Globalization & Development
Themes and Concepts in Current Research

Edited by
Don Kalb
Wil Pansters
Hans Siebers

Kluwer Academic Publishers
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Globalization and Development
Themes and Concepts in Current Research

Edited by

Don Kalb
Utrecht University,
Utrecht, The Netherlands
and Central European University,
Budapest, Hungary

Wil Pansters
Utrecht University,
Utrecht, The Netherlands

and

Hans Siebers
Tilburg University,
Tilburg, The Netherlands

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK, BOSTON, DORDRECHT, LONDON, MOSCOW
Acknowledgements

The initial motivation for this book arose in 2001 from a project initiated by the CERES Research School, hosted by Utrecht University, about key conceptual issues in the field of development and social transformation. The result was a synthesizing study authored by Wil Pansters and Hans Siebers which led the CERES Board to support and facilitate the formation of six working groups composed of specialists focused on specific themes. We wish to thank CERES’ former and current scientific directors, prof. dr. Arie de Ruijter and prof. dr. Ton Dietz, who made this possible. ‘Pathways of Development’, as the project became known, could always count on their backing. The groups were chaired by Mayke Kaag, Valentina Mazzucato, Monique Nuijten, Kees Jansen and Hans Siebers. We wish to express our gratitude for all their organizational and scholarly efforts. A great number of CERES members actively participated in various group and plenary discussions. Some of them appear as co-authors of the chapters published here, others contributed in different ways. The project would not have been possible without the broad involvement of researchers from the different institutes and university departments that make up the CERES Research School. We want to thank all of them for their efforts.

In the last part of this project, others played an important role in bringing it to conclusion. Luisa Steur did an excellent and efficient job in final and language editing. Margot Stoete and Gérard van Bethlehem designed the cover of the book. Henny Hoogervorst and Esther Verdries at Kluwer Academic Press were professional and enjoyable publishers to work with. René Hendriks, from the Faculty of Social Sciences at Utrecht University, was, as always, extremely efficient in turning the manuscript into a camera-ready document. We wish to thank all of them for making the publication of this book a rewarding experience.

Special words of appreciation should go to the members of the CERES office at Utrecht University. Lolita van Toledo, Agniet Cools and Carolien Mulwijk resolved numerous practical, organizational and technical problems that inevitably arise in complex projects like this. Above all, they at all times provided a pleasant environment to work in. A final expression of gratitude should be addressed to the deputy director of CERES, Ab van Eldijk, who played a pivotal role in bringing this project to a good end. His gift to kindly involve and reconcile different interests and convictions demonstrated to be a valuable asset for CERES time and again.

Don Kalb, Wil Pansters and Hans Siebers
Antwerpen/Utrecht, April 2004
# Contents

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS .......................................................... IX

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1

Conflicitive domains of globalization and development.

*Don Kalb, Wil Pansters, Hans Siebers*

CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................... 9

Time and contention in “the great globalization debate”.

*Don Kalb*

CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................... 49

Ways forward in livelihood research.

*Mayke Kaag*

CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................... 75

Identity formation: Issues, challenges and tools.

*Hans Siebers*

CHAPTER 4 ........................................................................... 103

Governance in action.

Some theoretical and practical reflections on a key concept.

*Monique Nuijten*

CHAPTER 5 ........................................................................... 131

Transcending the nation.

Explorations of transnationalism as a concept and phenomenon.

*Valentina Mazzucato*

CHAPTER 6 ........................................................................... 163

Unpacking and re-packing knowledge in development.

*Kees Jansen*
Notes on contributors


Mayke Kaag is an anthropologist. She received her PhD (November 2001) from the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam and is currently attached to the African Studies Centre. Among her recent publications are Usage foncier et dynamique sociale au Sénégal rural; l’histoire d’un bas-fond et de ses défriicheurs (Rozenberg, 2001) and (with L.B. Venema) Local Manifestations of a Globalizing Donor Regime: ‘Good Governance’ in a Senegalese Rural Community. In: Kooiman, D., A. Koster, P. Smets & B. Venema (eds), Conflict in a Globalizing World. Essays in Honour of Peter Kloos. Assen: Van Gorcum, 2002.

Don Kalb is a researcher at the department of anthropology, Utrecht University, and associate professor of sociology and anthropology at Central European University, Budapest. He was the Director of the SOCO Program (social consequences of economic transformation in East Central Europe) at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. His books include Expanding Class: Power and Everyday Politics in Industrial Communities, the Netherlands, 1850-1950 (Duke University Press), 1997; (ed.) The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000; with Herman Tak (eds.), Critical Functions: Pathways beyond the Cultural Turn (Berghahn Books), 2004. He is the founding editor of Focaal-European Journal of Anthropology.

Monique Nuijten is a senior research fellow of the Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, at the department of rural development sociology, Wageningen University. Her PhD thesis studied agrarian reform and land conflicts in Mexico, with a special focus on power relations and the state bureaucracy. At present, she has a research project on institutions and forms of local-global governance with a special focus on Mexico, Peru and Brazil. She recently pub-
lished the book *Power, community and the state; the political anthropology of organisation in Mexico*, Pluto Press, 2003.

Wil Pansters is associate professor at the Department of Cultural Anthropology of Utrecht University. He specializes in political and organizational anthropology. His regional interest is in Latin America, particularly Mexico. He has published nine books and articles in Spanish and English about regionalism, political culture, social movements, and the politics of democratization and transition. He is currently preparing a volume about the transformation of boss-ism (*caciquismo*) in twentieth century Mexico. His most recent research project is about the political and cultural transformation of higher education in Latin America against the background of neo-liberal reform.

Hans Siebers is associate professor at Tilburg University, department of Organizational Sciences. His research lines focus on (1) problems and challenges of multiculturality, (2) identity regulation, politics of identification and diversity at work and in organizations, and (3) conceptual studies including multiculturality, identity formation and social transformation. Currently, he is conducting a comparative research programme on the functioning and career opportunities of migrant co-workers in several Dutch organizations. Each of these research interests has resulted in several publications.

Valentina Mazzucato is a development economist with a specialization in anthropology. She is based at the Department of General and Development Economics at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and at the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Amsterdam. She currently heads a research program on transnational Ghanaian networks in which the effects of these networks on people’s economic behavior are investigated.
Introduction:
Conflicitive domains of globalization and development

Don Kalb, Wil Pansters, Hans Siebers

“Development” has always been a subsumption of space by time. The global development machine that emerged after the Second World War, its policies, bureaucracies and research institutes, worked on the assumption that cultural differences, alternative social structures and organizations, and the spatial contradictions/divergences of capitalism could be projected onto time as the great and ultimate dissolvent. Spatial contrasts were reframed as temporal sequences into the same direction. The poor South was simply the rich North before its take-off. And if it would duplicate its example, with expert and financial support from the North, it could only be a question of time before dissimilarity was ironed out.

The space in which this ironing out was to happen was first of all the national state. After decolonization the number of national states in the world had tripled. Underwritten and supported by the UN and the World Bank – the later infamous IMF was initially meant to help fix the exchanges between developed economies – national states in the South were made responsible for replicating the discovery of modernity in the West, in economics and politics, and on the social and the cultural terrain. The subsumption of space by time implied that modernity was believed to be, could be thought to be, and was implemented to be a ‘modernity in one country’ – not entirely unlike Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’. The national state was the iron cage of modernity and development.

This worked as long as the international environment was conducive to state-led investment, policy initiation and coordination – say to the mid seventies. The crisis of the Northern capitalist economies in the 1970s and 1980s and the fall of the Bretton Woods system made an end to all that. It led to policy competition, mercantilism, swinging exchange rates, turbulence, financialization, and a long period of high real interest rates on the dollar and other currencies. The result was a debt crisis in all national states. The consequences
for dependent economies in the South and in large chunks of the Communist East were grave, expressed among others in run away inflation. After a first try out in the UK in 1976, the Northern response was the transformation of the IMF into a machine for refinancing quasi-bankrupted sovereign states in the South and East with public sources from the North/West. The IMF and the WB were gradually turned into “debt collection devices” (Bienefeld) on behalf of the creditors. After a short decade of training in Latin America and Africa they were additionally charged with overseeing the ‘transition’ to capitalism in the East and got more and more equipped for the full institutional re-engineering of whole countries. The reengineering was meant to turn countries into competitive recipients of foreign finance and investments, turn them into profitable exporters, and re-shape the state and welfare institutions into efficient service providers for market oriented ‘employable’ populations without endangering the dependent state’s primary function of servicing external debts.

The result, not surprisingly, was continued stagnation and depression in much of the South and East. In many places the state had all but lost the capacity to lead, initiate, and coordinate economic policies, except for facilitating ‘globalization’: the practice and ideology of deepening global connectedness to global governance, to global capital flows, to global trade, to global civil society, to global migration, and to the new cultural imperatives of global modernity. Development, thus, had become a sub-theme to the practice and ideology of globalization.

This book comes out of a collective effort on the part of researchers affiliated with the CERES research school in development studies in the Netherlands to discuss a series of themes and concepts that seem crucial to the overlapping fields of globalization and development research. While development in the course of the eighties and nineties was becoming hinged on to globalization, prior approaches to development were increasingly being criticized from postmodernist, ecological, feminist and Marxist corners. An impasse was announced by various actors in the field, and renewed reflection on some of the basic concepts and methods became inevitable. Much of the initial rethinking went under the sign of postmodernism and tended to give priority to micro and actor centered research, abandoning the wider structured connection with space and time, trying to understand local social logics in their own terms. Later, with the emerging discussion on globalization itself, new macro dimensions were added, and efforts were re-launched to articulate local/global approaches, uniting actor based and institutional perspectives in a vision of hierarchically networked social change. The chapters of this book, most of them written by small groups of cooperating specialists, intend to discuss a
set of key themes and concepts that 1) reflect these intellectual and historical developments; 2) are in use by the public, politicians as well as researchers; 3) reflect the continuing concern of students and practitioners of development with international inequality and poverty; 4) and contain crucial discussions and perspectives for a critical engagement with current globalization processes and their consequences, among others by encouraging local/global approaches and re-importing spatial relationships and dynamics into what was once conceived – under developmentalism – as just a technical sequence in time, and later – with the advent of postmodernism – as just another local universe of meaning. The following chapters discuss the notions and issues of globalization, livelihood, identity, governance, transnationalism, and knowledge.

The first chapter of this collection deals with the great question of contemporary globalization and sets the stage for the subsequent chapters. Since the 1990s, globalization has become the conceptual center of political, scientific and public discussions of current social transformations. This chapter claims that, in the early 1990s, globalization – or ‘globalism’ – has become the banner of a political project in which political liberals and neo-liberals made common cause. In the second half of that decade this liberal platform started to unravel again as its contradictions became ever more visible, its public support increasingly doubtful, and its consequences ever more serious. The space was opened up for the emergence of left wing as well as more conservative coalitions, depending on place and context. The compression of time and space apparently did not by itself lead to a more unified social and cultural space but ushered as well in global conflict, rivalry, cultural closure, and ultimately collision and war.

In chapter 1 both the ideological and analytical sides of the concept of globalization will be critically discussed. What was pursued politically and to what extent have its political and ideological interests and coalitions been surpassed and criticized? What was claimed analytically and to what extent can these claims stand the test of critical empirical scrutiny? The chapter first discusses the original claims of the globalizers and then looks at length at the various institutionalist answers that came up in the later nineties, from micro to macro institutionalists, from anthropology to political economy. It will point out that the original claims of the globalizers, promising benefits for all actors in the global theatre, have not been delivered. Comprehensive inequality – social, economic, cultural, political; among nations, within nations, in the world as a whole – has been on the rise as volkswirtschaftliche conceptions of the national and global state have been abandoned. As a consequence, states incurred a systematic shortage of popular legitimacy everywhere, fuelling protest, resigna-
tion, and elite as well as popular exit.

In people’s local responses two fields of questions are basic: the first one is about making a living, the second about making a difference. It has to be stressed that both are about economic, social, political, and cultural issues and that both are relevant in Western as well as non-Western contexts, North and South. Both imply intense connections between local and global relationships and are suffused by power, power projects and power differences. As such they blur conventional distinctions between for example sociology and anthropology, between development studies and cultural studies. They request different disciplines to collaborate and blur.

The question of how people (are able to) make a living points to a number of relevant factors involved in global processes, all associated with the large scale process of proletarianization that chapter 1 argues may well be the underside of neo-liberal globalization. For example, policies of structural adjustment and transition as well as ecological degradation linked to global climate change must be mentioned, but also the differential impact of international investment and the operations of multinational companies. It has to be stressed that for example structural adjustment and the operations of multinationals are associated with very particular conceptions of how people are supposed to make a living, with very specific ideas about preferable modes of life. Here the ideological and political dimensions immediately come to the fore.

The analysis of the impact of these macro forces does not preclude the need for focusing on the various ways people actually try to deal with their impacts and work to make a living. In chapter 2 the concept of livelihood is discussed and further developed as a tool for doing just that, i.e. studying the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of the various ways in which people make a living. The authors argue for a processual and actor-oriented approach to livelihood and for studying up and outwards by addressing issues of formal and informal social security, social exclusion and inequality, thus linking the options of actors with the structure and action of institutions. The consequences of globalization involve, minimally, increased insecurity, risk and vulnerability. The units for livelihood studies are linkages, connections, and networks rather than bounded and integrated social and economic entities.

The ways people make a living are closely related to their ways of constituting and positioning themselves in the world, in other words their identity formation. In chapter 3 it is outlined that this is increasingly understood in terms of making a difference. Making a difference, both within oneself, between oneself and the world, and between us and them, is increasingly at stake in a globalizing world in which existing identifications are challenged and the local embeddedness of identity formations is necessarily questioned.
The ensuing uncertainty, epitomized in the post-fixes of post-national, post-fordist, post-modern, and the multicultural, has become a breeding ground for culture to replace modern ideologies as perhaps the main battle ground for global-local conflicts. Contesting definitions of how people are and are supposed to be have ‘taken over history’ as history was announced to have come to an end after the Cold War. Very specific political interests are involved in the promotion and proclamation of particularistic, universalistic or normative claims of identity formation; hence not just identity but also identity politics. Cultural fundamentalism has become a marked characteristic of the reaction within many European countries towards increased immigration, as in East and South East Asia in response to the actions of the IMF in 1997 and afterwards, and in South and West Asia and the Middle East in response to stagnation, degradation and neo-colonialism.

Consequently, the authors of chapter 3 deconstruct the concept of culture and discuss the problems involved in the application of the concept on an operational level. They prefer to locate the concept of culture at a meta-level, and for different reasons they do the same with the concept of identity formation. They link the latter with other concepts that can be operationalized in empirical research, such as identification, narrative of self and cultural orientation. They also point to a number of philosophical and methodological problems in writing about identity. Especially processes in which identity politics become combined with unequal access to resources or are used to legitimize such inequality require further study because of their potentially dangerous outcomes in multicultural societies (see also the first chapter for the global logics behind such fights). A plea is made for an interdisciplinary approach that combines a focus on individual psychological consequences of identity requirements with analysis of the external imposition of cultural categories through authoritative institutions, power holders and the wider reverberations of conflict.

At the heart of the debate about globalization is the issue of the changing roles of the state in a globalizing context. Of course, this is not just an analytical issue but also a highly contested and ideological one given that the neo-liberal globalization project explicitly pushes towards curtailing the state’s role in society and economy and advocates a rigorous retrenchment of the ‘left hand’ of the state. It goes without saying that such policies play a crucial role in shaping the questions of livelihood and identity formation.

The changing role and capacities of the state are captured by the concept of governance. This concept has recently come up in a variety of different contexts and debates. It hosts first of all a political agenda pushing for norms of conduct such as ‘good governance’, ‘accountability’, and ‘transparency’. As
the writers of chapter 4 argue, this language of administrative neutrality and instrumentality cannot hide the fact of specific political interests embedded in the neo-liberal globalization project behind it. The neutral and expert languages of policy by definition serve to conceal power struggles and political interests.

But apart from language, there is real change in the ways policies are developed and implemented in many parts of the world in the era of globalization. A remarkable shift has taken place in the locus of authority: competences of central governments are slipping away upwards as well as downwards, both to supranational or transnational levels (e.g. EU, UN, IMF) and to local levels and communal institutions. Governmental institutions have also lost initiating and coordinating capacity in that they are often forced to find (global) private and (global) civil society sponsors to be able to develop any policy at all, partly because of the systematic pressure on their fiscal bases, partly as a result of changing global political fashions. This blurring of the boundaries between private and public actors invites as well as reflects the amalgamation of public administration studies with studies of management and organization.

But there is a need for old style political economy as well, the authors powerfully contend. A wide array of new arrangements of governance may be emerging in different contexts, involving multiple actors and institutions linked together in often networks of interactions, but this does not at all mean that each stakeholder is allowed to participate equally or actively, neither that such networks are transparent. Nor does it imply that all outcomes are legitimate, stable or fair. As said above, globalization does not quite entail equality or equal opportunities as the advocates of the globalization project would claim. Governance is always associated with processes of power and domination and, consequently, with resistance and subversion.

The concept of governance raises a number of important questions. What shifts are occurring in the authority and competence of central governments in relation to supranational integration and decentralization in various parts of the world? How can the interactions between governmental institutions, private companies and civic organizations be characterized? How do they affect policy and implementation in concrete cases? How can we describe the arrangements involving different and multiple actors and institutions locked into or linked with complex networks? How can the politics of such hybrid forms be described and explained? These are some of the issues to be dealt with in chapter 4.

Concepts such as livelihood, identity formation and governance present useful windows for envisioning the consequences of globalization – both as a political project and as actual ongoing transformation on various levels – for specific people in specific circumstances as well as the ways in which such
subjects are enabled and disabled to deal with them. In our view, two issues epitomize these consequences in a particularly illustrative way, i.e. transnationalism and knowledge intervention. The concept of transnationalism, analyzed in chapter 5, describes global flows and networks of people. In contrast to the connotations of the notion of flow, however, it is obvious that many states try to curb or at least control these movements, often in a last effort to uphold the appearance of territorial sovereignty of the nation-state. In chapter 6 it is argued that while the production and distribution of technology has adopted global dimensions, access and control over such technologies is ever more concentrated and centralized among little handfuls of core actors. Here the negative consequences of the partial withdrawal of the state from the production of technology and the securing of public access to it are highlighted.

The case of transnationalism is a dramatic illustration that globalization does not quite entail the evolutionary withdrawal of the state from controls and regulations. It does so perhaps in the domain of financial markets or international advertising, but not in relation to actual people. It also underlines that it is hardly an equalizing process: not every world citizen is equally likely to migrate. But globalization does enhance travel and communication opportunities and that in itself is leading to a profound qualitative shift in migration forms. Chapter 5 shows that the identity formations of those involved in these flows can no longer be understood as a choice between either maintaining their identification with their places of origin or as integrating in the frameworks of the host country. Instead, hybrid, composed or third identities take the floor. Also the livelihood of the people concerned, their ways to make a living, must be understood as emerging within a basically transnational space where moving back and forth between locales and members of networks and receiving and spreading information from various places throughout these networks are the rule rather than the exception.

How does the flow of people, goods, money and ideas across national borders affect the meaning and experience of new social, economic, political and cultural spaces? What does this imply for notions as community and belonging? What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities and problems of related concepts such as transnational communities, transnational networks, or circuits? In thinking through the conceptual consequences of the notion of transnationalism, the authors touch on crucial themes of culture, identity and the nation-state.

The case of knowledge intervention shows that the shifts assumed by the concept of governance – more civil society, more cooperative partnerships between private and public actors – may be very partial indeed, or even seriously problematic. It also points to the fact that differences in access to
technology touch the heart of livelihood issues of, for example, local producers. The cases presented in chapter 6 show that such livelihood issues sharply circumscribe the space of maneuver for the possible identity projects of the people involved. Continuity in the construction of narratives of self and the identification options of those involved in community based sustainable forest management, for example, depend on the question whether these forms of community management will be recognized at all by international development agencies.

The major objective of chapter 6 is to ‘unpack’ the social formation of expert knowledge. A key issue here is whether particular types of knowledge relevant for processes of development and social transformation, for example technology and capital intensive or not, are presented as inevitable or whether alternative types of knowledge are taken into consideration too. This raises huge questions about the legitimacy and authority of expert knowledge vis-à-vis local knowledge. The differential access to certain forms of knowledge and the privileging of particular kinds of knowledge asks for a more profound analysis of inequality, asymmetrical power relations and conflict. This perspective elicits questions about knowledge rights and cognitive justice. Which developmental models and practices restrict the possibilities of cognitive justice? What should alternative models and practices look like? Which strategies are employed by subaltern actors to contest and resist knowledge inequalities and fight for voice and access to decision-making agencies?

Our six themes and concepts form crucial building blocks for the necessary critical engagement with the highly contested domains of globalization and development. They offer windows by which to interrogate the discrepancy between the mantras embraced by governments and elites and the popular experiences and consequences on the ground of their policies; they point to the inevitable contradictions and tensions; they offer tools to work toward and help to envision democratic change; and they make a strong plea for capturing – and shifting – the local-global interconnections between core global power wielders and common actors that produce change, fix its direction, and insure that they are immeasurably more beneficial to some than to others.
Time and contention in
‘the great globalization debate’\(^1\)

Don Kalb

Introduction
This is as good a sign of the times as any other: instead of a new James Bond around Christmas we now have The Lord of the Rings and Harry Potter, billion dollar spectacles that are clearly crowding out that good old icon of the Cold War and Western modernity. The new mass fascinations are of an altogether different kind. They displace Western publics to mystical times/places and tap into old European mythologies of good and evil as a perpetual moral struggle right within our own landscapes. The (secret) weapons are magical and no longer top-technological. And modern civilization is a disease rather than a solution. The actual production of these media events, however, is based on the latest digital technologies that have been developed in the most advanced computer games such as Civilization and the war simulations designed as scenarios for the Pentagon (Poblocki, 2002). These games popularized Western supremacy feelings and a clash of civilizations awareness well before Huntington’s book became a best seller, and long before American conservatives took the chance given them by the Islamist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon to deliver a final though miscalculated push to the glide to overt Empire. The political territorial blocs and nations that vied for the imaginary prize of modernity in the age of Bond have been substituted by categorical values, beliefs, and loyalties buried deeply in the magical roots of culture. Our pasts are the future now.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had given the decisive boost to the accumulating forces of Western liberal capitalism to turn themselves into a new paradigm for global governance. It also allowed the actors expressing these forces the necessary self-awareness, embodied in a relatively new term: globalization. The idea of globalization was an ‘emic’ notion, cobbled up during the swirling processes of accelerating and comprehensive social change in the nineties. It was meant to signify the advent of a new epoch of borderless exchanges among a mankind that was supposedly unifying and expectant of common prosperity, democracy and civil society on a world scale. ‘The Third
The ‘Wave’ of democratization (Huntington, 1993) was flushing away a whole series of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes; and information, goods and capital (not people) started to flow freely across borders that increasingly became just juridical. This was a cosmopolitan project no longer contained in the modern cage of the developmentalist nation-state, nor apparently dependent on such erstwhile fetish-variables as homegrown industrialization and technology. Global connectivity became the key. The national state was declared obsolete; to some extent even the state-nation.

But against Western liberal mythologies, rooted in the European Enlightenment, about the unity and logical simultaneity of markets, democracy, and civil society, the actual and definitional struggles of globalization during the nineties made it clear that instead of a smooth confluence of these ‘goods’, there was inherent friction and contradiction. And hence social and political struggle. Moreover, in reifying, anonymizing and pluralizing ‘the markets’, glorifying the potential role of an active civil society beyond proportions, and predicting the ultimate demise of the state, globalization theory committed precisely the errors that Marx and the Western critical tradition in general (including much of the historical and comparative social sciences) had unmasked as the blind spots of liberal theory: the emergence of a small set of highly concentrated capitalist actors from among an initial wider pool of owners; the maintenance of hegemonies in the interest of such organized capitalist actors through the public sphere of civil society; and the amalgamation of concentrated economic power with state power in the core states of the system, acting to orchestrate the behavior of weaker ones and then underwriting their authority over their subjects through clientelism, vassalage, dependency or colonialism, using war as the necessary extension of diplomacy. The critical tradition claimed that ‘the market’, democracy and civil society had always coincided with, and had been predicated on, centralized coercion, concentrated ownership, and war-making on behalf of the usurpers. Instead of liberal utopia, it exposed domination, expropriation, exploitation, alienation, market fetishism and also, inevitably, popular protest. As we will see, the developments of the nineties have been a high-speed rehearsal of this dialectic.

All of this should not have surprised anybody only slightly familiar with the turbulent and bloody history of the unfolding West itself. As capital, modern state power, civil society and democracy were unleashed since the Age of Revolutions, not equilibrium but turbulence, struggle, inter-elite and inter-imperialist rivalries as well as mass political action have determined history. But globalization theory arrived precisely at the moment that liberalism had seen its finest hour in the downfall of Communism. Both liberal democrats and free market capitalists were celebrating their apparent world victory. Their
consensus, full of tensions, and in the course of the late nineties increasingly
decried as hegemony by a growing movement of dissenters, led to almost mil-
ennial visions of the future and had declared history as just that, times passed
by (Fukuyama, 1993).

This chapter will discuss the currents and critiques of recent globalization
theory. It will do so with broad strokes while indicating the shifting temporal
and political context; it will also try to bridge the relevant social science disci-
plines. The aim is to generate competing hypotheses and explore some of the
evidence they can muster.

The author does not pose as neutral discussant. He sees truth in the claim
(discussed below) that the globalization discourse has served to hide from
view the emergence of a neo-liberal world empire centered on the United
States of America on behalf of the propertied strata of the rich countries and a
transnational class in formation. He also believes that territory and space have
become more important rather than less (in contrast to Hoogvelt, 1997; Robin-
son, 2002), even though the explanation of regional trajectories must now be
located more robustly in the interaction between local and global structures
than in any intra-territorial properties per se. Finally, he believes that the glo-
balization phenomenon and all that it hides as well as exposes is leading to a
new agenda in the social sciences: one in its basic dynamics less descriptive
and geared to local detail than was the case under the sign of postmodernism
in the eighties and early nineties – though respecting some of its advances
– and one more oriented toward common interdisciplinary programs with a
limited range of core questions and concepts. These questions and concepts
will no longer be derived primarily from local or national contexts, and will be
more theory driven, comparative, and in search of explanations of spatial and
temporal outcomes.

The shifting grounds of the liberal alliance
The notion of globalization is a complex multi-layered concept. It has in fact
served three cognitive goals at once. It was at the same time an emic idea, a
scientific term and a political program. At bottom it does not claim more than
that people and places in the world have become and are becoming ever more
extensively and densely connected with each other so that what happens at
place A has unforeseen repercussions in place Z. Seen in this way it is also
nothing particularly new. Globalization thus refers to an evolutionary process
of what David Harvey has called ‘time/space compression’, the progressive
increase in human capacities to annihilate space by reducing the time needed
to cross it (Harvey, 1989). This is the core of the folk, scientific and politi-
cal referents alike. Every next stage of conceptual specification, however, is
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

contested. Is it good? For whom? Who or what drives it? And what is the valid
evidence for answers to these questions? On this level, science and politics are
blurred, as they inevitably are when they reflect upon and act within contem-
porary social change. How to isolate them?

Two considerations guide the next steps. First an observation from the
sociology of knowledge: the globalization concept was hardly used before
1990, became a veritable fad in the course of the decade, and ultimately gave
rise to what David Held has justifiably called ‘the great globalization debate’,
which continues and will in its outgrowths probably mark the first decade of
the third millennium. This suggests that even though the term does refer to a
long-run evolutionary process, it is precisely the acceleration of that process in
or around the nineteen nineties that forced it (anew?) onto our minds. Second:
subsequent research has demonstrated that globalization as a long-term pro-
cess, whether originating in ideological and religious forces (Robertson, 1992),
in human evolution itself (the *oeuvre* of William MacNeill), in the dynamics of
the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980; Arrighi, 1994), or in all
three together (Held et al. 1999), is not linear but comes in waves and spirals,
producing ‘discontinuous change’, epochal transformation or qualitative shifts
rather than merely continuous and quantitative trends. It is a story of epochs
and periods, not just of time passing by. What characterizes our epoch? Which
forces drive our period?

But note this: while globalization theory could only emerge in response
to the collapse of the socialist world between 1988 and 1992, a series of inter-
related world events since 1997 might be suggesting that we are gliding into
a new period now (though probably not a new epoch). This shift, by creat-
ing difference if not contrast, facilitates hindsight. Here is a selection of the
events, presented in a relaxed chronological order: the East Asian, Russian and
Argentine financial crises; the bursting of the bubble on the stock-markets and
the decline of the pension and mutual funds that drove the bull market; the
unmasking of the new economy hype and its optimistic assertion that eternal
productivity growth without inflation had become possible; the large scale dis-
coveiy of fraud and self-enrichment on the part of capitalists and auditing insti-
tutions; the sudden and severe economic slowdown in the OECD countries,
the extreme lowering of real interest rates on the dollar, the yen and the euro,
and the upsurge of protectionism in the US; the US move toward militarism
and unilateralism in response to (and, arguably, preceding) the Islamist attacks,
partly prepared by the remarkable spread of ‘culture talk’ (Stolcke, 1995) in
the West since the mid-nineties and in its turn powerfully feeding into it and
making it merge imperceptibly with more bellicose ‘clash of civilizations’ rhet-
oric. Whatever they exactly signify, there can be little doubt about the overall
direction: we are moving out of a liberal phase and into a less optimistic and more fearsome conservative period in economic, political, military and cultural aspects. Might this shift have been booked in advance? Was it a predictable turn inwards after the collapse in practice of the liberal myths?

The recent shifts help us to see that much of globalization theory until at least the mid-nineties was extremely time-bound in its hope and presumptions. In retrospect, its claims were clearly overstated, enthralled as their authors were by the liberal politics and prospects of the day. Globalization theory was indeed the platform of a coalition of forces consisting of neo-liberal free-market proponents on the one hand and liberal civil society advocates on the other (see Kalb, 2000). The fall of the wall in 1989 had occasioned the unification and celebration of two world-historical projects, which in their specific linkages were driven first of all by the US political agenda: the Helsinki process of human rights advocacy and the monetarist *cum* liberalizing reform of national political economies. They now became embodied in the Washington Consensus, succinctly formulated by John Williamson in 1990 (Williamson, 1990, 1992), and in the cosmopolitan humanitarianism of the UN, the International Criminal Court, and the international NGO world.

Liberals and neo-liberals joined their forces in the aftermath of the fall of the wall in an effort to shape the contours of George Bush senior’s ‘New World Order’. This was a genuine globalizing alliance, reflecting the belief that liberal capitalism was now ‘the only game in town’. It revitalized the old enlightenment hope of the *doux commerce* by claiming that: 1) if commodities are freely exchanged between people and places, 2) actors everywhere will discover their self-interests as producers and consumers and will let these interests prevail over collective passions and hot politics, 3) they will then form into modern ‘independent’ and productive middle classes, 4) who will demand civil rights and vote against inefficiencies and insider interests, 5) which will foster trade, prosperity, freedom and growth, and will further deepen global interdependence among mankind (see Kalb, 2000, 2002). Globalization theory, with all its different accents, basically generalized this virtuous circle of liberalism over world space (and world history). It explained why globalization was good and claimed that it was there for everyone.

Both liberal streams also argued that globalization was a causal, anonymous, and more or less irresistible force. Time/space compression set the whole virtuous circle in motion, as a consequence of which space was further annihilated. Markets as well as human morality had now outgrown the cage of the national state and the state nation, as proven by the collapse of the socialist world. We had finally arrived on the threshold of a free world civilization and we were on our way to an era of cosmopolitan rule. Arrangements for trans-
national governance now had to be put in place in order to guide the process further. Globalization, thus conceived, constituted a veritable new grand narrative which superseded the grand narratives of modernity (liberalism, socialism, corporatism), based as they were in the nineteenth and twentieth century struggles for the social constitution of the national state in a capitalist world. It became the new grand narrative precisely a decade after the grand narratives of modernity had been declared dead by postmodern philosophers. Globalization theory was (neo-)liberalism writ large, pushed from its Anglo-Saxon homeland onto planetary dimensions (Kalb, 2000). We could have safely predicted, therefore, that socialist, corporatist, imperialist and regionalist alternatives, some of them framed through nationalism or religion, would be explicitly put forward in the near future; by now they are demonstrably emerging.

Globalists would point to an expanding array of multilateral institutions that undergird cosmopolitan governance, from the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT and later the WTO in the economic domain, to UNHCR, the International Criminal Court, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the OSCE and other organizations in the sphere of international law and human rights. All of them gained in media exposure and responsibility during the nineties. Globalists would also enlist international cooperation such as in the G8 meetings, Nato, Nafta, EU, Apec, Asean and other regional forums as efforts to elevate political and juridical coordination above the level of the national state. In addition, globalists would show that below the top level of world politics there had emerged a dense network of professional coordination, such as on drugs, technical standardization, health, telecommunications, fishing, tourism, aviation, banking supervision, atomic energy, insurance, accounting etc. As a consequence, while in the middle of the nineteenth century there were just two or three interstate conferences per year, there were more than 4000 per annum by the end of the nineties (Held and MacGrew, 2002: 19). In the early twentieth century there had been 37 International Governmental Organizations. In 2000 there were 6743 of them (Ibid.).

Political liberals, moreover, would proudly point to the rapid growth of a global civil society of NGO’s that specialized in advocacy on environmental, humanitarian, juridical, social, and gender issues which sometimes successfully mobilized to help change global or national arrangements, such as in the case of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Greenpeace actions against Shell, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Transparency International, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and recently Jubilee 2000, which succeeded in finally putting debt relief for the poorest countries on the agenda of the G8 and the World Bank. These examples showed that civil society action had the capacity to actually intervene in global high politics and behind-the-doors expert
negotiation (see for example O’Brien et. al. 2000; Khagram, 2002, 2004, Smith, 2002). It demonstrated that cosmopolitan governance was real and capable of democratizing itself. Their actions also forced formal institutions to open up their proceedings and prove that they were actually accountable to the world society of citizens. By 2000 there were more than 47,000 International NGO’s (Held and MacGrew, 2002: 18). Global consciousness, the awareness of mutual interdependency between human beings worldwide, described by Giddens (1995), Falk (2000), Held (1995), Kaldor (2003) and others as a driving force as well as an index of cultural globalization, was best proven by this dense web of global civil society actors, especially those in the fields of human rights, feminism, and the environment.

On the more narrowly socio-economic terrain globalists like Manuell Castells (1996) pointed out that a transition from a space of places to a space of flows had occurred in the course of the eighties and nineties. Location now mattered ever less but insertion within global networks ever more. Reich (1991), Castells and others had argued that national economies were now largely fictitious and that the fate of social groups and territorial spaces had come to depend on their marketable skills and their consequent insertion in or exclusion from global networks of production and exchange. In the process, multinational corporations had transformed into transnational corporations, selecting their spaces for production and marketing on the basis of global criteria of productivity, added value, and purchasing power. Economic power and political power became therefore substantially de-linked, it was implied, while corporate monopolies had lost their durability. This was both a threat to established insiders, first of all male blue collar workers in the core countries, as well as an opportunity for outsiders, especially women in both the North and the South. The message was that the global market had become a surprisingly open and dynamic terrain, accessible for all those who had acquired the necessary marketable skills, from software developers in Bombay and Ireland, to metal workers in Sao Paolo and Seoul, to women workers in Chengzen, Monterrey or Manila.

Globalists also pointed out that foreign trade had been growing much faster than world output since the seventies. More importantly even, foreign direct investment had increased hugely since the early eighties and was accelerating during the nineties (up to 1997). Portfolio investments, short term lending and foreign exchange had multiplied and were reaching historically unprecedented levels. An enormous pool of excess capital was available, partly produced by transnational enterprises, partly by pension funds, mutual funds and insurance corporations, and partly the result of new financial instruments such as hedge funds and derivatives. Via the surging stock-markets in global cities such as
London, New York, Tokio, Paris, and Frankfurt (Sassen, 1990), and through their regional linkages in the emerging market economies which all opened bourses in this decade, these mobile funds were recycled in search of quick valuation. Such valuation was often found in rapidly growing export zones in Southeast Asia, China, Mexico, Brazil or Central Europe. Part of it was invested in the privatized state industries and utilities of de-regulating states in the core as well as the periphery, which in the first years facilitated new investments by these enterprises on a scale impossible for debt-bound states to achieve. Another part flew into state bonds issued by countries that commanded confidence among the financial elite, again both in the core and the periphery.

The message implied by such figures was that access to the global markets was becoming increasingly democratized and popularized to a degree never seen before. Capital now appeared to be working for us all, albeit perhaps less so for the insiders of old (globalists were not quite moved by the ‘farewell to the working class’). This enabled the territories of what was once called the Third World access to earnings from export led industrialization and not just from commodities exports. And not only through labor intensive manufactures in textiles, shoemaking or apparel: South Korea featured the amazing examples of conglomerates such as Daewoo, which jumpstarted itself into the middle to high technologies of car and electronic manufacturing; or Hyundai, which was transformed in less than a decade from a toolmaker into a corporation putting out everything from elevators to laptops. In combination with rising incomes and investment in infrastructure facilitated by the World Bank, IMF and private lenders, these demonstrable trends were lifting up whole territories into the select club of the elite economies of the globe. ‘By the late ninety nineties’, write Held and MacGrew, basing themselves on UNDP data, ‘almost 50 percent of total world manufacturing jobs were located in developing economies, while over 60 per cent of developing country exports to the industrialized world were manufactured goods, a twelve-fold increase in less than four decades’ (Held and MacGrew, 2002: 52).

Early globalization theory was about the hopeful convergence of democracy, civil society and open markets (everything communism was not) into a stable precondition for world civilization and cosmopolitan rule. It was a political platform that allowed free-market liberals and political liberals to sustain a coalition of forces that helped to shape an entire epoch of world history in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Socialism. That platform was enchanted by the promise of a final liberal equilibrium that would be beneficial for all at the closing years of the short and atrocious twentieth century.

But the closing decade itself would be far from stable. This was to a considerable extent produced by the liberal paradigm for global governance itself,
as it interacted with, and confronted, prior social and territorial structures and set about transforming the bases of livelihood for the whole world population. As a consequence, from the mid-nineties onwards, political liberals and market liberals started to part ways. The World Development Reports of the World Bank since 1996 signaled explicitly that markets were not enough to build institutions and functioning civil societies and began to care about the condition and maintenance of the state in the globalizing world (World Bank, 1997). At the end of the decade, in an atmosphere of open disagreements among researchers and directors (Wade, 2001), World Bank reports described large-scale poverty and endemic corruption (World Bank, 2000). Political liberals and ‘new institutionalists’ began to demand increased investments in ‘good governance’ and civil society, while downplaying the wisdom of the classical conditionalities of the Washington Consensus such as privatization, stabilization and liberalization (for example Stiglitz, 2003). ‘Sequencing’ became a key policy concept, aiming to slow down the onslaught of marketization on transitional societies. Analytically it announced serious doubts about the purported links in the chain connecting economic liberalization, democracy, growth and equity (see also ILO, 2004) Globalization theorists like Beck (1997) and Held (1995) began differentiating the concept of globalization (a good thing: read global civil society) from globalism (a bad thing: the globalization of capital and markets). Benjamin Barber (1996) and others explained that the MacWorld of globalizing capital threatened to produce Jihads based in religion and absolute values everywhere if the protection and promotion of civil society was neglected as it was. Michael Hart concluded unambiguously that the expansion of the operating sphere of capital had produced nothing less than a ‘post-civil society’ (Hardt, 1995).

There was no way about it. The outcomes of transition in post-socialist societies, arguably the test case of the globalist paradigm, were everywhere unsatisfactory and often squarely criminal, above all in Russia itself. The catastrophes in Bosnia and Rwanda had not been prevented by humanist cosmopolitanism, while new ones were simultaneously being inaugurated in the Congo and East Timor. The increasingly visible polarization of rich and poor within countries and among countries (see below) and the apparently unstoppable degradation of public goods from education to the environment, in particular in the post-socialist world and Africa, were in blatant contrast with the liquidity and exuberant wealth of local comprador bourgeoisies, private enterprise managers and the transnational class, both in the North and the South.

Political liberals gradually became impatient with their free-market and capitalist partners in the globalist alliance. European Third Way social democrats had superseded conservative governments from the mid-nineties onward,
and their intellectual *avant gardes* were now pressing for more civil society in the deal with free market liberalism, just as the Clintons were doing in the US. But the concept of civil society, being both voluntarist and structuralist at the same time, bourgeois as well as civic, was too malleable, too woolly, and too compromising to give much guidance in analysis and action, as noticeable in for instance Giddens’ political writings (1995, 1998, 1999). Its intellectual history, or better that part of it that was actually appropriated, was too solidly rooted in liberalism and too much tainted with pre-1848 beliefs in the happy confluence of markets and democracy on behalf of popular emancipation. Third Way intellectuals never fully succeeded in severing the supposedly virtuous association between markets and civil society. But even so, both intellectual and social dissent against, as well as demonstrable material refutation of the predictions of the virtuous circle of globalism, was clearly getting off the ground after the mid-nineties.

### Skeptics and realists

The critique was built out and substantiated by political economy and social policy researchers on the one hand and anthropologists on the other, fuelling the debate with issues of history, space, institutions, power and difference. This was happening against a background of deepening intellectual and political contention. The first French protest wave against neo-liberal reforms in the mid-nineties triggered a radicalization of the cultural sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and associates in France and elsewhere, which gave a strong impetus to the antiglobalist journal *par excellence*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*. These Parisian circles sought collaboration with Latin American activists and laid some of the intellectual groundwork for the later World Social Forum and the anti-globalist movement (or Global Justice Movement), which was ‘suddenly’ to emerge in 1999 (Fisher and Ponniyah, 2003; Sen et. al., 2004). There was also a remarkable surge of attention for the work of the Austrian émigré historical political scientist, Karl Polanyi, among others by the conservative and well exposed philosopher John Gray (1998) in London as well as by some authors on the Left, including Giovanni Arrighi (1994), whose impressive work of the early nineties, linking Braudel, Wallerstein and Polanyi in new and seminal ways, prefigured key themes in turn-of-the-millennium debates. In some circles it was increasingly recognized that globalization might well be, first of all, an epochal imposition of markets by centralized transnational institutions dominated by the core capitalist economies, just as Polanyi had described for the nineteenth and early twentieth century world system under British auspices. In this context of wider emergent political and intellectual contention (see below), the new ‘reformist’ body of academic literature advanced two key routes for critique on
globalist liberalism, both of them embodying institutionalist perspectives; the former of a more structuralist variety and the latter more actor-centered. The first was packed in the concept of ‘path dependency’, the second in notions of ‘hybridity’ and, somewhat later on, ‘place-making’.

Structuralist institutionalists were skeptical about the actual emergence of an open global space in which incessant flows would lead to an equalization of ‘factor costs’, *Gleichschaltung* of local/national institutional designs and global integration. Hirst and Thompson (1996, 2000) for example demonstrated that Castell’s space of flows was with respect to actual trade in goods still less internationalized than the Britain based economy of the late nineteenth century. The ‘real’ economy, in their account, was regionalizing rather than globalizing, giving rise to three regional clusters of national economies: the Triad of the EU, US/Nafta, and Japan/China/APEC (see also Mittelman, 2000). They showed with a wealth of material that roughly two thirds of all transactions remained within these regional clusters. Such internal transactions were ‘embedded’ (Polanyi) in a texture of local institutions in labor markets, education, law, networks of trust and familiarity etcetera, all of them ultimately anchored in a more or less public institutional heritage guaranteed, maintained and adjusted by states, bureaucracies, and their policy networks in civil society. It followed that real economic growth as distinct from the nominal growth in the virtual economy of stock-markets did not first of all depend on the freeing of flows in global space but rather on the maintenance of production cultures on the ground. Such production cultures came in various genres, among others East Asian development states, European continental welfare states, and Anglo saxon liberal and stock-market based regimes. It made no sense to impose one version as the only rational one (Dore, 2000). Similarly the work of Amsden (1992, 2003), Weiss (1998, 2003), Wade (2004) and other historical institutionalists on East Asian states underlined the centrality of state action in preparing economies for successful export performance. East Asia, thus, squarely denied the path to export earnings recommended by the globalists. Not shock-therapeutic opening, but patient and carefully managed integration was the lesson. In general, the Hirst and Thompson argument was strongly supported by a wider upsurge of interest in economic sociology and institutional and social economics, much of it recapturing the old Polanyian insight of embeddedness as well as the related notions of networks and trust (for recent overviews see Smelser and Swedberg, 1995; Swedberg, 2003; Guillen, 2002).

One crucial innovation should be emphasized. Hirst, Thompson and other skeptics switched the attention away from the supposed bipolarity of global flows versus (obsolete) nation states and towards the regional clusters of states that actually served to localize and process the overwhelming majority of such
flows (See also Kalb, 2000). This at once took the sting out of the globalist argument for two reasons. First, states immediately lost the malign status of the enemy. On the contrary, state structures became the actual guarantors of cultures of work and consumption as well as the organizers of successful international integration (see also Milward, 1999). Secondly, it silently incorporated the economies just over the border of the old core economies of the US, Japan and the European heartland into its vision of the new core, which resulted in a dramatically different estimation of the spatial spread of the ‘global’ economy.

Indeed, this conceptual innovation immediately exposed a major weakness in the globalist argument: export led manufacturing in LDC’s only really took off in a very select number of them, mainly situated close to the backdoor of the core economies, such as in Northern Mexican states; in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia, all of them closely linked with Japan and the capitalist entrepots of Hong Kong and Singapore; in the Czech Republic or along the highway that connects Budapest with Vienna, just over the border of the ‘Schengen’ area. The rest of the less developed world remained largely excluded from non-commodities and non-minerals based FDI, even more so than used to be the case under classical capitalist imperialism (Hoogvelt, 2001). Instead of singing their praise, Hirst and Thompson and others showed that international markets did not work nearly well enough. The cause: market failure through a lack of public interventionism, institution building, international and internal redistribution, and active state involvement in general. The consequence: exclusion of large spaces and populations from the markets of the North and West. The skeptics thus successfully put the globalist argument on its head. Market failure, the classical point of what Keynes had called the ‘underground tradition’ in economics, was their main tool (see for instance Baker, Epstein and Pollin, 1999).

While market-failure arguments showed why whole tracts and populations remained excluded from the potential gains of integration in the circulatory networks of the advanced economies, global commodity chain analysis (or value chain analysis) explained why producers in LDC’s that were actually integrated were being pauperized nevertheless. These analysts (for example Gereffi et. al, 1994; Haugerud et. al. 2000; Kaplinsky, 2000, 2002) countered the trickle down assumption of global marketization by pointing out that markets were not anonymous hidden hands but rather structured relations of power between nodes in a network in which the weak found it practically impossible to improve their relative positions vis a vis the strong. While design, research and development, and marketing functions remained controlled by the North, Southern producers found it very hard to move upwards in the chain of added value and seemed to be condemned to low barrier/low skill/low value added
GLOBALIZATION ACTIVITIES

This was not only the case in simple commodity productions but also in manufacturing and large FDI layouts. The accelerating integration of China and South Asia in Northern networks since the mid-eighties had enormously expanded the supply of unskilled and medium skilled workers. This was resulting in an intensifying downward pressure on income among workers and firms in global commodity chains in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America, as well as in increased feminization of labor forces (on gender see Mills, 2003). Rather than marketization per se, it turned out to be positionality and relations between nodes within the chain as well as the class relations and path-dependence of regional production systems within the world economy that seemed to determine social and economic outcomes.

Marketization now appeared in a rather different light: instead of spreading the fruits of integration via trickle down, it seemed to shortcut upward trajectories by continuously enlarging the reserve army of labor. Marketization turned out to be a force for monopolistic control rather than democratic participation. It apparently allowed capitalists to structurally depress incomes in manufacturing, as in the maquiladoras of Tijuana (see FT, 1-7-03); or crowd out commodity producers at the vulnerable down sides of the world market, such as coffee growers in Brazil and Colombia who have been hit by the growth of production in Vietnam. Commodity chain analysts implied that only collective action and public intervention would help producers to move upward into higher value added productions, prevent gender and generational exploitation, and alleviate recurrent marginalization in and through markets; a classic Labor argument.

Similar emphasis on the relevance of path dependence and public choice was produced by policy and poverty research in the North and West. In her work on global cities in the core, Saskia Sassen had maintained that the transition from industrial welfare states to neo-liberal urban economies based on service sector growth was generating a new social polarization in big Northern cities (Sassen, 1990; 1998). This was no longer a classical class divide rooted in property and production between owners and workers but a much more desperate one between isolated groups in sharply segregated labor markets: the high wage, highly educated, ‘white’ and formal job-holders in the producer-services sector (finance, real estate, insurance, high tech) on the one hand, and insecure, informalized, ‘colored’ and lowly skilled workers in the consumer services. Both thrived on a deepening postindustrialism, but the first gained ever better salaries and conditions without any apparent collective bargaining while the second was crowding itself out under conditions of intensifying immigration, attacks on unions, and retrenchment of public services. An insulated bourgeoisie and a self-exploiting lumpen-proletariat with little in between, this
was Sassen’s prediction for metropolitan areas in the North (see for an early statement, Castells, 1986).

An avalanche of urban and regional research that really took off by the mid-nineties now showed that this was not universally the case. Institutions, public and private, largely explained the differences. First, different regional paths and regimes of industrialization responded differently to the postfordist/postindustrial transition. The more skill intensive ones in for example Germany or Japan were capable of moving into higher added value while constantly re-educating their workers (for example Dore, 2000). Mass production sites typical of liberal regimes in the UK or the US industrial heartland gave way to disinvestments, de-industrialization and communal degradation. A take off in high-tech was also shown to be dependent on government policy and nearby manufacturing capacities and not just on the adjacency of a top university, an airport and abundant venture capital, as claimed by the globalists (Saxenian, 1996).

Second, social outcomes were significantly mediated by prior social policy structures which were all but overlooked in the original Sassen thesis. Comprehensive welfare states had a much better record in this respect than more liberal ones and the social dumping predicted by Sassen turned out to be a special case rather than a universal one. The most effective European welfare states had succeeded in preventing the rise of the working poor by keeping up collective labor standards while simultaneously finding various solutions for the trade-off with unemployment. Esping Andersen’s work (1999, 2002) emphasized that ‘Third Way’ social democrats in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Austria had discovered how to mobilize public policy structures to generate job machines, refuse social dumping, and put national budgets in order. The experience of Europe as a whole also denied the globalist argument by combining the integration of European markets with an upwards convergence of social policy standards.

Against the unilineal idea of progress inherent in the neo-liberal account, this body of research on mainly European public policy structures made a case for the continued path-dependence of outcomes of global integration. Path-dependence in this context signaled that outcomes of large scale social transition were always mediated by a prior public heritage of institutions of governance. It showed that states did matter. It also implied that earlier social struggles for rights and the balance of forces by which their outcomes had been maintained through time had repercussions for the next rounds of social change (Kalb, 2003). Prior power balances within civil societies in any given national or regional context apparently pre-selected the possible institutional responses, resistances and potential mobilizations of citizens. They also
structured public preferences more than could be deduced from the globalist/individualist assumption of citizens as consumers/short-term profit maximizers. Location therefore mattered, and hence culture. The switch to social democratic regimes in a majority of EU states around 1997 seemed to indicate that Europe’s heritage of public action was (re)producing outcomes that were significantly different from the largely neo-liberal ones achieved in the US and the UK (Ibid.), even though the Anglo-Saxon recipes were now being globally promoted as Washington Consensus orthodoxy in the post-Cold War era.

While institutionalists in political economy and public policy studies demystified the market and stressed the path dependency of actual outcomes, anthropologists destroyed the cosmopolitan illusions about the spread of global civil consciousness and one-worldism. Globalism and global narratives were not swallowed en bloc, they insisted. Appadurai (1996) for example distinguished between his five disjunctive forms of flow (techno-, finance-, ideo-, media-, and ethnoscapes). Flows were not all of a piece, he implied, and the actual local import of flows depended on the combinations in which they arrived, which was far from uniform from place to place. Kalb (2002) in a same vein emphasized that much of the South and East received software rather than hardware. With public infrastructures in disarray, incomes far from sufficient and inequality rising, software without hardware left the globalist offer for all practical purposes restricted to mere ephemeral images of commodities, a fantasy world fuelling illusions of possible personal becoming rather than offering tools for practical civic empowerment. The Comaroffs (2001), as well as Verdery (1996) and Humphrey (2002), both writing on postsocialism, similarly suggested that the neoliberal market, excluding actors from production but including them in public fantasies of millennial wealth creation by abstract and obscure mechanisms, epitomized by that global miracle par excellence the stock markets, led to the proliferation of vernacular ‘occult economies’ centered on drugs, martial and spectator sports, crime, gambling, pyramid schemes and other rituals of quasi-achievement and hit-and-run success under casino-capitalism. Several authors also noted the upsurge of highly mediatized, ritualist, pay-as-you-go religions, such as pentecostalism, which focus on this-worldly pecuniary success rather then relief in the afterlife, in particular in Africa, East Asia and Latin America.

Such illusions of consumption were strongly gendered and had age specific appeals. This invited an upsurge of counter-narratives of nationalism, localism, religion and tradition (Kalb, 2002), often of a male-chauvinist and paternalist persuasion. These reactive narratives helped to subsequently establish what Geschiere and Meyer (1998), following Bayart (1993), have called cultural closure; or what Zizek at an early moment and in relation to East
European transition had already identified as the return of the cultural super ego (Zizek, 1990). Geschiere pointed at the increasing incidence of accusations of witchcraft and manifestations of the occult in both Africa and China, as inequality and visibly uneven access to the cornucopia of global consumerism increased. Verdery (1996) and Tismaneanu (1998) described the emergent paranoid fantasies, myths, conspiracy theories, ‘chosen traumas’ and other populist predicaments that spread in the wake of the Soviet implosion and the Yugoslav wars, and sprang up anew in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis in places such as Indonesia and Malaysia, targeting jews, gypsies, Westerners, Albanians, and Chinese, among others, as scapegoats for dark forces that threatened the integrity and livelihood of imagined majority folk-communities. Thus, places and popular identities were becoming hamstrung between an intensifying dialectic of infinite openness and reactive and fearful closure. Instead of helping to create a cosmopolitan public sphere, neoliberal globalization tended to generate ‘culture talk’ (Stolleke 1995), insider/outsider fights, populist paranoia, and intense struggles for ‘place making’ in general (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997 a+b; Kalb and Tak, 2004).

Culture talk, insider/outsider cleavages, and place making were additionally propelled by accelerating migration, in its turn pushed by the forces of global marketization and regime collapse (another closely associated phenomenon, see below). Discourses of culture rapidly festered, both among migrant populations and among receiving communities during the nineties. This was the case everywhere, in poor as well as in rich societies. While there were not more people on the move between countries in the 1990’s than in the late nineteenth century (Staring, 2000), the new migration clearly invited heighten ed spatial and cultural border patrols. In the nineteenth century, migrations were often headed for the United States, Latin America, the antipodes or South Africa. Sending countries were mainly Europe, India (indentured labor), and China. In the late twentieth century people were on the move everywhere; in the South they drifted toward the cities and dynamic regions such as Lagos or Sao Paolo; in China from inland regions toward the free economic zones and the maritime conurbations along the pacific coast; from West Asia to Abu Dhabi and other wealthy centers in the Middle East; in Europe from the post-socialist countries such as Poland, Russia, the Kaukasus and the Balkans, as well as from older sending countries in the Maghreb, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and the post-colonies to the West, now including Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. Students too moved in large numbers to global places of learning, primarily in the West or Australia, but also to older centers of religious/civilizational knowledge such as Cairo or Damascus. The dynamics of cultural closure embedded in the ambivalences of neo-liberal globalization got an extra push
from increasing competition for access to scarce resources in land, labor, housing, education, and sometimes marriage markets. Appadurai (1996) and others suggested that longing for belonging in the global age created strong fantasies of home among diasporic groups in by definition less than friendly receiving societies. Imaginary homelands often became more radically ‘traditional’ than ‘at home’. Some migrant groups joined transnational radical nationalist movements, which often became powerful factors in homeland politics in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Croatia, Estonia, and others. Transnationalism in general was understood as a relatively new force, facilitated by cheap communication and transport. Its complex consequences for ‘home’ countries included, apart from the intensification of political contention through increased diaspora activism and funding, the steeply rising importance of remittances as against development aid, diversion of funds from investment to conspicuous consumption, but also ‘brain drain’ (see Mazzucato, this book chapter 5; Vertovec et al., 1999, 2003). Among refugee populations and people displaced by civil war or prosecution, diaspora nationalisms often gave rise to violent dreams of purification and sacrifice, as among Hutu and Tutsi fugitives in Central Africa (Malkii, 1995), Tamils in India, Europe or the US, and of course among Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon.

In addition to the deep play of cultural flux and closure and the intensifying boundary patrols associated with moving and receiving populations, the globalist era featured another systemic source of anti-liberalism that originated from its very own imperatives of democratic transition. The ‘third wave’ of democratization was less unproblematic and self evident than initially assumed. This became immediately clear in the unfolding drama of the break down of Yugoslavia. In Poland and the Soviet Union nomenclatura elites, including high party functionaries and members of the secret services, had chosen en masse to insert themselves in time and profitably in the emerging networks of transnational trade and finance, often by taking private control over socialist property (Volkov, 2002; Los and Zybertowicz, 2001, Staniszkis 1991). They traded political power for property and network gains. But in complex federations like Yugoslavia, Serbian and Croatian elites defended themselves against rising democratic claims by playing the nationalist card (Glenny, 1996), facilitated by control over much of the media (Bowen, 1996). Financial flows played an important role too. Ethno-nationalism in the eighties and nineties became a way to mobilize local populations threatened by ’structural adjustment’ and IMF imposed austerity programs. Such global flows and programs helped to systematically delegitimize indebted central states vis a vis their popular classes. Illiberal mobilizations were intended to rally local populations behind entrenched bureaucratic and military elites in order to prolong their hold on power and
give them time to regroup, monopolize strategic resources and organize their client networks around paramilitary booty and illegal trade. Here global monetarist imposition sponsored both the impulse toward democratic opening and transnational markets – by weakening the state as an accumulation vehicle for elites, as well as, inadvertently some would say, its opposite: xenophobic closure tending toward fascism in the context of collapsing states.

One of the least discussed causes behind this path to catastrophe, thus, was an international environment that offered very little incentives to national elites to actually relax their hold on bureaucratic levers (Kalb, 2002). While the ‘international community’ reduced Poland’s national debt by half and the reformers of the Russian state were offered lavish IMF and other funds as well as ample opportunities for fraud and self-enrichment during the privatization processes (Wedel, 2001), federal elites in Yugoslavia were cornered by strict application of IMF rules and a state department that in the memorable words of James Baker III ‘had no dog in this fight’. Again, place and geopolitical position mattered hugely, turning one territory into a showcase of globalist transition, while pushing the next to turn itself into a slaughterhouse. A comparable conjuncture arose in Indonesia in the wake of the East Asian crisis, the intervention of the IMF, and the partial success of the democratic movement in forcing the Suharto clan to step down. Indonesia’s transition to democracy, consequently, was marked by central state paralysis and surging nationalist and religious conflicts, as regional military and bureaucratic elites began to sponsor radical ethnic and religious groups in order to usurp local power vis-à-vis the center, cause permanent emergencies and deflect popular anger toward minority scapegoats. Religious bureaucratic regimes in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia functioned according to comparable paranoid logics of rule, as did post-socialist Romania until the mid-nineties and Zimbabwe after 1999. Central Asia and the Kaukasus were characterized as a whole by this illiberal syndrome. Thus, in the course of the decade it became increasingly clear that the globalist opening was throwing up its own unexpected obstacles as entrenched elites organized illiberal popular mobilizations playing into traumatic memories of violence and fears for national decline in a harsh neoliberal world context.

In these and similar ways structuralist and actor-oriented institutionalists destroyed both the basic assumptions and the presumed causal links in the chain of the globalist grand narrative. In a sense, path-dependence, hybridity and place-making were ingenious tools that united the most enduring elements from world systems theory (‘historical systems’), political economy and postmodernism in a new emergent paradigm. This paradigm studied historically situated, dynamic and contingent, though by definition power-suffused, dialectics of local and global histories (see also Kalb, 1997). In the process, the global
as an overbearing and imposing structure with inevitable local outcomes was rapidly hollowed out. At the end of the decade, a Marxist social theorist and ethnographer such as Michael Burawoy would write that ‘Globalization is produced through a conflictual, negotiated process within and between nodes of a global chain’ (Burawoy, 2001, 157), thus effectively evening out the supposed theoretical hierarchy of macro and micro. Criticizing Ferguson’s work on the stifling influence of World Bank activities on popular politics in Lesotho (1994), he wrote ‘(globalization) is not a machine but a production process with its own politics, no less and no more than every other node in the global chain – even if its resources and organizational endowments can subjugate nodes further down the chain’ (Ibid.). However, ‘...effects in one node reverberate down but also up the chain...the local no longer opposes but constitutes the global’ (Ibid.). Struggle and contingencies between differently situated actors and ‘levels’ were replacing globalist mechanics and teleology. Globalization became ever more often presented as a mantra rather than a natural fact of life, as an ideology that sought to mystify the contingent conditions of its own production and to obscure the always present potentialities for public choice and local action.

However, in retrospect and despite all the genuine methodological gains and key political insights, the institutionalist counter-case may have been overstated. The East Asian crisis led to a new round of severe indebtedness of nations that had featured unprecedented economic growth for a whole generation and had been the single example of how to escape Third World predicaments. It also led to forced and major devaluations of local currencies and savings accounts while opening the way for Western capital to buy up a considerable part of the family silver. Russia was ‘lost’ in 1998 and seemed not to ‘return’ into the vault of the Western parliamentary democracies. Argentina, a model student of the Consensus, would collapse soon, as would regimes in the Andes such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Colombia. Competitive devaluation threatened continuously among East Asian exporters, inexorably propelled by economic expansion in China, in its turn based in the vast reservoir of Chinese labor that was massively reallocated from agriculture and old state industries to the global factory along the pacific coast. The new economy myth in the US was shattered by 2000. The stock-market bubble had exploded. Portfolio flows were drastically reduced worldwide and shares lost over forty percent of their value. The dollar rapidly began to fall and started to lose its crucial function of world consumer-anchor of last resort, producing economic crises and political turmoil in Europe and Asia. Interest rates on the dollar and all major currencies were brought down to record lows in order to keep investment, stock market values and consumption up. Internal disagreements at the World Bank
and the IMF severely weakened the coherence of the Washington Consensus which was all but dead by 2002, leaving just ‘small talk’ of good governance in its wake, as well as ample space for political opportunism by their greatest donor. Contradictions of the neo-liberal global system worked themselves out ruthlessly in spite of all the talk of global governance, and had undeniable and painful consequences on the ground, notwithstanding the active presence of local institutions.

Policy research in Europe, too, had clearly exaggerated the autonomy of public policy. Europe immediately slipped into recession in the wake of the US stock market collapse and both unemployment and budget deficits began rising again (European bourses even lost considerably more of their value than Wall Street). Third Way social democrats started to lose elections and visibly lost belief in their cause. Voters were right: while gross GDP indicators showed that European governments had indeed kept up total welfare expenditures, closer inspection revealed that in many states a severe shift had taken place in the target populations of benefits, from young people to senior citizens and from outsiders to insiders (Esping Andersen, 2001). Income inequalities had been on the rise in most states since the mid-eighties and had not been mended during the boom of the late nineties. The ideology of social rights, presumably central to the ‘European model’, was slowly reduced to window dressing, except for those who practically ‘owned’ their rights. Third Way social democrats had proved good administrators and governors, but failed visionaries and opportunistic politicians. The European Union project, meanwhile, was getting stuck between the partly contradictory objectives of continental market-making (expansion) and federalization (deepening of political coordination). Third Way social democrats had lost the unique opportunity of synchronized regimes in a majority of European states to break the deadlocks and create a federal constitution with social rights enshrined, largely thanks to Blair’s New Labour government. Material outcomes were rather neo-liberal after all, even though cloaked in rhetorical traditions of social cohesion – although one must readily admit that US poverty figures remained far higher than European ones, UK figures much higher than Continental ones.

**An intermezzo on world inequality data**

Not surprisingly, the intensifying debate between market-liberals and institutionalists in the nineties focused among others on the question of who actually gained in status and income from globalization and with how many they were. Did poverty and inequality, both within nations, between nations, and among the world population as a whole rise or decline as a consequence of globalization policies (marketization, privatization, liberalization, stabilization)? And if
the rich indeed gained visibly and indubitably, did the poor share in some of their income growth? In other words, was the opening up of national markets by itself sufficient to produce spontaneous ‘trickle down’, as the market liberals believed, or was state intervention and increased institutional capacity necessary for outcomes that could benefit larger majorities, as the institutionalists argued?

A ‘Google’ internet search on the themes of globalization and inequality produces at the moment of writing 325,000 internet items that explicitly deal with the issue, a clear measure of how crucial the question had become for the legitimacy of globalizing states and transnational actors in the eyes of the wider public. It was one of the basic rallying points for the Global Justice Movement. Public concern ultimately led to the Heavily Indebted Countries Initiative to reduce the debt burden of dozens of the poorest countries and to the formulation of the Millennium development goals by the UN, a program of fresh aid, targets and benchmarks that should help reduce world poverty until 2015.

The World Bank played a key role in this debate, being the sole organization gathering worldwide income data independent from the national accounts. Predictably, in the course of the globalist nineties, the Bank increasingly became an arena of contention (Wade 2001a; Deacon, 1997). Its Eastern Europe research unit became a catalyst of methodological innovation after new personnel from transition countries, among others the Croat Branko Milanovic (1998, 1999), started to criticize the Bank’s poverty and inequality indices for the post-socialist nations – they were less sanquine about transition than the Bank. Milanovic’ work became a reference point in both the expert debate on method and the public debate on inequality outcomes. His evidence demonstrated that world inequality between 1988 and 1993 had been unambiguously on the rise.

But politicization of the World Bank went further than methods of data gathering and their interpretation. By the end of the nineties new senior officers such as James Wolfensohn and George Stiglitz, both nominated by the Clinton administration, nurtured a more market-critical and pro-poor stance within the Bank. Subsequently, the World Development Report of 2000/1, Chief Author Ravi Kanbur, subject world poverty, signaled a slight increase in extreme poverty over the last two decades as well as an increase in inequality. The US treasury did not like the first drafts. It had already been mobilizing against Stiglitz’ institutionalist influence in the Bank and now pressurized the Chief Author of the WDR openly so that he felt forced to resign before completion. Stiglitz left the bank too and wrote a critical and best selling book on the misconceived policies of the Bank and in particular the IMF (Stiglitz, 2003). The subsequent World Development Report of 2002 on globalization and economic
growth, authored by David Dollar (sic), denied the earlier findings of increasing inequality and poverty and sought to demonstrate that trickle down did exist, in particular in those nations that had opened up their national markets and reduced internal regulations. Clearly, the World Bank, being accountable to its largest donors and in particular to the US Treasury, was far from a neutral institution, and its flagship publication not quite the objective monitor it wished to be. In spite of this, which reasonable claims can be made on the basis of existing large-scale data? I want to make three such claims.

For one, while the World Development Reports of 2001 and 2002 contradicted each other on this score, it seems plausible to argue, as Robert Wade (2002) does, that the number of people with less than a dollar a day, or more generally the percentage of people with extremely scarce access to cash, has been declining. Why? If globalization is, as Polanyi would infer, a grand imposition of markets by core global actors, we cannot but expect a wider spread of money incomes among the world population at large. The process includes an acceleration of the transformation of the world peasantry into a class of casualized proletarian and proto-proletarian labor. The under-theorized downside of globalization, indeed, is proletarianization (see also Harvey, 2003). This also implies the monetization of family relationships as women and children become more closely associated with market incomes, while being weakly protected or not at all by indebted states seeking to accumulate export earnings. As such, globalization cannot but generate a growing percentage of households and individuals that become dependent on, and become forced to have access to, cash earnings.

But it is a non-sequitur to conclude from here that absolute poverty must be falling; nor, for that matter, that poverty is rising. What we are seeing, strictly speaking, is just increased proletarianization, participation in markets, and a deepening dependence on monetary incomes. This is so if only because of the decline of pre- or non-capitalist forms of livelihood, the associated diminution of redistribution and reciprocity within communities and families as common pools of non-cash resources decline, and because of the reduction of social rights and welfare-statism. Whether the rising cash incomes do or do not allow people access to a basket of basic necessities, including essential care given by family and friends as well as by wider formal or informal communities, we do not yet know. The answer of course is contingent upon the combination of scores of aspects of social relationships that cannot convincingly be represented as statistical aggregates. This is another way of saying that absolute poverty in the end is more about having no one than about having no thing and no dime (even though they are closely intertwined) and cannot therefore adequately be assessed by abstract monetary indices (see for example Mittel-
man, 2000). On the bare bones of survival, poverty is first of all a relational (micro) phenomenon.

This is arguably much less the case for issues of relative poverty/social inequality. And here is the second claim and the basic piece of evidence for any inference about rising or declining world inequality in the era of globalization: it is only China (and East Asia except Japan) which has ventured to close the gap in incomes with the developed world over the last decades (Wade 2001b, 2002; Wilterdink and Potharst, 2001). India remained stable, while populations in all other world regions, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, West and Central Asia, declined in relation to the West, just as incomes in the West became more unequal (Wilterdink, 2000). If we do not simply compare countries’ GDP per capita, but include a measure of the actual weight of countries’ population in the world population as a whole, the income growth of hundreds of millions of Chinese determines the whole picture of world inequality counts.

There is a caveat. China’s key role in lifting up world incomes could even have been stronger if inequality within China had not risen so dramatically since the early nineties. The incorporation of the Chinese coastal urban zones in the world economy has led to a strong increase in monetary incomes compared to rural and inland China, which was slowly drained of state-led investments and expenditures. This willed unevenness of development pulled off a more powerful process of internal migration and urbanization than the world has ever witnessed. But even so, the regional divides were not sufficient to offset the overall leveling effects of the rise of urban China on world inequality. Robert Wade (2002) concludes that all data taken together suggest that, depending on method, there is either hardly any change at all in overall world inequality since, say, 1980, or there is a slight increase. But take out China, and there is inevitably a very substantial increase of world inequality.

Three conclusions follow from this: 1) globalization policies have different effects on economic growth and inequality in different world regions. Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and West and Central Asia have been much more negatively affected than China or India. Ergo: There are no unmediated outcomes of marketization policies. Outcomes depend on starting positions, national histories, and relations with the core, as institutionalists and world systems theorists would appreciate; 2) But where Washington Consensus-Globalism has been adopted wholesale, inequality has risen dramatically, as in the post-colonies of Africa and Latin America; 3) While the aggregate effects of globalization on world inequality data may be relatively weak, China’s role suggests that the explanation must start not with attributing it to the success of Washington Consensus style policies – as the World Bank did in its 2002 World
Development Report – but with the rise of urban China (see graph).

The World Bank, in its 2002/3 report on globalization and economic growth took the easy way. Chinese productivity growth (as growth anywhere else), it claimed, was closely correlated with the implementation of globalization measures such as increases in external trade and decreases in internal state regulation. The correlation was subsequently treated as an explanation. It skipped over the essential point that China was hardly a good exemplar of neo-liberal globalization policies, not nearly as good as most places in Latin America, Eastern Europe or Africa, which had shown little growth and often even outright decline over the last two decades. China, of course, is a very populous, non-democratic one-party imperial state with a continuing socialist heritage and a mercantilist economy that is far from fully open to world market flows. In fact, mainland China is first of all being reconnected to its own Chinese diasporas throughout Asia and America (Vancouver). Its capital account, for example, which might appear fully open when one looks just at the impressive figures for FDI, is strictly controlled and first of all open to Chinese capital from abroad. It is the reorientation of far-flung Chinese capitalist networks on mainland China and vice versa that explains the rise of the coastal economy rather than an anonymous insertion into abstract global markets, as the aggre-
Gate figures of the IMF appear to suggest. If a particular set of state-policies should explain this process it is hardly the globalist prescriptions from Washington but rather the ‘one country / two systems’ project of the Communist party of China. To turn this into ego-confirming news for the global bureaucrats and bankers in Washington and elsewhere is stretching the evidence too far.

Finally a note on the social nature of Chinese export led industrialization; claim number three. Though export led growth in manufacturing does help to increase incomes in the coastal cities, it is predicated not just on increased class and spatial polarization (see the graph below) but perhaps even more significantly on the intensification of gender and generational inequalities, indeed the deepening of outright exploitation, which do not show up in any Gini coefficients, GDP per capita figures or yearly average incomes, indeed in no household based data at all. China replicates older forms of within-family exploitation that have historically been associated with the apparel, toy, textile and electronics industries (Chan, 2001; Lee, 1998; Sequino, 2000). In this respect, China stands as an illustration of the contradictory and partly perverse relation between globalization and women’s emancipation in general (Freeman, 2000; Mills, 2003). It is no coincidence that it is precisely these branches that have been attracted to the Chinese free trade zones. China’s particular path of extrication from Maoism-communism and its consequent hybrid mode of insertion in a specific segment of the world economy, therefore, does not testify to globalism tout court but rather to a powerful linkage between the return of its capitalist diaspora and an intensifying regime of gender and generational exploitation in the mainland that remains hidden in any World Bank inequality count.

**To empire and after**

Skeptical and realist critiques of liberal globalization theory were largely based on meso and micro observations. When they did connect these meso and micro findings with world-level structures they often imperceptibly blurred with a new wave of writing on imperialism gathering steam by the later nineties. Especially if institutionalists assumed or hinted at systematic, purposeful, and self-interested action by key actors in core states behind the drive to global marketization policies, they fed into an emergent radicalization of visions that began to depart decisively from the liberal middle ground of the mid-nineties. This emerging alliance was not coincidental. Institutionalists and (anti-) imperialists often stemmed ontologically, methodologically, and politically from the same roots in the European tradition of left wing liberalism-critique. In the current post Cold-War context and in the face of deepening proletarianization, class polarization of wealth, massive reconfigurations of gender and genera-
tion, and comprehensive global turbulence, there might now be less a divide on fundamentals between them than one in location and style, unlike any other moment since 1918.

The emergent Global Justice Movement after Seattle, 1999, the attacks of September 11, the sidelining of the UN and ‘old Europe’ by the Bush administration, his unfinished wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the unprecedented anti-war demonstrations of spring 2002, all served to radicalize the critique on US driven globalization. In a sense this happened almost posthumously. The neo-conservative self-victimization in the US led to strong protectionist and America-first inclinations, preparing the electorate among others for unprecedented hikes in the military budget. Strict monetary policies, formerly a linchpin of Washington Consensus prescriptions, were reversed 180 degrees to keep up lavish consumer borrowing and put a floor under stock-market values rather than supporting a strong dollar. In a matter of months, the US economy was thus turned from world consumer of last resort and global financial entrepot into the largest debtor nation in history. It was only saved from steep inflation and subsequent depression by huge inflows of Chinese and Japanese surplus funds intent on keeping the dollar somewhat in its place to secure their exports while the Pentagon was running its expensive protectorates in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The conjunction of these episodes at the end of a turbulent decade brought older notions of imperialism powerfully to the fore again. They highlighted the spread of a much less rosy, less hopeful, and less anonymous reading of globalization than had obtained in the mid nineties and thereby helped to put additional pressure on the visibly weakening alliance of political liberals and market liberals behind it. Globalization was increasingly unmasked as an ideology (for example Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). It remained undecided as yet whether it was the self-interested ideology of a US empire or rather the mantra of a transnational corporate financial class and its handmaidens in government, media and academia, which was pulling the strings of an emergent transnational state centered on the global power of the US. The US, in any case, was ever less circumspect in showing its capacity to shape global institutions in its own image and impose its rules via forceful, corruptive as well as consensual means on individual nations and regions. In the process it adroitly shifted from soft power to hard power (and back again) clearly to promote its very own contingent interests rather than transparently universal ones.

The unmasking went together with a reappraisal of the classics of imperialism: Rosa Luxemburg’s *The Accumulation of Capital* was republished for the first time since 1973, *nota bene* by a commercial press such as Routledge (2003), while Monthly Review Press brought a compilation of her political
Globalization

writings (2004). Nicolai Buckarin’s original treatise on Imperialism and World Economy (2003), the example on which Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism was built, had already been translated and published in 1995 but a new edition made it prominently onto the bookshelves in London, New York, and elsewhere in the spring of 2003. The stage was set, however, by Hardt and Negri’s iconoclastic but obscurantist and anarcho-utopian Empire (2000; and see Balakrishnan, 2003, for an assortment of critiques). This philosophical update of the European autonomista/autonomen experience of the seventies was instantly turned into a totem of the Global Justice Movement right before the turn of the tide.

These texts together make up a hardly coherent anti-imperialist intellectual mumbo gumbo, however. A huge gap yawns, in style as well as substance, between the early twentieth century Marxist treatises on imperialism and the anarchist siren call of Hardt and Negri. In the current context, it is fair to say, they suffer from mirrored inadequacies. The nature of the contemporary capitalist state escapes both (see also Harvey, 2003; Tilly, 2003; Wood, 2003). In genuine autonomista fashion, Empire celebrates the increasing irrelevance of the modern state and its hierarchic industrial production paradigms by the onslaught of global capitalism. The book paints an anonymous empire of capital that pulverizes the obsolete social hierarchies of modernity, in particular those associated with industrial classes, nations, and patriarchal families. Such collectivities all dissolve into formless ‘multitudes’ which, having little left to lose, now seek to turn negative liberation into positive liberty by claiming a space for subjectivities beyond capitalism. In a sense, Hardt and Negri, inspired by the current mobile, digital and networked context, discover precisely the collective actor that was once missing from Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (which, tellingly, was republished in 2002, again by Routledge), while bringing Marx’ dialectic up to date for postmodern times. The heroes are now transnational migrants and networked artisan-intellectuals. The philosophical analysis proceeds on a high level of abstraction, covering centuries rather than more recent or manageable epochs, and tends to ignore decades of systematic social inquiry into the state, current capitalism, and social movements.

Classical Marxist critiques of modern imperialism had a totally different purchase and style. All of them were grounded in concrete empirical analyses of the problems of national capitalisms around 1900. They pointed to a movement contrary to the one pictured by Hardt and Negri: the increasing mobilization of core states behind the interests of national capitalists at home and abroad, ultimately leading to the militarization of social economies, colonialism, and inter-imperialist war. Where Hardt and Negri see multitudes liberated from the cage of the modern state by global capital, and liberating themselves
subsequently from the demands of the capitalists, Luxemburg, Buckarin, Lenin (and Hobson and Hilferding) described growing state involvement in the reproduction of capital and labor, and consequently ‘social imperialism’, Empire formation, conquest and militarism. Which way to go for radical theory in the present epoch?

The mirrored inadequacies of Empire and classical imperialism theories concern the role and nature of the state in the current globalizing conjuncture, the place of geopolitics, and the precise ways in which current imperialism is connected with neo-liberal globalization (see also Panitch, 2000; Harvey, 2003; Wood, 2003). First, it is a confusion of myth and reality to argue that the new globalist imperialism, in contrast to the old, is more or less state-less or anti-state. There is a strong recent body of literature that theorizes the emergent transnational state and – notwithstanding other important disagreements among its authors – it convincingly points at an uneven, far from finished, patchwork of global administrations, power networks and military mechanisms that form the nucleus of an emergent transnational state with regionalist offshoots (Arrighi, 1994, 2000; Mittelman, 2000; Panitch, 2000; Shaw, 2000; Robinson, 2002, 2004; also Archibugi and Held, 1998). Apart from facilitating global cooperation, the radicals point out that this global framework serves to turn national states into competition states, which are intensely networked upwards and sideways in largely opaque forms placing them beyond the control of national democracies. Second, the new imperialists are not nearly so keen on occupying territory, ruling over its inhabitants, and waging wars to that end, as the classical imperialists were (Wood, 2003; Harman, 2003). Rather, they prefer to work through financial and vassalage linkages: the ultimate form of indirect rule. Third, inter-imperialist rivalry, the classical cause of modern war and the formation of exclusive trade blocs, is meanwhile uniquely prevented from taking a military or openly radical form by the fact that all potential claimants are dependent on the techno-military might of the one single player, the United States, that can both claim unprecedented military superiority over all other potential contenders as well as organize (an increasingly fragile) hegemony – soft power – via the United Nations, post-Bretton Woods frameworks, and bilateralism. It is this fragile hegemony in combination with the unipolar military might that forms the key force in the making (and unmaking) of the transnational state apparatus – and vice versa. Rather than recycling the debates within Marxism of a century ago or fully embrace the free-floating utopias of the present day narodniki, that is, indeed, rather than reproducing the old divides within the left, the imperialism critique of the new radicals should come to terms with these three more or less new properties of the state in the age of neo-liberal globalization.

While Held and Archibugi argue that the emergent transnational state
could well be the harbinger of a future cosmopolitan democracy, various political economy authors, ranging from Gowan (1999) to Wood (2003), Arrighi (1994, 2000), Sassen (1999, 2003), Robinson (2002, 2004), McMichael (2003), and Gilpin (2000, 2001), have described the emergence of a panoply of transnational governance structures that have increasingly taken on state-like functions and that are intended to do the work of an all but democratic neo-liberal imperialism (see also Panitch, 2000). These functions are the most coherent and authoritative in the domain of finance: the IMF and the World Bank, the coordinated network of treasuries and Central Banks, and their outbranching linkages with the top of the private banking sector, brokerage and arbitrage firms. Although the formal origin of IMF and World Bank goes back to the outcomes of the Second World War and the need to manage a liberal peace via multilateralism and international Keynesianism, these organizations and functions 1) have historically been transformed by the capitalist profitability crises of the seventies and eighties and have been reoriented towards financialization, that is the valorization imperatives of liquid and speculative capital. They have thus become geared to the interests of haute finance and large transnational corporations in a hypercompetitive world environment; 2) they have become the arena for the formation of a self-conscious transnational class, recruited from financial, corporate and state personnel; 3) which employs neo-liberalism and globalism as unifying ideologies that seek to (re)commodify aspects of social relationships and social production and reproduction that were hitherto object of state or community regulation, social entitlements, and protection, with the aim of expanding and deepening the circuits of capital; 4) and by doing so encroach routinely on the sovereignty of national states or regional conglomerates of states, among others by helping to ‘constitutionalize’ neo-liberalism, by empowering the transnational class segments within any individual country, and by decapacitating the social contracts between classes forged in the prior period of Fordism/Keynesianism/developmentalism/really existing socialism.

In sum, instead of a liberal and/or civil society reading of global governance, this work combines aspects of Marx, Gramsci and Polanyi in pointing out that structures of global governance first of all aim to impose world-wide marketization and ‘generalized debt-peonage’ (Harvey, 2003) from above, function as a forum for the ideological unification and practical rule of an emergent transnational class, and serve, above anything else, the interests of finance capital.

Authors such as Gowan (1999, 2003), Arrighi (1994, 2000), McMichael (2003), Harvey (2003), Panitch (2000) and Wood (2003), in addition, have demonstrated that this emergent transnational state obeys the interests of some
states far more than other states. They demonstrate that the structure was created step by step as a vehicle for the global extension of the US state and its ruling corporate class, plus similar class actors among its key allies in Europe and Japan. While some global forums function as communication and planning departments of this US led neo-liberal transnational state, for instance the Trilateral Commission, the G8, the OECD and the World Economic Forum, others, such as the IMF and the World Bank have been transformed into effective bureaucratic ‘debt collection devices’ (Bienefeld, 2000) for global financial flows and increasingly as vehicles for institutional re-engineering of obsolete national institutions. Regional alliances such as the EU, ASEAN and NAFTA, similarly, have first of all served to translate the issues of free trade, deregulated capital flows and property rights as agreed in GATT, WTO and other global organizations downwards into other jurisdictions (Mittelmann, 2000). Instead of cosmopolitan democracy in the making, this work argues that actual global governance is US led neo-liberal imperialism in action, what Peter Gowan (1999) has called the ‘Dollar-Wall Street-Regime’. In this vision, the multilateral UN organizations as well as the global civil society of NGO’s, organizations that political liberals tend to cherish, have for all practical purposes been limited to serving respectively as its fire department, its toolbox of experts, and its public relations group. These arenas are necessary for the maintenance of hegemony but they hardly affect the core financial interests that are the undemocratic prerogative of the treasuries of their key sponsors, first of all the US.

The contemporary imperialism argument thus emphasizes that what Bourdieu has called ‘the right hand of the state’ – finance and coercion – has become globalized and placed beyond any democratic control, while the ‘left hand of the state’ has been locked into increasingly defensive, under-funded, local and parochial conditions. Beyond the conventional institutionalist visions, which remain largely fixed to micro or meso environments, it claims that such condition has not just been the largely contingent outcome of institutional designs and actors in situ. Rather, it contends, this has been the systematic local outcome of a global framework of neo-liberal imperialism, imposed on behalf of finance capital and the transnational class by the core Northern states led by the US.

Two sorts of issues remain underdeveloped in this argument. First, the question of hegemony: Imperialist arguments, if they want to become persuasive outside the radical circles, depend on a sophisticated theory of hegemony that rejects mechanical ideas of top-down power and blank imposition. It must be emphasized that hegemony is a process in time and space, based both on force as well as consensus, exerting pressures and setting limits, pre-selecting certain options and including particular actors while excluding other options
and alternative actors. In its power balances and guiding interests it is a highly structured and systematic process, but in its particular negotiations and choices it must accommodate contingency and counter-power, making any particular outcome in place and time both determined as well as contingent. In concrete terms: if the United States is by far the most powerful player in making and running contemporary neo-liberal empire (yes, in the singular), it must accommodate slightly diverging Japanese or European interests among its rich allies in the financial and trade networks. It should also heed Brazilian, South African, Russian or Chinese interests in trade negotiations, or Russian, Indian, Korean and Pakistani in security matters. Shifting coalitions can exert different pressures, and outcomes are contingent upon the conditions under which particular alliances become possible and gain strength and coherence. Also, if the US state works primarily for the financial interests of the transnational class, it cannot but heed the particular local and national pressures under which the specific local segments of that class come into being and are reproduced. This is true at home and abroad. If, under Bush, classical industrial interests and oil-interests have become more influential in domestic US politics after 2001 in relation to Wall Street, it does not immediately mean that another epoch has arrived, but it does mean that different accents will be set, including a shift to hard power and, if necessary, inter-imperialist confrontation (steel tariffs, insider contracts for Iraqi ‘reconstruction’, less circumvent militarism, UN and Nato fissures). Similarly, if the US treasury and the IMF have to accommodate an Argentine intransigence on debt service, supported by a mobilized and angry population in combination with an obvious lack of breath of its national and comprador bourgeoisie, it may be more flexible then it used to be in earlier crises. If Korean workers stage huge strikes and demonstrations, the US and IMF will not push their demands on banking reform and the Chaebols to the limit, etc. The message is: local outcomes cannot simply be derived from macro imperialist theory or narratives. Hegemonies are by definition situated (historically and spatially) and depend on the configuration of collective actors at any one moment in time and on the context of place. That is, hegemonic outcomes are always amalgams of macro structure and micro action, determinations and voluntarisms, local and global. If such notion of hegemony would gain wider acceptance, a broad and fruitful cooperation between institutionalists and empire-theorists would become possible, potentially preparing important victories in the ‘great globalization debate’ and guiding and strengthening reformist and anti-globalist alliances.

Second, there is a whole set of often noted and discussed social issues that can and should be brought systematically into the orbit of empire theories. Neo-liberal empire does not just operate within financial linkages but it
is simultaneously and systematically producing a whole series of ramifications throughout local social orders. Institutionalist explanations would gain much analytical and political force if they ‘scaled up’ their approaches and explored more systematically and rigorously the chains of linkage between local outcomes and global structures. Empire theorists on the other hand would gain much more empirical leverage if their jumbo arguments would offer more openings for local level social research.

For example, the generalized intensification of pressures on peripheries and agriculture, leading to large-scale de-peasantization, (sub)proletarianization, informalization of markets, and increased migration all over the South, is part and parcel of empire, as is the pressure on older industrial territories and their working classes. In their turn, these processes exert strong pressures on families, households, sexes and generations, as well as local communities, which are all tendentially bereft of non-market sources of livelihood and survival. Proletarianization and all its diverse and potential consequences may be the underside of globalization, as we concluded earlier, but it is then also the flip side of empire, and an integral aspect of the theorization and analysis of its relations and mechanisms.

This is a useful message: it means that counter-imperial mobilizations can help to set limits to the process and lead to more radically negotiated outcomes. While mobilizations are mostly local or at best national, in the global epoch effective negotiations and articulations of positions often take stage at regionalist levels and in the negotiation between whole regional clusters and (or within) the global institutions. For the basic conditions of life, the most significant political battles are nowadays waged at the level of, within, and by the EU, a deepened Mercosur, the emerging alliances between Brazil, South Africa, India and China, or around the contents of the greater Indian trade area etc. as they negotiate with each other and with the US or global institutions. Regionalism is generally neo-liberal, as Mittelman has shown (2000), but it may receive new input from movements and mobilizations. Some of this input may be squarely right wing, conservative, religious, or nationalist. Anti-globalism is not everywhere a left wing movement, as it is partly in Western Europe, the US and Latin America. But whatever the local ideological origins and meanings of protest against neo-liberal empire, mobilizations, especially if coordinated on a regional level, may lead to significant modifications of the contents of regionalism, which may help to produce alternative outcomes on the ground within national territories or local life worlds. Such alternative outcomes concern first of all the maintenance of public welfare, health, education, pensions etc., but they are also about formations of family, household, gender, work, sociality and sodality. In short: social mobilizations and regionalist alliances may
produce new positions and input in the negotiation with neo-liberal empire, helping to generate alternative visions and practices of public economies and public services, feeding into alternative modes of life on the ground.

Finally, an often fully misrecognized integral aspect of neo-liberal empire is state-breakdown in the weaker zones of the world system such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Kaukasus, the Balkans, partly the Andes, and between 1993 and 1999 also in Russia. Empire-actors and their ideologists used to call such breakdowns ‘state failure’, and they have been concerned about the global security consequences. NGO-activists often attribute such breakdowns to corrupt government, rapacious elites, and failing institutions (Collier, 2003, for example). Such explanations are one-sided, focusing only – and paradigmatically – on local conditions. The fact is that neo-liberal empire is systematically producing such collapses, with all the associated human disasters. This is not to say that World Bank directors are personally responsible for the dramas in the ‘zones of turmoil’. But it is to emphasize that long term and severe state indebtedness in situations where 1) the modern state itself had been young, weak and imposed by internal or external colonialism and 2) where elites have had widely diverging interests, or interests that compete directly with the state, while having had little experience in the motivations and arts of compromise, and 3) lootable resources are available that are sought after in world markets, state collapse becomes an almost likely outcome. State collapse, really, is the catastrophic tip-of-the-iceberg of a generalized condition of lack of legitimacy on the part of all states and elites under neo-liberal empire – debt peonage does not make up for substantive citizenship. It is, fortunately, restricted to the vulnerable zones and their populations, but its causation is never simply local, and always derived from a much wider and much more universal process of the neo-liberalization of the state, a process that tends to turn all states – some more, some less – into bodies that must despair about their legitimacy and popular justifications.

Jonathan Friedman (2003 for instance) has been one of the few scholars who has consistently stressed the double polarization associated with globalization: the polarization between classes as well as the polarization between increasingly indigenized, ethnicized, nationalized, traditionalized, in short culturally ‘closed’ and strongly bounded populations. This double polarization, though, is an intermediated one. And the intermediating factor is precisely the systematic shortage of legitimacy on the part of the modern state under neo-liberal empire. A major paradox: the emergence of a transnational class operating with digital technologies and advanced management decision systems in the capillary branches of an emergent world empire is willy-nilly acting to parochialize the denizens of the contemporary post-welfare states of
the North and South, West and East. Our pasts are becoming the future now because categorical values, beliefs and loyalties, imagined to be buried deeply in the magical roots of our cultures and religions take the place of the universal modernisms gone awry. They are the cloak that deeply uncertain societies are wrapping around them, embodying the symbolic and somewhat desperate claim to community, identity and legitimacy, while their leaders and elites are sneaking through the magnificent backdoor-exit offered by empire.
Notes
1 I am grateful for thoughtful and helpful comments on style and substance from Monique Nuijten, Wil Pansters, Ellen Reijmers, Hans Siebers, Luisa Steur, Pieter de Vries and Nico Witterdink. I also thank graduate students at Central European University, Budapest, for enlightening exchanges, as well as the staff seminar at the department for cultural anthropology, Utrecht University, in particular Kees Konings. I am obliged to the CERES Research School for giving me the opportunity and the encouragement; without that an anthropologist would not easily have written a jumbo piece such as this. It was a rewarding experience.
2 The work of Charles Tilly as a whole can stand as a reminder and example, most programmatically perhaps still Tilly, 1985.
3 See for pre 1848 political languages: Bill Sewell, 1980.
4 Any detailed discussion requires a lengthy treatment of technical issues, such as the internal and external validity of statistical constructs like Purchasing Power Parities; the validity and comparability of data gathered by household surveys; the arbitrariness and inadequacy of the one-dollar-a-day line for measuring extreme poverty and other WB poverty lines for middle income countries (which are often 50-100% below national poverty lines in the relevant states); the differences between world inequality and the sum of national inequality ratio’s, with or without weighting of population numbers. Such discussion can obviously not be made in this context.
5 This is the case whether measured in terms of PPP-s, market exchange rates, distances between deciles/quintiles of population, or Gini-coefficients. Of course market exchange rates make the distance of incomes between developed and developing countries much bigger, compare Milanovic 1999 for example with Arrighi and Silver 2002. Market exchange rates are the only realistic numerical approximation of global class formation. Purchasing power parities are no real relation, just a statistical measure of ways and degrees of local survival.

References


Friedman, Jonathan 2003. *Globalization, the State and Violence*. Walnut Creek Calif.: Alta Mira Press.


Globalization


Ways forward in livelihood research

Mayke Kaag

In collaboration with Rik van Berkel, Johan Brons, Mirjam de Bruijn, Han van Dijk, Leo de Haan, Gerben Nootenboom and Annelies Zoomers

Introduction: Getting to grips with persistent problems of poverty and inequality

More than ever before, the world is one, yet still divided. Despite economic growth, technological change, better communications and the accumulation of knowledge, many people are still poor and getting even poorer. Moreover, access to and control of resources remains highly unequal. How can these persistent problems of poverty and inequality be understood and tackled? There are many angles from which to approach such issues, with diverse entry points such as macroeconomic indicators, the role of the state or global political and economic relationships. Recently the concept of ‘livelihood’ has gained popularity among both policy makers and scholars of poverty and development. It is used mostly as a sensitising concept, indicating an approach to poverty that aims to be people-centred, non-sectoral and grounded in the multidimensional reality of daily life. What current livelihood studies have in common is that they concentrate on the actions and strategies of people trying to make a living in adverse circumstances.

This livelihood perspective has proved to be interesting for scholars from different disciplines and backgrounds, and has produced studies dealing with a diversity of themes and focusing on diverse categories of people all over the globe, but always from the perspective of people’s day-to-day struggles in making a living. Thus, livelihood studies may focus on the way people cope with ecological disaster and economic and political adversity (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995), on the effects of resettlement (Dekker 2002) and processes of deagrarianisation (Bryceson 1999), on social-security mechanisms (Nootenboom 2003), diversification (Ellis 2000) and problems of sustainable livelihoods (Carney 1998). Research may cover groups as diverse as women traders in Tadjikistan (Kanji 2002), farmers in the Bolivian Andes (Zoomers 1999), San Bushmen in the Kalahari Desert (Taylor 2002), or unemployed workers in the European
Union (Van Berkel & Brand 1996).

The group of authors of this paper includes human geographers, anthropologists, an economist and a social psychologist. We, however, discovered common ground and interest in the livelihood debate. We feel that the livelihood approach outlined above is useful for studying poverty issues. At the same time, there are still ways forward to be explored. How can, for instance, actors' perceptions of the environment, of themselves, and of the dynamics and processes they are involved in, be integrated into one common framework? Can processes of inclusion and exclusion be analysed from a livelihood perspective? How can the effects of globalization processes be taken into account? These are the kinds of questions that need to be posed if the term ‘livelihood’ is to help us understand the complexity of current problems of poverty and development. In this chapter, we hope to contribute to the discussion and to offer some preliminary answers.

Scientific theories are no ready-made stocks of coherent ideas that can smoothly be applied to some clear-bounded problem. Instead, they emerge incrementally, by trial and error, searching and adapting, going back and forth. This also applies to the livelihood approach, which emerged through years of scientific debate, adaptation to changes in social reality, cross-fertilisation of different domains within social science, and exchanges between social scientists and policy makers. People felt attracted to ideas concerning livelihood and began to use the concept in various parts of the world and in different academic circles. It is only in retrospect that we can appreciate what these studies have in common and thus, what a livelihood approach is about. Furthermore, to fully grasp its significance, the context in which the livelihood approach emerged must be understood.

Therefore, we start by tracing the roots of the livelihood approach in its historical context and considering the debates that have nurtured it. Compared to earlier approaches, the livelihood approach is an important new way of studying poverty and development. Even so, there are still challenges ahead, as we discuss in the third section. We argue that it is important to enhance livelihoods analysis by implying structural constraints; by rethinking the claim of humancentredness associated with the livelihood approach; and by incorporating current developments by finding ways to catch up with a rapidly changing world. We will then link our observations to the specific research themes of livelihood and risk, social security, social exclusion, and globalization and multi-locality. Based on our own research interests and disciplinary backgrounds, these themes will serve as examples of how we are grappling with the different challenges in our own research areas. On the basis of these thematic discussions, we will indicate some ideas for moving forward. These
centre on the development of more dynamic understandings of livelihood. Related to this, in the fourth section we will further elaborate on some of the methodological problems involved. In the conclusion, we will resume the results of our explorations.

**Genealogy of the livelihood approach: Synergy of policy and academic debate**

The concept of livelihood is not new. Evans-Pritchard, for example, used it back in 1940 to describe the Nuer strategies for making a living. Other social scientists to employ the term include Kimble (1960), Pandit (1965) and Freeman (1975). In these studies, ‘livelihood’ was used rather concretely to describe the ways in which people make a living, and mainly pointed to the economic resource base people have at their disposal for doing this. The term was taken for granted and did not constitute an issue for debate.

One of the few scientists before the end of the twentieth century to elaborate the concept of livelihood more theoretically was the economist Polanyi (1886-1964), who died before finishing his book *The Livelihood of Man* that was only published in 1977 (ed. Harry W. Pearson). In this and in his earlier work, some basic aspects of the later livelihood approach can already be distinguished. Polanyi wanted to develop an economic science that was holistic and human-centred. He considered the economy as socially, culturally and historically embedded, as opposed to mainstream (formalist) economics that was merely concerned with individual maximising behaviour. In his substantive definition of the economy, the term ‘livelihood’ was central in pointing to the fact that people need a material base to satisfy their needs and wants. He stressed that ‘the means, not the wants are material’ (1977: 20).\(^3\) Polanyi’s ideas on the essence of the economy were influential, mainly in anthropology and social geography and to a lesser extent in his own discipline of economics. They triggered fierce debates over substantivism and formalism but the term ‘livelihood’ was not explicitly taken up by other scholars.

In geography, the notion of *genre de vie* adopted in French geography in the early 20th century can be considered as the first conception of livelihood (De Haan 2000b). Vidal de la Blache introduced *genre de vie* to explain that within a specific geographical setting, called the *pays*, there is a ‘highly localised, rooted, stable and socially bounded connection between people and the land’ (Johnston *et al* 2000: 294).

It was only at the end of the 1980s, however, that the livelihood approach began to take its present shape. Its emergence can be attributed to a convergence of several processes both in developmental practice and scientific debate. In fact, a cross-fertilisation of science and policy has taken place.
The 1980s was the era of Structural Adjustment Programmes, which were presented as the macroeconomic recipe for solving problems of development and poverty in so-called Least Developed Countries. The programmes did not go uncontested however. It was suggested that they were too narrowly macroeconomic and actually brought adverse consequences for the poor. Reports such as UNICEF’s *Adjustment With a Human Face* (Cornia, Jolly & Stewart 1987) stressed that a more people-sensitive approach was needed that would pay explicit attention to human welfare and the fulfilment of basic needs, both in the short and in the long run. The WCED¹ report *Our Common Future* (1987) also contained a plea, albeit modest, for ‘putting poor people first’ (Chambers 1987). In contrast to unitary macroeconomic approaches, the insight took root that situations of poverty are diverse in character and that poverty is a multi-dimensional problem, involving not only economic but also political, cultural, social and ecological aspects.

The development of these ideas converged with developments in more academically oriented approaches that – as early as the 1970s and 1980s – tried to develop a bottom-up and actor-oriented approach. Robert Chambers has been one of the pioneers in the field and influential in the elaboration of the livelihood approach at the IDS at the University of Sussex (Chambers 1987, Chambers & Conway 1992). In economics and geographical studies, an interest in the informal sector and in survival strategies of the poor had already emerged during the 1970s and 1980s (Schmink 1984). Survival and coping strategies had also been an important focal point in studies of risk and hazard such as in those by scholars from the ‘political ecology’ school (Blakie 1985, Blakie & Brookfield 1987, Wisner 1978, cf. Blakie *et al.* 1994).

Amartya Sen’s school of thought has also been influential. Sen stressed the importance of investigating entitlements instead of just property for understanding poverty and famine (Sen 1981). Later on, Sen developed his ‘capabilities approach’ that points to the need to assess poverty issues paying attention to what a person is capable of doing and being, and to his or her own perceptions of what is desirable (cf. Sen 1985, Dreze & Sen 1989).

It was in this context that a livelihood approach emerged that stressed the diversity of poverty situations and the multidimensionality of the poverty problem and focused on the agency and the capability of actors, on ‘strengths rather than needs’ (Murray 2000).

Interestingly, while the livelihood approach emerged as a critical response to World Bank and IMF policies in the 1980s, it actually converged with development policy in the early 1990s (UNDP 1990, OECD 1996). Complementary to macroeconomic adjustment measures that had preached the retreat of the state, the delivery of public and private services directed at specific target groups
progressively gained more attention. The livelihood approach fits well into this shift because of its focus on particular groups of poor people and its analysis of what they can do themselves and what (e.g. services) they need.

While the roots of the livelihood approach thus lie in the 1980s and early 1990s, the basic ideas have been further developed by scholars from different disciplines over the years. At first, economists and human geographers constituted the majority, but later on other disciplines such as anthropology and social psychology entered the debate as well. Three types of contributions can be distinguished. Most are case studies that focus on the livelihood strategies of a particular group of people in a particular environment (Dekker 2002, Kanji 2002, Taylor 2002). Secondly, there are a few influential contributions that are more theoretical and broader in scope, such as those of Ellis (2000), Bebbington (1999), De Haan (2000b), and Moser & Norton (2001). Thirdly, efforts have been made within policy circles to develop analytical frameworks that allow the livelihood situation of a target group to be captured and subsequent policy interventions to be formulated. DFID3 is the main representative of such an approach, but the World Bank, Oxfam International, and others have also incorporated the livelihood theme within their policies.

**Challenges in current livelihood research**

The livelihood perspective gives important new insights into the essence of global poverty problems. Its point of departure is the appreciation of poor people’s situated agency; how they actively shape their lives in particular contexts through material and non-material assets. In this respect, the livelihood approach is a valuable counterweight against approaches to poverty, such as macroeconomic and basic needs approaches, that tend to portray people as mere victims of structural constraints. We argue that appreciating people’s agency is a necessary condition for good livelihood research, but that it is not sufficient in itself.

Firstly, because by taking a group of poor people and their actions and strategies as the entry point for analysis, one risks adopting too narrow a view and of ignoring the context of structural constraints, such as power inequalities (cf. Moser & Norton 2001, Adato & Meinzen-Dick 2001). In addition, differences within these groups or categories, such as gender and age differences, may easily be glossed over. One of the consequences of such neglect is that a positive image of poverty is created: ‘they are poor, but see how nicely they are doing’. This is out of line with reality and even treacherous, as it diminishes the urge to address structural causes of poverty such as unequal power relations and unequal access to resources.
To give an example, Working the Sable – Environment and Society in Northern Nigeria by Mortimore & Adams (1999) is an excellent study of the flexibility and adaptation through which Sahelian people manage to carve out an existence in a capricious and harsh climate. Although the achievements of Sahelian households in sustaining and even developing their livelihoods are impressive, the authors overstate their argument by omitting some important points. They only study the people who have managed to survive in the rural economy and ignore those who died, gave up or moved to city-slums. Moreover, they tend to underestimate the degree of human suffering on the spot, for example apparent in the high infant mortality rate. In addition, important factors for explaining (differences in) resource endowments and farmers’ strategies such as the role of institutional factors like land tenure, village-based institutions for labour and wealth-sharing, markets and state organisations (Van Dijk 2002) are only considered in passing.

Secondly, apart from this actor-structure dilemma in livelihood studies, there is the issue of people-centeredness. Livelihood studies aim to be people-centred but what exactly does this mean? Some livelihood studies envision man rather narrowly, as a homo economicus mainly occupied with using assets to obtain well-defined economic goals. This view however, has been increasingly criticised and it has been stressed that to consider a person as a ‘whole’, his or her perceptions and ideas, hopes and fears, norms and values need to be taken into account (cf. Alkire & Deneulin 2000, Kaag 2001). Likewise, Bebbington (1999: 2022) states that assets are not only vehicles for instrumental action (making a living) but also for hermeneutic action (making life meaningful), and emancipatory action (challenging the structures under which one makes a living). Sen (1997) also challenges the instrumentality that is inherent in much economic thinking. He strongly pleads for real people-centeredness whereby human capability is considered an end in itself and not just a means for development or economic gain. It often proves difficult, however, to translate these insights into research and policy.

Thirdly, livelihood studies face the challenge of incorporating current developments and of catching up with a rapidly changing world. Attention, for example, should be paid to the influence globalization processes have on livelihoods, including the formation of trans-national networks and various forms of rural/urban linkages, the integration into world markets, and the emergence of new forms of social and cultural bonds. Applying a strong local or regional focus in livelihood research is no longer self-evident, nor is taking the household as the main unit of research.

Summarising, the challenge is (1) to take structure into account (2) while not loosing sight of poor people and their agency, (3) and to capture livelihoods in space and over time. This boils down to a more dynamic conceptualisation
of livelihood. One that puts people and their actions at the centre of analysis but simultaneously considers these actions as both results and constituents of broader and longer term processes. Indeed, we advocate a conceptualisation of livelihood practices as embedded action and of livelihood as fluid, moving with changing circumstances and responding to but also influencing external conditions.

In the following, we will link the foregoing observations to the specific research themes of risk, social security, social exclusion, and globalisation and multi-locality. These themes should not be read as an exhaustive coverage of livelihood issues but simply as examples of how we grapple with the above challenges in our own research areas.

The first subsection, on livelihood and risk, digs right into the issue of livelihood dynamics by focusing on the versatility of livelihoods, in particular the changing nature of livelihood conditions and the resulting insecurity with which people have to cope. Following micro-economic insights, it is explained how the study of risk as people’s subjective interpretations of versatility, puts the person and his/her ideas centre stage. At the same time, the study of risk implies a longer term perspective, as decisions about the use of resources depend on people’s view of the future and are nourished by their past experiences (Ortiz 1980). More sociological approaches to risk focus more explicitly on the social, cultural and institutional processes and arrangements that explain why some livelihoods are better predisposed to cope with risk (events) than others (Beck 1992).

This latter perspective is more systematically elaborated in the next subsection that focuses on livelihood security. Here, the accent is on the ways people try to deal with the volatility in their livelihood in the long run. Social security, indicating the arrangements people make to secure their livelihood over time, thus also includes a longer term perspective. A focus on social security arrangements reveals the cultural and social embeddedness of livelihood and the importance of institutions as mediating processes (cf. Ellis 2000, Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1999).

While social security arrangements concern social inclusion, the third subsection focuses, in stead, on social exclusion. Little attention has been paid to processes of exclusion in livelihood studies in developing countries – unlike in European studies on poverty. There are, however, many points for exchange and debate, for instance on the (degree of) people-centredness of much policy research on social exclusion.

The last subsection, on livelihoods, globalization and multi-locality, focuses explicitly on the challenge of capturing livelihoods in space and over
time. It identifies ways to study livelihoods in current times of globalization, as a result of which livelihoods have become increasingly multiple and multi-local. This part thus offers some directions for future livelihood research. We will finish this section by drawing some conclusions from our explorations into the different themes.

**Livelihood and risk**

Livelihoods can be analysed as a system or as a process. In the DFID definition indicating that ‘livelihood comprises capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living’ (DFID 2002), system characteristics seem to dominate. A process perspective emphasises the versatility of the access to livelihood assets and incorporates the variable, stochastic nature of livelihood elements. Ecological conditions and market prices vary across seasons and years, often in unpredictable ways. For example in semi-arid regions, the variability of rainfall causes large fluctuations in productivity and in crop and livestock (Scoones 1994, De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995, Van Dijk 2001). Likewise, small variations in soil conditions may cause important variations in cropping patterns. These variations may constitute both constraints and opportunities, and are an important source of risk (Gandah 1999, Brouwer et al 1993).

It is in this context that risk appears as a crucial concept for understanding livelihood processes in developing and developed countries. This section illustrates how economic and sociological theories on risk analysis and risk behavior offer instruments to deal with the apparent randomness of many variables influencing people’s livelihoods. In addition, it indicates some linkages from a risk analysis perspective to issues of insecurity, vulnerability and poverty, and thus shows how risk analysis may be useful in livelihood research.

Broadly defined in an economic sense, risk is the subjective interpretation of randomness. Randomness may concern a range of variables related to livelihood outcome (income, health, etc.) or to livelihood conditions (climate, politics, etc.). Randomness means that obtaining knowledge is problematic and that decisions are to be made through the interpretation of risk factors and the weighing up of different probabilities. Such an interpretation is inherently subjective: risk assessment is the product of complex cognitive and heuristic processes (Slovic 2000). In this, cultural understandings concerning the meaning of different variables – such as whether rain is considered a gift from God or a natural phenomenon – play an important role.

Understanding risk should include some notions about probability and variability, and a recognition of the differences between risk and uncertainty (Vose 2000). Risk analysis assumes that the probability of things happening is, by definition, subjectively determined. The decision-maker does not need
to know the true parameters but formulates expectations about them, often using intuitive keywords such as ‘risky’, ‘profitable’, ‘attractive’, etc. From the perspective of the decision-maker, limited information about the probability of things happening leads to uncertainty. This may be due to a lack of knowledge about the distribution of the parameters but can also be due to a lack of adequate measurement tools, for example in the case of soil fertility. When uncertainty occurs, priorities have to be set as to what extent relevant parameters should be included in the decision-making process.

The preceding facilitates a more precise conceptualisation of insecurity and vulnerability. Insecurity is the specific probability that some livelihood parameters fall below the value where the prevailing livelihood process becomes threatened. Vulnerability refers to the exposure to, and the impact of, specific risks on livelihood conditions and involves each of the preceding risk concepts. Let us take the example of a poor potato farmer in the highlands of the Philippines, whose income level only just allows him to meet his family’s basic needs. Potato cultivation is a risky enterprise because of highly variable yields and any adverse event can destroy the source of income (loss of plant material, soil diseases, typhoons, etc.). Moreover, the farmer applies pesticides without sufficient knowledge of the product and without protective clothes, which makes him vulnerable to health risks. Such health risks are considered extremely high by outsiders, yet the farmer may not even worry about them because of a lack of knowledge about the harmful effects of pesticides, for reasons of carelessness as ‘nobody wears protective clothes’, or because he simply has no choice. Risk analysis allows an investigation of both people’s livelihood circumstances and their interpretation of circumstances, with an eye to the future.

Such an economic concept of risk focuses on the probability of events, and the magnitude of the consequences, equating risk with the multiplication of both terms (Kasperson 1992). From a sociological point of view, risk however may take on other collective dimensions. Each event produces different arrays of responses by individual and collective decision making units. Risk events interact with psychological, institutional and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate perceptions and shape risk behaviour. These responses trigger all kind of higher order consequences and may demand additional responses at the institutional level or cause impediments to desired responses (Kasperson 1992).

A simple focus on risk alone also neglects the fact that not all people and livelihoods are equally vulnerable to risk events and equally predisposed to overcome the consequences of risk events. Beck (1992) speaks in this respect of ‘risk positions’ to indicate this differential predisposition towards risk.

Attention must also be drawn to the reflexive aspect of risk. People, liveli-
Livelihoods and other social groupings can be organised around risk (cf. Beck 1992). Careful analysis of institutional arrangements and organisational aspects of livelihoods may reveal that risk and uncertainty have been important structuring factors behind the organisation of livelihoods and collective arrangements. These institutional arrangements in turn lead to the production of knowledge, both local and scientific, which is used by decision-makers to deal with unforeseen events, and to negotiate livelihood conditions.

Livelihood (in)security
The shift from a risk to a social security perspective on livelihood is not as large as it seems. Whereas the former primarily emphasises the fact that livelihoods and people are exposed to various sorts of risks and are therefore vulnerable, a social security approach focuses on the ways in which individuals or collective entities try to diminish the impact of risk events through (collective) arrangements and insurance mechanisms. Thus, while livelihood primarily refers to people’s means of making a living and the activities that provide food, housing and a monetary or non-monetary income, and risk points to the threats and probabilities inherent in a livelihood, livelihood security deals with the stability and resilience of this livelihood in the long run. Livelihood security can be organised through local support systems that provide assistance in times of need and are generally based on kinship, nearness (neighbourhood), shared ethnicity, friendship, shared occupation or a combination of these. Examples include networks of mutual help, labour exchanges, patron-client relationships offering loans or assistance in times of need, and reciprocal gift giving. In Indonesia the latter is a widespread practice (called sumbangan) at weddings, burials, and religious ceremonies (selamatan) and forms a fertile ground for other forms of help and support (Nooteboom 2003: 189).

A complicating factor in assessing the meaning of local support systems is that local institutions and arrangements are often of a dual nature and paradoxical. They do not only offer security, but often constitute a source of insecurity as well. The practice of gift giving at weddings, religious ceremonies, and funerals, for instance, provides the receiving family with support to cope with the high expenses of such events. The contributions are, however, a burden for those invited (ibid: 190). Some authors have high hopes of these local forms of social security and their potential integration with state organised forms of social security (Van Ginneken 1999). It is however doubtful whether these local arrangements are strong enough to cover whole populations and insure them against all risks. Such romantic views and overoptimistic accounts of local forms of support may ignore the fact that for the poorest segments of the population, this support is often inaccessible or very limited in scope (Nooteboom
Livelihoods are never stable and especially poor people in developing countries regularly worry about whether there will be enough food for their families and whether they will have work, money, or at least access to a loan. When confronted with misfortune in the family, i.e. illness, income failure, or the loss of a family member, or on a larger scale, i.e. economic crisis, civil war or famine, the consequences are often most severe for vulnerable categories of people. Recovery after a disaster or bad luck may be difficult: poor people may not be able to, for instance, repair their house or buy new clothes, and inherited (live)stock and/or savings may have been exhausted. In addition, they may have seen their networks of kin, friends and neighbours shrink as their status declined, making it very uncertain whether they will find support when a new disaster strikes. The shocks and stresses people face can be of a material, financial, social or religious nature and causes and consequences often cannot be separated.

In this context, livelihood security draws attention to the everyday practices and difficulties that people face in making a living and the ways in which they try to safeguard their livelihood when times get rough. It aims at understanding people’s responses when confronted with misfortune, danger and crises, and it focuses on the multiple ways people try to secure their livelihood, directly through their own efforts or indirectly through support and care from others.

In livelihood studies, the importance of a secure (or sustainable) livelihood has been acknowledged, for example, by Chambers (1989:20) who was among the first to write about the vulnerability of the poor:

‘Vulnerability here refers to exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with them. Vulnerability thus has two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual is subject; and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss.’

Being vulnerable and insecure has a ‘relational’ aspect as social isolation – not a (temporary) decline in income – is the greatest threat to livelihoods. What makes the difference between being vulnerable or not is access to systems of redistribution. In other words, a lack of social relations and social networks accounts for the vulnerability of poor people. Not being able to participate in systems of (information) exchange, insurance, access to resources, and redistribution prevents people from receiving social assistance and protection in times of need.
The term ‘social security’ refers to the ways in which people, households, and societies try to protect themselves in a social way, i.e. by help, interaction and/or exchange with others, against shocks and stresses that threaten the continuity and stability of their livelihood. Social security studies often focus on non-state and locally organised forms of social security that are not included in state regulations and legislation. These arrangements are usually not formalised in written rules and regulations and are context-specific, restricted to small areas, and mainly organised by local people.

Social security studies aim to go beyond the study of income, economic conditions and actors’ strategies, to include both material and non-material aspects of shocks and stresses to people’s livelihood and how people experience these in time and context. They examine the institutions, arrangements and limitations that provide an understanding of people’s long-term strategies to gain protection and support. Attention is thus paid to levels beyond the individual or the household, such as neighbourhoods, kinship relations and social groups. Both poorer and richer members of society and their relationships are included in the analysis and the diversity in strategies and mechanisms of support is revealed.

Society is not an amorphous collection of individuals who cope with insecurities and risks individually and do so successfully or not depending on their personal skills, vulnerability or ownership of assets and resources. People constantly interact, mutually influence, enable or constrain, exchange and mobilise relationships with other people who might give access to resources and support in times of need.

Establishing and maintaining good relations with others is of crucial importance for enhancing and maintaining a living. At the same time, others can be a major source of insecurity. A relevant question is thus exactly how people handle these insecurities and dilemmas of exchange and support. Who cares for vulnerable and weak members in society – and under what conditions – if they cannot make a living themselves, or if their sources of livelihood are severely hampered by misfortune or contingencies? Do any viable arrangements and institutions exist to protect villagers against the negative consequences of misfortune? And if so, in what ways and to what extent do these arrangements and institutions provide support for individuals and households in times of need?

Livelihood and social exclusion
Clearly, not all members of a given society have equal access to social security arrangements: particularly the poorest tend to be excluded. Studying the processes through which such exclusion happens is important for understanding the causes and the effects of poverty, which indeed are often related to
historical processes of exclusion: exclusion of access to natural resources, trade opportunities, knowledge, social services, etc. Poverty, in its turn, also contributes to social exclusion: someone who is too poor to meet his/her social obligations or to live up to social expectations of what a good member of the community is or has, tends to be excluded even further. Social exclusion however, has not been an important concept in livelihood studies, although it has been in poverty approaches in Europe and the United States. The social exclusion debate does have much in common with debates on livelihood (cf. De Haan & Maxwell 1998, Jackson 1999). The observations presented below illustrate that it may be enriching to look, beyond livelihood discussions and literature alone, at parallel debates and discourses.

Since the 1980s, the concept of ‘social exclusion’ has gained increasing importance in the European Union, both in policy debates and in the social sciences. In a way, it has become an alternative to the concept of poverty, especially in the policy discourse around the European Community. The distinctions between both concepts have been debated extensively, not only for conceptual demarcation but also because of the policy implications this shift of concepts has, should have or might have. Some have welcomed the concept of social exclusion as providing a more multidimensional and dynamic approach to the analysis of the most vulnerable and marginalised groups in society. Others have criticised it for drawing attention away from the financial hardship of the poor, issues of social inequality and the importance of redistributive policies.

Of course, there is no such thing as ‘the’ social exclusion discourse. In her analysis of social exclusion and ‘New Labour’ in the UK, Levitas (1998) distinguished three different social exclusion discourses: the redistributionist discourse (RED), the social integrationist discourse (SID), and the moral underclass discourse (MUD). Simplifying, Levitas summarises the differences between these discourses as follows (1998: 27): ‘In RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no morals’. Different discourses also advocate different intervention strategies. The RED discourse focuses on the need for redistributive policies, SID emphasises the importance of labour-market integration programmes, and the MUD discourse attacks welfare-state dependency as such. Another example of different social exclusion discourses can be found in EU policy initiatives. Having initiated its ‘Employment Strategy’ in the late 1990s, the EU recently started its ‘Inclusion Strategy’ as a kind of supplement to its employment strategy. Traditionally, however, policy makers in the EU and in member states see employment as the ‘royal road to inclusion’. The question is how policy initiatives aimed at promoting inclusion should differ from those aimed at stimulating employment.
As far as we know, the concept of ‘livelihood’ has not been used in the discourse on social exclusion in Europe, either in social science research or in policy debates. Nevertheless, there are some clear parallels between the genealogy of the concept of livelihood and the social exclusion discourse.

One of the core characteristics of the livelihood approach is that it advocates an approach to poverty issues that is people-centred. Here the debate on social exclusion in the EU still has a long way to go. Much social science research as well as policy making is top-down. In the social sciences, an ‘objectivist’ approach classifies people as excluded, marginalised or included using outsiders’ standards that pay no attention to people’s own perceptions and experiences. In policy making, a ‘paternalist’ approach prescribes that people should be included and how, and defines what groups are excluded and thus constitute ‘problem groups’ towards which policy interventions are to be targeted. At the same time, social policies often counteract individual survival or inclusion strategies, for example by criminalising informal activities or by forbidding welfare recipients to engage in unpaid activities that might reduce their labour-market availability. Both the ‘objectivist’ and the ‘paternalist’ approach lead to critical gaps between the way scientists and policy makers look at social reality on the one hand, and the views of the ‘excluded’ and ‘poor’ on their own reality on the other. This may seriously jeopardises the adequacy of scientific knowledge and the effectiveness of social policy interventions (Leisering & Leibfried 1999, Van Berkel & Hornemann Møller 2002).

This is not to deny that there are increasing numbers of research projects that pay attention to vulnerable people’s ‘survival strategies’, to what being ‘excluded’ or ‘poor’ means to them, etc. And some policy interventions are bottom-up and engage with people’s survival strategies and own experiences and perceptions. In some cases, the concept of ‘reciprocal adequacy’ is used (Valkenburg & Lind 2002), on the one hand to ground scientific knowledge in the common-sense knowledge of the people under investigation, and on the other hand to underline that successful policy interventions require that interactions between interventionists and policy target groups are a dialogue rather than a monologue. In the social sciences, reciprocal adequacy implies continuous debate between the researched and researchers as to what adequate scientific knowledge is. In social interventions, reciprocal adequacy implies the active participation of clients in defining the problems that interventions should solve and in deciding on the means and objectives of those interventions. Nevertheless, the ‘objectivist’ and ‘paternalist’ traditions described above are still dominant.

Another parallel between the livelihood and social exclusion debates concerns the challenges both ‘lines of research’ are facing. One of these is
avoiding a reductionist approach. For example, even though the concept of social exclusion was introduced, among others, to emphasise the multidimensional character of social vulnerability and marginalisation, policy makers and researchers are still inclined to reduce social exclusion to a lack of employment and labour-market participation. Once again, there are exceptions to this. In the policy field, the European Union’s Inclusion Strategy as a supplement to its Employment Strategy could be cited as an example. Nevertheless, the reductionist view that unemployment implies exclusion and that employment is the key to inclusion, even in a wider sense, is still dominant.

A third issue present in both the livelihood and the social exclusion discourse is the particular vision of man as *homo economicus* that underlies both social science research and social policies. Debates on the welfare state and its perverse effects, and on the future of social policies, refer to the modern citizen as a calculating being who tries to obtain maximum profit from welfare state arrangements with a minimal assumption of responsibilities. Combined with a behaviourist view of human behaviour, this leads to social policy reforms that increasingly make living on welfare unattractive and emphasise the obligations of those dependent on welfare, developing all kinds of sticks and carrots to steer their behaviour. Compared to the two issues discussed above, this issue however has probably the longest tradition of extensive debate. Much research into the worlds of the ‘poor’ and ‘excluded’ has shown that as a theoretical framework to understand people’s behaviour, the *homo economicus* approach falls short. Some social scientists have therefore introduced the concept of *homo bonoris* as a different vision of man (see, for example, Engbersen et al. 1993). This runs parallel to the distinction used by Harré (1979: 4) between ‘a practical order, concerned with the production of the means of life, and an expressive order concerned with honour and reputation’. These visions can lead to quite different interpretations of the same action patterns.

The points elaborated above can be illustrated by considering evaluation studies of activation programmes. Often, these evaluations assess the effects of activation programmes in terms of the policy makers’ objectives only. Usually, this means investigating whether these programmes have contributed to the employability of participants, to labour-market entry and to welfare independence. Whether policy interventions empower or counteract the objectives, strategies and needs of participants are hardly subjected to research. This reflects the objectivist and reductionist tendencies in social science research. Furthermore, the emphasis in evaluation studies is often on the sticks and carrots applied in processes of activation instead of on the quality of activation processes and activation offers. In other words, the focus is on the participant as *homo economicus* rather than as *homo bonoris*. Of course, one could
explain these characteristics of evaluation studies as a result of the fact that
many of these studies have been commissioned by institutes responsible for
policy making and policy delivery. However, this is a partial explanation only:
they also reflect the routines and ‘habitus’ of many social policy students.

Livelihood, globalization and multi-locality
Under globalization, equilibrium and stability are further away than ever
before. ‘Globalization places a premium on flexibility and adaptability, and
those least able to respond to change are likely to be those adversely affected’
(Ellis & Seeley 2001: 1). Livelihood nowadays is thus continuously in change.
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly multi-local and multiple or multidimen-
sional. The general picture of livelihood under globalization will therefore
become one of increased rearrangements of strategies using various capitals
in different locations. This is explained below in a discussion of the chang-
ing meaning and significance of households for livelihood and the increased
importance of networks.

A household was often regarded as ‘a single decision-making unit maxi-
mising its welfare, subject to a range of income-earning opportunities and a set
of resource constraints’ (Ellis 1997: 12). Households were defined as ‘co-resi-
dent groups of persons, who share most aspects of consumption, drawing on
and allocating a common pool of resources (including labour) to ensure their
material reproduction’ (Schmink 1984: 89). Thus, a household’s boundaries and
functions were usually defined primarily in economic or material terms, and
secondarily in terms of cohesion, for example, as a set of social relations and
mutual obligations that were defined by kinship or other types of reciprocity.
More recently, it became clear that an individual’s and a household’s goals
sometimes conflict and that the cohesion of the household is often quite weak,
especially in cases of temporary migration. The old assumption of a nuclear or
extended family – comprising a male breadwinner, his non-working wife and
dependent children and other family members – has been rejected, as have
traditional patterns of labour division. This does not necessarily mean that the
old assumptions were erroneous, but that in recent decades new patterns of
labour division have appeared. Along with globalization and the new com-
munication and transportation technology, the characteristics and functions of
households have changed rapidly. The number of female-headed households
has increased, the elderly have increasingly become a separate and often isolat-
ed group who are no longer cared for in extended families, and children have
become divided into two groups – those who are supported and go to school
and those who are forced to work to supplement the household’s income.
Traditional principles of pooling labour, incomes and consumption within the
household have changed (De Haan & Zoomers 2003: 353-354).

In addition, households do not necessarily organise their livelihoods in one place (Salman & Zoomers 2002). Due to labour migration, most rural households already lived both from agriculture and remittances. But with globalization, the multi-locality of a household's livelihood accelerates and livelihood becomes increasingly dependent on social, information and other networks. Nevertheless, access to assets in a certain place still has considerable impact on livelihoods, and multi-locality should not be exaggerated. Mobility remains a cost item with its own risks. Even so, multi-locality and diminishing household cohesion are giving rise to livelihood networks. Individuals are no longer organised as co-resident groups (i.e. concentrated in space) but instead resemble individual cells connected to each other by networks of remittances, information, etc.

Finally, livelihoods are becoming increasingly diversified (i.e. multidimensional), with social groups, households and individuals combining several livelihood strategies. This may involve deploying different activities in one locality, but also spreading activities over different locations, contributing to the observed tendency of increased multi-locality.

The consequences of livelihoods becoming multi-local and multidimensional are that increasing attention has to be paid to networks, i.e. to the set of relations and ties among actors such as social groups, households or individuals. Social relations or ties may range from kinship, friendship and village membership to patron-client relationships, union or political party membership and ethnic bonds. They are not necessarily local; even kinship is becoming increasingly multi-local, with relatives migrating to different urban and rural areas. Social relations can overlap and people may be part of a variety of networks. Granovetter (1985) saw all economic actions as being embedded in social relations, which means that economic behaviour can only be understood as part of social behaviour. Markets, for example, also have to be considered as social institutions.

Any social relation can be mapped as a tie having both a content and a form. The content of a tie can include anything from goods, services, friendship or love, to money, information or advice. The form of a tie concerns the strength of the relationship. Relations between family members, friends and close colleagues are usually strong ties, involving people who frequently communicate with each other and with other actors in the same network, and who value the relationship highly. Weak ties occur between members of different networks, i.e. between people who have less contact and who value their relations less.

At first sight, strong ties seem important in sustaining a livelihood and
family and friends are the first to be called upon. Agricultural work and food are shared among family and friends in the village. Remittances from migrants in the city are mostly received by kin. Granovetter (1983), however, pointed to an issue that may also help to shed light on the value of different forms of ties for globalising livelihoods. He argued that weak ties are important for people looking for a job. Even the modern meaning of ‘networking’ emerged in this context: people looking for a job benefit more from contacts with members of networks other than the one(s) they are part of. Contacts with members of another network may yield new information about job opportunities or lead to other new contacts. The only complication is that people usually trust information from strong ties more than information from weak ties, which may hinder the recognition of feasible opportunities offered by weak ties. Returning to livelihoods and globalization, we can conclude that if globalization places a premium on flexibility and adaptability, leading to continuously changing multi-local and multidimensional livelihoods, then the bonus of adaptation is perhaps better realised through weak than through strong ties. These observations suggest that networks, translocal ties and multidimensionality are increasingly important for livelihood analysis in a globalising world.

Discussion

The foregoing discussions offer useful points of departure for our aim of developing more dynamic understandings of livelihood. All sub sections focus on the playground between individual strategies, collective arrangements and structural constraints. They try to capture the dynamics at play and consider the interaction between people and their social and natural environment (synchronous dynamics) and how this changes over time (diachronic dynamics). Accents differ depending on the specific subject and aims of research. Thus, while risk stresses the volatility of many livelihood situations, social security studies put an accent on the relative continuity that exists amidst this volatility by focusing on the longer term arrangements through which people cope with insecurity.

A focus on process is evident in all sub sections, but also here, accents may differ. Some studies consider livelihoods primarily as the results of past decisions taken, and reveal the processual character of livelihoods by studying chains of decisions in relation to opportunities and constraints in the socio-economic and ecological environment and the socio-cultural frameworks people employ to understand their environment and to take decisions. Other studies may be more concerned with the social processes, of for example social exclusion or globalization, in which livelihood takes shape. But, of course, both dynamics are interrelated and should be studied as such. Livelihood processes
are partly considered processes within a broader dynamic, partly a product of the latter but a constituent of it as well.

Within this overall processual perspective, institutions may be considered as links between the individual and the structural level (economic, socio-political, ecological conditions, etc.). Institutions constitute temporal arrangements with both enabling and constraining effects on people’s livelihood, as the discussion of risk, social security, social exclusion (the policy concerning unemployment), and globalization (globalising networks) all indicate.

People centredness is aimed at in several interrelated ways: by taking individual decision making as the starting point of the analysis, by trying not to adopt reductionist visions of man, and by explicitly implying people’s own perceptions, wishes and priorities in the livelihood analysis. We acknowledge that people’s perceptions are usually complex, made up of several considerations and weighing processes that may differ between individuals and groups and may change over time.

Finally, our exploration suggests that, while livelihoods have always been multidimensional, changing, and diverse, globalization processes contribute to their increasing complexity, multiplicity and multilocality. This urges us once more to critically assess current ways of studying livelihood and to counter possible atomic, reductionist and static tendencies. Globalization asks for innovative analyses of both continuity and change, place and space, and of livelihood networks stretching across different social, political, cultural and ecological contexts.

**Reflections on research practice**

While new insights may be fairly easily embraced at a theoretical level, it often proves difficult to translate them into research practice. There is a tendency to hold on to received concepts and research methods. When exploring ways forward in livelihood research, these, however, should be critically assessed as well.

Obviously, the concepts chosen for doing research will influence the research findings. The concept of ‘strategy’ for example has the connotation of trying to reach predefined goals, and of rational, planned action. In reality, however, many people cannot plan in advance because of an insecure environment (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995). In addition, individual and family goals and priorities do not remain constant. Livelihood should be conceived as a moving target (Zoomers 1999). In the same vein, thinking in terms of ‘capital’ (social capital, financial capital etc.) may tend to lead to a research design and to results from which *homo economicus* emerges, someone who is mainly occupied with investing his or her assets to reach certain goals. Depicting people
solely as economically rational and strategic actors does not do justice to other aspects that inform human behaviour, such as cultural values and norms, sense of responsibility, anger, fear, or love.

It is not the intention here to plead for the introduction of a whole range of new concepts. What should be stressed, however, is that it is important to critically assess the terms by which any analysis is made, to be aware of inherent connotations and the way research is directed. Sometimes it is sufficient just to make connotations explicit, sometimes it is useful to apply other, more appropriate terms. Instead of the term ‘strategies’ for example, the term ‘pathways’ is perhaps more useful as it points to the fact that insecure conditions often make it difficult for local actors to make strategic decisions in advance. Instead, strategies unfold as actors interact with the changes in the dynamic production environment. The term ‘pathways’ indicates that they are more a result of these interactions than of anything planned in advance (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 2001).

Furthermore, the concepts of networks, multi-local and multi-spatial livelihoods could be useful in overcoming the rather restricted perspective of the traditional household, which is often employed in livelihood studies. Livelihood units have proven to be far more flexible. Especially the multi-spatial dimension deserves more attention, not only because it is important for the analysis of livelihood processes, but also because it presses us to take a far broader range of contextual factors into consideration in livelihood research. People take their decisions not only in relation to the environment where they are: they also make an assessment of other situations in which they might be able to construct a livelihood.

Turning to the issue of methods, it may appear attractive to start with a large survey, to gain an overview of the situation and the problems of the target group(s), on the basis of which case studies can be done to supplement the general picture. Traditionally defined households are often taken as the unit of research without critical reflection. The problem with this way of organising research is however that the choices made at the outset, which are going to direct subsequent research phases, are based on the researcher’s definition of the problem. Instead, it could be more useful to start talking and listening to people to find out their own definition of the problems they encounter, what their relevant social frameworks are, etc. and to build subsequent research on the insights thus gained.

Frameworks such as the DFID rural livelihoods framework are often attractive to researchers and policy makers. The DFID framework has clearly elaborated schemes, diagrams and definitions and a good glossary (see www.livelihoods.org). Its strength is however also its weakness. Ideally, this kind
of scheme serves merely as a rough tool, as it cannot capture the complex dynamics of livelihood systems (Ellis 2000: 29). But in practice these schemes are easily used as frames to cover social reality: research becomes filling in boxes. This is particularly detrimental to livelihood research that aims to be people-centred, dynamic and sensitive to diversity. Schemes such as DFID’s may facilitate the analysis of research findings but should only be used as a supporting means.

Because of the importance of paying attention to power relations and the structural constraints within which people make a living, research methods are needed that allow a close analysis of people’s actions and the establishment of links between these actions and more structural phenomena and transformations in society at large. We therefore advocated a perspective on livelihood that captures the ongoing dynamics of people’s interaction with their social, institutional and material environment. Longer-term research, such as that on ‘livelihood trajectories’ proposed by Blaikie et al. (1998), is a way of attaining such a processual view. This is not, however, always feasible, nor is it necessarily the best way. Other methods of obtaining a longer-term perspective include studying current perceptions of the future or current social arrangements to secure a livelihood over time. Tracing life histories may be particularly good for eliciting individual perceptions of ongoing processes (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 2001), while studying ‘diagnostic events’ can be helpful in unravelling the interplay of different processes underlying (changes in) current livelihood practices (Kaag 2001).

Up to now, livelihood research has predominantly aimed to bring to the fore the particularities and diversity of livelihood situations and practices. Unfortunately, much less effort has been put into arriving at the aggregation and generalisation of research findings that is necessary to further academic development and formulate policy. The challenge is to demonstrate the diversity of ways in which people make a living, while also revealing the similarities and generalities involved. Setting up comparative research that departs from particular case studies but aims to unravel trends, appears promising for both academic and policy purposes.

**Conclusion**

This paper critically assessed the contribution of the livelihood approach to the study of poverty and inequality. It was recognised that the livelihoods perspective incorporates valuable new insights in the essence of poverty problems as it acknowledges poor people’s agency: they actively shape their lives through material and non-material assets, in interaction with their environment. In doing so, the livelihood approach is a helpful counterweight against approaches to
poverty that portray people as mere victims of structural constraints.

We also identified certain challenges for current livelihood research. We promoted a balanced view that not only considers the poor themselves but also acknowledges the context and structural constraints within which people have to make a living. In this respect, differences between individuals and categories of people also deserve explicit attention. Additionally, we pleaded in favour of a people-centred approach that considers humans as ‘whole’ beings instead of reducing them to mere economic actors and ignoring cultural and social aspects of their lives. Furthermore, an open mind is needed to see the changes livelihoods are currently undergoing as a result of processes of globalization. Finally, we argued that a critical stance has to be maintained both towards the ways of conducting and organising research and the concepts one chooses to use.

In the end, research is always based on a certain vision of human nature. Often, this is not made explicit in the social sciences but taken for granted because of the grand theories that form the basis of a discipline. As livelihood studies claim to be holistic and non-sectoral, they claim in fact to go beyond disciplinary divides. The livelihood perspective seems to offer sufficient common ground for scholars from different backgrounds to cooperate and exchange findings. However, such discussions and cooperation can be confusing when underlying assumptions about the world are not shared. This is not to say that all livelihood researchers need to adopt a similar worldview, but at least one should be aware of the different perspectives to allow a fruitful discussion and exchange of ideas. On the basis of such fundamental discussions, more explicit theoretical underpinnings may be developed that would provide the livelihood perspective with more theoretical weight and analytical strength.

Our points of departure have been the basic ideas that people are active agents whose own perspectives, strategies and judgements in making a living have to be taken seriously and that there is a human responsibility to address inequalities. This asks for livelihood studies that put people at the centre of analysis but also pay explicit attention to the structures in which people have to make a living, whilst being sensitive to the fact that these structures are provisional and bound to change over time due to the ongoing interaction between actors and their socio-economic, political, cultural and ecological environment. It is such a dynamic view that can capture the limits and the forcefulness of human agency.
Notes
1. The authors are members of CERES, Research School for Resource Studies for Development, and constituted a group on livelihood in the framework of CERES’ ‘Pathways of Development’ project. The group can be reached at KAAG@FSW.LEIDENUNIV.NL. We would like to thank Professor Frank Ellis for his critical comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2. We consider the essence of poverty to be the fact that one or several basic conditions for generating a living are not being met. These conditions are to a certain extent context specific and subject to (cultural and social) interpretation and evaluation.
3. That is why, elsewhere, he spoke of ‘want-satisfying material means’ (Stanfield 1986: 35).
4. World Commission on Environment and Development.
5. The Department For International Development, attached to the British government.
6. Paradoxically, an increase in knowledge and information causes an intuitively larger exposure to risk.

References


Zoomers, A. 1999. Linking livelihood strategies to development; experiences from the Bolivian Andes. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute/Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation.
Identity formation
Issues, challenges and tools.

*Hans Siebers*

In collaboration with André Droogers, Hans Knippenberg, Robert Maier, Lorraine Nencel, Catrien Notermans, Ton Salman, Marjo de Theije, Jeroen Vermeulen.

**Introduction**

This chapter discusses identity formation: the ways people constitute and position themselves in the world, how they render themselves and their relations with others meaningful, how they construct their narratives of self, enact their images of self, and perform their identifications in order to get things done. Paradoxically, this complexity of phenomena solidifies into apparently simplistic labels such as Mother, Director, Secretary, Chief, Gay, Hetero, Homeless, or Refugee. That a Refugee can be Homeless, a Father, a Chief of a tribe, and Homosexual illustrates the theoretical and practical complexity of identity formation. A multitude of processes, conditions, constraining and enabling factors, and subjective experiences contribute to how individuals, groups and communities envision, label and define themselves and others in specific historical, social and economic contexts.

This text was written by a multi-disciplinary and multi-institutional group of social scientists participating in the CERES School of Research and the study of identity formation. This text is an effort to discuss different perspectives and issues involved in the study of identity formation. Rather than a review of the state of the art in the field, it is a selection of issues reflecting the authors' fields of expertise and standpoints. Nonetheless, the issues presented below are crucial for our understanding of the conceptual complexity of identity formation.

The chapter's structure reflects the three elementary layers on which the analysis of identity (formation) is built. The first section presents a contextualization of the concept of identity formation within the social sciences. It will briefly discuss the concept's prominence within the social sciences, the advantages it offers over related concepts and the critical qualifications that can be made against it. A plea will be made to position the concept of identity (forma-
tion) at a meta level and to render other concepts that depend on it operational for empirical research purposes and further theorizing.

The second section presents an inventory of the different perspectives that social-psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, sociologists and others take in the analysis of the processes that fall under the meta-concept of identity formation. We then explore the theoretical tensions that exist between and within disciplines on a key set of issues, encouraging the reader to take a balanced, eclectic approach in research practice. Our queries predominantly concern the conceptualization of identity as a relational or social concept, although some of the relevant tensions and balances we discuss, such as those between biological versus social positions, fall somewhat outside the realm of the social sciences.

The third section takes a reflexive glimpse of one of the fields of empirical studies in which processes of ‘identity formation’ play a crucial role: identity politics. This discussion will take up two main lines of argumentation of the first chapter: identity politics within the struggles over globalization as a neoliberal political project and identity politics as a consequence of the increasing intensity of flows of people, images, capital, goods, meanings and so on spanning the globe and challenging existing identifications embedded in local, regional and national institutions. The section will conclude with a brief discussion of relevant directions in research.

**Why identity formation?**
The concept of identity or identity formation has strong scientific foundations, increasingly inspiring scholars from among others social-psychology, sociology, anthropology and discourse studies. In this section the position of the concept within the conceptual or semantic field as well as its relative advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis related concepts will be sketched.

**As an alternative to class, culture and self**
The current popularity of the concept of identity grew out of several theoretical debates. Whereas it started as a psychological concept, it was subsequently adopted in social science in general. To some extent, the concept gained momentum as an alternative to the concept of class (Wagner 2001) to allude to the ways people constitute and position themselves in the world. Classical class thinking, particularly structural-functionalist approaches, saw people in terms of their structural position within society, from where they satisfied society’s needs for integration and cohesion. Likewise, neo-Marxist approaches saw people as grouped together according to their common relations to the means of production and their antagonism towards groups occupying oppos-
ing positions within the capitalist or feudal mode of production. The concept of class therefore often became associated with master plans of ‘modernization’, ‘capitalist accumulation’ or ‘proletarianization’ that teleologically determined the course of history and class formation, and therefore the course of life of each and every person as well.

The concept of identity has also been presented as an alternative to the concept of culture. For some authors (for a summary see Brightman 1995) the concept of culture lost its appeal as it became associated with homogeneity, coherence, uniformity and continuity. It led to thinking in terms of reified and static abstractions and distinct realms of ideas, and diverted attention from the dynamics of specific interactions between specific people. The description of culture as a set of phenomena was also problematic. The selection of the items that were included in the description was felt to be arbitrary. Defining culture as a system was also criticised for the false image it created of cultures as bounded entities situated next to each other. Especially in functionalist approaches, culture had gained a superorganic status, as if people did not matter or were rule-following zombies. In short, not only class, but also culture seemed to trigger essentialist thinking.

The emergence of the concept of identity (formation) also relates to the problematic use of the concept of self. An Enlightenment or Cartesian approach found in certain branches of anthropology and sociology, considered subjects to be unique and capable of organizing their lives from a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action. People were seen as bounded selves, relatively autonomous, independent, reflexive and able to pursue their own goals. However, this portrayal of self in the literature was often limited to the Western self in opposition to the non-Western self that supposedly possessed all the opposite traits: unbounded, dependent, non-reflexive, unable to distinguish between him- or herself and his or her societal role and status and unable to pursue own goals (see for a critical discussion Sökefeld 1999). In short, here we also found essentialism, cloaked in the opposition between Western and non-Western selves.

The deterministic and essentialist ideas that informed the interpretation of concepts of class, culture and self, find few supporters among contemporary scholars. A person’s practices and meaning making are not determined solely by the structural directives and functional necessities of becoming conscious of one’s class position, nor do they merely represent an all-embracing and homogeneous culture. For example, religious experiences are about much more than simply executing society’s need for integration, keeping actors from adopting a clear position in class struggles or manifesting dominant cultural schemes. For the same reasons, the portrayal of non-Western selves as non-reflexive
and dependent on contextual cultural or structural factors must be discarded, together with the voluntaristic idea that Western selves supersede structural or contextual directives through rationality.

The ways people constitute and position themselves in the world are much more complicated and multifarious than the old concepts of class, culture and self suggest. They may be better captured by the concept of identity that, particularly in combination with a recognition of the fact that each individual deals with several and multiple identities, has the advantage of pointing to diversity and contradiction within the lived experiences of the individual (Ewing 1990). The actor no longer disappears behind a static view of class or culture nor is s/he exalted to illusionary voluntarist altitudes. Identity is increasingly understood in terms of dynamic and fluid processes of construction and (trans)formation, in which intention and instruction, reflexivity and domination, sense and performance, individuality and social embeddedness converge and clash. Such an approach not only escapes from deterministic and essentialistic conceptions, but also from ethnocentric oppositions of so-called Western versus non-Western selves (Cohen 1994).

A closer look

The concept of identity (formation) may have advantages over the concepts of class, culture and self, but has not replaced these concepts once and for all. Just like the concepts of class, culture and self, earlier conceptions of identity also disclosed essentialist notions, as if a person’s identity was his or her portrait, similar to an identity document such as a passport. In psychology as well as in anthropology the emphasis was on sameness, i.e. identity was seen as a more or less fixed and integrated whole of personality characteristics that a person shared with other members of his/her group. The modernist view on identity was strongly connected to notions of continuity and coherence (Wagner 2001). Having multiple identities was considered pathological.

Since the 1980s, though, having multiple identities (see Otto & Driessen 2000) has become considered normal and even a sign of mental health (Lifton 1993). The idea of fluid and many-sided identities has become popular (see Gergen 1991 and 1994). Difference has replaced sameness as the key word: difference between the various personality and identity traits as well as between the person and the group (see Sökefeld 1999). If the person is made up of several identities (gender, age, sex, education, occupational, class, ethnicity etc.) s/he cannot be understood as being wholly embedded in one single group. Relations between personal identity and group or collective identity cannot be taken for granted.

However, not only the concept of identity (formation) went through a
process of redefinition to get rid of its former essentialist connotations. In specific branches of sociology and social-psychology, a similar redefinition took place regarding the concept of self, emphasizing its multiplicity, de-centredness and transient character (Wagner 2001). Moreover, a relational and processual reworking of the class concept rid it of essentialism and determinism while highlighting the continuing importance of work and relations of production (see Kalb 1997). Such a concept of class calls attention to shifting (power) relations between people, actions and everyday life experiences, both in local and wider societal contexts. It is about the interplay between hegemonic structures and their material, social and symbolic foundations, which are sometimes contested, at other times confirmed, sometimes challenged or rebelled against, at other times evaded or obeyed. The concept of class reminds us of the deeply political nature of efforts to position and constitute oneself in the world and the interlinkages of these efforts with developments in a wider societal setting. However, other concepts such as hegemony (see Kalb 1997) may be more suitable for highlighting exactly these fluid processes of domination, differentiation, everyday politics, contestation, negotiation and identification because they better recognize the importance of other identifications besides socio-economic positioning, such as gender and ethnicity, in such processes.

In a similar vein, the concept of culture has also been reformulated and redefined. In the current definition, culture is no longer an integrated and shared whole oiling the wheels of social life, no system of cultural classification with relatively fixed markers in social life. Presently, culture appears as something discordant, non-systemic, contradictory and pluralistic, characterized by non-sharing and difference and failure to provide clear recipes for action (Featherstone 1995). In fact, the relative advantages of the concept of identity formation over the concept of culture may disappear when we recognize that both concepts used to trigger associations of reification, integratedness, wholeness, systemic and statistic nature, and essence, and that to get rid of such associations, efforts have recently been undertaken to shift the emphasis in both concepts from internal sameness to internal difference and process.

After all, borders marking off one culture from another have become questionable. The current emphasis is on scapes or flows of people, ideas, goods, images, capital, information, meanings, representations and so on, which increasingly span the globe and do not halt at any border (see Appadurai 1996 and Hannerz 1992 and 1996). As borders increasingly become permeable and porous, their capacity to provide a framework for the development of distinct cultures will be lost.

In short, the currently redefined concept of culture makes it very difficult to make substantive statements regarding a culture because it has virtually
become impossible to delineate one culture from another, to make explicit to whom such substantive claims refer and to whom they do not. This argument does not apply, of course, to the formal use of the concept of culture foregrounding the importance of studying processes of meaning making and practices of particular people in practical circumstances. The adequate place to position the concept of culture is at a meta level. The moment we want to say something substantive about cultural processes in operational terms, it makes more sense to use other concepts.

However, for different reasons a similar plea can be made regarding the concept of identity or identity formation. The concept also continues to raise problems and objections at an operational level. Etymologically speaking the concept is unmistakably linked to sameness, to something, which is identical. Wittgenstein already pointed to the problematic connotation of the meaning ‘identical’ here: ‘... to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all’ (quoted in Wagner 2001: 62). In addition, if the connotations of ‘sameness’ and being ‘identical’ are etymologically central to the concept of identity, how can this concept subsequently be redefined to mean exactly the opposite, i.e. difference? Moreover, these connotations of ‘sameness’ and ‘identical’ contrast sharply with the fact that the processes that we are interested in, i.e. the ways people constitute and position themselves in the world and render themselves and their relations with others meaningful, are becoming particularly relevant in the context of difference, not sameness. It is exactly globalization and its consequence, i.e. multiculturalism defined as the multiplication of experienced difference (Siebers 2002), that renders the constituting and positioning of oneself a problématique of prime importance.

So given the confusion raised by the concept of identity we prefer to position this concept at a meta level, pointing to the need and importance of studying the problems and issues involved in constituting and positioning oneself in the world in a globalizing context. These problems and issues themselves can better be studied using other concepts that can be defined and deployed in a more operational sense.

**Operational concepts**

In the framework of this chapter we cannot work out all the relevant operational concepts in detail. We can only depict some of the most important ones. Whether persons are embedded in certain groups and whether collective identities emerge is an open question. Therefore, research had best focus more on persons – individually or jointly – struggling and dealing with different global flows, societal developments, discourses, orientations and (shifting) power
relations. This helps to problematize relations between individual persons and groups in the face of current developments of fragmentation, atomization and individualization.

With such a focus, psychological drives and factors but also relational aspects – identifications (with and as) and differentiations (from) – will be found. Identifications and differentiations do not only include cognitive, but also normative and expressive or emotional meanings. The advantage of talking about identifications and differentiations is that they immediately refer to specific events, settings and situations in which these identifications and differentiations are made relevant. For example, when being abroad one’s nationality may be an important identification whereas the same person may emphasize his or her identification as teacher or student when at school.

Social reality however cannot be neatly cut into ‘slices’, one identification / differentiation being relevant in each of them. Several, sometimes contradictory identifications / differentiations may be relevant in one and the same setting. Such multiple or contradictory identifications call upon a person’s capacity to manage this multiplicity based on his or her awareness and reflexive sense of distinction between him- or herself and everything else. This awareness makes interplay between identifications and differentiations possible. Such a redefined conception of self in terms of the management capacity to deal with reflexive distinctions between oneself and the world (Sökefeld 1999) may create the basis for the construction of narratives in which a person tries to make sense and interlink the various meanings and identifications / differentiations in the multiple settings of his or her life-world in a discursive way, drawing on various flows, discourses and orientations.

This narrative integration of various identifications / differentiations may take place in a coherent way, leading to unambiguous prescriptions on how to act, or in a rather loose and flexible way, little concerned with coherence. It may be expressed in a single line of unequivocal concepts, consistently structured in an orderly and sequential, teleologically organised plot with a beginning, middle and end, or in a multi-centred way with various identifications clustered around several symbols without unambiguous interrelations (Gullestad 1996: 6). Narratives of self may remain stable over time, but may also change and transform in specific circumstances and events.

By constructing narratives of self, persons deal with contexts in which institutions guide or even oblige them to act in a particular way. Of course, material circumstances and involvement in or exclusion from specific production and consumption flows and structures play an important role here, as do cultural orientations (Van Binsbergen 1999a) or discourses (Foucault 1971). The advantage of the latter concepts over that of culture is that they focus on spe-
cific issues allowing for some degree of consistency at this issue oriented level without assuming any overall or consistently integrated framework of several discourses (Van Binsbergen 1999a). They also alert to the prevalence of imposition as against the spontaneous creation associated with culture.

Moreover, even though institutionally anchored, we may assume that societal discourses or orientations are in practice plural, calling for a differentiated and fluid concept of hegemony and its articulations with the everyday politics of individual persons. The fluctuating and multifarious character of these everyday politics also has to be stressed. Sometimes social discourses are enclosed within a specific orientation, at other times they take a critical distance. Sometimes discourses and narratives of self provide people with meaningful identifications that clarify issues and get things done. At other times people will feel powerless in the face of the challenges put in front of them. Occasionally they will feel torn apart by these challenges or, conversely, be able to play with differences while maintaining a stable sense of self. Sometimes individuals group together, at other times they stress their individuality. Thus, the concepts of discourse, hegemony and everyday politics enable us to understand people's contentious positioning in the power-laden fields of practice.

Identity formation – tensions and balances
In the following text the word ‘identity’ or ‘identity formation’ should be understood as referring to the challenges, problems and issues involved in the ways in which persons constitute and position themselves in the world and try to make the best of it. An advantage of seeing identity this way is that a priori characterizations of what identity ‘is’ or ‘is supposed to be’ are avoided and the need to look for operational concepts to study the various processes involved in identity formation is stressed. Thus we may get rid of the either/or questions common to the debates about identity. The processes of identity formation may be about flow and closure (Meyer & Geschiere 1999), about change and continuity, about difference and sameness, about fluidity and solidity, about coherence and fragmentation etc. In some situations one may get the upper hand, in other circumstances the other. How identity becomes articulated in specific occasions and events cannot be determined a priori, it requires empirical research.

The variability in time and space and the complexity of these articulations have to be stressed. In principle there are two ways to approach the matter: either in terms of structure or process (see Maier 1999, Worldview Group 1994). The first approach tries to distinguish elementary entities and their interrelations. The characteristics that these entities and relations either share or differ on are subsequently studied to understand the nature and functioning of the
whole system. Applied to the case of ‘identity formation’, this approach focuses on identifications / differentiations and their meanings and on the various practices stemming from these identifications / differentiations as ‘building blocks’ of narratives of self. The interrelations of these identifications and meanings in narratives and the patterning of these practices into behaviour are scrutinized. Subsequently, the relations between narratives and patterns of behaviour and the conditions, rules and driving forces behind the coming into being of these relations are questioned. The structure approach thus relies on the vocabulary of systems, patterns and maps.

The second approach, the one characterised by ‘process’, highlights change over time, actions and events. In principle these are complex dynamics composed of a great number of interrelated and continuously changing activities. Fundamental to this approach are transformation and novelty and the passages from chaos to order and vice versa. The quality of a process will depend on its extension (the number of objects the process will involve), the degree of change it can bring about and the continuity of the process. Regarding ‘identity formation’ this approach does not emphasize the identifications and practices themselves, but the ways they come about and transform over time. What merits attention in this view are not the final ‘products’ of ‘identity formation’ but the processes by which identifications and narratives become constructed and related practices become enacted, and the ways in which the persons and groups involved deal with conditions and discourses and their own drives in these processes. Here the fluid vocabulary of flux, change, and dynamics is used (cf. Cohen 1985, 1994). The emphasis is on the unpredictable nature of individual meaning making and acting, which cannot be reduced to the operations of a system. Performance, celebration and expression are preferred above some coherent idea of ‘self’ or ‘identity’.

For analytical reasons the distinction between structure and process approaches is useful. But we should be cautious not to simply adopt one approach and reject the other. In stead, we should use a combined perspective that calls attention to both relations and processes, elements and events, function and change, and allows us to study the phenomena and processes involved in both time and space. Such a method will be deployed in the following section where several important debates on the ways in which persons constitute and position themselves in the world are discussed. For each debate, we firstly distinguish the tensions between different poles in the debate and sensitize the scholar to the possible positions and options. Next, we underline the need for a balanced or eclectic approach in research practice and indicate the options for combining insights.
DRIVING IDENTITY FORMATION: GENES OR RELATIONS?

A first debate around the development of ‘identity’, or ‘personality development’, concerns the question of what drives the processes involved in the genesis of personality development. *Grosso modo* two opposing viewpoints can be distinguished (cf. Whitehouse 2001). On the one hand there are those who point to internal – genetic or biological – forces that prescribe an individual’s course through a pre-established sequence of phases, provided external conditions enable him or her to do so.

Others, on the other hand, claim that personality development is primarily relational in character (e.g. Gergen 1991), i.e. people start off as a *tabula rasa* that in the course of life becomes constituted or inscribed by social relations and interactions. The ways people constitute and position themselves in the world are the result of social relations that become inculcated in one’s *habitus* (Bourdieu 1972) and are shaped through the embodiment of cultural orientations or societal discourses. Personality development does not take shape autonomously, but is indexical, i.e. defined by a person’s relations with other relevant persons and processes. It is therefore contingent and can change over time, without any predetermined direction.

The internal and the external are clearly opposed in these interpretations of what drives personality development. Neither position, however, can ignore the other. Those who support the internal forces perspective cannot deny the role that social and cultural conditions play in facilitating the operationalisation of these internal forces. The genetic is undeniably real and pre-existing, but the choices it allows for are negotiable and changeable. On the other hand, those who stress relational or external forces cannot for instance deny the role of memory and mental instructions in influencing the meanings, actions and gestures of individuals in interaction with others.

REAL, IDEAL OR NOT POSSIBLE AT ALL?

Is identity construction a futile endeavour in today’s constantly changing social and cultural settings? And how is the structuring of narratives of self intertwined with normative conceptions of what one’s ‘identity formation’ is supposed to be like? These two questions synthesize a second set of tensions and balances around claims that ‘identity formation’ is feasible as a lifetime project integrating biological, mental, cultural and social aspects of life versus arguments that any such effort as a long-term life-project has become illusive.

Those who claim that the formation of a lifetime project is feasible understand it as a developing pattern of personality traits, driven by genetic impulses or by the construction of a narrative of self that meaningfully incorporates motivating metaphors about oneself. ‘Identity’, then, provides individuals with
a sense of direction in their life. It can also be defined as the emergence of a socially and morally responsible person or citizen who answers to the needs of family, church or society. Such a view finds supporters among specific schools of development psychologists, political scientists and sociologists. Anthony Giddens (1991) claims that contemporary conditions for such a project of ‘self-identity’ are favourable because individual meaning-makers can draw on almost endless reservoirs of knowledge enabling them to shape not only social conditions, but also their ‘self-identity’.

The scholars who claim that ‘identity formation’ is an illusion, point to the pace of social change that no longer allows anyone to articulate his or her experiences meaningfully. Globalization overstretches the individual’s capacity to adapt and undermines the stable conditions of community and circumscribed space that are necessary for ‘identity formation’ (cf. Van Binsbergen 1999b). Grand narratives, which used to provide an overall meaningful and motivational framework for individuals and groups to hold on to, are in disarray (Bauman 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1997, Lyotard 1984). Consequently, ‘identity’ can be about no more than a sequence of disconnected short-term experiences, sensations and kicks that fail to accumulate or provide a basis for understanding ‘identity’ as a project or task.

However, few would go so far as to deny the very possibility of a narrative of self. Questions such as ‘who are you?’ usually meet with some kind of explanation or account. The suggestion that repertoires of identifications / differentiations would necessarily be made up of disconnected single identifications / differentiations and that a person’s life-story would be made up of a series of disconnected spheres of his/her life-world and stages of life-history, is hard to accept. Persons may interrelate these various identifications meaningfully, though not necessarily rationally, in overarching narratives of self (Siebers 2000).

Several contemporary approaches emphasize the potential that each meaning-maker possesses to use a repertoire of multiple identifications in different situations and circumstances. Ewing (1990: 251) argues that people in all ‘cultures’ project multiple, inconsistent self-representations, phrased in terms of gender, age, sex, ethnicity, descent, nationality, religious affiliation, occupation, kinship, regional background, class, lifestyle etc., that are context-dependent and may shift rapidly. The fact that persons are often unaware of these shifts and inconsistencies leads to ‘the experience of wholeness’ (Ewing 1990). An illustration of this is found in Notermans’ research on multiple identifications of women participating in polygynous marriages in Cameroon, which pointed out that women strictly separate different stories representing different identifications (Notermans 1999). Identity stories can be so much context-bound
that the researcher has to change contexts in order to discover the multiple identifications: stories told from the perspective of a first wife in a polygynous household strongly contrast with stories the same woman can tell from the perspective of being a mistress. However, while occupying both positions, women never relate these stories to each other. By keeping only one frame of reference in mind at any particular moment, they are able to maintain an experience of wholeness in the face of radical contradictions (Ewing 1990, Notermans 1999).

An experience of wholeness can also come about through the articulation of several identifications / differentiations. A particular identification may be expressed through the articulation of another. De Theije provides an example of this with the case of Paulo, an activist in a Catholic base community in North Eastern Brazil, who explains his religious identity in terms of his gender identity (De Theije 1999, 2001). Paulo is in his 50s and lives with his wife and children in a small house in a poor neighbourhood. He and his sons can only just sustain his family by cleaning cars.

Life used to be different for Paulo. He told me [Marjo de Theije] that in the past he was not a man involved in the church, but an ‘erroneous man’, a ‘machão’ (big macho), ‘wild, and violent.’ After the death of a son, some twenty years ago, Paulo turned to religion and became involved in various activities in the parish. Through this participation he gradually became another person. He is a base community leader because he believes that discussing the relevance of the teachings of God for the world today helps people to work towards a better life. Paulo is also the president of the Vicentinos, a religious association addressing the needs of poor people. He helps putting up campaigns for the needy in the neighbourhood and ‘taking [the Eucharist] to all the sick people. To know how they are, have a chat, converse with them. And so there, my life bettered, developed.’

It is interesting that Paulo draws on gendered images to explain his religiousness. He uses the image of the machão to explain how he used to be another person. He contrasts this gendered stereotype with the implicitly less masculine person he is now without implying, however, that he is no longer a man. In Brazil, it is uncommon for a man to be so active in everyday religious affairs. In fact, this is considered ‘women’s business’. Generally it is only women who put religiousness into practice by performing religious duties as an extension of their caring duties in the household. Still, men like Paulo who do perform religious activities that are generally associated with female activism, are not considered deviant beings. In fact, Paulo is highly estimated in the local Catholic community.

For men like Paulo, masculinity does not depend on religiousness. Paulo
does not respond to the common image of a macho Brazilian man, but only within the vicinities of the church. Paulo recalls the satisfaction that his religious work gives him but also emphasizes that it is something you do in (dentro) the church, suggesting that other norms apply in other spheres of life. Indeed, in the household sphere, Paulo does not fulfil specific caring tasks. Apparently, for a male base community leader like Paulo, different gender ideals prevail in the religious realm and in the household or society in general.

Paulo shows us that radical changes in one's life do not necessarily exclude the possibility of actively (re)creating identifications / differentiations. In fact, quite the opposite is the case here. Paulo now lives with at least two different gender identifications: that of a Brazilian man, husband and father, and that of a religious man. Narrating about himself and his life he differentiates his life in at least two parts, i.e. the sphere of the church and that of outside life. He thus articulates his religious identification with a specific gender identification while reserving some space for his masculinity of the macho type in his family life. In his case this does not seem to provoke problems, although his wife complains about his Sunday morning duties. However, his turn to religion also affected his overall image about himself. To some extent, he manages to create an experience of wholeness by articulating several identifications, distinguishing several spheres of life and maintaining an image of radical overall change in his life course. He does so in a flexible way, appropriating various identifications, without being bothered with consistency too much.

**Self-referential or performative?**

A third set of tensions and balances concerns the difference between identification as a self-reference vis-à-vis identification as a performance based on strategic considerations (Goffman 1959 and 1963). Identifications / differentiations may be constructed by someone to make his or her person meaningful and to make others understand him or her as s/he understands him- or herself, to become recognized. However, they may also be deployed in interactions for strategic reasons, to make someone else do something. The performance of very specific identifications may even be required by institutions or organizations. This forces a person into front stage obedience, reserving self-referential identifications for backstage activities. The identification of persons as law-abiding citizens by the state is a case in point. Persons may perform prescribed identifications and use them strategically, but that does not mean that they become part of their self-image.

The basic difference here is the point of reference, i.e. whether someone creates a self-image for his/her own sense-making needs or to make someone else do something. Nevertheless, self-referential and performative aspects do
not exclude each other; they may mingle in specific identifications / differentiations in specific settings. The fact that the process of identification is often closely linked to struggles over scarce resources demonstrates that identifications / differentiations cannot always be about self-reference only. For example, asylum seekers knocking at the gates of fortress Europe may seriously harm their interest if they only disclose a self-referential image when asked to identify themselves in order to get access.

However, the desire to have some anchor points in one’s self-narrative may be very important for the satisfaction of emotional needs such as the need for belonging, security, or recognition. We cannot rule out the possibility that the overstretching of the distance between required and performed identifications on the one hand and self-referential sense making on the other may result in conflict within a person’s self-perception and his or her experiences and relations in daily life. Such a breach between the self-referential and the performative could be an explanation for problems such as burnout.

**Individuality or ethnicization?**

Individuals do not construct their ideas about themselves in social isolation; they do so within groups and other larger social units. However, the exact relationship between the individual and the group, the social or the collective, between personal and collective ‘identities’, provokes differing viewpoints among scholars. Some perceive of the individual as embedded in social structures and cultural environments, others highlight the unique, bounded self, foregrounding a high level of individuality. There is more to ‘identity formation’ than identifying with a group or being a member of one of more groups, especially where traditional communities are questioned. On the other hand, identifications in terms of group membership remain possible, both regarding primordial communities such as kinship lines or local communities and ‘imagined’ communities such as the ethnic group and the nation (see Anderson 1987).

Differences of interpretation abound on the analytical understanding of group membership. Some sustain that group identifications emerge from commonalities such as common history, language, and traditions. Others, instead, point to the crucial role played by the construction of boundaries – real or imagined, geographic or social – arguing that the formation of a group (identity) is based on the opposition towards those who are considered as ‘outsiders’ or ‘others’ (Barth 1969, Simmel 1955). Cultural elements serve to erect such boundaries (see Baumann 1999). However, not many cultural commonalities are required for a strong group-identification. Some scholars are sceptical of the autonomous dynamics of the social and the cultural and point to the impor-
tant role of states in deliberately fomenting nationalism to create the conditions for industrialization (Gellner 1983) or to support other political purposes (Dijkink and Knippenberg 2001). Issues of power and hegemony appear to be intimately linked to group formation and boundary construction.

Whatever the source of group identification, it has become seriously challenged by globalization and fragmentation. Any stable embeddedness within the framework of an (imagined) community with its own ‘culture’ and territory is radically challenged by the diversity of influences from all over the world that individuals face. Grand narratives or community structures on which people may draw in reconstructing their image of self may fragment. Group identifications may thus become challenged and anxiety and uncertainty created if no other meaningful sources present themselves as credible alternatives.

An outcome of this state of anxiety and uncertainty is the growing importance of cultural difference and multiculturalism in the global-local theatres in which current problems of social transformation and contradiction are played out (see Benhabib 2002). For some, anxiety and uncertainty have resulted in efforts to restore the classical idea of the national community, reformulated within violent and regressive particularist terms. Others feel attracted to radicalism with universalist claims such as Islamist movements. Again others seek refuge in boosting their ego and individuality by putting their trust in their own entrepreneurial talents and capacity to take care of themselves. Globalization may also create opportunities for people to select from different discourses while constructing their identities. Influences from outside are often used to strengthen already existing traditions rather than to eliminate them (cf. Piot 1999). Christian Cameroonians, for example, have not used Christianity to destroy polygyny but to breathe new life into it. Here external influences have resulted in the proliferation of the traditional in a totally new understanding of polygyny, i.e. Christian polygyny (Notermans 2002: 352).

**Imposition or self-formation?**

The example of Christian polygyny, suggests another, final tension: are identifications conditioned by circumstances and imposed on individuals by discourses or are individuals ‘free’ to identify and ‘form their identities’ as they please? There is a constant tension between being the object of subjection and the subject of self-determination. Here the classical dilemma of structure and agency (see Giddens 1984) reappears. For specific kinds of identifications to emerge, specific conditions have to be met. For example, Habermas’ rational ‘identity’ is only possible within a modern society with modern institutions. On the other hand, society and institutions cannot operate or exist without the structuring influence of societal discourses on individual meaning making.
Each societal discourse contains normative images and expectations of ‘good identity’ (see Foucault 1991).

Social discourses can become institutionalised by being framed in objectified or rationalized language that constructs and recognizes very specific categories of individuals or groups. In the case of churches, the clergy may want its laity or converts to adopt its officialized religious discourses and comply with the rules and demands inscribed in these discourses. Government policies prescribe specific requirements individuals have to comply with in order to become entitled to social benefits. Managers define profiles individual applicants must meet to be hired. Thus, categorization and labelling are part of social discourses institutionalized into policies.

The objectified language of policies often tries to hide their unmistakably political character (see Shore and Wright 1997). Institutionalized discourses represent and reflect the interests of hegemonic groups and struggles over identification are often intertwined with questions regarding access to resources and power. The impact of hegemony, discourses and techniques of power such as confessions, intakes or application interviews, is however hardly ever total. The individuals concerned are not just obedient receivers of identity instructions. They always have some space, however limited, for manoeuvre and everyday politics.

This space is opened up by various factors. First, discourses cannot describe in every detail exactly what to think and do, leaving some space for differences in interpretation and practice. Second, there is always some relatively autonomous space between what is demanded from someone and subsequently performed by this person on the one hand (front stage) and what s/he actually thinks in self-referential terms on the other hand (back stage), as we have outlined above. Third, as a result of globalization, individuals and groups increasingly have access to different discourses on the same subject whereas the demise of grand narratives entails the loss of inter-discursive dependencies (see Foucault 1991).

In her ethnographic study, Nencel (2001) illustrates the dynamics between structure and agency in the ‘identity construction’ of Peruvian prostitutes. Official regulation of prostitution in Peru constructed two types of prostitutes: the registered women who were considered ‘healthier’ and ‘controllable’ due to the fact that they received regular testing for STD’s and who worked in licensed locales; and the clandestine women who worked in the street and were considered a danger to society as they were ‘uncontrollable’ and assumed to be the vectors of illnesses such as HIV/AIDS. Due to the regulation, clandestine prostitutes are stigmatized and marginalized even more than registered prostitutes. They face police violence and corruption on a daily basis.
Señora Pilar belongs to a group of clandestine prostitutes. She is a mother of two, of whom one is recently married, as she proves by proudly showing the pictures of her daughter in bridal gown. Her son of eight lives with her and goes to school in their neighbourhood. Señora Pilar comes to work after she has finished her household chores and has left her son at school. Although she does not work daily, she is a regular. Her presence depends on how much money she receives from her daughter. The area of street prostitution in the inner-city slums in Lima where she works is considered the lowest in workplace hierarchy. It pays poorly: $2.50 a client. But even that is more than most of these women would earn on the formal labour market. Some women, like Señora Pilar, supplement their earnings by pick pocketing their clients.

On one visit to the street, the scholar [Lorraine Nencel] ran into Pilar and intended to have a short conversation with her when they were suddenly disturbed by a group of schoolboys passing by. When one of the oldest boys murmured a sly remark to Pilar, she smacked him in the face with her pocket-book. She immediately justified her reaction: ‘He is just a schoolboy, he could be my son, not only that, he should show some respect while we are talking. We normally hide inside when school children come by’.

Pilar’s reaction gives insight into the interrelatedness of structure and agency. Structural constraints of poverty and lack of education limit the possibility for women like Pilar to choose and create options in their lives. Prostitution becomes one of the few viable opportunities for women from certain socio-economic strata. Moreover, the shame that is felt by many of the women working as clandestine prostitutes is partly the result of the institutionalization of prostitution through its regulation. This shame is also inscribed by hegemonic meanings of gender that exclude the possibility for women to be sexually assertive and do not condone transgressions of these norms.

Pilar’s reaction is however also an expression of her agency. She acts to resolve an unpleasant situation to the best of her ability. Seen from the actor’s perspective, she is managing and balancing multi-positional gender identifications as a poor woman, mother and prostitute. Her reaction was not only provoked by the shame she felt for being a prostitute, but also by the pride she feels at being a mother and the respect she feels she deserves as an adult. The slap in the boy’s face represents her attempt to manage these various perceptions in her own sense of identity. For the majority of the mothers who prostitute, their motherhood is a significant part of their sense of identity and one of the few things that makes their work gratifying. The one simple action of slapping the young boy is an expression of how different dynamics of ‘identity formation’ conflate in daily lived experiences.

The structuring impact of discourses on identification / differentiation
must not necessarily be understood in contradictory terms. After all, they allow individual ‘identity’ constructors to appropriate meanings and identifications offered by these discourses. Moreover, for discourses to become dominant some autonomous space for deviation in acting and identification is required.

**The politics of identity**

So far we have worked out some proposals for understanding the relationship between the meta-concept of ‘identity formation’ and related concepts such as class, culture, self, hegemony, discourse, identification / differentiation, narrative and cultural orientation. Next, we have elaborated several tensions and balances that can be used to problematize crucial dimensions of the study of identity formation. Of course, these elaborations are far from complete. They deserve to be worked out in further detail.

One of the fields that merits special attention in this respect is the field of identity politics. We already stressed that the constitution and positioning of oneself in the world is profoundly political in nature. It takes place in the interactions between hegemonic processes and structures and the everyday politics of groups and individuals with diverging and conflictive interests. Identity formation is intertwined with the struggle for scarce resources, is embedded in asymmetrical power relations and is articulated with the contestation and imposition of dominant discourses as well as the recovery of space of manoeuvre by individuals and groups. In this political game, identification and differentiation are not just self-referential processes; they entail a high degree of performativity and strategic calculation.

The politics of identity encompasses a wide field of study and we cannot possibly pay tribute to all its aspects. In the final section of this paper we will start by taking up two lines of the first chapter of this book, on globalization. First we discuss some aspects of the political movements triggered as a reaction to globalization as a (neo-) liberal project, framed around the Washington consensus in the 1990s. A multifarious and dispersed panorama of resistance has mobilized against this project and symbolic struggles over identifications and differentiations have taken centre stage. There is much more behind and besides the visible events in Seattle and Genoa, as we show in the discussion of some of the relevant aspects of so-called anti-globalism in a recent case of protest in the streets of La Paz, Bolivia. Secondly, we discuss globalization not so much as a political project, but in terms of the global flows of people, goods, capital and images that are changing the global condition (see Robertson 1992). These flows increasingly challenge existing identifications and their ensuing institutions. They incite the struggle over new definitions of individuals and groups as people instrumentalise identifications for their own political
purposes. We will bring these debates home to academia by raising some questions about the ways scholars deal with these issues and by proposing some other issues to be studied and scrutinized.

ANTI-GLOBALISM AND IDENTIFICATION STRUGGLES

On Wednesday the 12th of February 2003, Bolivia lived through one of its most dramatic days in a long series of protests and public manifestations against government policies. Over 20 deaths, hundreds of hospitalized people, attacks on several political party headquarters and large scale looting were reported, primarily in the city of La Paz.

Sustained protest evolved in Bolivia during the preceding administration headed by former dictator Hugo Banzer, and continued during the administration of president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. In broad strokes, the protests might be called anti-neo-liberal resistance – neo-liberal convictions and policies being the common denominator of both aforementioned governments. The protests in Bolivia could be seen as manifestations of diverse popular sectors' rejection of neo-liberal adjustments or the lack of compensation for their impact. Identifications / differentiations of the protesters could be acknowledged as disperse and multiple, but united in their rejection of government policies.

However, the logics of protests are often more anarchic. The occurrences of the 12th of February detonated when military ‘protecting’ the presidential palace fired at demonstrating policemen demanding higher wages and the withdrawal of a tax bill. The military reaction was however in the first place directed against the rock throwing youth, present in the same central square in La Paz, who demanded the dismissal of their school principal and also went on to air their rejection of government policy in general and the tax bill in particular. This tax bill would affect the police and all other ‘formally’ employed people in Bolivia, but would only indirectly affect the many millions working in Bolivia’s informal economy, and would affect the pupils even less. Yet, the tax bill ignited broad protest because it was interpreted as yet another measure to make ordinary Bolivians pay the bill for the country’s troubled economic situation and the neo-liberal and IMF inspired remedies.

Nevertheless, in the events of the 12th of February, the two most powerful protest groups against neo-liberalism were not part of the initial protest. One of them is the Movimiento al Socialismo, a party headed by Evo Morales, the coca-farmers’ leader. He directed many protest initiatives during the Banzer administration and was rewarded for it by obtaining the second place during the 2002 elections. He is an Aymara as are many of his followers, but ambivalently plays with this identification of belonging to a historically repressed
Ethnic minority. His main demands express resistance against the government (and USA-promoted) policy to eradicate ‘excessive’ (suspected cocaine-related) coca cultivation. In his discourse, he combines different identity frames by referring to ‘the sacred leave’ in indigenous traditions, to the rescue of national sovereignty and to the rejection of the neo-liberal philosophy because it hurts ‘ordinary Bolivians’. He vowed to oppose the present government, but yet neither he nor his party/movement were directly involved in the protests on February 12th. He did not hesitate, however, to demand the presidents’ resignation immediately after the events on the 12th and to threaten with new protests.

Felipe Quispe is the other central figure in Bolivia’s ongoing protest cycle, but his undisputed mobilizing capacity played no role in the ignition of the protests of the 12th of February either. Adorned with the Andean honorific title of mallku, he is more unequivocally playing the ethnic card, combining harsh words against blanco/mestizos with fierce attacks on neo-liberal politics. His party (Movimiento Indígena Pachakutic) did surprisingly well in the 2002 elections. His main topic is the impoverishment of highland peasants, but he easily connects this issue with the overall illegitimacy of governments headed by the ‘historical oppressors’, the blanco/mestizos. His relation with Morales is tense.

There are many other groups in Bolivia rallying against political measures: pensioners against the low level of their payments, consumers against price increases and privatizations, schoolteachers against the level of their wages, entrepreneurs against the failing reactivation of the economy. Within all these groups and among them, affinities are not always strong, co-operation is weak or absent, and identifications are shifting from ethnic through socio-economic to regional and national parameters, in shifting configurations and relative priorities – including the ones relatively inconsequential for collective political action.

There is thus a (co)incidental conflation of interests and fragments of ‘identity’, along with more persistent animosities and dissimilarity. Feelings of ‘nearness’ and shared interests coexist with feelings of competition and jealousy. There is no stable, ‘logical’ correlation between the identifications deployed and the specific roles and positions taken in the protesters’ camp. As they shift between and mingle performative and self-referential dimensions of identification, they reveal affinities and convergence, and on this basis they underscore their diversity.

In short, the contestation over globalization, epitomized by anti-globalism and resistance against neo-liberalism, cannot be understood just in culturalist terms, as this Bolivian example demonstrates. However, we also cannot deny the strong mobilizing potential of identification struggles within the present global condition. Morales’ identification with ‘ordinary Bolivians’ as opposed to
neo-liberal policies and Quispe’s call for resistance against ‘historical oppressors’, the blanco/mestizos, highlight this potential. The struggle over loyalties, identifications and differentiations cannot be relegated to a mere superstructure borrowing its dynamics from an economic or political infrastructure. Politics, identifications and economic interests have their own dynamics, but at certain moments and in certain events they become inextricably intertwined leaving no room for causal explanations.

The Bolivian example also shows that the struggle over globalization as a political project is far from homogeneous. There is no unified camp opposing neo-liberalism and globalism on a world scale, not even at the national level. Different and sometimes conflicting interests between various movements and parties lurk behind a common rejection of neo-liberalism and globalism. Conflicting interests mingle with identifications driving the parties and movements apart and resulting e.g. in the fragmented picture of protest in Bolivia as painted above. The struggle over identifications has both a mobilizing and a divisive potential.

The project the protest is rallying against is also far from unitary. It would certainly be an overestimation of its capabilities to understand globalization as a masterplan effectively manipulating interests, identifications and politics all over the world. Even more, the amalgam of practices and intentions attributed to the project by its opponents, varying from IMF-instructed budget cuts to programmes to eradicate ‘excessive’ coca production, suggest more coherence in the minds of these opponents than in the think tanks supporting the globalization project. To some extent, globalism and neo-liberalism have become reified symbols for the sake of mobilizing resistance and covering up internal differences.

Nevertheless, all these qualifications are not meant to deny the existence of globalization as a hegemonic project. The concept of hegemony allows us to acknowledge the non-essentialist play of diversity, complexity and partial contingency of the processes and movements involved as well as the intricate intersections between identifications and interests, between differentiations and politics, while taking into account that this play is partially structured and driven by (f)actors with specific interests and definitions, and interrelated with asymmetrical power relations.

Global flows and identity politics
Currently, affirming ‘one’s own (collective) identity’ is often seen as a defence mechanism or reaction against globalization’s tendency to homogenize, wipe out cultural particularities, and neglect traditions and local knowledge. Moreover, an ‘identity of one’s own’ is advocated as a minority right in the context
of dominant societies. Both in debates on and struggles about multiculturalism, ‘identity’ plays a major role. Here we are dealing with the consequences of globalization, not so much as a political project, but as a significant increase in the intensity of global flows of people, goods, capital, images etc.

It has almost become trivial to state that globalization produces ‘a sense of loss’ and anxiety about the identity and place of individuals, groups and nations. This anxiety is held responsible for the current rise in revitalizations of traditions, inherited cultural codes, rituals and cultural legacies. In turn, such revitalizations may come about with very specific political or strategic interests in mind. ‘Groups ‘discover’ their cultural uniqueness and exploit it for political purposes’ (Eriksen 2001: 309). The claim that globalization produces current identity projects is however hard to assess with concrete analyses of stimuli and responses. In any case, there are numerous examples of efforts to produce a distinguished ‘cultural identity’ in national and local realms prior to or with only secondary links to global influences (i.e. Basques, North-American Indigenous Peoples, Zulus). Both segregational strives and negotiations on group and territorial autonomy have existed before globalization obtained central stage. The consequences of global flows are not as clear-cut as they appear at first sight. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that in many cases, the strengthening of group demarcation draws upon the threat of global influences for inherited identifications. Globalization may have enhanced or amplified the urgency of revitalization, ethnic or nationalist movements.

However, such processes are also enabled by global discourses that support the right and legitimacy of difference and self-protection and by global technologies. For example, the Amazonian indigenous peoples tap into the internationally widely supported discursive frame on ‘biodiversity protection’ to underscore the legitimacy of their demands for territorial autonomy. Another example: the dissemination of new communication technologies is both a symbol for the economic integration and free market agreements that the Zapatistas in Chiapas (Mexico) resist, and an opportunity they use to ask for solidarity and support. Thus, it seems as if globalization contributed to both the motive and the means for identity politics. Moreover, the distinction between internal and external resources for cultural self-identification and identity politics has blurred. Cross-overs between alleged authentic sources and exogenous influences are often very paradoxical.

Such cross-overs also point to the changing significance of state territoriality, of the state’s capacity to control territory and society in the wake of globalization. Challenging the idea of a ‘national identity’ and thus the legitimacy of the foundation of state authority, globalization undermines the effectiveness of the state’s agency in obtaining economic, social, and physical security for its
inhabitants, giving rise to sub-state or global identifications. A growing tension can be discerned between identifications as embedded in traditional territorial and political structures and those emerging from the rise of network society (Castells 1997 and 2000). This does not necessarily negate the legitimacy of territoriality but does diminish the role of territory as a framework for generating trust, reliable institutions and resulting identifications. The world is waiting for new institutional answers that resonate with these changes (see Dijkink & Knippenberg 2001: 19).

Globalization and its challenge to institutions and identifications and ensuing identity politics not only bring up opportunities, but also risks. First, assertions of one’s ‘identity’ often come with a refusal to (self-) criticise this ‘identity’. Reluctance to include ‘care for the other’ in one’s identity-delimitation can lead to group egoism, confrontational logics and intolerance of group members who do not behave according to group standards or refuse to limit their loyalty exclusively to the group. The reification of one’s ‘collective identity’ can lead to a denial of choice for group members. We also need to ask ‘how [we] should take note of the relations between different people across borders whose identifications include, inter alia, solidarities based on classifications other than partitioning according to nations and political units, such as class, gender, or political and social beliefs’ (Sen 1998: 28).

Second, self-enclosure in asserted collective identifications will block the possibility of learning from persons outside the collectivity. In such cases, identity politics end up in self-righteousness and in the denial to take other viewpoints into consideration. This would mean subjective solidification instead of openness, and turns identity politics into an obstacle to multicultural society. Self-enclosure is easily produced when ‘identity’ is understood not as a meta-concept but as something real, to be located at the operational level as if it were tangible. Seeing identity as a ‘meta’ rather than an operational concept can take us from a self-enclosed and reified to a flexible and delicate understanding of the processes involved.

A-SYNCHRONIES AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES
Using ‘identity’ (formation) as a meta-concept points to a crucial shift in our conceptualization. As explained above, as researchers we have left behind the essentialist idea of a primordial, heritage-like or kernel-like image of ‘identity’. Instead, it has become popular to stress the dynamic, hybrid, fluid or indeterminate nature of the phenomena and processes inferred by the meta-concept of ‘identity formation’.

However, one can hear anthropologists and cultural studies scholars complain that just when they had painstakingly adopted these and a range of
other de-essentializing characteristics of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’, they see themselves confronted with voices in society that claim, cherish and defend their ‘culture’, ‘cultural identity’, and traditions, departing from a notion of ‘culture’ that evokes just that: essence, self-enclosure and authenticity. This suggests that developments in academia and developments in the realm of identity politics in the globalizing world are out of sync.

This situation can partly be explained by differences in goals and settings. Identity politics framed in essentialist terms can be an asset or strategic necessity for subordinated and deprived people to construct distinctive or defiant identifications for themselves to defend their interests. Essentialist and self-enclosed identity politics are of course also used by dominant political actors, as recent developments since September 11th, 2001, have shown. George W. Bush constantly confronts the world with the simple option of ‘either you are with us, or with the terrorists’. In short, identifications may be experienced and used in very absolute and totalizing ways, especially by those involved in struggle and conflict.

By contrast, in academia such strategic considerations are less salient, opening up the possibility to highlight the very delicate, subtle and pluriform processes that may be involved in identity formation. An academic perspective can and should account for the relative, variable and changing aspects involved. However, it would be wrong to suggest that a clear-cut breach between academic and political ‘uses’ of identity politics exists. The academic interest, to begin with, has definitely contributed to the current preoccupation about the effect of globalization on ‘identity’, and has partially delivered the vocabulary for both the struggles for the recognition of difference and diversity themselves and for the dominant political discourses on these struggles. In this sense, much identity politics echoes academic research. The research and its dissemination feeds into societal tensions and problems, and the epistemological logics behind it leave an imprint on how actors perceive themselves in their relational constellations. The question must for example be raised whether our image of identity as flexible, fluid, and non-essentialistic has served current capitalist interests, i.e. its need for the flexibilization of labour relations and the recurrent downsizing and restructuring of companies. Are we guilty of contributing to the ‘corrosion of character’ of those involved in these processes (Sennett 1998)?

Research priorities inevitably involve political choices. We want to close this chapter indicating lines of research that may be of particular interest. First, identity politics and the contested nature of identity formation present an array of examples and cases that call for much more attention. Identity politics seems to have risen to a level of prime importance in the struggles over access to resources and over who decides on inclusion and exclusion processes. We
may for example refer to the debates about the multicultural society in which the acceptance and access to resources of specific people defined in terms of specific identifications are at stake. We may also point to the fact that access to jobs and contracts is often decided using criteria that are framed in terms of ‘identity’.

Moreover, once identity politics becomes an object of or a key player within political strife and competition for resources, the danger of ethnicization of identifications into fundamentalist movements lies ahead. In the wake of such movements, identity positions may increasingly be framed in essentialist terms and give impetus to polarization, oppression and violence. An issue of particular importance here is the way in which institutional or governance arrangements are (un)able to deal with such problems or have become part of the problem instigating fundamentalist or nationalist polarization. These problems are surely not easy to tackle, but pose important challenges for further study.

Second, our fascination with the often colourful and multifarious expressions of the persons we study, must not blind us to problematic aspects of these manifestations. Despite post-modern celebrations of people’s colourful expressions, it remains important to pose questions such as to what extent an individual needs an experience of wholeness, based on an awareness of self, in the face of a multiplicity of identifications. Are there limits to his or her capacity to manage this multiplicity and what are his or her experiences when this capacity becomes exhausted? Will the imposition of particular identities by powerful actors on people not lead to alienation and disaffection? Is there a danger of dissolving all definitions of the self-referential in these processes by overstretching the relations between the performative and self-referential and how do the persons concerned experience such cases? In addition, where does an affirmative self-referential construction of one’s image or narrative of self end and derail into self-enclosed solidification? The capacity of individuals to manage the relational aspects of ‘identity formation’ may not be endless. If this is the case, its problematic dimensions deserve theoretical attention and empirical evidence.

The challenge is to link power, inclusion and exclusion in relation to resources on the one hand and the struggle over identifications on the other, to the ways in which people manage to accommodate their experiences with these identifications. Studying these experiences may offer a good ground for combining sociology and anthropology with approaches from psychology. Identity formation derives its dynamics from the dialectic between the capacity of people to create a sense of themselves and their power and space of manoeuvre within asymmetrical power relations.
References


Binsbergen, W. van 1999a. 'Culturen bestaan niet'. Het onderzoek van interculturaliteit als een openbreek van vanzelfsprekendheden. Rede in verkorte vorm uitgesproken bij de aanmaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar ‘grondslagen van interculturele filosofie’. Rotterdam: Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.


Governance in action
Some theoretical and practical reflections on a key concept

Monique Nuijten

In collaboration with Gerhard Anders, Jilles van Gastel, Gemma van der Haar, Carol van Nijnatten and Jeroen Warner

Introduction: theorizing a fuzzy concept
Over the past decades, governance has become a key concept within academic debates. It however does not have a definite academic meaning: there seem to be as many definitions of governance as there are researchers in the field. Because of the variable use of the highly popular concept, some clarity needs to be brought into the discussion. This article will give a short overview of the history of the concept and a glimpse of the variety of different approaches to it.

In many studies governance is not actually defined. It is often used merely to refer to a certain field of interest; something related to government or management. Approaches that do define governance specifically usually differ fundamentally in terms of their (implicit) views on the state, civil society, power and the role of policymakers. The authors of this article come from different disciplinary backgrounds (sociology, law, water and irrigation, political science and psychology), but share a thematic and theoretical interest in issues of order, rule and power. In this article we explore fields of common interest as well as areas of difference.

The aim of this article is not to present an inventory of governance theories but to discuss different possibilities of theorizing governance. To that end, the authors present their individual research projects and the different ways in which they approach the question of governance. In addition, some more general issues that are relevant to research on governance are addressed. For example, the importance of clearly defining one’s own theoretical position in relation to the wide-ranging academic and policy debates on governance. Another important topic is the tension that arises when the researcher who studies governance practices is also part of the policy process, leading to a conflict between critical analysis and active participation in the policy process. We also pay attention to the dangers involved in uncritically adopting popular, seemingly unproblematic concepts such as ‘participation’ and ‘good governance’.
The rise of a concept with multiple meanings

Governance plays a role in different disciplines such as institutional economics, organisational studies, political science, international relations, development studies and public administration. In some cases, an author's definition of governance clearly reveals his or her theoretical or disciplinary perspective. Graham Burchell, for example, describes governance from a clearly Foucauldian perspective as ‘a more or less methodical and rationally reflected ‘way of doing things’ or ‘art’ for acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, correct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves’ (1993: 267). In most cases, however, it is not so much the definition itself as the way in which the theme of governance is approached, that reveals the underlying theoretical notions on the state, power and policy.

Views on governance differ in many respects. Authors for instance disagree on whether governance only refers to formal forms of rule and order or also includes more informal, possibly illegal arrangements and on whether governance only refers to governmental administration or also comprises forms of organisation within civil society. Although many authors are not explicit about their perspective, it shows as they for instance either concentrate on formal organisations and official regulations or, in contrast, on any form of institutionalised practice, whether official or not.

In management studies, ‘the topic of corporate governance has received widespread theoretical and empirical attention ever since the separation of ownership and control within the modern firm was put on the academic agenda’ (van Oosterhout 2002: 138). In other academic fields, the popularity of the concept stems from discussions on the crisis of the state that started in the 1970s when the conviction that the role of the state in economic management and social welfare had to be reduced took root. In the 1980’s attention shifted to the market and later to the community. Hence, the governance discussion is linked to decentralisation processes and neo-liberal reforms, such as trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. Central are administrative and institutional reforms within the public sector. Furthermore, concepts of citizenship, participation and mobilisation are important elements in the governance discussion. Hence, the discussion is part of a shift away from state-led development, towards the strengthening of civil society and the reinforcement of associational activities in communities. It has to be noted, however, that the shift from state-led development or from ‘government to governance’ (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) does not actually imply a diminished role for the state as it continues to be one of the central actors in governance. What has changed however is that other actors, and the configurations in the relationship between the state and these other actors, have become more important. Even the World
Bank – not an organisation that can be suspected of sympathies for the state – has recognised the state’s importance ‘in a changing world’ (World Bank 1997). The discussions around state reform and new forms of governance in society take place in the Western world (Kersbergen en van Waarden 2001; Shore and Wright 1997a; Stoker 2000; Strathern 2000) as well as in developing countries (Baud 2000; von Benda-Beckmann 1993; Duffield 2001; Helmsing 2002; World Bank 1991, 1996). In Central and Eastern Europe, the discussion on governance forms part of the discussion on the transition from socialist to market economies and the accompanying reforms in governmental and administrative structures (World Bank 1996). In Western Europe the discussion revolves mainly around privatisation of state enterprises and changes in local politics leading to new forms of urban and local governance (see e.g. King and Stoker 1996; Stoker 2000) and around the transfers of decision-making powers from national states to the European Union.

In public administration, governance refers to the interactive and dialogical forms of management that have been developed since the eighties. The concept of governance offers a novel theoretical and managerial way to deal with social and political processes. For Jessop, ‘the literature on governance rejects the rigid polarisation between the anarchy of the market and the hierarchy of imperative coordination, in favour of the concept of heterarchy, i.e. horizontal self-organisation among mutually interdependent actors’ (Jessop, 2000: 15). Likewise, for Kooiman governance is the structure that emerges in a socio-political system as the ‘common result or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all actors involved’ (Kooiman 1993: 258). Kooiman’s approach is oriented towards the complexity of processes in which different actors play a role and points to new forms of public management in which civil society and the private sector share management responsibilities in order to increase governability. This slots nicely into the scientific field of ‘complexity’ that has started to captivate a wide audience. Along similar lines, Rhodes argues that ‘governance refers to institutional diversity; to the complex of local authorities with other local organisations drawn from the public, private and voluntary sectors – it also covers the processes of governing these interwoven and interweaving sets of organisations’ (2000: xii). Thus governance refers here not only to more interactive processes of governing but also to both steering processes themselves and the results of these processes.

In the development debate, governance has only become dominant since the early nineties. Although the use of the governance concept started late, ‘today it is difficult to find a publication on development issues put out by the United Nations, multilateral and bilateral agencies, academics or private voluntary organisations that does not rely heavily on its use’ (Hewitt de Alcán-
Unlike in public administration, in development studies, governance is a much more open-ended concept. Helmsing for example defines local governance as ‘structures and processes of societal decision making at the local level’ (2002: 4). According to Helmsing (2002) the early wave of decentralisation was primarily concerned with the transfer of public responsibilities and powers within the public sector itself, whereas in recent years decentralisation efforts seek to change the relationship between the state and civil society (2002: 2, 3). In other words, the focus has shifted from issues of government to issues of governance. Van Kersbergen and van Waarden talk in this respect of vertical (from national to local or to international bodies) and horizontal (from public to semi-public, to private) shifts in governance (2001: 6). In this context, common terms are also ‘local governance’, ‘public-private partnerships’ and ‘civic cooperation’. Key topics are the processes of networking and establishing partnerships and the framing of collective action. More recently, we see a strong focus in the governance debate on democracy and human rights, accountability, and the fight against corruption. Governance has also become an important theme in conflict studies. Creating effective and democratic state structures, establishing the rule of law and guaranteeing the representation and inclusion of minorities are currently considered crucial elements of conflict prevention and peace building strategies.

Globalization processes are another source of increased interest in issues of governance. People are increasingly confronted with new forms of power in which transnational and international actors are involved. They, in other words, face changing global patterns of (transnational) governance (von Benda-Beckmann 1999; Glick Schiller 2002; Randeria 2003). Glick Schiller for example discusses the ‘implications of migrants’ transnational connections and networks for the concept of citizenship and contemporary forms of and challenges to established systems of governance’ (2002:1). She talks about transborder citizens to refer to the millions of people throughout the world who live their lives across borders. As they participate in the social and political processes and regimes of more than one state, they play an important role in ‘reshaping the workings of several systems of law and governance’ (ibid.: 2). Randeria (2003) talks about ‘new patterns of scattered sovereignties’ as national states selectively implement norms and policies designed by supra-national institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. At the same time, she shows how regional governments in India bypass the national parliamentary arena by negotiating directly with the World Bank. According to Randeria this does not mean that the marginality of the state is increasing. On the contrary, nation-states remain very influential but use this new constellation to claim they are powerless in the face of prescriptions from Washington DC or Geneva. Yet, it does show
that an architecture of governance has developed in which governance can no longer be territorially defined and in which control over governance processes is quite difficult. Where national parliaments are bypassed, we clearly see a form of ‘governance without government’. Some authors thereby conclude that the global system is driven by a machine that has not one all-deciding centre of control, but which is nonetheless awfully powerful in its ability to impose laws, rules and procedures (see also Deleuze and Guattari 1980, Ferguson 1990; and Hardt and Negri 2000). Some authors are quite pessimistic about these developments and talk of ‘corporate-driven globalization’ that leads to forms of governance in which power and wealth are increasingly concentrated (Klein 2002: 16).

The different academic debates discussed above form the basis from which to think about and elaborate on definitions of governance in specific research settings. As an illustration of this, the following section will present Gemma van der Haar’s approach to governance in her specific research project on changes in municipal governments in Chiapas (Mexico).

A practice approach to governance changes in Chiapas, Mexico

Gemma van der Haar conducts research on the changes in and conflicts around municipal government in Chiapas. In this region, as in many other parts of Latin America, important changes in the organisation of municipal governments are taking place. They generally concern the municipal government’s institutional framework, competencies, authority structures and decision-making procedures, but sometimes also include re-municipalisation programmes, dividing large municipalities into more viable units. The changes respond to formal decentralisation agendas, but also reflect popular demands for democratisation and the recognition of indigenous rights and cultures. In Chiapas, furthermore, municipal reform has become an issue in the struggles between different political groups.

The most important component of van der Haar’s project is an in-depth study of the workings of a so-called Zapatista ‘autonomous municipality’ in Eastern Chiapas and the way it relates to (accommodates to or confronts) the operation of the official municipal structures. The Zapatista autonomous municipalities have been constituted as rival structures to the existing (‘official’) municipalities, with which they geographically overlap. They form one of the most radical and consistent projects for alternative ways of organising municipal government in Chiapas, with considerable appeal amongst indigenous organisations in other parts of Mexico. But they are also highly controversial (see e.g. Burguete Cal y Mayor 1998; López and Rebolledo 1999; Van der Haar 2001).
In her research van der Haar analyses in detail the evolving practices of governance in and around an autonomous municipality and the processes involved in the interaction of competing claims to governance between the autonomous and official municipal structures. She aims to contribute to the debates on decentralisation, municipal reform and democratisation, by developing a more anthropological perspective on processes of change at the municipal level. Van der Haar proposes to approach governance as a particular domain of practice that concerns, among others, administration, regulation, jurisdiction and service provision, and in which certain exercised competencies may or may not be formally endorsed (i.e. approved of by state structures and legislation). Following this approach, she adopts three inter-related concepts: ‘governing practices’ (or ‘practices of governance’), ‘governing capacity’ and ‘claims to governance’.

The notion of ‘governing practices’ is inspired by that of ‘organising practices’ as used by Nuijten (2003) and refers to partly institutionalised practices of administration, regulation, jurisdiction, service provision and other functions usually considered part of the ‘public domain’. These practices concern for example the access to and the administration of land and other natural resources, the formulation and enforcement of rules, the administration of justice, the organisation of authority and representation and the provision of infrastructure, health and education services. Claims to governance always entail an assertion of acting on behalf of the ‘public’, of dealing with issues of common concern. Such claims, however, always need to be problematised.

The notion of ‘governing capacity’ is used to refer to the effective capacity to exercise governing functions. The latter is not limited to state structures but extends to other social structures and collectivities. Multiple, and potentially competing, ‘claims to governance’, i.e. claims to exercise competencies in the fields of administration, jurisdiction etc., are understood to co-exist in practice. To a certain extent, these claims exist in parallel fashion, but they may enter into contradiction in specific domains or at specific critical junctures. Important issues for study are the ways these claims interact, the multiple negotiations and accommodations that take place, and the ways this changes normative and institutional repertoires.

An important method that van der Haar uses to study evolving governing practices and multiple claims to governance is the ‘critical event’. Around specific events, practices materialise, different claims are acted out and governing capacity is established. In such events, one may analyse how authority is claimed, endorsed or contested, what institutional arrangements and normative frameworks are drawn upon in this process, how they are brought to bear upon one another and what the consequences of their interaction are.
This approach may bring out some dimensions of processes of change at the level of municipal government that are hardly addressed in the current literature on decentralisation, municipal reform and democratisation of local government. It seeks to move beyond instrumentalist perspectives, taking due account of the role of power struggles and the complexities and contradictions of processes of change.

**Governance as analytical or as instrumentalist concept**

An important divergence in the governance debate is the instrumentalist versus the analytical view on governance. The instrumentalist approach is often used in response to a crisis of manageability and is reflected in the design of projects, programmes and policies that look for practical relevance. According to instrumentalist views on governance, the goals of the steering processes are set out at the beginning and much reference is made to ‘purposive behaviour’, ‘goal-oriented activities’ and ‘decision-making’. The notions of the ‘common good’ and ‘collective goals’ are very strong, as is the language of ‘clients’, ‘stakeholders’ and ‘target groups’. Schneider for example defines governance as the ‘exercise of authority and control in a society in relation to the management of resources for social and economic development’ (Schneider 1999: 522). Or, in a different way, Jon and Peters, see governance as ‘the articulation and pursuit of collective interests in the ‘post-strong state’ era’ (2000: 12).

From an analytical perspective, however, the notion of common goals seems problematic. Who defines the common goal with respect to governance? Usually the policymakers define what it is that requires steering or what are the ‘shared goals’. Instrumentalist views on governance that are oriented towards collective goals run the risk of ignoring or downplaying power relations. Shore and Wright rightly argue that ‘it is a feature of policies that their political nature is disguised by the objective, neutral, legal-rational idioms in which they are portrayed. In this guise, politics appear to be mere instruments for promoting efficiency and effectiveness’ (1997b: 8). That is a danger with some of the policy-oriented and instrumentalist governance literature: by focusing on collective objectives and by putting governance problems in technical terms they can de-politicise socio-political issues.

Analytical views on governance do not start from practical objectives. Rather than focusing on how things should be, they study how things are. In a first instance, the interest is more in understanding governance than in trying to change the system or to make normative judgements. More specifically, this perspective is ‘largely concerned with developing a better understanding of the different ways in which power and authority relations are structured in different contexts – thus focusing on the different modes of inter-penetration of state-civil
society relations’ (Doornbos 2001: 96). An obvious limitation of this approach to governance is that it does not directly contribute to the improvement or change of governance structures. The difference between instrumental and analytical approaches to governance becomes particularly clear in the research projects of Gerhard Anders in Malawi and Jilles van Gastel at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both Anders and van Gastel analyse the various stages of the formulation and implementation of ‘good governance’ policies and New Public Management employing an anthropological methodology.

Civil servants in Malawi and the implementation of ‘good governance’

Gerhard Anders conducted research in Malawi on the implementation of ‘good governance’ policies since 1994 and the dramatic changes that took place since the transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s. The research focused on the organisation of social support within civil servants' social networks. Anders argues that the volatile situation in the bureaucracy and society at large triggered responses by civil servants that are shaped by kinship morality. These effects are neither anticipated nor taken into account by the World Bank and the government.

Measures to enhance efficiency and transparency have been rather unsuccessful or have been hijacked by members of the bureaucratic and political elite. Furthermore, divisions within the state bureaucracy have been exacerbated by the World Bank’s ‘enclave approach’ (Dia 1993) that singles out or even establishes agencies that are supposed to function as motors for reform. In other words, the state’s sovereignty has become increasingly fragmented due to the influence of international donors such as the World Bank and the IMF. Anders’ informants stated again and again that corruption had been on the rise since the introduction of democracy and reform policies in 1994 – which does not exactly testify to the efficacy of policy reforms inspired by ‘good governance’!

In an environment characterised by scarcity and limited provision of public services, personal relationships are people’s main means to strive for social security and mitigate/anticipate shocks from contingencies such as death, sickness and old age (von Benda-Beckmann 1994). In practice, civil servants are exposed to constant demands and expectations for support by family members and to a lesser degree by friends and colleagues. As a result of urbanisation, modernisation and globalization, social networks, the way they operate and the moral norms that structure them are in a process of transformation. This has been exacerbated by the economic and political changes since the 1990s.

Anders’ informants’ heightened sense of insecurity and the ways they dealt with insecurity and change have to be seen in the context of the civil service
reform. Adopting an anthropological perspective undermines instrumentalist visions of ‘good governance’ propagated by the World Bank, the IMF and other donor agencies. Furthermore, Anders’ research shows the importance of distinguishing the instrumental from the analytical conception of governance. In other words, ‘governance’ as a topos in policy-making or as something that can be realized is different from ‘governance’ as analytical concept to describe complex patterns of ordering and regulation (Anders 2003; Rosenau/ Czempiel 1992: 10, 11).

For academics it might seem easy to dismiss the World Bank’s concept of good governance as purely political and of no consequence to scientific analysis. According to Anders however, an acceptance of the distinction between ‘the political’ and the ‘scientific’ ignores both the role of scientific knowledge in political programmes and policies on the one hand, and the political implications of scientific knowledge on the other. The term governance epitomises this blurring of the boundaries between the realm of normative policy prescriptions and the domain of scientific analysis. It seems to be no coincidence that the term governance became particularly popular in various scientific disciplines such as political science, law and economics at the same time when governance became one of the key concepts in the neo-liberal discourse on the state and development assistance.

In his research on the history of the concept of governance, Anders traces this blurring of boundaries between the normative-political and the scientific-analytical approach to the policies of the World Bank and the IMF. For example, in its first treatise on governance the World Bank defined governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1992: 3). This definition is strikingly similar to several scientific definitions. In the policies of the World Bank the normative political and the scientific analytical blend into one conception of governance that is thus not merely academic – on the contrary, it is at the foundation of the World Bank’s attempts to rebuild the state in a more ‘efficient’ and ‘transparent’ manner.

The Civil Service Reform in Malawi is justified by its neutrality and scientific character and is presented as an instrument to optimise bureaucratic organisation and processes. Within the World Bank a so-called Governance Approach has been developed that taxes a country’s ‘patrimonial character’ and prescribes specific measures to be taken depending on the level of patrimonial appropriation by the state. This bluntly instrumentalist and normative approach that treats culture as just another variable that can be ‘adjusted’ according to certain political objectives is presented as scientific analysis (Dia 1993).

Anders argues that because of the ambiguities produced by the blurring
of the spheres of the ‘normative’ political and the ‘scientific’ analytical, studies of regimes of governance should proceed in two steps. First the analysis should unmask reified categories such as ‘governance’, ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ both in scientific and political discourse. The second step should entail a reflexive, i.e. self-conscious, analysis of the web of power relations, interests and strategies that produce the reified categories (Lemke, Krasmann & Bröckling 2000: 21-24). It is obvious that the reflexive approach, that is conscious of its own situatedness in the web of power relations in the academic and the political arena, has implications for the position of the researcher.

**Governing ‘good governance’ at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

For her MSc research van Gastel analysed the ‘governance’ of ‘good governance’ within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of a process of shifting policies and changes in development co-operation (van Gastel 2001). She argues that it is impossible to operationalise a concept such as ‘good governance’ without taking into account its institutional context: ‘good governance’ acquires a certain meaning within a specific political arena. Following the anthropological approach of Shore and Wright, van Gastel treats the models and language of decision-makers as ‘ethnographic data to be analysed’ (1997b: preface). Policies thereby can be read ‘in a number of ways: as cultural texts, as classificatory devices with various meanings, as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function to empower some people and silence others’ (1997b: 7). Van Gastel’s research did not approach the policy process as a linear top-down course of action but instead focused on the differing notions of ‘good governance’ that were used in the negotiations between institutions and actors, and the way actors used their power to influence the process.

The governance concept, developed around 1990 in international institutions, has played an increasingly important role. In order grasp the politics of policy-making around the concept, van Gastel reconstructed the ‘life history’ of the Explanatory Memorandum of the National Budget (*Memoire van Toelichting of the National Budget*) of 2000 – the document that presented ‘good governance’ as a spearhead under Minister Herfkens’s policy. From this document, she worked back to the 1992 Explanatory Memorandum of Minister Pronk which introduced the concept into Dutch development policy for the first time.

To place Dutch policy construction within international fields of influence, van Gastel looked at the meanings given to ‘good governance’ in different international institutions such as the World Bank and the UNDP. Van Gastel concluded that on the one hand there exists an ethical or ideological notion
of governance, propagated by the UNDP and the Stockholm Initiative (1991). According to the advocates of this view, the fall of the Berlin Wall showed that the Western system of justice and peace, democracy and development, human rights, and international law was the only option and that not the state but the individual should be central to development policy. On the other hand, there exists a more technocratic, functional notion of ‘good governance’, propagated by the World Bank and IMF. This view is based on the effectiveness and efficiency of aid and thus focuses on deliverance capacity and the role of the state, particularly in public expenditure management and the fight against corruption.

Examining the biographies of the two Dutch Ministers involved in ‘good governance’ policy construction, Pronk and Herfkens, van Gastel discovered that Pronk, who had worked at the UNDP and had participated in the Stockholm Initiative, very much followed the ideological view, as is visible in two of his key policy papers ‘A World of Difference’ (1991) and ‘A World of Dispute’ (1993). People working in the DMV-department (for Human Rights, Good governance and Peace building), which was set up by Minister Pronk to deal with issues such as democratisation, also adhered to the ethical view. On the other hand, Minister Herfkens, who had worked at the World Bank for six years, adhered to a much more technocratic notion of ‘good governance’. Thus, different and opposing notions of governance and good governance circulated at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unlike the official model in which the Minister is the policy maker and bureaucrats merely advise her, officials do influence policy-making through ‘backdoor methods’. For instance, policy advisors who provide the Minister with texts for press conferences influence the Minister’s policy by taking the opportunity to advocate their own views on good governance. As did policy advisors at the Democratisation, Good governance and Human rights Department (DMD) who, without the Minister’s request, wrote a policy paper that discussed a range of issues, varying from human rights to institutional development and public finance, from a ‘Pronkian’ perspective on governance. The Minister demanded adjustments before the paper would be given official status but the policy advisors refused, which eventually brought the policy process to a halt. The ‘governance’ of ‘good governance’ at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was thus a conflict-ridden process shaped by the opposing views of two Ministers with different professional trajectories in development.

Studying governance processes around the notion of good governance, as van Gastel does, can easily create confusion. The problem of using a notion as object of study and as analytical concept at the same time is well known from other fields such as legal anthropology, where law is both an analytical
and a folk concept. Generally, the overlap of analytical and analysed concepts is a result of the shift in anthropology towards complex societies and policy formulation and implementation. Turning a problem into a virtue it could even be argued that a characteristic of anthropology of the 21st century is the use of the same concepts that are analysed by the actors under research themselves (Riles 2001; Shore & Wright 1997b: 7).

The doctrine of partnerships and participation

Participation is a central component of debates on new forms of governance. Schneider even speaks of participatory governance as a ‘paradigm shift based on the trilogy of empowerment, accountability and capacity building’ (1999: 521). Schneider replaces the broad concept of good governance with the concept of participatory governance that is narrower and has a stronger focus on participatory development. According to Schneider, participatory governance introduces ‘maximum transparency and sharing of information in a process that includes all stakeholders (government, bureaucrats, intended beneficiaries, i.e. ‘primary stake-holders’, and their organisations and possibly others) and leads to joint decision making wherever feasible’ (ibid.: 523). The question, however, is whether the ‘small’, the ‘local’, the ‘non-governmental’, the ‘traditional’ or the ‘indigenous’ is always ‘beautiful’ and ‘better’, as often seems to be (implicitly) assumed. In addition, several authors question the extent to which participation programmes have really been able to give people more bottom-up control. Numerous studies have shown how participation discourses have been used in manipulative ways and have sometimes even harmed those who were supposed to be empowered (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 1; Nuijten 2002). Critical studies of the Popular Participation policy in Bolivia suggest that it has not only failed to empower marginalised groups and ensure their participation, but has even weakened indigenous communities and authority structures (Assies, van der Haar and Hoekema 1999; Orellana 1999). As Assies remarks, decentralisation policies that recognize local level, indigenous governance tend to imply incorporation, monitoring and displacement of traditional leadership (Assies 1999). Yet, there are more pitfalls to this debate. As several authors have argued efficient decentralisation and power-building from below is only possible with a strong state that can institutionalise and support these processes and guarantee the rights of the different actors involved.

The research by van der Haar among indigenous communities shows the complexities involved in processes of decentralisation and democratisation. With reason, many observers see the Zapatista autonomous municipalities in the Mexican state of Chiapas as a much needed alternative to the usually highly undemocratic, ineffective and illegitimate municipal governments
in many indigenous regions. However, we cannot simply qualify these local autonomous structures as ‘democratic’, ‘inclusive’ or ‘participatory’. Closer study would need to show whether and how intentions concerning, amongst other things, the inclusion of women and youth in decision-making, the overcoming of differences between different ethnic groups and communities, and the sensitivity and accountability of leaders to their bases (according to the Zapatista maxim *mandar obedeciendo* or ‘to command obeying’) translate into practice. However sympathetic and appealing such ‘subaltern’ projects may be, it should be kept in mind that they are political projects that involve a redistribution of power, the production of new inequalities and the construction of new dominant discourses, silencing or de-legitimising others. It is important that researchers do not uncritically buy into the dominant discourse but seek to understand the power play, the diverging perspectives and the tensions (see also Van der Haar 2001, and forthcoming).

According to van Nijnatten (see below) ‘real’ participation is easier to achieve if the people involved have clear, explicit rights to negotiate decisions. The starting point for real participation lies in the exchange of information. In child welfare in the Netherlands, for instance, social workers inform their clients about the possibilities in the care-supply and clients are expected to inform the social worker about their problems and needs. The client knows his or her specific situation best and the contribution of the care agent is general knowledge and clinical experience. Both types of expertise may be combined and may lead to a reconstruction of the way the client considers his or her life and the care for the children. The biographical elements of the client thus acquire new meaning in interaction with the care agent. On the other hand, the care agent will try to apply professional expertise in the specific situation of the client (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). Only in open and explicit negotiations are clients able to accept or refuse a particular form of intervention. Negotiation and information are key issues here.

Van Nijnatten notices that participation is generally perceived as ‘a good thing’, either for ideological reasons (the right to decide for oneself), developmental reasons (to achieve growth) or political reasons (as a means to empowerment). Real participation in child welfare is achieved when clients are involved in the decision-making processes, are empowered to raise their child(ren) by themselves, and play an active role in the relevant discussions (Hofstede, Van Nijnatten & Suurmond, 2001). Yet, there is also another side to participation: efforts to involve clients can also be an effective strategy to diminish the client’s resistance and to smooth the process of intervention. In institutional communication, participation acquires a functional character (Drew & Heritage, 1995). A major danger with participatory approaches is
therefore that professionals impose definitions of need which correspond neatly with existing devices (Biehal 1993). In short, the discourse of participation always hides a double promise: on the one hand the empowerment of people and the questioning of power relations but on the other the instrumental use of trying to improve the efficiency of the process (see Baggen, Masschelein & Wildemeersch 2000). These complexities in forms of participatory governance are also illustrated in the project below.

GOVERNANCE AT WORK:

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PLATFORMS FOR INTEGRATED CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT

Over the past ten years, Jeroen Warner has studied multi-level governance of water and water conflicts, trying to understand how to prevent disputes over water from turning into violent and/or disruptive conflict. His central research question is: which factors influence the emergence, functioning and sustainability of Multi Stakeholder Platforms in river catchments. Inspired by Uphoff and others, Participatory Irrigation Management has become a dominant policy model. However, the approach used to concentrate on farmers, ignoring other interest groups such as fishermen, traders, the industry and landless families. It was therefore recognised that different types of stakeholders should participate in the management of shared resources. In 1992, UNCED at Rio introduced some elements by identifying ‘major groups’ that should be involved in environmental management. In the late 1990s Integrated Water Resource Management and Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) became in vogue as solutions to address problems of water governance.

Stakeholder platforms for resource-use negotiation aim to achieve collective agency in managing a resource. They are promoted across the globe as a solution for environmental management and sustainability issues and find increasing support, both from top-down (donors, governments) and bottom-up (NGOs) institutions. The challenge is to devise social-political arrangements in which public, private and civil-society actors at different levels are involved in decision-making networks. In 2000, the ‘stakeholder dialogue’ made its entry in the Second World Water Forum (2000).

Inspired by Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality, the MSP concept is buttressed by a belief in the power of dialogue and consensus-building in breaking down institutional and power barriers, and the ability of people at the local level to manage local resources. In this respect it ties in with traditions of social negotiation and subsidiarity found in North European countries and various theoretical strands including participatory planning, deliberative democracy (O’Riordan & Stoll-Kleeman 2002), self-regulating institutions (Ostrom 1990; Mayntz 1993), and participatory irrigation management (Uphoff 1996).
Warner's research programme differentiates between MSPs as policy prescription and as empirical practice. We need to acknowledge that policy formulation and policy implementation are two different things. Both however are complex processes of formal and informal, legal and illegal, open and hidden interaction and negotiation of different interest groups. For that reason, we should remain critical about the relation between planning and reality. The implementation of policies can be a highly conflictual process that may work out quite differently in practice from the imagined result. Therefore, a key question is whether MSPs actually make a difference to selected stakeholders themselves in solving their often conflicting common-pool resource management issues.

MSP as a policy model assumes that leaving managerial top-down approaches and including a wider range of actors improves the chances for meaningful, democratically supported Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). The relevant stakeholders, which in different local situations include different groups, are too easily considered merely in terms of competing economic interests. However, other identities – cultural, linguistic or religious – may need to be represented as well.

While being a prescriptive ideal-type, this approach reflects the increasingly complex management pattern that has grown out of the outsourcing of public services like water supply. The state cannot seem to manage water but also the shift to market forces that started around 1990 and that was enshrined by the Dublin principles of 1992, did not bring a solution. The rediscovery of civil society seems to be a last-ditch effort to release the governance capacities hidden in society – in a nonpolitical manner that disregards structural power relations. Thus ‘dialogues’ between multiple stakeholders are encouraged, to help solve ‘social dilemmas’. Multiple-Stakeholder Dialogue is considered to be a useful ‘tool’ in the solution-oriented world of aid.

However, the expectations of the parties involved differ. Dominant actors in the Dutch ‘Partners for Water’ consortium are keen to promote MSPs as an exportable solution, which may constrain the room for critical distance. Others feel that MSPs can improve public management, challenge the established order, emancipate poor farmers or improve communication. And there are those who feel that MSPs are just window dressing, reinforcing the status quo.

According to Warner, one should keep several things in mind with respect to the participatory claims that are made by MSP projects. Dialogues may indeed tap the knowledge and capacities of people in different sectors, and in so doing achieve synergy. However, it is not clear who is supposed to integrate these expressions of governance. Governance, development, participation and, by extension, stakeholder dialogue, have different gospels. Stakeholder
dialogues may be capable of managing conflicts, making water management more efficient and more integrated, and giving voice to disenfranchised groups. And of course, ‘governance’ and ‘participation’ as cornerstones to institutional change are attractive propositions as they address real problems and hold out attractive solutions. But actually these assumptions go unquestioned – it does not really seem to matter whether the medicine actually works.

According to Warner, it is important to realize that even where there is ‘anarchy’, some kind of governance is at work. People’s coping capacity, their instinct for survival, sees them through hardship and drives them to seek opportunities in ways that may not conform to established norms of behaviour. Kooiman’s acceptance of self-governing ‘interferences’ (2003) sheds an interesting light on accepted normative frameworks, in which what is right is what has been laid down in law and in which the government is the keeper of morality. In the language of cultural studies, ‘hierarchists’ see government as inherently for the common good, while the people are considered irrational. ‘Egalitarians’ on the other hand, often see it the other way round – populists like James Scott consider people to know best, while the state is an intruder. This provides interesting ideas for discussing questions of formality and informality in the conceptualization of governance.

For example, illegal water systems form a type of informality that is often not appreciated by the public sector that wants to control what is going on. However, would it not be smarter to improve these connections rather than eliminate them? After all, overloaded governments cannot possibly bear the whole brunt of ‘public services’ where private and civil-society actors can do their bit. To establish a degree of trust, it may prove wiser to consider legalising illegal connections and helping people to make them safer. In so doing, mutual co-optation can take place so that radical antagonism is prevented.

Similarly, there are arguments for the rationality of non-participation in multi-stakeholder platforms. This may outrage proponents of participation – can’t people see that it is good for them? We are sure they can, but from a strategic rationality perspective it is easy to see that there are opportunity costs in participation without direct benefit. For people who seek to capture the platform for their own benefit, working around the platform of direct lobbying of decisionmakers can be more productive. Communicative rationality and strategic rationality are not mutually exclusive – both are at work at different junctures.

This requires a critical but constructive approach to both governance and multi-stakeholder dialogue. In this context, Warner acknowledges the danger of MSP becoming a mechanism of depoliticisation and normalisation. But he also understands the genuine excitement about these concepts and the ways in
which they energise and incite people to get up and do things together. In this respect he shares Kooiman’s opinion that governance is as much about making the most of opportunities as it is about problems (Kooiman 2003).

**The researcher as participant in practices of governance**

Most researchers on governance are also themselves involved in governance processes. For example, some research is based on a specific request for policy recommendations and other more academic research can become part of the policy process at a later stage. Moreover, researchers can influence governance structures through political protest, supporting groups in resisting certain regulations and through recommendations to NGO’s. Once they start participating in the governance process, academic researchers become a small element in a much larger system they are not in control of.

One of the famous pitfalls in policy-oriented research is that political problems become neutralised in the ‘language of science’. The creation of a powerful, noncontroversial metaphor or catchphrase, which should of necessity be vague, can be a potent strategy for aligning people to take action (Smircich and Morgan 1982). Powerful symbols and concepts like the WWF koala, ‘sustainable development’ or ‘good governance’, have equifinal meaning: they mean different things to different people, but align people to the same objective. Governance seems to be such a conveniently imprecise and appealing catchword. While different schools assign different meanings to it (see Rhodes 2000), none of these schools has the upper hand – the different interpretations and conceptualisations have coexisted for years now.

The reality of politics and the neutralization of concepts make it all the more important for academic researchers to define their own position. Following Smith (2002), academic researchers should openly address and discuss their position vis-a-vis various classes and socio-economic processes. They should be able to define their concepts, and operationalise them in relation to their research theme and the wider global setting. Especially in policy oriented research it is important to be aware of the background and political use of certain concepts. At the moment that academic researchers are used for their ‘expert’ knowledge, they can be neutralised as political persons and become accomplices in a process they would not really like to be part of. Several authors, for example, warn for the detrimental effects of the governance agenda for developing countries. According to Hewitt de Alcántara the popularity of the concept of governance in international development circles can easily be explained: ‘By talking about governance- rather than state reform or social and political change – multilateral banks and agencies within the development establishment were able to address sensitive questions that could be lumped
together under a relatively inoffensive heading and usually couched in technical terms, thus avoiding any implications that these institutions were exceeding their statutory authority by intervening in the internal political affairs of sovereign states (1998: 107). Others have pointed out that this fuzzy and multi-interpretable concept has become an instrument for neo-liberal economic policies (WRR report 2001) and that by requiring that they become self-activating and free agents, liberalism has in effect rendered its political subjects ‘governable’ (Burchell 1991: 119).

Whether researchers try to intervene in practices or ‘only’ try to understand and explain, they are always engaged with the field they study, although the nature of that relationship differs. The different types of study and the relation between researcher and the field, become clear in van Nijnatten’s research on the relations between social workers and their clients in child welfare in the Netherlands (Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Van Nijnatten, Van den Ackerveken & Ewals, in press).

**Governance in child welfare**

In the field of child welfare in the Netherlands, Van Nijnatten has been involved in two types of studies. The first focuses on understanding developments in Dutch child welfare policy. Van Nijnatten studies the relations between parents and children and between families and child welfare agencies by comparing recent discourses of families, parenthood and family interventions with entrepreneurial management discourse. So, he uses the governance discussion to develop new forms of analyzing relations within Dutch families, for example by focusing on heterarchy instead of hierarchy, facilitation instead of direction and household management instead of task performance. The study reveals both shifts in parenting practices and new ways to describe them (Van Nijnatten 2000).

The second type of study that Van Nijnatten is involved in is more interventionist. The main goal is to learn about the dynamics of child welfare practices and to return this information to institutional agents and policy makers. Research is conducted on control and instruction in conversations between institutional representatives of child protection agencies and clients (Stenson 1993). In this type of institutional communication, the child protection agency sets the rules, agenda and style of the conversation (Cederstund 1992). Analysis of the conversations showed that clients respond to this both through adaptive and reconstructive practices (Van Nijnatten, Hoogsteder, & Suurmond 2001; Van Nijnatten & Hofstede 2002).

Van Nijnatten’s studies have been undertaken from a perspective that distances itself from the ‘triomfalistic’ view of objectivist studies, relying rather on
a constructivist position that emphasises that meaning does not exist outside the relation between researcher and subject but is created in that relation-
ship. In van Nijnatten’s policy-oriented research on micro-level governance of
cild protection institutions, the indefinable future is thus part of the dynamic
process of the construction of meaning. Social workers are given feedback
through his studies and direct improvement of the practice of social work and
development of education programs is aimed for. Several authors have shown
the subtle processes through which policy discourses construct their subjects
as objects of power. Yet, van Nijnatten’s research project cannot be reduced to
naive support for disciplining practices (Foucault, 1975) that streamline policy
processes. Nor can the encounters between child protection workers and cli-
ents be seen as mere efforts to adapt clients to the norms of society. According
to van Nijnatten, encounters with mandated clients and intervention studies
should also be seen as attempts at co-constructing a reality of ‘good govern-
nance’ that is ‘better’ for both client and child protection institution.

**Some remarks on research methods**

Every research project involves a multitude of methodological choices, ranging
from the number of people to be interviewed, the types of questions to be
asked, the unit of analysis, the analysis of events and texts, etc. The develop-
ment of a research methodology is a creative process, which besides logical
thinking and scientific rigour requires imagination, flexibility and improvisa-
tion. In the following section we discuss some of the most relevant method-
ological choices that have to be made in governance research. We emphasise
that the methods can be used and developed in different ways, according to
specific research settings.

**Studying ‘up’ and ‘down’**

Especially in the field of governance ‘as researchers, we need to reconsider
how to approach problems located in or flowing through multiple sites” (Fisher
1997: 459). This methodological dilemma is well illustrated in Anders’ study.
He started his research through conversations with dismissed civil servants
and discontent junior officers complaining about their ‘selfish bosses’. He
soon realised that the implementation of civil service reform had failed almost
completely. To find an explanation for this, Anders looked at higher levels of
the bureaucracy and the World Bank. In this way he did what Reinhold (1994:
477-9) calls ‘studying through’: tracing ways in which power creates webs of
relations between actors, institutions and discourses across time and space.
Laura Nader already pointed out in the 1970’s that anthropologists have to
‘study up’ in order to understand the processes whereby power and respon-
sibility are exercised' (1972: 284). She argued that anthropological research is particularly well equipped to study actual behaviour of individuals and groups hidden behind the veil of formal organisation by virtue of its eclecticism and broad cross-cultural understanding (1972: 293). In an attempt to ‘study up’ Anders moved up the hierarchical ladder and talked to senior civil servants and local World Bank staff. He thus continuously moved up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy, which made him appreciate the heterogeneity within the civil service and the complexity of the implementation process of the civil service reform. Anders adopted a broad contextual approach that draws on anthropological studies of bureaucracy and state power addressing the social and cultural context of formal organisation (Herzfeld 1992; Britan 1981; Britan/Cohen 1980). When ‘studying up’, the researcher cannot rely exclusively on localised methods to study a ‘translocal’ phenomenon such as the state (Gupta 1995). To fully understand the process of policy intervention it is necessary to draw on newspapers, policy papers, official documents, government circulars and legislation next to more conventional ethnographic data (Gupta 1995; Nader 1972). To study up or through will often require multi-sited fieldwork to track the new objects of study through various locations. According to Marcus the object could be a material thing, a metaphor or mode of thought, story, plot or allegory, life history or conflict (Marcus 1995).

Conversational analysis
In order to investigate the interactions between social workers and mandated clients, Van Nijnatten videotaped the dialogues between family supervisor and parents. The researchers then analysed how family supervisors presented their formal competencies and the rights of the parents. They focussed on formulations about their relationship with the parents; their interactional strategy in the case of formal decisions and, finally, on successful conversational strategies and interventions. A first systematic method for analysing turn-takings in conversations was formulated by Sacks et al. (1974). A more differentiated analysis becomes possible when conversations are considered as a sequence of successive turns and acts of the participants. A description of the turns and acts of the participants reveals the interaction structures.

Conversational analysis focuses on the use of language in specific contexts and constructs talk as a means of social action (see e.g. Heritage 1989). This entails an interest in the strategies and resources that actors use in order to engage in mutually intelligible social interactions. What participants say in a conversation is seen as both dependent on the context and the source of a new context. Each utterance instantly constructs the context for the following one, thus renewing the context. Van Nijnatten and his team used several tools
to analyse talk in an institutional context (see Drew & Heritage 1992):

- **lexical choice**: use of jargon, emphasis on an institutional identity (e.g. the use of ‘we’);
- **turn taking**: who sets the agenda, brings in new topics, and how the course of the conversation is constructed by speech acts;
- **sequence organisation**: one specific turn evokes another as posing a question generally evokes an answer (‘adjacency pairs’). Institutional talk tends to be sequentially organised and have a communication pattern that is characterised by a question-answer sequence: the doctor asks and the patient answers;
- **politeness strategies**: engagement with the views of the other person by verbalising resemblance (positive politeness) or by underlining the independent position and giving the other more options (negative politeness). Common strategies are: understatement: use of diminutives and formulation of a request as a question rather than a demand; downtoner: demonstration of awareness that the client will probably disagree with a request; precommitment: check if the client will agree before he is able to agree; sweetener: emphasising good qualities that are relevant for a request; disarmer: mentioning beforehand factors the client might have to disagree; excuse: explicit expression of sorrow; offer: proposal to do something for the client to make it easier for the client to reciprocate.

But even where a set of coherent analytical tools is used, the interpretation of recordings will naturally be biased by researchers’ individual perspectives. To reach better reliability, video recordings were discussed extensively by the research teams, as were ambiguities in interpreting the data.

**Conclusion:**

**The importance of direction in a fragmented academic field**

In this article a wide array of approaches to governance has been discussed. Although it seems impossible to arrive at a generally accepted definition of the concept, it is important not to abandon generalisations altogether. Despite the differences, we can determine some general points of agreement. In one way or another governance refers to processes of steering, ordering, ruling and control. The steering processes themselves, as well as the results of these processes are considered part of governance. In addition, governance is often used in relation to processes of social transformation. Discussions on governance can refer to many different levels and subjects, from supervision of parents over children, changing relations between the European Union and its member states, urban councils, municipal reforms, the World Bank etc. Structures and
Globalization and Development

practices of governance influence the distribution and reshuffling of people, means and resources. In other words, they influence sets of relations between individuals, groups and objects. Practices of governance have institutional, discursive and normative dimensions, which makes them a very broad field of study. Governance is always related to forms of domination and power relations. Therefore, it always implies forms of resistance and subversion. In that way, governance links up with debates on ideology and hegemony. Practices of governance are never neutral.

The wide-spread interest in governance coincided with neo-liberal reforms, waves of privatisation and globalization. Governance started to be used for the analysis of processes in the Western world and was then enthusiastically taken up in the development debate. As often happens when concepts are taken up in the development debate, they were emptied of their theoretical meaning and the baggage of many years of academic discussion. Although governance is claimed to be a very new approach, present discussions on it do not differ much from past ones. Discussions on re-organisation, local institutions, participation and empowerment continuously return in the development debate under different headings. The development debate is characterized by the fact that every new concept or model is presented as a panacea whereas new approaches to governance are in fact not the new ‘magic charm’ that will radically change the world (von Benda-Beckmann 1993). As Duffield (2001) points out, development specialists would do better finding ways to deal with complexity than continuously inventing new concepts and theories. A great danger is that although high expectations and sweeping changes may be well intended, many institutions that are central to democracy and accountability can be destroyed in the process of introducing ‘good governance’. As Hewitt de Alcántara remarks, ‘the concept of ‘civil society’, so closely integrated into the discourse of ‘good governance’, has been used in ways that may very well weaken, rather than strengthen, the groundwork for democracy’ (1998: 108).

The continuous emergence of new, simplistic buzzwords is not an innocent phenomenon. It has important political implications (Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1990, 1998). The highly attractive and seemingly neutral concept of governance easily conceals inequalities and power relations. In addition, the accompanying rhetoric about partnerships, co-operation etc. tends to disguise structural differences. Through this discursive framing political contradictions are easily reduced to technical and administrative problems. Obviously, depoliticisation can be an important management strategy in situations of post-conflict reconstruction and severe socio-political cleavages where one wants to get practical issues organised without making things more complicated than they already are. Yet, depoliticisation becomes detrimental when it is used to
deny existing problems and power relations and to shift responsibilities to the wrong persons and groups. Lamentably, this is what happens in much of the mainstream governance debate. In our view, academic researchers should continue to critically study the effects of buzzwords and policy concepts.

From different debates and disciplines, the present authors concur that, whatever approach one takes, it is vital to address power relations, diversity and contradictions. In addition, in policy oriented work one should be modest in the proclaimed effects of new programs. Governance practices are always the result of a mix of spontaneity and planning. Much applauded innovations in governance can have both beneficial and noxious effects and governance guided by so-called principles of partnership and participation can work towards exploitation, monopolisation, and ‘benevolent dictatorship’ just as it can work towards democratisation, progress and liberation. In this respect, governance is like ‘development’ - a faith that makes its prophecy self-fulfilling. Of course, even though it is a myth, we do need to believe in good governance and the idea that control is possible, even if that requires acceptance of the contingent. As Jessop (2000) convincingly argues, governance will always fail, for failure is a central feature of all social relations. For the same reason governance is necessarily incomplete. ‘Indeed, given the growing structural complexity and opacity of the social world, failure is the most likely outcome of most attempts to govern it, in terms of multiple objectives over extended spatial and temporal horizons, whatever coordinating mechanism is adopted’ (Jessop 2000: 30).

Confronted with the coming and going of buzzwords, academics continuously need to (re-) position themselves. Our short overview of governance studies showed that a difficult question is to what extent the models and language of policy-makers should be used as ethnographic data to be analysed and to what extent these conceptual frameworks can be used for our own analysis. The idea of an independent academic framework of analysis, distinct from the policy framework, is problematic. First of all, for pragmatic or opportunistic reasons, we will always have to use policy notions and buzzwords to a certain extent as funding streams also move along with the new buzzwords. As Wacquant (2002: 1524) mentions, there is an intense pressure on academics ‘to tailor their work to the popular expectations of the ‘generalised market’ rather than to the scientific norms of the ‘restricted market’ of their discipline, in accordance with the well-established opposition that structures every field of cultural production (Bourdieu 1994). But there are also other limitations with respect to the development of a separate independent analytical language. If we use our own instruments and concepts, many people will not ‘hear’ us or ‘listen’ to us and this means that we position ourselves completely outside the
policy debate. In addition, one could ask if we should not engage in the domi-
nant discourse and try to influence the use of certain concepts and ideas, rather
than develop our own analytical categories. Furthermore, at a more theoretical
level, one can ask to what extent it would even be possible to position our-
selves outside the dominant discourse. Whatever position is taken however,
researchers on governance should always be able to situate themselves clearly
within the existing academic and political field in which the notion of gover-
nance is employed.
Notes
1 Edwin Rap has actively participated in the discussions leading to the writing of this article.
2 For preliminary findings on civil servants’ responses to liberalisation, economic crisis and the civil service reform see Anders 2002.
3 His present position is that of coordinator/researcher at Wageningen UR of the ‘Sustainability of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management project’, supported by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
4 These were conceptualised by the Communication and Innovation Studies Group at Wageningen University and developed by Niels Röling.

References
Globalization and Development


O’Riordan, Tim, Susanne Stoll-Kleemann (eds.) 2002, Biodiversity, Sustainability and Human Communities. Protecting Beyond the Protected. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


WRR 2001 Ontwikkelingsbeleid en goed bestuur, rapporten aan de regering no. 58, Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers.
Transcending the nation
Explorations of transnationalism as a concept and phenomenon

Valentina Mazzucato

In collaboration with Rijk van Dijk, Cindy Horst and Pieter de Vries

Introduction: Locating transnationalism

The concept of transnationalism first emerged as an alternative to the dominant approach in migration studies during the 1970s and 1980s that narrowly conceptualized the migrant as a labor migrant that had either completely assimilated to the receiving country’s culture – which could be evaluated on the basis of participation in the job market, education and social services- or was only a temporary sojourner eventually to return home (Rouse 1995). This earlier perspective focused merely on migration from developing to developed countries and the effects on the latter’s economy and society.  

Transnationalism moves away from conceiving migration in terms of one or a few discrete moves, to its conceptualization as a continuous flow of people, goods, money and ideas that transgress national boundaries and thereby connect different physical, social, economic and political spaces. It emphasizes new forms of human mobility that have emerged because airplanes, telephones, satellite technology, faxes, and computers allow movement and communication between large distances with much greater speed and quantity (see Ethnic and Racial Studies (1999) volume 22, issue 2, Vertovec 2001). Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc (1992), who were among the first to theorize transnationalism, introduced a focus on migration within a globalizing economy and the questioning of the role of the nation-state in regulating migrants’ activities and identities. Whereas migration studies used to focus on the participation of migrants in the host country society, transnationalism emphasizes the institutions and identities that migrants create by being simultaneously engaged in two or more countries (van Amersfoort 2001).

The various definitions of transnationalism reflect the different disciplinary backgrounds of scholars it has attracted. Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, define transnationalism as ‘the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin
and settlement’ (1994: 7). Vertovec emphasizes the importance of people within networks by focusing on the ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (1999: 447). Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, from an economistic view, delimit the concept of transnationalism to *occupations and activities* that require sustained contacts over time and across national borders (1999: 218). Other authors emphasize the flow of immaterial things such as *ideas* and *feelings of solidarity* that may shape transnational identities (Clifford 1994).

Transnationalism has been criticized as a phenomenon and as a concept. As the former, transnationalism cannot be considered new (van Amersfoort 2001). Pries (2002) and Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999) for example identify transnational phenomena that pre-date the revolution in information and communication technology: 17th and 18th century artists, scientists and aristocrats in Europe whose existence entailed traveling constantly throughout Europe; transnational networks of Muslim scientists in the 18th century; Venetian, Genoese and Hanse merchants throughout medieval Europe; and enclaves of commercial representatives engaged in international trade for the Portuguese, Dutch and English colonial empires.

This criticism urges us to adopt a historical perspective on transnational phenomena that does not assume that linkages between migrants and the continuous flows this entails are new phenomena. Due to technology and a modern capitalist system of production, the quantity (intensity, frequency, regularity), type and simultaneity of flows of people, goods, money and ideas across national borders have, however, reached previously unprecedented levels (Harvey 1990; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994). We need to use transnationalism to investigate whether indeed new dynamics are set in place by these flows that somehow alter relationships between people and the way groups can lay claims to resources and whether and how new institutions are formed and nation-states play a role in regulating people’s activities or defining their identities. Foner for example (1997) does this by analyzing the different waves of immigration to New York city from a historical and critical stance to see whether the most recent influx of migrants has led to new processes and dynamics.

As a concept, transnationalism is similar to concepts already in existence within migration and ethnic studies. Grillo (1998) and van Amersfoort (2001) point to concepts such as ‘circular migration’, ‘chain migration’, ‘symbolic ethnicity’ or ‘multi-local families’ that represent the same idea, only under a different name. Indeed, we believe some authors do not distinguish between transnationalism and international migration and neglect a considerable body of research by using the word transnationalism to mean little more than the
ties that migrants maintain with their homeland. We however use transnationalism to mean much more. As we explain below, by asking different research questions, making different assumptions about space and using different units of analysis, transnationalism can lead to new insights about current social events.

Different research questions than those asked by ‘classical’ migration studies, which were largely based in the developed world and concerned with phases of immigrant adaptation, follow from the emphasis that transnationalism places on the flow of ideas, goods, money and people across borders. They concern the emergence and functioning of hybrid institutions, cultures and identities and require the unhitching of old binaries such as the static pair of the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ economy. Transnationalism highlights that any supposed attachment of people to a place should be a matter of investigation. And although first developed within the context of migration studies, the idea of a transnational community goes beyond the analysis of the migration process and helps theorize about the emergence of new forms of community based on transnational flows and notions of shared belonging through the work of the imagination. This approach is for example applied by Ghorashi (2002), who does not ask how female Iranian refugees adapt to their new countries of residence, but investigates what kinds of loyalties emerge amongst these refugees and what ideas they have about their identity as a consequence of the ties they maintain amongst each other, with people in Iran, and with people in their countries of residence.

Notions of space that assume that physical, social, and political spaces perfectly overlap with geographical areas are problematized in transnationalism research. It acknowledges the importance of the nation-state in affecting the way migrants move and organize themselves, in creating barriers (restrictive visa policies) or providing opportunities (employment within developed country economies). But at the same time, transnationalism implies a crossing or transcending of boundaries through the flow of ideas, cultural images (Appadurai’s (1996) ethno-space, media-space, etc.), people and goods that contribute to the constitution of new kinds of spaces. As Gupta and Ferguson (1992) put it, people’s conscious efforts to reflect upon their culture lead to the mapping of culture upon space in ways that counter official representations of national space and identity. Transnational communities can be ‘real’ as in the case of mutual support groups and associations responding to defined needs (repatriation of dead bodies, celebrations, support of ‘home’ communities etc.), as well as ‘imagined’ as in the case of migrants who construct cultural identities in the receiving country by engaging in idealised representations of ‘home’, leading to what Benedict Anderson (1983) has called ‘long distance national-
ism’. The latter can however just as well lead to ‘real’ actions.

The ‘units’ of analysis in transnational research follow from the methodological decoupling of social, cultural, economic, political and geographical space and the emphasis on flows. Why focus exclusively on the nation-state when migratory activities include unintended, unplanned and illegal forms? Can we speak of a village community, implying a bounded notion of culture, when villagers are connected to London, Toronto and Hamburg through telephones, communication centers and ever cheaper air travel? Instead of using nation-states or village communities, transnationalism research uses middle-range units of analysis such as transnational communities, networks or circuits. Through these middle-range concepts, the durable connections and institutionalized relationships that emerge as a consequence of the various cross-border flows can be more adequately theorized.

The decoupling of different kinds of spaces and the use of middle-range units of analysis distinguish transnationalism research from the seemingly related topic of globalization. Globalization literature maintains a high degree of abstraction. It tends to take a macro-perspective on flows of goods, people and capital and portrays global forces as inevitable or natural (Burawoy 2000). Transnational studies instead highlight the effects of a globalizing world on people’s everyday lives by focusing on individuals embedded within networks, or on groups forming new institutions and new identities as a consequence of cross-border flows. Consequently, a second difference between transnationalism and globalization studies concerns the conceptualization of space. While the latter concentrate on de-territorialized processes (for example Castells’ (1996) space of flows), the former focus on transnational social relations as anchored in, while also transcending, one or more nation-states (Kearney 1995). While globalization studies emphasize the breaking down of boundaries, transnationalism takes into account the boundaries between a privileged ‘first class’ world and those disconnected from it (Ferguson 1999) and looks as much at the creation of new boundaries (Geschiere and Meyer 1998) as at their transcendence.

Two areas have remained under-researched in this first decade of transnationalism research. The first concerns the different effects of transnational phenomena on various actors – men and women, young and old, rich and poor, first and second generation migrants and those with legal or illegal status. As George (2000) for example does in researching a group of Indian migrants in the United States who developed a transnational culture by which more demands were placed on women, transnational research in general needs to keep sight of the differences within groups and avoid overly homogenizing categories.
Secondly, the classical emphasis on so-called south – north migration still predominates. Transnational phenomena are, however, just as likely to occur in south – south migration. There are large flows of African laborers in Arab countries and of south-east Asians in the Asian tiger nations. Rudnick (2002) for example describes the creation of a transnational ‘bad girl’ notion as a result of flows of Bangladeshi women to Malaysia. To add to our empirical understanding of transnational phenomena, more studies should adopt such a south – south focus.

In the second and third sections we expand, methodologically and empirically, upon the research questions, units of analysis and conceptualizations of space used in transnationalism research, thereby hoping to stimulate beginning researchers in the field to include these deliberations in thinking about their own research topic. In the second section we critically reflect upon theories and concepts used in the different disciplines attracted to transnational research (economic geography, anthropology, sociology). The three sub-sections discuss concepts relevant to the study of migrant livelihoods, theories that address the permeability of culture and notions of community that include, but go beyond the nation-state. Thus each sub-section addresses transnationalism from a different angle: the material, i.e. the links between people and how these affect their lives materially; the imaginary, i.e. processes of imagination, identity creation and cultural reorientation; and the political, i.e. the political struggles and agency drawn upon to claim resources vis-à-vis the state. Section three illustrates these theoretical arguments with empirical cases: a description of Ghanaian migrant networks and their transnational economic institutions reveals the material aspects of transnationalism; a close examination of the ‘voodoo’ controversy around Nigerian prostitutes in the Netherlands demonstrates cultural reorientations; a study on the networks of Somali refugees highlights the methodological challenges of conducting research on middle-range units of analysis and the potential of using the internet; and finally, a discussion of Peruvian herders in the United States exemplifies transnational processes of community-creation that challenge static conceptions of community.

**Mobile livelihoods, cultural reorientations and transnational communities**

**Transnational migrant livelihoods**

Livelihoods is a concept used in the social sciences to refer to the totality of resources and agency that people draw upon to make a living (see the chapter on livelihood in this book). Most studies, however, still focus on livelihoods as being created, negotiated and fought for principally in one locality. This sub-section looks at livelihoods from a transnational perspective and in so
doing critically reflects upon the notions of sedentary livelihoods, refugees, and transnational economic activities. A transnational lens on livelihoods forces us out of the false assumption that sedentary lives are the natural state of society. Transnationalism studies focus on how people create livelihoods in a context of mobility rather than on why they move, thus getting us beyond the rigid distinctions between refugees and migrants. In making livelihoods within a context of mobility and flows, people create transnational economic spaces in which institutions are renegotiated and new ones created. The study of these institutions forms the focus of research on transnational economic spaces.

Transnationalism and the study of mobile livelihoods

A transnational perspective questions the common assumption that sedentarization is the ‘natural’ state of society (De Bruijn, Van Dijk and Foeken 2001). International migration has largely been treated as a deviance from the prevailing norm of social organization at the world level (Zolberg 1983: 6). Yet, mobility, including that which is cross-border, has always been essential to people’s livelihoods. Transnationalism, by focusing on networks that span geographical borders, forces us to understand people’s livelihood strategies within the context of mobility. It also allows us to move beyond simplistic dichotomies of migrants as either moving for economic or political reasons.

How a transnational perspective affects the study of livelihoods can be seen for example in the implications it has for refugee studies. Here debates on transnationalism have been largely ignored. Conversely, studies on transnational communities have until recently disregarded refugees or treated them as a separate case. Vertovec (1999: 453) for example writes ‘whereas many transnational communities have found themselves dispersed for reasons of forced migration, others have largely spread themselves in order to spread their assets’; as if the first group could not engage in the second activity. This mindset is based on much disputed typologies and theories of international migration, like the model of push and pull factors (see e.g. Black 1995) and the idea of a strict separation between refugees and labor migrants: the former constituting the political element, the latter the economic element of international migration. Recently, interest in the transnational connections that refugees entertain is slowly increasing to include not only their political but also their economic, social and cultural activities.

Thereby the conceptual distinction between refugees and other migrants becomes blurred: a combination of political, ethnic, economic, environmental and human rights factors cause people to move. The relationship that exists between refugees and their homeland(s) is complex and transnational economic and political ties determine people’s livelihoods on both sides to a great
extent. Refugees do not merely wait for a political change in their country so that they can return, or if this is not forthcoming, put their efforts into integration in their new society; often, they continuously engage with their home country through ‘long distance nationalism’ or remittance sending. Their home governments also do not always and forever disown them, since often the economic and political backing of the growing number of citizens ‘in diaspora’ is essential (Al-Ali et al 2001: 617). Moreover, refugees do not live in isolation from other migrants, but are often part of a diaspora network. Substantial numbers of Somali have for example lived in Europe and the USA not only as refugees and asylum seekers but also under a variety of other legal statuses (Crisp 1999). Thus, it is more useful to focus on such communities as a whole, instead of trying to create an artificial distinction between ‘economic migrants’ and refugees. Transnationalism shifts the focus from the economic and political reasons of why migrants leave to the connections that migrants entertain with their relatives and community members in the homeland and across the diaspora. Economic and political aspects become some of the many aspects that explain the political, economic, cultural and social transnational spaces that migrants create in making their livelihoods.

Transnational livelihoods can take many forms and shapes, and have been studied from various perspectives. Salih (2001a; 2001b), who conducted research amongst Moroccan migrant women working in Italy, draws the conclusion that ‘transnational practices such as transferring money, buying land or a house, or investing in other signifiers of symbolic and economic capital in their country of origin, have been a constant character of Moroccan international migrants, adhering as they did to a ‘myth of return’ (Salih 2001b: 52). What has altered, in her view, is the level to which changes in technological communication, travel and financial services have favoured the maintenance of transnational relations, reducing imaginary and real distances. Due to these changes, the women she spoke to were able to engage in more than one national context to accumulate the symbolic and economic capital needed for their livelihoods.

Similar processes have been identified in the case of refugees, on different levels. Koser (2001; Al-Ali et al 2001) describes how financial contributions from the Eritrean diaspora have been used by the state for military and humanitarian purposes, but also by relatives and friends for their daily living. The economic strength of those in the diaspora enables them to influence political and economic decisions in their home country on the level of the household as well as the state. Indeed, as Adamson (2001: 156) points out, by mobilizing and transferring resources directly to actors in the home country, transnational communities can have a transformatory impact as they alter the local balance of resources and
power. For Somalis in refugee camps in Kenya, remittances from the Diaspora have been essential for their survival in a semi-arid region with scarce livelihood opportunities and insufficient international aid (Horst 2002b; Horst and Van Hear 2002). This has lead to a complex exchange of responsibilities and expectations that link the different members of Somali transnational families, who are very involved in each other's life and livelihood decisions, despite great distances.

Transnational economic spaces

Transnationalism contributes to the study of mobile livelihoods as it prompts us to ask different research questions than have previously been the focus of migration studies. Within economics and sociology the main research questions concerning migration have been ‘what explains the propensity to migrate and its effects?’ and ‘what explains immigrant incorporation?’ (Brettell and Hollifield 2000). Transnationalism, however, recognizes that migrants are increasingly located in transnational spaces. These spaces are combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organization that can be found in at least two spaces. (Faist 2000:216-217). Thus, transnationalism shifts attention to questions of how people create new social, cultural and economic spaces to form their livelihoods.

Most research concerning transnational economic spaces has focussed on ethnic entrepreneurs (Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Rath 2000) and therefore on activities ‘that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation’ (Portes 1998: 219). It concentrates on the links that migrants create and maintain between developed and developing countries in order to engage in business ventures and how migrants capitalize on their social networks for this. The institutional aspects of transnational economic space, i.e. the norms and rules that guide people’s behaviour, have, however, received little attention. How do the links between people in different locations affect the institutions and concepts that they use to make economic decisions? How do the flows of people, ideas, goods and money change economic decision-making? Contact with new cultures and between migrants and non-migrants in the country of origin changes the realm of possibilities that migrants as well as ‘people back home’ see as potentially accessible to them, thereby affecting their objectives and their expectations for the future. In an increasingly globalising world, new asset categories are defined (identity papers for example take on an economic life of their own as they are created, traded and exchanged to meet the migrants’ various needs) and different institutions emerge (for example, the institution of using monetary loans to create trust amongst potential trading partners from different ethnic origins brought into contact with each other through migration). At the same time, relying on
well-known institutions existing in the land of origin can help people cope in new environments. For example, ethnicity is increasingly used by people to access resources in foreign situations. Institutions such as gift-giving can help create a livelihood in difficult new environments. Research on transnational economic space thus focuses on what economic behaviour emerges when economic decisions are informed by categories and institutions that are created and renegotiated within a context of mobility and cross-boundary flows.

As transnational networks are the conduits of the flows of people, ideas, goods and money that affect the processes of changing economic behaviour, the latter have to be studied taking these networks as the units of analysis. This differs from the focus of migration studies on individual migrants or migrant groups and that of the new economy of migration on households (Massey et al. 1987). Transnationalism literature recognizes, in stead, the individual migrant as a member of a larger whole that extends beyond geographical boundaries; a social network that comprises relatives, friends and colleagues in the homeland, country of residence and wider diaspora. Due to technological developments in communication and transportation, links between these dispersed people have been able to tighten and, consequently, new livelihood opportunities have developed. One of the methodological consequences of this is discussed in the third section.

A transnational approach on livelihoods should, however, not become over-celebratory. The globalized context that facilitates or forces family members to move, can create disjointed livelihoods (for an example, see the analysis on Peru in the third section) and sever ties, thus complicating collective action or protest and producing criminal activities. People may benefit from transnational livelihoods, but the demands on their time and income may also increase (for example, George 2000). Also, the considerable political role that Diasporas play can lie not only in stimulating development or peace but also in destabilising societies and increasing inequalities.

Transnationalism and culture: Forging new identities in a borderless world?
Transnationalism simultaneously acknowledges and transcends physical borders. The question dealt with in this sub-section is how this simultaneity relates to culture and identity. There is a growing literature, particularly in Cultural Studies and Anthropology, that emphasises cultural cross-border flows and their capacity to unite (for instance by creating a shared consumptive cultural identity among global McDonalds consumers) and divide (for instance through increasing xenophobia).

How and why does a transnational focus move culture and identity beyond the perimeters of the nation-state? One of the first studies that con-
cisely and empirically questioned social science perceptions on the relationship between nationalism and identity was the award-winning monograph *Purity and Exile* by Finnish anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1995). In her book, dealing with the diaspora-cultures of Rwandan and Burundian refugees in Tanzania, Malkki questions the idea of conceiving a nation and a national identity as one; as if totally overlapping and congruent with one another. Through active and creative sharing of memories of persecution, violence and trauma, Rwandan and Burundian refugees were actually re-working social memory and forming a transnational community of those sharing experiences of loss and de-humanization, in default of national borders, within the confines of one nation, Tanzania. This highlights how transnationalism relates to the transcending capacity of identity-creation and cultural (re-) orientations.

Preceding Malkki's work and starting with Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983), an anthropology developed that criticised the notion of bounded cultural wholes. Gupta and Ferguson (1997) developed Anderson's work in questioning the so-called *people-power-place paradigm* that tended to tie specific cultural formations to a certain people inhabiting a particular locality. Against the engagement of classical anthropology in a 'among the so-and-so' type of ethnography that naively prescribed deep attachments of specific cultural features to a particular locality, post-modern anthropology stresses processes of 'deterritorialization'. This perspective, which perceived culture as both producing borders as well as creating the identities that would transcend them, gave way to three directions of further research in anthropology.

First, any specific attachment of people to place became understood as a specific historical condition and thus a matter for further investigation. It was to be treated as the outcome of processes of power-brokerage, ethnicity, assimilation, migration and so-forth, something Appadurai (1995) called the 'production of locality'. Secondly, the exploration of the 'deterritorial' features of a given cultural identity made it possible to study the permeability of culture as it was created through the production of identities under the guise of ethnicity, language, religion and even nationality. It thus expounded the issue, long ignored by classical anthropology, that the 'localness' of any culture can only be understood as the outcome of its interaction with a wider world. It recognised the fact that cultural identities can produce connectivities over wide geographical distances; linkages which in themselves may develop unfettered by political boundaries of any magnitude. The question thus became, to what extent cultures mediate, transgress or transcend different borders and are thus problematic to those who want to exert powers of containment. Thirdly, culture came to be seen not as a primordial, genetic given, but rather as a performative aspect of agency and self-realisation.
The term transnationalism also alludes to *Postcoloniality* writ large, particularly as found in Cultural Studies literature on the multicultural state, mass media and the world-wide spread of consumer identities. The ‘holy trinity’ of Bhabha, Said and Spivak originated the de-centering of the empire through which history could become re-written from the Colony’s perspective and through which the arrival of migrants from the South in the former empire could become understood in a broader framework. The terms ‘transnationalism’ and ‘hybridity’ (see Modood and Werbner 1997) came to signify a perspective in which transnational and diasporic movements appear not as ‘random’ but as intentional and focused. Hybridity is the place from where the transnational migrant critically engages with the host society’s culture and politics, adopting some of its elements but rejecting most. Postcolonial writing is thus about how the ‘sub-altern’ (cf. Spivak) speak, write and think the empire. Cultural hybridity is the site where the transnational migrant can remain the eternal stranger, an *imagination of alterity* which also enables the host society to start thinking critically about itself and its dominant social formations. Hybridity, or transnationalism for that matter, in this Cultural Studies approach, functions as a moral mirror for the dominant society; the space where ethical reflections about social vices and virtues are being produced, where heated debates erupt over social values and political truths and where the production of different moral orders takes place.

This perspective on the position of migrants in the multicultural societies of the West often attributes a great deal of agency to the individual migrant. It is as if the migrant becomes the individual purveyor of his or her possibilities and opportunities in life, overlooking all the options to overcome the hardships of increasing xenophobia, identity politics, retrenching economies and so forth. In this sense, Cultural Studies has been focusing on a more or less elitist, cosmopolitan expression of the migrant’s predicament in literature, images, film, video and so forth. Anthropology has tended to follow the Cultural Studies interest of studying migrants as they move into intercontinental travel and exchange, but has done so from a much more empirical angle and has remained less elitist in orientation. Recent work tends to show that in creating a moral ideology that would validate the stranger’s position in a given society, radicalization often occurs. This is not only true for certain Muslim groupings in the West, but also for certain Ghanaian migrants to Europe, where an unprecedented growth of Christian fundamentalist movements of a Pentecostal kind has taken place (van Dijk 2002).

The process of creating ulterior identities is about more than simply migration across national borders. Conscious, deliberate and highly reflexive efforts are made of ‘unbounding’ one’s culture where certain important societal or
individual goals demand it. With regard to identity, the concept of transnationalism thus calls into consideration areas of research relating to morality, ideology, social memory, and creativity as well as to the more material aspects of the organisation of migration and of connections across distances. These are vast areas of study related to the production of transcultural identities, some of which are covered by Cultural Studies (literature, mass-media, popular culture, arts etc.) while others are dealt with in ethnographic study after the post-modern turn in anthropology.

Concluding, we want to highlight that transnationalism in the study of culture and identity is as much about transcending boundaries through identity creation and cultural reorientations as it is about creating new boundaries through the pursuit of exclusive rights to a territory, institutions or domains of knowledge. Consequently, transnationalism may, and often does, start at home. Both transcending and creating boundaries are movements that demonstrate a comparable capacity of qualifying, contesting and moving beyond the borders and the cultural confinement of the nation-state.

**Political Identities and the Crisis of the Nation-State**

This sub-section looks at the implications of a transnational perspective for the conceptualisation of the nation state. Within transnationalism studies, international borders and borderlands, as areas where sovereignty is both affirmed and denied, have been preferred research subjects (Alvarez 1995; Heyman 1994). Borders in this view are not seen as discrete lines on geographic maps but as territorial zones that manifest the limits of state power. Border crossing has become a metaphor for the diminishing sovereignty of the nation-state, and like all metaphors it can be expanded to different contexts, making border crossing an aspect of social relations in all situations where people with different cultural backgrounds meet (the topic of multiculturalism) (Donnan and Wilson, 1999).

Within one line of thinking, represented by Appadurai (1996), borders have expanded so as to encompass the entire world. The globe has become one big border zone, where different ideologies and life-styles co-exist (sometimes peacefully, sometimes not), while none of them is capable of acquiring global dominance. In another line of thinking, represented by Sassen (1998), the future of the nation-state is not so much denied, as its changing role within new structures of governance emerging in the wake of processes of economic globalization is emphasized. Transnational finance capital has become dominant at the global level, but it cannot do without defined forms of national territorial governance. Economic globalization has led to a concentration of finance capital in a network of global cities (New York, Tokyo, Sao Paulo, London, Paris, etc.), with specific infrastructural requirements (urban services) that
must be fulfilled within the territorial context of the nation. The state, within this context, remains essential in providing the regulatory framework (legal and economic) for the functioning of these global centres. It fulfils a new role, one that is increasingly de-linked from the specificities of a historically constituted nation-state project. It is within this line of thinking that we proceed.

The crisis of a hyphen
As Benedict Anderson argues, the nation-state has been a historically unique way of territorializing notions of identity and order. His argument is that the nation-state is imagined through the cultural construction of a shared, homogeneous space whereby a number of representational technologies such as cartography, printing, and museology play an important formative role. Malkki (1992) adds to this that the ‘naturalisation’ of the state has led to the stabilization of ideas on the ‘national order of things’. The latter is, however, very much part of an order of discourse, that of the modernist project of nation-state building.

The crisis of the nation-state does not concern the idea of ‘the nation’, as the global persistence of nationalist passions evidences. Nor is it a crisis of the state as a governance structure; in fact the number of states world-wide is still growing. As Hobsbawn (1996) argues, so far there is no substitute for the territorial state as the most effective authority for purposes of legitimisation and public accountability. The crisis, thus, is that of the hyphen in the nation-state, caused on the one hand by the de-territorialization of the national space and on the other by the de-nationalisation of the territorial state. The fact that the project of the nation-state is being undermined by neo-liberal and privatization programmes all over the world, does not mean that the repressive and identificatory powers of the state have been rendered inoperative, nor that the state has ceased to be the addressee of claims and complaints. This is demonstrated by the fact that social or popular movements from the Zapatistas to far-right fundamentalist groups in the USA (e.g. those who inspired the Oklahoma bombing) explicitly target the state as their interlocutor (if not their enemy). In Europe, where the so-called Third Way – between a statist nationalization programme and unregulated neo-liberal globalization – has been dominant for over a decade, the tension between the nation and the state is expressed in current discussions over (illegal) immigration and citizenship rights. These revolve around the presupposed role of the state in defending certain cultural and social rights (e.g. the right to religious and sexual tolerance, the welfare state, the national way of life), seen as specific national achievements, vis-à-vis the threats of unbridled globalization.
Political identities and transnational social space

Despite all the talk about global social movements performing within a transnational space that overlooks the state, the latter is actually more than ever a focal point of social struggles. It is the primary domain in which different programmes of rule and governance are enacted and the key arena in which political identities are constructed.

One way in which transnationalism research can address the topic of political identities within transnational space is by analysing social situations, or encounters, in which foreigners meet with state institutions representing different types of claims. Examples are ordinary encounters of legal foreigners with police agents when extending their permits, or those of illegal aliens with a large array of state and semi-state institutions that may persecute them, protect them, or just ignore them for pragmatic reasons (such as schools, municipalities, etc.). Ralph Trouillot (2001) has proposed an interesting strategy for undertaking an anthropology of the state in a world in which transnational flows are rendering national borders increasingly irrelevant as effective modes of regulation. His question is, how states rule in situations in which conventional notions of national identity are in contestation, if not in outright crisis, as is for example the case in European countries experiencing strong xenophobic movements directed against foreigners.

The effects of state action are the result of the interplay between a myriad of actions and interventions enacted by a multiplicity of agencies and institutions with different mandates, principles and agendas. How do these actions and interventions create different kinds of political engagements and disengagements? How do they structure the commitments and exclusions that lead to the constitution of transnational subaltern identities?

Trouillot (2001: 3) identifies four effects the state can have on the kinds of political identities people construct: isolation, identification, legibility and spatialization effects. The isolation effect entails that atomized individualized subjects are moulded and modelled for governance as part of an undifferentiated but specific ‘public’. People with different kinds of religious, political or territorial attachments come to recognize themselves as individuals with certain packages of rights and obligations. However, these are differentially distributed, legally and according to the ability of people to claim particular entitlements and/or to escape certain obligations. The imagery of this differential distribution figures prominently in the political debate: who pays taxes and who doesn’t? Who is entitled to particular citizenship rights, and why? Are particular groups just invisible because they are not registered, or are they evading police control? Some groups are excluded, others exclude themselves, and still others are victimized. Feelings of anxiety regarding undeserving strangers emerge. The
Transnationalism

foreigner comes to symbolize all that undermines and subverts the self-identity of the nation. Transnationalism becomes ubiquitous, yet suspect.

The second, identification effect entails the realignment of the atomized subjectivities along collective lines within which individuals recognize themselves as the same. This is what is commonly denominated the new ethnic politics, or cultural politics. Official categories, originally instituted for administrative purposes – often in a paternalistic vein – are appropriated by larger populations who start identifying themselves as co-nationals vis-à-vis foreign aliens. While the isolation effect leads to the constitution of a public self (the citizen, the foreigner, the guest-worker, the alien) under the impact of given categorization devices, the identification effect leads to the internalization of these devices and hence to the constitution of a ‘private self’. For example, in the Netherlands, children of migrants are considered second generation migrants. After being denied ‘Dutchness’ as a second generation Moroccan foreigner, you might be obliged to ‘choose’ for your Moroccan identity, even though it is bestowed upon you.

The third, legibility effect concerns the production of both a language and a body of knowledge for governance, and of theoretical and empirical tools that classify and regulate collectivities. As said, popular categories, even if they originate as administrative devices, do have consequences for the way in which the political debate is structured. Thus some politicians argue that ‘the Moroccan community should be taken to task for its inability to control its young male unemployed’. Different political persuasions shape the languages and knowledge for the governance of transnationalism. On the left, for example, there is a language of multiculturalism that preaches inter-cultural tolerance. The alternative advocated by confessional parties in the Netherlands is the corporatist path, in which cultural and/or ethnic groups are expected to ‘organise’ themselves both within civic and political terrains. Meanwhile, the nationalist right insists on ill-defined notions of national cultural heritage, which for various cultural reasons are not, and cannot be, shared by all subjects of the state.

The fourth, spatialization effect leads to the materialisation of the previous effects through the spatial organization of the social life of the different transnational communities thus constituted. In short, the types of categorization one is subjected to, the encounters with state agencies that one can expect and the modes of identification that are possible, have consequences for the types of political identities and social movements that one might become part of. Transnationalism has often been celebrated as a process of liberation from primordial ties. But the increased density of transnational flows, in conjunction with the crisis of the hyphen, is also accompanied by the surge of new forms
of ethnic entrepreneurship and political brokerage.

The murky side to transnationalism concerns arms trade, forced prostitution, drug trafficking and paedophilic and pornographic transnational networks or communities. Hindu castes and Pentecostalism, but also different kinds of mafia and other groups involved in shadow economies at the interstices of different governance structures, have expanded through transnational flows. The lack of institutional fixity of the state has provoked a multiplicity of overlapping structures of governance with differing territorial referents. Functions that in the past were the sole prerogative of the state have been taken up by new constellations of actors, ranging from official international institutions to illegal and semi-legal networks. Thus the division between state and civil society, or public and private is increasingly blurred.

Transnational cases: Ghanaian networks, voodoo in a Dutch setting, the Internet and an Andean comunidad

This section presents four cases of transnational research in order to illustrate our theoretical discussion with empirical examples. In the first sub-section we consider transnational economic institutions of Ghanaian migrants to illustrate the study of transnational economic livelihoods. The second sub-section examines the use of voodoo by transnational child trafficking networks to illustrate the transnational cultural re-orientations discussed earlier. In the third sub-section the issue of doing research on middle range units such as transnational networks, as raised in the first section, is presented and a particular solution offered. In the final sub-section, we discuss the creation of a transnational community vis-à-vis the Peruvian state to highlight the points made in the last part of the previous section.

Studying transnational economic livelihoods

The University of Amsterdam-Vrije Universiteit program, ‘Transnational Ghanaian Networks’ (Mazzucato 2000) investigates the relatively under-studied area of how transnational networks affect the institutions guiding economic behaviour of migrants, in this case Ghanaian migrants, in their host countries and in their countries of origin. These institutions, which include commonly held categories such as rules, laws, or norms of conduct that guide economic action, define the structure of economies and allow for the development of economic activities that escape forms of territorialization, resulting in the creation of a transnational economic space. The program thus studies how transnational networks affect people’s objectives and thereby inspire economic activities that may produce transnational spaces, for example in the case of health insurances, housing investments and church or funeral expenditures that are partly
supported by gifts and services that escape state regulation. Conversely, the program also looks at how the need to operate between nations, thus within a transnational space, leads to economic activities that are facilitated by a network of actors located across different nations (such as the activities around the certification of a person's identity that simultaneously circumvent and confront state identity politics).

The program is composed of three projects based in three important nodes of Ghanaian migrants' transnational networks: the Bijlmermeer neighborhood of Amsterdam, Accra (Ghana), and rural to semi-urban villages in the Ashanti Region of Ghana to which many migrants trace their roots. In each of these locations, the projects investigate how transnational networks affect economic activities.

Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands form an example of economic migrants, as distinct from the group of Moroccan and Turkish 'guest workers' who were invited to the Netherlands in the 1960s because of the labour shortfall during the economic boom. The latter group were given official status upon arrival and thus formed part of the state system from the very beginning. Furthermore, these migrants have reached pension age, make use of the Dutch welfare state, and have children of working age that form the second generation. The main difference for Ghanaian migrants is that they need to contend with a state that from the beginning, albeit to varying degrees, has wanted to keep them out. Ghanaian migrants started arriving in the 1980s when the economies of Ghana as well as of Nigeria, where many were working, were deteriorating. Most migrants, both men and women, are still in their prime working years and the second generation has only just started high school completion. They therefore make relatively little use of the Dutch welfare state. There are around 16,000 Ghanaian migrants recorded in the Netherlands and an estimated 40,000 if we add the many undocumented migrants.

The present Kuffuor government is highly interested in promoting relationships with Ghanaians overseas who are morally pressured to invest in the home economy. The Ghanian state does this for example by making official visits to overseas communities, by having radio-programmes in which migrants are put in contact with Ghanaian politicians to debate local issues and by providing new credit facilities. The Kuffuor administration even approached the Dutch government to support this migrant-oriented development strategy, thereby exporting the state and its interests far beyond its own territory. A slew of economic activities are generated because of state attempts to involve or exclude migrants, or because of migrants' own attempts at evading or involving the state. The Ghanaian case thus demonstrates how the state has become just one of the many actors that either form a liability or can be profitably engaged with.
Transnational institutions are part of migrants’ strategies that contend with and go beyond the state. Examples from Ghana include internet searches by village communities to find ‘suitable’ candidates to function as white development chiefs who can, through their international connections, secure funds for development projects in these villages. Or the emergence of funeral businesses to cater to the needs of internationally dispersed families, such as body-cooling services that can conserve a body for up to two years in expectation of the moment that most family members can come for a funeral ceremony (van Dijk 2001, 2002; Mazzucato 2001). The amount of money used for funerals has however been a matter of contention, as the state wants the capital for ‘more productive’ investments. Examples of transnational institutions are also found in the Netherlands (Mazzucato 2001): funeral insurance schemes that either formally (through insurance agencies) or informally (through a migrant’s social network) guarantee the repatriation of a deceased person’s body. Or health insurance schemes that help migrants set aside money to be able to cover the insurance of loved ones back home.

These transnational institutions not only cater to the economic needs that result from a transnational setting, but also produce flows of people, financial capital, and ideas that escape state control. What do these transnational institutions look like? How do they function? Within what context do they function, if it is not the state and if they extend beyond national borders? By investigating such questions, the ‘transnational Ghanaian networks program’ aims to contribute to understanding the creation and the logics of transnational economic spaces.

Unsettling a national order of things: ‘Voodoo’ in the transnational domain

Studying the ritual and occult practices through which traffickers of young Nigerian girls to the Netherlands control them, enables us to explore different aspects of transnationality. Firstly, it illustrates the complexity of cross-border flows as the trafficking of Nigerian girls extends beyond the borders of nation-states, but remains uncaptured by state regulations, as it tends to produce inchoate spaces that no state is capable of controlling. Secondly, it demonstrates how transnationality can shape identities, formed beyond taxonomic state control through processes that have no clear-cut basis within any given nation-state. Thirdly, we exemplify how transnationality produces transcultural features of social life and practices that can be perceived as ‘cultural’ but nevertheless may not fit the connotations commonly attributed to culture as a territorialized phenomenon.

The sudden discovery of the illegal trafficking of Nigerian girls to work in the Dutch sex-industry and particularly the alleged involvement of occult
religious rituals of an unknown origin – termed ‘voodoo’- in forcing the girls into submission, produced a moral panic (WOCON 2001) and an unprecedented effort in the policing of magic in Dutch society (Van Dijk et al. 1999). In their campaign against child-prostitution, the Dutch police services became confronted with what they believed was ‘African Voodoo’. Ignorant of what it was they were fighting against, the police felt obliged to protect society against this perceived spiritual threat that originated from a ‘dark continent’ and intended to keep Nigerian minors in bondage to the Dutch sex-industry. Once the story was out that the police had created a special taskforce, with the remarkable name ‘Voodoo-team’, the media reacted with a mixture of shock, sensation and sensuality. The apparent enslavement of young Nigerian girls to the sex-industry, primarily through ‘voodoo’ rituals performed on them by their pimps and madams, also deeply alarmed Dutch politics. Its discourse of liberal capitalism, free entrepreneurship, unfettered travel for citizens and permissiveness in public mores was confronted with acute difficulties in exercising stable control over space, time, liberties of sexuality and flows of money, goods and people.

Despite all efforts, the state could not reach a satisfying ‘solution’ to this alleged ‘occult backdoor’ to the fortress that Europe, including the Netherlands, was supposed to be. The basic problem the state faced was that its taxonomy did not ‘reach’ into the intercultural and interstitial domain where the problematic of the manipulation through ‘voodoo’ was played out. The judicial basis for declaring such activities ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ was absent. In this case the police did not know how to ‘label’ the occult practices and could not easily identify a guilty party (the pimps, the witch doctors?).

The concerted police action against traffickers, ‘madams’, pimps and their brothels involved in the exploitation of child prostitutes, revealed unexpected and extraordinary aspects of the predicament of the Nigerian girls: they were for example often found living with what appeared to be deep fears and anxieties about powers of an unknown nature and origin. Some of the girls began referring to particular religious rituals and many asked ‘where is my packet, did you retrieve my packet from my operator?!’ This apparently meant a lot to the girls in view of the rituals they went through in Nigeria and after arrival in the Netherlands.

Almost immediately the term ‘voodoo’ was coined as a way of referring to both the anxieties about supernatural powers the police recorded, the rituals that supposedly had taken place in relationship to the girls’ travel and the packets that seemed to keep the girls in bondage. A small number of girls began co-operating with the police in the investigation of trafficking networks, and could indicate apartments where ‘packets’ had been assembled or were
being kept. The police discovered a number of these small parcels made of unknown objects often wrapped in cloth, and opened them for investigation. Some appeared to contain human-related material: finger- and toenail cuttings, hair-cuttings, underwear, sometimes stained with what appeared to be menstrual blood. Other materials were also found: kola-nuts, pieces of twisted metal, powder and soap.

A doomful and threatening picture began emerging of ‘voodoo’, evidenced by the existence of such packets and by the tormenting fears from which these girls suffered. ‘Voodoo’ became defined as an essential element in how the system was operated by women-traders and traffickers. In a sense it became the ‘rational’ explanation for a great deal of the girls’ ‘irrational’ behaviour. The police and other authorities became highly interested in the details of the girls’ ‘voodoo’ experiences. In some cases they obtained lengthy reports of what they perceived as gruesome acts of swallowing objects, drinking sacrificial blood, pins and puppets, fire and water; in short many aspects of the popular culture imagery of ‘voodoo’.

The images of ‘voodoo’, which provoked the police to give the matter top-priority and to engage in an unprecedented action to police magic and disentangle the sexual exploitation of girls from the threats of African religion, immediately strike us as highly hybrid. They are clearly the result of an intercultural interface where meanings and understandings are produced between members of groups with very different status, cultural backgrounds, competences, expertise and engagements with transnational and transcultural situations. The orientalizing images of the police continuously stumbled into the occidentalizing images of the girls and vice versa, forming a many-layered politics of mystique.

The ‘voodoo’ and the religious system it seemed to represent never ‘touched ground’ in any location around the world: it did not belong to either Dutch or Nigerian religious cultures. Instead, the rituals borrowed elements from a range of religious cultures and images available in Nigeria and the Netherlands. Some elements, such as the eating of Kola-nuts and the use of animals for sacrificial offerings, relate to certain religious practices found in West African cultures, while other elements resemble Hollywood images of Haitian ‘voodoo’ scenes. These frightening images circulate in West Africa as much as they do in the West, and there is a widespread fascination among the West African public for these depictions of the occult and the fantastic. Most of the madams and pimps staging ‘voodoo’ rituals in apartments in the Bijlmer in Amsterdam were part of mixed (Dutch-Nigerian) marriages, which allowed them to combine religious ideas and preconceptions and to construct a form of ritual intimidation that began ‘acting’ as a culture on its own.
The reason why the girls were being intimidated by something that originally does not belong to the religious systems they knew, was that religious practices in Nigeria are never static and always appeal to the incorporation of new and fantastic elements, thereby making for an ever dynamic cultural fabric of rituals that can never be known to all in society at any given point in time. The pimps and madams therefore felt confident in engaging in the kind of ‘culture production’ that they could see going on in Nigeria to serve their interests in a transnational domain.

Hence what we have witnessed here is the construction of a transnational culture that is fully deterritorialized. It once again demonstrates that nations and cultures are not co-terminous. The existence of transnational practices and cultural forms unsettle national projects of identity formation, control and taxonomy, unfortunately this time at the expense of minors certainly in need of protection from a nation-state.

**Doing research in transnational communities: What happens between sites?**

The concept of transnationalism focuses our attention on the cross-border flows of people, goods, money and ideas that link different physical, socio-cultural, economic and political sites. In order to truly grasp these ‘translocal linkages’ (Hannerz 1998: 247), studying transnational communities or networks in single or even multiple localities does not suffice. Developing new research interests and methods *between* and *across* sites is essential. For, how else can we analyse the actual flows and links between places and deal with research subjects’ high mobility?

Transnational anthropology, according to Hannerz (1998:246), is hardly characterised by a distinct set of methodological approaches. Nevertheless, these existing approaches are notably insufficient and various researchers therefore attempt to transcend them. In this exploratory phase, we may recall Paul Stoller’s view that ‘the key to doing research in complex transnational spaces devolves less from methods, multidisciplinary teams, or theoretical frameworks – although these are, of course, important – than from the suppleness of imagination’ (1997: 91).

Technological developments in computer-mediated communication not only support the creation or continuation of transnational communities, but also provide a methodological solution to some of the dilemmas involved in studying them. Firstly, there is the problem of finding an appropriate research site, considering the mobility of research subjects. How for example to keep track of a Somali ‘transnational nomad’ (Horst 2002a) who, in the course of a few months, lives in Australia, visits his relatives in Kenya and the USA, frequently goes to Dubai on business trips and finally decides to leave Australia...
‘permanently’ for the United Arab Emirates? As this is not an uncommon pattern amongst the Somali, even a multi-sited research strategy would not suffice. Secondly, many activities that transnational groups engage in occur between or beyond sites and thus cannot be captured through research in a particular location.

The Internet and e-mail have proven to be essential tools in studying the livelihood strategies of Somali refugees in Kenyan refugee camps (Horst 2002b). Survival in this semi-arid region with limited regional opportunities and insufficient humanitarian aid largely depends on contributions from the diaspora. Thus it became essential to capture not only the views and daily life realities of those in the camps, but also of those they depended on. As these relatives and friends were spread world-wide, fieldwork in single or multiple localities was not sufficient. Methodological alternatives were therefore sought through the Internet. There are at least fifty different Somali Internet sites, forming a popular means of distributing news amongst Somalis and exchanging views on a variety of topics. For many decades, Somali businessmen invested in technologies for communication, transfer and transportation, since the Somali have a long history of migration. After the collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent creation of a substantial Somali Diaspora, these investments have greatly intensified. Internet and e-mail have currently become vital for dispersed Somalis to ‘stay connected’.

In order to access this transnational Somali community, Horst contacted a number of Internet sites, introducing her research in the refugee camps and forwarding some of her work. Somalinet (www.somalinet.com) published a number of reports, and added a ‘Forum Discussion’ where anybody could respond (anonymously or including his/her e-mail) to the writings. Interesting debates followed, to which the researcher also made some contributions, in order to stimulate the debate and ask specific questions. In a few cases, the discussions continued in the less public space of e-mail exchanges. One of those responding was Abukar Rashid, who had participated in the research in the camps and read about it on Somalinet⁶. He wrote an e-mail from Nairobi, while on his way to Canada, from where he later continued the correspondence. On his suggestion, the researcher sent an article on the closure of xawilaad offices in the aftermath of September 11th to Hiiraan.com (www.hiiraan.com), which immediately published it. The responses were overwhelming and more work was published on Hiiraan. This again led a number of qualified and experienced Somali, many of them highly educated and well-placed in their new countries, to show interest in the research.

Internet and e-mail offered a means to use certain ‘traditional’ techniques across transnational sites. Focus group discussions took place on topics that
the researcher suggested, involving Somalis in different continents. Interviews were conducted through e-mail, using questionnaires as well as ‘dialectical dialogues’ (Schrijvers 1991). Through the appearance of writings on Somali Internet sites, an active exchange between the researcher and the Somali diaspora took place, resembling the PRA (Participatory Research and Action) techniques used during fieldwork. This exchange provided the researcher with data in the form of contacts, case descriptions, newspaper articles, websites etc. and with feed-back on the research, while stimulating members of the Somali diaspora to discuss the problematic situation of their community members in the camps and organise fund raisings and project proposals.

Using computer-mediated communication for research amongst transnational groups has a number of advantages. It deals with the problem of high mobility and dispersal amongst these groups and simultaneously offers a space for communication that may engender a greater sense of security than face-to-face encounters do. Moreover, as it leaves the participants’ different backgrounds in terms of class, race, gender or age unclear, these interfere less with the discussions among members of the transnational group and between them and the researcher. This is however also a disadvantage as it makes the provided information difficult to contextualise. It may be assumed that internet users are usually relatively highly educated or young and more often male than female. In terms of their global location, access is far more available in Western countries and in urban spaces. This type of research therefore presents a partial narrative that should always be coupled with actual fieldwork. This partiality is common to transnational research, which always involves a trade-off between dispersion and intensity (Hannerz 1998). Further research to develop the potentials and overcome the pitfalls of the use of the Internet and e-mail as research tools is needed.

Creating comunidad in a transnational context

The research program ‘Livelihoods, international migration and the cultural construction of community in the Peruvian Central Highlands’ investigated the effects of changing patterns of mobility on notions of belonging and community in two different spatial settings: rural squatter settlements in the provincial city of Huancayo, and peasant communities, or comunidades, in the upper highlands. In this paper we focus on the latter. Here large flows of refugees from the rural hinterland to the urban areas had been triggered by the decade of guerilla warfare and generalized violence that preceded our research period (1997 to 2000). International migration, moreover, had also seen a unique increase, unprecedented in the highlands.

The research focused particularly on the impact of transnational flows of
people, commodities, images, and money on local practices and representations of community. A key question was whether community could still be considered in terms of local notions of place, or whether we saw the rise of transnational community, i.e. of community as an imagined and de-territorialized construct or a cultural representation of place migrants and refugees could resort to when talking about home. This was investigated by inquiring into people’s differential involvements in, and attachments to, transnational circuits, networks and communities.

International migration has impacted on sending communities in the upper highlands in contrasting ways. Life-styles, future expectations and consumption patterns have changed and new forms of entrepreneurship, specialising in the recruitment and training of labour for the international market, have arisen. Moreover, attitudes towards formal education have changed dramatically as basic literacy skills, in combination with a diligent demeanour, are considered to offer more opportunities in the international labour market than professions such as engineering and medicine.

In the upper highlands of the Andes, international migration has exacerbated what people experience as a generalized atmosphere of envy and distrust. Witchdoctors particularly diagnose envy as a cause of disease and exorcisation rituals have become quite common among families with migrants abroad. Furthermore, stories abound about the harshness of life abroad and of exploitation by middlemen and patrons, who put migration candidates to work in their own ranches on the Peruvian coast as part of a training programme. Yet the regional economy has received a boost from remittances earned by young men engaged in temporal migration to work as shepherds in cattle ranches in Ohio, Wyoming and Nevada. Shepherds return to their villages to marry and invest in vehicles for public transportation. An interesting result of these contrasting effects of international migration is that people in the highlands have developed strong attachments to the formal structures of the comunidad. Thus, as we will argue, rather than debilitating the peasant community it seems that participation in transnational migrant networks has led to a strengthening of local practices and notions of communal solidarity.

A comunidad is a form of social organization characterized by corporate control of land and other communal resources, the existence of rules and obligations enforced by communal decision-making bodies and, related to this, forms of reciprocal and communal labour (faenas) for the construction and maintenance of roads, irrigation canals, buildings, etc. Membership of the comunidad is open to sons and daughters of comuneros and to related others, provided the Communal Assembly of the comunidad agrees. Prospective comuneros are required to participate in faenas and take an active membership
in local organizations, such as school, sanitation, and irrigation committees. They thereby build up a record of service to the comunidad, by which they become entitled to larger amounts of land during their lifecycle.

In Los Altos Cunas important changes regarding authority relations within the comunidad have occurred during the last decade. A new generation of young comuneros has taken over positions in the Directive Board that is chosen by the Communal Assembly. In the past, only older, experienced comuneros were elected to the Board, after having assumed a series of functions, or cargos, in various committees.

Highlanders have been engaged in different kinds of migration for decades, such as to the mines and, stimulated by government colonization programmes, to the Amazonian jungle. Migration towards the United States, however, has had a different impact as it has confronted comuneros with new notions of labour discipline and economic values. Recruitment takes place through local networks, in which a good standing of the individual and his family is pivotal. Thus every family strives to have one son in the US in order to improve its livelihood possibilities. Migration to the US, however, is anything but pleasant for these shepherds. They resent the impersonality of the work, as well as the lack of comunidad (the parties, rituals, etc.). Yet they are proud of the new experiences they acquire as being part of a transnational community of labourers in the US and see it as a ‘rite of passage’ that enhances their marital prospects back in Usibamba. But the most important factor is the possibility to save enough money to invest in business activities in the Central Andes. Many migrants have returned with considerable savings (between US$ 10,000-15,000), which they usually invest in a small bus or minibus, which therefore now circulate throughout the Altos Cunas region (to which Usibamba belongs). Besides transport, migrants invest in commerce or restaurants, often in the lowland villages.

The expansion of migratory circuits (from the mines to the US cattle ranches) has thus led to the re-functionalization of old migration networks and the establishment of new ones (recruiting, mutual support), in which middlemen occupy nodal points. What however makes this kind of migration different from past forms of circular/temporal/seasonal migration is the sharp disjuncture between life in the United States and life in the comunidades. Conventional migration, to the mines or the Amazon, could be seen as part of processes of regional economic development. As Long and Roberts (1984) argued, the mining economy triggered a complex set of economic linkages between the mines, peasant communities and urban centres through flows of commodities, resources and people, resulting in the formation of a regionalized system of production with a distinct economic and cultural identity. Today, with the
ascendancy of international migration, peasants are simultaneously involved in two different production systems connected through a transnational, rather than a regional, system of production. Transnational livelihoods, in other words, become dependent on the access to wider transnational resource networks and on participation in two different labour regimes, that of the comunidad and that of cattle ranching in the US. Furthermore, peasant livelihoods become transnationalized in the sense that the household ceases to be a unit of production and consumption and becomes dispersed over transnational space.

The comunidad comes to play a key role in shaping these transnational livelihoods because transnational networks are highly dependent on the forms of discipline, solidarity and mutual support that are cultivated within it. We do not wish to idealize the Andean comunidad for, as argued, accusations, envy and distrust are common in the upper highlands. It is not ‘communal values’ that underpin transnational networks in Altos Cunas, but the everyday practices of production of locality (Appadurai 1996), through which the necessary skills and mutual support relations are shaped that are crucial for livelihoods that span both economic activities in the Peruvian highlands and in cattle ranches in the US. Access to the comunidad (and its resources), thus does not only mean access to material resources (land, labor, etc.), but also the reproduction of patterns of reciprocity, mutual support and forms of discipline that are critical for migration and hence shape this type of transnational network.

Conclusion
Transnationalism has attracted a diversity of disciplines and thereby has taken on many meanings. It first emerged to counter migration theories prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s that conceived of the migrant as either integrated within a host country society or, having failed to integrate, as returning to his/her country of origin (Rouse 1995). Transnationalism offered a different way of looking at movement and space. It firstly emphasizes that to understand social phenomena, it is important to consider the relationships and solidarities forged through the flow of people, ideas, goods and financial capital beyond national boundaries. In addition, both as a concept and as a phenomenon, transnationalism indicated spaces that extend beyond the geographical and involve imaginative processes of moving beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and all it may stand for.

In this paper we have focused on a number of aspects of transnationalism that give it substance and set it apart from previous areas of study. We identified three areas in which transnationalism makes a significant contribution. First, it theorizes space in new ways that allows for thinking about the nature of community, identities, and institutions in ways that transcend the nation.
Second, it uses middle-range units of analysis in order to incorporate the fact that villages or nations can no longer be assumed to contain the totality of the phenomenon we wish to study. Finally, given the different conceptualization of space, it asks different research questions about populations that move, than have migration studies, previously. Below these are briefly summarized.

Transnationalism is becoming an important concept because the project of the nation-state is increasingly questioned, as modern communication technologies are making it easier for people, goods, financial capital and ideas to cross national borders. The ability of the state to govern who is a member of a nation and who is not, and what the rules are for living within that nation are increasingly put to the test. As a result of cross-border flows, new social, economic, political and cultural spaces are being created that cannot be superimposed on the geographical space of the nation. Transnationalism thus offers a way to conceptualize and understand these disjointed spaces.

By making flows that transcend national borders central to any investigation, studies on transnationalism draw into question units of analysis that are limited to one geographical area such as the household, defined as those living together, the village or the nation-state. They rather use middle-range concepts such as transnational networks, communities or circuits in which flows that transcend national borders can be traced, followed, and studied.

Finally, the rethinking of space, and hence of the units of analysis appropriate for empirical research, impels us to focus on a different array of research questions than those asked by conventional migration studies. Transnationalism studies go beyond the analysis of the migration process. They focus on the emergence of new forms of community, notions of shared belonging through the work of the imagination, and new, hybrid institutions that emerge when different cultures meet and values are contested.

In the second section we presented areas of study in which transnationalism has had a particular influence. A first section on transnational migrant livelihoods argued that transnational flows lead to economic spaces in which new categories and institutions are created that affect the way people reason and act economically. The focus thus shifts from questions on why people move and how this affects their adaptation to a new place, towards the influence of the transnational economic space on people’s livelihoods in a particular place. In the area of refugee studies this moves us beyond much disputed typologies of international migration, based on push-pull factors and a strict distinction between economic and political migrants, to an emphasis on the connections that all migrants (refugees and non) entertain in order to create their livelihoods.

We also examined the way in which the growing interest for transnational
movements linked with the interest for what is called the deterritorialization of culture, as an orientation and context of identity that can be produced in different places simultaneously. Furthermore, culture came to be understood as constituted by imaginative processes, which often relate to the pursuit of distinct identities and moral codes. Hence, transnationality can produce its own identity markers and cultural forms and practices, which may transcend different boundaries.

Furthermore, we addressed the changing role of the state in transnational space. Rather than uncritically accepting the idea that the state in the era of globalization is withering, it argued that the role of the state in the regulation of transnational flows should be gauged in terms of four state effects: isolation, identification, legibility and spatialization. The discussion on the role of the state, then, is shifted from a preoccupation with its capacity to control people and territory, towards an examination of the social spaces that are constituted through the interaction between state forms of regulation and transnational processes. Such social spaces, subvert territorial and administrative spatial forms, and thus become symptoms of the crisis of the nation-state project. The theoretical question to be posed then is how to conceptualize emergent forms of (trans)-national governance in terms of state effects, and their impact on historic and popular representations of the nation.

In the third section, we presented some examples of research in each of these areas with the intention of highlighting some particular issues related to transnationalism studies. Such as a discussion of the transnational networks of Ghanaian migrants highlighted some of the differences that the study of transnational economic spaces has compared to previous approaches that looked at the economic aspects of migration. It argued that new institutions or previously existing ones take on a transnational character and impact the way economic decisions are made. We described the ‘voodoo’ used on Nigerian prostitutes operating in the Netherlands as an example of how transnationality may produce distinct practices and symbolic meanings that do not have a distinct geographical location. ‘Voodoo’ emerged as a transcultural concept: although the Dutch police and media considered it as something specifically West African, it was actually produced in a transnational interaction between the Netherlands and Nigeria. Furthermore we explored the role of electronic media in getting in touch with a constantly moving population, or one that is spread out across various geographical spaces. Research was presented that challenges us to think of the Internet and e-mail as tools to imagine and experiment with new ways of doing research between and across sites. A final sub-section focused on the temporary migration of Peruvians to work as shepherds in the US, illustrating how Andean people respond to violence, displacement and the crisis of the
Peruvian nation-state by becoming part of global transnational flows. Special attention was given to the reworking of notions of locality and community.

Notes
1. This paper is the outcome of a collective effort of the four authors. Valentina Mazzucato was the convenor and editor. The paper partly reflects discussions held in the CERES Pathways Transnationalism Group composed of: Lenie Brouwer, Rijk van Dijk, Halleh Ghorashi, Cindy Horst, Mirjam Kabki, Ilse van Liempt, Marisha Maas, Valentina Mazzucato, Wil Pannsers, Lothar Smith and Pieter de Vries.
2. There are some notable exceptions such as the Manchester studies of the Copperbelt in southern Africa (Gluckman 1942; Wilson 1941, 1942) in which south – south migration was the focus and in which migration was conceptualized as a circular, back and forth movement.
3. Institutions are defined similarly to Uphoff (1993: 614) as the ‘complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes.’
4. Werbner (1999) takes this one step further, drawing attention to the changing international balance of power and resources, by talking about ‘working class cosmopolitans’. This however still seems rather idealistic.
5. There is an extensive anthropological literature, such as that of for instance renowned authors like Margaret Mead or Ruth Benedict, which would perceive the arrival of objects from elsewhere, but particularly from the West as deeply disturbing, if not endangering, to the kind of primordial cultures they were studying.
6. Names have been changed so as to respect the privacy of informants.

References
Grillo, R. 1998. Transnational (see also postnational)? Paper presented to the Social Anthropology Graduate/Faculty Seminar, University of Sussex.


Wilson, G. 1941. *The economics of detrivalization in Northern Rhodesia*. The Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 5. Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.


Unpacking and re-packing knowledge in development

Kees Jansen

In collaboration Cees Leeuwis, Sunil Mani, Esther Roquas, Margaret Skutsch, and Gerard Verschoor

Introduction
The knowledge issue pervades divergent discourses on poverty and development. According to the opening sentence of the 1998/99 World Development Report, ‘Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in the darkness of poverty – unnecessarily’. For the World Bank, collapsing markets and failures in international competition are rooted in a lack of knowledge. Their widely shared concern is to prepare developing countries for the ‘modern knowledge economy’, particularly now that information technology plays such a large role in restructuring production and distribution processes. It is imagined that if the rapidly widening knowledge gap between developed countries’ cutting edge biotechnology R&D and technologies available to the public sector in developing countries were closed, biotechnology tools applied in national research programmes of developing countries could bring a sustainable solution to world hunger (Rausser, Simon and Ameden 2000; Serageldin and Persley 2000). Introducing biotechnology products, such as transgenic crops, brings up another knowledge issue, namely that of building the scientific and regulatory capacity to implement biosafety measures (UNDP 2001; UNEP/GEF 2002). Likewise, the knowledge-issue emerges in proposals to transfer corporate knowledge management cultures to the field of development (Denning 1998; van der Velden 2002). Knowledge talk even pervades critiques of mainstream development thinking, which explore the role of western science in dominating development processes (Apffel-Marglin 1996), and defend culturally other, lay or indigenous knowledge.

This chapter aims to deepen knowledge talk and challenges both mainstream and critical views on knowledge in development. The three general concerns around which the approaches of the different authors converge,
appear to be crucial for this task.

The first concern is questioning dominant models on the role of knowledge in development. This critical understanding of the construction of knowledge needs to be linked to the question of re-packing interventions in knowledge processes, i.e. to the shaping of alternative practices of knowledge in development.

The second concern addresses the issue of power and inequality. We need to see how inequalities in knowledge add to other inequalities rooted in unequal trade, labour exploitation and colonial rule and are sustained by an interweaving of dominant models of development with certain views on knowledge.

The third concern is the possibility of alternative practices of knowledge in development in the context of globalization. This involves studying collective action around the creation of knowledge. Moreover, it means exploring the possible role of the public sector, both at the national and the international level, in constructing knowledge and providing collective goals in view of dominant ideologies on globalization.

These concerns inform the five cases presented in this paper. We start with a case in which NGO-university networks intervene in local knowledge systems in order to articulate these with the international climate change arena that can, until now exclusively, define ‘good sustainable forestry practices’. The attention then shifts to the case of the contested introduction of genetically modified maize in Mexico, where the monopoly of ‘experts’ in knowledge creation is problematized. The third case calls for more research into the rather hidden work of expert networks advising policy makers in the international setting on the development of standards and regulations for handling new technologies. The fourth case focuses on the consequences of privatization models and the commoditization of knowledge for the quality and accessibility of innovation processes. The final case is inspired by concerns about the lack of investment in R&D in developing countries’ industries resulting from the absence of the necessary state support and proposes research that brings the state back into the process of shaping knowledge for development. In the concluding section, we summarize how these five cases share the same three concerns outlined above. First however, we elaborate more on these concerns.

**Studying knowledge talk**

**BEYOND A (DE)CONSTRUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE**

There is a long tradition of social science theories on knowledge, too vast to summarise here. Our research interest in unpacking the role of knowledge in development draws, as will be discussed, particularly on the ‘social construc-
tion of knowledge approaches’.

The sociology of knowledge sees knowledge, and how it is constituted, as a cultural product shaped by social context and history. Knowledge thus cannot be treated as a thing in itself, as an objective, universally valid body of facts and theories, but must be understood in relation to the social setting in which it originated. This relation between social structures and knowledge systems, has been considered from different perspectives. Karl Marx was mainly concerned with how social relations of production determine ideologies, whereas other approaches (Holzner and Marx 1979) focused on the consequences of knowledge for the encompassing social system. Independent of this controversy on the direction of determination, there has been a general concern with the differential distribution of bodies of knowledge throughout the social structure (Holzner and Marx 1979). Recent research on knowledge construction has however shifted its focus from the study of macro relations to the study of the social context in which knowledge is created at a meso and/or micro level. There is, therefore, growing interest in organizational structures and processes of institutionalization, and in issues of authority, power, and difference (Swidler and Arditi 1994).

Many contributions to the sociology of knowledge criticise positivist social science and the idea that development is simply about applying the right knowledge. From this perspective, recent World Bank efforts to establish itself as a Knowledge Bank and its claim that ‘Typically, developing countries have less ... know-how than industrial countries, and the poor have less than the non-poor’ (World Bank 1998: 1), exhibit the fallacy of treating knowledge as a thing-like entity. So do World Bank representations of development as an issue of narrowing knowledge gaps and addressing the information problems that result from incomplete knowledge about attributes such as the quality of a product, the diligence of a worker, or the creditworthiness of a firm.

But even from within the World Bank, writings have emerged that go beyond the thing-like perspective on knowledge and attempt to situate knowledge in the broader complexities of real life. Stiglitz (1999) for example developed a model of knowledge for development that, he believes, is quite distinct from ‘downloading best practices’. He argues that a body of global knowledge about ‘best practices’ exists and proposes to turn this ‘tacit’ or taken-for-granted knowledge into ‘codified’ knowledge that can be stored in knowledge banks. Local actors could then ‘tap into the reservoir of global codified knowledge’ (1999: 7) and localize the best practice. The model thus involves local experience and tacit knowledge and takes into account complexities, uncertainty, different values and unique circumstances. Stiglitz stresses the importance of involving local actors in building consensus from the multiplicity of values so
that many voices may define knowledge and ‘best practices’. This, however, does not exclude all authority to judge certain kinds of knowledge, as Stiglitz sees a role for the knowledge bank in certifying the credibility of messengers and messages in this ‘noisy world, with many alternative theories vying for centre stage’ (1999: 12).

What connects the diverse critiques of positivist social science, and has filtered through into Stiglitz’ thinking, is the relativization of truth. The certainty of knowledge is no longer seen as deriving from rational first givens or direct empirical experiences (Holzner and Marx 1979) and knowledge is considered within its socio-cultural and historical context. Disconnecting the diverse critiques, particularly since Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) seminal treatise, is however the extent to which social reality is viewed as a construct of our knowledge. Points of debate concern the relativist position, that finds no grounds to assess the ‘truth’ of different knowledge claims and the strict constructivist position that no distinction can be made between ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’. We differ with extreme relativists for we believe the constructedness of realities does not make them less real. And unlike strict constructivists, we think there is a world existing independently of our knowledge of it. At another level of abstraction, knowledge itself is part of that world, and thus a reality that can be reflected upon. In stead of relativity and constructedness, we emphasise the fallibility of knowledge, which makes us wary of simple correspondence of ‘truth’ since ‘the world can only be known under particular descriptions, in terms of available discourses, though it does not follow from this that no description or explanation is better than any other’ (Sayer 2000: 2).²

This implies an emphasis in our research on the relation between knowledge and practice; not only cultural, but also technical practice, needed to transform nature into products for human consumption. The focus in the cases discussed below is, therefore, on knowledge crucial for production and distribution: sustainable forestry, GM maize, regulation of biotechnology, complex farming systems and R&D for innovation in industrial production lines. The cases show that studying such knowledge is not only of concern to scholars of production (engineers) and distribution (economists) but also to scholars of culture and knowledge (philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists). Bringing them together will deepen the debate on knowledge in development.³

In recent studies on knowledge construction, there has been a one-sided emphasis on agency. Therefore, to return structure and time to the analysis, we must also consider evolutionary economics, and particularly its concept of path-dependence (see also Kalb, this volume).⁴ Whereas neoclassical economics reduces firm behaviour to profit maximization and only considers the
effects of technology on production functions, thus making it unable to decide what R&D projects to sponsor (Coombs et al. 1992), evolutionary economics includes an analysis of innovation processes. Technology is no longer seen as an entirely plastic entity shaped at will by the all-knowing hand of market forces. In stead, evolutionary economics postulates that technology development in firms is ‘path-dependent’, related to the cultural matrix of those involved, and steered by a complex selection environment that includes government regulation and institutions such as science and law (Nelson 1995).\(^5\) Like sociological and anthropological approaches that focus on situated knowledge (e.g. Whatmore and Thorne 1997), evolutionary economics focuses on the connections between people, artefacts, and regulatory regimes.\(^6\) The concept of ‘path-dependency’, however, adds a strong recognition of time and other constraints on change; what is imaginable through our knowledge and realisable through our practice is shaped by existing circumstances, transmitted from the past (Marx 1995).

A culturalist critique of ‘knowledge for development’ thus needs to move beyond the pure constructivist analysis of knowledge and address the question of reconstruction: of how to work with knowledge. People must establish which knowledge is more practical or ‘true’. This may include, in particular instances, the replacement or even exclusion of other, older knowledge for new, scientific knowledge that is better suited (Collins and Evans 2002). Not all knowledge is equally true, as its use in real life proves. We thus reject an ‘anything goes’ relativism. Thinking about knowledge implies thinking about intervening in concrete practices. The cases below do not only unpack knowledge interventions but also consider how to re-pack them. We should not see development interventions \textit{a priori} as constraining and dominating processes, but ask questions about the content of the knowledge that is being generated, applied, transferred, and collected – or neglected – and about who is involved in, or excluded from, certain knowledge processes. This brings us to the issue of power and cognitive justice.

\section*{Broadening Cognitive Justice}

The debates in development studies around power and knowledge generally revolve around contrasting knowledge claims and differences between knowledge systems, i.e. expert versus lay, and Western versus local knowledge. Since the 1980s and 1990s, local knowledge has become of great interest, sustained by three different perspectives (Jansen 1998). The utilitarian approach underlines local knowledge as a contribution to methods on development interventions: blending local with scientific knowledge could discover new ways of enhancing livelihoods (cf. Warren 1991). A utilitarian such as Agrawal, for
example, argues that before initiating ‘processes of truth-making’ and adding local knowledge into the category of ‘indigenous knowledge’ in knowledge databases, its potential utility for development should first be scientifically validated (Agarwal 2002: 292).

The anti-modernist view, in contrast, believes the utilitarian perspective will only understand what it can translate while in fact it is impossible to disentangle the technical, social, religious, aesthetic, and other characteristics of local knowledge (Banuri and Apffel-Marglin 1993; Apffel-Marglin 1996). This approach criticizes the universal pretensions of modern thought and takes local knowledge as an inspiration to decolonize our minds and abandon the Cartesian route to development by overcoming the separations of mind and body, subject and object and culture and nature.

The political economy view, however, rejects these romantic or preservationist views on local knowledge. It does not criticize modernization as such but only specific forms of modernization. It appeals to local knowledge as a source of political-economic empowerment (e.g. Thrupp 1989) and warns for overstating the uniqueness of local knowledge and taking a dichotomized, universal-versus-local view on knowledge. Local knowledge is namely in itself often differentiated and partial, and interweaves, hybridizes, and creolizes continuously with exogenous knowledge. One cannot assume a fixed boundary between locality and context (Jansen 1998). The difference between scientific and lay/local thought is often only gradual – both use experiments, logic, and causal thinking, as well as metaphors and associational thinking – and it follows that knowledge interventions could well address both domains of knowledge. The argument against privileging scientific thought is thus also an argument against privileging local knowledge.

A first implication of this third perspective is that the study of the knowledge of common people, such as small farmers, should always be interconnected with the study of the shaping of knowledge in large scale organizations, such as national and transnational firms, the state and international agencies. A second implication is that alternative development need not be preservationist and will often involve the appropriation of exogenous knowledge from dominant actor-networks.

Important in both the anti-modernist view and the political economy view is the issue of cognitive justice. Cognitive justice, as defined by Visvanathan (2001: 8), refers to ‘the right of many forms of knowledge to exist because all knowledges are ... partial and complementary and because they contain incommensurable insights’. Therefore, no knowledge should be labelled secondary and museumized. The concept of cognitive justice thus locates the problem of power at a much deeper level than that of the unequal access to knowl-
edge stocks observed by World Bank staff (World Bank 1998). For ‘to define knowledge as formal, abstractable knowledge is to impoverish knowledge and to deny the existence of tacit, embodied and, alternative knowledges’ (Visvanathan 2001: 6).

We believe the issue of cognitive justice belongs to the core of development studies. But, in contrast to Visvanathan’s argument, our emphasis is less on the epistemological status of specific bodies of knowledge or on their plurality and co-existence. For it is not enough to let all voices speak. Knowledge struggles continue, whether under the flag of consensus or confrontation. Cognitive justice is therefore, in our perspective, basically about politics, interests, and rights. This brings us to our next concern.

**Keeping development in focus in the age of ‘globalization’ and ‘governance’**

While the need for public action to achieve cognitive justice, despite or rather because of globalizing complexities, is pressing, the public production of knowledge for development is increasingly under attack. One sort of critique emerges from the criticism of Development as an outdated, modernist concept. As Pansters and Siebers mention, in Dutch development studies many authors firstly deplore ‘the fact that the concept of development has become closely linked to an evolutionary way of thinking in which so-called developing countries would have to go the same development path as the so-called developed world’, and secondly reject the notion ‘that social reality can be constructed and modified according to intentional and rational standards’ (Pansters & Siebers 2001: 2-3). Our research however is informed by a third dimension of development, as recognised by Pansters and Siebers (2001), namely its potential to point out pressing needs arising from inequality and environmental threats.

This dimension of development emerged from the conviction of the post-World-war moral community that the alleviation of poverty would not occur simply through self-regulating processes of economic growth or social change but required concerted intervention (Cooper & Packard 1997). The concept has been crucial for rethinking unequal relationships in the era of decolonization, for demanding a larger share of the world’s resources for the poorest countries without compromising their sovereignty, and for envisioning alternatives to present realities at the local and global level. Although aspects of control and domination are not absent from the development discourse, it simultaneously generates a demand for decency and equity. ‘Development’ can be an instrument for contestation and people can engage with it in ‘more varied and complex forms than acquiescence or resistance’ (Cooper and Packard 1997: 30). Moreover, it has the critical potential to search for alternatives to the anarchy
of the market by calling for collective action to address ‘unequal distributions across and within countries’ (cf. World Bank 1998: 1). Even in its most market-glorifying versions ‘development’ is about public action. At stake is, therefore, keeping development in focus, particularly in a time when the discourse of ‘globalization’ naturalises polarising economic processes as inevitable phenomena to which people, cultures, and politics can only adapt.

In this context, the concept of ‘governance’ has become increasingly popular for it is seen as the instrument to incorporate the poor and marginalised into globalization processes whose new complexities otherwise may lead to social disorder and catastrophes (see Kalb, this volume). The appeal of ‘governance’ is that it poses an alternative to both the government and the market and the idea that these two can compensate for each other’s failures. ‘Goverance’ does not refer to simple steering but to designing new forms of governing that overcome market and government failures through an interplay between active citizens, the state and private partners. The state has lost its monopoly to lay down the rules and enforce them: rules now have to be negotiated, meaning that input in policy formulation and implementation will have to come from a wide range of stakeholders (Jessop 2003). As Jessop however points out, there are also various sources of governance failure. Governance is not the answer to government failure: market failure, government failure and governance failure will persist and provoke questions about what to do (see Nuijten et al., this volume).

We therefore make two critical observations regarding ‘governance’. Firstly, leaving aside the discussion about the most realistic or desirable governance-government combinations, we think that an intervention in knowledge processes in the name of development should always rethink the issue of politics, and thus think about differences, resources, power, control and conflict, and about what kind of state operation is most desirable. The question of what the state bureaucracy should look like, should not be thrown out with the governance bathwater. The public sector remains a crucial and contested terrain to be studied and ‘intervened in’ by those who question current social relationships and the present distribution of wealth, resources, and opportunities.

Secondly, a proper understanding of knowledge in development requires the study of both old and new forms of government and governance intervention in knowledge processes and the interaction between them. Because development is a contingent, contextualized and changing process, the connections and disconnections made by multiple actors require our research attention. In an idealized model of knowledge intervention in the policy making process, each group of actors had its own knowledge base and differentiated role: politicians provided for the needs of the people and businesses and in case of
insufficient information called in experts to advise them. Today, however, most people no longer accept this ideal model. Different lobbying groups now press their case and call into question the ‘facts’ presented by others, challenging the ‘established’ knowledge base. It is now common to believe that experts are in cahoots with business or are called in to legitimize decisions already made by politicians who do not have the real interests of the people at heart.

Whether or not this is true is beside the point: the point is rather that people, businesses and interest groups all possess different information. They try to inject not just their values but also their ‘truth’ into the system at different points, using their own knowledge base and, increasingly, their understanding of other groups’ norms and knowledge bases. Social scientists have argued that knowledge of all these groups is socially constructed. But actually everyone basically knows this. Few people believe in universal, unbiased truths or simply respect ‘experts’ when it comes to knowledge inputs into the policy making process.

The research lines summarized below thus also take this third general concern into account and explore the new forms of connections between various actor networks and the way they change interventions in the creation, transfer, adaptation, and hybridization of knowledge.

**Examples of research into knowledge in development**

**CASE 1. CONNECTING LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS: COMMUNITY BASED SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT AND THE KYOTO PROCESS**

*Rationale*
This case examines knowledge relationships in the formulation of international policy and particularly the potential inclusion of sustainable forest management (SFM) as a Clean Development Mechanism within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. The hypothesis is that the influence of indigenous and other local level knowledge on this kind of policy may be enhanced by packaging such knowledge in ‘hi-tech’ forms, i.e. electronically, so that it can be appreciated by the relevant political fora and the epistemic communities advising them. The research aims to construct knowledge interventions and develop local capacity to gain access to finance under the climate change treaties for community based SFM activities.

These activities recently emerged, independently of their carbon saving function, as a means of reversing the degradation of natural forests in developing countries while simultaneously providing local communities with greater income (Smith and Scherr 2002). State owned natural forest is contracted out
to local communities, which then have exclusive rights to harvest products under a management plan that balances the rate of harvesting and natural regeneration. The long term impacts of SFM programmes, and their success in terms of forest health and the distribution of benefits, need further study. But at present many professionals find it a cost effective and ‘fairer’ model for forest management and considerably increased sequestration of carbon. Still, this type of forest management, unlike the creation of ‘carbon sinks’ by new forest plantations, has not been accepted under the Clean Development Mechanism rules of the Kyoto Protocol. If it were, large amounts of funding would become available for community based SFM and many poor rural people would be able to ‘harvest’ carbon alongside traditional forest products such as fuel wood.

At present, international climate funds are overwhelmingly spent on large scale industrial projects in developing countries, bypassing the vast majority of the population. Moreover, although climate change policy is made internationally, the interests of the South are underrepresented, partly because of imbalances of knowledge concerning the policy process. This research aims to address these inequalities by facilitating the link between ‘the people’, in this case the marginalized rural populations in developing countries, and ‘policy-makers’ and ‘experts’.

Local knowledge of forest management is seen in this research both as utilitarian (Warren 1991) and as a source of political-economic empowerment for common people (Thrupp 1989). This research should also, however, be relevant in changing international climate policy so that it becomes more beneficial to marginalized rural people in developing countries. And, at another level, it will examine the more general issue of how the ‘development machine’ operates – on the basis of whose knowledge and constructed in what way. This case thus also offers an examination of the perceived ‘powerlessness’ of local knowledge confronted with ‘modern, scientific’ knowledge, and of the danger of the appropriation of local knowledge by the scientific community (Agrawal 1995).

Contributions to rethinking knowledge in development
This research intends to contribute to linking local actors and global actors in new ways by examining the issue at hand from different levels. At the local level, research will be undertaken in communities undertaking SFM under a variety of schemes. The aim will be to measure the sustainability of their activities and to assess the carbon that is saved. Working with groups backstopping SFM activity at the grassroots level, experiments will be conducted to assess the extent to which local communities are able to use hi-tech methods such as lap-top based Geographical Information Systems (GIS), sequential photo series and a variety of electronic visualization techniques to record the carbon balance...
of their activities. Use of such technology by local communities is developing rapidly, as are participatory applications using hand-held computers in land, watershed, and forest management. It will be important to keep in mind that knowledge, and its translation via such media, may not be universal and may be ‘captured’ by some groups such as village elites or NGOs.

At the policy making level, the processes underlying the decision to exclude SFM, but to include afforestation/reforestation under the Clean Development Mechanism, will be analysed to understand what factors were taken into consideration, by whom, and why. The policy was heavily influenced by ‘independent’ experts from an advisory body to the UNFCCC: the Land Use, Land Change and Forestry Commission. The simple hypothesis is that SFM was rejected on technical grounds because the carbon sequestered by SFM is difficult to monitor as the creation of a baseline is problematic and the risks of loss of forest due to other human uses is higher than in afforestation projects. There may also however be more political reasons for the decision. An analysis of the decision could throw light on the base, ownership and form of the knowledge that affected the policy outcome.

An important factor, at a third level, is that representation of Southern interests in international policy development is limited by power imbalances and a lack of information (Gupta 1997). Research will therefore explore how the designated authorities in developing countries engage in climate change policy development, what their knowledge of the technical and political issues is, and how they bring this across. It is hypothesized that increased visibility of the benefits of SFM, through data storage and presentation in electronic form, will increase not only local authorities’ interest in SFM as a viable carbon approach, but also, more importantly, their leverage in accessing funds, and thus the regularity with which this strategy is advanced in the international debate.

CASE 2. CONTESTING THE TRICKLE DOWN MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC INFLUENCE:
GM MAIZE IN MEXICO

Rationale
Scientific knowledge may be directly related to large-scale interventions in a country’s economy and society. In order to explore this relationship, we use the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the ensuing release of genetically manipulated maize in Mexico.

A series of controversies about the possible effects of NAFTA emerged in Mexico, the U.S. and Canada in 1994. Pressure groups and politicians fiercely tried to convince each other of either the negative consequences or the positive spin-offs. No solutions pleased all and ‘experts’ were flown in to settle
the thorny issues. From their respective disciplines, econometrists, lawyers, agronomists and engineers confidently produced rational solutions and advice on future courses of action. Most experts advocated laissez-faire, whereas some recommended temporary protection of vulnerable economic activities such as maize production. Policy makers took up the latter cluster of recommendations. When NAFTA came into being in 1994, Mexican farmers would enjoy protection from cheap US maize through import tariffs that would last until 2008 – time enough, experts argued, for Mexican peasants to modernize their farms and prepare for open competition. In a classic showcase of autocratic power, however, Mexico never levied any tariffs on imported maize.

In 1996, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) allowed American farmers to produce and export genetically modified (GM) maize and it soon found its way into Mexico, evoking fears about genetic contamination of local varieties. Again, the issue was hotly debated. Geneticists then settled the controversy by ‘proving’ that genetic modification is harmless. And again, a decision was taken on the basis of this knowledge as Mexican authorities approved importation. As a trade-off, the strict condition was posed that the GM maize could be used for consumption purposes only. Eventually, however, most assumptions underlying scientists’ solutions proved incorrect. By 1998 the domestic price for corn had fallen to a mere 45 per cent of pre-NAFTA levels, a large part of Mexico’s 3.2 million small-scale farmers was bankrupt, and foreign multinational companies captured 25 per cent of the Mexican maize market. To make things worse, regulatory frameworks failed and by 1999 farmers all over Mexico were sowing GM corn, which resulted in horizontal gene transfer to local maize varieties.

This case points to the close relationship between scientific knowledge and large-scale interventions. The decision to release GM maize, we hypothesize, was taken on the basis of knowledge produced by a few and used by still fewer to intervene in a controversial situation that affected many: a paradigm case of the so-called ‘trickle down’ model of scientific knowledge and influence, which works as follows. First, decision-makers turn to scientific experts, who ‘frame’ the problem so that it is made calculable, manageable, reduced. Then, the problem is taken to the laboratory where, through an appeal to positivist, scientific methods, knowledge is produced. Finally, the answers are ‘scaled-up’ by politicians, economists or captains of industry. In this ‘trickle down’ model of scientific influence, knowledge emerges from the lab and is then passed on to society at large.

*Contributions to rethinking knowledge in development*

Taking decisions on the basis of the ‘trickle down’ model raises a range of
problems to be studied. First there is the problem of framing. In the ‘trickle down’ model, complex problems are framed to make them fit within the laboratory walls. The walls however have moved outwards as econometrists, geneticists and lawyers depend on peasant households, maize fields and MNCs for their data. These situations may be described as ‘collective experiments’ (Latour 1999) wherein a variety of dissimilar actors, from the laboratory to the consumer, become progressively entangled. Reducing the controversy around the release of GM maize to its ‘scientific essence’ is futile, quite simply because the controversy is simultaneously a political question, a moral exercise and a scientific experiment.

Secondly, there is the dilemma of scaling up. In the ‘trickle down’ model, scaling up solutions to complex problems is tricky because they grow out of laboratory experiments, from simplification mechanisms that ‘seek to tame the many erratically changing variables that exist in the wild world, keeping some stable and simply excluding others from the argument’ (Law and Mol 2002: 2). The problem is that what was not foreseen is likely to happen anyway.

A third problem relates to morality. Since Bacon and Descartes, the public can accept or reject experts’ knowledge, but it can certainly not add to it, dispute it, let alone contribute to its elaboration. In the ‘trickle down’ model knowledge is unequally distributed. This is particularly problematic in cases with high moral and political content, such as genetic modification. As Latour (1999: 243) argues, ‘if there is one thing that does not require an expert and cannot be taken out of the hands of [the lay people], it is deciding what is right and wrong, what is good and bad.’ Expert knowledge may effectively shortcut political process and keep the crowds at bay, but it cannot solve normative issues.

Therefore, nothing could be more inadequate for designing collective experiments than the ‘trickle down’ model of knowledge with its two clearly separated forums, one of scientists bringing piecemeal solutions to complex problems and the other of lay persons waiting for the experts’ advice. This old difference that separated ‘true’ knowledge from passions and interests has eroded, giving way for what Callon, Law, and Rip (1986) coin a ‘hybrid forum’. In a single, hybrid forum both experts and non-experts actively participate in debates, tests and attempts at interpretation – in short, in experimentation and collective learning. In these hybrid forums everything becomes controversial (Callon 1998). Thus in the example of GM maize a single, hybrid forum includes multinational companies, national and international environmental NGO’s, local agricultural associations, indigenous groups, universities and research centres, religious organizations, consumers, and ministries, who all put forward potentially incompatible definitions of the situation and proposed
solutions – thus indicating the absence of a stabilized, central knowledge base that may help to reach consensus. The actors do not necessarily attack pre-existing knowledge, and may coincide on a number of issues, such as ‘maize is the backbone of the peasant economy’ or that ‘nearly 70 per cent of farmers cultivate native or criollo varieties’. Yet on other issues opinions differ sharply: indigenous communities consider corn to be at the heart of their culture whilst for DuPont maize is a commodity just like any other; NGO’s appeal to precautionary principles to which Mexico subscribed by signing the Convention of Biological Diversity yet scientific articles demonstrate the safety of GM-maize. The list of controversial issues is huge and growing as more and more actors become involved.

Collective experiments have moved outside the walls of the laboratory and become increasingly democratized as certain actors refuse to swallow ‘expert advice’ and fight for their voice to be heard. Thus we will study the emergence of social movements challenging the introduction of GM-maize such as organized producers of organic maize, hundreds of tortillerías that sell only certified organic produce, or consumer associations who turn their back on US maize. Each of these movements frames the controversy differently, has specific demands, and employs the necessary tactics. The knowledge that emerges thus coincides with the constitution of alternative collective identities that in turn help shape the rules of using scientific knowledge.

CASE 3. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SCIENCE-POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE MODELLING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Rationale
Biotechnology arouses heated debates, increasingly also in developing countries. Technological uncertainties, potentially high risks for biosafety and human health, ethics, and economic interests in high investments and projected future profits, all invoke demands for regulation. Experts play a central role in making this regulation and international organizations such as the FAO, WHO, and UNEP continuously set up expert advisory committees around controversial technical issues to generate cognitive consensus, codified in laws, standards, guidelines and best practices. Some major concerns warrant more research into the hidden role of international expertise networks operating in plant biotechnology regulation. The models, standards and guidelines that international expert committees design for application in developing countries are not simple translations of technical arguments into policy advice but are laden with norms, beliefs, assumptions and notions of validity of the supposedly ‘neutral’ experts. In fact, expert committees exist not so much for their scientific value as for their political and regulatory value in legitimizing political
decisions through seemingly neutral, independent statements of truth.

A redefined version of the concept of ‘epistemic community’ is relevant here. The concept refers to a nation-wide or worldwide group of professionals with recognized competence and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within a certain domain (Haas 1992). Such increasingly international expert communities articulate cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, help states to identify their interests, frame the collective debate, propose specific policies, and identify points for negotiation. The process of consensus construction in epistemic communities however needs to be explained rather than presumed (Grundmann 1996), and the unqualified separation of reason from social processes needs to be disrupted. Therefore we must examine the influence of ideological frameworks on the content of knowledge generated by international epistemic communities, whose members’ views are conditioned by the institutions in which they work.

Our central premise is that these international epistemic communities differ from circles of policymakers in their arguments, authority structures and discursive styles. Epistemic communities are neither purely political or purely scientific groups. They have the specific task to order, select and filter information, and to develop system knowledge rather than scientific knowledge: they produce policy recommendations rather than proposals for new research or scientifically interesting, but policy irrelevant knowledge. This inherent tension between science and politics, make epistemic communities a special social category.

A second concern about the increasing role of international epistemic communities in modelling biotechnology regulation is the unequal participation of developed and developing countries in generating cognitive consensus and setting standards. At international meetings, delegations from developing countries are relatively small, but influence is also unequal as economic interests and the use of hegemonic power affect the agenda, operation and the status of advisory groups. The process whereby a certain view becomes dominant is complex and not necessarily a direct result of hegemonic international relations, corporate interests or similar external forces. We hypothesize that a complex combination of internal and external factors and processes determine the outcome of expert networks. This demands careful empirical study. Ultimately, we doubt whether through epistemic communities ‘reason’ may defeat economic interests in policymaking (Grundmann 1996).

Contributions to rethinking knowledge in development
The research contributes to rethinking four thorny issues. The first concerns capacity building. Proposals to develop biotechnology in developing countries
often ignore the dilemmas between ‘doing things right’ along predefined scientific standards, and exploring new avenues of ‘doing the right thing’. The chance of escaping conventional thinking is low, since available knowledge will define what kind of new expertise is wanted. Much work needs to be done if one assumes that the escape from underdevelopment needs unconventional thinking and authentic R&D and that expert formation should be about social learning around local problems rather than capacity building along dominant models.

A second issue concerns the tensions between standardization and harmonization on the one hand, and heterogeneity and complexity on the other. Expert formation by international organizations is driven by a universalizing science and the internationalization of epistemic communities tends to enforce harmonized standards. However, national political, economic, and social conditions and specific ecological and technical environments tend to be diverse, heterogeneous and complex. ‘Doing things right’ emphasizes a universally applicable science and harmonized standards while ‘doing the right thing’ emphasizes contextualizing standards and allowing for locally specific trajectories. Interesting is how international expertise deals with specific contexts when building science-based universal guidelines, that in turn need to be translated to the specific conditions of individual developing countries.

A third issue concerns the production of consensus. Does consensus result from rational argument or imposed compromise? How is consensus achieved among divided perspectives? The ideal type epistemic community as defined by Haas (1992) supposes that scientists and technologists come to a consensus by virtue of their scientific and technical knowledge rather than as representatives of certain organizations or countries. But reaching scientific consensus may be difficult or impossible because of scientific uncertainties, and often external forces influence consensus making. Detailed empirical research can unravel how consensus building or hegemonic knowledge construction takes place. Challenges are firstly to analytically disarticulate the technical from the political (Collins and Evans 2002) and secondly to overcome reductionist versions of political economy, social constructivism, and positivist science, which respectively prioritize external power struggles, prioritize internal power struggles, or disregard power completely. This last point may sound like a regression, a technocratic response to the mess of political interests. However, our view on knowledge by definition excludes the possibility of technocracy. Any proposal for technology development is laden with judgements, and is thus political. This observation, however, does not mean better knowledge is not possible or should not inform decision-making.

The fourth issue concerns the legitimacy of technical decisions in a field
where science and politics intersect. One could propose experts’ recommendations to be accountable only to peer review, i.e. to other experts who decide whether the arguments are sound, valid, and based on substantial evidence. In contrast, one could also propose democratic evaluation of expert recommendations with participation of all groups in society. The first view implies a technocratic view on policy advice; the latter a politicization of epistemic communities and expert knowledge. We start from an agnostic position towards this technocracy versus politicization problem, allowing us to study how it is solved in concrete situations.

CASE 4. COMMODITIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF (MULTI-STAKEHOLDER?) INNOVATION PROCESSES

Rationale
The privatization of agricultural extension services, driven by dominant ideas on globalization and governance (see Kalb; Nuyten et al., both this volume), impinges on innovation processes. ‘Agricultural extension’, an institutionalized form of knowledge intervention for agricultural development, was until the 1980’s mainly studied to predict and influence the adoption of innovations by individual farmers (see Rogers 1983). However, the tendency among extension institutions of indiscriminately promoting badly adapted and pre-defined innovations, often developed by researchers with little understanding of farmers’ problems and priorities (Röling 1988), has lately given rise to a considerable amount of critical thinking in extension studies and to radical changes in extension theory. The very idea of what constitutes an innovation and how it is brought about has changed dramatically. Innovations are now not just a technical phenomenon, but also include a re-organization of social relationships. This implies that ‘adoption’ is a collective rather than an individual phenomenon, thus requiring co-ordinated action. ‘Successful’ innovations, moreover, develop in a non-linear manner and depend on the integration of knowledge from various sources, whereby science often plays a relatively minor role. Innovation processes are, furthermore, political in nature, often involving tension, conflict and unequal division of resources among stakeholders. Conceptions regarding the possible role(s) of the ‘extensionist’ or ‘change agent’ have changed. While previously they had to ‘provide advice’ or ‘disseminate innovations’, they must now facilitate the design of well-adapted socio-technical innovations, i.e. their role is to support multi-stakeholder processes of network building, social learning and conflict management to arrive at novel social and technical arrangements (Leeuwis and Pyburn 2002).

Within this changed perspective on ‘agricultural extension’, the privatization of agricultural extension and the commoditization of knowledge is criti-
cally assessed. The reasons for governments to stimulate the development of markets for agricultural knowledge and information include dissatisfaction with the functioning of agricultural extension, budget constraints, structural adjustment policies, and reduced public support for subsidizing the agricultural sector (Leeuwis 2000). Policy makers increasingly believe market mechanisms can be applied to ‘knowledge intervention’. Even if many governments still fund extension activities, the ‘delivery’ is increasingly contracted out to private companies (Marsh and Pannel 1998, Umali and Schwarz 1994). And although agricultural research is rarely fully privatized, applied and strategic agricultural research institutes are becoming independent organizations competing, through the tendering system, in a ‘market’ for research outputs. ‘Input’ financing is thus replaced by ‘output’ financing. Together, these tendencies form the contours of a newly emerging market for applied agricultural knowledge and information.

Creating a market implies organizing excludability of others from the marketed product in order to assign it with the necessary property rights and price (Umali and Schwarz 1994). This raises questions about the consequences of the ‘commoditization of knowledge’ on access to knowledge and information, i.e. how does substitution, exclusion and relocation occur for different categories of actors?

Contributions to rethinking knowledge in development
Several studies have already suggested that the focus of extension and applied research is likely to shift to well-resourced clients (Marsh and Pannel 1998). It has however hardly been studied how the commoditization of knowledge affects the dynamics of innovation processes, e.g. in terms of network building, social learning and conflict management. Assuming that innovation processes demand creative and flexible co-operation within knowledge networks (Van Schoubroeck 1999), preliminary studies suggest that several obstacles for such co-operation exist in the emerging knowledge markets (Leeuwis 2000). Firstly, it has become more difficult to work on things that cannot in advance be assigned the clear ‘product’ definition that tendering procedures require, thus limiting the horizon, flexibility and creativity of innovation processes and reducing the scope for taking on board learning experiences and intuitions. Moreover, co-operation between applied research and extension is hindered by competition for resources and contracts, and disagreement on payments. Similarly, the reduced exchange of free knowledge and information among parties in the network, including reduced horizontal exchange among farmers, may hamper the formulation of well-articulated collective ‘demands’ for research and extension (Oerlemans et al. 1997). The availability of applied research for
primary agriculture is also under threat due to shifting client perceptions and
increased bureaucracy and transaction costs (Marsh and Pannell 1998).

It turns out that the idea that applied agricultural knowledge can be treat-
ed as a private and/or toll good, may only be valid in the case of ‘proven’ and
easily adaptable innovations that are already available. The overall impression
is that ‘knowledge markets’ complicate the very processes necessary to arrive
at such ‘proven’ innovations, because commoditization of knowledge leads to
interaction patterns that hinder flexible cooperation and creativity. The notions
of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ are often not applicable to innovation processes.
In the discourse on privatization, the ‘demand’ side is mostly associated with
users of knowledge (farmers) while the suppliers are supposedly the develop-
ers (researchers) and transmitters of knowledge (extension agents). Thus, the
metaphor of supply and demand reintroduces the earlier abandoned idea of
a clear division of tasks between the three parties. In an effective innovation
process it tends to be unclear who ‘supplies’ and who ‘demands’ knowledge
and information, as successful innovation requires the integration of relevant,
often intangible, knowledge from several parties. This means that it is inher-
ently unclear who should be paying whom in a multi-party innovation process.
Consequently, a market does not seem the right institutional arrangement for
bringing about innovation.

The overall innovative capacity of agrarian knowledge networks may suf-
fer from the commoditization of knowledge, particularly for forms of agricul-
ture that are least amenable to standardized recipes, and on which relatively
little knowledge is available. This includes forms of agriculture that aspire or
are ‘forced’ to work with few external inputs and/or with limited means to con-
roll the environment, such as ecological or rain-fed agriculture, requiring com-
plex, diverse and locally specific knowledge and innovations (Leeuwis 2000).
Therefore, more systematic research into the changing dynamics of innovation
processes in a context of privatization is necessary, also from a perspective of
developing the appropriate responses and more suitable institutional arrange-
ments to facilitate innovation.

Case 5. The role of the state in generating knowledge in developing countries

Rationale
The production of goods and services necessarily depends on the use of
knowledge. The knowledge intensity of production has increased manifold
in the last two decades, clearly indicated by the increased share of traded
knowledge intensive products (Mani 2000). The production and export of these
products also takes place in developing countries, though with a considerable
concentration of it in a few Asian countries.
Knowledge underlying production, whether industrial or non-industrial, can be formal or non-formal. We however only consider the first type. Even in freely competitive markets, there are a number of disincentives to the creation of formalized knowledge. This raises the question of whether there are reasons to defend state support for formal knowledge creation, especially within industrial enterprises in developing countries.

Though of great importance, the role of state intervention in the generation of knowledge has received little attention. The only major attempt has been by the World Bank (1998), whose study emphasized the role of the state in developing countries, but interpreted it narrowly as freeing up trade and investment regimes through international trade in commodities and in capital. Very little empirical evidence, however, supports the idea that formalized industrial knowledge can be obtained through free trade. Rather, this type of very location-specific knowledge will have to be created locally through the right types of institutions and incentive systems. More research into the main theoretical and empirical reasons for public intervention in knowledge creation is necessary.

Contributions to rethinking knowledge in development
A first issue is whether there is a theoretical rationale for state interventions in industry-linked R&D in developing countries. We believe these reasons are the two types of ‘market failure’ that exist in R&D financing by private sector agents.

The first type of failure happens when the investor that performs R&D also finances it. This failure is captured in the so-called ‘appropriability’ argument: R&D investments result in the production of new knowledge that is non-rival in its use and can therefore, despite the existence of intellectual property right mechanisms, be imitated by competitor firms at lower costs than the costs of creating it from scratch. The failure results from the failure to appropriate the full returns of own research. The gap existing between private and social rates of return for certain innovations, justifies public policy measures to combat possible underinvestment in R&D by private sector agents. These public policy measures include fiscal incentives for R&D, research grants, strengthening of the intellectual property regime and financing of research partnerships.

The second type of failure exists when the innovation investor has to seek funding from an external financier. Here, a second gap exists, between the private rate of return and the cost of capital. Conventional capital markets, whether based on debt or equity, eschew innovation projects as their outputs are uncertain and unpredictable. To correct for this failure, specialized financial institutions, such as venture capital institutions, have been established, usually
with state support.

Apart from these two theoretical arguments, current research has also found several empirical reasons justifying state intervention, particularly in the context of firms operating in developing countries. One is that especially since the mid 1980’s, there is a slowing down of investments in R&D by business enterprises, accompanied by a reduction of its funding by governments, across the world. There is, moreover, little evidence of internationalization of R&D: most US patents granted to the world’s largest companies are still based on research conducted in their home countries (Patel and Vega 1998). In addition, there are growing imperfections in the market for new, disembodied technologies, which shows considerable year-to-year fluctuations and is actually shrinking in size. Increasingly, technologies are transferred to developing countries not through the market but through internal transfers between the parent firm and affiliates of large TNC’s and through foreign direct investment. Here there is, however, little empirical evidence of positive spillovers to local, unaffiliated companies. In those countries, like Singapore, where there are positive spillovers, these are the direct result of explicit, ingenious public policies. In sum, the globalization of technology generally affects developing countries only in an insignificant manner, if at all, and the market for technology is shrinking and not very competitive.

Our recent and ongoing research (Mani 2002) suggests that developing countries need their own public innovation policies and we believe, in conflict with currently dominant discourses, that it is important to rethink the public instruments and institutions that encourage knowledge creation at the firm level. Here it is particularly important to keep in mind differences between developing countries for these can be significant. This is already revealed through a simple indicator such as the issue of US patents to particular countries: of all developing countries, only eleven received US patents (Mani 2002).

The differences between countries affect their definition and scope for state intervention. The widely cited pieces of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) assume that formalized knowledge is only created through the R&D efforts of firms and research institutes. Undeniably, however, knowledge is also created through a variety of non-R&D routes. In some developing countries, the main medium for knowledge creation is through formalized R&D activities within industrial enterprises or in research institutes, whereas in other countries firms and institutes can generate knowledge through a variety of non-R&D channels, such as the installation of new vintages of capital goods and the consequent information provided by suppliers. Understanding these differences leads to better informed choices for state action. In the first group of countries, state intervention would best take the form of financial incentives such as tax credits
and research grants targeted at raising R&D investments at the firm level. In
the second group, the preferred policy would include grants and concessional
loans for acquiring new technologies from other firms and institutions and
changing these technologies to suit local conditions. Such strategies have to
be balanced with the need for public expenditure to sustain a critical mass of
scientists and engineers.

There are thus various theoretical and empirical grounds justifying further
research on state involvement in supporting R&D. The possibility of govern-
ment failure does not relieve us from the task, obvious to anyone who takes
seriously the right of developing countries to develop their own industries, to
debate how governments should compensate for market failure in this field of
knowledge in development.

Conclusions
This chapter sketched the broad contours of a research framework on knowl-
edge in development that builds on a fruitful exchange of ideas between
different research programmes. The first shared concern was how to unpack
both knowledge in development and interventions in knowledge processes
by different actors. The five cases go beyond simple descriptions of access
and issues of distribution and redistribution of knowledge as a thing that you
can have or not have. They underline the importance of zooming in on the
social shaping of knowledge and access to knowledge. Moreover, they see
knowledge in terms of processes and relationships and try to understand how
knowledge is embedded in its social and political-economic historical context.
To some degree, all five research trajectories also intend to analyse how and
why certain knowledge is constructed, analysing how certain models, classifi-
cations, and ideas about knowledge in development processes are presented
as inevitable ‘facts’ (Hacking 1999). For example, they intend to understand
how certain theories about the need for privatization and withdrawal of the
state from investing in R&D or extension services contrast with everyday
dynamics of innovation processes and extension. Three of the cases underline
the importance of unpacking the role of expertise through problematizing the
‘trickle down’ model of scientific biotechnology knowledge and the monopoly
of ‘experts’ in defining collective action, criticizing the criteria for eligibility of
forestry projects within the various treaties in the international climate change
process, analysing how certain principles about risk assessment become domi-
nant, unravelling who becomes involved in advisory groups and why, and
identifying the possible consequences for the knowledge constructed after
such processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Typically, the research trajectories are not restricted to closed knowledge
systems and do not separate local knowledge from external knowledge. In each case there is a focus on controversies about knowledge in the light of social, economic, and political shifts, that can be labelled under the term ‘globalization’: the problem of connecting forestry communities to international organizations that dominate the definition of policy models on climate change and the codification of knowledge required to participate in the decision making process; the controversial role of science supporting large-scale technological interventions based on the free trade idiom; the obfuscated internationalization of science-policy interactions to model regulation for developing countries; and the consequences of the privatization ideology on state support for R&D in firms and for communication and innovation in the agricultural sector. The cases study the new connections and disconnections that result from these contemporary political processes.

A second concern, emerging from the unpacking of knowledge processes, is the issue of power and inequality, linking the observation of differential access to knowledge to a more profound analysis of inequality, asymmetrical power relations, and conflict. The privatization of extension services may increase selectivity within privatized knowledge networks: both research and extension tend to be directed towards more resourceful clients. Commoditization of knowledge seems to go along with arrangements that obstruct participation of farmers and industrial firms in developing countries in innovation processes, which is likely to reduce innovative capacity. Moreover, it may also pose constraints for public agencies such as extension organizations, research institutes, and regulatory agencies, to take on new roles and mandates that are more in line with both new societal challenges and conceptual understanding of innovation processes. Several of the research programmes focus on the framing of problems by experts and politicians and how this disenfranchises the non-experts and makes them invisible. Expertise creates legitimacy and authority to intervene. The question has been raised whether local knowledge should be trusted by the international community. This is a question of knowledge content and skills, but also of reliability and susceptibility to cheating. Privatization, the commoditization of knowledge, and the framing of the problems by international expertise networks may increase North-South inequalities: firms from the South cannot innovate to be competitive, experts from the North define what are important risks, the needs of resource-poor farmers are not addressed by the research and extension systems, local forestry communities are excluded from decision making about forestry projects, and so on. This may also enlarge tensions and conflicts within Southern societies, for example, between resource-rich industrial agriculture and resource-poor farmers, between national firms and subsidiaries of transnational corporations.
and between experts and lay persons.

Inequality, asymmetrical power relations and domination are, however, contested. Poor farmers, lay people, and national firms frame the problems in their own terms and contest the privatization of extension systems, the expert definitions of risks and sustainable forestry, and the protection of transnational corporations and producers in the North through a lopsided application of the ‘free market’ ideology. Contestations over power in knowledge shaping are not only situated at a highly subtle, almost abstract epistemological level but are also a day to day affair, present in making choices, taking positions, and acting.

This points to the third shared concern. The research programmes all intend to contribute to a re-packing of knowledge interventions in order to address inequalities. It is not possible to stand on the sideline as neutral observers and interpreters. Within a power-laden domain, certain theories and practices have to be supported or alternative actions imagined and initiated. These research programmes therefore aim to formulate policy alternatives which redress the negative consequences of current forms of privatization, commoditization of knowledge, domination of international expertise networks by a few countries, commercial forces and dominant models in carbon saving projects. Most do not see a post-modern, fragmented world, where the dominant approach to knowledge is inescapable, but a complex world where contestation and negotiation include making alliances, realizing small improvements, and playing at fields traced out by powerful players. One programme advocates a new role for extensionists as facilitators of processes of learning. It not only aims at an alternative process of knowledge generation and transfer, but also at alternative knowledge, about more complex farming systems such as ecological agriculture. Other programmes also aim for specific alternatives: biosafety regulation which is tailor-made to variations in local ecological and socio-economic conditions, criteria for carbon saving which include sustainable forestry by local communities, criteria for defining when state action is needed to support firm investment in technology innovation, and imaginations of maize not only as a commodity but also as a cultural element. All the research programmes reconstruct the need for a greater level of public responsibility in dealing with issues pertaining to knowledge and innovation. Collective action in the public sphere, using both government and governance instruments, is needed more than ever to address inequalities in knowledge issues. We thus believe that cognitive justice, in its broader definition, should be a core concern of development studies.
Notes

1. Kees Jansen is connected to the Technology and Agrarian Development group, Wageningen University (corresponding author: kees.jansen@wur.nl; Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands); Cees Leeuwis is part of the Communication and Innovation Studies group, Wageningen University; Sunil Mani is linked to the United Nations University/Institute for New Technologies in Maastricht; Esther Roquas is co-ordinator for CERES at Wageningen University; Margaret Skutsch is connected to the Technology and Development Group, University of Twente; and Gerard Verschoor is part of the Rural Development Sociology group, Wageningen University. The authors are grateful to Bert Helmsing for his comments on an earlier version of this paper (the usual disclaimer applies).

2. ‘If the world itself was a product or a construction of our knowledge, then our knowledge would surely be infallible, for how could we ever be mistaken about anything?’ (Sayer 2000: 2).

3. Our interest in new knowledge, technological change, and innovation differs from the current interest in the ‘knowledge society’ and ‘technological culture’. Rapid and substantial changes take place due to new information and communication technologies, but this does not imply that knowledge and technology determine social relationships and social change in a qualitatively different way than in the past. Technology and knowledge have always been central elements of society. They are not exclusive characteristics of advanced, modern, or post-modern societies. The concepts of knowledge society and technological culture are in this sense misleading and ethnocentric. They tend to privilege certain forms of knowledge over others, and may ignore the social, economic, and political conditions that create dominance of one knowledge system over others as well as inequalities in access to specific kinds of knowledge. Hence, research on, for example, local forestry practices or industrial assembly lines is as ‘modern’ as research on Geographical Information Systems, telecom sectors, and biotechnology.

4. Within anthropology, the neo-Durkheimian grid-group cultural theory has actively kept the idea of meanings embedded in structures and social groups central to anthropological thinking (e.g. Milton 1996; Richards 2004).

5. This idea of ‘cultural matrix’ has many similarities to the notion of ‘thought styles’ or ‘cultural bias’ as developed by the neo-Durkheiman grid-group cultural theory (Douglas and Ney 1998; Schwarz and Thompson 1990); see the preceding note.

6. The attention that evolutionary economics pays to actors’ expectations, uncertainties in the process of technological change, and to the idea that an economic calculation of technology decisions can only be made ex-post, brings it close to sociological questioning of technological change. For the remaining differences between these approaches see MacKenzie (1992).

7. Some other early contributions from the Netherlands to this critique of ‘development’ are Nederveen Pieterse (1991), Long and Long (1992), Schuurman (1992), and Slater (1992).

8. Cooper and Packard (1997: 30) make an important observation about one problematic aspect of the development construct. ‘The power of the development construct lay [sic] in its rejection of the past and its aspirations for the future rather than its capacity to address the complexities and the possibilities that lay within ongoing processes.’ Both hegemonic views on development as well as subaltern views may overlook this element of ‘development’.

9. A series of ten in depth case studies in Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, Mali, Nepal and India is planned.
References


Index

access to a loan, 59
access to resources, 5, 53, 59, 60, 90, 98, 99
accountability, 5, 106, 114, 115, 124, 129, 130, 143
accounting, 14, 46
activation programmes, 65
actor-oriented approach, 4, 26, 52
actor-structure dilemma, 54
adaptability, 64, 66
adjacency pairs, 123
advice, 65, 174–176, 179
Afghanistan, 23, 34
Age of Revolutions, 10
aggregation, 69
agricultural extension services, 179, 180, 189, 190
agricultural knowledge, 180, 181
agricultural work, 66
agriculture, 27, 40, 65, 71, 127, 174, 181, 186, 188, 190
airplanes, 131
alienation, 10, 99
alleviation of poverty, 169
alternative social structures, 1
Amnesty International, 14
Andes, 27, 41, 49, 74, 154, 155
anger, 26, 68
anonimizing, 10
antagonism, 76, 118
anti-globalism, 18, 39, 40, 45, 92–94
anti-modernist view, 168
APEC, 14, 19
Argentina, 12, 27, 39
ASEAN, 14, 38
assimilation, 140
assistance in times of need, 58
associational activities, 104
asymmetrical power relations, 8, 92, 95, 99, 185, 186
A-synchronies, 97
atomic energy, 14
atomization, 81
Australia, 24, 151, 189
Austria, 18, 22
authoritarian regimes, 10
autonomista/autonomen, 35
autonomous municipality, 107, 108, 114
aviation, 14
balanced approach, see eclectic approach,
Balkans, 24, 41, 44
Bangladesh, 135
banking supervision, 14
belonging, 7, 25, 88, 93, 133, 153, 157
benevolent dictatorship, 125
best practices, 165, 166, 176
bilateralism, 36
biological versus social positions, 76
biotechnology, 163, 166, 176, 177, 184, 187, 189
blue collar workers, 15
Bolivia, 27, 73, 92–95, 114, 129
Bolivian Andes, 49, 74
bound cultural wholes, 140
Bosnia, 17, 159
bottom-up control, 114
boundary construction, 89
Brazil, 16, 21, 39, 40, 86, 87, 102
breadwinner, 64
Breton Woods system, 1, 36
burnout, 88
Burundi, 140
Cameroon, 85, 89, 101
capabilities approach, 52
capacity building, 114, 177, 178
capitalism/capitalist, 1, 2, 9, 10, 12–14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 30, 32, 33, 35–37, 44, 47, 77, 79, 98, 101, 128, 132, 149, 161
capitalist accumulation, 77
capturing livelihoods over space and time, 55
cartesian approach, 177, 168
casino-capitalism, 23
casualized proletarian labor, 30
causal links, 26
causes of poverty, 53, 60
celebrations, 99, 133
Central Africa, 25
Central Asia, 26, 31
Central Europe, 16, 43
CERES research school, 2, 43, 71, 72, 75, 130, 159, 187, 189
chain migration, 132
characteristics of households, 64
child welfare, 115, 120, 129
child welfare policies, 120
China, 16, 19, 21, 24, 27, 31–33, 40, 44, 45
chosen traumas, 24
circular migration, 132
citizenship, 41, 104, 106, 128, 143, 160
citizenship rights, 143, 144
civic cooperation, 106
civic empowerment, 23
civic organizations, 6
civil servants, 110, 121, 122, 127
civil society on a world scale, 9
civil war, 25, 44, 59
claims to governance, 108
clash of civilizations, 9, 12
class formation, 43, 77
class struggles, 77
classical imperialism theories, 36
classical migration studies, 133
clean development mechanisms, 171–173
clients, 62, 91, 109, 115, 120–122, 180, 185
climate, 4, 54, 56, 164, 171–173, 184, 185, 188
closed populations, 41
coca cultivation, 94
cognitive justice, 8, 167–169, 186
cohesion, 28, 39, 77, 78, 81, 82, 95
collective identities, 78, 80, 88, 95, 97, 176
cold war, 5, 9, 23, 33
collaborative governance, 14, 19, 64
collaborative identities, 78, 80, 88, 95, 97, 176
collusion and war, 3
communal solidarity, 62
common sense knowledge, 62
communication technology, 14, 49, 64
compositional identities, 7
corruption, 6, 131, 151, 153, 173
cost of class, 76, 77, 79
cost of culture, 5, 77, 79, 80
cost of identity formation, 5, 75–80, 92, 97, 101
cost of society, 77–79
cosmopolitan governance, 14, 15, 45
creation of knowledge, 164
crime, 23
cross-border flows, 134, 139, 148, 151, 157
cross-boundary flows, 139
cultural closure, 3, 23, 24
cosmopolitan citizenship, 139
cultural differences, 1, 89, 100, 101
cultural dimensions, 4, 100, 159
cultural fundamentalism, 5
cultural hybridity, 141
cultural orientation, 5, 81, 84, 92
cultural reorientation, 135, 142
cultural self-identification, 96
cultural studies, 4, 97, 118, 139, 141, 142
cultural understandings, 56, 72, 122
cultural uniqueness, 96
cultural values, 68
culture production, 151
culture talk, 12, 24
Czech Republic, 20
danger, 59, 90, 99, 109, 115, 118, 124, 172
degradation, 49
debt collection devices, 2, 28, 43
debt crisis, 1
debt peonage, 37, 41
decentralisation, 6, 104, 106–109, 114, 128
decentralisation processes, 104
decision-making, 8, 57, 64, 67, 72, 105–107, 109, 114–116, 138, 154, 178, 185
decision-making agencies, 8
decision-making process, 57, 107, 185
decolonization, 1, 168, 169, 188
deliverance capacity, 113
democracy, 9, 10, 16–18, 26, 37, 38, 43–45, 47, 106, 110, 112, 113, 116, 124, 127, 129
democratization, 10, 15, 16, 25, 45, 107–109, 113, 114, 125, 176
Denmark, 22
de-peasantization, 40
dependent children, 64
deploying different activities, 65
de-policisation, 44, 118, 124, 128
deregulation, 38, 104
descent, 85
deterministic conceptions, 78
determinantalization, 140, 151, 158, 159
de-territorialized process, 134
development of identity, 84
development machine, 1, 172
development studies, 2, 4, 45, 104, 106, 113, 128, 167, 169, 186
developmentalism, 3, 10, 37, 189
DFID definitions, 56
DFID rural livelihoods framework, 53, 56, 68, 69, 71, 72
diachronic dynamics, 66
diagnostic events, 69
dialectical dialogues, 153
diaspora, 25, 32, 33, 47, 137–140, 152, 153, 160, 162
differentiation, 79, 81, 83, 85–88, 91–93, 95, 101
discontinuous change, 12
discordant, 79
discourses, 24, 61, 80–84, 89–92, 96, 98, 114, 115, 120, 121, 163, 166, 183
disjointed livelihoods, 139
distribution of technology, 7
divergences of capitalism, 1
dominant actor-networks, 117, 168
dominant cultural schemes, 77
domination, 6, 10, 78, 79, 124, 169, 186
drugs, 14, 23
dynamics, 3, 11, 12, 24, 46, 50, 55, 66, 69, 73, 77, 83, 88, 90, 91, 99, 120, 132, 179–181, 184, 188
East Asia, 5, 12, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 47, 135
East Timor, 17
ecclectic approach, 76, 83
ecological degradation, 4
ecological disaster, 49
economic actions, 65, 72, 146
economic adversity, 49
economic behaviour, 65, 139, 146
economic crisis, 27, 59, 127
economic decision-making, 138
economic linkages, 155
economic globalization, 142
economic growth, 19, 27, 31, 32, 46, 49, 169
economic migrants, 137, 147, 159
economically rational actors, 68
education, 17, 19, 25, 40, 78, 91, 108, 121, 131, 154, 188
effects of poverty, 60
egalitarians, 118
Egypt, 24
elementary entities, 82
emancipatory action, 54
embeddedness of identity formations, 4
empire formation, 36
empirical practice, 117
employability, 63
employment, 22, 28, 61, 63, 67, 71, 72, 74, 133
employment within developed country, 133
empowerment, 23, 114–116, 124, 168, 172, 190
enclave approach, 110
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical Information Systems (GIS)</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22, 44, 73, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>135, 141, 146–148, 158, 161, 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gift giving</td>
<td>58, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalising livelihoods</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalising networks</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalization processes</td>
<td>3, 50, 54, 67, 106, 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalization theory</td>
<td>10–14, 16, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalizers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global capital flows</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global centres</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global cities</td>
<td>15, 21, 46, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global civil society</td>
<td>2, 6, 14, 15, 17, 23, 38, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global climate change</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global connectedness</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global connectivity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global consciousness</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global consumerism</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global development machine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global economic relationships</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global flows</td>
<td>7, 19, 25, 80, 92, 95, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global governance</td>
<td>2, 9, 16, 28, 37, 38, 43, 127, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global identifications</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global integration</td>
<td>19, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global interdependence</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Justice Movement</td>
<td>18, 29, 34, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global knowledge</td>
<td>165, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global knowledge systems</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global-local conflicts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global logics</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global market</td>
<td>15, 16, 20, 24, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global marketization</td>
<td>20, 24, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global migration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global modernity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global patterns of governance</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global political fashions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global processes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global political relationships</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global theatre</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global trade</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalist mechanics</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goal-oriented activities</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good governance</td>
<td>5, 17, 28, 103, 110–114, 121, 124, 125, 127, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good identity</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governability</td>
<td>105, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance</td>
<td>2, 3, 5–7, 9, 14–17, 22, 28, 37, 38, 45, 46, 99, 101, 103–114, 116–121, 123–130, 142–146, 158, 169, 170, 179, 186, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance approach</td>
<td>111, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance changes</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance failure</td>
<td>129, 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance problems</td>
<td>109, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance processes</td>
<td>107, 113, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance structure</td>
<td>37, 110, 119, 143, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governing capacity</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governing practices</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government failure</td>
<td>170, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governmental institutions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gramsci</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grand narratives</td>
<td>14, 26, 85, 89, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great globalization debate</td>
<td>9, 12, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>24, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group formation</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group identifications</td>
<td>88, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>growth</td>
<td>12–14, 17, 19, 21, 27, 29–33, 45, 46, 49, 71, 72, 115, 127, 141, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>habitus</strong>, 64, 84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harmonization</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>health</td>
<td>14, 40, 56, 57, 108, 146, 148, 172, 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hedge funds and derivatives</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic groups</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic international relations</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic knowledge construction</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic meanings</td>
<td>91, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic outcomes</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic power</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic processes</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic project</td>
<td>95, 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemonic structures</td>
<td>79, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemony</td>
<td>11, 36, 38, 39, 79, 82, 89, 90, 92, 95, 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki process</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hermeneutic action</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hermeneutic traders</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heterogeneity</td>
<td>122, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchically networked social change</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchism/hierarchists</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high real interest rates</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>historical systems</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>homo economicus</em>, 54, 63, 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homogeneity</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>homo honoris</em>, 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household</td>
<td>30, 33, 40, 43, 46, 54, 60, 64, 65, 68, 73, 86, 87, 91, 120, 137, 139, 156, 157, 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household cohesion</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household’s livelihood</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household sphere</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human agency</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
human capability, 54, 73
human centredness, 50, 51
humanitarian issues, 14
human mobility, 131
human rights, 13–15, 44, 73, 106, 113, 136
Human Rights Watch, 14
human suffering, 54
hybrid forum, 175
hybrid identities, 7
hybrid institutions, 133, 157
hybridity, 19, 26, 141
hybridization of knowledge, 171

ideas, 4, 7, 38, 50–55, 70, 77, 79, 88, 118, 126, 131–
133, 138, 139, 143, 148, 150, 151, 156, 157, 179, 184
identification, 4, 5, 7, 8, 75, 76, 79, 81–83, 85–99,
101, 144, 154
identification struggles, 93, 94
identity creation, 135, 140, 142
delimitation, 97
document, 78
documentation, 4–7, 63, 75–80, 82–85, 88, 91,
92, 97–99, 151
identity of one’s own, 95
identity politics, 5, 76, 79, 95–99, 141, 147
identity regimes, 5
identity stories, 85
identity traits, 78
ideology, 2, 27, 28, 34, 46, 124, 141, 142, 185, 186
illness, 59, 90
image of self, 89
imagination of alterity, 141
immigrant adaptation, 133
imperialism, 20, 33–38, 44–46
implications of migration, 106
inclusion, 50, 55, 61–63, 74, 98, 99, 106, 115, 171,
184
income, 16, 21, 23, 28–33, 43, 46, 47, 56–60, 64,
128, 139, 171
income failure, 59
increased migration, 40
index of cultural globalization, 15
India, 24, 25, 31, 32, 40, 106, 130, 187
indigenous knowledge, 163, 168, 188, 190
individual cells, 65
individuality, 78, 82, 88, 89
individualization, 81

Indonesia, 24, 26, 32, 58, 73
industrial interests, 39
industrialization, 10, 16, 21, 22, 33, 43, 47, 89
inequality, 3–5, 8, 23, 28–33, 43, 46, 47, 56–60, 64,
128, 139, 171
infant mortality rate, 54
informalization of markets, 40
information, 7, 10, 44, 57, 59, 65, 66, 71, 79, 100,
114, 115, 120, 132, 153, 163, 165, 171–173, 177,
180, 181, 183, 187, 189, 190
innovation processes, 164, 167, 179–181, 184, 185
institutional communication, 115, 120
insecure environment, 67
insecurity, 4, 55–58, 60, 66, 71, 72, 74, 110, 127
insider/outsider cleavages, 24
insider contracts, 39
institutionalism/institutionalist, 3, 17, 19, 23, 26–29,
31, 33, 38–40, 90, 104, 108, 114
institutionalized discourses, 90
instruction, 78, 84, 90, 120
instrumental action, 54
instrumentalist approach, 109
instrumentalist concept, 109
instrumentalist perspectives, 109
insurance, 14, 15, 21, 58, 59, 73, 146, 148
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM),
116, 117
integration, 79
integration, 6, 19–22, 54, 58, 61, 76, 77, 81, 96, 101,
102, 137, 179, 181
integration into world markets, 54
intention, 68, 78, 95, 115, 141, 158, 169
intercultural interface, 150
inter-cultural tolerance, 145
inter-elite rivalries, 10
inter-imperialist confrontation, 39
inter-imperialist rivalries, 10
inter-imperialist war, 35
internal difference, 79, 95
internal migration, 31
internal sameness, 79
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 14
International Criminal Court, 13, 14
international inequality, 3
international investment, 4
international migration, 132, 136, 137, 153, 154,
157, 160–162
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1, 2, 5, 6, 14,
25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 37–39, 52, 93, 95, 106, 110, 111,
113
International NGOs, 13, 15
interrelations, 81–83
Iraq, 34, 39
Ireland, 15
Islamist attacks, 9, 12
Islamist movements, 89
Italy, 24, 137, 161
male-chauvinist, 23
managing conflicts, 118
many-sided identities, 78
Maoism-communism, 33
maps, 83, 142
marginalisation, 21, 61–63, 73, 90, 106, 114, 170, 172
market failure, 20, 170, 182, 184, 188
market fetishism, 10
marketization, 17, 20, 21, 24, 28, 31, 33, 37
market liberals, 16–18, 28, 29, 34
martial and spectator sports, 23
Marx, 10, 37, 165–167, 188, 189
Marxism/Marxist, 2, 27, 35, 36, 76, 189
mass fascinations, 9
mass political action, 10
meaning of different variables, 56
mechanisms of support, 60
Medecins Sans Frontieres, 14
media-space, 133
memory, 45, 84, 140, 142, 161
mercantilism, 1
micro-economic insights, 55
micro-level governance, 121
Middle East, 5, 24, 31
migration, 2, 5, 7, 21, 24, 31, 40, 46, 47, 64, 65, 73, 131–133, 135, 136, 138–143, 152–162
migration studies, 131, 133, 138, 139, 157, 159, 161, 162
militarism, 12, 36, 39
militarization of social economies, 35
misfortune, 59, 60
mobile funds, 16
mobile livelihoods, 135, 136, 138
mobilisation, 22, 25, 26, 35, 40, 104
mobility, 65, 131, 136, 139, 151, 153, 161
modern imperialism, 35
modernity in one country, 1
monetization, 30
money, 7, 30, 43, 59, 61, 65, 91, 131–133, 137–139, 148, 149, 151, 154, 155, 161
monopolisation, 15, 21, 26, 125, 164, 170, 184
moral underclass discourse (MUD), 61
multicultural, 5, 97, 99, 100, 141
multiculturalism, 80, 89, 96, 101, 142, 145, 161
multicultural societies, 5, 97, 99, 141
multidimensional, 49, 52, 61, 63–67
multidimensional livelihoods, 66
multidimensionality, 52, 66
multilateral institutions, 14
multi-level governance, 116
multi-local families, 132
multi-local livelihoods, 66
multi-locality, 50, 55, 64, 65, 67
multinationals, 4, 15, 174, 175
multinational corporations, 15
multiple identities, 78, 85, 86
multiple stakeholders, 117
multiplicity, 67, 79, 81, 99, 144, 146, 165
multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), 116–118
municipal governments, 107, 109, 114
mutual funds, 12, 15
mutual support, 135, 155, 156
myths, 13, 24, 45, 160
narrative(s) of self, 5, 8, 75, 81–85, 99
national budgets, 22, 112
national community, 7, 26, 46, 89, 133–137, 140, 145, 146, 151, 154, 155, 159, 161, 185
national cultural heritage, 145
national identity, 96, 132, 140, 144, 161
nationalism/nationalist, 3, 7, 14, 23, 25, 26, 40, 47, 89, 96, 99, 100, 131–146, 151, 156–162, 189
nationalist polarization, 99
nationality, 81, 85, 140, 148, 158
nation-states, 7, 10, 19, 46, 106, 131–135, 139, 142, 143, 148, 151, 156–159, 161
NATO, 14, 39
nearness, 58, 94
negative politeness, 123
neighbourhood, 58, 60, 86, 91, 147
neighbours, 59
neo-colonialism, 5
neo-liberals, 3, 13
neo-liberal free market, 13
neo-liberal globalization, 4–6, 24, 32, 36, 143
neo-liberal imperialism, 37, 38
neoliberal market, 23
neo-liberal world empire, 11
neo-liberalism, 14, 37, 44, 93–95, 129
neo-Marxist approaches, 76
networked artisan-intellectuals, 35
networking, 66, 106
scientific knowledge, 62, 111, 167, 172–174, 176, 177, 188
Second World War, 1, 37
Second World Water Forum (2000), 116
sedentarization, 136
sedentary livelihoods, 136
self-enclosure, 97–99
self-identity, 84, 85, 101, 145
self-perception, 88
self-realisation, 140
self-referential identifications, 87
self-referential image, 88
self-referential sense, 88
self-righteousness, 97
semi-arid regions, 56, 71, 74, 138, 152
sense and performance, 78
sense of responsibility, 68
sequence organisation, 123
sequencing, 17
sex, 40, 52, 71, 74, 75, 78, 85, 91, 143, 148–150, 160
shaping knowledge for development, 164
shared ethnicity, 58
shared occupation, 58
short term lending, 15
significance of households, 64
Singapore, 20, 183
situated knowledge, 167
skeptics, 18–20, 33
social and economic contexts, 75, 184
social and economic developments, 109
social and economic entities, 4
social and economic outcomes, 21
social and political change, 119
social and political outcomes, 21
social and political processes, 105, 106
social and political spaces, 133
social and political struggle, 10
socialism/socialist, 1, 12–14, 16, 17, 23–26, 29, 32, 37, 45, 47, 93, 105
socialism in one country, 1
social and cultural activities, 136
social and cultural bonds, 54
social and cultural conditions, 84
social and cultural context, 122
social and cultural space, 3
social assistance, 59
social behaviour, 65
social capital, 67
social change, 2, 9, 12, 22, 45, 46, 85, 169, 187
social constructivism, 178
social dilemmas, 117
social embeddedness, 55, 78
social exclusion, 4, 50, 55, 60–63, 66, 67, 72
social frameworks, 68
social groups, 15, 58, 60, 65, 187
social imperialism, 36
social inclusion, 55
social institutions, 65, 69
social integrationist discourse (SID), 61
social issues, 14, 39
social mobilizations, 40
social policy interventions, 62
social policy reforms, 63
social policy research, 18, 64
social policy standards, 22
social policy structures, 22
social processes, 66, 161, 177
social reality, 50, 62, 69, 81, 127, 166, 169
social relations, 30, 37, 59, 64, 65, 84, 125, 131, 134, 142, 165, 170, 179, 187
social science research, 62, 63, 129
social security, 4, 49, 50, 55, 58, 60, 66, 67, 71–74, 110, 160
social security mechanisms, 49, 73
social struggles, 22, 144
social transformation, 38, 89, 123
social vulnerability, 63
sociality, 40
societal developments, 80
societal discourse, 82, 84, 89, 90
socio-economic processes, 119
sociology, 4, 12, 18, 19, 44, 46, 55–57, 72, 76, 77, 79, 85, 89, 103, 128, 130, 135, 158, 165–167, 187–190
sociology of knowledge, 12, 165, 188, 190
sodality, 40
soft power, 34, 36
soil conditions, 56
soil fertility, 57
sources of livelihood, 40, 60
South Africa, 24, 39, 40, 45
Southeast Asia, 5, 16, 135
South Korea, 16, 20, 43
south – north migration, 135
south – south focus, 135
space of flows, 15, 19, 134
Spain, 24
spatial contradictions, 1
spatial relationships, 3
specific interactions, 77
spreading activities, 65
stability, 58, 60, 64
stabilization, 17, 28, 143
stakeholder dialogue, 116–118
transnational migrant networks, 154
transnational migrants, 35, 135, 141, 154, 157
transnational networks, 7, 54, 132, 139, 146, 147, 156–158, 161
transnational phenomena, 132, 134, 135
transnational social space, 144
transnationalism, 3, 7, 25, 47, 131–142, 144–146, 151, 156–162
transnationalism research, 133–135, 144
transparency, 5, 110, 114
Transparency International, 14
transportation technology, 64
trickle down, 20, 21, 29, 30, 173–175, 184
turbulence, 1, 10, 34
turn taking, 122, 123, 130
unbounding, 141
undocumented migrants, 147
unequal access to resources, 5, 53
unequal power relations, 53
unequal trade, 164
unified social and cultural space, 3
uniformity, 77
union membership, 65
United Arab Emirates, 152
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 171, 173
United Kingdom (UK), 2, 22, 23, 28, 61
United Nations (UN), 1, 6, 13, 29, 34, 38, 39, 44
UNCED, 116
UNHCR, 14, 160
United States of America (US), 12, 13, 18–20, 22, 23, 25, 27–30, 34, 38–40, 44, 155, 156, 158, 159, 174, 176, 183
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), 174
urban governance, 105
urbanization, 31, 110
utilitarian approach, 167
utilitarian perspective, 168
variability of rainfall, 56
variations in cropping patterns, 56
Venezuela, 27
versatility of livelihoods, 55
Vietnam, 21
village-based institutions, 54
village communities, 134, 148
village membership, 65
volatility, 55, 66
volkswirtschaftliche conceptions, 3
voodoo, 135, 146, 148–150, 158, 162
vulnerability, 4, 56, 57, 59, 60, 63, 71

Wars, 24, 34, 36, 128
Washington consensus, 13, 17, 23, 28, 31, 34, 47, 92, 189
water management, 118
weak ties, 65, 66, 72
wealth-sharhing, 54
welfare independence, 63
West Asia, 5, 24
West Bank, 25
Western modernity, 9
wholeness, 79, 85–87, 99, 100
workplace hierarchy, 91
World Bank (WB), 1, 14, 16, 17, 27, 29–33, 37, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 105, 106, 110–113, 121–123, 128, 130, 163, 165, 170, 182, 188, 190
World Economic Forum, 38
World Social Forum, 18, 44, 46
World Trade Organization (WTO), 14, 38
xenophobia, 26, 139, 141, 144
xenophobic closure, 26
Yugoslavia, 25, 26, 44
Zimbabwe, 26

hobic closure, 26
Yugoslavia, 25, 26, 44
Zimbabwe, 26