpret, what each of those things
signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature; and not to the
Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks
is called Latria. And again in his book de Civ. D. l. 6. c. 8. Atenim ba-
bent i!la physiologicas quasdam (sicent ait!) id est, naturalium rationum inter-
pretationes. Quafi vero nos in bae disputatione physiologiam quaeramus, &
non theologiam; id est, rationem naturae, & non Dei. Quamvis enim qui
verus Deus est, non opinione sed natura sit Deus; non tamen omnis natura
Deus est. But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological
interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we
sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of
God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet
is not every nature God. But certainly the first and chief ground of this
practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or
other) all the things of nature, was no other than, what has been already in-
timated, their supposing God to be not only diffused thoroughly the whole
world, and in all things, but also in a manner all-things; and that there-
fore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the
world.

Wherefore these personated Gods of the Pagans, or those things of na-
ture deified by them, and called gods and goddesses, were for all that by
no means accounted, by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods.
Thus Cotta in Cicero: Cum fruges Cserem, vinum Librem dictimus, ge-
ner nos quidem sermonis utisimus ufisato: sed eodem tam amement esse putas,
p 345.
qui illud, quo vestatur, Deum esse credat? Though it be very common and
familiar language amongst us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacbus, yet who
can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which
be seeds upon? The Pagans really accounted that only for a God, by the
worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit
to themselves, and therefore nothing was truly and properly a God to them,
but what was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato L.10. De Leg.
writes, that the atheistick wits of his time therefore concluded the sun,[p. 665.]
and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth
and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense;
and for this cause, ο宴会 των ανθρωπων προγμάτων Φρονίμεων δυνάμεων, unable to
take notice of any human affairs. And Aristotle \affirmeth concerning the
gods in general, ζην τε πάντα ποιεδούσα ανώτερος, και ιδεων άρχη, &c. That all
men conceived them to live, and consequently to act, since they cannot be supposed
to sleep perpetually as Endymion did. The Pagans universally conceived
the gods to be happy animals; and Aristotle there concludes the happy-
ness of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not
debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans)
of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacbus, and the Earth the

U u u 2

mother
mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

And the reason, why the earth was not really a goddes, is thus given by him:

*Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore senfu.*

Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense. Thus Balbus in Cicero tells us, that the first thing included in the notion or idea of a god is this, *Ut fit animans, That it be animant;* or ended with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: *Quoniam tenuissimus est aether, & semper agitatur & viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque senfu acerrimo esse. Quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, conscientiam est in illis senium incess & intelligentiam: Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse descenda. Because the aether is most subtle, and in continual agitation, that animal, which is begotten in it, must needs be ended with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore since the stars are begotten in the aether, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding; from whence it follows, that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods. And Cotta in the third book affirms, that all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that *multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant, many would not so much as admit them to be animals;* plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, Plutarch, for this very reason, absolutely condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as abfurdi, impious, and atheistical; *Propter quod aer est immutabilis, et animalia, quae in se animatis, et quae ne animatis, quidem esse concedant, many would not so much as admit them to be animals;* plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Hence men in the use of them, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived, how these things should be gods, for nothing, that is inanimate, is a god. And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of Pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by natural being meant inanimate) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagan but what had life, sense, and understanding. Wherefore those perforated gods, that were nothing but the natures of things deified, as such, were but *di commentitii & fictitious, counterfeit and fictitious gods;* or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, *τα Ελλήνων ουκ ανάπλασμα, συμβολαποιεῖσθαι δοκίμα αὐτοῦ τῶν πραγμάτων, sigment of the Greeks (and other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified. Neither can*
can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial considerations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name, and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Aelopian Dialogue, *Cum non potest una quanquam e multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, fiquidem sit unus & omnia, ut necessis sit, aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari.* Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is he rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things: so that either every thing must be called by his name, or be by the name of every thing. With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca feemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God, *Cui nomen omne convenit, He to whom every name belongeth;* and when he further declares thus concerning him, *Qua-cunque voles illi nomina aptabis;* and, *Tot appellaciones ejus profunt effe, quot munera.* You may give him whatsoever names you please, &c. and, *There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his:* and lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer De Mundo is likewise consonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that *God is πᾶς & οὐὸμα, φίλοις δείν πάντως αῖτίς αἵρετος, or, may be denominated from every nature,* because be is the cause of all things. We say therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name God, or God by the name of every thing.

Wherefore these personated and deified things of nature were not themselves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a God) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are, so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans professed, that they did, *τὸν Ἰουλιανὸν ὄρατον μὲν παράγοντα, μηδὲ ὁπερ τὰ βασιλεία τῶν ζωῶν, look upon the heaven (and a world) not slightly and superficially; nor as mere brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but those sensible phantasms, which from the objects obtrude themselves upon them; or else, as the same Julian, in that oration, again more fully expresseth it, τὸν ὄρατον τὰς ὁπερ τὰς ὀποῖς ἂν ὁμιλεῖ, ἢ τοῦ τῶν *P. 286. ἀλλ' ἄλλα ἡ ἄριστη τὰς καλλίστας φύσεις.* Not view and contemplate the heaven and world, with the same eyes that oxen and horses do, but so as from that, which is visible to their outward senses, to discern and discover another invisible nature under it. That is, they professed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to see God in every thing, not only as pervading all things, and diffused thorough all things, but also as being in a manner all things. Wherefore they looked upon the whole world as a sacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity in it; it being, according to their theology, nothing

thing but God himself visibly displayed. And thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the universe, under the name of Pan. As they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupiter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly only (as we now use to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus described in that old Egyptian monument, to be all that was, is, and shall be; so was it before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptians took the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they supposed the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato confound τον μεγατον θεον, and ὃν τὸν κόσμον, the greatest God, and the whole world together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo himself, writing of Moses, could not conceive of his God, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than as, τὸ κυβερνητικὸν ἴμα τονωλας, καὶ Γίων, καὶ Ῥωμασ, καὶ τον κόσιμον, και τὸν τῶν ὀλυν βιον, namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole. By which notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same, which was conceived together with it: of which therefore he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo, writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν ἑραυν ἁμα καταδίω, take the heaven for Jupiter; and also Herodotus before him, that they did κυβερνητικὸν τὸν ἑραυν Δίω καλεῖ, call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter, that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the highest God, but that, though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as for example, in the higher and lower aether, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, &c. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God, who acteth in the waves, and whose wonders are in the deep.

But besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity; and therefore unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodate

commodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Eusebius; ἀσώ-Pr. Ew. l. 3. μᾶτις καὶ ἀφανίς ἐν πάσιν θεῷ Θεῷ, καὶ διὰ πάντων διάκονα, καὶ τοῦτον ἐνίκτως. 13. ἦν τῶν δεδεμένων σεισμοφόροι, That God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable, that men should worship him, by and through those things, that are visible and manifest. Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans in his time, τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ καὶ δόλῳ τοῦ κόσμου Φαμίν De Leg. l. 7, οὕτω ξενίου δὲν, οὕτω πολυσφημοίν, τὸς αὐτὸς ἐπιμόνων ὁ γὰρ εἶδος οἴνου ἵκων f. 821. That as at length, and in the whole world, men should not hastily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do. The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to content themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that, which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professed his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun and moon, and stars. Maximus Difft. 1. Tyrus doth indeed exhort men to ascend up, in the contemplation of God, [P. 12.] above all corporeal things; τίας τοῖς ἐδώ χρησιν, εἴς τιν ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπος σώματι (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταύτα, ήτοι ἑκείνῳ ἐνθέντα ἄκριτα καὶ ψυχικά, ήπρὸς τὸ κάλλιον πνεύματι) ἀλλὰ ή τῶν ἐπικαλομένων ἱλικιών δει, ήρευσθήσας τοῦ ὑφήμου, ἐπὶ τῶν ἄπλον τῶν, &c. The end of your journey (faith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and divine, and the genuine off-spring of that supreme Deity, framed after the best manner, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens, &c. Nevertheless, he closes his discourse thus: εἰ δὲ ἔκαστον πρὸς τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑνωμένου Θεὸν, ἀμφοὶ τού τε ἐγώ ἐν τῷ παρεώλθει ὁμοίως, ἐντεύξας τε ἐνοπλωτά πολλα, πολλα ἑνώπιον ὑπάνα, ὁμόθες ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ ποιήθη λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ τρεξμιέας μονόν Στίς Στίς παίς ήμεῖς ἡ φίλοι, ἀλλὰ ἀλατίοι ἀλεθῶς τούτο μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν αἰ οἰκεῖον φύσεως, &c. But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Boeotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God; but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, &c. Latly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God, (because himself is invisible,) in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthydemos; ὅτι δὲ γάρ άλλως λέγω, εἴ οὖν γὰρ ἄλλων ἔρχεται Χερσόπουλος. Μελημονήν ἔσος δὲ τάς μορφας τῶν Ἡρώων, ἀλλὰ ἐξαιρεῖν σα τὰ ἐγών αὐτῶν ἐν χρόνιοι σεβομαι, mor. 1. 4. ἐν τιμίῳ τοῖς Θεοῖς. That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them. Which he afterward particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole
Accidents and Affections personated, Book I.

whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the sun, moon, and stars were to them, we cannot certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirits of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these Pagans to be animated, (as was before observed concerning Proclus;) and partly also those demons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over the parts of them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα Σέλενιον, all things are full of gods and demons.

XXXIII. But that these physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also meer accidents and affections of substances. As for example, first, the passions of the mind; τα πάντα Σελεμίαν, Σμούνος οικύνεσαν, θα Σελένιος, faith S. Greg. Nezianzen, They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods, or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis;

"Ελπὶς έν ανδρόπονοι μόνη Σελένη ἤθικα οἰκύνεσιν,
"Αλλοι δ' ὀλυμπισθί οικυλιτίστε ινειν;

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Numen, that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsaken those mansions and the world;) but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Olitorium, and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or seigned, as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand. Thus also Love and Desire were gods or goddeses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, &c. Which Victory was, together with Virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods by Plautus in the prologue of his Amphitryon; and not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavoured the restauration thereof, in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things writing thus concerning it, Nemo calendam neget, quam profittetur optandum; Let no man deny that of right to be worshipped, which be acknowledged to be wifhed for, and to be desirable. Besides all which, Echo was a goddeess to these pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock) and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of things,

1 Orat. XXXIV. Tom. I. Oper. p. 546.
2 In Sententias, Verf. 1131, 1132. p. 115.
3 Vide Vellium. de Idololatra. Lib. VIII.
4 Epiftolar. Lib. IX. Epift. LXI. p. 441.
and deified by the Pagans.

things, of which Vossius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book de Theologia Gentili. And this perfirating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostome hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar Athenians to have been a better forth of strange gods, when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection, because they suppos'd him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Analogias, or resurrection, a goddess too. Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious. Of the former Pliny H. N. l. 2. thus; Inferi quoque in genera descripturum, morbique, & multae etiam pestes, &c. dum est placas trepidi metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publicè febri sanum in palatio dedicatum est, Orbonæ ad edem larium ara, & male fortuna Exquiriliis. So great is the number of these gods, that even bell, or the state of death itself; diseases and many plagues are numbered amongst them, whether with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publickly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars elsewhere erected to Orbona, and to evil fortune. Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero; Qui ex genere Cupidinis & Voluptatis, & Lubentina Veneris, vocabula confecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum & non naturalium. Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious, and not natural, consecrated and deified. Cicero, in his book of laws, informs us, that at Athens Oper.] there were temples dedicated also to contumely and impudence, but withal giving us this censure of such practices, Qui omnia eajusmodi obstrenda & Gruter's Edition repudianda sunt. All which kind of things are to be detested and rejected, and nothing to be deified, but what is virtuous or good. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that such evil things as these were consecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nake

mended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply; ἐφιλείον ἡλίου ως καθο οὐτά ὑμετέρησα, &c. Ἀθηναίοι μὲν οὖν ἄρα τὰ σώματα, ἐμφατικῶς οἱ ἐλεήμονες ἀπὸ τοις ἐν ὑπονοίαις, τῆς ἄμειλης ὑπονοίας, ἄπυκνοις ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεννηθῆναι νεφέλαις, ἐκ παντοκράτοις, &c. We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, &c. but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously deified by the Greeks, (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and allegorical sense, or without it) when they say that she was begotten out of Jupiter's brain all armed. And again afterwards, ἢν ἐν ἀποσπάσαι ἢ λέγοι τὰς ἰχθὺν ἐναὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων. If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant prudence, &c. Wherefore, not μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μόνον μό

Lib. II. Cap. XI. p. 3354. Tom. IX. Oper.
only according to the poetical, but also to the political, and civil theology of
the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances,
perfonated, were made so many gods and goddeffes; Cicero himself in his
book of laws approving of such political gods as these: Bene vero, quod mens,
piefas, virtus, fides, confecratur manu; quorum omnium Romae dedicata pub-
licè tempula funt, ut illa, qui babeant (babent autem omnes boni) deos ipfos in
animis suis collocatos putent. It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are
confecrated, (all which have their temples publiflicly dedicated at Rome) that
so they, who possess these things, (as all good men do) may think, that they have
the gods themselves placed in their minds. And himfelf makes a law for
them in his own commonwealh, but with a cautionary provifion, that no
evil and vicious things be confehrated amongst them: Ab fcilicet, propter qua
datur homini adfensus in calum, mementem, virtutem, pietatem, fideum, earumque
laudum delubra funto. Nec uilla vitiorum solemnia obvinta. Let them also
worship these things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be
fringes or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be perform-
ed to vicious things.

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans,
which was called by Varro natural, (whereby is meant not that which
was phyfiological only, but that which is true and real) and by Scævola
philofophical; and which is by both oppofed, not only to the poetical
and fabulous, but also to the political and civil. I fay, according to this
theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no
means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were fo
far from having any life and fenfe in them, that they had not fo much as
vptos ap, ἢ &C, any real fubfidence or fubstantial effence of their own.
And thus does Origen dispute againft Minerva's godhip, as tropologically
interpreted to prudence, ἵνα δὲ τροπολογηται ἥ γνήσιον θεον εἶναι η Ἁθηνα, παραγγελτη tis auktis των ὑπός ς καὶ των θεῶν, ἢ ψευδομαίς κατὰ των τροπολογίων
tauτων. If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the
Pagans show what fubstantial effence it hath, or that it really subsists ac-
cording to this tropology. Which is all one, as if he should have faid,
let the Pagans then fhew, how this can be a god or goddeff, which hath
not fo much as any fubstantial effence, nor subsists by itself, but is a
meer accidental effence of substances only. And the fame thing is like-
wife urged by Origen, concerning other fuch kind of gods of theirs,
as Memory the mother of the mufes, and the Graces all naked, in his
first book; where Celsus contended for a multiplicity of gods againft the
Jews; that these things having not ὑπός ς καὶ θεῶν, any fubstantial effence
or fubfidence, could not poftibly be accounted gods, and therefore
were nothing else, but 'Ελληνων ἅνωπλάσμαλα συμματοποιητα ἅπε των περι-
μάτων, mere figments of the Greeks, ibings made to have human bodies, and fo
perfoned and deified. And we think, there cannot be a truer commentary
upon this paflage of Origen's, than these following verses of Prudentius, in
his second book againft Symmachus:

Define.
Chap. IV. but several Names of God.

Define, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem
Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris:

Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members. Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was, (whose altar Symmachus there contended for the reformation of) are by Prudentius called res incorporea, incorporeal things, accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that ποιητές were αὐτόματα, qualities incorporeal. Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensible herc0; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero doth for this reason utterly banish and expelode these gods out of the philosophick and true theology: Num censès figitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hae refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, bonorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, ceteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim babere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobis met insunt ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandi nobis sunt, ut bonos, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum fit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero. Is there any need, think you, of any great subtilty to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind, hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory, (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things) and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them, cannot possibly be understood. And again, afterwards he affirmeth, Eas, qui dix appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum, that those, who, in the allegorical mythology of the Pagans, are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods.

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that vis or force, which Cicero tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwise understand those following words of Balbus in Cicero, Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut fine Deo regi N. D. l. z. non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit: Of which things because the force [Cap.xxiii. is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods; that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified, by calling of them gods. And Pliny, though no very divine person, yet Nat. ii. l. 2. being ingenious, easily understood this to be the meaning of it; Fragilis & laboriositatem in partes ipsa digestit, insomnata fave membris, ut por-
The Pagans breaking and crumbling

Book I.

tionibus quisque coleret, quo maximè indigeret; frail and toilsome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity; that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of. Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple being, unixed with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perftringeth in his second book against Symmachus:

Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,
Que simulæ parere metis virtutibus, ut me
Per varias partes minus, cui nulla recidi
Pars aut forma potest, quia sum substantia simplex,
Nec pars esse queo.

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus the Pagan, who determined, that it was one thing, that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such like other things, worshipped as gods and goddesses, did by these, and all those other Pagan gods before mentioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme Deity, according to its several virtues or powers: so that when he sacrificed to victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple Deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial considerations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods; which Isis notwithstanding, is that true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophick theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, victory, virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, &c. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus hims elf seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his Amphitryo in these words:

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragædiis
Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare que bona
Vobis fecissent? Quis benefactis meus pater,
Deum regnator, architec tus omnibus.

Whereas there was before cited a passage out of G. I. Vossius his book de Theolog. Gent. which we could not understand other wise than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-existent; we now think our selves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met
met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects
the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this
manner; that the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so
many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor
indeed eternal neither, but created by one supreme Mind or God, and ap-
pointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things
of nature, as his ministers. Which same thing he affirmeth also of thofe
defiled accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so
many substantial minds or spirits created, presiding over thofe several things,
or dispensing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book,
(where he speaks concerning thofe affections and accidents defied by the Pa-
gans) are as followeth: Huicmodi deorum propé immensa est copia. Ac in
civilis quidem theologia considerari solent, tanquam mentes quaedam, hoc hono-
riris à summo Deo fortitae, ut affectionibus iis praecipit. Nempe crediderunt
Deum, quem optimum max. vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quod pafló, ut
dicebant, plurimum beatitudinis ejus decederet, fed, in flar regis, plurimos ba-
bere ministros & miniftras, quorum singulos huic illive curae praecipit. Sic
jusficia, quae & Afræa & Themis, præfella erat aSibus candis, in quibus
jusficia attenderetur; Comus curare creditus eft comminutione; & sic in ca-
teris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affeïtione fortefiis, cujus cura cuixc commiiffa
crediteretur. Quo paflé fi considerentur, non aliter different a spiritibus fve
angelis bonis malitque, quam quod bi reverâ à Deo conditi fint; ille verò men-
tes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sunt figmentum mentis humanae, pro numero
affectionum, in quibus vis effe major videretur, comminificentis mentes affectioni-
bus singulis præfella. Facile autem sacerdotes suas commenta persuadere simplicioribus potuerunt, quia satis videretur verifimile, summæ illi menti, deorum
omnia regi, innumeris servire mentes, ut eò perfeélter fuit fimmi dei beati-
tudo, minusque curis implicitur; inque tot famulantium numero, fimmi numi-
nis majeftas magis elucet. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologia civilis. Of
fuch gods as thofe there was an innumerable company amongst the Pagans. And
in their civil theology they were wont to be considered, as certain minds (or
spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things;
they stipulating, that God, whom they called the best, and the greatest, did not
immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a deftruction
to him, and a bindance of his happiness; but that he bad, as a king, many be
and fe-minifters under him, which bad their several offices affigned to them.
Thus justice, which was called also Afræa and Themis, was by them thought
to preside over all thofe affions, in which justice was concerned; and Comus
over all revellings; and the like. Which gods, if considered after this manner,
will no otherwife differ from angels good and bad, than only in this, that
thofe latter arc beings really created by God, but the former the figments of
men only; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater
force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of
them. And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion
by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind,
who is the king of all the gods, should have many other minds as his subferrient
minifters under him, both to free him from follicitous care, and also to add to his
grandeur
grandeur and majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology. Where, though "Vesus" speak particularly of that kind of pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified, (which no man in his wits could possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar pagans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of substances; yet does he plainly imply the same of all those other political gods of thee pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them, as so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and having their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and "Vesus" are now well agreed, viz. that the ancient pagans ascribed no such thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that "Aeolus" was probably taken by Epicurus in Arrianus, (not indeed for one, but) for many created ministers of the supreme God, or deities collectively, appointed by him to preside over the minds, in all the several parts of the world. And the pagans in St. Austin seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after the same manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or deities, (one or more) that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dis pense the same. Quoniam scibant majores nostri nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniabant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab his sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde fientes; scit a bello Bellonam nuncupaverunt, non Bellum; scit a cunicis Cuninam, non Cunam; scit a segetibus Segetiam, non Segetam; scit a ponis Pomonom, non Pomum; scit a bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut ceriè nulla vocabuli declinatia scit res ipse nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, que dat pecuniam, non omnino pecuniam dea ipsa putata: Ita virtus, que dat virtutem, honor qui bonorem, concordia que concordiam, victoria que victoriam dat. Ita, inquitum, cum felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa que datur, sed numen illud attenditur, à quo felicitas datur. Because our forefathers knew well, that these things do not happen to any, without the special gift and favour of some god; therefore were those gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the God, that bestowed war, was called not Bellum, but Bellona; the God, which bestowed over infants cradles, not Cuna, but Cunina; that which giveth corn, Segetia; and that which affordeth apples, Pomona, &c. But at other times, this was done without any declension of the word at all, they calling both the things, and the god, which is the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only signify money, but also the goddess, which giveth money; Virtus, the goddess, which giveth virtue; Honor, the god, that bestoweth honour; Concordia, the goddess, that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess, which bestoweth victory. So also
CHAP. IV. the Ministers of one Supreme.

also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing, which is given, but that divine power, from whence it is given. Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or daemons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispense the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Voctus, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans, that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created spirit, appointed to bestow victory, to whosoever at any time enjoy'd it, in all parts of the world; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispense justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all those other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, &c.

And Laëntius Firmianus, taking notice of that profecion of the Pagans, De Fals. Rel. c. 7. [Init. Dis. vin. Lib. I. Chap. IV. p. 51.] to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subfervient ministers, generated or created by him, (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, Gennisse regni sui ministros deum; That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him, which were called by them also gods) plainly denies all the Pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply; Verum bi neque dixi sunt, neque deos se vocari, aut colui volunt, &c. Nec tamen illi sunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum & exiguis & certus est numerus. But these ministers of the divine kingdom, or subfervient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as such, &c. Nor indeed are they those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number. That is, the Pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, faith he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and sixty, but innumerable, stars and daemons.

Moreover, Aristotle, in his book against Zeno, (supposing the idea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the most perfect being) objecteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries, (that is, the civil theology) there seems to be no one absolutely powerful being, but one God is supposed to be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: eitpe αυξα επικρατισιν του θεου λαμβανει τον δυνατατατου και βελτιστου λειψιν, και δοκει τατι χατα του νουων, αλλα παλαι κεφαλιν εισαι αλλα μων οι δοκου εκ τω δοκου εις την κατα τη ευς την υμελογιαν. Whereas Zeno takes it for granted, that
that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one the most excellent and most powerful being of all; this doth not seem to be according to law, (that is, the civil theology) for there the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively as to several things; and therefore Zeno took not this content of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seemeth. From which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon as the subservient ministers of one supreme God; and yet they generally acknowledging, (as Aristotle himself confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many independent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubtless would reply, that these their political gods were but one and the same supreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: that is, receiving several denominations, according to several notions of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved already to have been the general sense of the chief Pagan doctors; that these many political and popular gods were but the polyonymy of one natural God, that is, either partial considerations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifestations in the world, severally perfonated and deified.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess also; that according to the natural theology, the many Pagan gods were but so many several denominations of one God; though this learned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of this natural theology too much, and improperly call the God thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it such a nature, as was ended with sense and understanding. His words are these; Dispar vero sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non alid numen agnoceabant, quam naturam rerum, etque omnia gentium numina referebant, &c. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sicut natura effet occupata circa banc vel illam affectiorem, ita numina nominque deorum variare. Cum igiur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid eriderent; et eam devenire, ut immamen deorum deorumque fingenere caturvam. Sagaciores interim b.e. cuneta, unum effe numen atiebant; putat rerum naturam, qua licet una foret, pro variis tamens effectis varia sortiretur nomina, vario etiam afferetur cultu. But the same is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other God, but the nature of things, and referred all the Pagan gods to that. For they conceived, that as nature was occupied about several ightings, so were the divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And where-ever they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceive something divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an innumerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the mean time affirmed all these to be but one and the same God; to suit the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners. Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from physicks, or natural philosophy only; whereas we have already shewed, that the natural theology
logy of Varro and Scavola, was of equal extent with the philosophick; whose
only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth
sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us: as also that
it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion,
fancty and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the
world. Thus does St. Austin distinguish betwixt natura deorum, the true na-
ture of the gods, and hominum institut, the institutes of men concerning them. [p. 16.Tom.
VII]
As also he sets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, ac-
cording to the mind of Varro, in this manner: Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum vid.
falsas opiniones ea colantur & credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum
natura fit nusquam: It may come to pafs, that those things may be worshipped
and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real
existence any where, either in the world, or without it. Wherefore, if instead
of this nature of things, which was properly the god of none but only of such
atheifick philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind
or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused
thorough all, (which was the true God of the Pagan Theifts;) this of Vossius
will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, accord-
ing to them, those many poetical and political gods before mentioned were
but one and the same natural or real god; who, in respect of his different
virtues, powers and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped
after different manners; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to thofe
Theologers, there were really also many other inferior miniflers of this one
supreme God, (whether called minds or daemons,) that were supposed to
be the subfervient executioners of all thofe several powers of his. And ac-
cordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans natural
theology set down out of Prudentius 1:

Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis infruêta minifris.

viz. That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who dis-
playeth and exerciseth his manifold virtues and powers in the world, (all severally
perfonated and deified in the poetick and civil theologies) together with the
subfervient miniftry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or de-
mons, called also by them gods.

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown
Platonick Pagans did reduce thofe many poetical and political gods, and
therefore doubtles all the perforated and deified things of nature too, to the
Platonick ideas, or firft paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal
world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity,
thafs, is, from the first hypotafis of the Platonick trinity; and which were
commonly called by them vorroi oôi, intelligible gods, as if they had been in-
deed so many distinct substances and persons. And, as we have also proved
out of Philo, that this high-flown Paganick theology was ancientser than
Either

1 In Apotheosi, verf. 191.
either Julian or Apuleius; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian Theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than a symbols of those eternal Ideas; &c. Origen ge ἡμῶς τῶν μὲν Ἀρμοτίων κατοργικάν, ὄντα ἐπάνω ἁείων, &c. (οὐ δεικόν οἱ πολλοὶ) ζῶν ἐφημερίων τιμαὶ εἰς τὰ τοιοῦτα διδάσκομεν. Celsus also addeth, that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion, for as much as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas. According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however supposed to have been generated from that first divine hypothalfs of the Platonick and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them, all to exist in one divine intellect, according to that of Plotinus, οὐκ ἐδύτο γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ νοεῖν, That the intelligibles exist not whereof of themselves, without Mind or Intellecf; which Mind or Intellect being the second divine hypothalfs, these intelligible and invisible gods, (however generated from God) yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to co-exist with God, and to in-exist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of Julian’s in his sixth oration, πάλιν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῷ ἑκοῖ τῶν ὁποίων ὑπο- τοι τὰς αἰτίας οἵτινες ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑποδοτοῖς ἔτι εἰς ἐπικοφάνεια, ὡς ἐν τοῖς μετάταται ἐντοί, καὶ ἐν τοῖς εἰσορ ἐν τὰς ἀειμενίας, For God is all things, so far as he containeth within himself, the causes of all things, that any way are; whether of immortal things immortal; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible but eternal also, and always remaining; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production. Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the divine Ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonick and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of Gods to the divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the supreme God, (though dependent on him too) but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in Op. i. Cels. p. Origen, that, as the Egyptian Theologers called their religious animals, symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. Τὰ τῶν Ἄρμοτίων σπειρογονίων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ Φασκαλίων εἰς τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ σύμβουλοι. Celsus applauds the Egyptian Theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God.

And now we have given some account of the Polyonymy of the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper, personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several Gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different

different notions and partial considerations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. \( Janus, \) as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet, \( Septimius Apber, \) accordingly thus invoked 1:

\[ \text{O cate rerum Sator! O PRINCIPIUM DEORUM!} \]

Stridula cui limina, cui cardinets tumultus,

Cui referata magis autera clausra mundi:

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and principle, from which all forms and lives issue forth, and into which they again retire; being there laid up as in their secret storehouse; or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaick writers expresseth it, that which doth \( ταύτα ποιεῖ \) εἰς \( ίιον \) \( ἀποτειλεῖ, \) make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again; this Hetturian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by \( Jamblichus \), \( δ \) το \( Α\breve{π}χων \) τῶν \( κεφαλάν \) \( λέγων \) \( δύσκαιν \) \( εἰς \) \( Φα\breve{ν}ς \) \( ἄγων, \) be that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light. God was also called Athana or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing it self through all things: and Aprodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus his supreme God, (so called according to \( Lastantius \), \( θύα \) \( εἰς \) \( αძκα \) \( νιβιτ \) \( έπί \), \( πρώις \) \( εἰς \) \( ιν \) \( \text{infinite} \) \( \text{apparuerit} \), because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss; but according to Proclus, because he did \( ξεραίν \) \( τος \) \( νοτή \) \( ἴνδας, \) discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself; though we think the conjecture of \( Arbanius Kircherus \) to be more probable than others, that \( Phanes \) was an Egyptian name;) this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphick and Egyptian theology, as \( Proclus \) upon Plato's \( Timeus \) informs us, fitied \( αδρος ιος, \) tender and soft Love. And Pherecydes Syrus likewise affirmed, \( εις \) \( έρωτα \) \( μεταξύ έλλυ \) \( των \) \( Διώκλοιτων \) \( θημερετω \), that Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world. Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us; as for example, \( Summanus \) amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obsolete: of which St. \( A\breve{u}t\breve{t}in \) thus; \( \text{Romani \ H. C. D. l. 4. c.} \)

\[ \text{teres neceo quem Summanum, cui noxurna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi templum insignie ac sublime constructum est, propter ades dignitatem, sic ad eum multitudo confluixit, ut vox inventiatur, qui Summani nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit. The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they called Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thither; in so much that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings.} \]

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called \( special \); so were these but several names of that supreme God also, according to

\[ Y y y 2 \]

\[ \text{particular} \]

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1 Apud Terentium Maurum de Literis, \( \text{Ex. inter Grammaticos veteres à Puthchio editos,} \) p. 2296.
2 De Mytleriis \( \text{Egyptior. Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 159.} \)
3 \( \text{Institut. Divin. Lib. I. cap. V. p. 31.} \)
4 \( \text{In OEdipo \( \text{Egyptico,} \) p. 498.} \)
5 Apud Proclus in Comment. in \( \text{Timeum Lib. III. p. 156.} \)
All these Pagan Gods.

Book I.

particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, tho' they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all thing, to be himself in a manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin's Uneque adeone, iniquium, majores nostros insipientes fuiffe credendum est, ut hec necefirent munera divina esse, non deos? Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so jottish, as not to know, that these things are but divine gifts, and not gods themselves? And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature, was only to signify, that they acknowledged the force of all things to be divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made itself visible, accordingly they declare in that place of Eusebius before cited in part; μὴ τὰ ὑπόμονα σώματα ἐν τοῖς ἑξίλιας ἐγέρα, μὴδέν τα ἀκακτα μή τὰ ἐν κόσμῳ ὅπηκε ἡ ἡθοποίει, ἄλλα τὰς τινὰς ἀφρονίς ἀνωμάλεσ, αὐτὰ δὴ τὰ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐρα ῥηθεὶ διὰ θεὸν, πανόμοια δυνάμεις, τὰ παντα πληγαν, καὶ διὰ πάνων δικαίων, ἡτοί τὰ πᾶσιν ἐπισατέων ἀρχαλλών δὲ ἐγέρα τὰς ἐν πάσης ὀλίγας, καὶ διὰ πάνων ὄλευθρα, τὰ τούτων ἐπισκόπως δίκ των δυνάμεων τί- 
είν. That they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passeth through all things, so far from, as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things.

St. John, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious or phantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these; εἴ γὰρ δὲ τὰς παρὰ ποιήσας λεγομένας ἔριξ, ἐν ἡμῖν θεὸς ἃ λόγῳ ἐνδείξε, καὶ τὰς τοῖς ὁλοκλήροις ἑπισκόπως ἀκαλλωμένως, &c. Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the Pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confused the whole Pagan idolatrie, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing

now but the true piety left; be, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the Lord of nature, and the maker of all substances. From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the Pagan poetick gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they could be no other, than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or several names of him. So that Athanasius his poetick Gods, or οἱ ποιηταὶ μεταφορικῶς ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ, Gods fabulously deified by the poets, were chiefly those two kinds of Pagan gods, first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and secondly his particular powers diffused thorough the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and phancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves in Athanasius acknowledge: οὗτος γὰρ ὁ Θεός, Παγανοί, καὶ τὰ ὄνομα τὰ παλαιότερα καὶ ἤδη θεῖα, οὐ μὴν ὁ Ζεύς, οὐδὲ Ἰπποστάσις, οὐδὲ Ἰνδος, οὐδὲ Ερμής, οὐδὲ Ἀφροδίτη, πλὴν ὀλίγα ἢ πολλὰ πάντων τῶν ἐκατοντάκου, They say, that the names of those gods are meerly fictitious, and that there does no where really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors. Notwithstanding which, that third sort of Pagan gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetick gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet is their personation and deification meer fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from this theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially he himself invisible; yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons and gods, was nothing but poetick fiction and phantastry, accordingly as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.

XXXIV. Hitherto have we declared the sense of the Pagans in general; those also being included, who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parceling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various manifestations of its power and providence in the world: by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this, because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayeth himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by groser vapours, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polyedrous glafs, by reason of those many superficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator; so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas ποιηταὶ μεταφορικῶς with
those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with **πολυνωμον**, that which hath
many names, all one with that which hath many powers: according to this of
Callimachus' concerning Diana,

\[
\text{Δὲς μὲν παρθενὴν αἰώνιν, ἀπὰ, Φυλάσσειν,}
\text{Καὶ Πολυνωμίν.}
\]

And this of Virgil concerning *Alesto*,

______________

**Tibi nomina mille,**

**Mille nocendi artes.**

And accordingly the many Pagan gods are, in *Plato's Cratylus*, interpreted as
the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the Pagan
theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state
and grandeur of the suprême God, for him to be considered diffusively, and
called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (poly-
phony being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted
and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the Maker
or Creator of the whole world. The second thing, in which the Pagans ag-
greed, is their perfonating and deifying also the parts of the world, and
things of nature themselves, and so making them so many gods and goddes-
tes too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this;
that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all
things, and therefore himself is in a manner all things, ought to be worship-
ped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as also that the force
of every thing was divine, and that in all things, that were beneficial to man-
kind, the divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe, how both those forementioned principles, of God's
pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds
of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on fur-
ther by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the suprême Deity,
than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertain-
ment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because
it was so obvious for those of them, that were religious, to conceive, that as
themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not
without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from
the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies was
from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pa-
gans, as was before observed, suppose God to pervade and pass through all
things **ἀπιγνώσκειν**, unmixedly; these concluded God to be (according to that definition
of him in Quintilian, taken in a rigid sense) *Spiritum omnibus partibus*

*Infusumque Deum cælo, terrisque fretoque,*

**Infusis**

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*Hymn. in Dionam, verf. 5, 6.*  
*Anecd. Lib. VII. verf. 524.*
Infused into the heaven, earth, and seas; Sacroque meatu conspirare Deum, and intimately to conspire with his own work the world, as being almost one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called Nature also, that being thus defined by some of the Stoicks, Deus mundo permifitus; God mingled throughout with the world; and divina Ratio toti mundo infita. The divine, reason infused into the whole world. Which Nature notwithstanding, in way of distinction from the particular natures of things, was called xunh ὕλη, and communis natura, the common nature. And it was plainly declared by them not to be a senseless nature; according to that of Balbus in Cicero, Natura ëβ, que continent mundum omnem, cumque tutetur: atque ea quidem non fine sensu, atque ratione: It is nature, by which the whole world is contained and upheld, but this such a nature, as is not without sense and reason. As it is elsewhere said to be perfect and eternal Reason, the divine Mind and Wisdom containing also under it all the λόγος σημειωτικός, the spermatick principles, by which the things of nature (commonly so called) are effected. Wherefore we see, that such Naturalists as these may well be allowed to be Theists, (Moses himself in Strabo being accounted one of them;) whereas those, that acknowledge no higher principle of the world, than a senseless nature, (whether fortitous, or orderly and methodical,) cannot be accounted any other than absolute Atheists. Moreover, this soul of the world was by such of these Pagans as admitted no incorporeal substance, it self concluded to be a body too, but ἀπλότατος ἡ τάχως, a most subtle and most swift body, as was before observed out of Plato (though endued with perfect mind and understanding, as well as with spermatick reasons) which instilling it self into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole univerfe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling it self with all; Heraclitus and Hippasus thinking this to be fire, and Diogenes Apolloniates air; whom Simplicius, who had read some of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of atheism, which Hippo and Anaximander lie under.

Again, whereas the more sublimated Pagans affirmed the supreme God to be as Simplicius all, so as that he was nevertheless something above all too, he being above the soul of the world; (and probably Æschylus in that forecited passage of his, σάτυρα σαμπ καὶ τοῦ βάθους, σιδηρων, σιδηρων, Jupiter is the air, Jupiter is the earth, Jupiter is the heaven; Jupiter is all; Thus Ante omnia. In Eplets. p. 234. things, and yet something higher than all, or above all:) those Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the soul of the world, made God to be all things in a groffer sense, they supposing the whole corporeal world animated to be also the supreme Deity. For though God, to them, were principally and originally, that eternal unmade soul and mind, which diffuseth it self through all things; yet did they conceive, that as the human soul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal, or man; so this mundane soul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire divine animal, or God;

It is true indeed, that as the human soul doth principally act in some one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the Hegemonicon and Prin-
To these, the Parts of the World, Book I.

Principale, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian 1 ridicules, the place betwixt the eye-brows; so the Stoicks did suppose the great soul or mind of the world, to act principally in some one part thereof, (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon) as the Hegemonicon or Principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less his whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laertius in the life of Zeno 2: 'Tou δι ηανιαν διαισηθαι κατα των αγ προνια, εις ἀπο αὐτω μέροι δινοντος τον ποιή, καθάπερ ήδι ήμών της ψυχής, αλλ' ἐνδια ήδι χω μην μᾶλλον, δι' ήδι μεν γραφο αἱς εἴς εἰκώρηκεν, ως δια των διδονο χω των νεφεων δι' ἄν δι οίς νεφεων, ως δια της εἰκώρηκεν. Αὕτω δι ήδι του ὀλου κοσμου ζωον υπα τοια ἠμών χω λογικος, έχων διαισηθαι μεν τοι αἰτηρια, ποιή του γραφο, ποιή τοι πληθον κατ ζών λαθήσαται αἰ- διπτικων ᾅπερ εἰκώρηκενοι, δια των οι ηναι, και δια του οι ζωον αναπετευν και Φυτων, δια δι της γης αὐτως καθ' έπω. The Stoicks affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit, (as through the bones and nerves) but through others as mind or understanding, (as through which is called the Hegemonicon or Principale.) So the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its Hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Poffidonius the air, to Cleanses the fire, &c. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth it self, only as a habit. Wherefore the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one divine soul, is it self, according to these Stoicks, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius, ᾧ δι του κοσμου περισσον ειδον, The Stoicks call the whole world God; and Origen against Celsus, κατοικει δι του θεου κοσμου λεγειν ειναι Θεον, Στοιχη μεν του πειρων Τοις άναμνει οι Φυται, Στοιχη μεν του πειρων Τοις άναμνει οι Φυται, The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a God, but the Stoicks, the first and chief God. And accordingly Manilius 3:

Qua pateat mundum divino numine verti
Aique ipsum esse Deum:

Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a divine mind, and also it self to be God. As likewise Seneca 4 the philosopher, Totum hoc, quo continentur, & unum est, & Deus est, this whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing, and God. Which is not to be understood of the meer matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as ended with a platfick and fenfeles nature only; but of it as animated by such a soul, as besides senfe was originally ended with perfect understanding; and as deriving all its godship from thence. For thus Varro in St. Aulfin declares both his own, and the Stoical senfe concerning this point, Dicit idem Varro, adhuc de naturali theologica praefogens, Deum se arbitrari esse animam

1 De Animâ, cap. XV. p. 169.
2 Lib. VII. Segm. 138, 139. p. 452.
3 Lib. I. verf. 434, 435.
Now if the whole animated world be the supreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the several parts and members thereof must be the parts and members of God; and this was readily acknowledged by Seneca; Membra jumus corporis magni; We are all members of one great body; and Totum hoc Deus est, facii ejus & membra jumus; This whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions; as if our human souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with that great soul of the universe. And accordingly, the soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans, in these its several members; the chief parts of the world, and the most important things of nature; as it were by piece-meal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods; for then not only every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of grass, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that affront of Celsus; That if the whole were God, then the several parts thereof must needs be gods, or divine L. s. p. 234; too: Quis enim Ieius omoni animatique, alia e, pala, & alio, & vox, meritis sola te cosmu, quos, dixi, totos vo, & Flora: idem meritis te cosmu, & oti potamis, y, a, a, Ylahosis, in, cetera, vo, potamis, y, a, Ylahosis, & eis, eius, alia ubi, uto, Phusis, Ellaxis, tae, oms, in, Sxnu, ejus, svis, sine, omnis, omen, potamis, & Xlahosis, totus in, & Xyis, ejus. Kii, te, christian, Kii, xnu, wisset, & kii, Ellaxis, Iudit, & tii, lati, elon & Xyis, potamis te, meris, tota, in, & eis, ejus, tota in, not, ejus, y, a, y, alia, ejus, & y, alia, ejus, y, & ejus, ejus, & ejus, ejus, & ejus, & ejus, ejus, & ejus, ejus, ejus, ejus. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this; but they would only call these spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods. Wherefore this universal assertion of Celsus is false even according to the Greeks themselves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kind of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals or gods: which they themselves, who assert the world to be God, will not affirm.
Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these, as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worship the soul of the whole world, their supreme deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Austin intimates, when writing against Faustus the Manichean, he prefers even the Pagan gods before the Manichean: Jam vero calum, & terra, & mare, & aer, & sol, & luna, & cetera hydra omnia, h.ee mani-
ifesta oculis apparent, atque ipsi fenibus premito sunt. Quae cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam univer-
sum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, que 
funt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, que omnino non sunt, propinquiores effetis vera
pietati, si saltem Pagani effetis, qui corpora colunt, efti non colenda, tamen ve-
ra. Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars, are things all 
manifest and really present to our senses; which when the Pagans worship as
gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD, (for some of them think 
the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD) they worship things, that 
are; so that you worshipping things, that are not, would be nearer to true piety 
than you are, were you Pagans and worshipped bodies too; which though they 
ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things. But this is fur-
ther insifted upon by the famé St. Austin in his book De C. D. where after 
that large enumeration of the Pagan gods before fet down, he thus convin-
ces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, 
of the one great God, after that manner personated: Hec omnia que dixi, & que-
cunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus sum) bi omnes dii deaque fit u-
nus Jupiter; fve sunt, ut quidam volunt, omnia ipsa partes ejus, fve virtutes ejus, 
ficut eis videtur, quibus eum placet eft mundi animum; que sententia velut magno-
rum, multorumque, doctorum eft. Hec, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale fit, nonum 
interim quaer., quid perderent, si unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio? Quid 
enim ejus contemperetur, cum ipse coleretur? Si autem metuendum fit, ne praeter-
missa fve negligita partes ejus trasseretur; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unus animan-
tis hac tota vita est, que omnes simul continet deos, quasi suas VIRTUTES, vel 
MEMBRA, vel PARTES: sedJam quaque pars habet vim aut ceteris separatu,
fi præter aliem irasce altera patet, & alia placari, alia concitare. 
Si autem dictur omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offendi, si 
PARTES ejus non etiam singillatim minutatimque colorarent, fulté dictur. 
Nulla quippe earum praetermitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui haberet omnia, color-
tur. All these things, which we have now said, and many more, which we 
have not said (for we did not think fit to mention all) all these gods and 
goddesfs, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them 
to be his PARTS, or his POWERS, and VIRTUES, according to the sense 
of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is 
the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what 
it is, we will not now examine. what would these Pagans lose, if in a 
more
more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be depriued, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, lest his parts perverted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of a great animal, which at once contains all the Gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by itself, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry, when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pretermitted, when be, that hath all, is worshipped.

Thus do the Pagans in Athanasius also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing; αὐτὸς πάντων υπερβαίνως μὲν, ἢ καθ’ εαυτὰ λαχραβαίνων, ἐπὶδέ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦνται, ὡμός ἐστὶ πάντα συνάπτοντες, ἢ ως ἐν αποτελεσισὶ μέγα σώμα, τὸ ἄλον Θεόν εἰμι. Φίλιος! But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things; notwithstanding do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body, (enlivened by one soul,) so is the whole of them truly and properly God. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally perverted and defiled, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul, diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world it self, and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods, (much less independent ones,) but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piece-meal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.

The Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mundane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's language, did ὑπερβαίνειν πάντων τὴν αἰώνιν φύσιν, ἢ μὴν αὐτὸς αὐτὰς νομίζειν ἰδεύκαί τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ σώματα ἐπτεῖν αὐτῷ, γινόμεναι ἀλλαγμέναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ σώματα ἐπτεῖν αὐτῷ, τὸν ἅπαντα ἄλον-Cont.Cels. p. 260. 7

2 Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31. Tom. I. Oper.
was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped, as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though much disliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheless approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be ἵνα ἀγαλματα μόνα το ἑσυχ καὶ ἑδος οὐκάματος a moş holy, and moş god-becoming temple. And the ancient Persians or Magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with men's hands, did notwithstanding thus worship God, sub dio, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero testifieth: Nec sequor Mages Persarum, quibus autaribus Xerxes inflammavit templo Graecae diecitur, quod partitibus inclinarent deos, quibus omnia deberebant esse potentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum effet et domicilium: Neither do I adhere to the Persian Magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation this whole world is. And therefore when Diogenes Laertius wroteth thus of these Magi, that they did, τωι ἀναφέρονται πόρον καὶ γνώμην τῶν ἐκ θεων κατωροκότων, make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images; we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature, and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus, and that according to the express testimony of Dino; Dino affirmeth, that the Persian Magi sacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and water to be the only statues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fell into another; whilst they allow not wood and stones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do, nor Ichnemones and Ibieses, as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers. Which difference between the Pagan theologers, that some of them look'd upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Seipio's dream, where the world was called a temple. Bene autem universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, proper illos, qui assumunt, nihil esse aliud Dei, nisi caelum ipsum, et caelestia ipsa quae cernimus. Ideo ut juxta omnipotentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nonquam posse videri, quicumque humana subiectura affectuque templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hoc veneratur ut templum, caelum tamen maximum debeat conditori; sciatque quosquis in ejus templi bujas inducitur, vitam sibi vivendum faceret. The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those, who think God

think God to be nothing else, but the heaven it self, and those heavenly things which we see, (or the whole sensible world animated:) wherefore Cicero, that he might shew the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever felleth under human sight, his temple; that is, that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the maker and creator of them; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or myrr, holy and religiously. And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally Cosmopolites, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other; not that they worshipped the world as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great mind or soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but) the common nature, and the nature of the universe, because it contained under it the spermatick reasons, or plattick principles of the whole world.

Furthermore, these Pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a God; those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second or at least a third God. And thus Origen, saith, ουτως δι' τον θεου κοσμου λεγεσθαι εις Θεον, Στουοι μεν τον Πατην, οι δε αντι Πλατωνιον ταν Διατεσιν, τιναι δε αυτων τον Τειτων. The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a God; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second God; though some of these Platonists call it the third God. Those of the Platonists, who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, look'd upon that whole Platonick trinity of divine hypostases (Τον την τον τον) all but as one first God: but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a greater distinction between those three hypostases, and made so many several gods of them; the first, a monad or simple goodness; the second, mind or intellect; the third, psyche or the univerfal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, exifting likewise from eternity with it. Now this second god, which was the whole animated world as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the son of the first God. That the Egyptians called the animated world the son of God, hath been already proved; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsus, where he pretends, that the Christians called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient Pagans, who had styled the world so: 'Οτεις δι' αυτων τυτο εις ιτεμεν αυτων, Θεου γον καλειν ημας ουδεποται, τω δε του κοσμου, ους ιν τε γενομενοι, παντα τε αυτω εν ιατω ην τον προεινου. Παρα γονομενα ετος τε και flotation ηνα θεον: Where these Christians came to call their Jesus the Son of God, I shall now declare; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made

\[\text{Contra Celsum, Lib. I. p. 235.}\]
made by God, the son of God, and God. Now is there not a goodly similitude (think you) between these two sons of God, theirs and ours? Upon which words of his, Origen writeth thus; οὐκ ἔδει γίνοι Θεὸς ἡμῶν λόγος, τὸ πάντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἡ μόρφωσις τῶν κόσμων, διὸν ἡ θεομορφία, διὸν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἡ ὁμοσπονδία. Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the son of God, from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the son of God, and God. Wherefore these Pagans, who look'd upon the whole animated world only as the second God, and son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by perforating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand, what that was, which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped theanimate parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods; viz. their not perceiving, that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God; the temple, image, and son, of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutions of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged another theology, which was neither fiction, nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philosophick theology of theirs, there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be look'd upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several-powers and manifestations of the world personated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides the philosopher, ἵνα τὸ γὰρ τὸν κόσμον ἀφορμάζει καλύπτων, there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names: and according to that of Antiphon before cited, That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God, viz. as Laelianius adds, Summe totius artifex, The maker of the whole world.

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology, St. Austin telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these, Abist, iniquint, fabularum est ista garrulitas; and again, Rufius, iniquint, ad fabulas redit;
CHAP. IV. to be deceived in their Religion.

Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables, and, You would bring us again to fables. And though they owned another theology besides their civil anio, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so capable of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex Scævola in St. Auflin declareth, Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates, That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it; he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophick theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as for example, Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ectatem, nec definita corporis membra; That the true God hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æclapius, &c. were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with others; and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions, publicly maintained the same doctrine: Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, que vulgo feire non sit utile; multaque, que tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare popularum expediat: & id& Græcos teletas & mysteria taciturnitate pariethibulique clausisse, &c. That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise; and that for this cause, the Greeks en-closed their Teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy. Upon which of Varro St. Auflin thus noteth; His certe totum consilium prodidit sepientium, per quos civitates & populi regerentur: Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of states-men and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcana of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their governors. The same father there adding, That evil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived. Lastly, Strabo also, though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose; η γαρ θηλὴν τι γυμνίαν ή πάντας ή φυλαξίαν πλήθων ἦναρχαίον λόγον. Ὁ πλατών κατούρων, ή προσθεῖναι πρὸς φυσικήν ή φιλοσοφικὴν αὐτὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀνθρώπων, τότε αὐτὴν ένενεμότητα, καὶ τὴν τόπον τῆς ἠλεημοσυνής. It is not possible, that women, and others of the vulgar sort, should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness and faith, merely by philosophick reason and truth; but this must be done by superflition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations. From whence it is plain, that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology besides the natural and philosophical, but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in thefe Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth herein; Synesius himself writing after this manner:  

84. Tom. Vll. Oper.  
XXXV. We have now dispatched the first of those three heads proposed to be insinuated on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many personal names, so that much of their polytheism was but seeming and phantastical, and indeed nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, they making many poetical and political gods of that one natural God; and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, according to that clear acknowledgment of Maximus Madaurensis before cited: *Unius summī Dei virtutes, per mundumnum opus diffuses, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; et dum ejus quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere ovideumur: The virtues of the one supreme God diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, his as it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.* We shall proceed to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and phantastick polytheism, they had another real polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophick theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superiour to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be ἐγνώστα and ἄνωγνωστοι, unmade and self-existent, or independent beings, but all of them (one only excepted) γενετόρις ἰδεις, generated gods, according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not κατὰ χρόνον, yet at least, κατὰ αἰώνα γενετοῖς, though not made in time, yet as produced from a superiour cause. Plutarch propounding this for one amongst his Platonick questions, why ὁ ἄνωτερον θεὸς, the highest and supreme God, was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words

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1 In Encomio Calvitiei, p. 73. Oper. Edit. bricci.
2 In Tim. Cap. XIII. p. 236. Edit. Fa-
words before cited; & τὸν μὲν Θεὸν τῶν γενετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνόμωτων πατὴρ ἦτο (ὡς 'Ομήρῳ ἐπιφράζοντες) ποιήσει δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ αὖθων; that perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods, and of men, (as he is also styled in Homer) but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings. From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the ὁ ἀπωτάτων Θεὸς, the one highest God, being every way ἄγνωστος, unmade and unproduced, was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called γενετωτός. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words: Πλάτων Symposium l. 8. τόν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τῆς κοσμῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενετέρων, τὸν ἀγενετὸν καὶ αὐτῶν Ὁμήρῳ. i. [p. 718.] ἐπιφραζούσι. Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated. And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called αἰθων, or eternal, yet were they likewise γενετωτοί; too, in another sense, that is, produced and derived, by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way ἄγνωστος, and independent upon any other cause. And thus Proclus universally pronounces; Τῷ εἰσὶν Θεῷ, Θεοὶ π. l. θαλάται οἱ Θεοὶ, διὰ τὸν περὶ τὸν ἐγκυνόν οὖν. All the gods were their being gods to the p. 132.] first God; he adding, that he is therefore called παντὸς Θεοτόκος, the fountain of the godhead.

Wherefore the many gods of the intelligent Pagans were derived from one God, and but ἕνεκοι διάφορας, (as Plutarch somewhere calls them) the several deities, or ministers of the one supreme, unmade Deity. Which (as hath been before observed) was frequently called by these Pagans Θεός; God, κατ' ἐξοχήν, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior, or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called Θεοί, the gods. And accordingly the sense of Celsus is thus represented in Origen, Θεοὶ δυναμένοις L. 4. p. 209. εἰςαὶ πάντως ομότως, μόνις σύντον ἔγον ἐκεῖν Θεῶ. That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of God. Moreover, these inferior gods are styled by Ammianus Marcellinus, sub-L. 22. sventiales potestates, substantial powers, probably in way of distinction from those other Pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme God, or his powers severally perforated and defied, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus', (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men) were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Themis: whom (faith he) the antient Theologers feated in cubili & jōlio Jovis, in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter; as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus in Plutarch styles her πάρθηνον τῆς Διός, Vit. Alex. Jupiter's afferor, though that philosopher abused the fable, and grokly de- [p. 596. Tom. proved the meaning of it, as if it signified πάν τῷ πραξίμον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατῆσθαι Σι- μίλοι εἰκώδιος κόλος. That whatsoever is done by the sovereign power, is therefore just and right: whereas the true moral thereof was this, that justice or righteousnefs fits in council with God, and in his mind and will, specifies laws to nature and the whole world. Themis therefore was another name of God, amongst the Pagans, according to his universal consideration, besides those before mentioned: and when Plato, in his

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Themis; the Eternal Law, or God. Book I.

De Dea The-mide, p. 39.

book of laws, would have men to swear by the names of those three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis; these were but so many several partial notions of the one supreme Deity; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as Pigtrius observeth, Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac equitate fanciri debere juramenta. In Jove enim summni numinis poteftatem, falsi ac perjurii vindicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide, jus, fas, atque licium eft intelligitur. Est enim Themis ipsa lex extera atque univerfalis, mundo ac naturae præscripta; or, according to Cicero, Ratio reæ summii Jovis. And Ficinus, in his commentary as to the main agreeith herewith. So that, when the Pagan theologers affirmed the Numen of Themis to prefide over the spirits of the elements, and all thofe other fubtantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this; that there was one supreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the divine Mind, which prefcribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of which things come to pafs in the world, was the fountain, from whence all divination proceeded; as thofe secrets were more or lefs imparted from thence to thofe inferior created spirits. The philosophy of the Pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade felf-exiftent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other fubtantial powers or fpirits, created by it, as the minifters of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetick phancy, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourith to it, to make up their Pagan theology.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different fenfes; one unmade felf-exiftent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus the Pythagorean declaring, that they, who afferted one only God, and not many, underftood not what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency confined in, namely in ruling over gods; and Plotinus conceiving, that the supreme God was moft of all glorified, not by being conftuted into one, but by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him; and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be diftinguifhed; firft, that, according to the Pagan Theifts, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or fubtantial powers, and living understanding natures, fuperior to men, which were neither felf-exiftent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or created from one supreme. Secondly, that forasmuch as thofe were all fuppofed to have some influence, more or lefs, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the Pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the Gods of the oriental Pagans neither meer dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but living understanding beings, fuperior to men, (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chal-

3 Lib. XII. p. 685. Oper.

deans in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his dream, There is none other, that can shew this thing before the king, except those Gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh; that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive, that these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that this was such a thing, as could not be done by those daemons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converse with men, but was referred to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there are multitudes of understanding beings superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament fully agree with the Pagans herein. Thoufand Thoufands ministers unto him, and ten thoufand thoufand thoufand stood before him; and Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels. But the latter of them, that religious worship and invocation doth of right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in these writings, that being a thing peculiarly referred to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Je- remy to be understood, expressed in the Chaldæan tongue, that so the Jews might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into Babylon; Thus shall ye say unto them, the gods, that have not made the heavens and the earth,shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens. That is, there shall come a time, when none shall be religiously worshipped any where upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God, who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, shall then have its complete accomplishment, when the king- doms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ. And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the Pagans and the Chris- trians by Laetantius: Sed forte quaerat aliquis a nobis, quod apud Cicero- nem quaerit Hortensius; Si Deus unus est, quae esse beata solitudo quae? Tan- quam nos, qui unum esse dicimus, defirium ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim minifros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et est istud verum, quod dixiffe Senecam suprâ ve- tuli; genuine regni sui minifros Deum. Verùm bi neque dixit, neque deos se vocari aut colit volunt; quippe, qui nihil præter judicium ac voluntatem Dei faciant. As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary and deferred Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his ministers, whom we call Angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca, that God hath generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; whereas as they only execute the will and command of God. And again afterwards to the same purpose, Si eos multitudine delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerables, & arguimus eorum errores in diversum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen quo nomine appellari debeant; nè Deum verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuant, &c. If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred sixty five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know, by what name they
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they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose name is profaned, when it is given to many. From which passages of Laetantiust it plainly appeared, that the main controvertly between the Christians and the Pagans was then only this, Whether or no, the created ministers of the supreme God might be

called gods, and religiously worshipped. But this Pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians is by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered; namely, from those three hypostases or persons of the trinity; they affirming upon that account, that though Christians did not acknowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did they not therefore make God a solitary and sterile being, before the creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way between Jews and Pagans, they interpreting Moses also his faciamus hominem, to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now shew particularly what these many gods of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the Pagans were divided in their philosophick or natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them thinking, τὸ Θεῖον ἕξισμαλον ἥνω τῆς ὄλης Φύσεως, that the supreme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and the whole world; but others, that he was nothing higher than an anima mundi, or soul of the world. Now the former of these two were chiefly amongst the Greeks, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions amongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπεράνων θεός and the ὑπόαρχον, the super-mundane and the mundane gods; the θεός αἰώνιος and the γεννυτος, the eternal and the generated gods; that word latter being now taken in a narrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in time, or had a beginning of their existence: and lastly, the νοός θεός and the αἰώνιος, the intelligible and the sensible gods. And the ὑπεράνων θεός, αἰώνιος and νοός θεός, supermundane, eternal, and intelligible gods, of these Pythagoreans and Platonists, were first of all, and principally, those ἀρχαί ὑποκύπτειν, (as Plotinus calls them) those three divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles in the univerfe, viz. Ταγαθος or Ηεν, Νους and Πσυχη, or Μονας, Μινδ and Σουλ. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention of Plato's, but much ancier than him, is plainly affirmed by Plotinus in these words; Καὶ εὐκίστε ὁ ὄγος τοῦ νοού τοῦ καϊνού, μη ὃ ἐπὶ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν ἐρμηθείς μη ἀνάλειπταιμένοις, τος ὃς νῦν ὁ

γός εὐκίστε ἐκεῖνων ἰεραχθεὶς μετετυπωμένοις τῆς πάπας τετελέσθαις ταλαιάξ ἐποίη τω δ' Παρμενίδως προτέτειο τῆς τοιαύτης ὕποσ: That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now extant, being but explanations of them) appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insisted on them.

Now it is well known, that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagoric sect, and therefore probable, that this doctrine of a divine trinity was one of the arcanums of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numenius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Mo-
Moderatus (as Simplicius informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principal Pythagorick cabala: ÆTΩ γάρ κατά τάς Πυθαγορικές τοίον τοιούτων ἔργων ἀποφαίνεται: τῷ ἔλεγχε τῷ Διονυσίον, ὅπερ ἐστί τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργων, τα ἐνδών Φανέρων ἐκείνα τῷ σύμφων ἐνυπηρέτων τῷ τόν θεοῦ τῶν ἐνυπηρέτων ὁμοιάζειν τύπως; This (Moderatus) declareth, that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that, which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and that the third, which is physical or soul, partaketh both of the first unity, and of the ideas. Lastly, we have Jamblichus his testimony also in Proclus to the same purpose; τρεις εἰκονεῖς τιτυς κη παρά τοις Πυθαγορείους ὑμομαίειν, That there were three gods also praised by the Pythagoreans. Now we have before shewed, that Pythagoras his philosophy was derived from the Orphick cabala, which Proclus in another place thus fully testifieth: ἄπαντα γάρ ἐν τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ Θεοθεολ. πλείον τις μετατρέπεται ἔλεγχος ἐν τοιοῦτοις ἐπιφανεστηκόντων ὑμοιότητι αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν Πυθαγορείων οὗ ὑμεῖς ἔγειρατες. All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphick Mystagogia; Pythagoras being first instructed by Aglaophemus in the Orphick Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next, who received a perfect knowledge of all these divine things, both out of the Pythagorick and the Orphick writings. And that a Trinity was part of that Orphick cabala, we have already proved out of Amelius, he affirming (in Proclus) that Plato’s three kings were the same with Orpheus his trinity, of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus. Moreover, since all these three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaica) it feemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath been also noted, that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraick mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magick or Chalday oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified, that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the highest of all their gods, and that called by an Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman Capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena amongst the Greeks, was understood to signify the divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as Aristotle informeth us: διὸ παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς φύσεις ἐλπίζειν ὕποταν ὑμεῖς εἰκονομεῖν, κορυφή ταῖς ἀγάλμασις αὐτῶν ὑμῶν χρόνῳ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν. Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications.

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of divine hypotheses should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though

1 Comment. in Timaeum Platon. Lib. II. p. 94.
there be nothing in it (if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason: and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that, which Proclus affirseth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaick Oracles, to be true, that it was at first ἑναραθότος θεολογία, a theology of divine tradition or revelation, or a divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it to be thought any considerable objection to the contrary, because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and other Pagan thelogers, did not express this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanaian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral cabala; but afterwards more fully under Christanitie, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree, in the significations of the word ὁμοουσίως, co-essential or consubstantial. Nor lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondred at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst Pagans and Philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this divine cabala was but little understood by many of those, who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this their trinity, a trinity of gods, τὸν Πατέρα, τὸν Διόνυσον, and τὸν Τριών Θεὸν, the first, the second, and the third god; as the more philosophical amongst them called it also a trinity of causes, and a trinity of principles, and sometimes a trinity of opificers. Thus is this cabala of the trinity styled in Proclus, η τῶν Τριῶν Θεῶν ἑναραθότος, the tradition of the three gods. And accordingly is it said of Numenius by him, that τῆς ἀνομίας Θεῆς, he did προγεγέγραπτος καλεῖν, πάππαν, Ἰησοῦν, ἀπόγονον, having praised the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them, the grandfather, the son, and the nephew; Numenius thereby intimating, that as the second of these gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third, called the nephew of the first, was derived both from him and from the second; from the first as the grandfather, and from the second, as the father of him. Harpocratin likewise, Atticus, and Ameius, are said by Proclus to have entertained this same cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of these stylign them βασιλείας τρεῖς, and πρῳδόν ὑμιμρήσου, three kings, and three opificers, or makers of the whole world. In like manner Platinus, speaking of the second of these three hypostases, (that is, νούς the first mind or intellect) he calls him ἐνετερος...
from a Divine Cabala.

And this nature is God, I say a second God, offering himself to view, before that other God can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit, that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in meek soul neither, but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendid shining before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king. He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of them all: Εὐκότος ὁ λέγεται ὁ κόσμῳ ἐκώλ, ἀλλ' ἐκκοιμημένος. En 2. l. 2. c. ἐστὶν ἢ τῷ πέραν, κείστωσι, τῷ ὅλω τῇ ἐστίν, ἢ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κείστωσι. Wherefore this world may well be called an image, it depending upon that above, (as an image in a glass) which is threesfold. Whereof the first and second God always stand immovable; the third likewise is in self stable too, but accidentally moved, by reason of the mobility of matter and things below it. And that we may here give a taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too, Porphyrius in the life of Plotinus 1 affirms, that both Plotinus and himself had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatick union with the first of these three gods, that which is above mind and understanding: σωλάκωσι οὐκαμοί έκατών εἰς τὸν πέραν ἣ ἐπίκεισθαι Σέον ταῖς ὑπόθεσις, ἤγαμος ἤπειρος ὁ μετέ πορφύρης, μὴ τί εναν τείχον ἢ, ἢ γὰ πρὸ τούτῳ ἠμφορόνος ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔγνων Πορφύριος ἀπέκ实用 λιγότερον ἠμελήσας. Plotinus often endeavouring to raise up his mind to the first and highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who had neither form nor idea, but is placed above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to whom I Porphyrius affirm my self to have been once united in the sixty eighth year of my age. And again afterwards, τόλον αὐτῷ ἦλθεν κατέ- τος ἤ, τὸ ἐναλλάχθη τῇ ἐξεῦρεται τῷ ἐπί πάντας Σέος, ἄν κολάξ ἐπὶ τετράκας ὑπὸ τῆς συνήψεως αὐτῶ τῇ συνήψει τούτῃ. Plotinus his chief aim and scope was, to be united to, and conjoined with the Supreme God, who is above all, which scope he attained unto four several times, whilst my self was with him, by a certain ineffable energy. That is, Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatick union with the Τό τό, and Ταγάθων, the first of the three highest gods, (called the one and the good) as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book 2, where he calls it ἀρχήν, and παρθένον ἐπιστήμης πρέπειν, and τὸ ἐκπον ἠφθηγον, τῷ οὗν πάντων κυρίον συνάπτειν, a kind of fidelial union, and a certain presence better than knowledge, and the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe. Thus we see, that the Platonick trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third most of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the Pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianitie, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the Pagan polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since

1 Cap. XXIII. p. 127. in Fabricii Biblioth. 2 De Bono vel Uno, Ennead. VI. Lib. IX. cap. X. p. 772.
since in the scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this divine cabala of the trinity, though they said or word be said to have been with God, (that is, God the father;) and also it self to be God, (that is, not a creature;) yet is it no where called another, or second God. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this Pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but must call it either a trinity of divine hypostases, or subsistences, or personis, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable, that Philo’s, though, according to his principles, he was a zealous opposer of the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, scruple to call the Θεων ἱερών, the divine Word, after the Platonick way, Δεύτερον Θεόν, a second God; as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, Thou shalt have no other gods before my face; possibly because he conceived, that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second God, the divine θερών or Word, is declared by him to be οίκος, eternal, and therefore, according to the Jewish theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third God is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having any scrupulosity against a plurality of gods, (so long as there was only one fountain of the godhead acknowledged) that they rather accounted it an honour to the supreme God, as hath been already shewed, that he should have many other, not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore, besides this second and third God, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Austin doth upon this account seem somewhat to excuse the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in these words: Libris enim verbis locuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religiosarum aurium pertimescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quae in significatione, impiam gignat opinionem. Nosi autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; sic aut nec duo doce vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quamvis de unoque locuentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quinque Deum esse fateamur. The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things, that are signified by them. That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them several gods, and all of them a trinity of gods, and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this, That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God: yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God or principle, or to call the Holy Trinity a Trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

And Vide Eusebium, Praefar. Evangel. Lib. VII. cap. XIII. p. 325.
Chap. IV. The World, to some the Third God.

And indeed when the Pagans thus spake of a first, second and third God, and no more, though having innumerable other Gods besides, they did, by this language, plainly imply, that these three gods of theirs, were of a very different kind from all the rest of their gods; that is, not Ἱερόν θεονός, but,ἄτα, not created, but eternal and uncreated ones. And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of gods for the Ἱερόν in general, the divine Numen, and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be showed afterward. So that the θεος, the first God, was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the γενόμενοι θεοί, the generated or created gods, or the gods, that were made in time, together with the world; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third god. Which first of the three gods is also frequently by them called θεός, God, emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in these principles.

Neither was this trinity of divine subsistences only thus ill-linguaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of gods; but also the Cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called Προσε, is by some of them made to be ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτάμενος, the immediate soul of the corporeal world, informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies; infomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third god. This Proclus 1 affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean, ὁ γάρ κόσμος καὶ ὅτι ὁ τρίτος ἢ ἦθελ, That the world, according to him, was the third god. And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him ὁ, κόσμος ἢθελ, ὁποτε ἐννοήσας λέγεις, τρίτος, the world, as is commonly said, is the third god.

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timeus Locrus, but also Plato himself calls it Ἱερόν γενόμενος, that is, a created god, the word γενόμενον being here put for that, which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief of all the γενόμενοι θεοί, that is, the creature-gods. Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those gods is the father and fountain of all, or the original of the god-head. And the second, so much as he is called by them, both πανταξιος and δημιουργός, the maker, and the opificer of the whole world, he therefore can be no creature neither:

Bb b b whereas

1 Comment in Timeum Platon. Lib. II. p. 93.
2 This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Plotinus, Ennead. III. Lib. V. cap. VI. p. 296.
whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called, both ποίμα and ὁ δημιουργὸς, the work, or thing made, that is plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus 1 thus fully represents his scene; Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, πατὴρ γὰρ τοῦ δεύτερον, τιμία μὲν τοῦ τρίτου ὁ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δημιουργὸς δίτος, οὖτος γὰρ ὁ δεύτερος Θεός, τὸ δὲ δημιουργὸς ὁ τρίτος. Numenius called the first of the three Gods the father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made; so that, according to Numenius, there were two opificers, or creators of the world, the first and the second God; and the world it self, (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third God.

And that this notion of the Trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other γεννωτοί Θεοί, generated gods, might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore the philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into Θεοί ἄδικοι and γεννωτοί, that is, eternal or uncreated, and created gods; and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favour of this spurious hypothesis of the Trinity, that the world was accounted the third God, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly that third God; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world it self, as ποίμα and δημιουργός, as the work and thing made, to be the third; we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal it self, according to Timæus, and Plato, and others, is affirmed to be γεννωτος Θεος, a generated god, that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotle 2 observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradiction himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be ὤς τοῦ ὄντος, not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven, of which something before. Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient Cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else ζυγὸν ἰχνότομον, an informing soul of the world, to be the third hypothesis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable, that this was the true reason, why Philo, though he admitted the second hypothesis of the Platonick and Pythagoric (if not Egyptian) Trinity, called by him Θεος λόγος, the divine Word, and styled

styled ἀδέρφος θεός, the second God, and, as Eusebius adds, ἀδέρφον αὐτῷ, the second cause; yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third God, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world, as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god, which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans. It is true, that he somewhere sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεόν, that God, who is before the Word, or else rather the Word itself, the second God, (according to him the immediate creator and governor of the same;) nevertheles, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is φυσικῶς ὑπερήφανον, a supermundane soul.

To this first depravation of that τινα ἑπάξιος θεολογία, that theology of divine tradition, and ancient Cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their Trinity to be the archetypal world, or τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ παράλοιπον κόσμω, as Philo calls it, the world that is compounded and made up of ideas, and containeth in it all those kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and intelligible world are really so many distinct substances, animals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis, not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. These are those gods commonly called by them, νοοτρόποι θεοί, intelligible gods, not as before in way of distinction from the ζητητικόν, the sensible gods (which is a more general notion of the word) but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be inflected on also) called νοοτικοί θεοί, intellectual gods. Proclus upon Plato’s Politia concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this reason, because if there were, ὦ ἐν τῷ καθὸν ἑκάστα θεὸς ἐστι, ἀπειρότης πάσα ιδέα θεοῦ ἐστὶ θεόν, as Hemanus affirmed, that every idea of evil also would itself be a god, because every idea is a god, as Parmenides hath affirmed. Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfluenced with this fantastick conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing thus concerning the second God, the first Mind or Intellect; γενάμενον δέ ἡν τοῦ ὅστα τοῦ καθοῦ γεννημένα, πάντα μὲν τὸν ἰδίῳ κόσμῳ. En 5. l. i. c. 7. λος, πάντας ὁ θεός νοοτίκως, That he being begotten by the first God, (that is, by Platonizing of emanation, and from eternity) generated all entities together with himself, the pulsabritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods. Apuleius alfo (as hath been already noted) grofsly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in those words; ὄντας δὲ Πλάτων ἐκκόσμησαν, ὁμοῦ, ἐνεργολογοῦσαν, ἀναμελώς, sive illo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retrò eviternos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porretho, &c. And he with Julian and others reduce the greater part of the Pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian...
Ideas made Animals and Gods.  B O O K I.

Theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and senisible:

De Mol. Opif. B A O I S (ο Θεός) τῷ ὁμοτῷ τουτον κόσμου ὑμισιντησα, προετύττα τὸν νοητόν, ὅσ
p. 5. [p. 5, 4.] χρόνιμος ασωμάτως, ἵστειν ἀπαράδειγματι, τὸν σωματικόν ἀπεράσομαι, προσβι
τεριον ὑπότου ἀπεικονίσασα, τοσατα περιζευαι αἰώνια γένει, ὅταν ἐνεχείρ νοητα, τοῦ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεσώτα κόσμου ἐν τῷ πάρυ τῳ ὑποτον αἰώναλι: God intending to make a visible world, first formed an intelligible one; that is having an incorporeal and most god-like pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to the same, this younger an image of that older, that should contain as many sensible kinds in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not possible (faith he) to conceive this world of ideas to exist in any place. Nay, according to him, Moses himself philosophized also after the same manner in his Cof-
mpota, describing, in the first five verses of Genesis, the making of an intel-
ligible heaven and earth, before the senisible: πρῶτον ὑπὸ παρα τῇ νοητα κόσμον ὁ
τοιού ἤτοι πρωνον ασωματον ὁ γνα αρολον, ὁ αἰορος ἱδεϊν ὑν κομεν, ἐνθ ἰδεϊστε ἀσωματ
τος ὁ πειραιματι, ὁ ἔτι πάσιν ἐβδομάν Φωτογ, ὁ πάλιν ἀσωματον ἐν χνοτον ἱλιε πα-
ράδειγμα, &c. The Creator first of all made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum; incorporeal water and air; and last of all light, which was also the incorporeal and intelligible paradigm of the sun and 
solars, and that from whence their sensible light is derived. But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere takes notice of those, who admiring the pulchritude of these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-
flown Platonick notion, as it gave fanetuary and protection to the grossest and 
soulest of all the Pagan superstitious and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature, (inanimate 
substances, and mere accidents) under a pretence of worshipping the divine 
ideas in them; so doth it directly tend to absolute impiety, irreligion and 
athemism; there being few, that could entertain any thoughts at all of those 
eternal ideas, and scarcely any, who could thoroughly persuade themselves, 
that these had so much reality in them, as the sensible things of nature; as 
the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in 
it as a material house made up of stones, mortar and timber; so that their 
devotion must needs sink down wholly into those sensible things, and them-
selves naturally at length fall into this atheistic persuasion; That the good 
things of nature are the only deities.

Here therefore have we a multitude of Pagan gods supermundane and 
 eternal, (though all depending upon one supreme) the gods by them

* De Confusione Linguar. p. 345.
them properly called νοστια, intelligible, or the divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another deprivation of the ancient Mofaick Cabala of the trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the divine ideas, as so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; that is, not one God, but a whole world of gods.

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mofaick Cabala of the trinity, (the certain rule whereof is now only the Scriptures of the New Testament) when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their trinity, called Θεον ην ψυχη, the first soul, there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world; so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called Ὀνήματα νοστια, the first mind or intellect, there were innumerable other μηρικοι ουσι, particular minds, or intellects substantial derived, superiour to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypostasis of all, called Το ην, and Ταυραβος, the one, and the good, there were derived like- wise many particular Ευμακες, and Αυμακες, unities and goodnesses substantial, superiour to the first intellect. Thus Proclus in his Theologick Institutions, Μετα δε τον Θεον τον ουσιας, ευμακες αυμακες τον ψυχην ταυραβον, ουσι, και τον ην τον ψυχην, Ουσι, και τον ην τον ψυχην. After the first one, (and from it) there are many particular Henades or unities; after the first Intellect and from it, many particular Noes, minds or intellects; after the first Soul, many particular and derivative souls; and loftly, after the universal Nature, many particular natures, and seminal reasons. Where it may be obiter observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Psyche, or mundane soul, a universal Φυσις, or substantial nature also; but so as that besides it there were other particular λογοι σπερματικοι, seminal reasons, or plaitick principles also.

As for these Noes, and that besides the first universal mind or intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all souls, that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with him; amongst whom Plotinus may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others, ὑμιν ην ηνος και εις ηνος, και εις ψυχας, εις αλλοις δια θεον ειρηναι. That souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely p. 653. [En- proved. Upon which words Ficinus thus; Hie, & suprâ & infrâ seepo, perpendicular, IV. cap. X.]
The Spurious Platonick Trinity.  

Book I.

In Epist. Euth. sides Proclus and others, affected by Simplicius also; ἀφ' εἰσὶν τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῶν ἐποχῶν τάφων, τὰ τε πρῶτα, ἦ τὰ μέσα, ἦ τὰ τέλη άλλα τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἦ ταῦτα τῶν ἐποχῶν, μιᾷ ἀρχαίας πολλάς ἀρχαίας, ἦ μία εἰς ὑπὲρ πάσας, πολλὰς ἀρχαίας ἀναφέρει. The highest good (faith he) produced all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself dost be produce like himself, one goodnes many goodnes, and one unity or benade many benades. And that by these Henades and Autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscious of themselves, appears also from these following words; τὰ μὲν ἐν πρῶτα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρῶτον ἀρχαῖον παραγόμενα, διὰ τοῦ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐκ ἐξέστη τι εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον, αὐτὴν ὃντα ἢ ἀναφέρει, ἦ τι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπὸ μακριστώτης ἰδιμυνα, ἦ τοι ἐν τῷ ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητι εἰσὶ. Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immovable and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indifferent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnes. Where afterward he adds something concerning the vis also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοαγαθότατον, not essentially goodnes, but only by participation; yet, being by their own nature also immovable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word Henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea before mentioned; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now have we discovered more of the Pagans inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz. besides thoe ἄνδροι Ὡτοί, thoes intelligible gods; troops of Henades and Autoagathotetes, unities and goodnes; and also of Noes, immovable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, Ὡτοὶ ἑνικοὶ, and Ὡτοὶ ὅμοιοι, benadical (or monadical) gods, and intellectual gods.

But since these Noes, or ῥαμικὰ Ὡτοί, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superior to that first soul, which is the third hypostasis of this trinity; as all thoes Henades or ἑνικοὶ Ὡτοί, thoes simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the Noes, and therefore superior to the second hypostasis also, the first mind; and yet all these Henades and Nous, however supposed by these philosophers to be eternal, so much as they are particular beings only, and not universal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostasis of this trinity, as well the first mind as the first soul, must be accounted creatures also; because no created being can be superior to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of thoes Platonists, plainly understood this trinity no otherwise, than as a certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe; or a gradual descent of things from the first or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so far as to the souls of all animal.
animals. For which cause, Proclus to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that, their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of Henades or Unities, the second of Noes, Minds or Intellects, the third of Souls, and the last of Natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they supposed one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular, or participated ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular Henades; one first universal Nous, Mind or Intellect, and many secondary and particular Noes or Minds; one first universal Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of beings, they deified, besides the first θεός and Θεόβιον, one, and good, not only the first mind, and the first soul, but also those other particular Henades, and Noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived, that nothing was to be accounted a God, but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some οὐρανοί and some γαλαξίαι, some eternal, and some generated, or made in time; yet did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor show how far in this scale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commissure betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether indiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and confisted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient Cabala of the Trinity.

This is therefore that Platonick Trinity, which we oppose to the Chriftian, not as if Plato's own trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Chriftian; it self in all probability having been at first derived from a Divine or Mofaic Cabala; but because this Cabala, (as might well come to pass in a thing so mysterious and difficult to be conceived) hath been by divers of these Platonifts and Pythagoreans mishunderftood, depraved, and adulterated, into such a trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees, (till multiplying of it, as it goes,) till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further till to the animated parts thereof, stars and demons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else, but to lay a foundation for infinite polytheism, cofmolatry, (or
(or world-idolatry) and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observa-
tible, that these Platonick Pagans were the only publick-and profeffed cham-
pions against Christianitv; for though Cefsus were suspected by Origen to
have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at least profonate a Platonitt too.
The reason whereof might be; not only because the Platonick and Pytha-
gorick fect was the divineft of all the Pagans, and that which approached
nearest to Christianitv and the truth, (however it might by accident there-
fore prove the worst, as the corruption of the beft things,) and by that means
could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianitv
and encounter it; but also because the Platonick principles, as they might
be understood, would, of all other, serve mofl plaufibly to defend the Pagan
polytheifm and idolatry.

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here obferve only three things;
first, that it is not a Trinity of meer names or words, nor a Trinity of par-
tial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing. For
such a kind of Trinity as this might be conceived in that firft Platonick
hypoftatis it felf, called τὸ θεόν καὶ τὸ γενέας, the one and the good, and perhaps
also in that firft perfon of the Christian Trinity; namely of goodnefs, and
underftanding or wisdom. and will or active power, three inadequate con-
ceptions thereof. 'Tis true, that Plotinus was fo high flown, as to main-
tain, that the firft and highest principle of all, by reafon of its perfect unity
and simplicitv, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding,
and therefore does not fo much as vede i̇guv, in a proper fene, understand
it felf: notwithstanding which, this philofopher himfelf adds, that it cannot
therefore be faid to be ignorant nor unwise neither; these fpecifions be-
longing only to fuch a being, as was by nature intellectual, υς μεν ἡρᾶς μη
vομον, δυστοτος; Intellectus, nifi intelligat, demens meritò judicatur. And he feme
to grant, that it hath a certain fimple clarity and brightnefs in it, fuperiour
to that of knowledge; as the body of the fun has a certain brightnefs fuperiour
to that secondary light, which streameth from it; and that it may
be faid to be νόμος αληθινος, knowledge it felf, that does not underftand, as mo-
tion it felf does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by ordinary
malors, that the highest and moft perfect of all beings fhould not fully
comprehend it felf, the extent of its own fecundity and power, and be con-
scious of all that proceedeth from it, though after the moft fimple man-
ner. And therefore this high-flown conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of
Plato himfelf too) has been rejected by latter Platonifts, as phantafical,
and unsafe: for thus Simplicius, ἀλλὰ τὸ ψιλόν τὸ ἕκτον καὶ τὸν ἀκροτάτον, ἐ
δὲ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ πεπραγμένον ἀκροτάτου. But it muft needs have alfo the
moft perfect knowledge, fince it cannot be ignorant of any thing, that is pro-
duced from it felf. And St. Auquin in, in like manner, confutes that affertion
of fome Christians, that the θεός, or eternal Word, was that very wisdom
and understanding, by which the father himfelf was wife; as making it
nothing but an inadequate conception of God. But this opinion, that the
Christian Trinity is but a Trinity of words, or meer logical notions, and in-
adquate conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian
Church.

En 6.1. c. 5.[P. 729.]
En Epift. p. 235.

De Trinit. Lib. VI. cap. II. III. p. 598, 599. Tom. VIII. Oper.
Church in Sabellius and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons.

The second thing, that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity, is this, that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second, nor third, creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made ̀ές ἐν θεῷ, as Arian maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, Erat quando non erant, that once they were not, but their going forth was from eternity, and they were both coepe and coeternal with the father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that, which is both eternal and undestroyable, is ἵψος φαίδο uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the Deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the Holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending the whole world, and all created things under it: which univerality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this Holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, and necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal, or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen, ἐπεικεῳμεν ἐν τον πατικα τῆς αληθείας, κύ τοι ἐν τῷ αληθεία, συνά διό τῇ ὑποτάσει πράγματα, εν δι τῇ ὑμνοία [Liv. VIII.] κύ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ κύ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βαλάντιας: We worship the father of truth, and the son for the truth it self, being two things as to hypostasis; but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will: but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual περιχώρωσις, and ἐνυπαρξία, inexistence and permutation of one another, according to that of our Saviour Christ, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doth the works. We grant indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together, as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three divine hypostases to be one God.
We shall conclude here with confidence, that the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undisputed principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsense and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished, that some Religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradictory to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of design to make men surrender up themselves and consciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity, (as we all must do, if we will be Christians) should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictory, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.

But, for the present, we shall endeavour only to shew, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonick, or Pseudo-Platonick Trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third God, or last hypothesis of their trinity, to be either the world, or else a $\psi\chi\nu\iota\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$, such an immediate soul thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypothesis, so do they debase the Deity therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for cosmo-latry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grossest and most sottish of all idolatries, the worshipping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal, and sensible god.

It is true indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian Writers have supposed, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book Peri Archon, Sicul corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est, & ab una anima continetur, ita & universum mundum, velit animal quoddam immane, opinandum pute; quod quidam ab una anima, virtute Dei ac ratione tenetur. Quod etiam à santon Scripturâ indicari arbitror per illud, quod dicitum est per prophetam; Nonne caelum & terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? & caelum nila sedes, terra autem seabeulum pedum necrum; & quod Salvator, cum ait, Non esse jurandum neque per caelum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia seabeulum pedum ejus. Sed & illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipso vivimus & movemur & sumus. Quamdeno enim in Deo vivimus, & movemur, & sumus, nisi quod in virtute sed universum confinigitis & continet mundum? As our own body is made up
Chap. IV. reasonable; as the Christian.

up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be look’d upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the Scripture in sundry places; as in that of the Prophet, Do not I fill heaven and earth? And again, heaven is my throne and the earth my foot-stool. And in that of our Saviour, Swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God, nor by the earth, because it is his foot-stool. And lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, For in him we live, and move, and have our being. For how can we be said to live and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does confirme and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his foot-stool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth? Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but quasi anima, as it were, the soul of the world: as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be look’d upon, according to Aristotle’s notion thereof, merely as anima sola, an immovable essence; for then it is not conceivable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffected, inlexible, rocky and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, quasi anima mundi, as it were the soul thereof: though St. Cyprian would have this properly to belong to the third hypostasis, or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this notion of a mundane soul, besides something of Paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third divine hypostasis, cannot be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed thereinto, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incomplete alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his; Solius Dei, id est, Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, nature, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, & absque ulla corporae affectione societate, intelligatur subsistere. It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to subsist without any material substance, or body, vitally united to it. Where Origen affirming, that all created souls, and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the Holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed) he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

Cccc 2 And
And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet ὑφήκοςμος, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, but only ὑπερμακόςμος, a supermundane soul; that is, such a thing as though it preide over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Proclus plainly affirmeth, not only of Amelius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who, likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein; μελα δὲ τοῦ Αμελίου ὁ Πορφυρίου ὑπερμακόςμος τοῦ Πλατονικοῦ συμφέρει, την μὲν ὑφήκοςμον τοῦ υπερμακόςμου ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργόν, τούτου δὲ τοῦ κοσμοφέρει μελα τέτον. After Amelius, Porphyrius thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the super-mundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof. And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or not this was Plotinus his true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonick trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was δημιουργός, the opificer and creator of the world, and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one ᾿ ὑφήκοςμος, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, and another ᾿ ὑπερμακόςμος, a supermundane soul, which was the third in their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of laws he undertakes to prove, was ᾿ ὑπερμακόςμος, a super-mundane soul, and not the same with that ᾿ ὑφήκοςμος, that mundane soul, whose genesis, or generation, is described in his Timæus; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because, in order of nature, before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the Cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be ποίημα and δημιουργόμενον, a creature and thing made; yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a super-mundane soul, and δημιουργός, not a creature, but the creator or opificer of the whole world.

And as for the second particular proposed; it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostases, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostases; as also was that monstrous extravaganzy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and
and animals. Which, besides others, Tertullian in his book de Animalibus, imputes to Plato: Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporeales, supermundiales, divinas, & eternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas & exempla, & causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, & subhaecentium corporalibus; & illas quidem esse veritates, nec autem imaginates carum. Plato conceiveth, that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine and eternal; which he calls Ideas, that is, forms, exemplars and causes of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images. Neither can it be denied, but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, founding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the causes of the likenesses and unlikenesses of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the noemata, or conceptions, of that one perfect intellect, which was their second hypothesis; and therefore they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them. Wherefore, when they called them ideas, essences or substances, (as they are called in Philo ἀκακακοῦται ὅτι, the most necessary essences,) their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanid things, as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by others sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius 1 the philosopher, plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal λόγος, he pointing the words otherwise than our copies now do, ὃ γέγραμεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἔστι, that, which was made, in him was life: this philosopher glossing after this manner upon it, ἐν ὑπὸ τὸ γεγραμμένον ζῷο, καί ζωὴ, καί ὑπὸ τῷ δόξῃν, ἐν κωμόν όπότε ῥωτότ, was, was living, and life, and true being. Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasions possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastic notion, Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus; Whatsoever is in God, is God. But the main thing therein was a piece of Paganick poetry; these Pagan theologers being generally possessed with that poetick humour of perforating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonick Pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all πάντα ρωμαί αὐτού, to co-exist with God, and in-exist in him, that is, in the first mind, or second hypothesis of their trinity.

Lastly, whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases, of their Trinity, as Noes, Minds, or Intellects superior to the first soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Unities and Goodness superior to the first Intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases, that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creating of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor any immoveable, natures amongst them, whose ὅσις is their ἐπιγνώσις, their essence, their operation; but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen and others of the fathers add, lapuble and peccable. Nulla natura est, quæ non recipiat bonum & malum, exceptá Dei natura, quæ bonorum omnium fons est; & Christi sapientia, sapientie enim fons est, & sapientia utique jubilias recipere non potest; & justitia est, quæ nonquam professo injuriam capiet; & verbum est vel ratio, quæ utique irrationales effici non potest; sed & lux est, & lucem certum est, quod tenebra non comprehendet. Similiter & natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialisiter sancta est. Sigua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex sua natura hoc possidens, sed ut accidentis; propter quod & decidere potest, quod accidit. There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good; and the wisdom of Christ, for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice; and the reason and word itself, which can never become irrational; he is also the light it itself, and it is certain, that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor infundate it self with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such, as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it; and whatsoever is but accidental, may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly. Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as Autoagathotetes, essential goodness, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature, as the Platonists call Noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose ὅσις is their ἐπιγνώσις, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action; (only the eternal Word and Wisdom of God being such) who also are absolutely unuitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes make mention of Noes, minds or intellects, but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapsé, by that name; which was as much as if he should have said, though
though some of the Platonists talk much of their *Noes*, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only Noes really existing in nature, are unfallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding, that the highest rank of created Beings are indeed no better than those, which the Platonists commonly call *ψυχαλ*, or souls. By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-moveable and active; whereas the *Noes* of the Platonists are altogether immovable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as exist not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the *Noes* of the Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to bodies, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make up one animal. Thus, I say, *Origen* conceived even of the highest angelical, and arch-angelical orders, that they were all of them *ψυχαλ*, souls, united to bodies, but such as were pure, subtle and ethereal: however, he supposed it not impossible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and feculent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian writers concurred with *Origen* herein, that the highest created spirits were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with some corporeal indument. Lastly, *Origen*’s souls were also supposed to be all of them, endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free-will, and consequently to be self-improvable and self-impartial; and no particular created spirits to be absolutely in their own nature impeccable, but liable into vicious habits: whereas the Platonick *Noes* are supposed to be such beings, as could never fall nor degenerate. And the generality of the Christian writers seem’d to have confounded, or confin’d with *Origen* in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince of devils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus does St. Jerome determine; *Solum Deus est, in quem pecatum non cadit; cætera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, possunt in utramque partem suam felisere voluntatem. God is the only Being, that is absolutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free-will in them, may possibly turn their will to either way; that is, to evil as well as to good. It is certain, that God, in a sense of perfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent liberty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only privilege of God, that is, of the Holy Trinity, to be devoid of *liberum arbitrium*, namely as it implieth imperfection, that is, peccability and lapaibility in it.

It is true, that some of the Platonick philosophers suppose, that even in that rank of beings called by them *Souls*, though they be not essentially immutable, but all self-moveable and active, yet there are some of them of fo high a pitch and elevation, as, that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into vitious habits. Thus *Simplicius* for one; ἀλλὰ ἐὰν μὴν ὑπάρξη τῶν ἐν Ἑπιφ. τις ψυχῶν, ἀτε ψυχικῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοσυγγαμματίων παραχθήσονται, μὴ ἐγενοτίς τῶν ἑκάστων ὑπερβαλλόντων, διὰ τὸ μὴ μὴν ἀκεραίοτητα, ἀλλὰ ὑπερβαλλόντων τῶν ἐγενοτίων, λίτου ὡς συνειδής πρὸς αὐτόν, συμφωνοῦσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκατοσυγγαμματίων συνάρθοντα, αὐτῷ τοῦ αἰρέται μονοειδῶς πρὸς ἑκάστῳ τεταμενήν ἑχων, οὕτως ὑποκλίνωμεν πρὸς τὸ χείρον. ἦς οὕτος η ψυχικῆς ἀτομῆς ἀλλὰ των ἑκάστων ἀναρχίας, τάχα ὡς καὶ ἐὰν τοιαύτης ἑκάστης γενέσθαι τις ἀντὶς αὐτῆς τοιούτως ὡς τὰ

*Epitol. CXLI.*
But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodneses essentially, but defirous of good, nevertheless are they so near akin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and individually cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worser. Infomuch that if Proærefis be taken for the chusing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as Proærefis to be imputed to them, unless one should call the chusing of the first goods Proærefis. By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniack or angelick beings. Where though he make a question, whether Proærefis or Deliberation belong to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricious liberum arbitrium or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that assertion of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally of one and the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution; and consequently that all the difference, that is now between them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanour, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him, neither, but that the highest angels also, the Seraphim and Cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for which monstrous paradox is only this, that the divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a προσωπολήπτης, an accepter of persons, should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far, as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of his hypostatick union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existent state, beyond all others souls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the Scripture, Quod dilectioris perfettio, & affectus sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ita ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum personae acceptione, anime ejus assumptio, sed virtutum fraterni fidei merito delata, audì ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dilectisci justitiam & odii iniquitatem; propter ea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo Letitia præ participibus tuis: dilectioris ergo merito ungitur oleo Letitia anima Christi, id est, cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Unigi namque oleo Letitia, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleti. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia spiritus fuit prophetis ei data est, sed ipsius verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo. That the perfection of love, and sincerity of divine affi...
Against Origen's Endless Circuits.

affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the God-head, so that the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with profopolepsy (the acceptance of persons) but bestowed upon it justly for the merit of its virtues; bear (faith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore hast God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. The soul of Christ therefore was anointed with the oil of gladness, or made one with the Word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else, but to be replenished with the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy-Ghost bestowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the Word of God dwelt in him. But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak; because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from the fame, as Origen himself must needs confess, he not allowing the souls of brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists conceived, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously absurd and irrational) there can be no reason given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of souls superior to those of men, without the injustice of profopolepsy; as, besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that souls, as such, are essentially endowed with liberum arbitrium, or free will, and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at rest, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by divine grace; such as wherein they might be free from the fear and danger of ever losing the fame. Of whom St. Augustine therefore thus; Illum & propter alia nonnulla, & maximè propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitutides & miseries, & statu in seculorum intervallis ab ifis ad illas, atque ab illis ad ifas itus ac redditus internaminibiles, non immortè reprobavit ecclesia, quia & hoc quod misericors videbat, amisit, faciendo fanteis veras miseries, quibus pænas luarent, & falsas beatitutines, in quibus verum ac securum, hoc est, sine timore certum femiperni boni gaudium non haberent. The Church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both for certain other opinions of his, and especially for these his alternate beatitudes and miseries, without-end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of souls from one to the other, in reflexes vicissitudes and after periods of time. For as much as hereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwise he seemed to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for the best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart; and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have any true or sincere joy, free from the fear of losing that good, which they possess. For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenour of the Gospel, promising eternal and eternal life to those, who believe in Christ.

De Civitate Dei, Lib. XXI. cap. XVII. p. 481. Tom VIII. Oper.
Now the reason, why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person, not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonick learning, but also one, who was sufficiently addicted to those dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them; and therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular Henades or Noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonick hypothesis, superior to the universal Psyche also, (which was the third hypostasis in their trinity, and seems to answer to the Holy Ghost in the Christian;) Origen was as likely to have been favourable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created Henades, and ἀναπτωμέναι essentiel goodnesse, superior to the Platonick first Mind; or any such Noes, and ἀναπτωμέναι essentiel wisedoms, superior to their universal Psyche; it being all one, as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superior to the second; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superior to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the creator and creature, together; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the catholick doctrine of the Platonick school, that there were such Henades and Noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them, and that of the latter sort too. For first, as for those Henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found anywhere in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he supposed no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second
second epistle, where he describes his Trinity, he doth not say of the first, περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὸ πεῖνα, about the first are the first; as he doth of the second, δυστέρων περὶ τὸ διάτεραν, and of the third, πρῶτον περὶ τὸ τρίτον, about the second are the second, and about the third the third: but of the first he faith, περὶ τοῦ παρόντος, about the king of all things are all things, and for his sake are all things; and he is the cause of all things, that are good. Wherefore here are no particular Henades and Autoagathotetes, Unities and Goodness, about the first Τὸ Εὖ and Τὸ ἐννοοῦ, One and Good; but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cause of all. Moreover Plotinus, throughout all his works, discovers not the least suspicion neither of these Henades and Agathotetes, this language being scarcely to be found anywhere in the writings of any Platonist nearer to Proclus; who also, as if he were conscious, that this assenmenum to the Platonick theology were not so defensible a thing, doth himself sometime, as it were, tergiverfate and decline it, by equivocating in the word Henades, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps Synesius also uses the word, in his first hymn, when God is called by him

εὐστήρων ἐνὸς ἀρχῆς,
Μονάδων μονάς τε πρῶτης.

The first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades; that is, the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas. And as for the particular Noes, Minds or Intellechts, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus his time; he, besides the paffage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as Enn. 6. l. 4. c. 4. Ἀλλὰ τὸς ψυχαῖς πολλαί κη νοών πολλοῖς. P. 847, 848. But how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia? From which, and other places of his, Ficinus concluded Plotinus himself really to have afferred, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called νοεῖς or νοι, Minds or Intellechts. Neverthelss, Plotinus speaking of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these Noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the particpation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both: δεῖ νοεῖν ᾧς ᾦς ἐν ἐννοεῖν, ἤ ἰπτὴν ἐντὸς τοῦ καύστρου ἢ ἰπτὴν ἢ ἰπτὴν ἢ πρὸς ὑποθέσειν τοῖς ἀναλαμβάνοντες τοὺς πρὸς τῆς ἱερᾶς ἐν ἐννοεῖν, ἢ πρὸς τῇ προσφέρεσιν πρὸς ἔννοον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἱερῶν ἡμών ἑντοῦ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ καύστρου ἢ πρὸς τῇ προσφέρεσιν πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ καύστρου ἢ πρὸς τῇ προσφέρεσιν πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ καύστρου ἢ πρὸς τῇ προσφέρεσιν πρὸς τὶς ἱερῶν ἡμῶν ἑντοῦ. There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many, as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And
by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of
being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him. And in the
next chapter he adds, ἢγοις τὰ τοιαύτα ἐκ ἀντιλαμβανόμενα, ἀλλ’ ἀργῶς
tāis τοιαύταις ἐνεργείας τὰ πολλὰ τ’ ὤ. καί ὀλίγας ἐνεργείας ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἱκάνων ἐνέρ-
γείας αὐτ., νῦν δὲ τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς τεταρτοῖς. &c. That though we have these things in us, yet
do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher
energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, these do always all;
Mind, and that which is before Mind, Unity; but every thing, which is in our
souls, is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose our selves
towards it, &c. Where Platonius seems to make the Noes, or Minds, to be
nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind.
And it is said of Porphyrius, who was well acquainted with Platinus his phi-
losophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these Noes or Intellec-
ts, as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is
certain, that such minds as these are no where plainly mentioned by Plato, he
speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, have
only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of
them in his δύναμις, χερὶ τὰ δύναμις, (before mentioned) his second about the
second things, or second things about the second; yet by these may very well
be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created
beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonick, or rather Pseudo-
Platonick trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the
creature, and that probably in favour of the Pagan polytheism and idolo-
try, is nothing so agreeable to reason as itself, as that Christian Trinity be-
fore described, which distinctly declares, how far the Deity goes, and where
the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole
Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of
perfections only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by
the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But it is already manifest, that all the forementioned deprivations and ad-
dulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, and that spurious trinity,
described, (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical,
in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither
upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers univerally. But on the
contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists
retained much of the ancient genuine Cabala, and made a very near ap-
proach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases,
distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them ac-
counted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First therefore we affirm, that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his
Timæus, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determi-
ning the bounds between them, after this manner: "Εἰς ὑπὸ δὲ κατ’ ἑλέον ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πρῶ-
tον διασχιστος ταῖς τιπό τοῦ ὕμνου ἀν {}, πάνω τὸ δὲ ἐκ ἡχοῦ τιπ τοῦ μνεμοσύνον μηδὲν ἄνθρωπον

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in part retain'd by Plato, &c.

We being here to treat concerning the universe, judge it necessary to begin with a distinction, betwixt that, which always is, and that, which is made, but never truly is. The former of which, being always like it self and the same, is comprehensible by intellec"tion with reason, or is the object of knowledge, the latter of them, that which is made and perishful, but never truly is, is not properly knowable, but opinable only, or the object of opinion, together with irrational sense. Now every thing, that is made, must of necessity be made by some cause. The reason, why Plato, being to treat of the universe, begins here with this distinction, was, as 'Plocus well observes, because, in tais exiainès, éknon iranías ápóklaroí, τo énik to dí a to ë: it is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonstrable, that there must be something eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning. And it is evident by sense and experience, that all things are not such, but that some things are made and perish again, or generated and corrupted. Now the latter Platonists, being strongly possessed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered strange strange violence to Plato's text in this place, and wrested his words to quite a different sense from what he intended; as if by his το γνῶμεν, that which is made, he did not at all mean that, which had a beginning, but only that, whose duration is flowing and successive, or temporary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be such, which though it hath a successive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran so strong this way, that even Boetius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this sense, Conf. Phil. that is, its being without beginning: Non est quidam (that he) qui cum. 5. Pro. 6. auditum, vijum Platonii mundum bunc nec babuiffe initium temporis, nec habitum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coeternum putant. Aliud est enim, per interminabilem duci viam, quod mundo Plauto tribuit; alius interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexum esse presentiam; quod divina mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Some, when they bear Plato to have held, that the world had no beginning, nor shall never have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world co-eternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing, to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature. To which purpose he adds afterwards, Neque si digna rebus nominis velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum quidem aeternum, mundum vero decremen esse perpetuum. Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should say, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual. But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato's design in this place.

* Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. I. p. 10.
place, which was to prove or assert a God, because if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his το γενόμενον κριτικόν, or that which is made, he did not understand only that, whose duration is successive, but also το γενόμενον τον αρχην τον έξοχον, that which had a beginning of its generation, and το ον αρχην τινως αποκάλυμαν, that which begun from a certain epoch of time; or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very Timeus of his, that Time it self was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world; and from thence does he infer, that there must of necessity be another eternal being, viz. such as hath both a permanent duration, and was without beginning, and was the cause both of time and the world: forasmuch as nothing can possibly be made without a cause; that is, nothing, which once was not, could of its self come into being, but must be produced by some other thing; and so at last we must needs come to something, which had no beginning. Wherefore Plato, thus taking it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and flowing duration, was not without beginning; as also that whatsoever was without beginning, hath a permanent duration or standing eternity; does thus state the difference between uncreated and created beings, or between God and creature; namely, that creature is that, whose duration being temporary or successive, once had a beginning; and this is his το γενόμενον μετα τον αρχην κριτικον, that which is made, but never truly is, and that which ὑπαρχειν τινως αποκάλυμαν, must of necessity be produced by some cause; but that whatsoever is without beginning, and hath a permanent duration, is uncreated or divine; which is his το ον μετα τον αρχην γεννηθαι, that which always is, and hath no generation, nor was ever made. Accordingly as God is styled in the septuagint translation of the Mosaic writings, έν οίω ὕπαρχειν, or φανερωτα, this eternal nature, which always is, and was never made, Plato speaks of it, not singularly only, as we Christians now do, but often in the paganick way plurally also; as when, in this very Timeus, he calls the world τον αιδων και την γην και τον ηλιον, a made or created image of the eternal gods. By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that το ωρύντον, and το δεινον, and το τρισ, that first, and second, and third, which, in his second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things; that is, his trinity of divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likeness, the whole was made; as Plotinus also plainly declareth in these words of his before cited, έν οιω και τον εικονομενες εικεντρομενες εις τρισθον το και ωρυντον το το δεινον το τρισ, τo το προπνευματικον, or perpetually renewed (as the image in a glass is) of that first, second, and third principle, which are always standing; that is, fixed in eternity, and were never made. For thus Eusebius rec-
cords, that the ancient interpreters of Plato expounded this first, second and third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a trinity of Gods; ταύτα δι τοῦ προ. Ep. l. 11. Πλάτωνοι διαστημάτων ωραίων, ὅπι τὸ πρῶτον Στίθος ἀνάγαγον, εἰπτε το Δεύτερον αὐτοῖς, εκείνων ἡ Τρίτην τοῦ τούτος Ψυχήν, Θεοῦ Τρίτην καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπερσώμενοι εἶναι. These things do the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to the second cause; and to the third the soul of the world, they calling this also the third God. Wherefore we think there is good reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of Plato in his Timeus, whose image or statue this whole generated or created world is paid by him to be, were no other than his trinity of divine hypostases, the makers or creators thereof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, that Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal Gods, as Platonizing, when he affirmed; 'A diis omnia à principio faita, That all things were at first made by the gods; and à providentia ac deorum mundum & omnes mundi partes constitutas esse; That the world and all its parts were constituted by the providence of the gods'.

But that the second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, viz. Mind or Intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first called Tagathon, the Good, was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to have been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by many express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists; but we shall here content our selves only with two, one of Plotinus writing thus concerning it, Enn. 5. l. 1. c. 6. ἐκποιεῖν τίνι ἤμι σε δυνατόν σώσαν οἷον χρῶν, τοῦ λόγου περὶ τῶν αἰχμάτων πτωμάτων, &c. Let all temporal generation here be quite banished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or such as always are, we attributing generation to them only in respect of causality and order, but not of time. And though Plotinus there speak particularly of the second hypostasis or Nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the third hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane soul; which is, there said; by him likewise to be the word of the second, as that second was the word of the first; Καὶ τὸ γενέαμα αὐτὸ κρείσθεν Νοῦ, Νοῦ εἰναι, χριστίων ἀπόστολοι Νοῦς, ὃτι τὰ ἀλλὰ μετ' αὐτός, οἷον ὑπὸ ψυχῆς λόγος ἦν, ἦν ἐνεργητικά τοις, ὅπερ κατοιχήθησαν. That which is generated from what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, because mind is the best of all things, and everything else is after it, and junior to it, as Psyche or Soul, which is in like manner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as Mind is the word and energy of the first good. The other testimony is of Porphyry, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of his philosophick history, where he sets down the doctrine of Plato after this manner; εἰστοίχοις Πλάτωνος προείρι τῷ Ἀραχίῳ ἔτεκα συντόνων τῶν ἀναμονῶν τούτων, οἵ τοίς ἕκαστον ὑπερπαντάζοντος. And so forth. ἄν οὐδεὶς ἐπιπλησίων τούτων, ἦν οἷον ἔθετε ὑποτίμησεν τοῖς ἀλληθέσις, τῷ ἀλλᾶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐ Γινώσκειν καὶ οὐδέ τι Βουνομένων ἁλλὰ τοῦτον αἰτεῖν ἔπεμψέκειν, ἐκεῖνοι τῶν τότε ἔργων γέρωνς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἐπαρελθόντος αὐτοῦ ὑποτέλεσις εἰς Στίθον, ἐπαρελθόντος δὲ εἰς αὐτόν αὐτοῖς φρονήσεως χρονίως, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντως καὶ αὐτ余人 φρονίμους. Χρονικάς, ἐπὶ γὰρ χρόνως πάντως ἐν καθετὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τί ἐν ἧνος.
Nous or Logos called Autopater. Book I.

Plato thus declareth concerning the first good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things, that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchriade it self, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own-parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begotten. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time; nor when time was afterwards made, did it any way affect him; for Mind is always timeles, and alone eternal. Here, besides the eternity of Mind or Intellect, the second divine hypostasis in the Platonick trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet it is called αὐτοπάτερ and αὐτογενός, its own-parent, and its own-offspring, and said to have sprung out αὐτογένως, self-begotten.

Now because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground thereof; which is thus declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it sprung from the first good or supreme Deity from eternity, yet is it said to be self-begotten, because it did not spring from that, as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always standing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by Plotinus after this manner: οὐ κινηθήσθαι, Φατίδος γεγυμένης, οὐκ ἔχει τὸ γνώμιν, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸ μνήμονα μετὰ τὴν καταρέσαν εἰς γνώμιν, τῇ δὲ εὐτέρᾳ δεῖ τὴν αἰχμὴν δοξῆς, εἰς διώτερον μετ' αὐτῷ, οὐ προσνύσπιλος, οὐδὲ βηλυβόλος, οὐδὲ δόλως κινθέως, ὑποτύγχαναι αὐτῷ. That, which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its generation, because then it would not have been the second, but the third after that motion. Wherefore if there be any second after that first good, it must needs proceed from that first, as remaining immovable, and not so much as actively concerning thereto, nor willing it, which would be motion. Now this in Porphyrius his language is paraphrased to be, a being produced from the first good or original Deity, αὐτογένως, self-begotten, or in a way of self-generation. But the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this, that though this second divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from the first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturally, or in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, or by a particular fiat of the supreme Deity, but by way of natural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius singular in this language, we finding the very same expression, of αὐτοπάτερ and αὐτογενός, self-parent and self-begotten, in Jamblichus his mysteries; where it is likewise by him applied not to the first principle of all, but to a second divine hypostasis, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ ἐξελάπρις, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτερ καὶ αὐτογενός. From this one, the self-sufficient God made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he called Sui-Pater, and Scipio-genitus his own father, and self-begotten. But of this God or divine hypostasis in Jamblichus more afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as this in the Christian Trinity, because we

1 Jamblich. de Mysteriis Αἰγύπτιον. Sect. VIII. cap. II. p. 158.
we have no warrant for it from the scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late divines have ventured to call the Christiaan Logos after the same manner ἀναστείλεται, and ex φεσίνο Deum, God from himself.

Dionysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been produced into being; subjoins these words: In ea verò De Trin. l. 1. professione, quod supra memoravi, planissime constat, germanum Platonicum Arianum exitisse. From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was before affirmed) that Arius was a German or genuine disciple of Plato's. But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and p. 58,

others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And indeed for either Plato or Plotinus to have denied the eternity of that second hypostasis of his, called Nous, or Logos, and the son of the first, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of Wisdom and Understanding itself; because, according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but ἀναστείλεται, original Wisdom itself, and consequently, that very Wisdom, by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been fully of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his; ἀναστείλεται ο νοεσθαί, ο θεος γενεσία ο πατής, &c. Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any wisdom; but it is he alone, by whom the Father made all things. And again, ἐν γε δὲ λόγο ἐν ὧν ο λόγος πατής, for the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word. And ἐν ὧν λόγο ἐν ὧν ο λόγος πρό- μενος, ἐν γε λόγος πρός τον θεόν. Σοφία γενεσία ο Κύριος ον ἐν ὧν ο λόγος ο πατής, ἐν ὧν ο λόγος ο πατής, ἐν ὧν ο λόγος ο πατής. That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom, therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, His delight was with me. But those latter words he cited with approbation out of Dionysius Bifhop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affir- mitheth Arius, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom senior to that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that Nous, or universal Mind, which is the second hypostasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it ἀναστείλεται and ἀναστείλεται, its own parent and its own off-spring, as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mythical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also, from the first good, and to be the off-spring thereof. Wherefore, Plato, who supposing the world not to have been eternal, ascribing the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be not a creature, according to Athanasius his own doctrine, ἀναστείλεται, ἐν ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἐν ὧν ὁ πατής, &c.
Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius, which Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said de se mentem creasfe, to have created Mind from it self; and again this Mind, animam se creasfe, to have created from it self-soul; because it is certain, that these ancient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word creare, (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion, of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficiency. But the chief ground of Petavius's mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Plotinism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole animated world, (which gave him occasion to write thus, Tertius verò Deus manifestè creatus ab ipdem Platonisic putatur, quem & poíma nominant;) and that other doctrine of those, who made it not to be the world it self, that is a creature, but the opifcer or creator thereof.

But we grant, that there may be some more reason to make a question, whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or no; because in his Timæus, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way probable, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to Dionysius, and that Pychis, or Soul of his, which is the only God, that in his tenth de Legibus he goes about to prove against the Atheists, should ever not have been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double Pyche, or soul, one ιπονεμιον, or mundane, which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created God; another υπερκοσμιον, supramundane, or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two Plotinus, calling it the heavenly Venus, thus describeth: τὴν δὲ οὐκοίησιν άρημασίαν, ἐν Κρόνος νεών ὄστης ἐκείνως, άυτήν ψυχήκα τετανότεν ἤπατε, ἤπατος ἐς αὐτοῦ αίφατον αἰφατότου, μείνασαν ἄνω ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τόπη ἵλθεν, μόνα Ἀθέλωσων, μόνα δυνάμεις, οτι δ' θεος οὐκ ἂν κατα τὰ κατά φύσεα βαίνειν. Καταπραγματησασκόμενος ἐς ψυχήν τινά ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμετοχῇ ἐκς ὁμοίων ὑπήρκαν ὡς τὸ κατά τούτο ἐκέντρον, τῷ αἱμοτροπῳ εὐερίδο, καὶ διὸ θεοῦ ἀλλ' εἰκάζον, οὗ διαμίουσι ἐκτοις, περικόκλεας ἐκάθεντας, καὶ καλείμεθα ἐκ τοῖς ἐκτοις, καὶ εἰς δικαιώματα περιλαμπτείς, εἰς αὐτούς συνεκτομομενήν ἐπιστομομένην τῷ Κρόνῳ, καὶ εἰς βούλεις τῆς πάθος του Κρόνου θύρων, ἐνέγκυος τε τοὺς αὐτοῖς ἐκ θεώσιμως, καὶ ἐξωλογίως ἀρτεσκόμενος αὐτοίς. This heavenly Venus, which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect Mind or Intelleét, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archetical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can, nor will ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immerfed in them; it being of just
such a nature, as is not inclined to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that immovable Mind or Intellect, than that light, which is circumfused about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Chronus, or rather the father of Chronus, Uranus, adding towards it, and being enamoured with it, begat love, Χαρίστον ὅτι ικέσθη τῷ Μῦθῳ λέγοντες, τῷ πρῶτῳ ἐλλαμπέσα τῷ θρόνῳ, Χαρίστον ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐρτῳ τῶν θεῶν. Moreover, as we call this soul it self separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love. After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that other Venus, which in the fable is laid to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watry nymph. We conclude therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might, according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it; yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Chronus, without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the forementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.

Which to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, first, that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionysius, after he had mentioned his first, second and third; that is, his trinity of divine hypostases, immediately subjoins these words: Η ἐν αὐτῳ ἐρένται ὑποκρίνομαι, περὶ τα αὐτα ἐρένται μαθεῖν τοι ἀγαλματίσκον, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος αὐτῷ θυγνην, ὅτι ἐν ίκανον ἐχειν τοι οἱ βασιλεῖς πείσων, ήν ἐν ἑπτά, ήν τοιούτοι. The mind of man (as parturient, has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I spake of, there is nothing of this kind; that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity are not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely undeestroyable. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor the first and second without the third, than original light can exist without its splendour, coruscation, or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnosticks in his time, who would make more of these divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes, that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner: οὐ τῶν ὕποκρίλης ἑτερας ἔχων, ἀλλα τὸ ἔτως προτεταμένης, ἐπιτι σὺν μετα οὐδενοί. And this is the passage from which Plutarch makes his syllogism: Οὐ τὸν πλεῖον, οὐ τὸν μικρότερον, οὐ τὸν πρῶτον, οὐ τὸ τελευταῖον.
Therefore we ought not to entertain any other principles, but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind; or the supreme Intellect, next after it, and then the universal Soul, in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles, (or universal principles) nor yet fewer than these three. For be, that will contrariwise the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul, and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse from one another, hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be, &c.

Thirdly, as all these three Platonick hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do πρεπεῖν τῷ ὀνόματι, contain and comprehend the whole world under them, and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them infinite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called, by Platonick writers, ἀρχαί and αἰτίων, principles, and causes, and opificers of the whole world. First, as for Νοός, Mind, or Understanding; whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c. and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magick or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind,

"Οὐ πρῶτον ἡλικία τίθνη ἄρχεων,

That, Mind is generally by all men looked upon, as the first and highest God: Plato considering, that Unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοόδος before Νόος, an Intelligible before Intellect; so that knowledge could not be the first; and lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple Good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first divine hypostasis; and Mind or Intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his Philebus, though he agrees thus far with those other ancient philosophers, ὡς ἐν τῷ πάντω Νοῆς ἄρκεω, that Mind always rules over the whole universe; yet does he add afterwards, ὅτι Νοῦς ἐστι γενός τοῦ πάντων αἰτίων, that Mind is (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things; and that therefore it rules over all things, with; and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is Διάθεσις, or the Highest Good: Where, when Plato affirms, that Mind, or his second divine hypostasis, is γενός τοῦ, with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is σύγχρως, and ὑπόσχος, and ὑποσκόλος, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with ὑπόσχος, co-essential, or con-substantial. So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council, and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not

Chap. IV. Plato's Third no Creature.

It is true, that by the δυσιγκατά, or Opificer in Plato, is commonly meant Nous or Intellect, his second hypostasis; (Plotinus affirning as much, δυσιγκατά καί τοῖς Πλάτωνι, The Demiurgus to Plato is Intellect.) Nevertheless, both Amelius, and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third hypostasis also δυσιγκατά, the artificer or opificer of the whole word; some of them making him to be the second from Mind or Intellect; others the third from the first Good, the supreme cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Amelius styled Demiurgus also. Wherefore, as was before suggested, according to the genuine and ancient Platonick doctrine, all these three hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world, and of all things besides themselves; as Plotinus more than once declares the tenour thereof, Hi Tres uno quodam modo omnia producunt, These three with one common consent produce all things, and before him Proclus, πάντα οὖν ταῦτα τοῖς ἄνω διὰ τοῦ μείων τοῦ Ψυχής, All things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul; and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Porphyry, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.

From all which it appears, that Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius, who notwithstanding made not Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonick trinity was a certain middle thing also between the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things heter-
But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian, or Pythagorick trinity, doth either agree, or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypothasies to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent, and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypothasies upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus Platonus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intelligence, which is the second in the Platonick trinity, and anwers to the Son or Word in the Christian; To de alii telam, alii x adien yr, ey ELATTON de 1wth yena, Ti x, χρη τελειωται Ανθρωπιν; μνημον ου γενεα, η τα μεγα μετ αυτων, Μεγιστον ωι μετ αυτων Νομον, τον Δειον. Kαθo γαρ o Νου έκεινον, η νοστη αυτω μονω i.e.; το ειναι τον. Και το γενομαινον απω κεριστενον νει, ους τον ειναι Kαι κεριστενον απω κεριστενον τυν Νομαν, δη τα αλλα μετ αυτων. Ουκ η νοστη λογον νει, η υπερ έν ον γαρ νοστην, which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it generates, is always less than it self. What shall we therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being of all? Does that produce nothing from it self? or rather does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now the greatest of all things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is Mind or Intelligence; and this is second to it. For Mind beboldeth this as its father, and standeth in need of nothing else beside it: whereas that first principle standeth in need of no mind or intelligence. What is generated from that, which is better than mind, must needs be mind or intelligence; because mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of nature after it and junior to it; as Psyche it self, or the first soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and energy of the first good. Again, the same is more particularly declared by him, concerning the third hypothasies called Psyche, that as it essentially dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way inferior to it. Ψυχη γαρ γενεα Νομον, η λογον νοστην, τελεωτον, και η τελεωτου ουκ, ρεγανον ικει, και μη δυναμιν ουσι τοποτης αγωνου ειναι. Κεριστενον τε ειναι αντεντε γενομαινον, ηλλα ELATTON ον, εκαλον ειναι αυτου. Perfect Intelligence generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power could not remain sterile. But that, which is here begotten also, cannot be greater than its begetter; but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image thereof. Elsewhere the same philosophher, calling the first hypothasies of this trinity Uranus, the second Chronos, and the third Zeus, (as Plato had done before) and handomly allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning Chronos, or the second of these; μετακαι o πατρός το αριστονη, το αυτον ε ζεναι. That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferior. Again, the same thing is by that philosophher thus ascertained in general, ει τοις ανταπαινος, ουκ ει το αυγο, αλλα
in the Platonick Trinity.

Which gradual subordination and essentiel dependence of the second and third hypoftases upon the first is by these Platonicks illustrated several ways. Ficinus refembles it to the circulations of water, when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is deprefted, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. Alius (faith he) sic fermé profuit ex alio, ficut in aqua circulus dependet a circulo; one of these divine hypoftases doth in a manner fo depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another. Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, till hath it the more subsidence and detumecence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the Pagan Platonifts themselves, each following hypoftas is many times faid to be εχων τίπτω, a print, famp or impression, made by the former, like the fignature of a feal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them, εἰκών, and εἰκολογία, and μίμησις, an image, and representation, and imitation; which if confidered in Audibles, then will the second hypoftas be look'd upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the second and third hypoftases were but certain replications of the firft original Deity with abatement; which though not accidental or evanid ones, but fubftantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be confidered in Vifibles, then will the second hypoftas be refembled to the image of a face in a glafs, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glafs, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two Parhelia, or as a second and third fun. For thus does Plinuis call the universal Psyche, or third hypoftas, εἰκών τοι σφήκεν τί θεὸς εἰκών, the image of Mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendour thereof. Which fimilitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would not have to be fqueezed or prefed hard; because they acknowledge, that there is something of diffimilitude in them alfo, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glafs is faid ἰτιγριτικόν, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it; so each following hypoftas doth essentially depend upon the former or firft, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expreffion in any of thefe Pagan Platonifts fo unhandfome and offensive, as that of Philo's, in his
The distinctive Characters

Book I.

second book of allegories ¹, στη θε ο λόγος αυτός κατα, ὃς χαθής ὁ ἐν χρυσώμαν οἰκομοντικὸς, The Word is the shadow of God, which be made use of, as an instrument, in the making of the world. Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, a second God, and the son of the first God. As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is it self the archetype of other things, αὐτὴ δὴ οὐ σχηματίζει· καὶ ὄργανον ἑπτάνυστον, ἑτέρων ἑπτάνυστον, ὅπερ ὁ Θεὸς παράγοντας τὰς εἰκόνες, ἐν σκιᾷ καὶ σκιά τοῦ πνεύματός, ὅπως ἔνακο ἀλλό γίνεται παράδειγμα. This shadow and as it were image (of the first God) is it self the archetype and pattern of other things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow;) so is this image it self another pattern or paradigm also. But this dependence and subordination of the divine hypotheses is most frequently illustrated in Platonick writings, by the ἐλαξιος or ἀπίγνωσι, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies; the Nous, or second hypothesis being resembled to that radiant effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypothesis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus Platonus, ἀν ἐν καὶ τί δεῖ νοτίαι πετρί εἰπων μίνων, ἔνα ἐπιφάνεια ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ μένων, οἷον ἡλί το τιρὶ αὐτο λάμπειν, ὅπερ καὶ ἕθελον, ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπενδομο ὑποθεκτος. How should we consider this second hypothesis, otherwise than as the encompassed splendour, which encompasseth the body of the sun; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated a-new.

But this effectual dependence, and gradual subordination of hypothesae, in the Platonick trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters, which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be "Ἐν τῷ χρυσῶν, one before all things; a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as Platonus writes, οὕτως εἴδε χρυσώτα ὑπαρξόν, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason: that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and second power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by Parmenides, Ἐν χρυσώτα, one actually all things; that is, in their distinct ideas. And the third, according to the same philosopher, as Platonus tells us, was Ἐν καὶ χρυσωτα, one and all things; as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectually all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly, the first of these is sometimes said to be Πάντα ἐκάστος, all things unitively; the second Πάντα νοηθός, all things intelligently; and the third, Πάντα ψυχήν, all things animally; that is, self-moveably, actively and productively. Again, the first of these is commonly styled Τὸ γοερος, the

¹ P. 48. "Ennead, V. lib. I. cap. VI."
² P. 515. "Ennead, V. lib. III. cap. XV."
³ P. 79. "Oper."
the Good, or Goodness itself, above Mind and Understanding, and also the Simple Light, above Essence, ineffable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also Φως ἀπλως, a simple light; the second Νός, Αἷος, Σωφρονία, Unity and Goodness only by participation, or Ἀγαθοσκέλος, Boniform, but essentially and formally; Mind, or Understanding, Reason and Wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite Knowledge. The third, Ψυχή, Self-movable Soul; Goodness and Wisdom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite Self-activity, or Effectiveness; infinite, active, perceptive and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also Ἀφορίςμη and ἄναμφη, Venus and Love; but differently from that of the First Good, which is Love too; but a Love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity: ὦ γὰρ τίλεον, τῷ µὴν ἔπειθεν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, μὴ δὲ δεικνύειν, ὦτον ὑπερφέρειν, ὡς τὸ ὑπεπτάσιος αὐτῷ πιείναι πάλιν. That which being absolutely perfect, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant redundancy produced all things. Whereas this latter is a Love of infinite activity. Of the first, it is said, by Plotinus, that it is ἀναπηρής, above all manner of action, for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius, Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐπικαλοῦμαι ἵνα χρων τὸν πρῶτον, ὡς τε ἐν τῃ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ Θείῳ (τῷ ὑπερφέρειτε) ὡς τὸ ὑπεπτάσιος αὐτῷ πιείναι πάλιν. Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that God, who is the artificer. Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus: τὸν µεν πρῶτον Θεόν ἄρρητον ἕκατον ἕκατον ἐνεπνεύσασθαι ἀκροχοίζων καταλέγει. It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the king of all things. Of the second, to whom the energy of intellect is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his οὐσία is his εὐγνωσία, his essence his operation; and that he is ἀναπηρής οὐσία, though a multiform, yet an immovable nature. He therefore is properly called the Demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity, τὸ πέπτυον κυνόχωμα (as Plotinus speaks) ὡς ὑπὸ τὸν Φως, ὡς ἅγιον ἑξεπτωμένου εἰκός. That, which moveth about Mind, or Intellec, the light, or effulgency thereof, and its print or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and doth according to it. This is that, which reduces both the fecundity of the first Simple Good, and also the immoveable wisdom and architeconic contrivance of the second into act or energy. This is the immediate, and, as it were, manuany Opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἐγνωσόμενον τοῦ πάντων, that which actually governs, rules and presideth over all. Amelius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling—thee three divine hypostases three Minds, and three Kings, styles the first of them, Τὸν ὄν, Him that is; the second Τὸν ἐξολοθρή, Him that hath; and the third Τὸν ὀσῶν, Him that beholds. In which expressions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essential dependence, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception, in this Platonick scale, or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essential character of the second is made to be

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be understanding, reason and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence, that
either the first and the second are really nothing else but two different
names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they
be distinct hypostases, or persons, that the first of them must needs be ἀγνός
and ἐλέγος, devoid of mind, reason and wisdom; which would be very absurd.
To which, all the reply we can make, is as follows: First, that this is
indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonick and Pythagorick theology,
(which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians,
or rather from the Hebrews themselves) that whereas the Pagan Theologers
generally concluded, νόμι παντων προγειείναι, That Mind and Understanding,
properly so called, was the oldest of all things, the highest principle and first
original of the world; those others placed something above it, and conse-
quently made it to be not the first, but the second. Which they did chiefly
upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason,
knowledge and wisdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwise than
so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most
reasonable to make the first principle of all, not to be number or multitude,
but a perfect Monad, or Unity. Thus Plotinus, ὁδεῖσιν μὲν νῆτις ὁπετε ὅψις,
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therefore as there
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Platonists make Mind and Wisdom
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P. 518.
[Ennead. V.
Lib. IV. cap.
XVI.]

P. 514.
[Ennead. V.
Lib. III. cap.
XVI.]

P. 555.
[Ennead. V.
Lib. V. cap.
XIII.]

P. 556.
[Ennead. V.
Lib. VI. cap.
XIII.]

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highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to Intellect. Which consideration Plato much insisteth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do the Platonists confidently conclude, ὃ τι Θεό κρείττων Λόγος ἐγείρετο, παραγωγὰς ταύτα ὅπως αὐτὲς ἐνσώματα. That the supreme Deity is more excellent and better than the Lógos (Reason, or the Word) Intellect and Sense, be affording these things, but not being these himself. And to apprehend έν αὐτῷ λόγον πολύς ἡ παρ᾽ οὗ τότε ἐνιούσιν εἰς Λόγος: πώς ἔν τις ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος λόγῳ καὶ πώς τι ἀγαθόν τε ἐν ἀγαθῷ. That, which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold; but the first principle itself was not Word: if you demand therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is confonn, from goodness it self. With which Platonick and Pythagorick Doctrine exactly agreeth Philo the Jew also, ον πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου, Θεός κρείττων ἐγείρετο πάντα λογική φύσις, τῷ εὔφορῳ τού πάντων εἰς τῇ βελτίωσιν καὶ τιν ἐξισίμην καθότι τοίς ἑκείνοις, οὐδὲν ἔχως ἐν γνώσιν ἐξορμοῦσαν. That God which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit, that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that, which is originally from itself and above all. And indeed, we should not have so much intitled upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration, that we have for all the Scripture-mysteries; which scripture seems to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or Off-spring of God the Father. And Athanasius, as was before observed, very much compleieth here also with the Platonick notion, when he denies, that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any Reason or Wisdom, before that Word and Son of God, which is the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. What then? shall we say, that the first hypostasis, or person in the Platonick trinity, (if not the Christian also,) is θεος and αλογος, senseless and irrational, and altogether devoid of Mind and Understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of mysterious atheism; and under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, most rously to degrade the same? For why might not senseless matter, as well be suppoed to be the first original of all things, as a senseless, incorporeal being? Plotinus therefore, who rigidly and superficsetly adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being, as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge and reason, but also above essence it self, (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and Goodnes substantial) and consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or post-nate thing, though eternal; but notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity.

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only, (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun it self;) the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the ἐκλαμψίς or ἀπαγγελμα, the circumambient fulgor, or outshining splendour of that sun. Thus Enn. 5. l. 6. c. 4. τὸ παρεξοθ ἄρα τοῦ τοῦ Φῶς. Φῶς ἀπείρω ἀπόλυσ. That from which this multiform light of Φῶς or Intelligence (the second hypostasis,) is derived, is Φῶς ἀπαγγελμα, another most simple light. As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first principle, or supreme Deity, that it is ἐν νοστη ἐπίρω νατα τῆς ἐν νοστῆ ἐπίρω νατα τῆς τῆς νοστῆ ἐπίρω νατα τῆς in knowledge or understanding, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intelligence. Sometimes again, this philosopher subtly distinguisheth betwixt νοστη αὐτῆς, intelligence itself, and τὸ νοστη, or τὸ ἔχον τῆς νοστῆ. That which doth understand, or which hath intelligence in it; making the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the latter: ὡς ἐν νοστῆ νοστῆ, ἀλλα τὸ ἔχον τῆς νοστῆς διοὶ ἐν πάλιν αὐτὲς, ἐν τῷ νοστη γινόμας τῶν ἐν νοστῆ ἐπίρω νατα τῆς Intelligence it self doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence. For in that, which doth understand, there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it. Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that, which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him, that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence it self, as being not the same; or else of him, and the τὸ νοστῆ, the intelligible, or object of his intellect; Intelligence supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtlety would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence, κατὰ τὸ νοστῆ. ᾧ οὕτως τὸ ἔρος. That which understandeth is indigent as that which feeth. But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenour of the Platonick hypothesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to consist only in this, that it is not essentially ἄγαθος. Goodness it self; but only ἄγαθον, boniform, or good by participation; it being essentially no higher than Φῶς, Αἴσθησις and Σοφία, Mind, Reason and Wisdom; for which cause it is called by those names, as the proper characteristical thereof. Not as if the first were devoid of wisdom, under pretence of being above it; but because this second is not essentially any thing higher. As in like manner, the third hypostasis is not essentially wisdom it self, standing or quiescent, and without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or wisdom moving and acting.

The chief ground of this Platonick doctrine of an essential dependence, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity of divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their theology, that there is but one Original of all things, and μιᾷ παρα τῆς παρα τῆς. only one Fountain of the Godhead; from whence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly derive its whole being from the first, as the ἀπαγγελμα from the Φῶς, the splendour from the original light, must of necessity have also an essential dependence.


dependence upon the same; and consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second; yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son and grandson, when addi at least, have no essential dependence one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are all perfectly co-equal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from that, which did beget, but from God and nature; the begetter being in either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun; and consequently, though co-eternal, have an essential dependence on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the deity, or trinity of hypostases subordinate, from hence; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus between God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be. Nor will the whole Deity be skrewed up to such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether uncapable of having an intercourse or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be; then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multifidiform platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immoveable mind; as Aristotle’s God is ἀκόντις ὑπόπος, an absolutely immoveable substance, whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that whatsoever is in God, is God; it would be likewise utterly unconceivable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God, (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such,) but also, how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actuate the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act pro re natâ accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without raising the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such
an immovable, inflexible, and unalterable Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pretend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seeming repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of divine hypostases subordinate.

Lastly, they pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many divine hypostases, and why there could be no more: whereas according to other ways, it would seem to have been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing, which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity, is this; that though these philosophers sometimes called their three divine hypostases, not only θεῖς Φύσεως, three natures, and three principles, and three causes, and three officers, but also three Gods, and a first, and second, and third God; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one Θεὸν, one Divinity, or Νῦνεν. It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the second God, though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the third God. Now those of them, who called the world the second God, attributed indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those, who would have it to be the third God. Because these latter supposed, that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second God; they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Pyche, which was properly their third hypostasis. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth God; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second God, they intimated, that though those three divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they notwithstanding, really all but one Θεόν, Divinity or ΝΥΝΕΝ; or, as Plotinus speaks, τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ Θεῷ, the divinity which is in the whole world. Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Ταγαθὸν, but many times plainly of the ἔσχατον, and ἐστερωμένον, and τρίτον, the first, and second and third all together; or that whole divinity, which consisteth or is made up of those three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced
CHAP. IV. really one Divinity.

duced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived, how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three divine hypostases; it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Plotinus, the lives and souls of all animals, (as stars, daemons and men) are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Psiche, as their fountain and caufe after a special manner; accordingly as in our Creed, the Holy Ghost is styled the Lord and giver of life; this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostases were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, αὐτῶν ἀπάντων τῶν καλῶν, The cause of all good things; and therefore doubtlesly chiefly of souls: and the second is called by him and others too, ὁμοίως, the cause and artificer of the whole world. We conclude therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are all really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyrius in St. Cyril 1, ἀρχι τρίων ὑποτάσεων τῶν θεῶν προελθέντας ἐκλήν ἔννοια ἐν τοῦ μὲν ἀναστάσιν Θεόν τὸ ἀγαθόν, μετ' αὐτῶν ἐκ τῷ δόξεως, τῶν ὑμνημών τριν ἐν Ἰης τῷ κόσμῳ ὑπόκλησιν ἀρχι γορο ψυχῆς τῶν θείων προελθέντων. That the essence of the divinity proceeds or propagates it self (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or substances. The highest God is the Tagathon, or suprême Good; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the Soul of the world, that is the third: for the divinity extendeth so far as to this soul. Here we plainly see, that though Porphyrius calls the three divine hypostases three Gods; yet does he at the very same time declare, that οἱ θεῖοι θεῖα and θεῖος, the essence of the Godhead and the Divinity extends it self to all these three hypostases, including the third and laft also, (which they call the mundane soul) within the compas of it. And therefore that even according to the Porphyrian theology it self, which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianity) the three hypostases in the Platonick trinity are ὁμοίως, co-essential, both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much; where he writeth thus of the Platonists 2, τρεις ἀρχικὲς υποτάσεως υποδιάμεινῃ ἦς αὐτοῖ, ἕκαστης τρίων υποτάσεων τῶν θείων τοῖς θεοῦ προελθέντων ἴχθυμαίμαιν. That supposing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe,) they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.

Indeed many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to be one divinity: but the Platonists themelves do upon this very account, and no other, declare all these three to be one divinity, because they have an essentiel dependence and gradual subordination in them; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly co-equal, and to have no essentiel dependence one upon another,

1 Contra Julian. lib. VIII. p. 271.
2 Ibid. p. 2, c.
another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate Gods, having only a generical or specifical identity; and so no more one, than three men are one man: a thing, which the Platonick theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the suprme God and first Cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with co-equal splendour, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendour, two of them being but the Parbelii of the other, and effectually depending on it; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and the third but the second refracted. At least those three co-equal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and its first and secondary splendour, (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypoftases of their trinity, as is nowhere else to be found in the whole world. To this purpose Plutinus, φέρει δέ αὐτόν, ἵνα καθο-καθος, ἀλλ' ὁτι μετ' αὐτόν ζηματάξα ὄλον ὡς δέι ζωής ή μοί: πέμψει δὲ πάντα το γεννόμενον ζή το ἄγαλμα, καὶ μάλιστα ὄταν τοῖς μόνοι, τό γενσάν τό ἄγεννιμον ὄταν δὲ τὸ ἁπτόμενον το γενσάν, ἵνα ἀναίχομαι οἵων οὐκ λεγομαι, ὡς τὴν ἑπαρχετάν μόνον ἄπαθες.

Intelleft is said to behold the first good; not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intelleft and soul. Everything, which is begotten, desires and loves that, which begat it; especially when these two (that which begat, and that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begat, is absolutely the best thing, that, which is immediately begotten from it, must needs cohere intimately with it, and so as to be separated from it only by alterity. Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three divine hypoftases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are tantum non, only not, the very self fame. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypoftases of their trinity are ἀναίχομεν, absolutely indivisibla and inseparable, as the ἀναίχομα is ἁπάθετον from the φύς, the splendour indivisibly conjoined with the light or sun. Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the fame purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three divine hypoftases just such an ἐνεπερεχόμοι, circuminfetto, or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypoftases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or it self gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Ταγαθον in the Νοῦς; and so both of them really and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind understanding and
and Wisdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of Plato, Plotinus, and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the Mind and Wisdom of it. And the Empericobefes of the second or third hypostases, was thus intimated by Plato also; Ἔφθανε μεν καὶ τῷ Νίτι ἐκεῖνν ψυχῆς, πάντα δὲ τοίχους. Οὐκ ἐν μέν τι τε φιλόσ. p. 30. ἐπὶ δὲ ἔφατε τῷ ὦν ψυχῆς, ἐπί τίνι τούτῳ ἐνθύμησα. Where hav- ing spoken of that divine Wildom and Mind, which orders all things in the world, he adds; But Wisdom and Mind can never be without soul, (that is, cannot act without it.) wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kingly Mind, and a kingly Soul. Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and consequently those two to be but one God. Which Nous is also said to be both the γεννής, i. e. of the same kind, and co-efficient with the first cause of all things. To conclude; as that first Platonick hypostasis, which is it self said to be above Mind and Wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so do both the first and the second move and act in the third. Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous and Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one θεός, or Divinity; just in the same manner as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference of a sphere, or globe, are all essentially one sphere. Thus Plotinus exprestly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche; σεμονὸν γὰρ τι τῇ ἐκεῖνεν τοιαύτῃ, ὅσον κύκλῳ περιπερίγραμμον κέντρον, ἐπὶ δὲ κέντρον αὐτοῖς, διάστημα ἀδιάτατον ἄφες γὰρ ἐγείρει εἰς τοῖς, εἰ πορευόμεν τὸ κέντρον τάξειν, τὸν νῦν κατὰ κύκλον αὐτόκεντρον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κυμαίμενον ἄφες τάξεις. For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indifinate distance, (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing.) For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind, or Intellect to be the immoveable circle, or distance; and lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference, acted by Love, or Deire. These three Platonick hypostases therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite Goodness, infinite Wisdom, and infinite active Love and Power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one θεός, or Divinity, just as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonick and Parmenidian or Pythagorick trinity; from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeeth or difagreeth with the Chriftian. First therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient Cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confusing therein the differences between God and the Creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christiannity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspound therewith, in those three fundamentals before mentioned. First, in not
making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or person. Secondly, in making none of these three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world: which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be *Homoousian*. Lastly, in supposing these three divine hypostases, however sometimes paganically called three gods, to be essentially one Divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Ariantism is commonly suppos'd to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Photinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Ariantism; it being a certain middle thing between that and Sabellianism, which in general was that mark, that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonick Trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different explication of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all, as one and the same numerical essence, or substance, of the three divine hypostases. And secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God; yet did they assert an essential dependence of the second and third upon the first, together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute co-equality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Ariantism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypostases, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (contra Jul. lib. 1.) he writing thus concerning Plato, Τὸ Θεώρημα μὲν ἐν ἑνίκη οὐκ ἐκκόπη, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τα Ἀριεὶς περιεχόντων, ἐν ἑνίκη διακεῖται ἀλλὰ ταῖς τα ὑποκείμεναι τῇ ἀλλήλης τὰς ὑποτάσις εἰσφέρει. Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arians, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypostases: as elsewhere the same pious father also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypostases of their trinity to be, in his sense, Homoousian, that is, absolutely co-equal. But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Ariantism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials, which were, Ἔρατως ἐγώ ἐγὼ ἐρατό, or the second hypostasis being made εἰ ἑνὶ Ῥωμαίοις, together with its being mutable and lappable; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable: yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect of its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissimulated, palliated, or excused.

Over
Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's
collectors were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the
Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their
own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate
distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not de-
scending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the for-
mer of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken mag-
nificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, he sub-
joins immediately, ὁμοιότερον ἐν καὶ ἡμετέρα, ὁ δὲ τῶν πρωτόσων σκαψῆς,
καὶ διὸ οἰκουμένη, εὐτέρεια το ἀυτὸ τίμησο ἑν ψυχή. That this soul of ours is
also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one
(thought he) will consider it as in itself, pure and naked, or script from all things
adventitious to it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable. Agreeably
whereunto doth this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul
πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀληθῆ, that is, but the elder father of our human souls. Which,
as it rankly favours of philosophick pride and arrogancy, thus to think so
magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls
with that mundane soul; so was it a monstruous degradation of that
third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing
of the same. For if our human soul be ὁμοιότατον of the same kind or species,
with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only ὁμοιότατον, of like
honour and dignity, but also, in the language of the Christian church, ὁμοιότατον,
co-essential with our human souls, (as our Saviour Christ, according to the
Arians in Albinus, is said to be ὁμοιότατον ὁμοίως τῶν ἀνθρώπων, co-essential with
Tom i. p. 557. us men.) From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature,
or else our human souls divine. Wherefore, unless these Platonists would
confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously
aburd for them, to suppose that first eternal Mind and Will, by which
the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap
or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them
being that perfect Will, which was the Architect or Demiurgus of the
world, whilst the latter is only the elder father of all human souls. Moreover,
these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity
so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were
the informing soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder father of our
created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their
polytheism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry) that is, for their
cosmo-latry, astro-latry, and demono-latry. For thus much is plainly intimated
in this following passage of Plotinus, διὰ τῶν θεῶν κόσμος ὀν ἦν ὁ θεός ἐν τῆς ἡλίου P. 48 S.
This whole corporeal world was made a god, by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated, as likewise are all the stars therefore gods. Where he afterwards adds, τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀποκτηνοῦν
τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐνα, ἀληθῶς προσβλητικὸν ἑν τῶν ἐνα, That which is to the gods, or
goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs it self be the elder god, or
goddess. So that this third hypostasis of the Platonick Trinity, called the
mundane soul, is but a kind of fitter goddes with the souls of the fun, moon

G g g 2
and stars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddesses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictory together; that Soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sister to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them; whereas this sisterly relation and confusion between them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane Soul, which is their third God, or divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonick hypotheses, stairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the Deity is supposed to differ but gradually only from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trode in Plotinus his footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was, in all probability, the true reason, why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth) were by Constantinian called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arians and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foundation for creature-worship and idolatry. But notwithstanding, all this (as many other things) was but heedfully and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drollingly nodding all the while, as it also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenor of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares, that third hypostasis not to be the immediate, informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superiour Venus, which also was the Demiurgus, the maker, both of other souls, and of the whole world. As Plato had before expressly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, or the Lord and Giver of life: and likewise declared, that amongst all those things, which are ἀδεξεως ὕψως εὐφυεῖ, congeners and cognate with our human souls, there is ἀέω τυποῦ, nothing any where to be found at all like unto it. So that Plato, though he were also a man-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probability would he not at all have approved of Plotinus his ἑρωδια, οἱ καὶ ἡμᾶς, our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the divine triad; but rather have said, in the language of the Psalms, It is he that hath made us, and not we our selves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture.

Notwithstanding all which, a Christian Platonist; or Platonick Christian, would, in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that since they had no scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologicized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all.

* Vide Lib. I. Cap. IX. p. 52.
all, if they did not only speak, many times unadvisedly, and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point, and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterwards revealed, than that they should any where stumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, ὁκων, reason or word too, (as well as κός, mind or intellect) and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, the Father; and affirming him to be the δυναστεία and αἰτίον, the artificer and cause of the whole world; and lastly describing him, as the scripture doth, to be the image, the figure and character, and the splendour or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, than this so great and abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by Pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been affected, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves; they then not so much as determining, that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonick Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the Apostles times, plainly asserted the same; as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Leontius, and many others. All whose testimonies because it would be too tedious to set down here, we shall content our selves only with one of the last mentioned: Et Pater et Filius Deus est; sed ille quas ex eorbus fons, hic tanquam defiensa laftit. i. 4. c. ex eo virum: Ille tanquam fol, hic tanquam radius a sole porreuiis. Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: be like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun. And though it be true that Anbanius, writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and amongst others cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute co-equality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, subordination and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius therefore taxed for Platonick, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastick tradition being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years togethert

gether after the Apostles times, though it cannot justify the Platonists, in any thing discrepant from the scripture, yet may it in some measure doubtless plead their excuse, who had no scripture-revelation at all, to guide them herein; and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonick Christian would further apologize for these Pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they supposed an absolute co-equality of them would infer. And that they made only so much subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there was, μηδεν μεταξων, nothing intermedios, or that could possibly be thrust in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the co-equality of the persons in the Holy Trinity is, because it cannot well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence of the Godhead, being absolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that dependence and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited, ἡς ἐξ ἑξος ἁπλοτατον τὴν δευτερολογίαν ὁσιον, the essence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypostases. Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, confitteth. (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in being eternal, which, as we have already shewed, was Plato’s distinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature. He by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and therefore being absolutely undefeatable; which perhaps is included also in the former. Lastly, in being not particular but universal, ἐν ἀλλ’ ἑσσεγετε, one and all things, or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, say these Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-existence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original, principle, and cause of all: but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of it self, is therefore ipso facto to be detrued and thrust down into the rank of creatures; then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as the Platonick Trinity, upon this supposition, needs be creatures, and not God; the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the creator
CHAP. IV. Homoousian, and Co-equal.

creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth alike to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonick grounds, that all the three divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are co-equal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing between and the essence of the Godhead, and the distinct hypostases or personalities thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general and universal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as 

Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril, 

besides several others,许. Cyril, ὅ τι ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸ γενός, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἔτος τὸ ἐξ οὗ ποιεῖται, τοῦ ἔκ τοῦ ὑπόστασιν ἔξω. The essence or substance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum. So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but general or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases, (approved by the orthodox fathers) neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word, is ὅμοουσιών, co-essential, or consubstantial, and co-equal with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council itself, that the Son was therefore co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, meerly because he was God, and not a creature.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homo-ousian, co-essential or consubstantial, yet in a further sense than this; namely, as being all of them one Θεός or divinity. For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them: μέχρι τῶν ὑποστάσεων τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ προσόντων ἐν Θεόν. That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it; that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but also that they are not so many separate and divided Gods, but all of them together one God or Divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language as we Christians are, do often call them three Gods, and a first, second, and third God; yet notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one Θεός or Divinity; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following. First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexcistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second

* This seems to be a mistake for Theodoret, in whom we find the very words, Dialog. I. de Trinitate, p. 408. Tom. V. Oper. advers. Heref. lib. II. Oper. p. 297. Then the same thing is said in other words in St. Cyril.


* Contra Julian. lib. VIII. p. 270.
in the third. And ality, because the entire ness of the whole divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all \( \text{πρωτοπληρωμα} \), one and the same energy or \( \text{ἔναση} \) ad extra. And therefore, as the centre, radial distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be co-essential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and bows or branches, co-essential to an entire tree: so, but in much a more perfect sense, are the Platonick \( \text{τα ἐν θεάνων} \), Nous and \( \text{Φύσις} \), co-essential to that in \( \text{τῆς πνευμάτως} \), that divinity in the whole universe. Neither was \( \text{Athenæus} \) a stranger to this notion of the word \( \text{ἐνωδόνοις} \) alio, he affirming that \( \text{τὰ ρέματα ἐνωδόν ποίησαι καὶ ἄνευ τής ἁμαρτίας} \), That the Branches are co-essential with, and indivisible from, the vine; and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought, that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in itself alone, for then should there be a Trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it; (which were to make the mystery contemplable) but because all the three hypotheticals, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypotheticals, or persons, in Plato’s trinity, (as it is commonly represented) yet this is only \( \text{ad intra, within the Deity itself}, \) in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves; but \( \text{ad extra, outwards}, \) and to us, are they all one and the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonick Christian would, in favour of these Platonicists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependence and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only \( \text{τὰ πρῶτον} \), but also \( \text{τὰ μετεπεριστώμενα} \), of dignity as well as order, amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and undivided from any other, must needs have some superiority and preeminence over that, which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all these three hypotheticals, or persons, be alike omnipotent \( \text{ad extra}, \) or outwards, yet \( \text{ad intra}, \) inwards; or \( \text{within the Deity} \) it self, are they not so; the Son being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypotheticals (who is the original fountain of all) by \( \text{Macrobius} \) styled, \( \text{αὐτός ὁ Πρώτος} \), \( \text{ὁ Μόης} \) \( \text{ὁ Θεός} \); he therein implying the second and third hypotheticals, Nous and \( \text{Ψύχη} \), to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together; however, \( \text{ad extra}, \) or outwards, and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And \( \text{Plotinus} \) writeth

\[ 517. \]
only imitating and partaking thereof. And accordingly hereunto would the Platonick Christian further pretend, that there are fundry places in the Scripture, which do not a little favour some subordination and priority both of order and dignity, in the persons of the holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious, than that of our Saviour Christ, _My Father is greater than I:_ which to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as _Athanafius_ himself, St. _Basil_, St. _Gregory Nazianzen_ and St. _Chryfislon_, with several others of the Latins, interpret the name to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the divinity of our Saviour Christ. Infomuch that _Petavius_ himself, expounding _De Trin._ the Athanayan creed, writeth in this manner: _Pater major Filio, rite_ & p. 863. _catholice pronuntiatus est à plerifique veteran_; & _originem prior sine reprebenvione_ dici solct. The Father is, in a right catholick manner, affirmed, by _nof_ of the ancients, to be greater than the Son; and he is commonly said also, without _re-__prebenvion_, to be before him in _refpe_ of original. Whereupon he concludeth the true meaning of that creed to be this, that no person in the Trinity is greater or less than other, in _refpe_ of the effence of the Godhead common to them all; _Quia vera Deitas in nullo esse aut minor aut major potest_; _Because the_ true Godhead _can be no where greater or less_: but that, notwithstanding, there may be some inequality in them, as they are _hic Deus_, and _hoc perohna_; _this God_, and _that perohna_. It is true indeed, that many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this inequality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as the Father’s begeting, and the Son’s being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to afford, that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also, as for example, St. _Hilary_, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus; _Siquidum unum dicens Deus, Chriftum autem Deus, ante fecula Filium Dei, obfcutum Patri in creafione omnium, non confettur_, _anathema sit._ And again, _Non exaëquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri_, _fubjettum intelligimus._ And _Athanafius_ himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxality in this point, when he doth fo often reembles the Father to the _φως_, or to the _Φως_, the _sun_, or the _original_ light, and the Son to the _απαναγραφα_, the _splendor_ or _brightness_ of it, (as likewife doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itfelf;) he fefons hereby to imply some dependence of the second upon the firft, and subordination to it; espe-__cially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be look’d upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun, and its _splendor_, and its derivative light; _εις γὰρ της αρχῆς_.

* Cont. Ar. Or. τις μετα τριων πλων υπεθεμα τοι εικωνα, αλλω χειου μεν απαναγραφα, μεν εις το εξ Φως εις τη απαναγραφα, φως ουτω μιαν αρχην ουδεμεν. For it appears from

the multitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionifts and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its _splendor_; so that we acknowledge only one principle.

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As also here he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria, in so many words: God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; therefore there is an eternal splendor also co-existent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him. For if the Son of God be as the splendor of the sun, always generated, then must he needs have an essential dependence upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh, of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Arianus; viz. to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὢν τῷ Φωτῷ ἀπαντάμαχα, ὢς ὦλιος ἄμις, as the splendor of the light, and as the vapour of the water; adding, ὅτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαντάμαχα, ὅτε ἡ ὦλιος ἄμις, ὅτε γὰρ τὸ θάνατος ἐτέρνος, ἠνεφέρεται ἐν τῇ ἀφάντητῃ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίᾳ. For neither the splendor nor the vapour is the very sun, and the very water; nor yet is it alien from them, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effuxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is in no way diminished or lessened thereby. Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendor) seem plainly to imply some dependence and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, he ascerting, as Photius informeth us, an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did Origen before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, Arianus maketh use of, without any cenure or reprehension of them. Wherefore when Arianus, and the other orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three Persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as ἐπεροίσων, of a different essence from him, one being God and the other a creature; they affirming on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as ἐπεροίσων, of the same essence with him; that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as hic Deus et hic persona (to use Peta- vius his language) hic God and that person.

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt the more genuine Platonists, and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many conceived. However, our Platonick Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely orthodox fathers themselves. For according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the character of the first hypostasis is supposed by them, to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active
active love and power, (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial) it is more easy to conceive, that all these are really one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them. But besides this, there is another Platonick hypothesis (which St. Austin De Civ. D. hinteth from Porphyrius, though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypostasis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second. And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third in like manner, μεσον δυναμεως, a middle power, and γενος αιθριου, the relation of both the first and second to one another. Which agreeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypostasis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and the second, and that love, whereby the Father and Son love each other. Now, according to this latter Platonick hypothesis, there would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonick Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonick Trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypostases of their Trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or μονοθεις, one entire Divinity; upon which latter account, the whole may be said also by them, to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that they no where suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictory to their very hypothesis itself, and all one, as if they should affirm them, indeed not to be three hypostases, but only one. Nevertheless, the Christian Platonist would here also apologize for them after this manner: that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word essence being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripatetics, when they call a man, or animal in general, substantiam secundam, a second substance. Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish, in this controversy of the Trinity, between ὁ θεος and ὁ θεον, the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the hypostases or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypostasis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret pronounce of these fathers in general, κατά τὴν τῶν πατέρων διακαταλογίαν, ἐν ᾧ διαφορὰν ἔχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ καθῆκος.  ἐν τῷ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰκονικοῦ νῆτος  ὁ πατὴρ ὁ Οὐσιον ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος τὸ ὄνομα, τοῦτον ἐρχεται 'Η ΟΥΣΙΑ ἡ ἁγία ὅτι ΝΗ ΤΙΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΝ. According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the species or individuum, so

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doth essence or substance, differ from hypostases; that is to say, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers, not to be one singular or individual, but one general or universal essence and substance; Theodore, notwithstanding, there acknowledging, that no such distinction was observed by other Greek writers between these two words ὑπόστασις and ὑπόστα, essence or substance and hypostasis, as that the former of them should be restrained to universals only, general or specific essences or substances; but that this was peculiar to the Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the mean time not denying, but that each hypostasis, profon, or person, in the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own singular, individual, or existent essence also; and that there are thus, τρεις ὑπόστασις, three singular existent essences in the Deity, as well as τρεις ὑποστάσεις, three hypostases; an hypostasis being nothing else to them, but an existent essence: however, for distinction’s sake, they here thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the signification of these two words, that a singular and existent essence should not be called essence, but hypostasis; and by ὑπόστα, essence or substance, should be meant that general or universal nature of the Godhead only, which is common to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further confirmation of this; as that of St. Basil: ὅσον έξέλειν τά κοινά προς τό θεόν, οὕτως έξέλειν ὑπόστασιν. What common is to proper, the same is essence or substance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases. But we shall content ourselves only, with this full acknowledgment of D. Petavious; In hoc uno Graecorum praeverit, quod omnium judicium concordant, ὑπόστασις, id est, essentiam unam substantiam, aut naturam (quæm ὑπόστα vocant) generalem esse aliquid & commune, ac minime definitum; ὑποστασις vero prorsum, singularum, & circumscriptum, quod ex illo communis, & peculiaribus quibusdam notis ac proprietatibus veluti componitur.

In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks especially agree, that Ufia, essence or substance, and nature, which they call Phylis (in the Trinity) is something general, common and undetermined; but hypustasis is that, which is proper, singular and circumscribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common essence or substance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumstances.

But besides this, it is further certain, that not a few of those ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, because they zealously opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also, that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity, had not only one general and universal essence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specific essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John) under that ultimate species of man; or that specific essence of humanity, which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus
thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril) to be

Essentia cum suis quibusdam proprietatibus ab ipsis, quae sunt ejusdem speciei, numero differens; an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individualizing circumstances) differing only numerically from those of the same species with it. This doctrine was plainly asserted and industriously pursued, (besides several others both of the Greeks and Latins) especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damascen; whose words, because Petavius, hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they, who principally insisted upon the absolute co-equality and independent co-ordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependence one upon another, but are naturally co-equal and unsubordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity, (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely co-equal, unsubordinate and independent: and this was that, which was commonly called by them their οὐκοινότης, their co-essentiality or co-substantiality. Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologers, finds no other fault at all with the Platonick Trinity, but only this, that such an Homooousios, such a co-essentiality or co-substantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein; τίτο αυτοίς άθεν, ει τον τις ουκοινότητα του μενον έπεμορίων άντλην υποστάσεις. P. 270.

There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonick Trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, bad they but accommodated the right notion of co-essentiality or co-substantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not further distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another. That is, had the Platonists complied with that hypothesis of St. Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and coordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this co-essentiality or co-substantiality of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already shewed, that this Platonick Trinity was, in another sense, Homooousian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very sense of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their Trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or identity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavoured with their logick to

1 Vide Expofition. Compendiar. Fidei Or. 
2 Lib. IV. de Trinit. Cap. IX. §, IV. Tom. 
4 Il. Dogmat. Theolog, 
5 XV. Edit. Paris 1645.
to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specifick essence or substantie of human nature in them all, and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which name logick of theirs, they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus his gods were but one God neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given, why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; we say, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this Trinity is no other than a kind of Tritheifm, and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonick trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyffen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypotases of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one God, than three individual men have one common specific essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decreed for tritheifick; so in the room thereof started there up that other trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine, which seemeth not to have been owned by any publick authority in the Christian Church, save that of the Lateran council only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be render'd probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Petavius, (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastic antiquity;) and for this reason especially, because many are much led by such new names and authorities; In eo praecipue vim collocasse patres, ut aequalem patri naturâ excellentiâque filium esse defenderent, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conficiere. Etenim Niceni huius praefules, quibus nemo melius Ariane sedea arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimita maxime foret, accius dujudicare putuit, nihil in professionis sua formulâspectarunt aliud, nisi ut aequalitatem illam efficiat, dignitatis, aeternitatis affirmat. Tostatur hoc omnia vox ipsa, quæ arx quaedam sibi catholicis dogmatibus. Hec enim aequalitatem potius efficiat, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cetera ejusdem modi sunt in illo decreto, ut, &c. The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian hereticks, was in offering only the equality of the son with the father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those

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6 The fourth general Lateran Council held in 1215, under Popo Innocent III.
those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugn'd, aimed at nothing else in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity and eternity between them. This does the word Homoousios itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than singular individual essence, as we have before showed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree, as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence. Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not affected by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: First, Because these orthodox Anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and consequently that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis, according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing, that none of those fathers ever dream'd of.

Again, the word Homoousios, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things, numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely, that the Greek tongue should have any name for that, which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And accordingly St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus, ἀναφηκαὶ τῷ πατρί τῆς ὑποστάσεως καὶ τῷ ἀλλοιῷ ὀμοιότητι, ἀλλά ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτῷ. That it plainly takes away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that, which the ancient fathers meant, p. 1070. Tom. II. Oper.)
The true Notion of the

Book I.

En. 4. I. 7.
Epist. de Sent.
Dion. p. 556.
Tom. I. O. 2.

by the word hypostasis: for the same thing is not homoousios, co-essential or consubstantial with itself, but always one thing with another. Wherefore as to  

the word homoousios are used by Ptolemy as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul,  

that it is full of divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congeners, and homoousious with them; so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth,  

That the branches are homoousious [co-essential or consubstantial] and congeners with the vine, or with the root thereof. Besides which, the same father useth  

ho  

indifferently for  

r  

in dryndy places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of general or specific. And thus was the word Homoousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon 1, they affirming, that our Saviour Christ was  

us men;  

That the Son be co-essential or consubstantial (or of the same essence or substance) with us men, be having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the husbandman. And again, a little after, in the same epistle,  

or did Dionysius, think you, when he affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be co-essential or consubstantial with us men? From all which it is unquestionably evident, that Athanasius did not, by the word homoousios, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common general or specific only; and consequently, that he conceived the Son to be co-essential or consubstantial with the Father after that manner.

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of Arians was, which they opposed and condemned. Now Arians maintained, the Son or Word to be  

a creature, made in time, and mutable or defecible; and for that reason, as Athanasius tells us,  

that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated.) Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of Arians, determined, that the Son or Word was not thus  

nor ἀλλοτριώσις, but ὀμοοüσις τῷ Πατρὶ, co-essential or consubstantial with the Father; that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that 甥ix, essence or subsistence of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. Hilary, Natura una, non unitate personae, sed generis; one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind. Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Cont. Serm. Aulfsin writing thus against the Arians; Patris, ergo & Filii, & Spiritus Arian. c. 18. Sanül, etiam disparem cogitant potestatem, naturam falem confiteantur aequali. Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal. And St. Basil likewise; Though the Son be in order second to the Father, because produced by him, and in dignity also, (forasmuch as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet is he not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one divinity in them both. And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homoo'ousios, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality, and co-equality of the Son with the Father, namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us, how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it; πάντως το θυσιαστήριον υπόρεξαλα, χ' οι πεπρο τοις ρήμασιν ὁς απείσοια λύτη ἡ τῷ εἰς τῆς κορωνί, χτ τῷ ὁμοουσία, χτ τῷ μέθε κληρονομεν ἡ ποιήμα, μέτε τὰς ἑκάστας ἐκ τοῦ Θεού γένεις, ἀλλ' γενέσις ἡ τῆς παντελείου υσίας, ο λόγος, All the rest subscribing, the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and co-essential or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or creature, or any of the things made, but the genuine off-spring of the essence or substance of the Father. Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of scripture words and phrases, against the Arians; τῆς συνόδου θεολογίας τῆς μιᾶ τῶν Ἀριστοκρατίας ἀλλαν τα εις τῶν. εἰς τὸν ὕδατον ὑπόρεξαλά, χτ τῇ ὑδατον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰς ὕδατον, αλλ' τοῦ ὕδατον τα ἐπηρρέα, χτ λόγος ἐς χτ σοφίας, ἀλλ' οι κληρώσης ἑδε ποιήμα. ιδων εἰς τον ἀριστοκρατίσ.
As that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God, and consequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived, that the Eusebian faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation, they conceitedly, 

*consequentia*; that the Son was indeed of the substance of God, thereby to disinguish him from all created beings. Again, a little after, in the same epistle, he added; *

*οικοεστιν του θεου και ανατρεφον τον θεον. *

whereby they conceived themselves necessitated, more plainly to declare, what they meant by being from God, or out of him; and therefore added, that the Son was out of the substance of God, thereby to disinguish him from all created beings. Again, a little after, in the same epistle, he says, *

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Wherefore it seemeth to be unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained, against Arius, the Son to be homouuious, coessential or confabstantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, Of the same essence or substance, yet they univerally understood thereby, not a farnecis of singular and numerical, but of common or univeral essence only; that is, the general or specificall essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis
Synedris Arimini & Seleucia, where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt those two words, 'Homooios,' of like substance, and 'Homooios of the same substance': 

'Ομοιοίς γὰρ χεῖρις ἡμᾶς ὑπείκε τὸ ὄνομα ὑπὲρ ἑταὶ τῶν εὐαίσθεν, ἀλλ' ἔπει γεγονότας εἰς τοιαύτῃ λέγεισα ὄνομα· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσίων οὐκ Ὁμοιοίς, ἀλλ' ταυτίτις ζε λεξικήν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγειν τοῖς μετα τῆς οὐσίαν· τὸ γάρ ὄνομα Ὁμοιοίς εἶσιν καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οὐκ Ἀνθρώπου λέγειν ἄλλ' Ἐνεργοπτέος· "Ο μὲν τὸ Ὀμοιοῖς καὶ Ὁμοιοῖς, τὸ δὲ Ἐνεργοπτεῖς καὶ Ἐνεργοπτεῖς. For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences or substances, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their essence, to be congenereous, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that, which is congenereous, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also Homooliosis, co-essential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance) and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is Heterooliosis, (of a different essence or substance.) Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocrisy of Meletius, &c., concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner: 

'Ο τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος τὸ ἐκαί τοῦ οὐσίαν τῷ πατρὶ λέγειν δε οὐκ είναι τοῦ Θεοῦ χεῖρις τοῦ Ὅμοιοις, ὡς οὐσίας, τῇ οὐσίᾳ τετεθεν εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀθείς, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡσαιμωσίαν οὐ νοσίον οὔτε τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας εἰσαί, εἰπαμενος λέγειν μή ἄνθρωπος ὑμῶν ὁμοίοις, ὡς ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὴν ἀνθρώπου οὐσίαν εἰς μὴ μή ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ οὐσίαν, εἰς θείαν ἡ ἡς, ἀλλ' ἡς ὡς ὡσαιμωσίαν εἰς ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, ἀνθρώπου ἡ ὡς ἄνθρωπος θεῖος, δύο γὰρ τοῦ ὡς ὡσαιμωσίαν μεν λέγειν ὡς ὡσαιμωσίαν δε' ἕν ὄνομα. O γάρ κατὰ τὴν συνθεσιν βάλειν τὸ ὘μοιοίς ἀκόμης, οὕτε εἶναι περὶ μιᾶς χεῖρις τῆς οὐσίας αλλ' περὶ τῆς συνθεσιν, καὶ ἦν διατάσεως ταύταις· Ἐνεργοπτέος ρητὸς εἰρηκτικὸς τὸ ὄνομα Ῥήμα τῷ Ἐνεργοπτεῖς ἀκομῆς τῇ Ἐνεργοπτεῖς καὶ ἔστω ἔστω διὰ τοῦτο εἰρήκτικα νομαδον περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Φύσιν παρασκευάζει, &c. He that denies the Son to be Homooliosis, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner, he, who retaining the word Homooliosis or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likenet in substance, affirments the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God; but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand these words, Of the substance of the Father, be, not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial, or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only, as a figure, is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word Homooliosis, yet be doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according to the customary signification thereof, for that, which hath one and the same essence or substance, this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense, than to signify that, which hath the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Where we see plainly, that though the word Homooliosis be interpreted,
That which hath one and the same essence or substance, yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with another. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. Augustine to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, contra Maxim. chap. the 15th, writeth thus, Du ventur bonum, et si nullus eorum filius fuit alterius, unius tamen ejusdem sunt substantiae. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiae, etiam si non sit per omnia similitis patri. Quadcirca verus Dei filius, & unius cum patre substantiae est, quia verus filius est; & per omnia est patri similitus, quia est Dei filius. Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God. Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the Son is of the same substance with his father, or any one man with another. Again, the same St. Augustine, in his Respon. ad Sermonem Arianorum, expresseth himself thus: Ariani nos vocant Homoeoufanos, qui contra eorum errorem, Graecus vocabulo ipsecum defendimus, Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdemque substantiae, vel, ut expressius dicamus, essentiae (quia alia Graec appellatur) quod planius dicitur unius ejusdemque substantiae. Et tamen siquis isorum, qui nos Homoeoufanos vocat, filium suum non cujusque esset, sed diversae diceret esse substantiae, exobosari ab ipso mallem filiuni, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate exit, cecantur, qui cum confiteantur unum Dei filium, nonunt ejusdem substantiae etiam, cum Patre etiam firment, sed diversae atque imparis, multorum modis redugibus diffimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo est creatus; gratissimi, non naturalis. The Arians call us Homoeoufians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks Homoeous, that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called Oulía, which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons, who thus call us Homoeoufians, who would not as willingly be disbarred, as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety therefore are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge, that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only. Lastly (to name no more places), in his first book De Trinitate, he hath these words: Si filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum patre substantiae est. Omnis enim substantia, quae Deus non est, creatura est; & quia substantia non est, Deus est. Et si non est filius ejusdem substantiae, cujus est pater, ergo falsa substantia est. If the Son be not a creature, then is he of the same

same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, That the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word Homousios against Arians, intended not therein to assure the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their declaring and disowning those two words, Tautoousion and Monoousion. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus; "Kaiâ lèγομεν Ταυτοουσιον, ouâ μν ἐν Λίτε παρὰ τιτι λεγομένων, Σαβηλλων απεικονιζεί Ταυτον δὲ λέγομεν τη Σιμόθη, χρη συνάξ, χρη τη δικαια. We affirm not the Son to be Tautoousion, (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power. Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he undertook this only of a general or specific, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is; and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word Homousios; he therefore rejecting that other word Tautoousion, because it would be liable to misinterpretation, and to be taken, in the Sabellian sense, for that, which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word Homousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word Monoousios, Athanasius himself, in his Exposition of Faith, thus expressly condemns it, ων τη γραμματεια Φρονομεν, ις τη Σαβηλλων Μονοουσιον χρη συνάξ. 'Ομοιωσιον. We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be Monoousios, and not Homousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son. Where onsa, essence or substance, in that fictitious word Monoousios; is taken for singular or existent essence, the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellians, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word Homousios is understood a common or universal, general or specific, or singular essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a Monoousian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a Tautoousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis: they alike distinghuishing them from the Homousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated, or creators. From whence it is plain, that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several persons of the trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius; Τριας δὲ των ονωματών, καὶ Φωναιας λεγον, ἀλλα αληθειας καὶ πραξεις Τριας. The trinity is not a trinity.

trinity of mere names and words only, out of hypostases, truly and really existing. But the Homooousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that Monoousian trinity of Sabellius, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing, and that other Heterousian trinity of Arius, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances, (one of which only was God, and the other creatures,) this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by Athanasius; οὔτε ἐλάχιστον τι φρόνει ἡ Καθολικὴ Εὐκλησία, εἰς μὴ εἰς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Καὶ τὸν Ιησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν Θεὸν, εἰς τὰς Σαβελλιανὰς περὶ πίστιν οὔτε πλείους ἐπίπεδον, εἰς μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἰσακίαν τοῦτο τὸν Ποιότητον καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυτικῶς καλακυλίσθη: The catholic church doth neither believe less than this Homooousian trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan politheism and idolatry; it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures, together with the Creator.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonick Christian would conclude, that the orthodox trinity of the ancient Christian church did here agree with the genuinely Platonick trinity, that it was not Monoousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As likewise, the right Platonick trinity does agree with the trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not Heterousian, but Homooousian, co-essential, or confubstantial; none of their three hypostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time, but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this Homooousiotes, or co-essentiality of the three persons in the trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then shall we conclude, that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons in the trinity being but three individuals under the same species (as Peter, Paul, and Timothy) and having no other natural unity or identity, than specifical only? Indeed some have confidently fastened this upon Athanasius, because, in those Dialogues of the Trinity 1, published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grossly owned, and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men, but only then when they differ from one another, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another father found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athanasius, in those others his reputedly genuine writings, does sometime approach

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1 Dialog. I. p. 160. Tom. II. Oper.
approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stresses upon this homoeofo
tes, this coessentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three
persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled,
Concerning the common essence of the three persons, and the chapter inscribed,
"Oys iv eiis treis Iost, That there are not thee Gods, doth Aibanosius lay his
foundation here. When to that question propos'd, How it can be said,
that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that
there are not three Gods? the first reply which he makes is this, οτα κοινο
τις Φυσις, κωνικαι δυομα τις α'ιωνον το τε εις πληθυν διηγειαν αντo
μις Φυσις, ει δομαλι καλεται και οτα οριοisSelected τος αυθοτος, τον παλιον Ανθρωπον
tη ορυγη υποκειμενον, ειτ διαβοτω καλψ το διαλατσεια το κοτρων, αε αυτo
θεωτο διαλατσεια. Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one com-
mon name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, di-
vided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For
both when he is angry with men, doth he call all those, who are the objects of
his anger, by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world,
is be reconciled thereto as to one man. The first infinances, which he gives
hereof, are in Gen. the 6th, the 3d and 7th verses; My spirit shall not al-
ways strive with man, and I will destroy man whom I have created. Upon
which, Aibanosius makes this reflection: και τα τις κατα τη Σαλασσα, πιντιον
μετα μιρην αρισκται εν τη Σαλασσα, ηπ τον αυτον Ανθρωπον η Θεον δειον
εις ιπτων πολλων αναρηται ηλ εκ ιπτως μελε ιψινον, ημ επη τον θεον οι
βολοι και παση της Φυσις, και το της νάτου τοι πολλοι ητι τοις αυτοις α
γεοι, ηπως και ουκ εστιν ηρρται αι Σαλασσας τη πληθυ τοις αυτοις ιπτω
τοις μελε ιμερες αυτον Ανθρωπον και το της νάτου τοις ιπτων 
ιπτων ιμερες άγας έχω τοις πολληι της Φυσις. When Pharaoh went ou
the Red-sea, and fell, with infinite chariots in the same; and there were
many men, that were drowned together with him, and many horse's; yet Moles knowing, to that was but one nature
of all those, that were drowned, speaks thus both of the men and
horse's. The Lord hath thrown both the horse and the rider into the sea:
he calling such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a mul-
titude of horse's but one horse. Whereupon Aibanosius thus concludeth; Π. 214. 
i εν τωις Ανθρωποις, οπως εν θεως της Φυσις. Πληθυ τω τη Φυσις και
ωικες, και θεος εκ της Φυσις εις Ανθρωπον εις τοις αυτοις, οι δε
Ανθρωποι εις της Φυσις γενομενοι, εις τοις πολλοις, οι δε απο
κατα Χρονον. If therefore amongst men, where the things of nature are confounded, and where
there are differences of form, power and will (all men not having the same dis-
position of mind, nor form, nor strength) as also different languages, (from
whence men are called by the poets Meropes) nevertheless, by reason of the
community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Tri-

Chap. IV. make the Trinity one God.
of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God? But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine fectus of Athanasius) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this κοινόν τῆς φύσεως, a common nature, essence, or substance, of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those Scripture-passage are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action, of which more afterwards. Moreover, Athanasius elsewhere plainly implies, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians, where he tells us, that his Trinity of divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendour, and the light from both. Now, three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως, a common nature, essence, and substance, and therefore are coessential or consubstantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that, according to Athanasius, this specifick identity or unity, is not sufficient to make the three divine hypostases one God. Again, the fame Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith, writeth thus; οὕτως τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μεμεριζομέναι καὶ ἑαυτὰς, ἄστος συμμαθησόμεναι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἑν τῷ λογίσμῳ, ἂς τὰ δὴ Φυσιομενον. Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporally in men) that we may not comply with the pagan polytheism. From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though co-essential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specifick nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude polytheism from the Trinity. Wherefore, the true reason, why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this Homoeousiotás, or co-essentiality of the Trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. This Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them, πολλὰς καὶ εἰσάγων [Θεος] διὰ τὸ ἑπεξετάσας αὐτῶν, That they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity. And again afterwards determining, that there is ἐν τῷ τῆς Θεότητος, one species of the Godhead, in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds; ὡς τῷ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὑμολογουμένῳ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἕνα πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐως ἑξετάσας θεοῦ τῆς πολὺ ἑπεξετάσας τῶν ἑως ταῖς Θεότη-τος, ὧν τῷ μίαν ἐν τῆς τριάδος Θεότητος ἑπεξετάσας ἐν γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἢ ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἐς ἐν οἷῳ πολὺς καὶ καιρόις ἐν τῷ ὕμνῳ ἑπεξετάσας θεοῦ, ὡς τῷ μίαν καὶ τῶν ἑπεξετάσας θεοῦ, καὶ ἐς της τριάδος, τῶν ἑπεξετάσας θεοῦ. And thus do we acknowledge one only God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously, than those heretics do, who introduce a multiform Deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called God by these Arians, then
then must be and his father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature. In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council, he p. 275. affirmeth, concerning the Arians, that there is a separate existence of the different persons of the Trinity, or the one Godhead, in three persons. That they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy world into three heterogeneous substances, separate from one another. Whereas the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is nowhere thus described by him; for they show the insufficiency hereof, conclude thus, and say, that in the unity of the Creator, there must be a more than one Creator, to each of which the Creator be and his Father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature. And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, I and my father are one, only in respect of content or agreement of will, Athanasius shewing the insufficiency hereof, concludes that the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing alien, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together. Wherein the unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son, Where by unity of essence or substance, that Athanasius did not mean a union of singular and individual existence, but of general or universal essence, only, appears plainly from these following words: That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are three persons of one substance, Ep. de Syn. A. though they have separate existence, they are not separate from one another. For those things, which are made or created, though they may have a agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son, being begotten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him. So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of essence with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that, which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the father. There are also many other places in Athanasius, which though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generick or specific essence only, or else in such other senses as shall be afterwards declared. As for example, in his fourth oration, Bill. 5. we acknowledge only one Godhead in the Trinity; where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead, that is, of one substance, wherein the Son, and the Father, and the Holy Ghost, are three persons of one substance, Id. 463. Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then must he be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature. Again, when in the same book it is said, Vid. 455. the substance of the Father is one substance with the Father; that the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead; it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of such another sameness of unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere, said

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by him to be μία ἐνίοτε, one essence or substance, this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other sentences before mentioned.

But though Athanasius no where declare the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be monoosean; and though he lay a great stress upon their εἰδική ἑστία, their specific or generic unity, and coessentiality, in order to their being one God, for as much as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration, μία ἀρχή, κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτὸ τὸν Θεό, There is but one principle, and accordingly but one God. Again, in his book against the Sabellianists, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ὁ Θεός, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος πατὴρ, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ὁ γενναῖος Θεός, οὐδεὶς ἅγιος Θεός, οὐδεὶς ἅγιος Πνεῦμα. There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that, which is begotten, is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods; which was the impiety of Marcion. Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth, τὸν Θεὸν ἰδιότατον, τὸν πάτερα, ἀρχήν ἕνα κατὰ τὸν Θεόν. That the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root; and fountain of the Son. And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dinoytus, οὗτος ἐκ τούτου ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἔκτοτος, ὁ Θεός, κατὰ τὸν Θεόν, οὗτος οὗτος προέρχεται. That God (the Father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son, a river poured out from him. To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendor; to the prototype and the image. And he concludes the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner, τὸν Θεὸν τρίαδα εἰς ἕνα ὅπειρον εἰς κοσμόν τοὺς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀλοῦ τοῦ παν- ἱματιστοῦ, λεγον, τοῖς εἰς τὸν θάνατον πάντοις πάσι κοσμίζει, Ο hen the divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head. But the chief force of this consideration is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity is a Trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: far and much as, were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

In the next place therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three divine hypostases are not μερισματίσμαι and κοινωνισμαι, separate and disjoined beings.
to Athanasius, one God.

being, but adiaphora, indivisibly united to one another. Thus in his fifth oration \( ^1 \), πατερα κρυπτωσον ζων εν αιωνας τω Θεοτυς, και τω εικονει, αμφισειον και κοτις ενας των λογιων απο τω πατρες. The father and the son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjointed with him. Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only general and universal; because in the following words he supposeth them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably conjointed together, again, in his book De Sent. Dionys. ους αδιαφορας τα αποκρυπτωμεν προς το Φως, The Son is indivisible from the Father, as the splendor is from the light. And afterwards in the same book he insisteth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after this manner: οι δε ζων και αδιαφορας της των πατερα δοτικα των ζων ειναι διεπικειμενα, με έχειν το λογιον προς τον ουκ εις τον κρυπτων, προς την ηγους, ει μεν αν διαμειναι και αποκρυπται του λογιου και τον εκ της ανατολης, Φως τω πωτηρων και τω σημειῳ μερισθαι και τιμηθαι διεπικειμεναι, το αποκρυπτωμεν αμφισειον απο τον Φως ἐτερον, &c. Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisible from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and to separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendor from the light? Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Goth is not a creature, διεπικειμενοι πρόποτον αυτω τω αποκρυπτομενοι ους ουκ εις τον κρυπτων, τω σημειῳ μερισθαι και ανατολεις προς ταλαιθη, a Trinity undivided and united to itself. Which Athanasian indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendor, nor the splendor without the original light, and neither one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendor, and an eternal light. And secondly, that these are so nearly and intimately conjointed together, that there is a kind of συνιστωσις, continuity, betwixt them; which yet is not to be understood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjointed with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers \( ^2 \) have called ἐμπεριστάσεως, their circuminfection. To this purpose does he cite the words of Dionysius, ἀπόφρωμαι γαρ τω λόγῳ, και από κοπικες δια ἐμπεριστάσεως, ἐνεπεριστάσεως τινι καιριν λόγιον, και ούτοις ἐν τοις ἐκατέρωπρον ἐν καταστασις, ἐφεξῆς ἀν τοπον, και εντοιοις ὑπέρ οὕτω και ὁ πατὴρ και ὁ λόγον και ὁ θεόν. \( ^3 \)

\( ^1 \) P. 529. \( ^2 \) P. 566. \( ^3 \) See Petav. Lib. IV. de Trinitate, Cap. XVI. p. 263; Tom. I. Dogmat. theolog.
The Perichoresis in the Trinity. Book I.

For reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart, into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other. And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendor, he affirming 

In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of the picture. And therefore if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a profopoeia bespeak him after this manner; 

Orat. 4. 457. 

And further, that worshippest the image, therein worshippest the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king. Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insineth upon this particular; 

Orat. 4. [P. 453.] 

The Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, being derived from it, as the splendor from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that be, who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendor, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river.

Orat. 4. [P. 453.]
CHAP. IV. Another Notion of Homousios.

Lastly, the same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three divine hypostases to make up one entire divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; or the root, and the stock, and the branches, one entire tree. And in this sense also, is the whole trinity said by him to be μία Σιώπης, and μία Φύσις, and μία Ψυχή, and εἰς Σείώς, one divinity, and one nature, and one essence, and one God. And accordingly the word Homousios seems here to be taken by Athanasius, in a further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are coessential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly essential thereunto. For when he affirmeth, τὸ φυτὸν εἰς μία Ψυχήν ὁμοφύσις, and τὰ κλάδων ὑποστάσεις τῆς ὑπερήπνοια, That the tree is congruous or homogeneal with the root, and the branches coessential with the vine, his meaning is, that the root, stock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but also all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congeners and coessential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire Divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three divine hypostases have not a concept of will only, but essentially one and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce ad extra, μίαν ὑποστάσιν, one and the self-same energy, operation, or action; nothing
nothing being peculiar to the Son as such, but only the economy of the incarnation: "οὐ γόητος ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὴν Φυσιν καὶ Ἴοτε\(\) πάντως μὴ πάντως ἔδοξειν
οὐχ ἔδοξεν διὰ τὸ Λόγον, ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ πάντως πνεύματι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκ τὸῦ Πνεύματος ἀνεβαίνει καὶ ὁ ἄνευ τοῦ ἁγίου Τριώνα\(\) καὶ ὁ ὡς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκπαντεύεσθαι μεταβάλλειν \(\) ἐπὶ πάντως, καὶ ἴση πάντως, καὶ ἐν πάντως ἐπὶ πάντως μεν ὡς πάντως, ἢς οὐκ οὐδὲν ἀπερὶ πάντως ἐκ τὸ λόγον ἐν πάντι ὅ, ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ. The trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things. And thus is the unity of the holy Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle, and fountain; through all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit. And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three divine hypostases, though not Monousious, but Homoousious only, are really but one God or Divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonick trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonick Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonick trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare, that wheresoever this most genuine Platonick trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Conconstantinopolitane councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writings, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that creed, commonly called Athanian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgement of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to divine providence, for the preferring of the Christian church from lapsing, by Arianism, into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those, which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason, why we introduced the Platonick Christian here thus apologizing, was first; because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity, that the ancient Platonick trinity should be made more disrepeant from the Christia; than indeed it is. And secondly, because, as we
have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonick trinity was doubtless Anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity Anti-Platonick; the second and third hypostases, in the Platonick trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonick Euxenius, or gradations, so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril’s leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastick historian, not without cause wonders, how those two prebishops Georgius and Timareus should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were accounted such great readers of Plato and

Origen; Ωομάχαθε δε τοι Ευξενίου, τον δον ουανον, ην Αρειαν, Σπαντεια παχεμενειν, ιδιον τον Πλατώνα οικαν και μετα χειρας ειχεν, ο δε τον Οριγενην ανιπτειν επει δε γης Πλατων ην τον Σωφρονιου και το Τριτον ανιπτον, ως αυτος ουμαχειν εισεχειν, αρχην υπορεξους εικεπιν την και οριγεινος πολλης ιολογει πον ην το παλειν. It seems to me wonderful, how those two persons should persist in the Arian persuasion; one of them having always Plato in his hands, and the other continually breathing Origen. Since Plato no where affirmeth his first and second caulis (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their existence; and Origen every where confesseth the Son to be coeternal with the Father.

Besides which, another reason for this apology of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Platonick Pagans after Christianity did approve of the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, represent the genuine Platonick trinity as really the same thing, with the Christian, or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or the manner of expression. The former of these is evident from that famous passage of Amelius contemporary with Plutinus, recorded by Eusebius; St. Cyril, and Theodoret;

Και αυτος ερενον ο Λογος, και γενεις ευ νανο πολλων, τον γυμνακα ινανειν, ως αυτον αν ην Ηροδοτος, ην και αι νανος. Χριστιαν τον θεον ειναι ην θεον ειναι. ει την παλαι ανοικετον, εια την γινομενον ζων και ζωον και ει την περικεισθαι. Και ει την αιωναλα πελες ην σεληνι ινδοσαμενον, Φιλοτεοτατον, μετα την περικετη εικετην της φυσεως τον μεγαλον άρμενη και αλαλολη παλαι αποθεοθεται, και θεον ειναι ην ειναι το την εις την αιωναλα και την ανθρωπον καταθηκαν. And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that Barbarian also placed in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God; and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also that he descended into a body, and being clothed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body. In which words, Amelius speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. And the same is further manifested from what St. Athanasius writeth concerning a Platonist in his time, Iniustum Eutychianos, cui nomen est Eutychianus, qui etiam Platonistus. He saith τα ανθρωπον, qui possidet Mediolanum. ecclesiae praefedit episcopus, ch. 34.
The Father's Sense of the Book I.

scopus, scoliamus audire, auris literis conscribendum, & per omnes ecclesiæ in locis eminentissimis proponendum eft dicebat. We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, afterward bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed, the beginning of St. John's gospel desired to be written in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches. And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies; Justin Martyr, in his apology affirmeth of Plato, diviner χῦραν τοι παρε Θεω λαγης οικεστι; τοι δε τριτη το λεγοντι επεξεργασα το θεσπις πειμαλι, &c. That he gave the second place to the Word of God; and the third to that spirit, which is said to have moved upon the waters. Clemens Alexandrinus speaking of that passage in Plato's second epistle to Diomynus, concerning the first, second, and third, writeth thus; ευ δειπως γυμη εξαιπω, η της εαυτος τριαδε μονωδαι, τριτη μεν γαρ εις το χρυσον πνευμα του ου δε ειτοντεν, δε το παλον εγνωτε νατα έξωσιν το παλεσ. I understand this no otherwise, than that the Holy Trinity is signified thereby, the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father. Origen also affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus, θα παντι επεξεργασατε εις Κλεας, και πολλεν του Πλατωνοε παρατηρεψίν, εις, εις εις, εις του πεις Ερμηνευς και Κορίτσου επιστολης Celfus, who pretendeth to know all things, and who writeth so many other passages out of Plato, doth purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and conceal that, which he wrote concerning the Son of God, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus; *where he calls him the God of the whole universe, and the prince of all things, both present and future; afterwards speaking of the Father of this prince and cause. And again, elsewhere in that book, he writeth to the fame purpole, δια της έποδος τοι παρε Πλατωνι εν ταις επιστολαις αλεξιμην, δι εις τοις αυτεσ ερμηνησιν, περι το διορισκον το τω, ως εις εις τω, παρατηρης εις αυτους υπο του Πλατωνος, δι πολλας ερμηνευς, αναγκαζονται, παραβλεπονται, δει δι μεν εμπεριερον τις τω παλεσ, ηοι εις τω, ιε δε πρωτα και εις παλε τως παλεσ εις αυτω. Neither would Celfus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle before mentioned, concerning the former and governour of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father. Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed de Spiritu Sancto, affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Pycche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: Hujus sempiterna virtus & divinitas, cum in propria natura, ab inquitioribus mundi antiquis philosophis propriè investigari non posset; subtilissimis tamen intuiti conscientia compositional mundi, & distinctissimis elementorum affectibus, presentem omnibus animam adjuvissi dixerunt; quibus, secundum genus & ordinem singularum, vitam preberet & motum, & intrangressibles figeret metas, & stabilitatem assignarent; & universem banc vitam, hanc motum, hanc rerum essentiam.

* The following are not Origen's words, passage of Plato cited by Origen, but Dr. Cudworth's, who thus explains the...
Genuine Platonick Trinity.

In the next place Eusebius Cæsari. Pr. Ev. 1. 11. gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonick, at least as to the main, with the Chriftian trinity, which he will have to have been the Cabala of the ancient Hebrews, thus: 

[quote from the text]

The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost, after the Father and the Son, in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed Trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also tranfend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first, caufe: see bow Plato enigmatically declareth the fame things in his epiftle to Dionylius, in these words, &c. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first God, and to a second caufe, and to a third the fould of the world, which they call also the third God. And the divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle. But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonifts; that though they derived the second hypoftasis of their Trinity from the firit, and the third from the second, yet they fuppofed both their second and third hypoftases to be uncreated; and therefore does he fend the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one 'Agenneto, one self-originat-ed Being, would unskillfully conclude, that the Word or Son of God mutt therefore needs be a creature. Thus in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council, ξροσάζοντο παρ Ελληνων λατινώ τιν λέγει τιν 'Αγεννήτων' 

[quote from the text]

The Arians borrowing the word Agennetos from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one such) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right significations of that word Agennetos from those very Platonifts, who gave it them. Who, though acknowledging their second hypoftasis of Nous or Intellecf, to be derived from the first called Tagathon, and their third hypoftasis or Pycbe from the second; neverthelefs doubt not to affirm them both to be Ageneta or uncreated, knowing wel1; that hereby they detra€ nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore, the Arians either ought so to speak as the Platonifts do; or else to lay nothing at all concerning these things, which they are ignorant of. In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain diffinction made betwixt 'Εγνών and 'Άγιών, that is, unlegotten and uncreated; and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him,
not to be Ἀγέννητος, unbegotten, (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only Ἀγέννητος) yet is he here said to be Ἀγέννητος, uncreated; he declaring the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypothenes of their trinity, not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Ἀιβανάφις, concerning the Platonick trinity, is a great vindication of the same. We might here further add St. Austin's confession also, that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did ἐποσπονεῖν ἄνωτέρω πατέρων ἑνεσθεῖν, the latter, ἐποσπονεῖν; Plotinus did ἐποσπονεῖν his Ψυχή, or soul, after the paternal Intellect; but Porphyrius interposed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both. It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonick trinity, but only that Homousiothe of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not all be God, or uncreated, but also three coequal individuals, under the same ultimate species; as three individual men; keeving that gradual subordination, that is in the Platonick trinity, to be a certain tange of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludes, ὅπόν οὐκ ἔχειν ὁλοκλήρως τοῦ ἀληθείας, That Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Ψυχή; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison, which Socrates drunk. Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypothenes to be three individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcedius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian; though his language indeed is too much paginical, when he calls the three divine hypothenes, a chief, a second, and a third God: Ἰσιους τοῦ δισθεσίου ταλις μενες concipienda est; originem quidem rerum esse summum & ineffabilem Deum; post providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis utrinque subesterna quam temperarie; tertium esse porro substantiam, quae secundam mens intellectusque dicitur, quas quaedam custos legis eterna. His subjettae esse rationales animas, legi obsequentes, ministras verò potestate, &c. Ergo summus Deus juvem, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animae verò legem agunt. This thing is to be conceived after this manner; that the first original of things is the supreme and ineffable God; after his providence, a second God, the establishment of the law both eternal and temporary; and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second Mind or Intellect) is a certain keeper of this eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers, &c. So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the third executes. But souls are subject to the law. Where Chalcedius, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledging no such beings as Henades and Noes, but only three divine hypothenes, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony of
testimony of Theodoret in his book De Principio; the Platonists, Numenius, and Plotinus, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three superior temporals or eternals, Good, Mind or Intellect, and the Soul of the universe; he calling that Tagathon, which to us is Father; that Mind or Intellect, which to us is Son or Word; and that Psyche, or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghost. And these things (faith he) were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Hebrews.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of Almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the Pagan world, and be received by the wilest of all their philosophers, before the times of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity amongst the learned Pagans. Which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides their other adulterations of the Trinity before mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did in all probability, for this very reason, quite innovate, change and pervert the whole Cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of divine hypostases; they first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Zamblicbus, who in his Egyptian Mysteries, where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypotheses, writeth in this manner: ή τι ώς ηδιον, ή των άλλων άνηρ, κα των άλλων άνήρ, άντι θεος εις παραστοκ, ή τω παραστό ήδιον ή τω φυσικόν αντηρ άλλων άνηρ, δια της ιενης έμπνης μενεν εν γαρ ηπον αυτω επιλυκεται, ένε αλλο αυτον έπειταν γε μενεν άντων άπαν άνηρ έπειταν, ένε αλλο της ανατολης γε μενεν την ανταρχης ανηρ έπειταν, ή τω φυσικόν αντηρ άλλων άνηρ, δια της ιενης έμπνης μενεν εν γαρ ηπον αυτω επιλυκεται, ένε αλλο αυτον έπειταν γε μενεν άντων άπαν άνηρ έπειταν, ένε αλλο της ανατολης γε μενεν την ανταρχης ανηρ έπειταν, ή τω φυσικόν αντηρ άλλων άνηρ, δια της ιενης έμπνης μενεν εν γαρ ηπον αυτω επιλυκεται, ένε αλλο αυτον έπειταν. Before those things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God superior to the first God and king, immutable, and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient God, who is Autopator, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this
is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence. Where, so far as we can understand, Jamblicbus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagatham, or monad, which is the first of the three divine hypostases. And this doctrine was afterward taken up by Proclus, he declaring it in this manner: ποταμες ἔτη τὸ πληθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναχτὸν αὐτοφυγοι εἰδόθην. μᾶλλον ἐν πρὸ τό πληθὺς κατὰ τὸν πληθὺς τοὺς πληθυντές ἐν αἴει ἤτοι, ἢ πάντες. Ξεινάπατρίς ἄπυ μονάδες ἀρχηλια. δὲι μὴν γὰρ ἐκ πρώτου προελθεῖν τοῦ αἰτιοῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν περὶ τῆς ἑκδριάς ἡ μορφή. ἢ μὲν οἰ νομοἀρχιον νεραίς ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἰς, θεομον ναὶ τοὺς θεῶν τάξεων ἐκ πληθυν ἀρχηλια ἐκ ἁρχα ἐκ πρώτου. ἀρχηλια. Ξεινάπατρίς ἄπυ μονάδες. Plato every where ascends from multitude to unity, from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity. Here Proclus, though endeavouring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing left that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before the trinity of demiurgick hypostases, there must be a single monad or head, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jamblicbus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonick theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of Porphyry: ἀλλα θεομον ἀπαντάρμος τοῦ πρὸ τό αὐτοφυγοι, Φάσκωνε μη διών ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ συν. αριστεύει τοις. ἢ πρὸς ἄρτιν ἐξερεύναμα γὰρ ἀπὸ πάνως κανονικά διὸ τὸ εἶναι ἀπαντάρμο πώς ἀρχηλια ἀυτοῦ μονάδων ἀπὸ δὲ τὸ ΝΟΤΥ (ἀρχηλα γάρ ἔτος) τῆς πρῶτης μονᾶς συμβαίνει. But those before mentioned contradicted this doctrine (of Porphyry and the ancient Platonists) affirming, that the Tagathon ought not to be comprehended or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or conjunction with any other. Wherefore those begin their trinity with Nous or Intellect, making that the first. The only difference here is, that Jamblicbus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus, after them. Wherefore, it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene council and Athanafius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually flated and settled, and much to be insifted upon by Christians, Jamblicbus and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonick Trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the first of them being not coordinate with the other three, nor confociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that
that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age of Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the trinity, and so a quaternity of divine hypostases; Platonius positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or Cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numenius, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates, Toto sum Eυσεβ. P. E; τιθεν τον Σωφίτας, that he also (before Plato) offered three gods; that is, three divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans.

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides his Henades and Nees before mentioned, added certain other phantastick trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect; (to omit others;) whereby that ancient Cabala and Σωφίτας, theology of divine tradition, of three archical hypostases, and no more, was disfigured, perverted, and adulterated.

But besides this advantage from the ancient Pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans, admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christi-anity doth; (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophick Pagans) there is another advantage of the same extending even to this present time, probably not unintended also by divine providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits precipitantly condemning the doctrine of the trinity for nonsense, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant and conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no byass at all upon them, nor any scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they pandei Soci, creature-gods, but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent, and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent; causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonick trinity, because we shall make use of this doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where
Arians charged by the Fathers.  

Book I.

we are to show, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the Pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity, (the Son and Holy Ghost) they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypothesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate Pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatrized, and made highly guilty of that very thing, which it so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Ausin, Paukinus, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself, (and consequently to our Saviour Christ) as he was supposed by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Athanasius, in his fourth oration against the Arians: δια τι ποιος ανθρωπος ναυτης, ου ευσερυθηνα εις των Ελλων, κα χρησιμοτατον ημεραν η την ευκαιριαν πειρατεια τα παντα θεον

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ει δε οι μεν Ελληνες εις αυκατην απο πολλοις γενοις λατρεουσι, ουτο δε εις γενειν γε αυκαιην, ουτο εις διαφοραν αλληλους ο, τε χρησεν αυτων λατρειαν εις γενειαν εις πολλαν ιτη, οι πολλοι αυ ιτη των Ελλων την αυτην την εις τατο φανερων, ην εταιρος χρησιμοτατοται εις πολλους ιτης, ουτο δε εις τας ανθρωπινας εις αυτης εις τας ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας Ωλοις ιτης, ουτο δε εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρωπινας εις της ανθρω.
hypotases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire divinity.

But the principal things, which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers, where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἐν ἡγιάστω καὶ πολλὸς ἅγιος λατρείαι ἐδέχοντο, worship only one uncreated, and many created gods; so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolaters, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in worshipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his 37th oration: τί δὲι ἡγιάστω καὶ πολλὸς ἅγιος λατρείαι ἐδέχοντο; What then would some say, is there not one divinity also amongst the Pagans, as they, who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare? And that full and remarkable one of Irenaeus, where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles: ηὗ τε καὶ εἰς ἀριστέραν τοῦ θεοῦ φυλάσσεται τὸ πρῶτον τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ εὐγνώμονα τοῦ θεοῦ, that they so revered the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator: that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the creator of this universe. The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers, who charged the Arians with Pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, that not to be incapable of idolatry, who worship one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers, the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship, which is given to the supreme God, and therefore according to the modern distinction, not λατρεία, but δαιμονία, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave such an inferior worship to Christ, the Son, or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defeatable, than they did to that eternal God, who was the Creator of him.

* Pag. 601. Tom. I. Oper.
him. As those fathers imply, the Pagans themselves to have given much
an inferior worship to their πολλοι γενναί Θεοι, their many gods, whom
themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did in ἀγαπη, to that
one uncreated God.

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the God-
head, were nevertheless, by the fathers, condemned as guilty of idola-
try, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ,
the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a
creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt, who
bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of
men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent
God, the Creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however
conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them
as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and
that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls,
were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them, to give an infe-
rior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself,
according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted lefs,
to bestow the fame upon those other creatures, made by him, as angels
and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and Son of God, however sup-
posed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such; and is in Scrip-
ture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship, (worship,
him all ye gods;) so that the Arians, though formally idolaters, according to
their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so: whereas
these religious angels and saint-worshippers must be as well materially as
formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made
no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the su-
preme God, it being that, whereby he is adored as self-existent and omni-
potent, or the Creator of all; and Doulia, such an inferior religious worship,
as is communicable to creatures: but concluded of religious worship uni-
versally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator
only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration 1,
ει γάρ ὡς τῇ δόξῃ υπερήφανον προσκυνεῖτο, ἐδει καὶ ἐκείνου τῶν ὑποτελεστῶν,
tον υπερήφανον προσκυνεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκ ἑαυτὸς οὐκ ἐστιν, κατάστημι γὰρ κτίσμα τοῦ προσκυνεῖ,
ἀλλὰ κτίσμα Θεόν. If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped, (though
a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every in-
ferior being to worship what is superior to it: whereas the case is otherwise;
for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Cre-
ator. Now they, who distinguish religious worship, into Latria and Doulia,
must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that, which is superior
to us, and not the Creator only; which is here contradicted by Athanasius.
But becaufe it was objected against these orthodox fathers by the Arians,
that the humanity of our Saviour Chrift, which is unquestionably a crea-
ture, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see
what account Athanasius gives of this: ἣ κτίσμα προσκυνεῖμεν, μὴ γε-
ναίοι· Εὐθυκρῖνος γὰρ καὶ Ἀρείποιος ἡ Τοικότητ πλανή· ἀλλὰ τοῦ Κόσμου τῆς κτίσεως
σκόμματι τῶν τῇ Θεῷ Δόξῃ προσκυνώμεν· εἰ γάρ καὶ τῇ πολείς αὐτή καὶ ἐν τῷ
μέγας

1 Tag. 394. Tom. I. Oper.
The Divinity in Christ.

Chap. IV.

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 to the worship of a God, as including oneness in it, from the Pagan polytheism, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen; and that their polytheism was partly but phantastical, nothing but the polyphony of one supreme God, or the worshiping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also; yet this was only of many inferior, or created gods, subordinate to one supreme 'Ayaotò, or uncreated.

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did consider the idea and propriety of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into atheism; there can be no reason why it should be thought absolutely impossible, for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent

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deities. But as for independent Gods invisible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this anywhere, nor find any more than a demi-theism, of a good and evil principle: only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly mistaken, as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain, that they were but very few; because, amongst the most barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found, without an acknowledgment of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries, which have been made of them, since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the forementioned atheistic objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a further account of the natural and real polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry, chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshiping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprized in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistic grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and reserve those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of atheism, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only sub-joining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistic arguments proposed.