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THE LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS DEBATES

In the Senatorial Campaign of 1858 in Illinois, between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Arnold Douglas; containing also Lincoln's Address at Cooper Institute

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PREFACE

In his "Twenty Years of Congress," James G. Blaine characterizes the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 as "a discussion which at the time was so interesting as to enchain the attention of a nation, in its immediate effect so striking as to effect the organization of parties, in its subsequent effect so powerful as to change the fate of millions." But both as historical documents and as masterpieces of the art of debate they are little known by the present generation. The editor of these selections has prepared them for the sake of their indisputable value in both respects. As a teacher of argumentation he has felt the lack of available material illustrative of the thrust-and-parry of actual debate, and designs this volume to supply what is almost a total deficiency among edited specimens of argument.

Of the seven joint debates of the campaign the speeches in three are printed entire—those in the debates at Freeport, at Galesburgh, and at Alton; being the second, fifth, and seventh of the series. They took place before audiences ranging in political sympathy from a strongly preponderant abolition sentiment at Freeport, to an equally preponderant pro-slavery sentiment at Alton. Their subject matter includes all the essential issues of the cam-
paign. But though the subject matter of one debate is broadly similar to that of the others, their very repetitions before audiences of widely differing temperament afford a rare opportunity for the study of persuasive adaptation, as well as for observing the development of the central issue, and the growth of Lincoln’s power in debate under the stress of the campaign. The debate at Ottawa, the first of the series, and one of those most frequently quoted, the editor has chosen to omit, as being in his opinion one of the least definite in its presentation of the essential issues. The debates selected are prefaced by Lincoln’s speech of June 16, 1858, at Springfield, Illinois, with which he opened the campaign; and supplemented by the famous Cooper Institute address of February 25, 1860, as Lincoln’s ultimate and perfected statement of the anti-slavery argument.

The annotation seeks to make clear, without the necessity of further historical reference, the meaning and significance of the political and the personal elements in the debates; it also correlates recurring discussions of identical topics, and is suggestive upon matters of logical process, and upon methods of persuasion.

The text of this selection is substantially that of the campaign edition of 1860, published by Follett, Foster & Co., of Columbus, Ohio. This edition, published with Lincoln’s consent, without annotation, as a Republican campaign document, was based on the reports of Lincoln’s speeches in the
Chicago Tribune and of Douglas's speeches in the Chicago Times. A few obvious grammatical errors, indicative of a hasty revision of the speeches for printing, the editor has taken the liberty to correct.

The editor records with especial pleasure the cordial encouragement in the preparation of this volume received from Mr. Horace White, of the New York Evening Post, who, as a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, accompanied Mr. Lincoln throughout the campaign of 1858. He is also under obligation to his colleague, Prof. Marshall S. Brown of the Department of History, for a critical reading of the proof of the introduction.

A. L. B.

New York University,
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INTRODUCTION

The senatorial campaign of 1858 in Illinois derives its historical importance from the fact that its influence was decisive in determining the political crisis of 1860. Before the great series of debates with Stephen A. Douglas in that campaign, Abraham Lincoln was a figure of local significance. As a result of what was essentially his forensic victory in the struggle with Douglas, he came to share with William H. Seward the leadership of the national Republican party, and entered naturally upon the path that led to the presidency in 1860. Before that campaign, Douglas, whose equal as a parliamentary debater and party organizer American history has hardly produced, had been for eight years the most forceful leader of the Democratic party, and the most conspicuous figure in national politics. As a result of the debates with Lincoln, the support of the South, upon which he had need to depend for furtherance of his ambition to become president, was irreparably lost, and the great national party whose candidate he hoped to be was broken in twain. Beginning with this campaign the long struggle against slavery entered, therefore, upon its final phase. The
ultimate leader in the struggle of a century to overthrow slavery had appeared.

The speeches comprising the body of this volume contain a full statement—perhaps the best statement—of the slavery question as it appeared at that time to two classes of people: those who in varying degrees favored the institution of slavery, and those who, though they did not yet aim to exterminate slavery from the states in which it was rooted, were seeking to prevent its extension to soil upon which it was not yet established.

The fundamental issue of 1858—the right or wrong of slavery—in its broad and universal statement of moral principle needs little elucidation for the student of to-day. But the political aspects under which it presented itself at that time are less familiar, and along with the party politics and the personalities of the hour deserve explanation. It is the purpose of this introduction briefly to set forth the origin of the three kinds of issues which appear in the debates—questions of principle, questions of party politics, questions arising from attacks made by either candidate upon the political acts of the other; also to supplement this account with some portraiture of the debaters themselves as they appeared to those who listened, and to give a general description of the great contest which they waged.

The invention of the cotton-gin by Eli Whitney in 1793 multiplied by fifty the amount of cotton which a single laborer could separate from the
cotton seed in a day’s work. This single invention made possible an increase of one thousand fold in the annual production of cotton in the South between 1791 and 1860. Upon this economic basis the institution of slavery which, it had been confidently supposed by all statesmen, South as well as North, was in process of extinction, reared a more significant growth, and became a social and political factor of the most formidable magnitude. But for the cotton-gin Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky would have been reclaimed from slavery, and Missouri would never have had it. After 1793 the prosperity of the South was founded upon cotton, and cotton fostered slavery. “That slavery is a blessing and cotton is king were associated ideas, with which the Southern mind was imbued in the decade before the war.”

The moral sense of the evil of slavery awakened but slowly in the North, and the people of that section were little inclined to attack the institution except when the extension of slavery to new territory was involved. The early Abolitionists of the Garrisonian type—radicals who denounced the Constitution as “an agreement with Hell” because it temporized with slavery—were nearly as hateful to the average Northern mind as to the Southern; nor did they ever become numerically representative of Northern opinion. The aggressive acts of practical Northern statesmen in opposition to

1 James Ford Rhodes’ History of the United States, Vol. i. p. 27.
slavery were limited to thwarting its growth. Before 1861 no Free-Soiler, no Republican ever, with the sanction of his party, maintained that under the Constitution of the United States there could be any interference from an external source with slavery in any state where it already existed. The aspect in which the slavery problem presented itself to the American people, therefore, throughout the long period from the admission of Missouri until the outbreak of the Civil War, was, whether slavery should be permitted to extend its sway into territory where it was not already a recognized institution. Chiefly the question was: Shall slavery be sanctioned in the National Territory and in the new states from time to time to be formed out of it?

Whether the admission of Missouri in 1820 was at stake, or the Wilmot Proviso of 1846, or the admission of California in 1850, or the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in the same year, or the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, or the Dred Scott decision, or the Lecompton Constitution proposed for Kansas in 1857; the broad outlines of the general problem remained the same.

Thoughtful men in the years before the great crisis grouped themselves upon this general question in ways which the party lines of any given time only imperfectly represented. First, there were the extreme radicals: on the side of the South they were the "Fire-eaters," who were willing to use any means to extend slavery; on the side of the
North they were the Abolitionists, who, with Garrison, believed slavery "a damning crime" with which no compromise was possible, and who proposed the immediate freedom and enfranchisement of the negroes. To gain their end they would, like the "Fire-eaters," sacrifice the Constitution and the Union itself. Then there were those of more moderate views, embracing the great bulk of people of all parties who lay between these two extremes. The mass of people in the South deemed slavery the real source of their prosperity, and became ultimately convinced of its soundness in principle. They further believed that its existence was sanctioned by the Constitution throughout the Union wherever people chose to have it. Yet until late in the decade preceding the War of Secession they continued for the most part to subordinate their interpretation of the rights of slavery to the maintenance of the Union. The mass of people in the North deemed slavery wrong, but they believed there was no constitutional sanction for interfering with it in states where it already existed, and they deprecated any action respecting it which might endanger the Union. In addition to these four classes, "there were men so constituted that they could decline to take any thought whether slavery were right or wrong, and could deal with every question that arose concerning it as a question of expediency, or of law and precedent." 1

Except for the radicals, the people of all parties and sections were in a mood, whatever their specific political creed, which did not preclude the possibility of compromise. Until the actual dawn of Secession, the history of the slavery question in America is a history of compromises between the effort of the slave states to extend their influence into new territory, and the gradually awakening moral opposition of the free states. Contributing to the tendency to compromise was a strong feeling that the slavery question was not a proper political issue. The greater parties were accordingly slow to formulate a definite policy respecting it. Until the formation of the Republican party in 1856, both of the great parties of the country, the Whigs and the Democrats, drew support from Northern and Southern states alike. The Whigs, Northern and Southern, and the Democrats, Southern and Northern, differed within their own ranks upon the Fugitive Slave Law, upon the extension of slavery to the territories, upon its suppression in the District of Columbia, and upon other questions of policy respecting slavery; but they tried to keep these differences, however intense, out of their party platforms, and, so long as it remained possible, deprecated the division of national parties upon sectional lines. The Liberty party in the North, the party of the Abolitionists, did, it is true, from 1840 to 1850 antagonize slavery in the main plank of its platform, just as the Prohibition party to-day antagonizes liquor selling; but the party
drew small electoral support and exerted only a moral influence. Not until after 1854 did the slavery question dominate all party platforms.

In 1848, the year when the Whigs elected General Taylor to the presidency, the slavery issue had advanced to a new and threatening aspect. Political power in Congress stood evenly poised between fifteen slave and fifteen free states. Slavery and the slave trade prevailed in the District of Columbia. An obsolete law compelling the return of fugitive slaves who escaped into free territory encumbered the statute books. By the terms of the famous Missouri Compromise of 1820, in all of the territory of the Louisiana Purchase lying north of latitude 36° 30′, slavery had been forever forbidden, except in the Territory of Missouri, then promised admission to the Union, and formally admitted in 1821 with a state constitution which forbade the legislature to make any restrictions upon slavery. In the territory south of 36° 30′, slavery was permitted. This Act of Congress, though capable of repeal like any other act, had been enacted with such assurance by all parties that it was to be a permanent settlement of the whole controversy over slavery, and had so long stood the test of time, that it seemed to have the stability and authority of an article of the Constitution. All these features of the situation as it existed in 1848 seemed not inconsistent with continued quiet. But the fruits of the Mexican war—the territory out of which California, New Mexico,
and Utah were afterward formed—had been ceded by Mexico in a treaty signed in the February preceding General Taylor's election. The Southern element in Congress, already accused of plotting to secure the admission of Texas and of fomenting the Mexican war as a means of adding new slave territory to the United States, now manifested a definite design to open this territory to slavery. But no legislation had been so far enacted. The Wilmot Proviso, introduced in Congress in 1846 by David Wilmot of Pennsylvania, proposing to prohibit slavery in all territory to be acquired from Mexico, after uniting Northern sentiment against slavery as it had never been united before, had failed to pass after arousing extraordinary debate.

The disposition of this new territory in the Southwest, respecting slavery, was the nucleus of a growing and ominous unrest. In 1850 California, of her own motion, applied for admission to the Union with a state constitution prohibiting slavery. Since 1792-3 Congress had followed the general policy of admitting states to the Union in pairs, one slave and one free, so as to preserve the balance of power between the slave and the free states. But to pair with California no slave territory stood ready for statehood. The South opposed the admission of California except upon the principle of compensation. Thus was constituted a complex problem of many aspects: the South wished to open the territories of New Mexico and Utah to
slavery; she desired the enactment of a more efficient law for the recovery of fugitive slaves; from some quarters of the South came the demand that Texas be divided into four states, according to a privilege reserved by the national government when Texas was admitted to the Union. Texas herself presented for settlement certain monetary claims and a troublesome boundary dispute with New Mexico. From the North, on the other hand, came demands for the prohibition of the interstate slave trade; for the suppression of both slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and for the passage of the Wilmot Proviso.

After a long struggle out of the flux of contending interests emerged at last, under the leadership of Henry Clay and Stephen A. Douglas, the great Compromise of 1850. By the terms of this agreement California was admitted as a free state; the remainder of the area ceded by Mexico was formed into territories with no restriction as to slavery; a new law for the recovery of fugitive slaves was enacted; Texas received $10,000,000 in lieu of all her claims, including those in the boundary dispute with New Mexico; and the slave trade, but not slavery, was prohibited in the District of Columbia. No mention in the final settlement was made of the interstate slave trade, or of the proposition to divide Texas into four states. The debates in Congress upon these measures furnish much of the most splendid oratory in our legislative history. In the galaxy of speakers were
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Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Cass, Benton—veteran leaders all—and the bold and youthful Douglas. All of them save Calhoun believed, or hoped, that now an ultimate settlement of the problem of slavery was reached. When Douglas returned from Washington to his home in Illinois it was with the declaration that he never expected to address Congress again upon any aspect of the slavery problem.

Douglas's share in the legislation of 1850 made him a national leader of the Democratic party. Born in Vermont in 1813, and emigrating first to New York and afterward to Illinois, he had made himself leader of the Jacksonian Democracy in his neighborhood before he was twenty-one years of age. Great personal magnetism, extraordinary energy of character and strength of intellect, and remarkable skill in debate, joined to a comprehensive knowledge of the political history of his country, prognosticated a rise in political station, almost unexampled in its swiftness and its audacity. By his discomfiture of a local orator of some repute, Douglas, who, though somewhat less than five feet in stature,¹ possessed a great voice, a deep chest and a massive head, gained with his first political address the nickname of "The Little Giant," an epithet which clung to him throughout his career. Beginning as district-attorney, he was next elected to the state legislature in 1836, where

¹Henry Villard, in his Memoirs (Vol. i. p. 55), says that Douglas was "not over four and a half feet high."
he was fellow-member with the Whig representative from Sangamon County, Abraham Lincoln, a quaint, ungainly person nearly two feet taller than Douglas, noted at that time for his rugged honesty and his knack at story-telling. Rivals the two men shortly became, but strangely enough, not in politics, but for the hand of Mary Todd, a young woman whom Lincoln subsequently married. Otherwise the race was for long to the swifter Douglas. In 1841, after serving a brief appointment as Secretary of State in Illinois, he was elected by the legislature, when he was twenty-eight years old, a justice of the Supreme Court. Two years later, when he was already leader of his party in the state, he entered Congress as a representative.

In the House his aggressive energy made an immediate impression. How he appeared as an orator to a contemporary of elegant and classical taste is revealed in a passage in the diary of John Quincy Adams: “His face was convulsed, his gesticulation frantic, and he lashed himself into such a heat that if his body had been of combustible matter it would have burnt out. In the midst of his roaring, to save himself from choking, he stripped and cast away his cravat, unbuttoned his waistcoat, and had the air and aspect of a half-naked pugilist. And this man comes from a judicial bench and passes for an eloquent orator!” But to other observers he seemed the personification of the virility, the constructive force, and the simplicity of the new
and great West.\(^1\) And before he entered the Senate in 1846 he had taken on all the external refinement of Washington life without loss of native strength. From the first he was the exponent of a vigorous foreign policy, and the advocate of internal improvements upon a comprehensive scale. Upon the moral aspect of slavery Douglas was indifferent. He was one of those "who could deal with every question concerning it as a question of expediency or of law and precedent." Never in his public career did he admit that slavery was wrong. His opponents asserted, and historians believe, that, while Douglas was animated by a genuine desire for the development of the material resources, and the expansion of the national territory and power of America, he was nevertheless an unsafe guide in the moral issues of politics, either because he was controlled by an overmastering ambition for political power, or because he was incapable of acute moral discernment.

Thus appeared Stephen A. Douglas to his contemporaries in 1850. Already he was, at thirty-seven, the guiding spirit of his party in Congress; and for ten years to come he was to be the boldest and most skillful leader, the readiest debater and the most superb fighter in American politics. Throughout that fateful decade he was destined to be the central actor in the mighty national drama.

\(^1\)See quotation from J. J. Ampere's Promenade en Amérique, in J. F. Rhodes' History of the United States, Vol. i. p. 245.
For four years the country dwelt in comparative freedom from the slavery agitation. Forty-four leading members of Congress from free and slave States alike signed an agreement that they would not support for any office whatever any man "who was not known to oppose the renewal, in any form, of agitation upon the subject of slavery." Profoundly unpopular was Sumner's early attempt to revive in Congress the discussion of the Fugitive Slave Law. With the laurels of the achieved compromise bright upon his head, Douglas was a prominent candidate of the younger Democracy for the presidential nomination of 1852. But he, like Cass, his chief rival, lacked Southern support, and the nomination passed to Franklin Pierce.

For two years longer quiet prevailed. Suddenly with hardly the shadow of a warning, and according to his subsequent statement, entirely upon his own initiative, Douglas on January 4, 1854, reported from the Committee on Territories a bill to organize the territory of Nebraska out of the great area, north and west of Missouri, which lay wholly north of latitude 36° 30'. The startling feature of the proposal was a clause authorizing the people of the proposed territory to decide for themselves whether they would have slavery or not. On January 23, Douglas substituted for this measure the famous Kansas-Nebraska bill, which differed from its predecessor only in two particulars. In its final form

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it affirmed that the slavery restriction of the Missouri Compromise was inconsistent with the principles of the legislation of 1850, and was therefore inoperative and void; and it further divided the territory described in the former bill into two parts, the northern to be called Nebraska, and the southern, Kansas.

Throughout the country the measure produced the most violent sensation. To the South it was an enormous concession, for it meant the repeal of the rock-ribbed Missouri Compromise. By inference it opened the whole of the national territory to slavery, subject only to the will of the territorial inhabitants. It meant the abdication by Congress of the right, hitherto never seriously questioned, to exercise absolute authority over the affairs of the territories. In the North no Southern aggression ever provoked such stupendous and unanimous wrath. In mass meetings, in the press and the pulpit, in petitions to Congress, and the protests of legislatures, popular indignation gave a vast and weighty utterance. Except in Illinois, the Democratic party throughout the North at first neither desired nor dared to support Douglas. No political leader was ever more execrated. By his own declaration he "could have travelled from Boston to Chicago by the light of his own burning effigies." ¹

The principle embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska bill was called the principle of "popular sove-

It was not a new one. In 1847 Lewis Cass had written a letter to one Nicholson in Nashville, Tenn., in which he proposed to settle the slavery question in the territories in a very simple way. It was to permit the people of each territory to determine for themselves whether they should have slavery or not. This plan seemed to accord with the democratic principle of individual liberty which has at all times lain at the foundation of our government. Cass favored it because he did not believe Congress had the right to legislate upon the domestic institutions of the territories, and because the slavery question was exactly of the sort which the people of a territory should determine for themselves. As a solution of the slavery problem "popular sovereignty" evaded all responsibility on the part of the national government for the conduct of domestic affairs in the territories. Douglas early seized upon the principle, made it his own, and to the outbreak of war continued to maintain it in debate, and sought to embody it in legislation. As applied to the state of the slavery question in 1854, "popular sovereignty" was inconsistent with the provisions of the Missouri Compromise, which excluded slavery from all territory north of latitude 30° 30', except in Missouri. It was in conflict also with an extreme Southern doctrine, which maintained that the right to hold slaves as property was one with which neither Congress nor any territorial legislature had the right to interfere. It was
contrary, finally, to the doctrine that human bondage was a moral wrong, for the existence of which the national government was responsible wherever its authority was supreme. Such was the principle of popular, or "squatter" sovereignty, which aroused so profoundly the antagonism of the North.

In Congress the bill was bitterly assailed. In the Senate, Chase of Ohio, and Seward of New York, and Sumner of Massachusetts, with others, denounced it as a betrayal of the North by its repeal of the Compromise of 1820, and as part of a plot to nationalize slavery; and they accused Douglas of bidding, by the bill, for Southern support for the presidential nomination of 1856. But in the face of the storm Douglas did not quail. One by one he met in debate and overcame the ablest leaders of the opposition. The severe logic of Chase, the lofty moral indignation of Sumner, the polished periods of Everett, the adroitness of Seward with his clear vision of high moral law were no match in hand-to-hand debate for the astute resourcefulness of the bold and masterful Douglas.

Little by little he brought into line behind him the amazed and partially disaffected elements of his party in Congress. In spite of the feeling which convulsed the North there was no revolt against the powerful party organization in the upper and lower houses of legislation, of which Douglas was the undisputed head. To thwart the attempt of
Chase to divide the Northern and Southern wings of his party by shrewd amendments to the bill, and to calm the Northern Democracy, who feared the measure was the beginning of a conspiracy to nationalize slavery, he inserted this amending clause: "It being the true intent and meaning of this bill not to legislate slavery into any territory or state, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the inhabitants thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Against the accusation that he was guilty of political unfaith in moving the appeal of the Missouri Compromise, he ingeniously contended that the repeal had in effect been accomplished by the legislation of the Compromise of 1850, wherein Utah and New Mexico were allowed to determine for themselves whether or not they should admit slavery.\(^1\) Thus, declared Douglas, the principle of popular sovereignty, or congressional non-intervention, was made to supersede the principle of 1820, the congressional prohibition of slavery north of latitude 36° 30'.

Step by step the bill was driven to its passage. On March 3, 1854, it passed the Senate by a vote of 27 to 14. One month later it passed the House, and in May, President Pierce made it a law by his

\(^1\) It was of some significance that part of Utah lay north of latitude 36° 30', though that area was not a portion of the territory of the Louisiana Purchase, originally affected by the Missouri Compromise.
signature. No more amazing personal triumph than this of Douglas has occurred in our history; nor so great and fateful a sacrifice of national peace to individual ambition. Yet, from the point of view of those who believed in slavery and of those also who were indifferent to its moral wrong, it can, now as then, be maintained that the policy of Douglas, while great with ambition, was neither inconsistent, dishonest, nor insincere.

Anger and turmoil throughout the North greeted the passage of the bill. Upon his return to Chicago Douglas stood for four consecutive hours before a huge mass meeting attempting to make his great voice heard in his defense; but in vain. That night Douglas was set upon and was in danger of his life. Throughout the country party lines were broken up, and all party organizations were either in dissolution, or in a state which seemed to forbode it. The Democratic party itself, the party of Douglas, was shaken to its foundation. The old Whig party had been crushed in 1852 in the victory of Pierce, because of its incapacity to meet the rising issues of the time, and no organization had yet filled its place. The Free-Soilers, the successors of the Liberty party, the heirs to its opposition to the extension of slavery, had been, though yet a minor party, of growing significance. The "Know-Nothings," embracing a small proportion of the Whigs and some Democrats, stood upon a curious platform of opposition to foreigners and Roman Catholics; but this party had no promise of per-
manence. The wrong of slavery, its aggressive purpose, its threatened domination of the country broke upon the aroused moral vision of the North in all their naked enormity. To all people and parties alike, it was apparent that slavery was the inevitable problem of the hour; that compromise would be extremely difficult if not henceforward impossible. Upon the general platform of opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act gradually assembled a body of voters who first called themselves the Anti-Nebraska men. They ultimately included most of the old Northern Whigs, many Democrats, and all of the Free-Soilers. These men organized conventions in 1854 for the first time under the name of the Republican party.

The presidential election of 1856 loomed ahead. By extraordinary efforts Douglas had partially overcome the opposition to his policy in Illinois. In the fall of 1854 his party elected one state officer, the only Democratic candidate for a state office elected that year in any Northern state. But in 1855 the Illinois Legislature chose, as his colleague in the United States Senate, Lyman Trumbull, an Anti-Nebraska Democrat. Trumbull's chief rival was a Whig, Abraham Lincoln, by this time widely known in his state as a lawyer, a political leader, and a campaign orator of great effectiveness in direct and homely methods of presenting truth. But the center of the national drama was now Kansas, where Freedom and Slavery were grappling in actual warfare for the control of the ter-
ritory. Nebraska by common consent was a free territory, but desperate efforts were making to win its southern neighbor for slavery. Immigration bureaus, North and South, were sending colonists thither. The pro-slavery immigrants formed a legislature first, and sanctioned slavery. The Free-Soil men, in a numerical majority, ignored the proceeding, chose Topeka as their capital, and, after framing a constitution which excluded slavery, they applied to Congress for admission as a state. In December, 1855, two rival governments existed in the territory, and brawls and bloodshed were of frequent occurrence. President Pierce favored the pro-slavery government. Douglas, in the Senate, proposed that Kansas be admitted when her population should reach 93,420, a population sufficient to entitle her to one representative in Congress. Meanwhile matters grew worse and a state of civil war prevailed. Under these conditions the presidential campaign of 1856 dawned. The first fruits of the Kansas-Nebraska Act were ready to pluck.

On June 2d, the Democratic national convention met at Cincinnati. The leading candidates were President Pierce, Douglas, and James Buchanan. The time was unpropitious for Douglas. Ten days earlier the warfare in Kansas had reached a climax in the sacking of Lawrence, the leading Free-Soil town. There was a tendency to lay the Kansas disturbance at the door of the author of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. In addition, the disorganized and
weakened state of the party made it necessary to conserve every strategic advantage. Buchanan lived in Pennsylvania, then the pivotal state. Besides this the South, though favorable to Douglas, preferred a weaker man in the White House, a servant, not a leader. On the fifteenth ballot Buchanan was nominated over Douglas, Pierce having withdrawn. The goal of his ambition, to attain which Douglas had paid so heavy a price, receded four years further into the future.

Before the election the Administration succeeded in restoring order in Kansas. A sobering concern for the safety of the Union succeeded the indignation over the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The South stood solid for Buchanan. The National Republican party, headed by Fremont, was not entirely organized from its heterogeneous elements. In the election Buchanan received 174 electoral votes, to 114 for Fremont, and 8 for Fillmore, who was the candidate of the "Know-Nothings" and the remnant of the Whigs. Buchanan won the title of President, but Douglas had dictated the platform and retained the reality of power.

The issue of statehood for Kansas remained prominent, but in 1857 it was overshadowed for a time by a decision of the United States Supreme Court, upon the power of Congress over slavery in the territories, and the status of negroes under the Constitution. In the debates upon the Kansas-Nebraska bill, Douglas in reply to a question whether in his opinion the people of a territory
could, under the Constitution of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, had answered: “That is a question for the courts.” Now the decision upon that question was forthcoming. On March 6, 1857, two days after Buchanan’s inauguration, an opinion was handed down, touching the right to freedom of a negro, Dred Scott, who, while a slave, had been brought by his master into Illinois, where slavery was illegal, and then into the Louisiana territory, north of latitude 36° 30’. With two important dissenting opinions the court, with Chief Justice Taney presiding, decided the following essential points: first, that negroes were not included in the statement of the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal; second, that no negro could become a citizen of the United States; third, that the right to hold slaves as property was affirmed in the Constitution; fourth, that neither Congress nor any territorial legislature could exclude slavery from any territory. The decision had been anticipated. But it was the greatest victory yet won by the South. Hereafter slavery was free to go into the national territories as it pleased. Again the North was stirred to its foundations, and a readjustment of party lines was necessary. The charge that there was a conspiracy to nationalize slavery was renewed. It was charged that Buchanan and the Supreme Court were in collusion, and with anxious hearts the opponents of slavery predicted a further decision which should open the states to slavery, and thus accomplish the
full design of the conspirators. To Douglas, however, the decision was a source of confusion. At once he declared the decision was right and must be maintained. But what of "popular sovereignty," the principle upon which he had built his statesmanship? If under the Constitution slaves were lawful property in any territory, what became of the doctrine that the people of a territory could admit slavery or not as they chose? The problem was serious. It remained to be fought out in the campaign of 1858.

The decision had also the peculiar effect of making essentially the whole platform of the new Republican party, in its opposition to the extension of slavery, unconstitutional. While the position of the party was morally right, it was difficult to defend it in argument, when every point urged involved a criticism of the highest judicial tribunal in the land.

Emboldened by continued successes the Southern leaders became more audacious and overbearing than they had ever been. The North was thoroughly awake to the desperate character of the conflict. Feeling ran so high in Congress that personal combats were daily feared. By the Dred Scott decision slavery was now legalized in Kansas. But the problem of her statehood remained open. Since 1856 three out of every four immigrants had come from the free states. At this juncture a brazen conspiracy was formed to bring Kansas into the Union under a pro-slavery constitution.
Sanctioned by the territorial legislature, a convention met near the close of 1857 at Lecompton to frame a constitution for the new state. The free-state men, dissatisfied with the mode of its organization, refused to attend, and its pro-slavery members, after drawing up an instrument favoring slavery, fell in with the scheme, devised by a Southern junta at Washington, of submitting it to the people in such a way that they had no chance to vote against the constitution as a whole, but only "for the Constitution with slavery" or "for the Constitution without slavery." And if the "Constitution without slavery" were chosen, it was provided that there should be no interference with slavery wherever in the Territory it already existed. At the election on December 21, 1857, the free-state men refused to vote, and the "Constitution with slavery" was chosen by a vote of 6143 to 589. In reaction against this proceeding the free-state men called a special election on January 4, 1858, to vote simply for or against the Lecompton Constitution. But this time the pro-slavery men, deeming the matter already settled, refused to vote, and the poll showed 10,266 votes against the Constitution to 138 for it with slavery, and 24 for it without slavery.

Now the contest was brought before Congress. With the Constitution as adopted on December 21, 1857, the Lecompton plotters formally applied for the admission of Kansas to the Union. President Buchanan, utterly subservient, gave the influence of the Administration to the iniquitous scheme.
For Douglas it was a critical moment. If as leader of his party he lent his powerful aid to the plot, it meant a total and humiliating surrender to the pro-slavery propaganda. It meant the sacrifice of the spirit, if not the letter of popular sovereignty, for the Lecompton Constitution in no sense expressed the voice of the people. It meant the loss of enough of his Northern following to imperil his re-election to the Senate in the state campaign in Illinois about to begin. On the other hand if he opposed the measure he would sacrifice the political support of the South for which he had paid so heavily. To the surprise of the country Douglas met the issue by a formal revolt from the policy of his party, and a refusal to support the Lecompton scheme. Vigorously attacking the measure, he procured its defeat in the House of Representatives. A modified form of the scheme, called the English Bill, next proposed, offered the people of Kansas a large land grant if they would accept the Lecompton Constitution with slavery, at a new election to be held in August of 1858. But if they refused thus to accept the constitution they were to be denied admission until their population reached 93,420. Douglas opposed this bill as vigorously as the other, but he was unable to defeat it. The people of Kansas, however, at the appointed election refused the bribe of land, and rejected statehood as thus offered by a vote of five to one.

Save for Douglas the original Lecompton plot would have succeeded. Among the Southern
leaders wrath at his procedure succeeded amazement. The Washington Union, the organ of the Administration, called him "traitor," "renegade," "deserter." "I have very little doubt," wrote a journalist at Washington, "that if compelled to choose between Douglas and Seward for President, the whole band of pro-slavery fire-eaters, with Toombs at their head, would vote for the latter." But among the Northern leaders amazement gave way to perplexity. The Liberator, the organ of the New England Abolitionists, began to commend Douglas. The Republicans viewed him with curious speculation. He was now fighting their battle. He had broken from his own party. Could he be planning to join them, place himself at their head, and with them fight the growing power of slavery? It was a profoundly interesting possibility. It appealed to many prominent Republicans, like Horace Greeley and Anson G. Burlingame, who began to manifest unwonted friendliness. But Douglas, whatever dreams he may for a time have had, had fought the Lecompton conspiracy because it was a dishonorable betrayal of popular sovereignty. That principle, in spite of the Dred Scott decision, he still maintained as affording the best solution of the slavery problem. He did not care, any more than in 1854, "whether slavery were voted down or voted up." Though he was now thwarting the advance of the slave power, he could not become a Republican. The Northern wing of his party comprehended his attitude and endorsed
his policy. Nevertheless, this uncertainty about his position, the glittering possibility of his conversion to the Republican party, was a factor of vital importance in adjusting the delicate political balance in the campaign of 1858.

When Douglas returned to Illinois to enter upon the contest for re-election to the Senate, the outlook in the state indicated a severe campaign. There was a powerful and growing anti-slavery party, though it was composed of heterogeneous elements that had been, not without difficulty, fused into agreement upon a specific policy. There was also a body of Buchanan Democrats who voiced the bitter antagonism of the Washington Administration against the destroyer of the Lecompton plot. On the other hand Douglas was now in enthusiastic favor with the mass of his party in Illinois, who sustained him in his revolt and applauded his continued maintenance of "popular sovereignty" and the Dred Scott decision, in the faith that the two were not irreconcilable. Besides this body of support, many national leaders of the Republican party openly advocated his return to the Senate, and out of admiration or gratitude for what he had done and hope for what he might become, deprecated opposition to him on the part of the Republicans of Illinois.

In this peculiar state of affairs the Republican state convention, on June 16, at Springfield, under circumstances of great enthusiasm tendered a unanimous nomination for the senatorial vacancy to
Abraham Lincoln. On the evening of that day Mr. Lincoln opened the campaign with the speech which begins the series in this volume.

The candidate thus honored, one whose fame was only just beginning to creep beyond the confines of his state, was a man of lowly origin and of singular power. Educated in the constant companionship of the Bible, Shakespeare, and Euclid, he had no better opportunities for social or further mental culture than what came to him as a local surveyor or as a clerk in a country grocery. Grotesque in appearance, he was in character strangely compounded. He was lanky in body, abnormally tall, awkward in movement, physically indolent, and attired habitually in ill-fitting garments. In his mentality he conjoined the coarse thought and speech of the frontier tavern with absolute purity of personal morals, and inflexible honesty. In him dwelt also the extremes of melancholy and humor; the one bringing him in desperate wrestling at times to the verge of madness, the other leading him by beneficent reaction even to the length of buffoonery. He possessed a profoundly intuitive

1June 16 is given as the date of this speech by Nicolay and Hay in their history; by J. F. Rhodes (History of U. S., Vol. ii. p. 314); by J. T. Morse, in his life of Lincoln in the American Statesmen series; by Douglas himself in the Alton debate, and by other authorities. June 17 is given as the date in the edition of the speeches of 1858, revised by Lincoln for the campaign of 1860. Herndon, in his life of Lincoln, is not clear upon the matter, but seems also to indicate the latter date.
and sympathetic comprehension of the plain people, and through moral and philosophic insight perhaps more than any other man he knew and revered the Truth for its own sake. To these traits were added great power of concentration and an intense personal ambition.

Admitted to the bar as soon as his opportunities permitted, he came to be considered the best jury lawyer in Illinois; but in distinction from Douglas he was deemed a poor advocate in a bad cause. As a lawyer he was keen in analysis, and eminently fair in his statement of a case; so that his opponents could take no exception to his presentation of their position. Quaint parables and illustrations, and an inexhaustible fund of wit and humorous stories gave a strong popular appeal to logical argument that was habitually sound in its process.

His transition to political life was gradual, but natural. From 1834 to 1837 he served in the state legislature, and made at that time a public assertion that slavery was “founded on injustice and bad policy.” In 1846 he began his service of a single term in Congress, and during the two years voted for the Wilmot Proviso forty-two times. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 recalled Lincoln from the practice of law to which he had returned at the end of his term in Congress, and he began to deliver speeches in opposition to Douglas, who quickly recognized in him an unusual opponent. In 1855 Lincoln was a strong Anti-Nebraska candidate for United States Senator, but
under circumstances of rare magnanimity threw his support to Judge Lyman Trumbull, whose election was thereby assured. By 1856 his leadership of the new Republican Party in his state was assured, and he even received considerable support for the presidential nomination.

Such was the man, strangely in contrast with Douglas, who was now his opponent in the critical campaign about to begin. Douglas did not underestimate his antagonist. "I shall have my hands full," he said. "He is the strong man of his party—full of wit, facts, dates—and the best stump speaker, with his droll ways and dry jokes, in the West. He is as honest as he is shrewd; and if I beat him my victory will be hardly won."

Conditions at the beginning of the campaign favored Douglas. His incomparable prestige as the foremost American statesman made a handicap against which Lincoln struggled without success. As an attempt to offset the prestige of Douglas, Lincoln determined upon the bold plan of meeting him face to face in a series of joint debates. After some hesitation Douglas accepted the challenge, and seven meetings were agreed upon. The places settled upon for the debates were, in order: Ottawa and Freeport, in the Republican strongholds of Northern Illinois; Charleston, Galesburg, and Quincy, localities in Central Illinois, where the two parties were nearly of equal strength; and Jonesboro and Alton, in the strongly Democratic region of southern Illinois. The conditions of the first debate
at Ottawa were that Douglas should open with a speech of an hour, with Lincoln to reply for an hour and a half, and Douglas to close with a rejoinder of thirty minutes. In the remaining debates the conditions were the same, except that the speakers alternated in the privilege of opening and closing.

The resulting forensic struggle is comparable but to one other in American history—that between Webster and Hayne. The two men presented a picturesque contrast as they faced one another:—Lincoln, with yellow, wrinkled face, and lean, un-gainly figure, much over six feet in height; Douglas, with massy figure, wonderful leonine head, black flowing hair, swarthy complexion, brilliant, dark, magnetic eyes, yet with less than five feet of stature. As speakers they were not less in striking contrast. "The Democratic spokesman," writes Mr. Henry Villard in his Memoirs,¹ "commanded a strong, sonorous voice, a rapid, vigorous utterance, a telling play of countenance, impressive gestures, and all the other art of the practiced speaker. As far as external conditions were concerned, there was nothing in favor of Lincoln. He had an . . . indescribably gawky figure, an odd-featured, inexpressive, and altogether uncomely face. He used singularly awkward, almost absurd, up-and-down and sidewise movements of his body to give emphasis to his arguments. His voice was naturally good, but he frequently raised it to an unnatural pitch." Yet as he became moved by the fervor of

¹ Vol. i., pp. 92-3.
speaking, much of his harsh, awkward manner gave place to a sort of natural freedom and dignity, and even grace, his face became mobile and expressive, and his voice, too, softened and became flexible and melodious.

In their methods of debate they were equally unlike. "In the whole field of American politics,"¹ say Nicolay and Hay, "no man has equaled Douglas in the expedients and strategy of debate. Lacking originality and constructive logic, he had great facility in appropriating by ingenious restatement the thoughts and formulas of others. He was tireless, ubiquitous, unseizable. It would have been as easy to hold a globule of mercury under the finger's tip as to fasten him to a point he wished to evade. He could almost invert a proposition by a plausible paraphrase. He delighted in enlarging an opponent's proposition to a forced inference, ridiculous in form and monstrous in dimensions. In spirit he was alert, combative, aggressive; in manner patronizing and aggressive by turns.

"Lincoln's mental equipment was of an entirely different order. His principal weapon was direct unswerving logic. His fairness of statement and generosity of admission had long been proverbial. For these intellectual duels with Douglas he possessed a power of analysis that easily outran and circumvented the 'Little Giant's' most extraordinary gymnastics of argument. But disdaining mere quibbles, he pursued lines of concise reason-

ing to maxims of constitutional law and political morals. Douglas was also forcible in statement and bold in assertion; Lincoln was his superior in quaint originality, aptness of phrase and subtlety of definition; and oftentimes Lincoln’s philosophic vision and poetical fervor raised him to flights of eloquence which were not possible to the fiber and temper of his opponent.”

To be victorious in the campaign Lincoln had need to win the radical Abolition vote, the moderate Republicans, and the conservative old-line Whigs for whose support Douglas also strove, and the Americans or “Know-nothings.” The split between the Buchanan and the Douglas Democrats favored him; but on his own part he had to contend against the lukewarm or hostile attitude of influential Republicans outside of Illinois.

The interest in the series of forensic encounters rapidly grew. Vast audiences assembled from far and near; coming by train, journeying in slow wagons over the dusty prairie roads even from adjoining states to hear the rival leaders, mounted in the open air upon elevated platforms of rough-hewn timbers, wrestle with each other’s convictions of policy and of duty. Newspapers throughout the country published the speeches entire, and the attention of the national public, drawn at first by Lincoln’s unexpected survival of the earlier debates, became fixed with unprecedented interest upon the unfolding drama of a local contest.

Personally, Lincoln and Douglas were friends.
The intention of each was plainly to conduct the debates upon a plane of courtesy and good-feeling. Douglas was characteristically brimful of good nature. He had called his opponent, maybe with a patronizing accent, a "kind, amiable, and intelligent gentleman, a good citizen and an honorable opponent." Lincoln quizzically replied to the compliments, declaring at Ottawa that he in respect of praise was like the Hoosier with his gingerbread: "He reckoned he liked it better than any other man, and got less of it." And yet once when Douglas spoke of Lincoln with too much assumption of superiority; and again, when he reiterated without respectable evidence that Lincoln and Trumbull had conspired, in 1855, to join the Whigs and Anti-Nebraska Democrats into a new party, and capture for themselves the spoils; the amenities of debate were sorely strained, and either candidate gave way to acrimonious comment. Even sharper interchanges were drawn forth when Lincoln charged that Douglas was a leading member of a formidable conspiracy to nationalize slavery; and particularly when Lincoln asserted with evidence that certain strongly Abolition resolutions persistently employed by Douglas as if Lincoln were responsible for the doctrines which they contained, were essentially forgeries and known by Douglas to be such. Besides these personalities, one serious charge was continually reiterated by Douglas: that Lincoln shifted his ground, as he passed from one section of the state to another, that he made his
principles suit the political complexion of his audience.¹

Besides personal questions, there were questions having their origin in the search for political advantage. Douglas’s aim was to separate the Whigs from Lincoln’s following. To this end he propounded seven questions to Lincoln at Ottawa, with a view of showing that Lincoln agreed with the Abolitionists in their entire policy regarding the great questions of 1850 and 1854. Lincoln answered the questions at Freeport, and avoided falling into the trap; and he at once put four questions to Douglas, and later a fifth, concerning certain phases of his slavery policy; one of them of so much significance that Douglas’s answer destroyed his presidential prospects in 1860.

But far above questions of personalities, and questions of politics, loomed the larger questions of political and moral principle. Did Lincoln at Springfield incite to sectionalism and revolution? Yes, and further urged interference, declared Douglas, with the sacred right of people to determine their domestic institutions for themselves. Not so, replied Lincoln; the Republican party seeks only to prevent the extension of slavery and to place it where it will disappear of itself. Why cannot the Union continue half slave and half free as our

¹ For more detailed description of the debates, and for explanation and discussion of the issues of the campaign, see the supplementary notes. The Introduction merely states the issues and correlates them.
fathers made it? rejoined Douglas; and what specific plan have you for the extinction of this economic institution? Then came the great questions of the place of the negro in the Declaration of Independence, and of the constitutionality of slavery. Here Lincoln was hampered by the Dred Scott decision, against which he protested in the name of truth and justice, though it was the verdict of the highest judicial tribunal. Douglas declared that Lincoln was not only seeking to divide the nation, and to undermine our highest constitutional authority, but was seeking to make the negro the social and the political equal of the white man. In rising at length above questions of state and constitution to view slavery in the light of moral law—of absolute right and wrong—Lincoln placed the argument on a plane where Douglas could not follow him; but Lincoln was no longer responding merely to the arguments of a personal opponent, he had become the voice of the aroused conscience of a nation.¹ "That is the real issue," he said at Alton. "That is the issue which will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world."

¹ "I asked him one day," says Mr. Horace White, "why he did not oftener turn the laugh on Douglas. He replied that he was too much in earnest, and that is was doubtful whether turning the laugh on anybody really gained any votes."—Herndon’s Life of Lincoln, ii. 101.
After a desperately severe campaign in which Douglas delivered a total of 130 speeches, and expended $80,000 for campaign expenses, as against $1000 by Lincoln, the election revealed an exceedingly close result. In the popular vote Lincoln received in the state 126,084 ballots, Douglas 121,940, and the Buchanan Democrat, 5,091. But an unfair apportionment brought it about that the legislature contained a majority of eight for Douglas. Lincoln was bitterly disappointed. To a friend he said that he felt "like the boy that stumped his toe,—'it hurt too much to laugh, and he was too big to cry.'"

Viewed from the present day, Douglas's victory was a remarkable one. His task had been herculean. "There is, on the whole," says Mr. I. N. Arnold,¹ "hardly any greater triumph in the history of American politics than his re-election." He had won support from the friends and the enemies of slavery alike. But of Lincoln himself Douglas said: ² "I have been in Congress sixteen years, and there is not a man whom I would not rather meet in debate." And the nation recognized in him the coming of a new leader. For though defeated, Lincoln had organized his own party, and rendered inevitable the fatal division of that of his opponent; had won a moral victory; had, in speeches which rank among the masterpieces of oratory in all time, determined the ultimate form of the slavery issue, and com-

¹Life of Lincoln, p. 149.
²Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, ii. 577.
posed the essential gospel of the anti-slavery movement. Before him the pathway lay clear to the stern and sad realization of his high ambition.

THE LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS DEBATES
Speech of Hon. Abraham Lincoln, delivered at Springfield, Ill., June 16, 1858 at the close of the Republican State Convention, by which Mr. Lincoln had been named as candidate for United States Senator.

Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course
of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.

Have we no tendency to the latter condition? Let anyone who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider, not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted, but also let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design, and concert of action, among its chief architects, from the beginning.

The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the States by State Constitutions, and from most of the National territory by Congressional prohibition. Four days later, commenced the struggle which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened all the National territory to slavery, and was the first point gained.

But, so far, Congress only had acted, and an indorsement by the people, real or apparent, was indispensable to save the point already gained, and give chance for more.

This necessity had not been overlooked, but had been provided for, as well as might be, in the notable argument of "squatter sovereignty," otherwise called "sacred right of self-government," which latter phrase, though expressive of the only rightful
basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: That if any one man choose to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska bill itself, in the language which follows: "It being the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "squatter sovereignty," and "sacred right of self-government." "But," said opposition members, "let us amend the bill so as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory may exclude slavery." "Not we," said the friends of the measure; and down they voted the amendment.

While the Nebraska bill was passing through Congress, a law case, involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State, and then into a territory covered by the Congressional prohibition, and held him as a slave for a long time in each, was passing through the United States Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both Nebraska bill and lawsuit were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was "Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the law case came to, and
was argued in, the Supreme Court of the United States; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska bill to state his opinion whether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits; and the latter answers: "That is a question for the Supreme Court."

The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement, such as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President, in his last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the weight and authority of the indorsement. The Supreme Court met again, did not announce their decision, but ordered a re-argument. The Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but the incoming President, in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the people to abide by the forthcoming decision, whatever it might be. Then, in a few days, came the decision.

The reputed author of the Nebraska bill finds an early occasion to make a speech at this capital indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently denouncing all opposition to it. The new President, too, seizes the early occasion of the Silliman letter to
indorse and strongly construe that decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had ever been entertained!

At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of the Nebraska bill, on the mere question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution was or was not in any just sense made by the people of Kansas; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is a fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up. I do not understand his declaration, that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or up, to be intended by him other than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public mind—the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and is ready to suffer to the end. And well may he cling to that principle! If he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle is the only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott decision "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled down like temporary scaffolding; like the mould at the foundry, served through one blast, and fell back into loose sand; helped to carry an election, and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point—the right of a people to make their own constitution—upon which he and the Republicans have never differed.
The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery, in its present state of advancement. This was the third point gained. The working points of that machinery are:

First, That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This point is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of that provision of the United States Constitution which declares that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

Secondly, That, "subject to the Constitution of the United States," neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery from any United States Territory. This point is made in order that individual men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the institution through all the future.

Thirdly, That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free State, makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State, the negro may be forced into by the master. This point is made, not to be pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for awhile, and appa-
rently indorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State.

Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion, at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are; and partially, also, whither we are tending.

It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back and run the mind over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it, outsiders could not then see. Plainly enough now, it was an exactly fitted niche, for the Dred Scott decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people to be just no freedom at all. Why was the amendment, expressly declaring the right of the people, voted down? Plainly enough now,—the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Why was the court decision held up? Why even a Senator's individual opinion withheld, till after the Presidential election? Plainly enough now: the
speaking out then would have damaged the perfectly free argument upon which the election was to be carried. Why the outgoing President's felicitation on the indorsement? Why the delay of a re-argument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation in favor of the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and petting of a spirited horse preparatory to mounting him, when it is dreaded that he may give the rider a fall. And why the hasty after-indorsement of the decision by the President and others?

We cannot absolutely know that all these adaptations are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen,—Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James, for instance—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortises exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few,—not omitting even scaffolding,—or, if a single piece be lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring such piece in—in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck.
It should not be overlooked that by the Nebraska bill the people of a State as well as Territory were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." Why mention a State? They were legislating for Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but why is mention of this lugged into this merely Territorial law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. Possibly, this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill,—I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He
approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska Act. On one occasion, his exact language is, "Except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction." In what cases the power of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint on the power of the Territories, was left open in the Nebraska Act. Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. And this may especially be expected if the doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up" shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a decision can be maintained when made.

Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty is the
work now before all those who would prevent that consummation. That is what we have to do. How can we best do it?

There are those who denounce us openly to their own friends, and yet whisper us softly that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there is with which to effect that object. They wish us to infer all, from the fact that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty, and that he has regularly voted with us on a single point, upon which he and we have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a living dog is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this work is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His avowed mission is impressing the "public heart" to care nothing about it. A leading Douglas Democratic newspaper thinks that Douglas's superior talent will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave trade. Does Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce the
whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property; and, as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave trade,—how can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free,"—unless he does it as a protection to the home production? And as the home producers will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.

Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wiser to-day than he was yesterday; that he may rightfully change when he finds himself wrong. But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and infer that he will make any particular change, of which he himself has given no intimation? Can we safely base our action upon any such vague inference? Now, as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do aught that can be personally offensive to him. Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principle so that our cause may have assistance from his great ability, I hope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle. But clearly he is not now with us; he does not pretend to be,—he does not promise ever to be.

Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its own undoubted friends,—those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work, who do care for the result. Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with
every external circumstance against us. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did we brave all then, to falter now,—now, when that same enemy is wavering, disseasoned, and belligerent? The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail; if we stand firm, we shall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerate, or mistakes delay it, but, sooner or later, the victory is sure to come.
Second Joint Debate, at Freeport

[August 27, 1858]

MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first met in public discussion. He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and he replied for half an hour. The order is now reversed. I am to speak an hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an hour. I propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of what was brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa. Of course there was brought within the scope in that half-hour's speech something of his own opening speech. In the course of that opening argument Judge Douglas proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories. In my speech of an hour and a half, I attended to some other parts of his speech, and incidentally, as I thought, answered one of the interrogatories then. I then distinctly intimated to him that I would answer the rest of his interrogatories on condition only that he should agree to answer as many for me. He made no intimation at the time of the proposition, nor did he in his reply allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no injustice in saying
that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing with me as though I had *refused* to answer his interrogatories. I now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I give him an opportunity to respond. The Judge remains silent. I now say that I will answer his interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have done so, I shall propound mine to him.

I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party at Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of the party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall answer I go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will be perceived that no one is responsible but myself.

Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I find them printed in the Chicago "Times," and answer them *seriatim*. In order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of these interrogatories is in these words:—

*Question 1.*—"I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"

*Answer.*—I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

*Q. 2.* "I desire him to answer whether he stands
pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more Slave States into the Union, even if the people want them?"

A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more Slave States into the Union.

Q. 3. "I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make?"

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.

Q. 4. "I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?"

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?"

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States.

Q. 6. "I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the Missouri Compromise line?"

A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories.
Q. 7. "I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not pledged to this, that, or the other. The Judge has not framed his interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered in strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly, that I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to which I have answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state what I really think upon them.

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave law, I have never hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law. Having said that, I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave law, further than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening its efficiency. And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in re-
g ard to an alteration or modification of that law, I would not be the man to introduce it as a new sub-
ject of agitation upon the general question of slavery.

In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more Slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a posi-
tion of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there would never be another Slave State admitted into the Union; but I must add that if slavery shall be kept out of the Ter-
ritories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.

The third interrogatory is answered by the an-
swer to the second, it being, as I conceive, the same as the second.

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. In relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up. I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to abolish it. Yet as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present views, be in favor of endeavoring to
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon these conditions: *First*, that the abolition should be gradual; *second*, that it should be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the District; and *third*, that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our capital that foul blot upon our nation."

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here, that as to the question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject; but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade among the different States, I should still not be in favor of the exercise of that power, unless upon some conservative principle as I conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all the Territories of the United States, is full and explicit within itself, and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine.

So I suppose in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself better understood, than the answer which I have placed in writing.

Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I suppose he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set of opinions for one place, and another set for another place; that I was afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I am saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and render them enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this audience.

I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories, so far as I have framed them. I will bring forward a new instalment when I get them ready. I will bring them forward now, only reaching to number four.

The first one is:

*Question 1.* If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, *before* they have the requisite
number of inhabitants according to the English bill,—some ninety-three thousand,—will you vote to admit them?

Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State constitution?

Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of political action?

Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?

As introductory to these interrogatories which Judge Douglas propounded to me at Ottawa, he read a set of resolutions which he said Judge Trumbull and myself had participated in adopting, in the first Republican State Convention, held at Springfield in October, 1854. He insisted that I and Judge Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican party, were responsible for the doctrines contained in the set of resolutions which he read, and I understand that it was from that set of resolutions that he deduced the interrogatories which he propounded to me, using these resolutions as a sort of authority for propounding those questions to me. Now, I say here to-day that I do not answer his interrogatories because of their springing at all from that set of resolu-
tions which he read. I answered them because Judge Douglas thought fit to ask them. I do not now, nor ever did, recognize any responsibility upon myself in that set of resolutions. When I replied to him on that occasion, I assured him that I never had anything to do with them. I repeat here to-day that I never in any possible form had anything to do with that set of resolutions. It turns out, I believe, that those resolutions were never passed in any convention held in Springfield. It turns out that they were never passed at any convention or any public meeting that I had any part in. I believe it turns out, in addition to all this, that there was not, in the fall of 1854, any convention holding a session in Springfield, calling itself a Republican State Convention; yet it is true there was a convention, or assemblage of men calling themselves a convention, at Springfield, that did pass some resolutions. But so little did I really know of the proceedings of that convention, or what set of resolutions they had passed, though having a general knowledge that there had been an assemblage of men there, that when Judge Douglas read the resolutions, I really did not know but they had been the resolutions passed then and there. I did not question that they were the resolutions adopted. For I could not bring myself to suppose that Judge Douglas could say what he did upon this subject without knowing that it was true. I contented myself, on that occasion, with denying, as I truly could, all connection with them, not denying or affirming whether they were passed at Springfield.
Now, it turns out that he had got hold of some resolutions passed at some convention or public meeting in Kane County. I wish to say here, that I don't conceive that in any fair and just mind this discovery relieves me at all. I had just as much to do with the convention in Kane County as that at Springfield. I am just as much responsible for the resolutions at Kane County as those at Springfield,—the amount of the responsibility being exactly nothing in either case; no more than there would be in regard to a set of resolutions passed in the moon.

I allude to this extraordinary matter in this canvass for some further purpose than anything yet advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his statement upon that occasion as matters that he believed to be true, but he stated them roundly as being true, in such form as to pledge his veracity for their truth. When the whole matter turns out as it does, and when we consider who Judge Douglas is,—that he is a distinguished Senator of the United States; that he has served nearly twelve years as such; that his character is not at all limited as an ordinary Senator of the United States, but that his name has become of world-wide renown,—it is most extraordinary that he should so far forget all the suggestions of justice to an adversary, or of prudence to himself, as to venture upon the assertion of that which the slightest investigation would have shown him to be wholly false. I can only account for his having done so upon the supposition that
that evil genius which has attended him through his life, giving to him an apparent astonishing prosperity, such as to lead very many good men to doubt there being any advantage in virtue over vice,—I say I can only account for it on the supposition that that evil genius has at last made up its mind to forsake him.

And I may add that another extraordinary feature of the Judge's conduct in this canvass—made more extraordinary by this incident—is, that he is in the habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charging falsehood upon his adversaries, myself and others. I now ask whether he is able to find in anything that Judge Trumbull, for instance, has said, or in anything that I have said, a justification at all compared with what we have, in this instance, for that sort of vulgarity.

I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of belief on my part that, in the introduction of the Nebraska bill into Congress, there was a conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national. I have arranged from time to time the evidence which establishes and proves the truth of this charge. I recurred to this charge at Ottawa. I shall not now have time to dwell upon it at very great length; but inasmuch as Judge Douglas, in his reply of half an hour, made some points upon me in relation to it, I propose noticing a few of them.

The Judge insists that, in the first speech I made, in which I very distinctly made that charge, he thought for a good while I was in fun! that I was
playful; that I was not sincere about it; and that he only grew angry and somewhat excited when he found that I insisted upon it as a matter of earnestness. He says he characterized it as a falsehood so far as I implicated his moral character in that transaction. Well, I did not know, till he presented that view, that I had implicated his moral character. He is very much in the habit, when he argues me up into a position I never thought of occupying, of very cosily saying he has no doubt Lincoln is "conscientious" in saying so. He should remember that I did not know but what he was altogether "conscientious" in that matter. I can conceive it possible for men to conspire to do a good thing, and I really find nothing in Judge Douglas's course or arguments that is contrary to or inconsistent with his belief of a conspiracy to nationalize and spread slavery as being a good and blessed thing; and so I hope he will understand that I do not at all question but that in all this matter he is entirely "conscientious."

But to draw your attention to one of the points I made in this case, beginning at the beginning. When the Nebraska bill was introduced, or a short time afterward, by an amendment, I believe, it was provided that it must be considered "the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of
the United States." I have called his attention to the fact that when he and some others began arguing that they were giving an increased degree of liberty to the people in the Territories over and above what they formerly had on the question of slavery, a question was raised whether the law was enacted to give such unconditional liberty to the people; and to test the sincerity of this mode of argument, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amendment, in which he made the law—if the amendment were adopted—expressly declare that the people of the Territory should have the power to exclude slavery if they saw fit. I have asked attention also to the fact that Judge Douglas and those who acted with him voted that amendment down, notwithstanding it expressed exactly the thing they said was the true intent and meaning of the law. I have called attention to the fact that in subsequent times a decision of the Supreme Court has been made, in which it has been declared that a Territorial Legislature has no constitutional right to exclude slavery. And I have argued and said that for men who did intend that the people of the Territory should have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and unconditionally, the voting down of Chase's amendment is wholly inexplicable. It is a puzzle, a riddle. But I have said, that with men who did look forward to such a decision, or who had it in contemplation that such a decision of the Supreme Court would or might be made, the voting down of that amendment would be perfectly rational and intelligible. It would keep
Congress from coming in collision with the decision when it was made. Anybody can conceive that if there was an intention or expectation that such a decision was to follow, it would not be a very desirable party attitude to get into for the Supreme Court—all or nearly all its members belonging to the same party—to decide one way, when the party in Congress had decided the other way. Hence it would be very rational for men expecting such a decision to keep the niche in that law clear for it. After pointing this out I tell Judge Douglas that it looks to me as though here was the reason why Chase's amendment was voted down. I tell him that, as he did it, and knows why he did it, if it was done for a reason different from this, he knows what that reason was, and can tell us what it was. I tell him, also, it will be vastly more satisfactory to the country for him to give some other plausible, intelligible reason why it was voted down than to stand upon his dignity and call people liars. Well, on Saturday he did make his answer; and what do you think it was? He says if I had only taken upon myself to tell the whole truth about that amendment of Chase's, no explanation would have been necessary on his part—or words to that effect. Now, I say here that I am quite unconscious of having suppressed anything material to the case, and I am very frank to admit if there is any sound reason other than that which appeared to me material, it is quite fair for him to present it. What reason does he propose? That when Chase came forward with his amendment ex-
pressly authorizing the people to exclude slavery from the limits of every Territory, General Cass proposed to Chase, if he (Chase) would add to his amendment that the people should have the power to *introduce or exclude*, they would let it go. This is substantially all of his reply. And because Chase would not do that, they voted his amendment down. Well, it turns out, I believe, upon examination, that General Cass took some part in the little running debate upon that amendment, and then ran away and *did not vote on it at all*. Is not that the fact? So confident, as I think, was General Cass that there was a snake somewhere about, he chose to run away from the whole thing. This is an inference I draw from the fact that, though he took part in the debate, his name does not appear in the ayes and noes. But does Judge Douglas's reply amount to a satisfactory answer? [Cries of "Yes," "Yes," and "No," "No."] There is some little difference of opinion here. But I ask attention to a few more views bearing on the question of whether it amounts to a satisfactory answer. The men who were determined that that amendment should not get into the bill and spoil the place where the Dred Scott decision was to come in, sought an excuse to get rid of it somewhere. One of these ways—one of these excuses—was to ask Chase to add to his proposed amendment a provision that the people might *introduce* slavery if they wanted to. They very well knew Chase would do no such thing, that Mr. Chase was one of the men differing from them on the broad principle of
his insisting that freedom was better than slavery,—a man who would not consent to enact a law, penned with his own hand, by which he was made to recognize slavery on the one hand, and liberty on the other, as precisely equal; and when they insisted on his doing this, they very well knew they insisted on that which he would not for a moment think of doing, and that they were only bluffing him. I believe (I have not, since he made his answer, had a chance to examine the journals of "Congressional Globe" and therefore speak from memory)—I believe the state of the bill at that time, according to parliamentary rules, was such that no member could propose an additional amendment to Chase's amendment. I rather think this is the truth,—the Judge shakes his head. Very well. I would like to know, then, if they wanted Chase's amendment fixed over, why somebody else could not have offered to do it? If they wanted it amended, why did they not offer the amendment? Why did they stand there taunting and quibbling at Chase? Why did they not put it in themselves? But to put it on the other ground: suppose that there was such an amendment offered, and Chase's was an amendment to an amendment; until one is disposed of by parliamentary law, you cannot pile another on. Then all these gentlemen had to do was to vote Chase's on, and then, in the amended form in which the whole stood, add their own amendment to it, if they wanted to put it in that shape. This was all they were obliged to do, and the ayes and noes show that there were thirty-
six who voted it down, against ten who voted in favor of it. The thirty-six held entire sway and control. They could in some form or other have put that bill in the exact shape they wanted. If there was a rule preventing their amending it at the time, they could pass that, and then, Chase's amendment being merged, put it in the shape they wanted. They did not choose to do so, but they went into a quibble with Chase to get him to add what they knew he would not add, and because he would not, they stand upon the flimsy pretext for voting down what they argued was the meaning and intent of their own bill. They left room thereby for this Dred Scott decision, which goes very far to make slavery national throughout the United States.

I pass one or two points I have, because my time will very soon expire; but I must be allowed to say that Judge Douglas recurs again, as he did upon one or two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln,—an insignificant individual like Lincoln,—upon his *ipse dixit* charging a conspiracy upon a large number of members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I want to say that, in the first place, I have made no charge of this sort upon *ipse dixit*. I have only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it, and presented it to the understanding of others, saying what I think it proves, but giving you the means of judging whether it proves it or not. This is precisely what I have done. I have not placed it upon my *ipse dixit* at all. On this occasion, I wish to recall his attention
to a piece of evidence which I brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing that he had made substantially the same charge against substantially the same persons, excluding his dear self from the category. I ask him to give some attention to the evidence which I brought forward that he himself had discovered a "fatal blow being struck" against the right of the people to exclude slavery from their limits, which fatal blow he assumed as in evidence in an article in the Washington "Union" published "by authority." I ask by whose authority? He discovers a similar or identical provision in the Lecompton Constitution. Made by whom? The framers of that Constitution. Advocated by whom? By all the members of the party in the nation, who advocated the introduction of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution.

I have asked his attention to the evidence that he arrayed to prove that such a fatal blow was being struck, and to the facts which he brought forward in support of that charge,—being identical with the one which he thinks so villainous in me. He pointed it, not at a newspaper editor merely, but at the President and his Cabinet and the members of Congress advocating the Lecompton Constitution and those framing that instrument. I must again be permitted to remind him that although my ipse dixit may not be as great as his, yet it somewhat reduces the force of his calling my attention to the enormity of my making a like charge against him.

Go on, Judge Douglas.
Ladies and Gentlemen: The silence with which you have listened to Mr. Lincoln during his hour is creditable to this vast audience, composed of men of various political parties. Nothing is more honorable to any large mass of people assembled for the purpose of a fair discussion than that kind and respectful attention that is yielded, not only to your political friends, but to those who are opposed to you in politics.

I am glad that at last I have brought Mr. Lincoln to the conclusion that he had better define his position on certain political questions to which I called his attention at Ottawa. He there showed no disposition, no inclination, to answer them. I did not present idle questions for him to answer, merely for my gratification. I laid the foundation for those interrogatories by showing that they constituted the platform of the party whose nominee he is for the Senate. I did not presume that I had the right to catechise him as I saw proper, unless I showed that his party, or a majority of it, stood upon the platform and were in favor of the propositions upon which my questions were based. I desired simply to know, inasmuch as he had been nominated as the first, last and only choice of his party, whether he concurred in the platform which that party had adopted for its government. In a few minutes I will proceed to review the answers which he has given to these interrogatories; but, in order to re-
lieve his anxiety, I will first respond to these which he has presented to me. Mark you, he has not presented interrogatories which have ever received the sanction of the party with which I am acting, and hence he has no other foundation for them than his own curiosity.

First, he desires to know if the people of Kansas shall form a constitution by means entirely proper and unobjectionable, and ask admission into the Union as a State, before they have the requisite population for a member of Congress, whether I will vote for that admission. Well, now, I regret exceedingly that he did not answer that interrogatory himself before he put it to me, in order that we might understand, and not be left to infer, on which side he is. Mr. Trumbull, during the last session of Congress, voted from the beginning to the end against the admission of Oregon, although a Free State, because she had not the requisite population for a member of Congress. Mr. Trumbull would not consent, under any circumstances, to let a State, free or slave, come into the Union until it had the requisite population. As Mr. Trumbull is in the field, fighting for Mr. Lincoln, I would like to have Mr. Lincoln answer his own question, and tell me whether he is fighting Trumbull on that issue or not. But I will answer his question. In reference to Kansas, it is my opinion that as she has population enough to constitute a Slave State, she has people enough for a Free State. I will not make Kansas an exceptional case to the other States
of the Union. I hold it to be a sound rule, of universal application, to require a Territory to contain the requisite population for a member of Congress before it is admitted as a State into the Union. I made that proposition in the Senate in 1856, and I renewed it during the last session, in a bill providing that no Territory of the United States should form a constitution and apply for admission until it had the requisite population. On another occasion I proposed that neither Kansas nor any other Territory should be admitted until it had the requisite population. Congress did not adopt any of my propositions containing this general rule, but did make an exception of Kansas. I will stand by that exception. Either Kansas must come in as a Free State, with whatever population she may have, or the rule must be applied to all the other Territories alike. I therefore answer at once, that, it having been decided that Kansas has people enough for a Slave State, I hold that she has enough for a Free State. I hope Mr. Lincoln is satisfied with my answer; and now I would like to get his answer to his own interrogatory,—whether or not he will vote to admit Kansas before she has the requisite population. I want to know whether he will vote to admit Oregon before that Territory has the requisite population. Mr. Trumbull will not, and the same reason that commits Mr. Trumbull against the admission of Oregon commits him against Kansas, even if she should apply for admission as a Free State. If there is any sincerity, any truth, in the argument of Mr. Trum-
bull in the Senate, against the admission of Oregon because she had not 93,420 people, although her population was larger than that of Kansas, he stands pledged against the admission of both Oregon and Kansas until they have 93,420 inhabitants. I would like Mr. Lincoln to answer this question. I would like him to take his own medicine. If he differs with Mr. Trumbull, let him answer his argument against the admission of Oregon, instead of poking questions at me.

The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, Can the people of a Territory in any lawful way, against the wishes of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State constitution. Mr. Lincoln knew that I had answered that question over and over again. He heard me argue the Nebraska bill on that principle all over the State in 1854, in 1855, and in 1856, and he has no excuse for pretending to be in doubt as to my position on that question. It matters not what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour
anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local legislature; and if the people are opposed to slavery, they will elect representatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a Slave Territory or a Free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point.

In this connection, I will notice the charge which he has introduced in relation to Mr. Chase's amendment. I thought that I had chased that amendment out of Mr. Lincoln's brain at Ottawa; but it seems that it still haunts his imagination, and he is not yet satisfied. I had supposed that he would be ashamed to press that question further. He is a lawyer, and has been a member of Congress, and has occupied his time and amused you by telling you about parliamentary proceedings. He ought to have known better than to try to palm off his miserable impositions upon this intelligent audience. The Nebraska bill provided that the legislative power and authority of the said Territory should extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the organic act and the Constitution of the United States. I did not make any exception as to slavery, but gave all the power that it was possible for Congress to give,
without violating the Constitution, to the Territorial legislature, with no exception or limitation on the subject of slavery at all. The language of that bill which I have quoted gave the full power and the full authority over the subject of slavery, affirmatively and negatively, to introduce it or exclude it, so far as the Constitution of the United States would permit. What more could Mr. Chase give by his amendment? Nothing. He offered his amendment for the identical purpose for which Mr. Lincoln is using it,—to enable demagogues in the country to try and deceive the people.

His amendment was to this effect. It provided that the legislature should have the power to exclude slavery; and General Cass suggested, "Why not give the power to introduce as well as exclude?" The answer was, They have the power already in the bill to do both. Chase was afraid his amendment would be adopted if he put the alternative proposition, and so make it fair both ways, but would not yield. He offered it for the purpose of having it rejected. He offered it, as he has himself avowed over and over again, simply to make capital out of it for the stump. He expected that it would be capital for small politicians in the country, and that they would make an effort to deceive the people with it; and he was not mistaken, for Lincoln is carrying out the plan admirably. Lincoln knows that the Nebraska bill, without Chase's amendment, gave all the power which the Constitution would permit. Could Congress confer any more?
go beyond the Constitution of the country? We gave all a full grant, with no exception in regard to slavery one way or the other. We left that question as we left all others, to be decided by the people for themselves, just as they please. I will not occupy my time on this question. I have argued it before, all over Illinois. I have argued it in this beautiful city of Freeport; I have argued it in the North, the South, the East, and the West, avowing the same sentiments and the same principles. I have not been afraid to avow my sentiments up here for fear I would be trotted down into Egypt.

The third question which Mr. Lincoln presented is, If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that a State of this Union cannot exclude slavery from its own limits, will I submit to it? I am amazed that Lincoln should ask such a question. ["A schoolboy knows better."] Yes, a schoolboy does know better. Mr. Lincoln's object is to cast an imputation upon the Supreme Court. He knows that there never was but one man in America, claiming any degree of intelligence or decency, who ever for a moment pretended such a thing. It is true that the Washington "Union," in an article published on the 17th of last December, did put forth that doctrine, and I denounced the article on the floor of the Senate; in a speech which Mr. Lincoln now pretends was against the President. The "Union" had claimed that slavery had a right to go into the Free States, and that any provision in the Constitution or laws of the Free States to the
contrary were null and void. I denounced it in the Senate, as I said before, and I was the first man who did. Lincoln's friends, Trumbull, and Seward, and Hale, and Wilson, and the whole Black Republican side of the Senate, were silent. They left it to me to denounce it. And what was the reply made to me on that occasion? Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, got up and undertook to lecture me on the ground that I ought not to have deemed the article worthy of notice, and ought not to have replied to it; that there was not one man, woman, or child south of the Potomac, in any Slave State, who did not repudiate any such pretension. Mr. Lincoln knows that that reply was made on the spot, and yet now he asks this question. He might as well ask me, Suppose Mr. Lincoln should steal a horse, would I sanction it; and it would be as genteel in me to ask him, in the event he stole a horse, what ought to be done with him. He casts an imputation upon the Supreme Court of the United States, by supposing that they would violate the Constitution of the United States. I tell him that such a thing is not possible. It would be an act of moral treason that no man on the bench could ever descend to. Mr. Lincoln himself would never in his partisan feelings so far forget what was right as to be guilty of such an act.

The fourth question of Mr. Lincoln is, Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard as to how such acquisition may affect the Union on the Slavery question? This question is very ingenuously and cunningly put.
The Black Republican creed lays it down expressly that under no circumstances shall we acquire any more territory, unless slavery is first prohibited in the country. I ask Mr. Lincoln whether he is in favor of that proposition. Are you [addressing Mr. Lincoln] opposed to the acquisition of any more territory, under any circumstances, unless slavery is prohibited in it? That he does not like to answer. When I ask him whether he stands up to that article in the platform of his party, he turns, Yankee-fashion, and without answering it, asks me whether I am in favor of acquiring territory without regard to how it may affect the Union on the slavery question. I answer that whenever it becomes necessary, in our growth and progress, to acquire more territory, that I am in favor of it, without reference to the question of slavery; and when we have acquired it, I will leave the people free to do as they please, either to make it slave or free territory, as they prefer. It is idle to tell me or you that we have territory enough. Our fathers supposed that we had enough when our territory extended to the Mississippi River; but a few years' growth and expansion satisfied them that we needed more, and the Louisiana territory, from the West branch of the Mississippi to the British possessions, was acquired. Then we acquired Oregon, then California and New Mexico. We have enough now for the present; but this is a young and growing nation. It swarms as often as a hive of bees; and as new swarms are turned out each year, there must be hives in which they can
gather and make their honey. In less than fifteen years, if the same progress that has distinguished this country for the last fifteen years continues, every foot of vacant land between this and the Pacific Ocean, owned by the United States, will be occupied. Will you not continue to increase at the end of fifteen years as well as now? I tell you, increase, and multiply, and expand, is the law of this nation's existence. You cannot limit this great Republic by mere boundary lines, saying, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no further." Any one of you gentlemen might as well say to a son twelve years old that he is big enough, and must not grow any larger; and in order to prevent his growth, put a hoop around him to keep him to his present size. What would be the result? Either the hoop must burst and be rent asunder, or the child must die. So it would be with this great nation. With our natural increase, growing with a rapidity unknown in any part of the globe, with the tide of emigration that is fleeing from despotism in the old world to seek refuge in our own, there is a constant torrent pouring into this country that requires more land, more territory upon which to settle; and just as fast as our interests and our destiny require additional territory in the North, in the South, or on the islands of the ocean, I am for it; and when we acquire it, will leave the people, according to the Nebraska bill, free to do as they please on the subject of slavery and every other question.

I trust now that Mr. Lincoln will deem himself
answered on his four points. He racked his brain so much in devising these four questions that he exhausted himself, and had not strength enough to invent the others. As soon as he is able to hold a council with his advisers, Lovejoy, Farnsworth, and Fred Douglass, he will frame and propound others. ["Good, good."] You Black Republicans who say good, I have no doubt think that they are all good men. I have reason to recollect that some people in this country think that Fred Douglass is a very good man. The last time I came here to make a speech, while talking from the stand to you, people of Freeport, as I am doing to-day, I saw a carriage—and a magnificent one it was—drive up and take a position on the outside of the crowd; a beautiful young lady was sitting on the box-seat, whilst Fred Douglass and her mother reclined inside, and the owner of the carriage acted as driver. I saw this in your own town. ["What of it?"] All I have to say of it is this, that if you, Black Republicans, think that the negro ought to be on a social equality with your wives and daughters, and ride in a carriage with your wife, whilst you drive the team, you have perfect right to do so. I am told that one of Fred Douglass's kinsmen, another rich black negro, is now traveling in this part of the State, making speeches for his friend Lincoln as the champion of black men. ["What have you to say against it?"] All I have to say on that subject is, that those of you who believe that the negro is your equal and ought to be on an equality with you socially, politi-
cally, and legally, have a right to entertain those opinions, and of course will vote for Mr. Lincoln.

I have a word to say on Mr. Lincoln's answers to the interrogatories contained in my speech at Ottawa, and which he has pretended to reply to here to-day. Mr. Lincoln makes a great parade of the fact that I quoted a platform as having been adopted by the Black Republican party at Springfield in 1854, which, it turns out, was adopted at another place. Mr. Lincoln loses sight of the thing itself in his ecstasies over the mistake I made in stating the place where it was done. He thinks that that platform was not adopted on the right "spot."

When I put the direct questions to Mr. Lincoln to ascertain whether he now stands pledged to that creed,—to the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, a refusal to admit any more Slave States into the Union, even if the people want them, a determination to apply the Wilmot Proviso, not only to all the territory we now have, but all that we may hereafter acquire,—he refused to answer; and his followers say, in excuse, that the resolutions upon which I based my interrogatories were not adopted at the "right spot." Lincoln and his political friends are great on "spots." In Congress, as a representative of this State, he declared the Mexican war to be unjust and infamous, and would not support it, or acknowledge his own country to be right in the contest, because he said that American blood was not shed on American soil in the "right spot." And now he cannot answer the questions I put to him at Ot-
tawa because the resolutions I read were not adopted at the "right spot." It may be possible that I was led into an error as to the spot on which the resolutions I then read were proclaimed, but I was not, and am not, in error as to the fact of their forming the basis of the creed of the Republican party when that party was first organized. I will state to you the evidence I had, and upon which I relied for my statement that the resolutions in question were adopted at Springfield on the 5th of October, 1854. Although I was aware that such resolutions had been passed in this district, and nearly all the Northern Congressional Districts and County Conventions, I had not noticed whether or not they had been adopted by any State convention. In 1856, a debate arose in Congress between Major Thomas L. Harris, of the Springfield District, and Mr. Norton, of the Joliet District, on political matters connected with our State, in the course of which, Major Harris quoted those resolutions as having been passed by the first Republican State Convention that ever assembled in Illinois. I knew that Major Harris was remarkable for his accuracy, that he was a very conscientious and sincere man, and I also noticed that Norton did not question the accuracy of this statement. I therefore took it for granted that it was so; and the other day when I concluded to use the resolutions at Ottawa, I wrote to Charles H. Lanphier, editor of the "State Register," at Springfield, calling his attention to them, telling him that I had been informed that Major Harris was lying sick at Springfield, and de-
siring him to call upon him and ascertain all the facts concerning the resolutions, the time and the place where they were adopted. In reply, Mr. Land- phier sent me two copies of his paper, which I have here. The first is a copy of the “State Register,” published at Springfield, Mr. Lincoln’s own town, on the 16th of October, 1854, only eleven days after the adjournment of the Convention, from which I desire to read the following:

“During the late discussions in this city, Lincoln made a speech, to which Judge Douglas replied. In Lincoln’s speech he took the broad ground that, according to the Declaration of Independence, the whites and blacks are equal. From this he drew the conclusion, which he several times repeated, that the white man had no right to pass laws for the government of the black man without the nigger’s consent. This speech of Lincoln’s was heard and applauded by all the Abolitionists assembled in Springfield. So soon as Mr. Lincoln was done speaking, Mr. Codding arose, and requested all the delegates to the Black Republican Convention to withdraw into the Senate chamber. They did so; and after long deliberation, they laid down the following Abolition platform as the platform on which they stood. We call the particular attention of all our readers to it.”

Then follows the identical platform, word for word, which I read at Ottawa. Now, that was published in Mr. Lincoln’s own town, eleven days after the Convention was held, and it has remained on record up to this day never contradicted.
When I quoted the resolutions at Ottawa and questioned Mr. Lincoln in relation to them, he said that his name was on the committee that reported them, but he did not serve, nor did he think he served, because he was, or thought he was, in Tazewell County at the time the Convention was in session. He did not deny that the resolutions were passed by the Springfield Convention. He did not know better, and evidently thought that they were; but afterward his friends declared that they had discovered that they varied in some respects from the resolutions passed by that Convention. I have shown you that I had good evidence for believing that the resolutions had been passed at Springfield. Mr. Lincoln ought to have known better; but not a word is said about his ignorance on the subject, whilst I, notwithstanding the circumstances, am accused of forgery.

Now, I will show you that if I have made a mistake as to the place where these resolutions were adopted,—and when I get down to Springfield I will investigate the matter, and see whether or not I have,—that the principles they enunciate were adopted as the Black Republican platform ["white, white"], in the various counties and Congressional Districts throughout the north end of the State in 1854. This platform was adopted in nearly every county that gave a Black Republican majority for the Legislature in that year, and here is a man [pointing to Mr. Denio, who sat on the stand near Deacon Bross] who knows as well as any living man
that it was the creed of the Black Republican party at that time. I would be willing to call Denio as a witness, or any other honest man belonging to that party. I will now read the resolutions adopted at the Rockford Convention on the 30th of August, 1854, which nominated Washburne for Congress. You elected him on the following platform:

"Resolved, That the continued and increasing aggressions of slavery in our country are destructive of the best rights of a free people, and that such aggressions cannot be successfully resisted without the united political action of all good men.

"Resolved, That the citizens of the United States hold in their hands, a peaceful, constitutional, and efficient remedy against the encroachments of the slave power,—the ballot box; and if that remedy is boldly and wisely applied the principles of liberty and eternal justice will be established.

"Resolved, That we accept this issue forced upon us by the slave power, and, in defence of freedom, will co-operate and be known as Republicans, pledged to the accomplishment of the following purposes:—

"To bring the Administration of the Government back to the control of first principles; to restore Kansas and Nebraska to the position of Free Territories; to repeal and entirely abrogate the Fugitive Slave law; to restrict slavery to those States in which it exists; to prohibit the admission of any more Slave States into the Union; to exclude slavery from all the Territories over which the General Government has exclusive jurisdiction; and to resist the acquisition of any more Terri-
tories, unless the introduction of slavery therein forever shall have been prohibited.

"Resolved, That in furtherance of these principles we will use such constitutional and lawful means as shall seem best adapted to their accomplishment, and that we will support no man for office under the General or State Government who is not positively committed to the support of these principles, and whose personal character and conduct is not a guarantee that he is reliable, and shall abjure all party allegiance and ties.

"Resolved, That we cordially invite persons of all former political parties whatever, in favor of the object expressed in the above resolutions, to unite with us in carrying them into effect."

Well, you think that is a very good platform, do you not? If you do, if you approve it now, and think it is all right, you will not join with those men who say I libel you by calling these your principles, will you? Now, Mr. Lincoln complains; Mr. Lincoln charges that I did you and him an injustice by saying that this was the platform of your party. I am told that Washburne made a speech in Galena last night, in which he abused me awfully for bringing to light this platform, on which he was elected to Congress. He thought that you had forgotten it, as he and Mr. Lincoln desired to. He did not deny that you had adopted it, and that he had subscribed to and was pledged by it, but he did not think it was fair to call it up and remind the people that it was their platform.
But, I am glad to find that you are more honest in your Abolitionism than your leaders, by avowing that it is your platform, and right, in your opinion.

In the adoption of that platform, you not only declared that you would resist the admission of any more Slave States, and work for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, but you pledged yourselves not to vote for any man for State or Federal offices who was not committed to these principles. You were thus committed. Similar resolutions to those were adopted in your county Convention here, and now with your admissions that they are your platform and embody your sentiments now as they did then, what do you think of Mr. Lincoln, your candidate for the United States Senate, who is attempting to dodge the responsibility of this platform, because it was not adopted in the right spot? I thought that it was adopted in Springfield; but it turns out it was not, that it was adopted at Rockford, and in the various counties which comprise this Congressional District. When I get into the next district, I will show that the same platform was adopted there, and so on through the State, until I nail the responsibility of it upon the Black Republican party throughout the State.

A voice: Couldn’t you modify, and call it brown?

Mr. Douglas: Not a bit. I thought that you were becoming a little brown when your members in Congress voted for the Crittenden-Montgomery bill; but since you have backed out from that posi-
tion and gone back to Abolitionism you are black, and not brown.

Gentlemen, I have shown you what your platform was in 1854. You still adhere to it. The same platform was adopted by nearly all the counties where the Black Republican party had a majority in 1854. I wish now to call your attention to the action of your representatives in the Legislature when they assembled together at Springfield. In the first place, you must remember that this was the organization of a new party. It is so declared in the resolutions themselves, which say that you are going to dissolve all old party ties and call the new party Republican. The old Whig party was to have its throat cut from ear to ear, and the Democratic party was to be annihilated and blotted out of existence, whilst in lieu of these parties the Black Republican party was to be organized on this Abolition platform. You know who the chief leaders were in breaking up and destroying these two great parties. Lincoln on the one hand, and Trumbull on the other, being disappointed politicians, and having retired, or been driven to obscurity by an outraged constituency because of their political sins, formed a scheme to Abolitionize the two parties, and lead the old line Whigs and old line Democrats captive, bound hand and foot, into the Abolition camp. Giddings, Chase, Fred Douglass, and Lovejoy were here to christen them whenever they were brought in. Lincoln went to work to dissolve the old line Whig party. Clay was dead; and although the sod
was not yet green on his grave, this man undertook to bring into disrepute those great Compromise measures of 1850, with which Clay and Webster were identified. Up to 1854 the old Whig party and the Democratic party had stood on a common platform so far as this slavery question was concerned. You Whigs and we Democrats differed about the bank, the tariff, distribution, the specie circular, and the sub-treasury, but we agreed on this slavery question, and the true mode of preserving the peace and harmony of the Union. The Compromise measures of 1850 were introduced by Clay, were defended by Webster, and supported by Cass, and were approved by Fillmore, and sanctioned by the National men of both parties. They constituted a common plank upon which both Whigs and Democrats stood. In 1852 the Whig party, in its last National Convention at Baltimore, indorsed and approved these measures of Clay, and so did the National Convention of the Democratic party held that same year. Thus the old line Whigs and the old line Democrats stood pledged to the great principle of self-government, which guarantees to the people of each Territory the right to decide the slavery question for themselves. In 1854, after the death of Clay and Webster, Mr. Lincoln, on the part of the Whigs, undertook to Abolitionize the Whig party, by dissolving it, transferring the members into the Abolition camp, and making them train under Giddings, Fred Douglass, Lovejoy, Chase, Farnsworth, and other Abolition leaders. Trumbull undertook to dissolve
the Democratic party by taking old Democrats into the Abolition camp. Mr. Lincoln was aided in his efforts by many leading Whigs throughout the State, your member of Congress, Mr. Washburne, being one of the most active. Trumbull was aided by many renegades from the Democratic party, among whom were John Wentworth, Tom Turner, and others, with whom you are familiar.

[Mr. Turner, who was one of the moderators, here interposed, and said that he had drawn the resolutions which Senator Douglas had read.]

Mr. Douglas: Yes, and Turner says that he drew these resolutions. ["Hurrah for Turner," "Hurrah for Douglas."] That is right; give Turner cheers for drawing the resolutions if you approve them. If he drew those resolutions, he will not deny that they are the creed of the Black Republican party.

Mr. Turner: They are our creed exactly.

Mr. Douglas: And yet Lincoln denies that he stands on them. Mr. Turner says that the creed of the Black Republican party is the admission of no more Slave States, and yet Mr. Lincoln declares that he would not like to be placed in a position where he would have to vote for them. All I have to say to friend Lincoln is, that I do not think there is much danger of his being placed in such an embarrassing position as to be obliged to vote on the admission of any more Slave States; I propose, out of mere kindness, to relieve him from any such necessity.
When the bargain between Lincoln and Trumbull was completed for Abolitionizing the Whig and Democratic parties, they "spread" over the State, Lincoln still pretending to be an old line Whig, in order to "rope in" the Whigs, and Trumbull pretending to be as good a Democrat as he ever was, in order to coax the Democrats over into the Abolition ranks. They played the part that "decoy ducks" play down on the Potomac River. In that part of the country they make artificial ducks, and put them on the water in places where the wild ducks are to be found, for the purpose of decoying them. Well, Lincoln and Trumbull played the part of these "decoy ducks," and deceived enough old line Whigs and old line Democrats to elect a Black Republican Legislature. When that Legislature met, the first thing it did was to elect as Speaker of the House the very man who is now boasting that he wrote the Abolition platform on which Lincoln will not stand. I want to know of Mr. Turner whether or not, when he was elected, he was a good embodiment of Republican principles?

Mr. Turner: I hope I was then, and am now.

Mr. Douglas: He swears that he hopes he was then, and is now. He wrote that Black Republican platform, and is satisfied with it now. I admire and acknowledge Turner's honesty. Every man of you knows that what he says about these resolutions being the platform of the Black Republican party is true, and you also know that each one of these men who are shuffling and trying to deny it is only try-
ing to cheat the people out of their votes for the purpose of deceiving them still more after the election. I propose to trace this thing a little further, in order that you can see what additional evidence there is to fasten this revolutionary platform upon the Black Republican party. When the Legislature assembled, there was a United States Senator to elect in the place of General Shields, and before they proceeded to ballot, Lovejoy insisted on laying down certain principles by which to govern the party. It has been published to the world and satisfactorily proven that there was, at the time the alliance was made between Trumbull and Lincoln to Abolitionize the two parties, an agreement that Lincoln should take Shields's place in the United States Senate, and Trumbull should have mine so soon as they could conveniently get rid of me. When Lincoln was beaten for Shields's place, in a manner I will refer to in a few minutes, he felt very sore and restive; his friends grumbled, and some of them came out and charged that the most infamous treachery had been practiced against him; that the bargain was that Lincoln was to have had Shields's place, and Trumbull was to have waited for mine, but that Trumbull, having the control of a few Abolitionized Democrats, he prevented them from voting for Lincoln, thus keeping him within a few votes of an election until he succeeded in forcing the party to drop him and elect Trumbull. Well, Trumbull having cheated Lincoln, his friends made a fuss, and in order to keep them and Lincoln quiet,
the party was obliged to come forward, in advance, at the last State election, and make a pledge that they would go for Lincoln and nobody else. Lincoln could not be silenced in any other way.

Now, there are a great many Black Republicans of you who do not know this thing was done. ["White, white," and great clamor.] I wish to remind you that while Mr. Lincoln was speaking there was not a Democrat vulgar and blackguard enough to interrupt him. But I know that the shoe is pinching you. I am clinching Lincoln now, and you are scared to death for the result. I have seen this thing before. I have seen men make appointments for joint discussions, and the moment their man has been heard, try to interrupt and prevent a fair hearing of the other side. I have seen your mobs before, and defy your wrath. [Tremendous applause.] My friends, do not cheer, for I need my whole time. The object of the opposition is to occupy my attention in order to prevent me from giving the whole evidence and nailing this double dealing on the Black Republican party. As I have before said, Lovejoy demanded a declaration of principles on the part of the Black Republicans of the Legislature before going into an election for United States Senator. He offered the following preamble and resolutions which I hold in my hand:

"Whereas, Human slavery is a violation of the principles of natural and revealed rights; and whereas the
fathers of the Revolution, fully imbued with the spirit of these principles, declared freedom to be the inalienable birthright of all men; and whereas the preamble to the Constitution of the United States avers that that instrument was ordained to establish justice, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; and, whereas, in furtherance of the above principles, slavery was forever prohibited in the old Northwest Territory, and more recently in all that Territory lying west and north of the State of Missouri, by the act of the Federal Government; and whereas the repeal of the prohibition last referred to was contrary to the wishes of the people of Illinois, a violation of an implied compact long deemed sacred by the citizens of the United States and a wide departure from the uniform action of the General Government in relation to the extension of slavery; therefore,

"Resolved, by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring therein, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested to introduce, if not otherwise introduced, and to vote for a bill to restore such prohibition to the aforesaid Territories, and also to extend a similar prohibition to all territory which now belongs to the United States, or which may hereafter come under their jurisdiction.

"Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested, to vote against the admission of any State into the Union, the Constitution of which does not prohibit slavery, whether the territory out of which such State may have been formed shall have been acquired by conquest, treaty, purchase, or from original territory of the United States.

"Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be
instructed, and our Representatives requested, to introduce and vote for a bill to repeal an Act entitled 'an Act respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters;' and, failing in that, for such a modification of it as shall secure the right of *habeas corpus* and trial by jury before the regularly constituted authorities of the State, to all persons claimed as owing service or labor."

Those resolutions were introduced by Mr. Lovejoy immediately preceding the election of Senator. They declared, first, that the Wilmot Proviso must be applied to all territory north of 36 deg. 30 min.; secondly, that it must be applied to all territory south of 36 deg. 30 min.; thirdly, that it must be applied to all the territory now owned by the United States; and finally, that it must be applied to all territory hereafter to be acquired by the United States. The next resolution declares that no more Slave States shall be admitted into this Union under any circumstances whatever, no matter whether they are formed out of territory now owned by us or that we may hereafter acquire, by treaty, by Congress, or in any manner whatever. The next resolution demands the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, although its unconditional repeal would leave no provision for carrying out that clause of the Constitution of the United States which guarantees the surrender of fugitives. If they could not get an unconditional repeal, they demanded that that law should be so modified as to make it as nearly useless as possible. Now, I want
to show you who voted for these resolutions. When
the vote was taken on the first resolution it was
decided in the affirmative,—yeas 41, nays 32. You
will find that this is a strict party vote, between the
Democrats on the one hand, and the Black Repub-
licans on the other. [Cries of "White, white," and
clamor.] I know your name, and always call things
by their right name. The point I wish to call your
attention to is this: that these resolutions were
adopted on the 7th day of February, and that on the
8th they went into an election for a United States
Senator, and that day every man who voted for these
resolutions, with but two exceptions, voted for Lin-
coln for the United States Senate. ["Give us their
names."] I will read the names over to you if you
want them, but I believe your object is to occupy
my time.

On the next resolution the vote stood—yeas 33,
nays 40; and on the third resolution—yeas 35, nays
47. I wish to impress it upon you that every man
who voted for those resolutions, with but two excep-
tions, voted on the next day for Lincoln for United
States Senator. Bear in mind that the members
who thus voted for Lincoln were elected to the Leg-
islature pledged to vote for no man for office under
the State or Federal Government who was not com-
mitted to this Black Republican platform. They
were all so pledged. Mr. Turner, who stands by
me, and who then represented you, and who says
that he wrote those resolutions, voted for Lincoln,
when he was pledged not to do so unless Lincoln
was in favor of those resolutions. I now ask Mr. Turner [turning to Mr. Turner], did you violate your pledge in voting for Mr. Lincoln, or did he commit himself to your platform before you cast your vote for him?

I could go through the whole list of names here, and show you that all the Black Republicans in the Legislature, who voted for Mr. Lincoln, had voted on the day previous for these resolutions. For instance, here are the names of Sargent and Little, of Jo Daviess and Carroll, Thomas J. Turner of Stephenson, Lawrence of Boone and McHenry, Swan of Lake, Pinckney of Ogle County, and Lyman of Winnebago. Thus you see every member from your Congressional District voted for Mr. Lincoln, and they were pledged not to vote for him unless he was committed to the doctrine of no more Slave States, the prohibition of slavery in the Territories, and the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. Mr. Lincoln tells you to-day that he is not pledged to any such doctrine. Either Mr. Lincoln was then committed to those propositions, or Mr. Turner violated his pledges to you when he voted for him. Either Lincoln was pledged to each one of those propositions, or else every Black Republican Representative from this Congressional District violated his pledge of honor to his constituents by voting for him. I ask you which horn of the dilemma will you take? Will you hold Lincoln up to the platform of his party, or will you accuse every Representative you had in the Legislature of violating his
pledge of honor to his constituents? There is no escape for you. Either Mr. Lincoln was committed to those propositions, or your members violated their faith. Take either horn of the dilemma you choose. There is no dodging the question; I want Lincoln's answer. He says he was not pledged to repeal the Fugitive Slave law, that he does not quite like to do it; he will not introduce a law to repeal it, but thinks there ought to be some law; he does not tell what it ought to be; upon the whole, he is altogether undecided, and don't know what to think or do. That is the substance of his answer upon the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. I put the question to him distinctly, whether he indorsed that part of the Black Republican platform which calls for the entire abrogation and repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. He answers, No! that he does not indorse that; but he does not tell what he is for, or what he will vote for. His answer is, in fact, no answer at all. Why cannot he speak out, and say what he is for, and what he will do?

In regard to there being no more Slave States, he is not pledged to that. He would not like, he says, to be put in a position where he would have to vote one way or another upon that question. I pray you, do not put him in a position that would embarrass him so much. Gentlemen, if he goes to the Senate, he may be put in that position, and then which way will he vote?

A Voice: How will you vote?

Mr. Douglas: I will vote for the admission of
just such a State as by the form of their constitution the people show they want; if they want slavery, they shall have it; if they prohibit slavery, it shall be prohibited. They can form their institutions to please themselves, subject only to the Constitution; and I, for one, stand ready to receive them into the Union. Why cannot your Black Republican candidates talk out as plain as that when they are questioned?

I do not want to cheat any man out of his vote. No man is deceived in regard to my principles if I have the power to express myself in terms explicit enough to convey my ideas.

Mr. Lincoln made a speech when he was nominated for the United States Senate which covers all these Abolition platforms. He there lays down a proposition so broad in its Abolitionism as to cover the whole ground.

"In my opinion it [the slavery agitation] will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States,—old as well as new, North as well as South."
There you find that Mr. Lincoln lays down the doctrine that this Union cannot endure divided as our fathers made it, with Free and Slave States. He says they must all become one thing, or all the other; that they must all be free or all slave, or else the Union cannot continue to exist; it being his opinion that to admit any more Slave States, to continue to divide the Union into Free and Slave States, will dissolve it. I want to know of Mr. Lincoln whether he will vote for the admission of another Slave State.

He tells you the Union cannot exist unless the States are all free or all slave; he tells you that he is opposed to making them all slave, and hence he is for making them all free, in order that the Union may exist; and yet he will not say that he will not vote against another Slave State, knowing that the Union must be dissolved if he votes for it. I ask you if that is fair dealing? The true intent and inevitable conclusion to be drawn from his first Springfield speech is, that he is opposed to the admission of any more Slave States under any circumstance. If he is so opposed, why not say so? If he believes this Union cannot endure divided into Free and Slave States, that they must all become free in order to save the Union, he is bound as an honest man to vote against any more Slave States. If he believes it, he is bound to do it. Show me that it is my duty, in order to save the Union, to do a particular act, and I will do it, if the Constitution does not prohibit it. I am not for the dissolution of the
Union under any circumstances. I will pursue no course of conduct that will give just cause for the dissolution of the Union. The hope of the friends of freedom throughout the world rests upon the perpetuity of this Union. The down-trodden and oppressed people who are suffering under European despotism all look with hope and anxiety to the American Union as the only resting place and permanent home of freedom and self-government.

Mr. Lincoln says that he believes that this Union cannot continue to endure with Slave States in it, and yet he will not tell you distinctly whether he will vote for or against the admission of any more Slave States, but says he would not like to be put to the test. I do not think he will be put to the test. I do not think that the people of Illinois desire a man to represent them who would not like to be put to the test on the performance of a high constitutional duty. I will retire in shame from the Senate of the United States when I am not willing to be put to the test in the performance of my duty. I have been put to severe tests. I have stood by my principles in fair weather and in foul, in the sunshine and in the rain. I have defended the great principles of self-government here among you when Northern sentiment ran in a torrent against me, and I have defended that same great principle when Southern sentiment came down like an avalanche upon me. I was not afraid of any test they put to me. I knew I was right; I knew my principles were sound; I knew that the people would see in the end that I had
done right, and I knew that the God of heaven would smile upon me if I was faithful in the performance of my duty.

Mr. Lincoln makes a charge of corruption against the Supreme Court of the United States, and two Presidents of the United States, and attempts to bolster it up by saying that I did the same against the Washington "Union." Suppose I did make that charge of corruption against the Washington "Union," when it was true, does that justify him in making a false charge against me and others? That is the question I would put. He says that at the time the Nebraska bill was introduced, and before it was passed, there was a conspiracy between the Judges of the Supreme Court, President Pierce, President Buchanan, and myself, by that bill and the decision of the court to break down the barrier and establish slavery all over the Union. Does he not know that that charge is historically false as against President Buchanan? He knows that Mr. Buchanan was at that time in England, representing this country with distinguished ability at the Court of St. James, that he was there for a long time before, and did not return for a year or more after. He knows that to be true, and that fact proves his charge to be false as against Mr. Buchanan. Then, again, I wish to call his attention to the fact that at the time the Nebraska bill was passed, the Dred Scott case was not before the Supreme Court at all; it was not upon the docket of the Supreme Court; it had not been brought there; and the Judges in all
probability knew nothing of it. Thus the history of the country proves the charge to be false as against them. As to President Pierce, his high character as a man of integrity and honor is enough to vindicate him from such a charge; and as to myself, I pronounce the charge an infamous lie, whenever and wherever made, and by whomsoever made. I am willing that Mr. Lincoln should go and rake up every public act of mine, every measure I have introduced, report I have made, speech delivered, and criticise them; but when he charges upon me a corrupt conspiracy for the purpose of perverting the institutions of the country, I brand it as it deserves. I say the history of the country proves it to be false, and that it could not have been possible at the time. But now he tries to protect himself in this charge, because I made a charge against the Washington "Union." My speech in the Senate against the Washington "Union" was made because it advocated a revolutionary doctrine, by declaring that the Free States had not the right to prohibit slavery within their own limits. Because I made that charge against the Washington "Union," Mr. Lincoln says it was a charge against Mr. Buchanan. Suppose it was: is Mr. Lincoln the peculiar defender of Mr. Buchanan? Is he so interested in the Federal Administration, and so bound to it, that he must jump to the rescue and defend it from every attack that I may make against it? I understand the whole thing. The Washington "Union," under that most corrupt of all men, Cornelius Wendell, is
advocating Mr. Lincoln's claim to the Senate. Wendell was the printer of the last Black Republican House of Representatives; he was a candidate before the present Democratic House, but was ignominiously kicked out; and then he took the money which he had made out of the public printing by means of the Black Republicans, bought the Washington "Union," and is now publishing it in the name of the Democratic party, and advocating Mr. Lincoln's election to the Senate. Mr. Lincoln therefore considers an attack upon Wendell and his corrupt gang as a personal attack upon him. This only proves what I have charged,—that there is an alliance between Lincoln and his supporters, and the Federal office-holders of this State, and the Presidential aspirants out of it, to break me down at home.

Mr. Lincoln feels bound to come in to the rescue of the Washington "Union." In that speech which I delivered in answer to the Washington "Union," I made it distinctly against the "Union," and against the "Union" alone. I did not choose to go beyond that. If I have reason to attack the President's conduct, I will do it in language that will not be misunderstood. When I differed with the President, I spoke out so that you all heard me. That question passed away; it resulted in the triumph of my principle, by allowing the people to do as they please; and there is an end of the controversy. Whenever the great principle of self-govern-
or without it, as they see proper,—shall again rise, you will find me standing firm in defence of that principle, and fighting whoever fights it. If Mr. Buchanan stands, as I doubt not he will, by the recommendation contained in his Message, that here-after all State constitutions ought to be submitted to the people before the admission of the State into the Union, he will find me standing by him firmly, shoulder to shoulder, in carrying it out. I know Mr. Lincoln’s object: he wants to divide the Demo-cratic party, in order that he may defeat me and get to the Senate.

[Mr. Douglas’s time here expired, and he stopped on the moment.]

MR. LINCOLN’S REJOINDER

My Friends: It will readily occur to you that I cannot, in half an hour, notice all the things that so able a man as Judge Douglas can say in an hour and a half; and I hope, therefore, if there be anything that he said upon which you would like to hear something from me, but which I omit to comment upon, you will bear in mind that it would be expect-ing an impossibility for me to go over his whole ground. I can but take up some of the points that he has dwelt upon, and employ my half-hour spe-cially on them.

The first thing I have to say to you is a word in
regard to Judge Douglas's declaration about the "vulgarity and blackguardism" in the audience,—that no such thing as he says, was shown by any Democrat while I was speaking. Now, I only wish, by way of reply on this subject, to say that while I was speaking, I used no "vulgarity or blackguardism" toward any Democrat.

Now, my friends, I come to all this long portion of the Judge's speech,—perhaps half of it,—which he has devoted to the various resolutions and platforms that have been adopted in the different counties in the different Congressional Districts, and in the Illinois Legislature, which he supposes are at variance with the positions I have assumed before you to-day. It is true that many of these resolutions are at variance with the positions I have here assumed. All I have to ask is that we talk reasonably and rationally about it. I happen to know, the Judge's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, that I have never tried to conceal my opinions, nor tried to deceive anyone in reference to them. He may go and examine all the members who voted for me for United States Senator in 1855, after the election of 1854. They were pledged to certain things here at home, and were determined to have pledges from me; and if he will find any of these persons who will tell him anything inconsistent with what I say now, I will resign, or rather retire from the race, and give him no more trouble. The plain truth is this:

At the introduction of the Nebraska policy, we
believed there was a new era being introduced in the history of the Republic which tended to the spread and perpetuation of slavery. But in our opposition to that measure we did not agree with one another in everything. The people in the north end of the State were for stronger measures of opposition than we of the central and southern portions of the State, but we were all opposed to the Nebraska doctrine. We had that one feeling and that one sentiment in common. You at the north end met in your Conventions and passed your resolutions. We in the middle of the State and further south did not hold such Conventions and pass the same resolutions, although we had in general a common view and a common sentiment. So that these meetings which the Judge has alluded to, and the resolutions he has read from, were local, and did not spread over the whole State. We at last met together in 1856, from all parts of the State, and we agreed upon a common platform. You, who held more extreme notions, either yielded those notions, or, if not wholly yielding them, agreed to yield them practically, for the sake of embodying the opposition to the measures which the opposite party were pushing forward at that time. We met you then, and if there was anything yielded, it was for practical purposes. We agreed then upon a platform for the party throughout the entire State of Illinois, and now we are all bound, as a party, to that platform. And I say here to you, if any one expects of me—in the case of my election—that I will do anything not
signified by our Republican platform and my answers here to-day, I tell you very frankly that person will be deceived. I do not ask for the vote of any one who supposes that I have secret purposes or pledges that I dare not speak out. Cannot the Judge be satisfied? If he fears, in the unfortunate case of my election, that my going to Washington will enable me to advocate sentiments contrary to those which I expressed when you voted for and elected me, I assure him that his fears are wholly needless and groundless. Is the Judge really afraid of any such thing? I'll tell you what he is afraid of. He is afraid we'll all pull together. This is what alarms him more than anything else. For my part, I do hope that all of us, entertaining a common sentiment in opposition to what appears to us a design to nationalize and perpetuate slavery, will waive minor differences on questions which either belong to the dead past or the distant future, and all pull together in this struggle. What are your sentiments? If it be true that on the ground which I occupy—ground which I occupy as frankly and boldly as Judge Douglas does his,—my views, though partly coinciding with yours, are not as perfectly in accordance with your feelings as his are, I do say to you in all candor, go for him, and not for me. I hope to deal in all things fairly with Judge Douglas, and with the people of the State, in this contest. And if I should never be elected to any office, I trust I may go down with no stain of falsehood upon my reputation, notwithstanding the
hard opinions Judge Douglas chooses to entertain of me. The Judge has again addressed himself to the Abolition tendencies of a speech of mine made at Springfield in June last. I have so often tried to answer what he is always saying on that melancholy theme that I almost turn with disgust from the discussion,—from the repetition of an answer to it. I trust that nearly all of this intelligent audience have read that speech. If you have, I may venture to leave it to you to inspect it closely, and see whether it contains any of those "bugaboos" which frighten Judge Douglas.

The Judge complains that I did not fully answer his questions. If I have the sense to comprehend and answer those questions, I have done so fairly. If it can be pointed out to me how I can more fully and fairly answer him, I aver I have not the sense to see how it is to be done. He says, I do not declare I would in any event vote for the admission of a Slave State into the Union. If I have been fairly reported, he will see that I did give an explicit answer to his interrogatories; I did not merely say that I would dislike to be put to the test, but I said clearly, if I were put to the test, and a Territory from which slavery had been excluded should present herself with a State constitution sanctioning slavery,—a most extraordinary thing, and wholly unlikely to happen,—I did not see how I could avoid voting for her admission. But he refuses to understand that I said so, and he wants this audience to understand that I did not say so. Yet it will be so
reported in the printed speech that he cannot help seeing it.

He says if I should vote for the admission of a Slave State I would be voting for a dissolution of the Union, because I hold that the Union cannot permanently exist half slave and half free. I repeat that I do not believe this government can endure permanently half slave and half free; yet I do not admit, nor does it all follow, that the admission of a single Slave State will permanently fix the character and establish this as a universal slave nation. The Judge is very happy indeed at working up these quibbles. Before leaving the subject of answering questions, I aver as my confident belief, when you come to see our speeches in print, that you will find every question which he has asked me more fairly and boldly and fully answered than he has answered those which I put to him. Is not that so? The two speeches may be placed side by side, and I will venture to leave it to impartial judges whether his questions have not been more directly and circumstantially answered than mine.

Judge Douglas says he made a charge upon the editor of the Washington "Union," alone, of entertaining a purpose to rob the States of their power to exclude slavery from their limits. I undertake to say, and I make the direct issue, that he did not make his charge against the editor of the "Union" alone. I will undertake to prove by the record here that he made that charge against more and higher dignitaries than the editor of the Washington
"Union." I am quite aware that he was shirking and dodging around the form in which he put it, but I can make it manifest that he leveled his "fatal blow" against more persons than this Washington editor. Will he dodge it now by alleging that I am trying to defend Mr. Buchanan against the charge? Not at all. Am I not making the same charge myself? I am trying to show that you, Judge Douglas, are a witness on my side. I am not defending Buchanan, and I will tell Judge Douglas that in my opinion, when he made that charge, he had an eye farther north than he was to-day. He was then fighting against people who called him a Black Republican and an Abolitionist. It is mixed all through his speech, and it is tolerably manifest that his eye was a great deal farther north than it is to-day. The Judge says that though he made this charge, Toombs got up and declared there was not a man in the United States, except the editor of the "Union," who was in favor of the doctrines put forth in that article. And thereupon I understand that the Judge withdrew the charge. Although he had taken extracts from the newspaper, and then from the Lecompton Constitution, to show the existence of a conspiracy to bring about a "fatal blow," by which the States were to be deprived of the right of excluding slavery, it all went to pot as soon as Toombs got up and told him it was not true. It reminds me of the story that John Phoenix, the California railroad surveyor, tells. He says they started out from the Plaza to the Mission of Dolores. They had two
ways of determining distances. One was by a chain and pins taken over the ground. The other was by a "go-it-ometer,"—an invention of his own,—a three-legged instrument, with which he computed a series of triangles between the points. At night he turned to the chainman to ascertain what distance they had come, and found that by some mistake he had merely dragged the chain over the ground, without keeping any record. By the "go-it-ometer" he found he had made ten miles. Being skeptical about this, he asked a drayman who was passing how far it was to the Plaza. The drayman replied it was just half a mile; and the surveyor put it down in his book,—just as Judge Douglas says, after he had made his calculations and computations, he took Toombs's statement. I have no doubt that after Judge Douglas had made his charge, he was as easily satisfied about its truth as the surveyor was of the drayman's statement of the distance to the Plaza. Yet it is a fact that the man who put forth all that matter which Douglas deemed a "fatal blow" at State sovereignty, was elected by the Democrats as public printer.

Now, gentlemen, you may take Judge Douglas's speech of March 22, 1858, beginning about the middle of page 21, and reading to the bottom of page 24, and you will find the evidence on which I say that he did not make his charge against the editor of the "Union" alone. I cannot stop to read it, but I will give it to the reporters. Judge Douglas said:
"Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions advanced boldly by the Washington 'Union' editorially, and apparently authoritatively, and every man who questions any of them is denounced as an Abolitionist, a Free-soiler, a fanatic. The propositions are, first, that the primary object of all government at its original institution is the protection of persons and property; second, that the Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited, are direct violations of the original intention of the Government and Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage on the rights of property, inasmuch as it was involuntarily done on the part of the owner.

"Remember that this article was published in the 'Union' on the 17th of November, and on the 18th appeared the first article, giving the adhesion of the 'Union' to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:

"'Kansas and her Constitution.—The vexed question is settled. The problem is solved. The dead point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to Kansas affairs is over and gone—'

"And a column, nearly of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it which was put forth editorially in the 'Union.' What is it?

"'Article 7, Section 1. The right of property is
before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and its increase is the same and as invariable as the right of the owner of any property whatever."

"Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended after 1864 by a two-thirds vote.

"'But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the ownership of slaves.'

"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they are identical in spirit with this authoritative article in the Washington 'Union' of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution.

"When I saw that article in the 'Union' of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."

Here he says, "Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions advanced boldly, and apparently authoritatively." By whose authority, Judge Douglas? Again, he says in another place,

"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they are identical in spirit with this authoritative article." By whose authority? Who do you mean to say authorized the publication of these articles? He knows that the Washington "Union" is considered the organ of the Administration. I demand of Judge Douglas by whose authority he meant to say those articles were
published, if not by the authority of the President of the United States and his Cabinet? I defy him to show whom he referred to, if not to these high functionaries in the Federal Government. More than this, he says the articles in that paper and the provisions of the Lecompton Constitution are "identical," and, being identical, he argues that the authors are co-operating and conspiring together. He does not use the word "conspiring," but what other construction can you put upon it? He winds up with this:

"When I saw that article in the 'Union' of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of the Union."

I ask him if all this fuss was made over the editor of this newspaper. It would be a terribly "fatal blow" indeed which a single man could strike, when no President, no Cabinet officer, no member of Congress, was giving strength and efficiency to the moment. Out of respect to Judge Douglas's good sense I must believe he didn't manufacture his idea of the "fatal" character of that blow out of such a miserable scapegrace as he represents that editor to be. But the Judge's eye is farther south now. Then, it was very peculiarly and decidedly north. His hope rested on the idea
of visiting the great "Black Republican" party, and making it the tail of his new kite. He knows he was then expecting from day to day to turn Republican, and place himself at the head of our organization. He has found that these despised "Black Republicans" estimate him by a standard which he has taught them none too well. Hence he is crawling back into his old camp, and you will find him eventually installed in full fellowship among those whom he was then battling, and with whom he now pretends to be at such fearful variance. [Loud applause, and cries of "Go on, go on."] I cannot, gentlemen; my time has expired.
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Four years ago I appeared before the people of Knox County for the purpose of defending my political action upon the Compromise Measures of 1850 and the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Those of you before me who were present then will remember that I vindicated myself for supporting those two measures by the fact that they rested upon the great fundamental principle that the people of each State and Territory of this Union have the right, and ought to be permitted to exercise the right, of regulating their own domestic concerns in their own way, subject to no other limitation or restriction than that which the Constitution of the United States imposes upon them. I then called upon the people of Illinois to decide whether that principle of self-government was right or wrong. If it was and is right, then the Compromise Measures of 1850 were right, and consequently, the Kansas and Nebraska bill, based upon the same principle, must necessarily have been right.

The Kansas and Nebraska bill declared, in so
many words, that it was the true intent and meaning of the Act not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. For the last four years I have devoted all my energies, in private and public, to commend that principle to the American people. Whatever else may be said in condemnation or support of my political course, I apprehend that no honest man will doubt the fidelity with which, under all circumstances, I have stood by it.

During the last year a question arose in the Congress of the United States whether or not that principle would be violated by the admission of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution. In my opinion, the attempt to force Kansas in under that constitution was a gross violation of the principle enunciated in the Compromise Measures of 1850, and the Kansas and Nebraska bill of 1854, and therefore I led off in the fight against the Lecompton Constitution, and conducted it until the effort to carry that constitution through Congress was abandoned. And I can appeal to all men, friends and foes, Democrats and Republicans, Northern men and Southern men, that during the whole of that fight I carried the banner of Popular Sovereignty aloft, and never allowed it to trail in the dust, nor lowered my flag until victory perched upon our arms. When the Lecompton Constitution was
defeated, the question arose in the minds of those who had advocated it what they should next resort to in order to carry out their views. They devised a measure known as the English bill, and granted a general amnesty and political pardon to all men who had fought against the Lecompton Constitution, provided they would support that bill. I for one did not choose to accept the pardon, or to avail myself of the amnesty granted on that condition. The fact that the supporters of Lecompton were willing to forgive all differences of opinion at that time in the event those who opposed it favored the English bill, was an admission they did not think that opposition to Lecompton impaired a man's standing in the Democratic party. Now, the question arises, what was that English bill which certain men are now attempting to make a test of political orthodoxy in this country? It provided, in substance, that the Lecompton Constitution should be sent back to the people of Kansas for their adoption or rejection, at an election which was held in August last, and in case they refused admission under it, that Kansas should be kept out of the Union until she had 93,420 inhabitants. I was in favor of sending the constitution back in order to enable the people to say whether or not it was their act and deed, and embodied their will; but the other proposition, that if they refused to come into the Union under it, they should be kept out until they had double or treble the population they then had, I never would sanction by my vote. The reason why I could not
sanction it is to be found in the fact that by the English bill, if the people of Kansas had only agreed to become a slaveholding State under the Lecompton Constitution, they could have done so with 35,000 people, but if they insisted on being a Free State, as they had a right to do, then they were to be punished by being kept out of the Union until they had nearly three times that population. I then said in my place in the Senate, as I now say to you, that whenever Kansas has population enough for a Slave State she has population enough for a Free State. I have never yet given a vote, and I never intend to record one, making an odious and unjust distinction between the different States of this Union. I hold it to be a fundamental principle in our republican form of government that all the States of this Union, old and new, free and slave, stand on an exact equality. Equality among the different States is a cardinal principle on which all our institutions rest. Wherever, therefore, you make a discrimination, saying to a Slave State that it shall be admitted with 35,000 inhabitants, and a Free State that it shall not be admitted until it has 93,000 or 100,000 inhabitants, you are throwing the whole weight of the Federal Government into the scale in favor of one class of States against the other. Nor would I on the other hand any sooner sanction the doctrine that a Free State could be admitted into the Union with 35,000 people, while a Slave State was kept out until it had 93,000. I have always declared in the Senate my willingness, and
I am willing now to adopt the rule, that no Territory shall ever become a State until it has the requisite population for a member of Congress, according to the then existing ratio. But while I have always been, and am now, willing to adopt that general rule, I was not willing and would not consent to make an exception of Kansas, as a punishment for her obstinacy in demanding the right to do as she pleased in the formation of her constitution. It is proper that I should remark here, that my opposition to the Lecompton Constitution did not rest upon the peculiar position taken by Kansas on the subject of slavery. I held then, and hold now, that if the people of Kansas want a Slave State, it is their right to make one, and be received into the Union under it; if, on the contrary, they want a Free State, it is their right to have it, and no man should ever oppose their admission because they ask it under the one or the other. I hold to that great principle of self-government which asserts the right of every people to decide for themselves the nature and character of the domestic institutions and fundamental law under which they are to live.

The effort has been and is now being made in this State by certain postmasters and other Federal office-holders to make a test of faith on the support of the English bill. These men are now making speeches all over the State against me and in favor of Lincoln, either directly or indirectly, because I would not sanction a discrimination between Slave
and Free States by voting for the English bill. But while that bill is made a test in Illinois for the purpose of breaking up the Democratic organization in this State, how is it in the other States? Go to Indiana, and there you find English himself, the author of the English bill, who is a candidate for re-election to Congress, has been forced by public opinion to abandon his own darling project, and to give a promise that he will vote for the admission of Kansas at once, whenever she forms a constitution in pursuance of law, and ratifies it by a majority vote of her people. Not only is this the case with English himself, but I am informed that every Democratic candidate for Congress in Indiana takes the same ground. Pass to Ohio, and there you find that Groesbeck, and Pendleton, and Cox, and all the other anti-Lecompton men who stood shoulder to shoulder with me against the Lecompton Constitution, but voted for the English bill, now repudiate it and take the same ground that I do on that question. So it is with the Joneses and others of Pennsylvania, and so it is with every other Lecompton Democrat in the Free States. They now abandon even the English bill, and come back to the true platform which I proclaimed at the time in the Senate, and upon which the Democracy of Illinois now stand. And yet, notwithstanding the fact that every Lecompton and anti-Lecompton Democrat in the Free States has abandoned the English bill, you are told that it is to be made a test upon me, while the power and patronage of the Government
are all exerted to elect men to Congress in the other States who occupy the same position with reference to it that I do. It seems that my political offence consists in the fact that I first did not vote for the English bill, and thus pledge myself to keep Kansas out of the Union until she has a population of 93,420, and then return home, violate that pledge, repudiate the bill, and take the opposite ground. If I had done this, perhaps the Administration would now be advocating my re-election, as it is that of the others who have pursued this course. I did not choose to give that pledge, for the reason that I did not intend to carry out that principle. I never will consent, for the sake of conciliating the frowns of power, to pledge myself to do that which I do not intend to perform. I now submit the question to you, as my constituency, whether I was not right, first, in resisting the adoption of the Lecompton Constitution, and, secondly, in resisting the English bill. I repeat that I opposed the Lecompton Constitution because it was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and did not embody their will. I denied the right of any power on earth, under our system of government, to force a constitution on an unwilling people. There was a time when some men could pretend to believe that the Lecompton Constitution embodied the will of the people of Kansas; but that time has passed. The question was referred to the people of Kansas under the English bill last August, and then, at a fair election, they rejected the Lecompton Constitution by a vote
of from eight to ten against it to one in its favor. Since it has been voted down by so overwhelming a majority, no man can pretend that it was the act and deed of that people. I submit the question to you whether or not, if it had not been for me, that constitution would have been crammed down the throats of the people of Kansas against their consent. While at least ninety-nine out of every hundred people here present agree that I was right in defeating that project, yet my enemies use the fact that I did defeat it by doing right, to break me down and put another man in the United States Senate in my place. The very men who acknowledge that I was right in defeating Lecompton now form an alliance with Federal office-holders, professed Lecompton men, to defeat me, because I did right. My political opponent, Mr. Lincoln, has no hope on earth, and has never dreamed that he had a chance of success, were it not for the aid that he is receiving from Federal office-holders, who are using their influence and the patronage of the Government against me in revenge for my having defeated the Lecompton Constitution. What do you Republicans think of a political organization that will try to make an unholy and unnatural combination with its professed foes to beat a man merely because he has done right? You know such is the fact with regard to your own party. You know that the axe of decapitation is suspended over every man in office in Illinois, and the terror of proscription is threatened every Democrat by the present Adminis-
tration, unless he supports the Republican ticket in preference to my Democratic associates and myself. I could find an instance in the postmaster of the city of Galesburgh, and in every other postmaster in this vicinity, all of whom have been stricken down simply because they discharged the duties of their offices honestly, and supported the regular Democratic ticket in this State in the right. The Republican party is availing itself of unworthy means in the present contest to carry the election, because its leaders know that if they let this chance slip they will never have another, and their hopes of making this a Republican State will be blasted forever.

Now, let me ask you whether the country has any interest in sustaining this organization, known as the Republican party. That party is unlike all other political organizations in this country. All other parties have been national in their character,—have avowed their principles alike in the Slave and Free States, in Kentucky as well as Illinois, in Louisiana as well as in Massachusetts. Such was the case with the old Whig party, and such was and is the case with the Democratic party. Whigs and Democrats could proclaim their principles boldly and fearlessly in the North and in the South, in the East and in the West, wherever the Constitution ruled, and the American flag waved over American soil.

But now you have a sectional organization, a party which appeals to the Northern section of the
Union against the Southern, a party which appeals to Northern passion, Northern pride, Northern ambition and Northern prejudices, against Southern people, the Southern States, and Southern institutions. The leaders of that party hope that they will be able to unite the Northern States in one great sectional party; and inasmuch as the North is the stronger section, that they will thus be enabled to out-vote, conquer, govern and control the South.

Hence you find that they now make speeches advocating principles and measures which cannot be defended in any slaveholding State of this Union. Is there a Republican residing in Galesburgh who can travel into Kentucky and carry his principles with him across the Ohio? What Republican from Massachusetts can visit the Old Dominion without leaving his principles behind him when he crosses Mason and Dixon's line? Permit me to say to you in perfect good humor, but in all sincerity, that no political creed is sound which cannot be proclaimed fearlessly in every State of this Union where the Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only is this Republican party unable to proclaim its principles alike in the North and South, in the Free States and in the Slave States, but it cannot even proclaim them in the same forms and give them the same strength and meaning in all parts of the same State. My friend Lincoln finds it extremely difficult to manage a debate in the central part of the State, where there is a mixture of men from the North and the South. In the ex-
treme northern part of Illinois he can proclaim as bold and radical Abolitionism as ever Giddings, Lovejoy, or Garrison enunciated; but when he gets down a little further south he claims that he is an old line Whig, a disciple of Henry Clay, and declares that he still adheres to the old line Whig creed, and has nothing whatever to do with Abolitionism, or negro equality, or negro citizenship. I once before hinted this of Mr. Lincoln in a public speech, and at Charleston he defied me to show that there was any difference between his speeches in the North and in the South, and that they were not in strict harmony. I will now call your attention to two of them, and you can then say whether you would be apt to believe that the same man ever uttered both. In a speech in reply to me at Chicago in July last, Mr. Lincoln, in speaking of the equality of the negro with the white man, used the following language:

"I should like to know, if, taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making exceptions to it, where will it stop? If one man says it does not mean a negro, why may not another man say it does not mean another man? If the Declaration is not the truth, let us get the statute book in which we find it, and tear it out. Who is so bold as to do it? If it is not true, let us tear it out."

You find that Mr. Lincoln there proposed that if the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, declaring all men to be born equal, did not include
the negro and put him on an equality with the white man, that we should take the statute book and tear it out. He there took the ground that the negro race is included in the Declaration of Independence as the equal of the white race, and that there could be no such thing as a distinction in the races, making one superior and the other inferior. I read now from the same speech:

"My friends [he says], I have detained you about as long as I desire to do, and I have only to say, let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man, this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position, discarding our standard that we have left us. Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal."

["That's right," etc.]

Yes, I have no doubt that you think it is right; but the Lincoln men down in Coles, Tazewell, and Sangamon counties do not think it is right. In the conclusion of the same speech, talking to the Chicago Abolitionists, he said: "I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal." ["Good, good."] Well, you say good to that, and you are going to vote for Lincoln because he holds that doctrine. I will not blame you for supporting him on that
ground, but I will show you, in immediate contrast with that doctrine, what Mr. Lincoln said down in Egypt in order to get votes in that locality, where they do not hold to such a doctrine. In a joint discussion between Mr. Lincoln and myself, at Charleston, I think, on the 18th of last month, Mr. Lincoln, referring to this subject, used the following language:

"I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters of the free negroes, or jurors, or qualifying them to hold office, or having them to marry with white people. I will say, in addition, that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which, I suppose, will forever forbid the two races living together upon terms of social and political equality; and inasmuch as they cannot so live, that while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, that I as much as any other man am in favor of the superior position being assigned to the white man."

["Good for Lincoln."]

Fellow-citizens, here you find men hurrahing for Lincoln, and saying that he did right, when in one part of the State he stood up for negro equality, and in another part, for political effect, discarded the doctrine, and declared that there always must be a superior and inferior race. Abolitionists up North are expected and required to vote for Lincoln
because he goes for the equality of the races, holding that by the Declaration of Independence the white man and the negro were created equal, and endowed by the divine law with that equality, and
down South he tells the old Whigs, the Kentuckians, Virginians, and Tennesseans, that there is a physical difference in the races, making one superior and the other inferior, and that he is in favor of maintaining the superiority of the white race over
the negro. Now, how can you reconcile those two positions of Mr. Lincoln? He is to be voted for in the South as a pro-slavery man, and he is to be voted for in the North as an Abolitionist. Up here he thinks it is all nonsense to talk about a difference between the races, and says that we must "discard all quibbling about this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position." Down South he makes this "quibble" about this race and that race and the other race being inferior as the creed of his party, and declares that the negro can never be elevated to the position of the white man. You find that his political meetings are called by different names in different counties in the State. Here they
are called Republican meetings; but in old Tazewell, where Lincoln made a speech last Tuesday, he did not address a Republican meeting, but "a grand rally of the Lincoln men." There are very few Republicans there, because Tazewell County is filled
with old Virginians and Kentuckians, all of whom are Whigs or Democrats; and if Mr. Lincoln had
called an Abolition or Republican meeting there, he would not get many votes. Go down into Egypt, and you find that he and his party are operating under an alias there, which his friend Trumbull has given them, in order that they may cheat the people. When I was down in Monroe County a few weeks ago, addressing the people, I saw handbills posted announcing that Mr. Trumbull was going to speak in behalf of Lincoln; and what do you think the name of his party was there? Why, the "Free Democracy." Mr. Trumbull and Mr. Jehu Baker were announced to address the Free Democracy of Monroe County, and the bill was signed, "Many Free Democrats." The reason that Lincoln and his party adopted the name of "Free Democracy" down there was because Monroe County has always been an old-fashioned Democratic county, and hence it was necessary to make the people believe that they were Democrats, sympathized with them, and were fighting for Lincoln as Democrats. Come up to Springfield, where Lincoln now lives, and always has lived, and you find that the Convention of his party which assembled to nominate candidates for Legislature, who are expected to vote for him if elected, dare not adopt the name of Republican, but assembled under the title of "all opposed to the Democracy." Thus you find that Mr. Lincoln's creed cannot travel through even one-half of the counties of this State, but that it changes its hues and becomes lighter and lighter as it travels from the extreme north, until it is nearly
white when it reaches the extreme south end of the State.

I ask you, my friends, why cannot Republicans avow their principles alike everywhere? I would despise myself if I thought that I was procuring your votes by concealing my opinions, and by avowing one set of principles in one part of the State, and a different set in another part. If I do not truly and honorably represent your feelings and principles, then I ought not to be your Senator; and I will never conceal my opinions, or modify or change them a hair’s breadth, in order to get votes. I tell you that this Chicago doctrine of Lincoln’s—declaring that the negro and the white man are made equal by the Declaration of Independence and by Divine Providence—is a monstrous heresy. The signers of the Declaration of Independence never dreamed of the negro when they were writing that document. They referred to white men, to men of European birth, and European descent, when they declared the equality of all men. I see a gentleman there in the crowd shaking his head. Let me remind him that when Thomas Jefferson wrote that document, he was the owner, and so continued until his death, of a large number of slaves. Did he intend to say in that Declaration that his negro slaves, which he held and treated as property, were created his equals by divine law, and that he was violating the law of God every day of his life by holding them as slaves? It must be borne in mind that when that Declaration was put forth,
all of the thirteen Colonies were slaveholding Colonies, and every man who signed that instrument represented a slaveholding constituency. Recollect, also, that no one of them emancipated his slaves, much less put them on an equality with himself, after he signed the Declaration. On the contrary, they all continued to hold their negroes as slaves during the Revolutionary War. Now, do you believe—are you willing to have it said—that every man who signed the Declaration of Independence declared the negro his equal, and then was hypocrite enough to continue to hold him as a slave, in violation of what he believed to be the divine law? And yet when you say that the Declaration of Independence includes the negro, you charge the signers of it with hypocrisy.

I say to you, frankly, that in my opinion this government was made by our fathers on the white basis. It was made by white men for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and was intended to be administered by white men in all time to come. But while I hold that under our Constitution and political system the negro is not a citizen, cannot be a citizen, and ought not to be a citizen, it does not follow by any means that he should be a slave. On the contrary, it does follow that the negro, as an inferior race, ought to possess every right, every privilege, every immunity, which he can safely exercise, consistent with the safety of the society in which he lives. Humanity requires, and Christianity commands, that you shall extend
to every inferior being, and every dependent being, all the privileges, immunities, and advantages which can be granted to them, consistent with the safety of society. If you ask me the nature and extent of these privileges, I answer that that is a question which the people of each State must decide for themselves. Illinois has decided that question for herself. We have said that in this State the negro shall not be a slave, nor shall he be a citizen. Kentucky holds a different doctrine. New York holds one different from either, and Maine one different from all. Virginia, in her policy on this question, differs in many respects from the others, and so on, until there are hardly two States whose policy is exactly alike in regard to the relation of the white man and the negro. Nor can you reconcile them and make them alike. Each State must do as it pleases. Illinois had as much right to adopt the policy which we have on that subject as Kentucky had to adopt a different policy. The great principle of this government is, that each State has the right to do as it pleases on all these questions, and no other State or power on earth has the right to interfere with us, or complain of us merely because our system differs from theirs. In the Compromise Measures of 1850, Mr. Clay declared that this great principle ought to exist in the Territories as well as in the States, and I reasserted his doctrine in the Kansas and Nebraska bill of 1854.

But Mr. Lincoln cannot be made to understand, and those who are determined to vote for him, no
matter whether he is a pro-slavery man in the South and a negro equality advocate in the North, cannot be made to understand how it is that in a Territory the people can do as they please on the slavery question under the Dred Scott decision. Let us see whether I cannot explain it to the satisfaction of all impartial men. Chief Justice Taney has said, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, that a negro slave, being property, stands on an equal footing with other property, and that the owner may carry them into the United States territory the same as he does other property. Suppose any two of you, neighbors, should conclude to go to Kansas, one carrying $100,000 worth of negro slaves, and the other $100,000 worth of mixed merchandise, including quantities of liquors. You both agree that under that decision you may carry your property to Kansas; but when you get it there, the merchant who is possessed of the liquors is met by the Maine liquor law, which prohibits the sale or use of his property, and the owner of the slaves is met by equally unfriendly legislation, which makes his property worthless after he gets it there. What is the right to carry your property into the Territory worth to either, when unfriendly legislation in the Territory renders it worthless after you get it there? The slaveholder when he gets his slaves there finds that there is no local law to protect him in holding them, no slave code, no police regulation maintaining and supporting him in his right, and he discovers at once that the absence of such friendly legislation
excludes his property from the Territory just as
irresistibly as if there was a positive Constitutional
prohibition excluding it. Thus you find it is with
any kind of property in a Territory: it depends for
its protection on the local and municipal law. If the
people of a Territory want slavery, they make
friendly legislation to introduce it; but if they do
not want it, they withhold all protection from it,
and then it cannot exist there. Such was the view
taken on the subject by different Southern men
when the Nebraska bill passed. See the speech of
Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, the present Speaker of
the House of Representatives of Congress, made at
that time; and there you will find this whole doc-
trine argued out at full length. Read the speeches
of other Southern Congressmen, Senators and Rep-
resentatives, made in 1854, and you will find that
they took the same view of the subject as Mr. Orr,
that slavery could never be forced on a people who
did not want it. I hold that in this country there
is no power on the face of the globe that can force
any institution on an unwilling people. The great
fundamental principle of our government is that
the people of each State and each Territory shall
be left perfectly free to decide for themselves what
shall be the nature and character of their institu-
tions. When this government was made, it was
based on that principle. At the time of its formation
there were twelve slaveholding States and one free
State in this Union. Suppose this doctrine of Mr.
Lincoln and the Republicans, of uniformity of laws
of all the States on the subject of slavery, had prevailed; suppose Mr. Lincoln himself had been a member of the Convention which framed the Constitution, and that he had risen in that august body, and, addressing the father of his country, had said as he did at Springfield: "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved, I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other." What do you think would have been the result? Suppose he had made that Convention believe that doctrine, and they had acted upon it, what do you think would have been the result? Do you believe that the one Free State would have outvoted the twelve slaveholding States, and thus abolish slavery? On the contrary, would not the twelve slaveholding States have outvoted the one Free State, and under his doctrine have fastened slavery by an irrevocable constitutional provision upon every inch of the American Republic? Thus you see that the doctrine he now advocates, if proclaimed at the beginning of the government, would have established slavery everywhere throughout the American continent; and are you willing, now that we have the majority section, to exercise a power which we never would have submitted to when we were in the minority? If the Southern States had attempted to control our institutions, and make the States all slave, when they had had the power, I ask
would you have submitted to it? If you would not, are you willing, now that we have become the strongest under that great principle of self-government that allows each State to do as it pleases, to attempt to control the Southern institutions? Then, my friends, I say to you that there is but one path of peace in this Republic, and that is to administer this government as our fathers made it, divided into Free and Slave States, allowing each State to decide for itself whether it wants slavery or not. If Illinois will settle the slavery question for herself, and mind her own business and let her neighbors alone, we will be at peace with Kentucky and every other Southern State. If every other State in the Union will do the same, there will be peace between the North and the South, and in the whole Union.

MR. LINCOLN’S REPLY

My Fellow-Citizens: A very large portion of the speech which Judge Douglas has addressed to you has previously been delivered and put in print. I do not mean that for a hit upon the Judge at all. If I had not been interrupted, I was going to say that such an answer as I was able to make to a very large portion of it, had already been more than once made and published. There has been an opportunity offered to the public to see our respective views upon the topics discussed in a large portion
of the speech which he has just delivered. I make these remarks for the purpose of excusing myself for not passing over the entire ground that the Judge has just traversed. I however desire to take up some of the points that he has attended to, and ask your attention to them, and I shall follow him backwards upon some notes which I have taken, reversing the order, by beginning where he concluded.

The Judge has alluded to the Declaration of Independence, and insisted that negroes are not included in that Declaration; and that it is a slander upon the framers of that instrument to suppose that negroes were meant therein; and he asks you: Is it possible to believe that Mr. Jefferson, who penned the immortal paper, could have supposed himself applying the language of that instrument to the negro race, and yet hold a portion of that race in slavery? Would he not at once have freed them? I only have to remark upon this part of the Judge's speech (and that, too, very briefly, for I shall not detain myself, or you, upon that point for any great length of time), that I believe the entire records of the world, from the date of the Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence; I think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that he ever said so, that Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any member of Congress ever said so,
or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so, until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that affirmation. And I will remind Judge Douglas and his audience that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was, in speaking upon this very subject he used the strong language that “he trembled for his country when he remembered that God was just”; and I will offer the highest premium in my power to Judge Douglas if he will show me that he in all his life, ever uttered a sentiment at all akin to that of Jefferson.

The next thing to which I will ask your attention is the Judge’s comments upon the fact, as he assumes it to be, that we cannot call our public meetings as Republican meetings; and he instances Tazewell County as one of the places where the friends of Lincoln have called a public meeting and have not dared to name it a Republican meeting. He instances Monroe County as another, where Judge Trumbull and Jehu Baker addressed the persons whom the Judge assumes to be the friends of Lincoln, calling them the “Free Democracy.” I have the honor to inform Judge Douglas that he spoke in that very county of Tazewell last Saturday, and I was there on Tuesday last; and when he spoke there, he spoke under a call not venturing to use the word “Democrat.” [Turning to Judge Douglas.] What think you of this?

So, again, there is another thing to which I would ask the Judge’s attention upon this subject. In the
contest of 1856 his party delighted to call themselves together as the "National Democracy"; but now, if there should be a notice put up anywhere for a meeting of the "National Democracy," Judge Douglas and his friends would not come. They would not suppose themselves invited. They would understand that it was a call for those hateful post-masters whom he talks about.

Now a few words in regard to these extracts from speeches of mine which Judge Douglas has read to you, and which he supposes are in very great contrast to each other. Those speeches have been before the public for a considerable time, and if they have any inconsistency in them, if there is any conflict in them, the public have been able to detect it. When the Judge says, in speaking on this subject, that I make speeches of one sort for the people of the northern end of the State, and of a different sort for the southern people, he assumes that I do not understand that my speeches will be put in print and read north and south. I knew all the while that the speech that I made at Chicago and the one I made at Jonesboro and the one at Charleston, would all be put in print, and all the reading and intelligent men in the community would see them and know all about my opinions. And I have not supposed, and do not now suppose, that there is any conflict whatever between them. But the Judge will have it that if we do not confess that there is a sort of inequality between the white and black races which justifies us in making them slaves,
we must then insist that there is a degree of equality that requires us to make them our wives. Now, I have all the while taken a broad distinction in regard to that matter; and that is all there is in these different speeches which he arrays here; and the entire reading of either of the speeches will show that that distinction was made. Perhaps by taking two parts of the same speech he could have got up as much of a conflict as the one he has found. I have all the while maintained that in so far as it should be insisted that there was an equality between the white and black races that should produce a perfect social and political equality, it was an impossibility. This you have seen in my printed speeches, and with it I have said that in their right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," as proclaimed in that old Declaration, the inferior races are our equals. And these declarations I have constantly made in reference to the abstract moral question, to contemplate and consider when we are legislating about any new country which is not already cursed with the actual presence of the evil,—slavery. I have never manifested any impatience with the necessities that spring from the actual presence of black people amongst us, and the actual existence of slavery amongst us where it does already exist; but I have insisted that, in legislating for new countries where it does not exist, there is no just rule other than that of moral and abstract right! With reference to those new countries, those maxims as to the right of a people to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
"piness" were the just rules to be constantly referred to. There is no misunderstanding this, except by men interested to misunderstand it. I take it that I have to address an intelligent and reading community, who will peruse what I say, weigh it, and then judge whether I advance improper or unsound views, or whether I advance hypocritical, and deceptive, and contrary views in different portions of the country. I believe myself to be guilty of no such thing as the latter, though, of course, I cannot claim that I am entirely free from all error in the opinions I advance.

The Judge has also detained us awhile in regard to the distinction between his party and our party. His he assumes to be a national party,—ours a sectional one. He does this in asking the question whether this country has any interest in the maintenance of the Republican party? He assumes that our party is altogether sectional, that the party to which he adheres is national; and the argument is, that no party can be a rightful party—can be based upon rightful principles—unless it can announce its principles everywhere. I presume that Judge Douglas could not go into Russia and announce the doctrine of our national Democracy; he could not denounce the doctrine of kings and emperors and monarchies in Russia; and it may be true of this country that in some places we may not be able to proclaim a doctrine as clearly true as the truth of Democracy, because there is a section so directly opposed to it that they will not tolerate us in doing
so. Is it the true test of the soundness of a doctrine that in some places people won’t let you proclaim it? Is that the way to test the truth of any doctrine? Why, I understood that at one time the people of Chicago would not let Judge Douglas preach a certain favorite doctrine of his. I commend to his consideration the question, whether he takes that as a test of the unsoundness of what he wanted to preach.

There is another thing to which I wish to ask attention for a little while on this occasion. What has always been the evidence brought forward to prove that the Republican party is a sectional party? The main one was that in the Southern portion of the Union the people did not let the Republicans proclaim their doctrines amongst them. That has been the main evidence brought forward,—that they had no supporters, or substantially none, in the Slave States. The South have not taken hold of our principles as we announce them; nor does Judge Douglas now grapple with those principles. We have a Republican State Platform, laid down in Springfield in June last, stating our position all the way through the questions before the country. We are now far advanced in this canvass. Judge Douglas and I have made perhaps forty speeches apiece, and we have now for the fifth time met face to face in debate, and up to this day I have not found either Judge Douglas or any friend of his taking hold of the Republican platform, or laying his finger upon anything in it that is wrong. I ask you all to
recollect that. Judge Douglas turns away from the platform of principles to the fact that he can find people somewhere who will not allow us to announce those principles. If he had great confidence that our principles were wrong, he would take hold of them and demonstrate them to be wrong. But he does not do so. The only evidence he has of their being wrong is in the fact that there are people who won't allow us to preach them. I ask again, is that the way to test the soundness of a doctrine?

I ask his attention also to the fact that by the rule of nationality he is himself fast becoming sectional. I ask his attention to the fact that his speeches would not go as current now south of the Ohio River as they have formerly gone there. I ask his attention to the fact that he felicitates himself to-day that all the Democrats of the Free States are agreeing with him, while he omits to tell us that the Democrats of any Slave State agree with him. If he has not thought of this, I commend to his consideration the evidence in his own declaration, on this day, of his becoming sectional too. I see it rapidly approaching. Whatever may be the result of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I see the day rapidly approaching when this pill of sectionalism, which he has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will be crowded down his own throat.

Now, in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his speech) about the Compromise of 1850 containing the principle of the Nebraska bill,
although I have often presented my views upon that subject, yet as I have not done so in this canvass, I will, if you please, detain you a little with them. I have always maintained, so far as I was able, that there was nothing of the principle of the Nebraska bill in the Compromise of 1850 at all,—nothing whatever. Where can you find the principle of the Nebraska bill in that Compromise? If anywhere, in the two pieces of the Compromise organizing the Territories of New Mexico and Utah. It was expressly provided in these two Acts that when they came to be admitted into the Union, they should be admitted with or without slavery, as they should choose, by their own constitutions. Nothing was said in either of those Acts as to what was to be done in relation to slavery during the Territorial existence of those Territories, while Henry Clay constantly made the declaration (Judge Douglas recognizing him as a leader) that, in his opinion, the old Mexican laws would control that question during the Territorial existence, and that these old Mexican laws excluded slavery. How can that be used as a principle for declaration that during the Territorial existence as well as at the time of framing the constitution, the people, if you please, might have slaves if they wanted them? I am not discussing the question whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New Mexican and Utah laws patterns for the Nebraska bill? I maintain that the organization of Utah and New Mexico did not establish a general principle at all. It had no
feature of establishing a general principle. The Acts to which I have referred were a part of a general system of Compromises. They did not lay down what was proposed as a regular policy for the Territories, only an agreement in this particular case to do in that way, because other things were done that were to be a compensation for it. They were allowed to come in in that shape, because in another way it was paid for,—considering that as a part of that system of measures called the Compromise of 1850, which finally included half-a-dozen Acts. It included the admission of California as a free State, which was kept out of the Union for half a year because it had formed a free constitution. It included the settlement of the boundary of Texas, which had been undefined before, which was in itself a slavery question; for if you pushed the line farther west, you made Texas larger, and made more slave territory; while, if you drew the line toward the east, you narrowed the boundary and diminished the domain of slavery, and by so much increased free territory. It included the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It included the passage of a new Fugitive Slave law. All these things were put together, and though passed in separate Acts, were nevertheless in legislation (as the speeches at the time will show) made to depend upon each other. Each got votes, with the understanding that the other measures were to pass, and by this system of Compromise, in that series of measures, those two bills—the New Mexico and
Utah bills—were passed: and I say for that reason they could not be taken as models, framed upon their own intrinsic principle, for all future Territories. And I have the evidence of this in the fact that Judge Douglas, a year afterward, or more than a year afterward, perhaps, when he first introduced bills for the purpose of framing new Territories, did not attempt to follow these bills of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska bill, I think you will discover that he did not exactly follow them. But I do not wish to dwell at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own opinion is, that a thorough investigation will show most plainly that the New Mexico and Utah bills were part of a system of compromise, and not designed as patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this Nebraska bill did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious distinctions between Free and Slave States. I am altogether unaware that the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the Free and Slave States. But there is still a difference, I think, between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans, on the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any difference between slavery and liberty; that he is in favor of eradicating, or pressing out of view, the questions of preference in this country for free or slave
institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery. Everything that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of policy carefully excludes the thought that there is anything wrong in slavery. All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to exclude the thought that there is anything whatever wrong in slavery. If you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him,—as his declaration that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or down," you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong. If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge Douglas declares that if any community wants slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong. He insists that, upon the score of equality, the owners of slaves and owners of property—of horses and every other sort of property—should be alike, and hold them alike in a new Territory. That is perfectly logical if the two species of property are alike and are equally founded in right. But if you admit that one of them is wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and wrong. And from this difference of sentiment,—the belief on the part of one that the institution is wrong, and
a policy springing from that belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong; and this other sentiment, that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung from that sentiment, which will tolerate no idea of preventing the wrong from growing larger, and looks to there never being an end to it through all the existence of things,—arises the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends on the one hand, and the Republicans on the other.

Now, I confess myself as belonging to that class in the country who contemplate slavery as a moral, social, and political evil, having due regard for its actual existence amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and to all the constitutional obligations which have been thrown about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy that looks to the prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when as a wrong it may come to an end.

Judge Douglas has again, for, I believe, the fifth time, if not the seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of conspiracy or combination between the National Democrats and Republicans. What evidence Judge Douglas has upon this subject I know not, inasmuch as he never favors us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and I do not choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the division in the Judge's party. He got it up himself. It was all his and their work. He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the steps that led to the Lecompton Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had;
though at last, when they reached it, they quarreled over it, and their friends divided upon it. I am very free to confess to Judge Douglas that I have no objection to the division; but I defy the Judge to show any evidence that I have in any way promoted that division, unless he insists on being a witness himself in merely saying so. I can give all fair friends of Judge Douglas here to understand exactly the view that Republicans take in regard to that division. Don't you remember how two years ago the opponents of the Democratic party were divided between Fremont and Fillmore? I guess you do. Any Democrat who remembers that division will remember also that he was at the time very glad of it, and then he will be able to see all there is between the National Democrats and the Republicans. What we now think of the two divisions of Democrats, you then thought of the Fremont and Fillmore divisions. That is all there is of it.

But if the Judge continues to put forward the declaration that there is an unholy and unnatural alliance between the Republicans and the National Democrats, I now want to enter my protest against receiving him as an entirely competent witness upon that subject. I want to call to the Judge's attention an attack he made upon me in the first one of these debates, at Ottawa, on the 21st of August. In order to fix extreme Abolitionism upon me, Judge Douglas read a set of resolutions which he declared had been passed by a Republican State Convention,
in October, 1854, at Springfield, Illinois, and he declared I had taken part in that Convention. It turned out that although a few men calling themselves an anti-Nebraska State Convention had sat at Springfield about that time, yet neither did I take any part in it, nor did it pass the resolutions or any such resolutions as Judge Douglas read. So apparent had it become that the resolutions which he read had not been passed at Springfield at all, nor by a State Convention in which I had taken part, that seven days afterward, at Freeport, Judge Douglas declared that he had been misled by Charles H. Lanphier, editor of the “State Register,” and Thomas L. Harris, member of Congress in that District, and he promised in that speech that when he went to Springfield he would investigate the matter. Since then Judge Douglas has been to Springfield, and I presume has made the investigation; but a month has passed since he has been there, and, so far as I know, he has made no report of the result of his investigation. I have waited as I think sufficient time for the report of that investigation, and I have some curiosity to see and hear it. A fraud, an absolute forgery was committed, and the perpetration of it was traced to the three,—Lanphier, Harris, and Douglas. Whether it can be narrowed in any way so as to exonerate any one of them, is what Judge Douglas’s report would probably show.

It is true that the set of resolutions read by Judge Douglas were published in the Illinois “State Reg-
ister” on the 16th of October, 1854, as being the resolutions of an anti-Nebraska Convention which had sat in that same month of October, at Springfield. But it is also true that the publication in the “Register” was a forgery then, and the question is still behind, which of the three if not all of them, committed that forgery? The idea that it was done by mistake, is absurd. The article in the Illinois “State Register” contains part of the real proceedings of that Springfield Convention, showing that the writer of the article had the real proceedings before him, and purposely threw out the genuine resolutions passed by the Convention, and fraudulently substituted the others. Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of the “Register,” so that there seems to be but little room for his escape. But then it is to be borne in mind that Lanphier had less interest in the object of that forgery than either of the other two. The main object of that forgery at that time was to beat Yates and elect Harris to Congress, and that object was known to be exceedingly dear to Judge Douglas at that time. Harris and Douglas were both in Springfield when the Convention was in session, and although they both left before the fraud appeared in the “Register,” subsequent events show that they have both had their eyes fixed upon that Convention.

The fraud having been apparently successful upon the occasion, both Harris and Douglas have more than once since then been attempting to put it to new uses. As the fisherman’s wife, whose drowned
husband was brought home with his body full of eels, said when she was asked, what was to be done with him, "Take the eels out and set him again," so Harris and Douglas have shown a disposition to take the eels out of that stale fraud by which they gained Harris's election, and set the fraud again more than once. On the 9th of July, 1856, Douglas attempted a repetition of it upon Trumbull on the floor of the Senate of the United States, as will appear from the appendix of the "Congressional Globe" of that date.

On the 9th of August, Harris attempted it again upon Norton in the House of Representatives, as will appear by the same documents,—the appendix to the "Congressional Globe" of that date. On the 21st of August last, all three—Lanphier, Douglas and Harris—reattempted it upon me at Ottawa. It has been clung to and played out again and again as an exceedingly high trump by this blessed trio. And now that it has been discovered publicly to be a fraud, we find that Judge Douglas manifests no surprise at it at all. He makes no complaint of Lanphier, who must have known it to be a fraud from the beginning. He, Lanphier, and Harris are just as cozy now, and just as active in the concoction of new schemes as they were before the general discovery of this fraud. Now, all this is very natural if they are all alike guilty in that fraud, and it is very unnatural if any one of them is innocent. Lanphier perhaps insists that the rule of honor among thieves does not quite require him to
take all upon himself, and consequently my friend Judge Douglas finds it difficult to make a satisfactory report upon his investigation. But meanwhile the three are agreed that each is "a most honorable man."

Judge Douglas requires an indorsement of his truth and honor by a re-election to the United States Senate, and he makes and reports against me and against Judge Trumbull, day after day, charges which we know to be utterly untrue, without for a moment seeming to think that this one unexplained fraud, which he promised to investigate, will be the least drawback to his claim to belief. Harris ditto. He asks a re-election to the lower House of Congress without seeming to remember at all that he is involved in this dishonorable fraud! The Illinois "State Register," edited by Lanphier, then, as now, the central organ of both Harris and Douglas, continues to din the public ear with this assertion, without seeming to suspect that these assertions are at all lacking in title to belief.

After all, the question still recurs upon us, How did that fraud originally get into the "State Register"? Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of that paper. Lanphier knows. Lanphier cannot be ignorant of how and by whom it was originally concocted. Can he be induced to tell, or, if he has told, can Judge Douglas be induced to tell how it originally was concocted? It may be true that Lanphier insists that the two men for whose benefit it was originally devised shall at least bear their share
of it! How that is, I do not know, and while it
remains unexplained, I hope to be pardoned if I
insist that the mere fact of Judge Douglas making
charges against Trumbull and myself is not quite
sufficient evidence to establish them!

While we were at Freeport, in one of these joint
discussions, I answered certain interrogatories
which Judge Douglas had propounded to me, and
then in turn propounded some to him, which he in a
sort of way answered. The third one of these inter-
rogatories I have with me, and wish now to make
some comments upon it. It was in these words:
"If the Supreme Court of the United States shall
decide that the States cannot exclude slavery from
their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in,
adhering to, and following such decision as a rule
of political action?"

To this interrogatory Judge Douglas made no
answer in any just sense of the word. He con-
tented himself with sneering at the thought that
it was possible for the Supreme Court ever to make
such a decision. He sneered at me for propounding
the interrogatory. I had not propounded it
without some reflection, and I wish now to address
to this audience some remarks upon it.

In the second clause of the sixth article, I believe
it is, of the Constitution of the United States, we
find the following language: "This Constitution
and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence which I will now read: “Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.” I repeat it, “The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution!” What is it to be “affirmed” in the Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution,—so made that it cannot be separated from the Constitution without breaking the Constitution; durable as the Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution which I have read; affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of the land; that the Judges of every State shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it without breaking it; durable as the instrument; part of the instrument;—what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable of arguing, whether as I state it, in syllogistic form, the argument has any fault in it?

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State
can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a slave.

I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a fault of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the right of a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed. I say, therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is true with Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme Court who pronounced it. They are estopped from denying it, and being estopped from denying it, the conclusion follows that, the Constitution of the United States being the supreme law, no constitution or law can interfere with it. It being affirmed in the decision that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, the conclusion inev-
itably follows that no State law or constitution can destroy that right. I then say to Judge Douglas and to all others that I think it will take a better answer than a sneer to show that those who have said that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, are not prepared to show that no constitution or law can destroy that right. I say I believe it will take a far better argument than a mere sneer to show to the minds of intelligent men that whoever has so said, is not prepared, whenever public sentiment is so far advanced as to justify it, to say the other. This is but an opinion, and the opinion of one very humble man; but it is my opinion that the Dred Scott decision, as it is, never would have been made in its present form if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be made, if that party is not sustained by the elections. I believe, further, that it is just as sure to be made as to-morrow is to come, if that party shall be sustained. I have said, upon a former occasion, and I repeat it now, that the course of argument that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge not his motives in this), is preparing the public mind for that new Dred Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the reasons for his first adherence to the Dred Scott decision as it is. I have turned his attention to the fact
that General Jackson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. I have asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. Jefferson said that “Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so.” And he said, substantially, that “whenever a free people should give up in absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their liberties were gone.” I have asked his attention to the fact that the Cincinnati platform upon which he says he stands, disregards a time-honored decision of the Supreme Court, in denying the power of Congress to establish a National Bank. I have asked his attention to the fact that he himself was one of the most active instruments at one time in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, because it had made a decision distasteful to him,—a struggle ending in the remarkable circumstance of his sitting down as one of the new Judges who were to overslaugh that decision; getting his title of Judge in that very way.

So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he swells himself up and says, “All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you fellows that dare question it in any way, are the enemies of the Constitution.” Now, in this very devoted adherence to this deci-
sion, in opposition to all the great political leaders whom he has recognized as leaders, in opposition to his former self and history, there is something very marked. And the manner in which he adheres to it,—not as being right upon the merits, as he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being absolutely obligatory upon everyone, simply because of the source from whence it comes,—as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may be; this is another marked feature of his adherence to that decision. It marks it in this respect that it commits him to the next decision, whenever it comes, as being as obligatory as this one, since he does not investigate it, and won’t inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong. So he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong. He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to take the next decision when it comes without any inquiry. In this I think I argue fairly (without questioning motives at all) that Judge Douglas is most ingeniously and powerfully preparing the public mind to take that decision when it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in various other ways. In these general maxims about liberty, in his assertions that he “don’t care whether slavery is voted up or voted down”; that “whoever wants slavery has a right to have it”; that “upon principles of equality it should be allowed to go everywhere”; that “there is no inconsistency between free and slave institutions.” In this he is also preparing (whether purposely or
not) the way for making the institution of slavery national! I repeat again, for I wish no misunderstanding, that I do not charge that he means it so; but I call upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the best instrument you could, and then set it to work in the most ingenious way, to prepare the public mind for this movement, operating in the Free States, where there is now an abhorrence of the institution of slavery, could you find an instrument so capable of doing it as Judge Douglas, or one employed in so apt a way to do it?

I have said once before, and I will repeat it now, that Mr. Clay, when he was once answering an objection to the Colonization Society, that it had a tendency to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves, said that "those who would repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate emancipation must do more than put down the benevolent efforts of the Colonization Society,—they must go back to the era of our liberty and independence, and muzzle the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; they must blot out the moral lights around us; they must penetrate the human soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the love of liberty!" And I do think—

I repeat, though I said it on a former occasion—that Judge Douglas and whoever, like him, teaches that the negro has no share, humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence, is going back to the era of our liberty and independence, and, so far as in him lies, muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; that he is blow-
ing out the moral lights around us, when he contends that whoever wants slaves has a right to hold them; that he is penetrating, so far as lies in his power, the human soul, and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty, when he is in every possible way preparing the public mind, by his vast influence, for making the institution of slavery perpetual and national.

There is, my friends, only one other point to which I will call your attention for the remaining time that I have left me, and perhaps I shall not occupy the entire time that I have, as that one point may not take me clear through it.

Among the interrogatories that Judge Douglas propounded to me at Freeport, there was one in about this language: "Are you opposed to the acquisition of any further territory to the United States, unless slavery shall first be prohibited therein?" I answered, as I thought, in this way, that I am not generally opposed to the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would support a proposition for the acquisition of additional territory according as my supporting it was or was not calculated to aggravate this slavery question amongst us. I then proposed to Judge Douglas another interrogatory, which was correlative to that: "Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how it may affect us upon the slavery question?" Judge Douglas answered,—that is, in his own way he answered it. I believe that, although he took a good many words to answer it, it
was a little more fully answered than any other. The substance of his answer was, that this country would continue to expand; that it would need additional territory; that it was as absurd to suppose that we could continue upon our present territory, enlarging in population as we are, as it would be to hoop a boy twelve years of age, and expect him to grow to man's size without bursting the hoops. I believe it was something like that. Consequently, he was in favor of the acquisition of further territory as fast as we might need it, in disregard of how it might affect the slavery question. I do not say this as giving his exact language, but he said so substantially; and he would leave the question of slavery where the territory was acquired, to be settled by the people of the acquired territory. ["That's the doctrine."] May be it is; let us consider that for a while. This will probably, in the run of things, become one of the concrete manifestations of this slavery question. If Judge Douglas's policy upon this question succeeds, and gets fairly settled down, until all opposition is crushed out, the next thing will be a grab for the territory of poor Mexico, an invasion of the rich lands of South America, then the adjoining islands will follow, each one of which promises additional slave-fields. And this question is to be left to the people of those countries for settlement. When we get Mexico, I don't know whether the Judge will be in favor of the Mexican people that we get with it settling that question for themselves and all others; because we know the
Judge has a great horror for mongrels, and I understand that the people of Mexico are most decidedly a race of mongrels. I understand that there is not more than one person there out of eight who is pure white, and I suppose from the Judge's previous declaration that when we get Mexico or any considerable portion of it, that he will be in favor of these mongrels settling the question, which would bring him somewhat into collision with his horror of an inferior race.

It is to be remembered, though, that this power of acquiring additional territory is a power confided to the President and the Senate of the United States. It is a power not under the control of the representatives of the people any further than they, the President and the Senate, can be considered the representatives of the people. Let me illustrate that by a case we have in our history. When we acquired the territory from Mexico in the Mexican War, the House of Representatives, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, all the time insisted that the territory thus to be acquired should be brought in upon condition that slavery should be forever prohibited therein, upon the terms and in the language that slavery had been prohibited from coming into this country. That was insisted upon constantly and never failed to call forth an assurance that any territory thus acquired should have that prohibition in it, so far as the House of Representatives was concerned. But at last the President and Senate acquired the territory with-
out asking the House of Representatives anything about it, and took it without that prohibition. They have the power of acquiring territory without the immediate representatives of the people being called upon to say anything about it, and thus furnishing a very apt and powerful means of bringing new territory into the Union, and, when it is once brought into the country, involving us anew in this slavery agitation. It is, therefore, as I think, a very important question for the consideration of the American people, whether the policy of bringing in additional territory, without considering at all how it will operate upon the safety of the Union in reference to this one great disturbing element in our national politics, shall be adopted as the policy of the country. You will bear in mind that it is to be acquired, according to the Judge's view, as fast as it is needed, and the indefinite part of this proposition is that we have only Judge Douglas and his class of men to decide how fast it is needed. We have no clear and certain way of determining or demonstrating how fast territory is needed by the necessities of the country. Whoever wants to go out filibustering, then, thinks that more territory is needed. Whoever wants wider slave-fields, feels sure that some additional territory is needed as slave-territory. Then it is as easy to show the necessity of additional slave-territory as it is to assert anything that is incapable of absolute demonstration. Whatever motive a man or set of men may have for making annexation of property or territory, it is very easy
to assert, but much less easy to disprove, that it is necessary for the wants of the country.

And now it only remains for me to say that I think it is a very grave question for the people of this Union to consider, whether, in view of the fact that this slavery question has been the only one that has ever endangered our Republican institutions, the only one that has ever threatened or menaced a dissolution of the Union, that has ever disturbed us in such a way as to make us fear for the perpetuity of our liberty,—in view of these facts, I think it is an exceedingly interesting and important question for this people to consider whether we shall engage in the policy of acquiring additional territory, discarding altogether from our consideration, while obtaining new territory, the question how it may affect us in regard to this, the only endangering element to our liberties and national greatness. The Judge's view has been expressed. I, in my answer to his question, have expressed mine. I think it will become an important and practical question. Our views are before the public. I am willing and anxious that they should consider them fully; that they should turn it about and consider the importance of the question, and arrive at a just conclusion as to whether it is or is not wise in the people of this Union, in the acquisition of new territory, to consider whether it will add to the disturbance that is existing amongst us,—whether it will add to the one only danger that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union or our own liberties. I think
it is extremely important that they shall decide, and
rightly decide, that question before entering upon
that policy.

And now, my friends, having said the little I wish
to say upon this head, whether I have occupied the
whole of the remnant of my time or not, I believe
I could not enter upon any new topic so as to treat
it fully, without transcending my time, which I
would not for a moment think of doing. I give way
to Judge Douglas.

MR. DOUGLAS’S REJOINDER

GENTLEMEN: The highest compliment you can
pay me during the brief half-hour that I have to
conclude is by observing a strict silence. I desire
to be heard rather than to be applauded.

The first criticism that Mr. Lincoln makes on my
speech was that it was in substance what I have said
everywhere else in the State where I have addressed
the people. I wish I could say the same of his
speech. Why, the reason I complain of him is be-
cause he makes one speech north, and another south.
Because he has one set of sentiments for the Aboli-
tion counties, and another set for the counties op-
posed to Abolitionism. My point of complaint
against him is that I cannot induce him to hold up
the same standard, to carry the same flag, in all
parts of the State. He does not pretend, and no
other man will, that I have one set of principles for
Galesburgh, and another for Charleston. He does not pretend that I hold to one doctrine in Chicago, and an opposite one in Jonesboro. I have proved that he has a different set of principles for each of these localities. All I asked of him was that he should deliver the speech that he has made here today in Coles County instead of in old Knox. It would have settled the question between us in that doubtful county. Here I understand him to reaffirm the doctrine of negro equality, and to assert that by the Declaration of Independence the negro is declared equal to the white man. He tells you to-day that the negro was included in the Declaration of Independence when it asserted that all men were created equal. ["We believe it."] Very well.

Mr. Lincoln asserts to-day, as he did at Chicago, that the negro was included in that clause of the Declaration of Independence which says that all men were created equal and endowed by the Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. If the negro was made his equal and mine, if that equality was established by divine law, and was the negro's inalienable right, how came he to say at Charleston to the Kentuckians residing in that section of our State that the negro was physically inferior to the white man, belonged to an inferior race, and he was for keeping him in that inferior condition. There he gave the people to understand that there was no moral question involved, because, the inferiority being established, it was only a question of degree, and
not a question of right; here, to-day, instead of making it a question of degree, he makes it a moral question, says that it is a great crime to hold the negro in that inferior condition. ["He's right."]

5 Is he right now, or was he right in Charleston? ["Both."] He is right, then, sir, in your estimation, not because he is consistent, but because he can trim his principles any way, in any section, so as to secure votes. All I desire of him is that he will declare the same principles in the south that he does in the north.

But did you notice how he answered my position that a man should hold the same doctrines throughout the length and breadth of this Republic? He said, "Would Judge Douglas go to Russia and proclaim the same principles he does here?" I would remind him that Russia is not under the American Constitution. If Russia was a part of the American Republic, under our Federal Constitution, and I was sworn to support the Constitution, I would maintain the same doctrine in Russia that I do in Illinois. The slaveholding States are governed by the same Federal Constitution as ourselves, and hence a man's principles, in order to be in harmony with the Constitution, must be the same in the South as they are in the North, the same in the Free States as they are in the Slave States. Whenever a man advocates one set of principles in one section, and another set in another section, his opinions are in violation of the spirit of the Constitution which he has sworn to support. When Mr. Lincoln went to Congress in
1847, and, laying his hand upon the Holy Evangelists, made a solemn vow, in the presence of high Heaven, that he would be faithful to the Constitution, what did he mean.—the Constitution as he expounds it in Galesburgh, or the Constitution as he expounds it in Charleston?

Mr. Lincoln has devoted considerable time to the circumstance that at Ottawa I read a series of resolutions as having been adopted at Springfield, in this State, on the 4th or 5th of October, 1854, which happened not to have been adopted there. He has used hard names; has dared to talk about fraud, about forgery, and has insinuated that there was a conspiracy between Mr. Lanphier, Mr. Harris, and myself to perpetrate a forgery. Now, bear in mind that he does not deny that these resolutions were adopted in a majority of all the Republican counties of this State in that year; he does not deny that they were declared to be the platform of this Republican party in the first Congressional District, in the second, in the third, and in many counties of the fourth, and that they thus became the platform of his party in a majority of the counties upon which he now relies for support; he does not deny the truthfulness of the resolutions, but takes exception to the spot on which they were adopted. He takes to himself great merit because he thinks they were not adopted on the right spot for me to use them against him, just as he was very severe in Congress upon the Government of his country when he thought that he had discovered that the Mexican
war was not begun in the right spot, and was therefore unjust. He tries very hard to make out that there is something very extraordinary in the place where the thing was done, and not in the thing itself.  

I never believed before that Abraham Lincoln would be guilty of what he has done this day in regard to those resolutions. In the first place, the moment it was intimated to me that they had been adopted at Aurora and Rockford instead of Springfield, I did not wait for him to call my attention to the fact, but led off, and explained in my first meeting after the Ottawa debate what the mistake was, and how it had been made. I supposed that for an honest man, conscious of his own rectitude, that explanation would be sufficient. I did not wait for him, after the mistake was made, to call my attention to it, but frankly explained it at once as an honest man would. I also gave the authority on which I had stated that these resolutions were adopted by the Springfield Republican Convention; that I had seen them quoted by Major Harris in a debate in Congress, as having been adopted by the first Republican State Convention in Illinois, and that I had written to him and asked him for the authority as to the time and place of their adoption; that, Major Harris being extremely ill, Charles H. Lanphier had written to me, for him, that they were adopted at Springfield on the 5th of October, 1854, and had sent me a copy of the Springfield paper containing them. I read them from the newspaper just as Mr. Lincoln reads the proceedings of meetings held
years ago from the newspapers. After giving that explanation, I did not think there was an honest man in the State of Illinois who doubted that I had been led into the error, if it was such, innocently, in the way I detailed; and I will now say that I do not now believe that there is an honest man on the face of the globe who will not regard with abhorrence and disgust Mr. Lincoln's insinuations of my complicity in that forgery, if it was a forgery. Does Mr. Lincoln wish to push these things to the point of personal difficulties here? I commenced this contest by treating him courteously and kindly; I always spoke of him in words of respect; and in return he has sought, and is now seeking to divert public attention from the enormity of his revolutionary principles by impeaching men's sincerity and integrity, and inviting personal quarrels.

I desired to conduct this contest with him like a gentleman; but I spurn the insinuation of complicity and fraud made upon the simple circumstance of an editor of a newspaper having made a mistake as to the place where a thing was done, but not as to the thing itself. These resolutions were the platform of this Republican party of Mr. Lincoln's of that year. They were adopted in a majority of the Republican counties in the State; and when I asked him at Ottawa whether they formed the platform upon which he stood, he did not answer, and I could not get an answer out of him. He then thought, as I thought, that those resolutions were adopted at the Springfield Convention, but excused himself by say-
ing that he was not there when they were adopted, but had gone to Tazewell court in order to avoid being present at the Convention. He saw them published as having been adopted at Springfield, and so did I, and he knew that if there was a mistake in regard to them, that I had nothing under heaven to do with it. Besides, you find that in all these northern counties where the Republican candidates are running pledged to him, that the Conventions which nominated them adopted that identical platform.

One cardinal point in that platform which he shrinks from is this: that there shall be no more Slave States admitted into the Union, even if the people want them. Lovejoy stands pledged against the admission of any more Slave States. ["Right, so do we."] So do you, you say. Farnsworth stands pledged against the admission of any more Slave States. Washburne stands pledged the same way. The candidate for the Legislature who is running on Lincoln's ticket in Henderson and Warren, stands committed by his vote in the Legislature to the same thing; and I am informed, but do not know of the fact, that your candidate here is also so pledged. ["Hurrah for him! good!"] Now, you Republicans all hurrah for him, and for the doctrine of no more Slave States. And yet Lincoln tells you that his conscience will not permit him to sanction that doctrine, and complains because the resolutions I read at Ottawa made him, as a member of the party, responsible for sanctioning the doctrine
of no more Slave States. You are one way, you confess, and he is, or pretends to be, the other; and yet you are both governed by principle in supporting one another. If it be true, as I have shown it is, that the whole Republican party in the northern part of the State stands committed to the doctrine of no more Slave States, and that this same doctrine is repudiated by the Republicans in the other part of the State, I wonder whether Mr. Lincoln and his party do not present the case which he cited from the Scriptures, of a house divided against itself which cannot stand! I desire to know what are Mr. Lincoln's principles and the principles of his party? I hold, and the party with which I am identified hold, that the people of each State, old and new, have the right to decide the slavery question for themselves; and when I used the remark that I did not care whether slavery was voted up or down, I used it in the connection that I was for allowing Kansas to do just as she pleased on the slavery question. I said that I did not care whether they voted slavery up or down, because they had the right to do as they pleased on the question, and therefore my action would not be controlled by any such consideration. Why cannot Abraham Lincoln, and the party with which he acts, speak out their principles so that they may be understood? Why do they claim to be one thing in one part of the State, and another in the other part? Whenever I allude to the Abolition doctrines, which he considers a slander to be charged with being in favor of, you all in-
dorse them, and hurrah for them, not knowing that your candidate is ashamed to acknowledge them.

I have a few words to say upon the Dred Scott decision, which has troubled the brain of Mr. Lincoln so much. He insists that that decision would carry slavery into the Free States, notwithstanding that the decision says directly the opposite, and goes into a long argument to make you believe that I am in favor of, and would sanction, the doctrine that would allow slaves to be brought here and held as slaves contrary to our Constitution and laws. Mr. Lincoln knew better when he asserted this; he knew that one newspaper, and, so far as is within my knowledge, but one, ever asserted that doctrine, and that I was the first man in either House of Congress that read that article in debate, and denounced it on the floor of the Senate as revolutionary. When the Washington "Union" on the 17th of last November, published an article to that effect, I branded it at once, and denounced it; and hence the "Union" has been pursuing me ever since. Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, replied to me, and said that there was not a man in any of the Slave States south of the Potomac River that held any such doctrine. Mr. Lincoln knows that there is not a member of the Supreme Court who holds that doctrine; he knows that every one of them, as shown by their opinions, holds the reverse. Why this attempt, then, to bring the Supreme Court into disrepute among the people? It looks as if there was an effort
being made to destroy public confidence in the highest judicial tribunal on earth. Suppose he succeeds in destroying public confidence in the court, so that the people will not respect its decisions, but will feel at liberty to disregard them and resist the laws of the land, what will he have gained? He will have changed the government from one of laws into that of a mob, in which the strong arm of violence will be substituted for the decisions of the courts of justice. He complains because I did not go into an argument reviewing Chief Justice Taney's opinion, and the other opinions of the different judges, to determine whether their reasoning is right or wrong on the questions of law. What use would that be? He wants to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to this meeting, to determine whether the questions of law were decided properly. He is going to appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to every town meeting, in the hope that he can excite a prejudice against that court, and on the wave of that prejudice ride into the Senate of the United States, when he could not get there on his own principles or his own merits. Suppose he should succeed in getting into the Senate of the United States, what then will he have to do with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case? Can he reverse that decision when he gets there? Can he act upon it? Has the Senate any right to reverse it or revise it? He will not pretend that it has. Then why drag the matter into this contest, unless for the purpose of making
a false issue, by which he can direct public attention from the real issue.

He has cited General Jackson in justification of the war he is making on the decision of the court. Mr. Lincoln misunderstands the history of the country if he believes there is any parallel in the two cases. It is true that the Supreme Court once decided that if a Bank of the United States was a necessary fiscal agent of the government, it was constitutional, and if not, that it was unconstitutional, and also, that whether or not it was necessary for that purpose, was a political question for Congress, and not a judicial one for the courts to determine. Hence the court would not determine the bank unconstitutional. Jackson respected the decision, obeyed the law, executed it, and carried it into effect during its existence; but after the charter of the bank expired, and a proposition was made to create a new bank, General Jackson said, "It is unnecessary and improper, and therefore I am against it on constitutional grounds as well as those of expediency." Is Congress bound to pass every Act that is constitutional? Why, there are a thousand things that are constitutional, but yet are inexpedient and unnecessary, and you surely would not vote for them merely because you had the right to? And because General Jackson would not do a thing which he had a right to do, but did not deem expedient or proper, Mr. Lincoln is going to justify himself in doing that which he has no right to do. I ask him whether he is not bound to respect and
obey the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as I? The Constitution has created that court to decide all constitutional questions in the last resort; and when such decisions have been made, they become the law of the land, and you, and he, and myself, and every other good citizen, are bound by them. Yet he argues that I am bound by their decisions, and he is not. He says that their decisions are binding on Democrats, but not on Republicans. Are not Republicans bound by the laws of the land as well as Democrats? And when the court has fixed the construction of the Constitution on the validity of a given law, is not their decision binding upon Republicans as well as upon Democrats? Is it possible that you Republicans have the right to raise your mobs and oppose the laws of the land and the constituted authorities, and yet hold us Democrats bound to obey them? My time is within half a minute of expiring, and all I have to say is, that I stand by the laws of the land. I stand by the Constitution as our fathers made it, by the laws as they are enacted, and by the decisions of the court upon all points within their jurisdiction as they are pronounced by the highest tribunal on earth; and any man who resists these must resort to mob law and violence to overturn the government of laws.
The Seventh and Last Joint Debate, at Alton

[October 15, 1858]

SENATOR DOUGLAS'S SPEECH

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is now nearly four months since the canvass between Mr. Lincoln and myself commenced. On the 16th of June the Republican Convention assembled at Springfield and nominated Mr. Lincoln as their candidate for the United States Senate, and he, on that occasion, delivered a speech in which he laid down what he understood to be the Republican creed and the platform on which he proposed to stand during the contest. The principal points in that speech of Mr. Lincoln's were: First, that this government could not endure permanently divided into Free and Slave States, as our fathers made it; that they must all become free or all become slave; all become one thing, or all become the other,—otherwise this Union could not continue to exist. I give you his opinions almost in the identical language he used. His second proposition was a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States because of the Dred Scott decision, urging as an especial reason for his opposition to that decision that it deprived the negroes of the rights and benefits of that
clause in the Constitution of the United States which guarantees to the citizens of each State all the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens of the several States. On the 10th of July I returned home, and delivered a speech to the people of Chicago, in which I announced it to be my purpose to appeal to the people of Illinois to sustain the course I had pursued in Congress. In that speech I joined issue with Mr. Lincoln on the points which he had presented. Thus there was an issue clear and distinct made up between us on these two propositions laid down in the speech of Mr. Lincoln at Springfield, and controverted by me in my reply to him at Chicago. On the next day, the 11th of July, Mr. Lincoln replied to me at Chicago, explaining at some length and reaffirming the positions which he had taken in his Springfield speech. In that Chicago speech he even went further than he had before, and uttered sentiments in regard to the negro being on an equality with the white man. He adopted in support of this position the argument which Lovejoy and Codding and other Abolition lecturers had made familiar in the northern and central portions of the State; to wit, that the Declaration of Independence having declared all men free and equal, by divine law, also that negro equality was an inalienable right, of which they could not be deprived. He insisted, in that speech, that the Declaration of Independence included the negro in the clause asserting that all men were created equal, and went so far as to say that if
one man was allowed to take the position that it did not include the negro, others might take the position that it did not include other men. He said that all these distinctions between this man and that man, this race and the other race, must be discarded, and we must all stand by the Declaration of Independence, declaring that all men were created equal.

The issue thus being made up between Mr. Lincoln and myself on three points, we went before the people of the State. During the following seven weeks, between the Chicago speeches and our first meeting at Ottawa, he and I addressed large assemblages of the people in many of the central counties. In my speeches I confined myself closely to those three positions which he had taken, controverting his proposition that this Union could not exist as our fathers made it, divided into Free and Slave States, controverting his proposition of a crusade against the Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision, and controverting his proposition that the Declaration of Independence included and meant the negroes as well as the white men, when it declared all men to be created equal. I supposed at that time that these propositions constituted a distinct issue between us, and that the opposite positions we had taken upon them we would be willing to be held to in every part of the State. I never intended to waver one hair's breadth from that issue either in the north or the south or wherever I should address the people of Illinois.
I hold that when the time arrives that I cannot proclaim my political creed in the same terms, not only in the northern, but in the southern part of Illinois, not only in the Northern, but the Southern States, and wherever the American flag waves over American soil, that then there must be something wrong in that creed; so long as we live under a common Constitution, so long as we live in a confederacy of sovereign and equal States, joined together as one for certain purposes, that any political creed is radically wrong which cannot be proclaimed in every State and every section of that Union, alike. I took up Mr. Lincoln's three propositions in my several speeches, analyzed them, and pointed out what I believed to be the radical errors contained in them. First, in regard to his doctrine that this government was in violation of the law of God, which says that a house divided against itself cannot stand, I repudiated it as a slander upon the immortal framers of our Constitution. I then said, I have often repeated, and now again assert, that in my opinion our government can endure forever, divided into Free and Slave States as our fathers made it,—each State having the right to prohibit, abolish, or sustain slavery, just as it pleases. This government was made upon the great basis of the sovereignty of the States, the right of each State to regulate its own domestic institutions to suit itself; and that right was conferred with the understanding and expectation that inasmuch as each locality had separate interests, each locality must have dif-
ferent and distinct local and domestic institutions, corresponding to its wants and interests. Our fathers knew when they made the government that the laws and institutions which were well adapted to the Green Mountains of Vermont were unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina. They knew then, as well as we know now, that the laws and institutions which would be well adapted to the beautiful prairies of Illinois would not be suited to the mining regions of California. They knew that in a Republic as broad as this, having such a variety of soil, climate, and interest, there must necessarily be a corresponding variety of local laws,—the policy and institutions of each State adapted to its condition and wants. For this reason this Union was established on the right of each State to do as it pleased on the question of slavery, and every other question; and the various States were not allowed to complain of, much less interfere with, the policy of their neighbors.

Suppose the doctrine advocated by Mr. Lincoln and the Abolitionists of this day had prevailed when the Constitution was made, what would have been the result? Imagine for a moment that Mr. Lincoln had been a member of the Convention that framed the Constitution of the United States, and that when its members were about to sign that wonderful document, he had arisen in that Convention as he did at Springfield this summer, and, addressing himself to the President, had said, "A house divided against itself cannot stand; this govern-
ment, divided into Free and Slave States cannot endure, they must all be free or all be slave; they must all be one thing, or all the other,—otherwise, it is a violation of the law of God, and cannot continue to exist;"—suppose Mr. Lincoln had convinced that body of sages that that doctrine was sound, what would have been the result? Remember that the Union was then composed of thirteen States, twelve of which were slaveholding, and one free. Do you think that the one Free State would have outvoted the twelve slaveholding States, and thus have secured the abolition of slavery? On the other hand, would not the twelve slaveholding States have outvoted the one free State, and thus have fastened slavery, by a constitutional provision, on every foot of the American Republic forever? You see that if this Abolition doctrine of Mr. Lincoln had prevailed when the government was made, it would have established slavery as a permanent institution in all the States, whether they wanted it or not; and the question for us to determine in Illinois now, as one of the Free States, is whether or not we are willing, having become the majority section, to enforce a doctrine on the minority which we would have resisted with our heart's blood had it been attempted on us when we were in a minority. How has the South lost her power as the majority section in this Union, and how have the Free States gained it, except under the operation of that principle which declares the right of the people of each State and each Territory to form and regulate
their domestic institutions in their own way? It was under that principle that slavery was abolished in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; it was under that principle that one-half of the slaveholding States became free: it was under that principle that the number of Free States increased until, from being one out of twelve States, we have grown to be the majority of States of the whole Union, with the power to control the House of Representatives and Senate, and the power, consequently, to elect a President by Northern votes, without the aid of a Southern State. Having obtained this power under the operation of that great principle, are you now prepared to abandon the principle and declare that merely because we have the power you will wage a war against the Southern States and their institutions until you force them to abolish slavery everywhere?

After having pressed these arguments home on Mr. Lincoln for seven weeks, publishing a number of my speeches, we met at Ottawa in joint discussion, and he then began to crawfish a little, and let himself down. I there propounded certain questions to him. Amongst others, I asked him whether he would vote for the admission of any more Slave States, in the event the people wanted them. He would not answer. I then told him that if he did not answer the question there, I would renew it at Freeport, and would then trot him down into Egypt, and again put it to him. Well, at Freeport, know-
ing that the next joint discussion took place in Egypt, and being in dread of it, he did answer my question in regard to no more Slave States in a mode which he hoped would be satisfactory to me, and accomplish the object he had in view. I will show you what his answer was. After saying that he was not pledged to the Republican doctrine of "no more Slave States," he declared:

"I state to you freely, frankly, that I should be exceedingly sorry to ever be put in the position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there never would be another Slave State admitted into this Union."

Here permit me to remark, that I do not think the people will ever force him into a position against his will. He went on to say:

"But I must add, in regard to this, that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territory during the Territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people should, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt a constitution, if they should do the extraordinary thing of adopting a slave constitution uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but we must admit it into the Union."

That answer Mr. Lincoln supposed would satisfy the old line Whigs, composed of Kentuckians and Virginians, down in the southern part of the State.
Now, what does it amount to? I desired to know whether he would vote to allow Kansas to come into the Union with slavery or not, as her people desired. He would not answer, but in a roundabout way said that if slavery should be kept out of a Territory during the whole of its Territorial existence, and then the people, when they adopted a State Constitution, asked admission as a Slave State, he supposed he would have to let the State come in. The case I put to him was an entirely different one. I desired to know whether he would vote to admit a State if Congress had not prohibited slavery in it during its Territorial existence, as Congress never pretended to do under Clay's Compromise measures of 1850. He would not answer, and I have not yet been able to get an answer from him. I have asked him whether he would vote to admit Nebraska, if her people asked to come in as a State with a constitution recognizing slavery, and he refused to answer. I have put the question to him with reference to New Mexico, and he has not uttered a word in answer. I have enumerated the Territories, one after another, putting the same question to him with reference to each, and he has not said, and will not say, whether, if elected to Congress, he will vote to admit any Territory now in existence with such a constitution as her people may adopt. He invents a case which does not exist, and cannot exist under this government, and answers it; but he will not answer the question I put to him in connection with any of the Territories now in
existence. The contract we entered into with Texas when she entered the Union obliges us to allow four States to be formed out of the old State, and admitted with or without slavery, as the respective inhabitants of each may determine. I have asked Mr. Lincoln three times in our joint discussions whether he would vote to redeem that pledge, and he has never yet answered. He is as silent as the grave on the subject. He would rather answer as to a state of the case which will never arise than commit himself by telling what he would do in a case which would come up for his action soon after his election to Congress. Why can he not say whether he is willing to allow the people of each State to have slavery or not as they please, and to come into the Union, when they have the requisite population, as a Slave or a Free State as they decide? I have no trouble in answering the question. I have said everywhere, and now repeat it to you, that if the people of Kansas want a Slave State they have a right, under the Constitution of the United States, to form such a State, and I will let them come into the Union with slavery or without, as they determine. If the people of any other Territory desire slavery, let them have it. If they do not want it, let them prohibit it. It is their business, not mine. It is none of our business in Illinois whether Kansas is a Free State or a Slave State. It is none of your business in Missouri whether Kansas shall adopt slavery or reject it. It is the business of her people, and none of yours.
The people of Kansas have as much right to de-
cide that question for themselves as you have in
Missouri to decide it for yourselves, or we in Illinois
to decide it for ourselves.

And here I may repeat what I have said in every
speech I have made in Illinois, that I fought the
Lecompton Constitution to its death, not because
of the slavery clause in it, but because it was not
the act and deed of the people of Kansas. I said
then in Congress, and I say now, that if the people
of Kansas want a Slave State, they have a right to
have it. If they wanted the Lecompton Constitu-
tion, they had a right to have it. I was opposed to
that constitution because I did not believe that it
was the act and deed of the people, but, on the
contrary, the act of a small, pitiful minority acting
in the name of the majority. When at last it was
determined to send that constitution back to the
people, and, accordingly, in August last, the ques-
tion of admission under it was submitted to a popu-
lar vote, the citizens rejected it by nearly ten to
one, thus showing conclusively that I was right
when I said that the Lecompton Constitution was
not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and
did not embody their will.

I hold that there is no power on earth, under our
system of government, which has the right to force
a constitution upon an unwilling people. Suppose
that there had been a majority of ten to one in favor
of slavery in Kansas, and suppose there had been an
Abolition President and an Abolition Administra-
tion, and by some means the Abolitionists succeeded in forcing an Abolition Constitution upon those slaveholding people, would the people of the South have submitted to that act for an instant? Well, if you of the South would not have submitted to it a day, how can you, as fair, honorable, and honest men, insist on putting a slave constitution on a people who desire a Free State? Your safety and ours depend upon both of us acting in good faith, and living up to that great principle which asserts the right of every people to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.

Most of the men who denounced my course on the Lecompton question objected to it, not because I was not right, but because they thought it expedient at that time, for the sake of keeping the party together, to do wrong. I never knew the Democratic party to violate any one of its principles, out of policy or expediency, that it did not pay the debt with sorrow. There is no safety or success for our party unless we always do right, and trust the consequences to God and the people. I chose not to depart from principle for the sake of expediency on the Lecompton question, and I never intend to do it on that or any other question.

But I am told that I would have been all right if I had only voted for the English bill after the Lecompton was killed. You know a general pardon was granted to all political offenders on the Lecompton question, provided they would only vote
for the English bill. I did not accept the benefits of that pardon for the reason that I had been right in the course I had pursued, and hence did not require any forgiveness. Let us see how the result has been worked out. English brought in his bill referring the Lecompton Constitution back to the people, with the provision that if it was rejected, Kansas should be kept out of the Union until she had the full ratio of population required for member of Congress,—thus in effect declaring that if the people of Kansas would only consent to come into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution, and have a Slave State when they did not want it, they should be admitted with a population of 35,000; but that if they were so obstinate as to insist upon having just such a constitution as they thought best, and to desire admission as a free State, then they should be kept out until they had 93,420 inhabitants. I then said, and I now repeat to you, that whenever Kansas has people enough for a Slave State she has people enough for a Free State. I was, and am willing to adopt the rule that no State shall ever come into the Union until she has the full ratio of population for a member of Congress, provided that rule is made uniform. I made that proposition in the Senate last winter, but a majority of the Senators would not agree to it; and I then said to them, If you will not adopt the general rule, I will not consent to make an exception of Kansas.

I hold that it is a violation of the fundamental principles of this government to throw the weight
of Federal power into the scale, either in favor of the Free or the Slave States. Equality among all the States of this Union is a fundamental principle in our political system. We have no more right to throw the weight of the Federal Government into the scale in favor of the slaveholding than the Free States, and last of all should our friends in the South consent for a moment that Congress should withhold its powers either way when they know that there is a majority against them in both Houses of Congress.

Fellow-citizens, how have the supporters of the English bill stood up to their pledges not to admit Kansas until she obtained a population of 93,420 in the event she rejected the Lecompton Constitution? How? The newspapers inform us that English himself, whilst conducting his canvass for re-election, and in order to secure it, pledged himself to his constituents that if returned he would disregard his own bill and vote to admit Kansas into the Union with such population as she might have when she made application. We are informed that every Democratic candidate for Congress in all the States where elections have recently been held was pledged against the English bill, with perhaps one or two exceptions. Now, if I had only done as these anti-Lecompton men who voted for the English bill in Congress, pledging themselves to refuse to admit Kansas if she refused to become a Slave State until she had a population of 93,420, and then returned to their people, forfeited their pledge, and
made a new pledge to admit Kansas at any time she applied, without regard to population, I would have had no trouble. You saw the whole power and patronage of the Federal Government wielded in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania to re-elect anti-Lecompton men to Congress who voted against Lecompton, then voted for the English bill, and then denounced the English bill, and pledged themselves to their people to disregard it. My sin consists in not having given a pledge, and then in not having afterward forfeited it. For that reason, in this State, every postmaster, every route agent, every collector of the ports, and every Federal office-holder forfeits his head the moment he expresses a preference for the Democratic candidates against Lincoln and his Abolition associates. A Democratic Administration which we helped to bring into power deems it consistent with its fidelity to principle and its regard to duty to wield its power in this State in behalf of the Republican Abolition candidates in every county and every Congressional District against the Democratic party. All I have to say in reference to the matter is, that if that Administration have not regard enough for principle, if they are not sufficiently attached to the creed of the Democratic party, to bury forever their personal hostilities in order to succeed in carrying out our glorious principles, I have. I have no personal difficulty with Mr. Buchanan or his Cabinet. He chose to make certain recommendations to Congress, as he had a right to do, on the Lecompton
question. I could not vote in favor of them. I had as much right to judge for myself how I should vote as he had how he should recommend. He undertook to say to me, "If you do not vote as I tell you, I will take off the heads of your friends." I replied to him, "You did not elect me. I represent Illinois, and I am accountable to Illinois, as my constituency, and to God; but not to the President or to any other power on earth."

And now this warfare is made on me because I would not surrender my convictions of duty, because I would not abandon my constituency, and receive the orders of the executive authorities as to how I should vote in the Senate of the United States. I hold that an attempt to control the Senate on the part of the Executive is subversive of the principles of our Constitution. The Executive department is independent of the Senate, and the Senate is independent of the President. In matters of legislation the President has a veto on the action of the Senate, and in appointments and treaties the Senate has a veto on the President. He has no more right to tell me how I shall vote on his appointments than I have to tell him whether he shall veto or approve a bill that the Senate has passed. Whenever you recognize the right of the Executive to say to a Senator, "Do this, or I will take off the heads of your friends," you convert this government from a republic into a despotism. Whenever you recognize the right of a President to say to a member of Congress, "Vote as I tell you, or I will bring a power to bear
against you at home which will crush you,” you destroy the independence of the representative and convert him into a tool of Executive power. I resisted this invasion of the constitutional rights of a Senator, and I intend to resist it as long as I have a voice to speak or a vote to give. Yet Mr. Buchanan cannot provoke me to abandon one iota of Democratic principles out of revenge or hostility to his course. I stand by the platform of the Democratic party, and by its organization, and support its nominees. If there are any who choose to bolt, the fact only shows that they are not as good Democrats as I am.

My friends, there never was a time when it was as important for the Democratic party, for all national men, to rally and stand together, as it is to-day. We find all sectional men giving up past differences and continuing the one question of slavery; and when we find sectional men thus uniting we should unite to resist them and their treasonable designs. Such was the case in 1850, when Clay left the quiet and peace of his home, and again entered upon public life to quell agitation and restore peace to a distracted Union. Then we Democrats, with Cass at our head, welcomed Henry Clay, whom the whole nation regarded as having been preserved by God for the times. He became our leader in that great fight, and we rallied around him the same as the Whigs rallied around old Hickory in 1832 to put down nullification. Thus you see that whilst Whigs and Democrats fought
fearlessly in old times about banks, the tariff, distribution, the specie circular, and the sub-treasury, all united as a band of brothers when the peace, harmony, or integrity of the Union was imperiled. It was so in 1850, when Abolitionism had even so far divided this country, North and South, as to endanger the peace of the Union; Whigs and Democrats united in establishing the Compromise Measures of that year, and restoring tranquillity and good feeling.

These measures passed on the joint action of the two parties. They rested on the great principle that the people of each State and each Territory should be left perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves. You Whigs and we Democrats justified them in that principle. In 1854, when it became necessary to organize the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, I brought forward the bill on the same principle. In the Kansas-Nebraska bill you find it declared to be the true intent and meaning of the Act not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way. I stand on that same platform in 1858 that I did in 1850, 1854, and 1856. The Washington "Union," pretending to be the organ of the Administration, in the number of the 5th of this month, devotes three columns and a half to establish these propositions: first, that Douglas, in his Freeport speech,
held the same doctrine that he did in his Nebraska bill in 1854; second, that in 1854 Douglas justified the Nebraska bill upon the ground that it was based upon the same principle as Clay's Compromise Measures of 1850. The "Union" thus proved that Douglas was the same in 1858 that he was in 1856, 1854, and 1850, and consequently argued that he was never a Democrat. Is it not funny that I was never a Democrat? There is no pretence that I have changed a hair's breadth. The "Union" proves by my speeches that I explained the Compromise Measures of 1850 just as I do now, and that I explained the Kansas and Nebraska bill in 1854 just as I did in my Freeport speech, and yet says that I am not a Democrat, and cannot be trusted, because I have not changed during the whole of that time. It has occurred to me that in 1854 the author of the Kansas and Nebraska bill was considered a pretty good Democrat. It has occurred to me that in 1856, when I was exerting every nerve and every energy for James Buchanan, standing on the same platform then that I do now, that I was a pretty good Democrat. They now tell me that I am not a Democrat, because I assert that the people of a Territory, as well as those of a State, have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery can or cannot exist in such Territory. Let me read what James Buchanan said on that point when he accepted the Democratic nomination for the Presidency in 1856. In his letter of acceptance, he used the following language:
"The recent legislation of Congress respecting domestic slavery, derived as it has been from the original and pure fountain of legitimate political power, the will of the majority, promises ere long to allay the dangerous excitement. This legislation is founded upon principles as ancient as free government itself, and, in accordance with them, has simply declared that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits."

Dr. Hope will there find my answer to the question he propounded to me before I commenced speaking. Of course, no man will consider it an answer who is outside of the Democratic organization, bolts Democratic nominations, and indirectly aids to put Abolitionists into power over Democrats. But whether Dr. Hope considers it an answer or not, every fair-minded man will see that James Buchanan has answered the question, and has asserted that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. I answer specifically if you want a further answer, and say that while under the decision of the Supreme Court, as recorded in the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, slaves are property like all other property, and can be carried into any Territory of the United States the same as any other description of property, yet when you get them there they are subject to the local law of the Territory just like all other property. You will find in a recent speech delivered
by that able and eloquent statesman, Hon. Jefferson Davis, at Bangor, Maine, that he took the same view of this subject that I did in my Freeport speech. He there said:

5 "If the inhabitants of any Territory should refuse to enact such laws and police regulations as would give security to their property or to his, it would be rendered more or less valueless in proportion to the difficulties of holding it without such protection. In the case of property in the labor of man, or what is usually called slave property, the insecurity would be so great that the owner could not ordinarily retain it. Therefore, though the right would remain, the remedy being withheld, it would follow that the owner would be practically debarred, by the circumstances of the case, from taking slave property into a Territory where the sense of the inhabitants was opposed to its introduction. So much for the oft-repeated fallacy of forcing slavery upon any community."

20 You will also find that the distinguished Speaker of the present House of Representatives, Hon. Jas. L. Orr, construed the Kansas and Nebraska bill in this same way in 1856, and also that great intellect of the South, Alex. H. Stephens, put the same construction upon it in Congress that I did in my Freeport speech. The whole South are rallying to the support of the doctrine that if the people of a Territory want slavery, they have a right to have it, and if they do not want it, that no power on earth can force it upon them. I hold that there is no principle on earth more sacred to all the friends of
freedom than that which says that no institution, no law, no constitution, should be forced on an unwilling people contrary to their wishes; and I assert that the Kansas and Nebraska bill contains that principle. It is the great principle contained in that bill. It is the principle on which James Buchanan was made President. Without that principle, he never would have been made President of the United States. I will never violate or abandon that doctrine, if I have to stand alone. I have resisted the blandishments and threats of power on the one side, and seduction on the other, and have stood immovably for that principle, fighting for it when assailed by Northern mobs, or threatened by Southern hostility. I have defended it against the North and the South, and I will defend it against whoever assails it, and I will follow it wherever its logical conclusions lead me. I say to you that there is but one hope, one safety for this country, and that is to stand immovably by that principle which declares the right of each State and each Territory to decide these questions for themselves. This government was founded on that principle, and must be administered in the same sense in which it was founded.

But the Abolition party really thinks that under the Declaration of Independence the negro is equal to the white man, and that negro equality is an inalienable right conferred by the Almighty, and hence that all human laws in violation of it are null and void. With such men it is no use for me to
argue. I hold that the signers of the Declaration of Independence had no reference to negroes at all when they declared all men to be created equal. They did not mean negro, nor the savage Indians, nor the Feejee Islanders, nor any other barbarous race. They were speaking of white men. They alluded to men of European birth and European descent,—to white men, and to none others,—when they declared that doctrine. I hold that this government was established on the white basis. It was established by white men for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men, and none others. But it does not follow, by any means, that merely because the negro is not a citizen, and merely because he is not our equal, that, therefore, he should be a slave. On the contrary, it does follow that we ought to extend to the negro race, and to all other dependent races, all the rights, all the privileges, and all the immunities which they can exercise consistently with the safety of society. Humanity requires that we should give them all these privileges; Christianity commands that we should extend those privileges to them. The question then arises, What are those privileges, and what is the nature and extent of them? My answer is, that that is a question which each State must answer for itself. We in Illinois have decided it for ourselves. We tried slavery, kept it up for twelve years, and finding that it was not profitable, we abolished it for that reason, and became a Free State. We adopted in
its stead the policy that a negro in this State shall not be a slave and shall not be a citizen. We have a right to adopt that policy. For my part, I think it is a wise and sound policy for us. You in Missouri must judge for yourselves whether it is a wise policy for you. If you choose to follow our example, very good; if you reject it, still well—it is your business, not ours. So with Kentucky. Let Kentucky adopt a policy to suit herself. If we do not like it, we will keep away from it; and if she does not like ours, let her stay at home, mind her own business, and let us alone. If the people of all the States will act on that great principle, and each State mind its own business, attend to its own affairs, take care of its own negroes, and not meddle with its neighbors, then there will be peace between the North and the South, the East and the West, throughout the whole Union.

Why can we not thus have peace? Why should we thus allow a sectional party to agitate this country, to array the North against the South, and convert us into enemies instead of friends, merely that a few ambitious men may ride into power on a sectional hobby? How long is it since these ambitious Northern men wished for a sectional organization? Did any one of them dream of a sectional party as long as the North was the weaker section and the South the stronger? Then all were opposed to sectional parties; but the moment the North obtained the majority in the House and Senate by the admis-
sion of California, and could elect a President without the aid of Southern votes, that moment ambitious Northern men formed a scheme to excite the North against the South, and make the people be governed in their votes by geographical lines, thinking that the North, being the stronger section, would outvote the South, and consequently they, the leaders, would ride into office on a sectional hobby. I am told that my hour is out. It was very short.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have been somewhat, in my own mind, complimented by a large portion of Judge Douglas’s speech,—I mean that portion which he devotes to the controversy between himself and the present Administration. This is the seventh time Judge Douglas and myself have met in these joint discussions, and he has been gradually improving in regard to his war with the Administration. At Quincy, day before yesterday, he was a little more severe upon the Administration than I had heard him upon any occasion, and I took pains to compliment him for it. I then told him to "Give it to them with all the power he had"; and as some of them were present, I told them I would be very much obliged if they would give it to him in about the same way. I take it he has now vastly improved upon the attack he made then upon the Administration. I flatter myself he has really taken
my advice on this subject. All I can say now is to recommend to him and to them what I then commended,—to prosecute the war against one another in the most vigorous manner. I say to them again: “Go it, husband!—Go it, bear!”

There is one other thing I will mention before I leave this branch of the discussion,—although I do not consider it much of my business, anyway. I refer to that part of the Judge's remarks where he undertakes to involve Mr. Buchanan in an inconsistency. He reads something from Mr. Buchanan, from which he undertakes to involve him in an inconsistency; and he gets something of a cheer for having done so. I would only remind the Judge that while he is very valiantly fighting for the Nebraska bill and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, it has been but a little while since he was the *valiant advocate* of the Missouri Compromise. I want to know if Buchanan has not as much right to be inconsistent as Douglas has? Has Douglas the *exclusive right*, in this country, of being *on all sides of all questions*? Is nobody allowed that high privilege but himself? Is he to have an entire *monopoly* on that subject?

So far as Judge Douglas addressed his speech to me, or so far as it was about me, it is my business to pay some attention to it. I have heard the Judge state two or three times what he has stated to-day,—that in a speech which I made at Springfield, Illinois, I had in a very especial manner complained that the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had
decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States. I have omitted by some accident heretofore to analyze this statement, and it is required of me to notice it now. In point of fact it is untrue. I never have complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it held that a negro could not be a citizen, and the Judge is always wrong when he says I ever did so complain of it. I have the speech here, and I will thank him or any of his friends to show where I said that a negro should be a citizen, and complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it declared he could not be one. I have done no such thing; and Judge Douglas, so persistently insisting that I have done so, has strongly impressed me with the belief of a predetermination on his part to misrepresent me. He could not get his foundation for insisting that I was in favor of this negro equality anywhere else as well as he could by assuming that untrue proposition. Let me tell this audience what is true in regard to that matter; and the means by which they may correct me if I do not tell them truly is by a recurrence to the speech itself. I spoke of the Dred Scott decision in my Springfield speech, and I was then endeavoring to prove that the Dred Scott decision was a portion of a system or scheme to make slavery national in this country. I pointed out what things had been decided by the court. I mentioned as a fact that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen; that they had done so, as I supposed, to deprive the negro, under all
circumstances, of the remotest possibility of ever becoming a citizen and claiming the rights of a citizen of the United States under a certain clause of the Constitution. I stated that, without making any complaint of it at all. I then went on and stated the other points decided in the case; namely, that the bringing of a negro into the State of Illinois and holding him in slavery for two years here was a matter in regard to which they would not decide whether it would make him free or not; that they decided the further point that taking him into a United States Territory where slavery was prohibited by Act of Congress did not make him free, because that Act of Congress, as they held, was unconstitutional. I mentioned these three things as making up the points decided in that case. I mentioned them in a lump, taken in connection with the introduction of the Nebraska bill, and the amendment of Chase, offered at the time, declaratory of the right of the people of the Territories to exclude slavery, which was voted down by the friends of the bill. I mentioned all these things together, as evidence tending to prove a combination and conspiracy to make the institution of slavery national. In that connection and in that way I mentioned the decision on the point that a negro could not be a citizen, and in no other connection.

Out of this Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication of my purpose to introduce a perfect social and political equality between the white and black races. His assertion that I made an "especial
objection” (that is his exact language) to the decision on this account, is untrue in point of fact.

Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has been alluded to, I desire to place myself, in connection with Mr. Clay, as nearly right before this people as may be. I am quite aware what the Judge’s object is here by all these allusions. He knows that we are before an audience having strong sympathies southward, by relationship, place of birth, and so on. He desires to place me in an extremely Abolition attitude. He read upon a former occasion, and alludes, without reading, to-day to a portion of a speech which I delivered in Chicago. In his quotations from that speech, as he has made them upon former occasions, the extracts were taken in such a way as, I suppose, brings them within the definition of what is called garbling,—taking portions of a speech which, when taken by themselves, do not present the entire sense of the speaker as expressed at the time. I propose, therefore, out of that same speech, to show how one portion of it which he skipped over (taking an extract before and an extract after) will give a different idea, and the true idea I intended to convey. It will take me some little time to read it, but I believe I will occupy the time that way.

You have heard him frequently allude to my controversy with him in regard to the Declaration of Independence. I confess that I have had a struggle with Judge Douglas on that matter, and I will try briefly to place myself right in regard to it on this
occasion. I said—and it is between the extracts Judge Douglas has taken from this speech, and put in his published speeches:

"It may be argued that there are certain conditions that make necessities and impose them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon a man he must submit to it. I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this government. We had slaves among us, we could not get our Constitution unless we permitted them to remain in slavery, we could not secure the good we did secure if we grasped for more; and having by necessity submitted to that much, it does not destroy the principle that is the charter of our liberties. Let the charter remain as our standard."

Now, I have upon all occasions declared as strongly as Judge Douglas against the disposition to interfere with the existing institution of slavery. You hear me read it from the same speech from which he takes garbled extracts for the purpose of proving upon me a disposition to interfere with the institution of slavery, and establish a perfect social and political equality between negroes and white people.

Allow me while upon this subject briefly to present one other extract from a speech of mine, more than a year ago, at Springfield, in discussing this very same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his ground that negroes were not included in the Declaration of Independence:
"I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all men were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what they did consider all men created equal,—equal in certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth that all were then actually enjoying that equality, or yet that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.

"They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all,—constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people, of all colors, everywhere."

There again are the sentiments I have expressed in regard to the Declaration of Independence upon a former occasion,—sentiments which have been put in print and read wherever anybody cared to know what so humble an individual as myself chose to say in regard to it.

At Galesburgh, the other day, I said, in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or believed, in the
whole world, who had said that the Declaration of Independence did not include negroes in the term "all men." I reassert it to-day. I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends may search the whole records of the country, and it will be a matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that the term "all men" in the Declaration did not include the negro. Do not let me be misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men who, finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the ascendancy and perpetuation of slavery, denied the truth of it. I know that Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school denied the truth of the Declaration. I know that it ran along in the mouth of some Southern men for a period of years, ending at last in that shameful, though rather forcible, declaration of Pettit of Indiana, upon the floor of the United States Senate, that the Declaration of Independence was in that respect "a self-evident lie," rather than a self-evident truth. But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that three years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it, and then asserting it did not include the negro. I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our friend Stephen A. Douglas. And now it has become the
catchword of the entire party. I would like to call upon his friends everywhere to consider how they have come in so short a time to view this matter in a way so entirely different from their former belief; to ask whether they are not being borne along by an irresistible current,—whither, they know not.

In answer to my proposition at Galesburgh last week, I see that some man in Chicago has got up a letter, addressed to the Chicago "Times," to show, as he professes, that somebody had said so before; and he signs himself "An Old Line Whig," if I remember correctly. In the first place, I would say he was not an old line Whig. I am somewhat acquainted with old line Whigs from the origin to the end of that party; I became pretty well acquainted with them, and I know they always had some sense, whatever else you could ascribe to them. I know there never was one who had not more sense than to try to show by the evidence he produces that some man had, prior to the time I named, said that negroes were not included in the term "all men" in the Declaration of Independence. What is the evidence he produces? I will bring forward his evidence, and let you see what he offers by way of showing that somebody more than three years ago had said negroes were not included in the Declaration. He brings forward part of a speech from Henry Clay,—the part of the speech of Henry Clay which I used to bring forward to prove precisely the contrary. I guess we are surrounded to some extent to-day by the old friends of Mr. Clay, and
they will be glad to hear anything from that author-
ity. While he was in Indiana a man presented a
petition to liberate his negroes, and he (Mr. Clay)
made a speech in answer to it, which I suppose he
carefully wrote out himself and caused to be pub-
lished. I have before me an extract from that
speech which constitutes the evidence this pretended
"Old Line Whig" at Chicago brought forward to
show that Mr. Clay didn't suppose the negro was
included in the Declaration of Independence. Hear
what Mr. Clay said:

"And what is the foundation of this appeal to me in
Indiana to liberate the slaves under my care in Ken-
tucky? It is a general declaration in the act announcing
to the world the independence of the thirteen American
colonies, that all men are created equal. Now, as an
abstract principle, there is no doubt of the truth of
that declaration; and it is desirable, in the original con-
struction of society and in organized societies, to keep
it in view as a great fundamental principle. But, then,
I apprehend that in no society that ever did exist, or
ever shall be formed, was or can the equality asserted
among the members of the human race be practically
enforced and carried out. There are portions, large
portions,—women, minors, insane, culprits, transient
sojourners,—that will always probably remain subject
to the government of another portion of the com-
munity.

"That declaration, whatever may be the extent of its
import, was made by the delegations of the thirteen
States. In most of them slavery existed, and had long
existed, and was established by law. It was introduced
and forced upon the colonies by the paramount law of England. Do you believe that in making that declaration the States that concurred in it intended that it should be tortured into a virtual emancipation of all the slaves within their respective limits? Would Virginia and other Southern States have ever united in a declaration which was to be interpreted into an abolition of slavery among them? Did any one of the thirteen colonies entertain such a design or expectation? To impute such a secret and unavowed purpose, would be to charge a political fraud upon the noblest band of patriots that ever assembled in council,—a fraud upon the Confederacy of the Revolution; a fraud upon the union of those States whose Constitution not only recognized the lawfulness of slavery, but permitted the importation of slaves from Africa until the year 1808."

This is the entire quotation brought forward to prove that somebody previous to three years ago had said the negro was not included in the term "all men" in the Declaration. How does it do so? In what way has it a tendency to prove that? Mr. Clay says it is true as an abstract principle that all men are created equal, but that we cannot practically apply it in all cases. He illustrates this by bringing forward the cases of females, minors, and insane persons, with whom it cannot be enforced; but he says it is true as an abstract principle in the organization of society as well as in organized society and it should be kept in view as a fundamental principle. Let me read a few words more before I add some
comments of my own. Mr. Clay says, a little further on:

"I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental government and from our ancestors. But here they are, and the question is, How can they be best dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements."

Now, here in this same book, in this same speech, in this same extract, brought forward to prove that Mr. Clay held that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence, is no such statement on his part, but the declaration that it is a great fundamental truth which should be constantly kept in view in the organization of society and in societies already organized. But if I say a word about it; if I attempt, as Mr. Clay said all good men ought to do, to keep it in view; if, in this "organized society," I ask to have the public eye turned upon it; if I ask, in relation to the organization of new Territories, that the public eye should be turned upon it,—forthwith I am vilified as you hear me to-day. What have I done that I have not the license of Henry Clay's illustrious example here in doing? Have I done aught that I have not his authority for, while maintaining that in organizing new Territories and societies, this fundamental principle
should be regarded, and in organized society holding it up to the public view and recognizing what he recognized as the great principle of free government?

And when this new principle—this new proposition that no human being ever thought of three years ago—is brought forward, I combat it as having an evil tendency, if not an evil design. I combat it as having a tendency to dehumanize the negro, to take away from him the right of ever striving to be a man. I combat it as being one of the thousand things constantly done in these days to prepare the public mind to make property, and nothing but property, of the negro in all the States of this Union.

But there is a point that I wish, before leaving this part of the discussion, to ask attention to. I have read and I repeat the words of Henry Clay:

"I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental government and from our ancestors. I wish every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors. But here they are; the question is, How can they best be dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements."

The principle upon which I have insisted in this
canvass is in relation to laying the foundations of new societies. I have never sought to apply these principles to the old States for the purpose of abolishing slavery in those States. It is nothing but a miserable perversion of what I have said, to assume that I have declared Missouri, or any other Slave State, shall emancipate her slaves; I have proposed no such thing. But when Mr. Clay says that in laying the foundations of societies in our Territories where it does not exist, he would be opposed to the introduction of slavery as an element, I insist that we have his warrant—his license—for insisting upon the exclusion of that element which he declared in such strong and emphatic language *was most hateful to him.*

Judge Douglas has again referred to a Springfield speech in which I said "a house divided against itself cannot stand." The Judge has so often made the entire quotation from that speech that I can make it from memory. I used this language:

"We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation. Under the operation of this policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease
to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, —old as well as new, North as well as South."

That extract and the sentiments expressed in it have been extremely offensive to Judge Douglas. He has warred upon them as Satan wars upon the Bible. His perversions upon it are endless. Here now are my views upon it in brief.

I said we were now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation. Is it not so? When that Nebraska bill was brought forward four years ago last January, was it not for the "avowed object" of putting an end to the slavery agitation? We were to have no more agitation in Congress; it was all to be banished to the Territories. By the way, I will remark here that, as Judge Douglas is very fond of complimenting Mr. Crittenden in these days, Mr. Crittenden has said there was a falsehood in that whole business, for there was no slavery agitation at that time to allay. We were for a little while quiet on the troublesome thing, and that very allaying plaster of Judge Douglas stirred it up again. But was it not understood or intimated with the "confident promise" of putting an end to the slavery agita-
tion? Surely it was. In every speech you heard Judge Douglas make, until he got into this "imbroglio," as they call it, with the Administration about the Lecompton Constitution, every speech on that Nebraska bill was full of his felicitations that we were just at the end of the slavery agitation. The last tip of the last joint of the old serpent's tail was just drawing out of view. But has it proved so? I have asserted that under that policy that agitation "has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented." When was there ever a greater agitation in Congress than last winter? When was it as great in the country as to-day?

There was a collateral object in the introduction of that Nebraska policy, which was to clothe the people of the Territories with a superior degree of self-government, beyond what they had ever had before. The first object and the main one of conferring upon the people a higher degree of "self-government" is a question of fact to be determined by you in answer to a single question. Have you ever heard or known of a people anywhere on earth who had as little to do as, in the first instance of its use, the people of Kansas had with this same right of "self-government"? In its main policy and in its collateral object, it has been nothing but a living, creeping lie from the time of its introduction till to-day.

I have intimated that I thought the agitation would not cease until a crisis should have been reached and passed. I have stated in what way I
thought it would be reached and passed. I have said that it might go one way or the other. We might, by arresting the further spread of it, and placing it where the fathers originally placed it, put it where the public mind should rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. Thus the agitation may cease. It may be pushed forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.

I have said, and I repeat, my wish is that the further spread of it may be arrested, and that it may be placed where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. I have expressed that as my wish. I entertain the opinion, upon evidence sufficient to my mind, that the fathers of this government placed that institution where the public mind did rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. Let me ask why they made provision that the source of slavery—the African slave-trade—should be cut off at the end of twenty years? Why did they make provision that in all the new territory we owned at that time slavery should be forever inhibited? Why stop its spread in one direction, and cut off its source in another, if they did not look to its being placed in the course of its ultimate extinction?

Again: the institution of slavery is only mentioned in the Constitution of the United States two or three times, and in neither of these cases does the word "slavery" or "negro race" occur; but covert language is used each time, and for a pur-
pose full of significance. What is the language in regard to the prohibition of the African slave-trade? It runs in about this way: "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight."

The next allusion in the Constitution to the question of slavery and the black race is on the subject of the basis of representation, and there the language used is:

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,—three-fifths of all other persons."

It says "persons," not slaves, not negroes; but this "three-fifths" can be applied to no other class among us than the negroes.

Lastly, in the provision for the reclamation of fugitive slaves, it is said: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." There again there is no mention of the word "negro" or of slavery. In all three of these places,
being the only allusions to slavery in the instrument, covert language is used. Language is used not suggesting that slavery existed or that the black race were among us. And I understand the contemporaneous history of those times to be that covert language was used with a purpose, and that purpose was that in our Constitution, which it was hoped and is still hoped will endure forever,—when it should be read by intelligent and patriotic men, after the institution of slavery had passed from amongst us,—there should be nothing on the face of the great charter of liberty suggesting that such a thing as negro slavery had ever existed among us. This is part of the evidence that the fathers of the government expected and intended the institution of slavery to come to an end. They expected and intended that it should be in the course of ultimate extinction. And when I say that I desire to see the further spread of it arrested, I only say I desire to see that done which the fathers have first done. When I say I desire to see it placed where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, I only say I desire to see it placed where they placed it. It is not true that our fathers, as Judge Douglas assumes, made this government part slave and part free. Understand the sense in which he puts it. He assumes that slavery is a rightful thing within itself,—was introduced by the framers of the Con-stitution. The exact truth is, that they found the institution existing among us, and they left it as
they found it. But in making the government they left this institution with many clear marks of disapprobation upon it. They found slavery among them, and they left it among them because of the difficulty—the absolute impossibility—of its immediate removal. And when Judge Douglas asks me why we cannot let it remain part slave and part free, as the fathers of the government made it, he asks a question based upon an assumption which is itself a falsehood; and I turn upon him and ask him the question, when the policy that the fathers of the government had adopted in relation to this element among us was the best policy in the world, the only wise policy, the only policy that we can ever safely continue upon, that will ever give us peace, unless this dangerous element masters us all and becomes a national institution,—I turn upon him and ask him why he could not leave it alone. I turn and ask him why he was driven to the necessity of introducing a new policy in regard to it. He has himself said he introduced a new policy. He said so in his speech on the 22d of March of the present year, 1858. I ask him why he could not let it remain where our fathers placed it. I ask, too, of Judge Douglas and his friends why we shall not again place this institution upon the basis on which the fathers left it. I ask you, when he infers that I am in favor of setting the Free and Slave States at war, when the institution was placed in that attitude by those who made the Constitution, did they make any war? If we had no war out of it
when thus placed, wherein is the ground of belief that we shall have war out of it if we return to that policy? Have we had any peace upon this matter springing from any other basis? I maintain that we have not. I have proposed nothing more than a return to the policy of the fathers.

I confess, when I propose a certain measure of policy, it is not enough for me that I do not intend anything evil in the result, but it is incumbent on me to show that it has not a tendency to that result. I have met Judge Douglas in that point of view. I have not only made the declaration that I do not mean to produce a conflict between the States, but I have tried to show by fair reasoning, and I think I have shown to the minds of fair men, that I propose nothing but what has a most peaceful tendency. The quotation that I happened to make in that Springfield speech, that "a house divided against itself cannot stand," and which has proved so offensive to the Judge, was part and parcel of the same thing. He tries to show that variety in the domestic institutions of the different States is necessary and indispensable. I do not dispute it. I have no controversy with Judge Douglas about that. I shall very readily agree with him that it would be foolish for us to insist upon having a cranberry law here in Illinois, where we have no cranberries, because they have a cranberry law in Indiana, where they have cranberries. I should insist that it would be exceedingly wrong in us to deny to Virginia the right to enact oyster laws, where they
have oysters, because we want no such laws here. I understand, I hope, quite as well as Judge Douglas or anybody else, that the variety in the soil and climate and face of the country, and consequent variety in the industrial pursuits and productions of a country, require systems of law conforming to this variety in the natural features of the country. I understand quite as well as Judge Douglas that if we here raise a barrel of flour more than we want, and the Louisianians raise a barrel of sugar more than they want, it is of mutual advantage to exchange. That produces commerce, brings us together, and makes us better friends. We like one another the more for it. And I understand as well as Judge Douglas, or anybody else, that these mutual accommodations are the cements which bind together the different parts of this Union; that instead of being a thing to "divide the house,"—figuratively expressing the Union,—they tend to sustain it; they are the props of the house, tending always to hold it up.

But when I have admitted all this, I ask if there is any parallel between these things and this institution of slavery? I do not see that there is any parallel at all between them. Consider it. When have we had any difficulty or quarrel amongst ourselves about the cranberry laws of Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or the pine-lumber laws of Maine, or the fact that Louisiana produces sugar, and Illinois flour? When have we had any quarrels over these things? When have we had perfect
peace in regard to this thing which I say is an element of discord in this Union? We have sometimes had peace, but when was it? It was when the institution of slavery remained quiet where it was. We have had difficulty and turmoil whenever it has made a struggle to spread itself where it was not. I ask, then, if experience does not speak in thunder-tones, telling us that the policy which has given peace to the country heretofore, being returned to, gives the greatest promise of peace again. You may say, and Judge Douglas has intimated the same thing, that all this difficulty in regard to the institution of slavery is the mere agitation of office-seekers and ambitious Northern politicians. He thinks we want to get "his place," I suppose. I agree that there are office-seekers amongst us. The Bible says somewhere that we are desperately selfish. I think we would have discovered that fact without the Bible. I do not claim that I am any less so than the average of men, but I do claim that I am not more selfish than Judge Douglas.

But is it true that all the difficulty and agitation we have in regard to this institution of slavery springs from office-seeking, from the mere ambition of politicians? Is that the truth? How many times have we had danger from this question? Go back to the day of the Missouri Compromise. Go back to the Nullification question, at the bottom of which lay this same slavery question. Go back to the time of the Annexation of Texas. Go back to the troubles that led to the Compromise of 1850.
You will find that every time, with the single exception of the Nullification question, they sprung from an endeavor to spread this institution. There never was a party in the history of this country, and there probably never will be, of sufficient strength to disturb the general peace of the country. Parties themselves may be divided and quarrel on minor questions, yet it extends not beyond the parties themselves. But does not this question make a disturbance outside of political circles? Does it not enter into the churches and rend them asunder? What divided the great Methodist Church into two parts, North and South? What has raised this constant disturbance in every Presbyterian General Assembly that meets? What disturbed the Unitarian Church in this very city two years ago? What has jarred and shaken the great American Tract Society recently, not yet splitting it, but sure to divide it in the end? Is it not this same mighty, deep-seated power that somehow operates on the minds of men, exciting and stirring them up in every avenue of society,—in politics, in religion, in literature, in morals, in all the manifold relations of life? Is this the work of politicians? Is that irresistible power, which for fifty years has shaken the government and agitated the people, to be stilled and subdued by pretending that it is an exceedingly simple thing, and we ought not to talk about it? If you will get everybody else to stop talking about it, I assure you I will quit before they have half done so. But where is the philosophy or states-
manship which assumes that you can quiet that disturbing element in our society which has disturbed us for more than half a century, which has been the only serious danger that has threatened our institutions,—I say, where is the philosophy or the statesmanship based on the assumption that we are to quit talking about it, and that the public mind is all at once to cease being agitated by it? Yet this is the policy here in the North that Douglas is advocating,—that we are to care nothing about it! I ask you if it is not a false philosophy. Is it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that everybody does care the most about?—a thing which all experience has shown we care a very great deal about?

The Judge alludes very often in the course of his remarks to the exclusive right which the States have to decide the whole thing for themselves. I agree with him very readily that the different States have that right. He is but fighting a man of straw when he assumes that I am contending against the right of the States to do as they please about it. Our controversy with him is in regard to the new Territories. We agree that when the States come in as States they have the right and the power to do as they please. We have no power as citizens of the Free States, or in our Federal capacity as members of the Federal Union through the General Government, to disturb slavery in the States where it exists. We profess constantly that we
have no more inclination than belief in the power of the government to disturb it; yet we are driven constantly to defend ourselves from the assumption that we are warring upon the rights of the States. What I insist upon is, that the new Territories shall be kept free from it while in the Territorial condition. Judge Douglas assumes that we have no interest in them,—that we have no right whatever to interfere. I think we have some interest. I think that as white men we have. Do we not wish for an outlet for our surplus population, if I may so express myself? Do we not feel an interest in getting to that outlet with such institutions as we would like to have prevail there? If you go to the Territory opposed to slavery, and another man comes upon the same ground with his slave, upon the assumption that the things are equal, it turns out that he has the equal right all his way, and you have no part of it your way. If he goes in and makes it a Slave Territory, and by consequence a Slave State, is it not time that those who desire to have it a Free State were on equal ground? Let me suggest it in a different way. How many Democrats are there about here ["A thousand"] who have left Slave States and come into the Free State of Illinois to get rid of the institution of slavery? [Another voice: "A thousand and one."] I reckon there are a thousand and one. I will ask you, if the policy you are now advocating had prevailed when this country was in a Territorial condition, where would you have gone to get rid of it? Where
would you have found your Free State or Territory to go to? And when hereafter, for any cause, the people in this place shall desire to find new homes, if they wish to be rid of the institution, where will they find the place to go to?

Now, irrespective of the moral aspect of this question as to whether there is a right or wrong in enslaving a negro, I am still in favor of our new Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a home,—may find some spot where they can better their condition; where they can settle upon new soil and better their condition in life. I am in favor of this, not merely (I must say it here as I have elsewhere) for our own people who are born amongst us, but as an outlet for free white people everywhere, the world over,—in which Hans, and Baptiste, and Patrick, and all other men from all the world, may find new homes and better their conditions in life.

I have stated upon former occasions, and I may as well state again, what I understand to be the real issue in this controversy between Judge Douglas and myself. On the point of my wanting to make war between the Free and the Slave States, there has been no issue between us. So, too, when he assumes that I am in favor of introducing a perfect social and political equality between the white and black races. These are false issues, upon which Judge Douglas has tried to force the controversy. There is no foundation in truth for the charge that I maintain either of these propositions. The real
issue in this controversy—the one pressing upon every mind—is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks upon the institution of slavery as a wrong, and of another class that does not look upon it as a wrong. The sentiment that contemplates the institution of slavery in this country as a wrong is the sentiment of the Republican party. It is the sentiment around which all their actions, all their arguments, circle, from which all their propositions radiate. They look upon it as being a moral, social, and political wrong; and while they contemplate it as such, they nevertheless have due regard for its actual existence among us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way and to all the constitutional obligations thrown about it. Yet, having a due regard for these, they desire a policy in regard to it that looks to its not creating any more danger. They insist that it should, as far as may be, be treated as a wrong; and one of the methods of treating it as a wrong is to make provision that it shall grow no larger. They also desire a policy that looks to a peaceful end of slavery at some time, as being wrong. These are the views they entertain in regard to it as I understand them; and all their sentiments, all their arguments and propositions, are brought within this range. I have said, and I repeat it here, that if there be a man amongst us who does not think that the institution of slavery is wrong in any one of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is misplaced, and ought not to be with us. And if there be a man amongst us
who is so impatient of it as a wrong as to disregard its actual presence amongst us and the difficulty of getting rid of it suddenly in a satisfactory way, and to disregard the constitutional obligations thrown about it, that man is misplaced if he is on our platform. We disclaim sympathy with him in practical action. He is not placed properly with us.

On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let me say a word. Has anything ever threatened the existence of this Union save and except this very institution of slavery? What is it that we hold most dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. What has ever threatened our liberty and prosperity, save and except this institution of slavery? If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition of things by enlarging slavery,—by spreading it out and making it bigger? You may have a wen or cancer upon your person, and not be able to cut it out, lest you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure it, to engraft it and spread it over your whole body. That is no proper way of treating what you regard a wrong. You see this peaceful way of dealing with it as a wrong,—restricting the spread of it, and not allowing it to go into new countries where it has not already existed. That is the peaceful way, the old-fashioned way, the way in which the fathers themselves set us the example.

On the other hand, I have said there is a sentiment which treats it as not being wrong. That is the Democratic sentiment of this day. I do not mean
to say that every man who stands within that range positively asserts that it is right. That class will include all who positively assert that it is right, and all who, like Judge Douglas, treat it as indifferent, and do not say it is either right or wrong. These two classes of men fall within the general class of those who do not look upon it as a wrong. And if there be among you anybody who supposes that he, as a Democrat, can consider himself "as much opposed to slavery as anybody," I would like to reason with him. You never treat it as a wrong. What other thing that you consider as a wrong do you deal with as you deal with that? Perhaps you say it is wrong, but your leader never does, and you quarrel with anybody who says it is wrong. Although you pretend to say so yourself, you can find no fit place to deal with it as a wrong. You must not say anything about it in the Free States, because it is not here. You must not say anything about it in the Slave States, because it is there. You must not say anything about it in the pulpit, because that is religion, and has nothing to do with it. You must not say anything about it in politics, because that will disturb the security of "my place." There is no place to talk about it as being a wrong, although you say yourself it is a wrong. But, finally, you will screw yourself up to the belief that if the people of the Slave States should adopt a system of gradual emancipation on the slavery question, you would be in favor of it. You would be in favor of it. You say that is getting it in the right
place, and you would be glad to see it succeed. But you are deceiving yourself. You all know that Frank Blair and Gratz Brown, down there in St. Louis, undertook to introduce that system in Missouri. They fought as valiantly as they could for the system of gradual emancipation which you pretend you would be glad to see succeed. Now, I will bring you to the test. After a hard fight they were beaten, and when the news came over here, you threw up your hats and **hurrahed for Democracy.** More than that, take all the argument made in favor of the system you have proposed, and it carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in the institution of slavery. The arguments to sustain that policy carefully excluded it. Even here to-day you heard Judge Douglas quarrel with me because I uttered a wish that it might some time come to an end. Although Henry Clay could say he wished every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors, I am denounced by those pretending to respect Henry Clay for uttering a wish that it might some time, in some peaceful way, come to an end. The Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the merest breath, the slightest hint, of the least degree of wrong about it. Try it by some of Judge Douglas's arguments. He says he "don't care whether it is voted up or voted down" in the Territories. I do not care myself, in dealing with that expression, whether it is intended to be expressive of his individual sentiments on the subject, or only of the national policy he desires to
have established. It is alike valuable for my purpose. Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in slavery; but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it, because no man can logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. He may say he don't care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing. He contends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them. So they have, if it is not a wrong. But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong. He says that upon the score of equality, slaves should be allowed to go in a new Territory, like other property. This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property. If it and other property are equal, his argument is entirely logical. But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong. You may turn over everything in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxim-like arguments,—it everywhere carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in it.

That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country, when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—
right and wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time, and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity, and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says: "You work and toil and earn bread, and I'll eat it." No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle. I was glad to express my gratitude at Quincy, and I re-express it here, to Judge Douglas,—that he looks to no end of the institution of slavery. That will help the people to see where the struggle really is. It will hereafter place with us all men who really do wish the wrong may have an end. And whenever we can get rid of the fog which obscures the real question, when we can get Judge Douglas and his friends to avow a policy looking to its perpetuation,—we can get out from among that class of men and bring them to the side of those who treat it as a wrong. Then there will soon be an end of it, and that end will be its "ultimate extinction." Whenever the issue can be distinctly made, and all extraneous matter thrown out so that men can fairly see the real difference between the parties, this controversy will soon be settled, and it will be done peaceably, too. There will be no war, no violence. It will be placed
again where the wisest and best men of the world placed it. Brooks, of South Carolina, once declared that when this Constitution was framed its framers did not look to the institution existing until his day. When he said this, I think he stated a fact that is fully borne out by the history of the times. But he also said they were better and wiser men than the men of these days; yet the men of these days had experience which they had not, and by the invention of the cotton-gin it became a necessity in this country that slavery should be perpetual. I now say that, willingly or unwillingly, purposely or without purpose, Judge Douglas has been the most prominent instrument in changing the position of the institution of slavery which the fathers of the government expected to come to an end ere this,—and putting it upon Brooks's cotton-gin basis; placing it where he openly confesses he has no desire there shall ever be an end of it.

I understand I have ten minutes yet. I will employ it in saying something about this argument Judge Douglas uses, while he sustains the Dred Scott decision, that the people of the Territories can still somehow exclude slavery. The first thing I ask attention to is the fact that Judge Douglas constantly said, before the decision, that whether they could or not, was a question for the Supreme Court. But after the court had made the decision he virtually says it is not a question for the Supreme Court, but for the people. And how is it he tells us they can exclude it? He says it needs "police
regulation," and that admits of "unfriendly legislation." Although it is a right established by the Constitution of the United States to take a slave into a Territory of the United States and hold him as property, yet unless the Territorial Legislature will give friendly legislation, and, more especially, if they adopt unfriendly legislation, they can practically exclude him. Now, without meeting this proposition as a matter of fact, I pass to consider the real constitutional obligation. Let me take the gentleman who looks me in the face before me, and let us suppose that he is a member of the Territorial Legislature. The first thing he will do will be to swear that he will support the Constitution of the United States. His neighbor by his side in the Territory has slaves and needs Territorial legislation to enable him to enjoy that constitutional right. Can he withhold the legislation which his neighbor needs for the enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of the United States which he has sworn to support? Can he withhold it without violating his oath? And, more especially, can he pass unfriendly legislation to violate his oath? Why, this is a monstrous sort of talk about the Constitution of the United States! There has never been as outlandish or lawless a doctrine from the mouth of any respectable man on earth. I do not believe it is a constitutional right to hold slaves in a Territory of the United States. I believe the decision was improperly made and I go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious against those who go
for reversing a decision. But he is for legislating it out of all force while the law itself stands. I repeat that there has never been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a respectable man.

I suppose most of us (I know it of myself) believe that people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law,—that is a right fixed in the Constitution. But it cannot be made available to them without Congressional legislation. In the Judge’s language, it is a “barren right,” which needs legislation before it can become efficient and valuable to the persons to whom it is guaranteed. And as the right is constitutional, I agree that the legislation shall be granted to it,—and that not that we like the institution of slavery. We profess to have no taste for running and catching niggers,—at least, I profess no taste for that job at all. Why then do I yield support to a Fugitive Slave law? Because I do not understand that the Constitution, which guarantees that right, can be supported without it. And if I believed that the right to hold a slave in a Territory was equally fixed in the Constitution with the right to reclaim fugitives, I should be bound to give it the legislation necessary to support it. I say that no man can deny his obligation to give the necessary legislation to support slavery in a Territory, who believes it is a constitutional right to have it there. No man can, who does not give the Abolitionists an argument to deny the obligation enjoined by the Constitution to enact a Fugitive State law. Try it now. It is the
strongest Abolition argument ever made. I say if that Dred Scott decision is correct, then the right to hold slaves in a Territory is equally a constitutional right with the right of a slaveholder to have his runaway returned. No one can show the distinction between them. The one is express, so that we cannot deny it. The other is construed to be in the Constitution, so that he who believes the decision to be correct believes in the right. And the man who argues that by unfriendly legislation, in spite of that constitutional right, slavery may be driven from the Territories, cannot avoid furnishing an argument by which Abolitionists may deny the obligation to return fugitives, and claim the power to pass laws unfriendly to the right of the slaveholder to reclaim his fugitive. I do not know how such an argument may strike a popular assembly like this, but I defy anybody to go before a body of men whose minds are educated to estimating evidence and reasoning, and show that there is an iota of difference between the constitutional right to reclaim a fugitive, and the constitutional right to hold a slave, in a Territory, provided this Dred Scott decision is correct. I defy any man to make an argument that will justify unfriendly legislation to deprive a slaveholder of his right to hold a slave in a Territory, that will not equally, in all its length, breadth, and thickness, furnish an argument for nullifying the Fugitive Slave law. Why, there is not such an Abolitionist in the nation as Douglas, after all,
MR. DOUGLAS'S REJOINDER

Mr. Lincoln has concluded his remarks by saying that there is not such an Abolitionist as I am in all America. If he could make the Abolitionists of Illinois believe that, he would not have much show for the Senate. Let him make the Abolitionists believe the truth of that statement, and his political back is broken.

His first criticism upon me is the expression of his hope that the war of the Administration will be prosecuted against me and the Democratic party of this State with vigor. He wants that war prosecuted with vigor; I have no doubt of it. His hopes of success and the hopes of his party depend solely upon it. They have no chance of destroying the Democracy of this State except by the aid of Federal patronage. He has all the Federal office-holders here as his allies, running separate tickets against the Democracy to divide the party, although the leaders all intend to vote directly the Abolition ticket, and only leave the greenhorns to vote this separate ticket who refuse to go into the Abolition camp. There is something really refreshing in the thought that Mr. Lincoln is in favor of prosecuting one war vigorously. It is the first war that I ever knew him to be in favor of prosecuting. It is the first war that I ever knew him to believe to be just or constitutional. When the Mexican war was being waged, and the American army was surrounded by
the enemy in Mexico, he thought that war was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust. He thought it was not commenced on the right spot.

When I made an incidental allusion of that kind in the joint discussion over at Charleston some weeks ago, Lincoln, in replying, said that I, Douglas, had charged him with voting against supplies for the Mexican war, and then he reared up, full length, and swore that he never voted against the supplies; that it was a slander; and caught hold of Ficklin, who sat on the stand, and said, "Here, Ficklin, tell the people that it is a lie." Well, Ficklin, who had served in Congress with him, stood up and told them all that he recollected about it. It was that when George Ashmun, of Massachusetts, brought forward a resolution declaring the war unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust, that Lincoln had voted for it. "Yes," said Lincoln, "I did." Thus he confessed that he voted that the war was wrong, that our country was in the wrong, and consequently that the Mexicans were in the right; but charged that I had slandered him by saying that he voted against the supplies. I never charged him with voting against the supplies in my life, because I knew that he was not in Congress when they were voted. The war was commenced on the 13th day of May, 1846, and on that day we appropriated in Congress ten millions of dollars and fifty thousand men to prosecute it. During the same session we voted more men and more money, and at the next session we voted more men and more money, so that by the time Mr. Lin-
coln entered Congress we had enough men and enough money to carry on the war, and had no occasion to vote for any more. When he got into the House, being opposed to the war, and not being able to stop the supplies, because they had all gone forward, all he could do was to follow the lead of Corwin, and prove that the war was not begun on the right spot, and that it was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and wrong. Remember, too, that this he did after the war had been begun. It is one thing to be opposed to the declaration of a war, another and very different thing to take sides with the enemy against your own country after the war has been commenced. Our army was in Mexico at the time, many battles had been fought; our citizens, who were defending the honor of their country's flag, were surrounded by the daggers, the guns, and the poison of the enemy. Then it was that Corwin made his speech in which he declared that the American soldiers ought to be welcomed by the Mexicans with bloody hands and hospitable graves; then it was that Ashmun and Lincoln voted in the House of Representatives that the war was unconstitutional and unjust; and Ashmun's resolution, Corwin's speech, and Lincoln's vote were sent to Mexico and read at the head of the Mexican army, to prove to them that there was a Mexican party in the Congress of the United States who were doing all in their power to aid them. That a man who takes sides with the common enemy against his own country in time of war should rejoice in a war being
made on me now, is very natural. And, in my opinion, no other kind of a man would rejoice in it.

Mr. Lincoln has told you a great deal to-day about his being an old line Clay Whig. Bear in mind that there are a great many old Clay Whigs down in this region. It is more agreeable, therefore, for him to talk about the old Clay Whig party than it is for him to talk Abolitionism. We did not hear much about the old Clay Whig party up in the Abolition districts. How much of an old line Henry Clay Whig was he? Have you read General Singleton’s speech at Jacksonville? You know that General Singleton was for twenty-five years the confidential friend of Henry Clay in Illinois, and he testified that in 1847, when the Constitutional Convention of this State was in session, the Whig members were invited to a Whig caucus at the house of Mr. Lincoln’s brother-in-law, where Mr. Lincoln proposed to throw Henry Clay overboard and take up General Taylor in his place, giving as his reason that, if the Whigs did not take up General Taylor, the Democrats would. Singleton testifies that Lincoln in that speech urged as another reason for throwing Henry Clay overboard, that the Whigs had fought long enough for principle, and ought to begin to fight for success. Singleton also testified that Lincoln’s speech did not have the effect of cutting Clay’s throat, and that he (Singleton) and others withdrew from the caucus in indignation. He further states that when they got to Philadelphia to attend the National Convention of the Whig party,
that Lincoln was there, the bitter and deadly enemy of Clay, and that he tried to keep him (Singleton) out of the Convention because he insisted on voting for Clay, and Lincoln was determined to have Taylor. Singleton says that Lincoln rejoiced with very great joy when he found the mangled remains of the murdered Whig statesman lying cold before him. Now, Mr. Lincoln tells you that he is an old line Clay Whig! General Singleton testifies to the facts I have narrated, in a public speech which has been printed and circulated broadcast over the State for weeks, yet not a lisp have we heard from Mr. Lincoln on the subject, except that he is an old Clay Whig.

What part of Henry Clay's policy did Lincoln ever advocate. He was in Congress in 1848-9, when the Wilmot Proviso warfare disturbed the peace and harmony of the country, until it shook the foundation of the Republic from its centre to its circumference. It was that agitation that brought Clay forth from his retirement at Ashland again to occupy his seat in the Senate of the United States, to see if he could not, by his great wisdom and experience, and the renown of his name, do something to restore peace and quiet to a disturbed country. Who got up that sectional strife that Clay had to be called upon to quell? I have heard Lincoln boast that he voted forty-two times for the Wilmot Proviso, and that he would have voted as many times more if he could. Lincoln is the man, in connection with Seward, Chase, Giddings, and other
Abolitionists, who got up that strife that I helped Clay to put down. Henry Clay came back to the Senate in 1849, and saw that he must do something to restore peace to the country. The Union Whigs and the Union Democrats welcomed him, the moment he arrived, as the man for the occasion. We believed that he, of all men on earth, had been preserved by Divine Providence to guide us out of our difficulties, and we Democrats rallied under Clay then, as you Whigs in Nullification time rallied under the banner of old Jackson, forgetting party when the country was in danger, in order that we might have a country first, and parties afterward.

And this reminds me that Mr. Lincoln told you that the slavery question was the only thing that ever disturbed the peace and harmony of the Union. Did not Nullification once raise its head and disturb the peace of this Union in 1832? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? Did not disunion raise its monster head during the last war with Great Britain? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? The peace of this country has been disturbed three times, once during the war with Great Britain, once on the tariff question, and once on the slavery question. His argument therefore that slavery is the only question that has ever created dissension in the Union falls to the ground. It is true that agitators are enabled now to use this slavery question for the purpose of sectional strife. He admits that in regard to all things else, the principle that I advocate, making each State and Territory
free to decide for itself, ought to prevail. He instances the cranberry laws and the oyster laws, and he might have gone through the whole list with the same effect. I say that all these laws are local and domestic, and that local and domestic concerns should be left to each State and each Territory to manage for itself. If agitators would acquiesce in that principle, there never would be any danger to the peace and harmony of the Union.

Mr. Lincoln tries to avoid the main issue by attacking the truth of my proposition, that our fathers made this government divided into Free and Slave States, recognizing the right of each to decide all its local questions for itself. Did they not thus make it? It is true that they did not establish slavery in any of the States, or abolish it in any of them; but finding thirteen States, twelve of which were slave and one free, they agreed to form a government uniting them together as they stood, divided into Free and Slave States, and to guarantee forever to each State the right to do as it pleased on the slavery question. Having thus made the government, and conferred this right upon each State forever, I assert that this government can exist as they made it, divided into Free and Slave States, if any one State chooses to retain slavery. He says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be abolished everywhere. I look forward to a time when each State shall be allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep slavery forever, it is not my business, but its own; if it chooses to abolish slay-
ery, it is its own business,—not mine. I care more for the great principle of self-government, the right of the people to rule, than I do for all the negroes in Christendom. I would not endanger the perpetuity of this Union, I would not blot out the great inalienable rights of the white men, for all the negroes that ever existed. Hence, I say, let us maintain this government on the principles that our fathers made it on, recognizing the right of each State to keep slavery as long as its people determine, or to abolish it when they please. But Mr. Lincoln says that when our fathers made this government they did not look forward to the state of things now existing, and therefore he thinks the doctrine was wrong; and he quotes Brooks, of South Carolina, to prove that our fathers then thought that probably slavery would be abolished by each State acting for itself before this time. Suppose they did; suppose they did not foresee what has occurred,—does that change the principles of our government? They did not probably foresee the telegraph that transmits intelligence by lightning, nor did they foresee the railroads that now form the bonds of union between the different States, or the thousand mechanical inventions that have elevated mankind. But do these things change the principles of the government? Our fathers, I say, made this government on the principle of the right of each State to do as it pleases in its own domestic affairs, subject to the Constitution, and allowed the people of each to apply to every new change of circumstances such
remedy as they may see fit to improve their condition. This right they have for all time to come.

Mr. Lincoln went on to tell you that he does not at all desire to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists, nor does his party. I expected him to say that down here. Let me ask him, then, how he expects to put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction everywhere, if he does not intend to interfere with it in the States where it exists? He says that he will prohibit it in all Territories, and the inference is, then, that unless they make Free States out of them he will keep them out of the Union; for, mark you, he did not say whether or not he would vote to admit Kansas with slavery or not, as her people might apply (he forgot that, as usual, etc.); he did not say whether or not he was in favor of bringing the Territories now in existence into the Union on the principle of Clay's Compromise Measures on the slavery question. I told you that he would not. His idea is that he will prohibit slavery in all the Territories, and thus force them all to become Free States, surrounding the Slave States with a cordon of Free States, and hemming them in, keeping the slaves confined to their present limits whilst they go on multiplying, until the soil on which they live will no longer feed them, and he will thus be able to put slavery in a course of ultimate extinction by starvation. He will extinguish slavery in the Southern States as the French general exterminated the Algerines when he smoked them out. He is going to extinguish slavery by
surrounding the Slave States, hemming in the slaves, and starving them out of existence, as you smoke a fox out of his hole. He intends to do that in the name of humanity and Christianity, in order that we may get rid of the terrible crime and sin entailed upon our fathers of holding slaves. Mr. Lincoln makes out that line of policy, and appeals to the moral sense of justice and to the Christian feeling of the community to sustain him. He says that any man who holds to the contrary doctrine is in the position of the king who claimed to govern by divine right. Let us examine for a moment and see what principle it was that overthrew the divine right of George the Third to govern us. Did not these Colonies rebel because the British Parliament had no right to pass laws concerning our property and domestic and private institutions without our consent? We demanded that the British Government should not pass such laws unless they gave us representation in the body passing them; and this the British Government insisting on doing, we went to war, on the principle that the Home Government should not control and govern distant colonies without giving them a representation. Now, Mr. Lincoln proposes to govern the Territories without giving them a representation, and calls on Congress to pass laws controlling their property and domestic concerns without their consent and against their will. Thus, he asserts for his party the identical principle asserted by George III. and the Tories of the Revolution,
I ask you to look into these things and then tell me whether the Democracy or the Abolitionists are right. I hold that the people of a Territory, like those of a State (I use the language of Mr. Buchanan in his Letter of Acceptance), have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. The point upon which Chief Justice Taney expresses his opinion is simply this, that slaves, being property, stand on an equal footing with other property, and consequently that the owner has the same right to carry that property into a Territory that he has any other, subject to the same conditions. Suppose that one of your merchants was to take fifty or one hundred thousand dollars' worth of liquors to Kansas. He has a right to go there, under that decision; but when he gets there he finds the Maine liquor law in force, and what can he do with his property after he gets it there? He cannot sell it, he cannot use it; it is subject to the local law, and that law is against him, and the best thing he can do with it is to bring it back into Missouri or Illinois and sell it. If you take negroes to Kansas, as Colonel Jefferson Davis said in his Bangor speech, from which I have quoted to-day, you must take them there subject to the local law. If the people want the institution of slavery, they will protect and encourage it; but if they do not want it they will withhold that protection, and the absence of local legislation protecting slavery excludes it as completely as a positive prohibition. You slaveholders of Missouri
might as well understand what you know practically, that you cannot carry slavery where the people do not want it. All you have a right to ask is that the people shall do as they please: if they want slavery, let them have it; if they do not want it, allow them to refuse to encourage it.

My friends, if, as I have said before, we will only live up to this great fundamental principle, there will be peace between the North and the South. Mr. Lincoln admits that, under the Constitution, on all domestic questions, except slavery, we ought not to interfere with the people of each State. What right have we to interfere with the people of each State. What right have we to interfere with slavery any more than we have to interfere with any other question? He says that this slavery question is now the bone of contention. Why? Simply because agitators have combined in all the Free States to make war upon it. Suppose the agitators in the States should combine in one half of the Union to make war upon the railroad system of the other half? They would thus be driven to the same sectional strife. Suppose one section makes war upon any other particular institution of the opposite section, and the same strife is produced. The only remedy and safety is that we shall stand by the Constitution as our fathers made it, obey the laws as they are passed, while they stand the proper test, and sustain the decisions of the Supreme Court and the constituted authorities.
Mr. President and Fellow-citizens of New York: The facts with which I shall deal this evening are mainly old and familiar; nor is there anything new in the general use I shall make of them. If there shall be any novelty, it will be in the mode of presenting the facts, and the inferences and observations following that presentation. In his speech last Autumn at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New York "Times," Senator Douglas said:

“Our fathers, when they framed the government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now.”

I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I so adopt it because it furnishes a precise and an agreed starting-point for a discussion between Republicans and that wing of the Democracy headed by Senator Douglas. It simply leaves the inquiry: What was the understanding those fathers had of the question mentioned?

What is the frame of government under which we live? The answer must be, “The Constitution of the United States.” That Constitution consists of the original, framed in 1787, and under which the
present government first went into operation, and twelve subsequently framed amendments, the first ten of which were framed in 1789.

Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the "thirty-nine" who signed the original instrument may be fairly called our fathers who framed that part of the present government. It is almost exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether true to say they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at that time. Their names, being familiar to nearly all, and accessible to quite all, need not now be repeated.

I take these "thirty-nine," for the present, as being "our fathers who framed the government under which we live." What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers understood "just as well, and even better, than we do now"?

It is this: Does the proper division of local from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to control as to slavery in our Federal Territories?

Upon this, Senator Douglas holds the affirmative, and Republicans the negative. This affirmation and denial form an issue; and this issue—this question—is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood "better than we." Let us now inquire whether the "thirty-nine," or any of them, ever acted upon this question; and if they did, how they acted upon it—how they expressed that better understanding. In 1784, three years before the Con-
stitution, the United States then owning the Northwestern Territory, and no other, the Congress of the Confederation had before them the question of prohibiting slavery in that Territory, and four of the "thirty-nine" who afterward framed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on that question. Of these, Roger Sherman, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh Williamson voted for the prohibition, thus showing that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory. The other of the four, James McHenry, voted against the prohibition, showing that for some cause he thought it improper to vote for it.

In 1787, still before the Constitution, but while the convention was in session framing it, and while the Northwestern Territory still was the only Territory owned by the United States, the same question of prohibiting slavery in the Territory again came before the Congress of the Confederation; and two more of the "thirty-nine" who afterward signed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on the question. They were William Blount and William Few; and they both voted for the prohibition—thus showing that in their understanding no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory. This time the prohibition became a law, being part of what is now well known as the Ordinance of '87.
The question of Federal control of slavery in the Territories seems not to have been directly before the convention which framed the original Constitution; and hence it is not recorded that the "thirty-nine," or any of them, while engaged on that instrument, expressed any opinion on that precise question.

In 1789, by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution, an act was passed to enforce the ordinance of '87, including the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory. The bill for this act was reported by one of the "thirty-nine"—Thomas Fitzsimmons, then a member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania. It went through all its stages without a word of opposition, and finally passed both branches without ayes and nays, which is equivalent to a unanimous passage. In this Congress there were sixteen of the thirty-nine fathers who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman, Wm. S. Johnson, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, Thos. Fitzsimmons, William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Rufus King, William Patterson, George Clymer, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler, Daniel Carroll, and James Madison.

This shows that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, properly forbade Congress to prohibit slavery in the Federal territory; else both their fidelity to correct principle, and their oath to support the Constitution, would have constrained them to oppose the prohibition.
Again, George Washington, another of the "thirty-nine," was then President of the United States, and as such approved and signed the bill, thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory.

No great while after the adoption of the original Constitution, North Carolina ceded to the Federal Government the country now constituting the State of Tennessee; and a few years later Georgia ceded that which now constitutes the States of Mississippi and Alabama. In both deeds of cession it was made a condition by the ceding States that the Federal government should not prohibit slavery in the ceded country. Besides this, slavery was then actually in the ceded country. Under these circumstances, Congress, on taking charge of these countries, did not absolutely prohibit slavery within them. But they did interfere with it—take control of it—even there, to a certain extent. In 1798 Congress organized the Territory of Mississippi. In the act of organization they prohibited the bringing of slaves into the Territory from any place without the United States, by fine, and giving freedom to slaves so brought. This act passed both branches of Congress without yeas and nays. In that Congress were three of the "thirty-nine" who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, George Read, and Abraham Baldwin.
They all probably voted for it. Certainly they would have placed their opposition to it upon record if, in their understanding, any line dividing local from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal Territory.

In 1803 the Federal Government purchased the Louisiana country. Our former territorial acquisitions came from certain of our own States; but this Louisiana country was acquired from a foreign nation. In 1804 Congress gave a territorial organization to that part of it which now constitutes the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, lying within that part, was an old and comparatively large city. There were other considerable towns and settlements and slavery was extensively and thoroughly intermingled with the people. Congress did not, in the Territorial Act, prohibit slavery; but they did interfere with it—take control of it—in a more marked and extensive way than they did in the case of Mississippi. The substance of the provision therein made in relation to slaves was:

1st. That no slave should be imported into the Territory from foreign parts.

2d. That no slave should be carried into it who had been imported into the United States since the first day of May, 1798.

3d. That no slave should be carried into it, except by the owner, and for his own use as a settler; the penalty in all cases being a fine upon the violator of the law, and freedom to the slave.
This act also was passed without ayes or nays. In the Congress which passed it there were two of the "thirty-nine." They were Abraham Baldwin and Jonathan Dayton. As stated in the case of Mississippi, it is probable they both voted for it. They would not have allowed it to pass without recording their opposition to it if, in their understanding, it violated either the line properly dividing local from Federal authority, or any provision of the Constitution.

In 1819-20 came and passed the Missouri question. Many votes were taken, by yeas and nays, in both branches of Congress, upon the various phases of the general question. Two of the "thirty-nine"—Rufus King and Charles Pinckney—were members of that Congress. Mr. King steadily voted for slavery prohibition and against all compromises, while Mr. Pinckney as steadily voted against slavery prohibition and against all compromises. By this, Mr. King showed that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, was violated by Congress prohibiting slavery in Federal territory; while Mr. Pinckney, by his votes, showed that, in his understanding, there was some sufficient reason for opposing such prohibition in that case.

The cases I have mentioned are the only acts of the "thirty-nine," or of any of them, upon the direct issue, which I have been able to discover.

To enumerate the persons who thus acted as being four in 1784, two in 1787, seventeen in 1789,
three in 1798, two in 1804, and two in 1819-20, there would be thirty of them. But this would be counting John Langdon, Roger Sherman, William Few, Rufus King, and George Read each twice, and Abraham Baldwin three times. The true number of those of the "thirty-nine" whom I have shown to have acted upon the question which, by the text, they understood better than we, is twenty-three, leaving sixteen not shown to have acted upon it in any way.

Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our thirty-nine fathers "who framed the government under which we live," who have, upon their official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very question which the text affirms they "understood just as well, and even better, than we do now"; and twenty-one of them—a clear majority of the whole "thirty-nine"—so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross political impropriety and wilful perjury if, in their understanding, any proper division between local and Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak louder than words, so actions under such responsibility speak still louder.

Two of the twenty-three voted against Congressional prohibition of slavery in the Federal Territories, in the instances in which they acted upon the question. But for what reasons they so voted
is not known. They may have done so because they thought a proper division of local from Federal authority, or some provision or principle of the Constitution, stood in the way; or they may, without any such question, have voted against the prohibition on what appeared to them to be sufficient grounds of expediency. No one who has sworn to support the Constitution can conscientiously vote for what he understands to be an unconstitutional measure, however expedient he may think it; but one may and ought to vote against a measure which he deems constitutional if, at the same time, he deems it inexpedient. It, therefore, would be unsafe to set down even the two who voted against the prohibition as having done so because, in their understanding, any proper division of local from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory.

The remaining sixteen of the "thirty-nine," so far as I have discovered, have left no record of their understanding upon the direct question of Federal control of slavery in the Federal Territories. But there is much reason to believe that their understanding upon that question would not have appeared different from that of their twenty-three comrades, had it been manifested at all.

For the purpose of adhering rigidly to the text, I have purposely omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any person, however distinguished, other than the thirty-nine fathers who
framed the original Constitution; and, for the same reason, I have also omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any of the "thirty-nine" even on any other phase of the general question of slavery. If we should look into their acts and declarations on those other phases, as the foreign slave-trade, and the morality and policy of slavery generally, it would appear to us that on the direct question of Federal control of slavery in Federal Territories, the sixteen, if they had acted at all, would probably have acted just as the twenty-three did. Among that sixteen were several of the most noted anti-slavery men of those times—as Dr. Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris—while there was not one now known to have been otherwise, unless it may be John Rutledge, of South Carolina.

The sum of the whole is that of our thirty-nine fathers who framed the original Constitution, twenty-one—a clear majority of the whole—certainly understood that no proper division of local from Federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories; while all the rest had probably the same understanding. Such, unquestionably, was the understanding of our fathers who framed the original Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the question "better than we."

But, so far, I have been considering the understanding of the question manifested by the framers
of the original Constitution. In and by the original instrument, a mode was provided for amending it; and, as I have already stated, the present frame of "the government under which we live" consists of that original, and twelve amendatory articles framed and adopted since. Those who now insist that Federal control of slavery in Federal Territories violates the Constitution, point us to the provisions which they suppose it thus violates; and, as I understand, they all fix upon provisions in these amendatory articles, and not in the original instrument. The Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott case, plant themselves upon the fifth amendment, which provides that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law"; while Senator Douglas and his peculiar adherents plant themselves upon the tenth amendment, providing that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution" "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Now it so happens that these amendments were framed by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution—the identical Congress which passed the act, already mentioned, enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory. Not only was it the same Congress, but they were the identical, same individual men who, at the same session, and at the same time within the session, had under consideration, and in progress toward maturity, these constitutional amendments, and this act prohibiting slavery in all the territory the nation then owned.
The constitutional amendments were introduced before, and passed after the act enforcing the ordinance of '87; so that, during the whole pendency of the act to enforce the ordinance, the constitutional amendments were also pending.

The seventy-six members of that Congress, including sixteen of the framers of the original Constitution, as before stated, were pre-eminently our fathers who framed that part of "the government under which we live" which is now claimed as forbidding the Federal Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories.

Is it not a little presumptuous in anyone at this day to affirm that the two things which that Congress deliberately framed, and carried to maturity at the same time, are absolutely inconsistent with each other? And does not such affirmation become impudently absurd when coupled with the other affirmation, from the same mouth, that those who did the two things alleged to be inconsistent, understood whether they really were inconsistent better than we—better than he who affirms that they are inconsistent?

It is surely safe to assume that the thirty-nine framers of the original Constitution, and the seventy-six members of the Congress which framed the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly include those who may be fairly called "our fathers who framed the government under which we live."

And so assuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them ever, in his whole life, declared that, in
his understanding, any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. I go a step further. I defy anyone to show that any living man in the world ever did, prior to the beginning of the present century (and I might almost say prior to the beginning of the last half of the present century), declare that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. To those who now so declare I give not only "our fathers who framed the government under which we live," but with them all other living men within the century in which it was framed, among whom to search, and they shall not be able to find the evidence of a single man agreeing with them.

Now, and here, let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our fathers did. To do so would be to discard all the lights of current experience—to reject all progress, all improvement. What I do say is that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot stand; and most surely not in a case whereof we ourselves declare they understood the question better than we.
If any man at this day sincerely believes that a proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories, he is right to say so, and to enforce his position by all truthful evidence and fair argument which he can. But he has no right to mislead others, who have less access to history, and less leisure to study it, into the false belief that "our fathers who framed the government under which we live" were of the same opinion—thus substituting falsehood and deception for truthful evidence and fair argument. If any man at this day sincerely believes "our fathers who framed the government under which we live" used and applied principles, in other cases, which ought to have led them to understand that a proper division of local from Federal authority, or some part of the Constitution, forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories, he is right to say so. But he should, at the same time, brave the responsibility of declaring that, in his opinion, he understands their principles better than they did themselves; and especially should he not shirk that responsibility by asserting that they "understood the question just as well, and even better, than we do now."

But enough! Let all who believe that "our fathers who framed the government under which we live understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now," speak as they spoke,
and act as they acted upon it. This is all Republicans ask—all Republicans desire—in relation to slavery. As those fathers marked it, so let it be again marked, as an evil not to be extended, but to be tolerated and protected only because of and so far as its actual presence amongst us makes that toleration and protection a necessity. Let all the guaranties those fathers gave it be not grudgingly, but fully and fairly maintained. For this Republicans contend, and with this, so far as I know or believe, they will be content.

And now, if they would listen—as I suppose they will not—I would address a few words to the Southern people.

I would say to them: You consider yourselves a reasonable and a just people; and I consider that in the general qualities of reason and justice you are not inferior to any other people. Still, when you speak of us Republicans, you do so only to denounce us as reptiles, or, at the best, as no better than outlaws. You will grant a hearing to pirates or murderers, but nothing like it to "Black Republicans." In all your contentions with one another, each of you deems an unconditional condemnation of "Black Republicanism," as the first thing to be attended to. Indeed, such condemnation of us seems to be an indispensable prerequisite—license, so to speak—among you to be admitted or permitted to speak at all. Now can you or not be prevailed upon to pause and to consider whether this is quite just to us, or even to yourselves? Bring forward
your charges and specifications, and then be patient long enough to hear us deny or justify.

You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you. You produce your proof; and what is it? Why, that our party has no existence in your section—gets no votes in your section. The fact is substantially true; but does it prove the issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of principle, begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease to be sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet, are you willing to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find that we have ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section this very year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly is, that your proof does not touch the issue. The fact that we get no votes in your section is a fact of your making, and not of ours. And if there be fault in that fact, that fault is primarily yours, and remains so until you show that we repel you by some wrong principle or practice. If we do repel you by any wrong principle or practice, the fault is ours; but this brings you to where you ought to have started—to a discussion of the right or wrong of our principle. If our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section for the benefit of ours, or for any other object, then our principle, and we with it, are sectional, and are justly opposed and denounced as such. Meet us, then, on the question of whether our principle, put in practice, would wrong your
section; and so meet us as if it were possible that something may be said on your side. Do you accept the challenge? No! Then you really believe that the principle which "our fathers who framed the government under which we live" thought so clearly right as to adopt it, and indorse it again and again, upon their official oaths, is in fact so clearly wrong as to demand your condemnation without a moment's consideration.

Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory, which act embodied the policy of the government upon that subject up to and at the very moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it, he wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same connection his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy of free States.

Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or in your hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon you, who repudiate it? We respect that warning of Washington, and we commend it to you, together
with his example pointing to the right application of it.

But you say you are conservative—eminently conservative—while we are revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on the point in controversy which was adopted by "our fathers who framed the government under which we live"; while you with one accord reject, and scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting something new. True, you disagree among yourselves as to what that substitute shall be. You are divided on new propositions and plans, but you are unanimous in rejecting and denouncing the old policy of the fathers. Some of you are for reviving the foreign slave-trade; some for a Congressional slave code for the Territories; some for Congress forbidding the Territories to prohibit slavery within their limits; some for maintaining slavery in the Territories through the judiciary; some for the "gur-reat pur-rinciple" that "if one man would enslave another, no third man should object," fantastically called "popular sovereignty," but never a man among you is in favor of Federal prohibition of slavery in Federal Territories, according to the practice of "our fathers who framed the government under which we live." Not one of all your various plans can show a precedent or an advocate in the century within which our government origi-
nated. Consider, then, whether your claim of conservatism for yourselves, and your charge of destructiveness against us, are based on the most clear and stable foundations.

Again, you say we have made the slavery question more prominent than it formerly was. We deny it. We admit that it is more prominent, but we deny that we made it so. It was not we, but you, who discarded the old policy of the fathers. We resisted, and still resist, your innovation; and thence comes the greater prominence of the question. Would you have that question reduced to its former proportions? Go back to that old policy. What has been will be again, under the same conditions. If you would have the peace of the old times, re-adopt the precepts and policy of the old times.

You charge that we stir up insurrections among your slaves. We deny it; and what is your proof? Harper's Ferry! John Brown!! John Brown was no Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican in his Harper's Ferry enterprise. If any member of our party is guilty in that matter, you know it or you do not know it. If you do know it, you are inexcusable for not designating the man and proving the fact. If you do not know it, you are inexcusable for asserting it, and especially for persisting in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does not know to be true, is simply malicious slander.
Some of you admit that no Republican designedly aided or encouraged the Harper’s Ferry affair, but still insist that our doctrines and declarations necessarily lead to such results. We do not believe it. We know we hold no doctrine, and make no declaration, which were not held to and made by “our fathers who framed the government under which we live.” You never dealt fairly by us in relation to this affair. When it occurred, some important State elections were near at hand, and you were in evident glee with the belief that, by charging the blame upon us, you could get an advantage of us in those elections. The elections came, and your expectations were not quite fulfilled. Every Republican man knew that, as to himself at least, your charge was a slander, and he was not much inclined by it to cast his vote in your favor. Republican doctrines and declarations are accompanied with a continual protest against any interference whatever with your slaves, or with you about your slaves. Surely, this does not encourage them to revolt. True, we do, in common with “our fathers who framed the government under which we live,” declare our belief that slavery is wrong; but the slaves do not hear us declare even this. For anything we say or do, the slaves would scarcely know there is a Republican party. I believe they would not, in fact, generally know it but for your misrepresentations of us in their hearing. In your political contests among yourselves each faction charges the other with sympathy with Black Republicanism;
and then, to give point to the charge, defines Black Republicanism to simply be insurrection, blood, and thunder among the slaves.

Slave insurrections are no more common now than they were before the Republican party was organized. What induced the Southampton insurrection, twenty-eight years ago, in which at least three times as many lives were lost as at Harper’s Ferry? You can scarcely stretch your very elastic fancy to the conclusion that Southampton was “got up by Black Republicanism.” In the present state of things in the United States, I do not think a general, or even a very extensive, slave insurrection is possible. The indispensable concert of action cannot be attained. The slaves have no means of rapid communication; nor can incendiary freemen, black or white, supply it. The explosive materials are everywhere in parcels; but there neither are, nor can be supplied, the indispensable connecting trains.

Much is said by Southern people about the affection of slaves for their masters and mistresses; and a part of it, at least, is true. A plot for an uprising could scarcely be devised and communicated to twenty individuals before some one of them, to save the life of a favorite master or mistress, would divulge it. This is the rule; and the slave revolution in Hayti was not an exception to it, but a case occurring under peculiar circumstances. The gunpowder plot of British history, though not connected with slaves, was more in point. In that case, only
about twenty were admitted to the secret; and yet one of them, in his anxiety to save a friend betrayed the plot to that friend, and, by consequence, averted the calamity. Occasional poisonings from the kitchen, and open or stealthy assassinations in the field, and local revolts extending to a score or so, will continue to occur as the natural results of slavery; but no general insurrection of slaves, as I think, can happen in this country for a long time. Whoever much fears, or much hopes, for such an event, will be alike disappointed.

In the language of Mr. Jefferson, uttered many years ago, "It is still in our power to direct the process of emancipation and deportation peaceably, and in such slow degrees, as that the evil will wear off insensibly; and their places be, pari passu, filled up by free white laborers. If, on the contrary, it is left to force itself on, human nature must shudder at the prospect held up."

Mr. Jefferson did not mean to say, nor do I, that the power of emancipation is in the Federal Government. He spoke of Virginia; and, as to the power of emancipation, I speak of the slaveholding States only. The Federal Government, however, as we insist, has the power of restraining the extension of the institution—the power to insure that a slave insurrection shall never occur on any American soil which is now free from slavery.

John Brown's effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. It was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which the slaves
refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that the slaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could not succeed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds with the many attempts, related in history, at the assassination of kings and emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the attempt, which ends in little else than his own execution. Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown's attempt at Harper's Ferry, were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The eagerness to cast blame on old England in the one case, and on New England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things.

And how much would it avail you, if you could by the use of John Brown, Helper's book, and the like, break up the Republican organization? Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. There is a judgment and a feeling against slavery in this nation, which cast at least a million and a half of votes. You cannot destroy that judgment and feeling—that sentiment—by breaking up the political organization which rallies around it. You can scarcely scatter and disperse an army which has been formed into order in the face of your heaviest fire; but if you could, how much would you gain by forcing the sentiment which created it out of the peaceful channel of the ballot-box into some other channel? What would that other channel probably be?
Would the number of John Browns be lessened or enlarged by the operation?

But you will break up the Union rather than submit to a denial of your constitutional rights.

That has a somewhat reckless sound; but it would be palliated, if not fully justified, were we proposing, by the mere force of numbers, to deprive you of some right plainly written down in the Constitution. But we are proposing no such thing.

When you make these declarations you have a specific and well-understood allusion to an assumed constitutional right of yours to take slaves into the Federal Territories, and to hold them there as property. But no such right is specially written in the Constitution. That instrument is literally silent about any such right. We, on the contrary, deny that such a right has any existence in the Constitution, even by implication.

Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is that you will destroy the government, unless you be allowed to construe and force the Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and us. You will rule or ruin in all events.

This, plainly stated, is your language. Perhaps you will say the Supreme Court has decided the disputed constitutional question in your favor. Not quite so. But waiving the lawyer's distinction between dictum and decision the court has decided the question for you in a sort of way. The court has substantially said, it is your constitutional right to take slaves into the Federal Territories, and
to hold them there as property. When I say the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it was made in a divided court, by a bare majority of the judges, and they not quite agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that it is so made as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another about its meaning, and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken statement of fact—the statement in the opinion that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution."

An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of property in a slave is not "distinctly and expressly affirmed" in it. Bear in mind, the judges do not pledge their judicial opinion that such right is impliedly affirmed in the Constitution; but they pledge their veracity that it is "distinctly and expressly" affirmed there—"distinctly," that is, not mingled with anything else—"expressly," that is, in words meaning just that, without the aid of any inference, and susceptible of no other meaning.

If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to others to show that neither the word "slave" nor "slavery" is to be found in the Constitution, nor the word "property" even, in any connection with language alluding to the thing slave, or slavery; and that wherever in that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is called a "person"; and wherever his master's legal right in relation to him is alluded to, it is spoken of as "ser-
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yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation.

The question recurs, What will satisfy them? Simply this: we must not only let them alone, but we must somehow convince them that we do let them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have been so trying to convince them from the very beginning of our organization, but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches we have constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this has had no tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince them is the fact that they have never detected a man of us in any attempt to disturb them.

These natural and apparently adequate means all failing, what will convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it right. And this must be done thoroughly—done in acts as well as in words. Silence will not be tolerated—we must place ourselves avowedly with them. Senator Douglas’s new sedition law must be enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is wrong, whether made in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private. We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We must pull down our free-State constitutions. The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint of opposition to slavery, before they will cease to believe that all their troubles proceed from us.

I am quite aware they do not state their case pre-
cisely in this way. Most of them would probably say to us, "Let us alone; do nothing to us, and say what you please about slavery." But we do let them alone—have never disturbed them—so that, after all, it is what we say which dissatisfies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing, until we cease saying.

I am also aware they have not as yet in terms demanded the overthrow of our free-State constitutions. Yet those constitutions declare the wrong of slavery with more solemn emphasis than do all other sayings against it; and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced, the overthrow of these constitutions will be demanded, and nothing be left to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary that they do not demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for the reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right and socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition of it as a legal right and a social blessing.

Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground save our conviction that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality—its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension—its enlargement. All they ask we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right;
all we ask they could as readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and our thinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full recognition as being right; but thinking it wrong, as we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view, and against our own? In view of our moral, social, and political responsibilities, can we do this?

Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the national Territories, and to overrun us here in these free States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored—contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong: vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a policy of "don't care" on a question about which all true men do care; such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said and undo what Washington did.
Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the government, nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it.
NOTES

THE SPRINGFIELD SPEECH

June 16, 1858

On the evening after he had received from the Republican State Convention its unanimous nomination for the United States Senatorship, Mr. Lincoln opened his campaign with this address. Because of its deliberate preparation and the radical character of some of its doctrines, it became the cardinal statement of the Republican position in the campaign of 1858, and the center of the most bitter attack of Mr. Lincoln's opponents. Indeed its utterance may be said to have marked the beginning of the final phase of the anti-slavery agitation which culminated in the War of the Rebellion. It had as much to do as any other single utterance with Lincoln's ultimate rise to national leadership.

1:12. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.—We can now appreciate with difficulty the sensation produced first throughout the state of Illinois, and later throughout the entire country by the first paragraph of this address containing the famous allusion to the "house divided against itself." To the conservative friends of slavery and of freedom alike, it seemed a deliberate incitement to sectional strife. "At the North, nine men out of ten," says J. T. Morse (Life of Lincoln, vol. i. p. 115), "cared less for any principle, moral or political, than they did for the discovery of some course whereby this unwelcome conflict between slavery and freedom could be prevented from dis-
organizing the course of daily business.” Mr. Lincoln’s words, therefore, were at the beginning of the campaign the delight of his political enemies and the dismay of his friends. But in his judgment the time was ripe.

Mr. Lincoln, as Republican leader of his state, had been led for some time to expect his nomination. His entire address of acceptance was prepared beforehand with the utmost care. When it was complete, Mr. Lincoln read it for criticism to his law partner, Mr. William H. Herndon. After the words “A house divided against itself cannot stand,” Herndon, who was an abolitionist, remarked, “It is true, but is it politic to say so?” Lincoln replied: “The proposition is true and has been for six thousand years. I want to use some universally known figure expressed in simple language, as universally well known, that may strike home to the minds of men in order to raise them up to the peril of the times.”

Reading the address later before a group of a dozen friends, he asked each for his opinion. Only one endorsed it; one characterized it as “ahead of its time”; another as a “— fool utterance.” The conservative vote it was urged would be alienated. But Herndon, who was of the number, exclaimed, “Lincoln, deliver that speech as read, and it will make you President.” To his critics Lincoln replied, “Friends, this thing has been retarded long enough. The time has come when these sentiments should be uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go down because of this speech, then let me go down linked to the truth—let me die in the advocacy of what is just and right.”

The nobility of such language is manifest when we consider Lincoln’s intense ambition for the Senatorship, the uncertain strength of the anti-slavery sentiment in the state, and the fact that he knew he was leading his party into unknown paths. The joy with which the doctrine of this opening paragraph was
received by Lincoln’s opponents is revealed by Senator Douglas’s incessant attacks upon it throughout the debates.

2:15. The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded.—When Taylor was elected president in 1848, slavery was sanctioned by law in fifteen Southern states and the District of Columbia. It was prohibited by law in fifteen Northern states. The admission of California in 1850 as a free state gave the North an advantage in all matters of national legislation. Moreover by the provisions of the Missouri Compromise slavery was excluded from all national territory north of lat. 36° 30’.

2:18. Four days later commenced the struggle.—Senator Douglas introduced the Nebraska Bill on Jan. 4, 1854.

3:2. If any one man choose to enslave another.—This paraphrase of Douglas’s doctrine of popular sovereignty is a happy instance of Lincoln’s power to sum up a political issue in a homely and telling aphorism. For further explanation of the doctrine see the Debates, and the Introduction, p. xxiii.

3:15. “But,” said opposition members, “let us amend the bill.”—Sen. Salmon P. Chase of Ohio led the opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill. By various means, including this amendment which is discussed by Mr. Lincoln in the Freeport debate beginning on p. 26, and subsequently by Mr. Douglas, beginning p. 36. Senator Chase sought to render distinct the division between the slavery and anti-slavery forces in the Senate.

4:4. Senator Trumbull.—Lyman Trumbull (1813-96), a conspicuous figure in this campaign, had been a judge of the Supreme Court in Illinois, and was from 1854-72 a Senator, representing his state in the national Senate. He was in this campaign a supporter of Lincoln—perhaps his most powerful one.

4:10. Mr. Buchanan was elected.—By the popular
vote, James Buchanan, Democrat, received 1,838,169 votes; John C. Fremont, Republican, 1,341,264; and Millard Fillmore, representing the Know-Nothings and Whigs, received 874,534. Buchanan succeeded Franklin Pierce.

4:22. The reputed author of the Nebraska bill.—i.e. Senator Douglas.

4:31. The Silliman letter.—A document addressed to President Buchanan in 1856 by the “electors of the State of Connecticut,” with Prof. Silliman of Yale University as its chief author, relative to the state of affairs in Kansas. In his reply the President cites the Dred Scott decision as proving that slavery existed in Kansas Territory with the sanction of the Constitution of the United States.

5:6. The Lecompton Constitution.—For a discussion, see the Introduction, p. xxxii.

5:10. He cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up.—This declaration of Senator Douglas was made in a speech on the Lecompton scheme, Dec. 9, 1857, in the Senate of the United States. The quotation was used with great effect by Lincoln throughout the campaign. The indifference of Douglas to the moral aspect of slavery was the ultimate cause of his political downfall.

8:17. Stephen A. Douglas, Franklin Pierce, Roger B. Taney, James Buchanan.—The charge, which Lincoln has now completely insinuated, is that President Pierce, his successor, President Buchanan, Chief Justice Taney and Senator Douglas, leader of the Democratic party in the Senate, were in collusion for the furtherance of a policy whereby slavery was to be nationalized. This was a matter of general belief among Republicans at the time.

A specific charge relative to the Dred Scott decision had recently been made by William H. Seward in the United States Senate, to the effect that “Before com-
ing into office Buchanan approached, or was approached, by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The court, alleged Mr. Seward, informed Mr. Buchanan of the nature of its expected decision, in such a way that the President was able to “announce the forthcoming extrajudicial exposition of the Constitution and pledge his submission to it as authoritative and final.” (Quoted by Rhodes’ History of the U. S., ii. p. 268.)

Mr. Rhodes indicates the lack of evidence to sustain the charge. “The only evidence for the charge of Seward lay in the statement of the President in his inaugural, that the question as to the time when people of a territory might exclude slavery therefrom was pending before the Supreme Court and would speedily be settled. Undoubtedly Buchanan then knew what would be substantially the decision of the court on the territorial question—but so did a thousand other men.” It had in fact been accurately forecast in the New York Tribune of March 2, 1856. “But, however Buchanan got his evidence,” continues Rhodes, “his character and that of Taney are proof that the Chief Justice did not communicate the import of the decision to the President-Elect.

“The tact of Lincoln is shown in making the charge by intimation and by trenchant questions; then, with humor and exquisite skill, giving a homely illustration which struck the popular mind so forcibly that the notion conveyed by it undoubtedly became the belief of the Republican masses as long as the Dred Scott decision remained a question of politics.” (Rhodes’ History, Vol. ii. p. 270.)

The character of the evidence tending to prove the broad conspiracy to nationalize slavery, on the part of “Stephen, and Roger, and Franklin, and James,” so far as it is brought forward by Lincoln in the Debates, is discussed in subsequent notes. (See 24:20, 25:25, 26:8, and 31:2, and notes thereon.)
9:22. If McLean or Curtis had sought.—At the time of the Dred Scott decision, March 6, 1857, the Supreme Court consisted of five members from Southern states. Of the four judges from Northern states two were Democrats; Justice McLean was the only Republican, and Justice Curtis was still rated as a Whig. In the decision, all justices essentially concurred except Justices McLean and Curtis, the latter of whom wrote an extremely able minority opinion.

9:25. Chase and Mace.—Senator Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, of pronounced anti-slavery views; the leading opponent of Douglas in the Kansas-Nebraska debate in 1854. Daniel Mace, was a Democratic Representative from Indiana and an opponent of the Nebraska Bill.

11:4 There are those who denounce us.—Lincoln was obliged at the beginning of the campaign to meet a singular defection among the leaders of his own party. Horace Greeley, the powerful editor of the New York Tribune, Anson G. Burlingame, Schuyler Colfax, and many others, became for a time more or less openly sympathizers with Douglas. Lincoln’s comparative obscurity, and the unparalleled prestige of Douglas as a national leader, were the incentives to this political unfaith. This defection was a great mortification to Lincoln and a stumbling block throughout his entire campaign. Senator Douglas never had any lasting idea of becoming a Republican leader. His lack of convictions on the slavery issue, as Lincoln points out, unfitted him for such a step. His votes on the Lecompton matter and the English Bill, were among the highest expressions in his whole career of a political morality, previously very unstable. But no other explanation of Mr. Lincoln’s defeat for the Senatorship is necessary beyond this defection of Republican leaders in their following after a vain hope.

11:8. A little quarrel with the present head of the
NOTES

dynasty.—The reference is to Douglas's quarrel with the Buchanan administration on account of his revolt against the Lecompton Constitution, and the English Bill (see Introduction p. xxiii).

THE SECOND JOINT DEBATE
AT FREEPORT*

August 27, 1858

The first two of the series of seven debates, those at Ottawa and Freeport, took place in Northern Illinois, among a population strong in Republican and Abolition sentiment. In the Ottawa debate on August 21, Douglas had attacked the "House-divided-against-itself" doctrine as revolutionary; had sneered at Lincoln for maintaining that negroes were included in the statement of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal"; and had criticised his opponent for his continued opposition to the principles affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision. By this mode of attack, Douglas sought, first of all, to fix extreme abolition principles upon Lincoln, thinking to accomplish this the more readily, since Lincoln, in giving voice to radical views in this section of the state, would be heartily applauded by those whose support he sought. But such an expression in Northern Illinois, Douglas knew, would embarrass Lincoln when he came to address audiences in Central Illinois which were divided or lukewarm in their attitude toward slavery; and would embarrass him still more before the pro-slavery audiences of Southern Illinois—"Egypt," as it is termed in the Debates. Lincoln's following was heterogeneous. "Their principles," tauntingly exclaimed Douglas, "in the North are jet-black, in the center they are in color a decent mulatto, and in lower Egypt they are almost white." If he could fix extreme

*For a general account of the series of debates, see the Introduction.
abolition views upon Lincoln in Northern Illinois, Douglas hoped thereby to detach many of Lincoln's supporters in central and southern Illinois. But on the other hand, if Lincoln resisted the temptation thus set before him, but failed, through timidity or conservatism, to satisfy his anti-slavery hearers in Northern Illinois, disintegration would begin on the spot in the ranks of those who were expected to support him.

As a specific means of accomplishing his end, Senator Douglas propounded seven questions to Mr. Lincoln in the Ottawa Debate, based on certain resolutions passed in 1854, alleged Senator Douglas, by the first Republican state convention ever held in Illinois—resolutions expressive of strong Abolition sentiment, which, according to Douglas were passed in the presence and with the sanction of Lincoln. (For a copy of these resolutions, see p. 260.)

In reply to Douglas at Ottawa Lincoln asserted that he had had no connection whatever with the resolutions quoted by his opponent and was, therefore, under no obligation to answer the questions asked. Nevertheless he consented to do so provided Judge Douglas would agree to answer similar questions that might subsequently be asked by Mr. Lincoln himself. To this proposal Judge Douglas made at the time no answer.

The Ottawa debate appears to have been a drawn battle. The partisans of either side were enthusiastic. Mr. Lincoln was carried off on the shoulders of several young farmers who overruled his remonstrances. But perhaps the advantage in this first debate lay on the whole with Douglas. His questions had not been answered. Lincoln yielded the platform thirteen minutes before the expiration of his time. The superior dexterity and polish of Douglas are apparent to the reader of the debate, and the effect of its publication, declared Douglas's partisan biographer, James. W. Sheehan, was most damaging to Lincoln. "The fate
of Lincoln was sealed by the discussion at Ottawa, and nothing but a special interposition of Providence could have elected a legislature favorable to his election to the Senate.” (Life of Douglas: p. 432.) Though Lincoln was then, as always, immeasurably the superior of Douglas morally and in intellectual power, he had not yet attained his subsequent height of earnestness and spiritual vision; nor had he yet acquired the uniform literary skill, which becomes progressively apparent as the campaign goes on.

The Freeport debate, the second in the series, says Mr. Horace White (Herndon’s Life of Lincoln, Vol. ii. p. 110), was attended by “a crowd even larger than that at Ottawa. Hundreds of people came from Chicago and many from the neighboring state of Wisconsin. Douglas came from Galena the night before the debate, and was greeted with a great torchlight procession. Lincoln came the following day from Dixon and was received at the railway station by a dense crowd, filling up the adjacent streets, who shouted themselves hoarse when his tall form was seen emerging from the train.”

This debate is perhaps the most famous of all the series. That is true, not because of its literary excellence, but because of the subsequent national importance of answers made by each candidate to vital questions put by the other—answers which, in the case of Senator Douglas, won for him the Senatorship, but destroyed his chance of attaining the larger goal of his ambition, the Presidency in 1860.

**MR. LINCOLN’S SPEECH**

**The Questions of Senator Douglas**

14:15. Mr. Lincoln opened the Freeport debate by answering the seven questions which had been propounded to him by Judge Douglas at Ottawa. In the
week which had intervened since the debate at Ottawa, Mr. Lincoln had ascertained to his satisfaction that the resolutions used by Judge Douglas at Ottawa were, to all intents and purposes in this campaign, a forgery. The issue which thereupon arose as to their genuineness between the rival candidates is one of the most conspicuous of the merely local features of the campaign. The dispute upon them recurs with considerable acrimony in the Galesburgh debate. (See Lincoln’s speech, pp. 113-116, and Douglas’s rejoinder, pp. 133-136.) Lincoln, however, waiving the question whether Douglas has any right to require him to answer questions based upon a platform for which he is in no way responsible—proceeds to answer each in detail. His first series of responses seems to take a technical advantage of the precise phrasing of Douglas’s questions.

Does Mr. Lincoln derive any real advantage from this first series of technical denials?

17:21. Question 1. In regard to the Fugitive Slave Law. The Fugitive Law of 1850 aroused bitter opposition in the North. Among its most obnoxious provisions were the following: (1) Alleged fugitive slaves were denied the right of testimony in their own behalf. "Ex parte evidence determined the identity of the negro who was claimed. Even the affidavit of the owner was not necessary; that of his agent or attorney would suffice." (Rhodes’ History of U. S., 4. 185.) (2) The reclaimed slave was denied the right of trial by jury, but was tried by commissioners appointed by the United Circuit Courts, who were "to hear and determine the case of a claimant in a summary manner." The decision of these commissioners once made, no "court, judge, magistrate, or any person" could "molest" the owner of a recovered slave by any legal process whatsoever. (3) The United States marshals were obliged to execute the law under penalty of heavy fine for laxity
of effort. (4) Bystanders "and "all good citizens" could be summoned to prevent the escape or to aid in the discovery of a negro fugitive; and any person who should willingly "hinder or prevent the claimant from arresting the fugitive," or should "rescue, or attempt to rescue . . . or harbor or conceal" the fugitive, was liable to a "fine not exceeding $1,000, and to imprisonment not exceeding six months; and should, moreover, for each fugitive so lost, pay to his owner the sum of $1,000. (5) If the Commissioner decided that the negro should be returned to the claimant, his fee was ten dollars; if the contrary, his fee was five dollars."

The interest of the slave-holders in the enactment can be judged from the following statement made in Scribner's Popular History of the U. S., (Vol. iv. p. 395): "It was estimated that more than 30,000 fugitive slaves found homes in Canada during the thirty years of the anti-slavery agitation; and that at the time of the passage of the act of 1850 there were not less than 20,000 in the free states."

The citizens of the free states, excepting the Abolitionists, who formed a small proportion of the population, were as a rule in favor of the general principle which permitted a slave-holder to recover a slave who had crossed the border into a free state or territory; but the specific provisions of the law of 1850, especially those which made every citizen liable on demand to render assistance in recapturing fugitives, were execrated. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 did much to awaken a smarting sense of their injustice. Thereafter, the law had no efficient enforcement. See Lincoln's speech at Cooper Institute: 201:5.

18:5. Question 2. Whether I am pledged to the admission of any more Slave States. This cautious and hesitating reply to an extraordinarily shrewd question is ridiculed by Judge Douglas in his reply on pp. 59-63 to
Mr. Lincoln’s answers to Questions 1 and 2. When Mr. Lincoln makes the hypothesis (line 12), “if slavery shall be kept out of the territories during the territorial existence of any one given territory,” it must be remembered that the Dred Scott decision of 1857 had already in effect legalized slavery in all the territories. The answer, therefore, is indirect.

What would have been the effect of a more direct answer, positive or negative? Notice especially in this connection Douglas’s attack in the Alton debate (148:24 et seq.) on this same reply of Lincoln’s. Has Lincoln sought to evade the question by “inventing a case which did not exist and could not exist” at the time when he answered the question? (See Douglas’s assertion to that effect, p. 150, line 27.)

The answer as given must certainly have failed to satisfy the Abolitionists. Douglas says (149:28), that Mr. Lincoln supposed “it would satisfy the old line Whigs, composed of Kentuckians and Virginians, down in the southern part of the State,” men who favored slavery, but who believed the Union should be preserved at any cost.

18:19. If we own the country. i.e. If the territory already belongs to us; an allusion to the contemplated acquisition of Cuba by purchase—a favorite plan of President Buchanan and his Southern advisers.

18:24. Question 4. In regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. This question of abolishing slavery within the District is distinct from that of the abolition of the slave trade therein, which took place in 1850, as a result of one of the measures of the Compromise legislation of that year.

Mr. Lincoln favors abolition in the District only if it be “gradual, compensated, and accomplished with the consent of the inhabitants.” Were these three conditions likely to be agreeable or equally agreeable to the anti-slavery element of Illinois?
19: 11. Question 5. The question of the abolition of the slave trade between the different states. Though Lincoln’s reply is almost absolutely non-committal, the question raised is entirely unimportant as an issue in the debates of this campaign.

20: 1. Question 6. Whether I desire that Slavery should be prohibited in all the territories. In the answer to this interrogation, at least, Lincoln is explicit and direct. (16:29.) Here he goes the entire length desired by his immediate audience.

20: 5. Question 7. Whether I am opposed to the acquisition of more territory unless slavery is first prohibited. Lincoln’s declaration (17:4), that in general he would or would not oppose the acquisition of new territory accordingly as he thought it would or would not aggravate the slavery question “derived its immediate importance from the well-known intention of the Buchanan administration and a very considerable party in the South very soon to acquire Cuba.” (J. J. Morse: Abraham Lincoln, Vol. i. p. 134.) While Secretary of State under Polk, Buchanan had offered Spain $100,000,000 for the island.

For Douglas’s views upon “expansion” see pp. 40-41. And especially see Lincoln’s reply at Galesburgh, pp. 125-129.

20: 22. The Questions of Mr. Lincoln. The annotation of these questions is deferred until Mr. Douglas’s answers to them are discussed. See the annotation of page 33 et seq. Mr. Lincoln now takes the aggressive.

21: 20. The first Republican Convention, held at Springfield in October, 1854. This introduces the issue of the authenticity of the resolutions to which reference has already been made. The important sections of the resolutions quoted at Ottawa by Mr. Douglas, with his prefatory remarks concerning them are appended herewith. After charging that Lincoln and Trumbull
had conspired together to make a new party out of the disrupted elements of the Old Whigs and Democrats (see Introduction), and that they had at this time assembled their forces in conjunction with Owen Lovejoy, Fred Douglass and other Abolition leaders in a state convention, Senator Douglas goes on:

"I have the resolutions of their state convention then held, which was the first mass state convention ever held in Illinois by the Black Republican party. . . . Here are the most important and material resolutions of this Abolition platform:

"'1. Resolved, That we believe this truth to be self-evident, that when parties become subversive of the ends for which they are established, or incapable of restoring the Government to the true principles of the Constitution, it is the right and duty of the people to dissolve the political bands by which they may have been connected therewith, and to organize new parties upon such principles and with such views as the circumstances and exigencies of the nation may demand.

"'2. Resolved, That the times imperatively demand the reorganization of parties, and, repudiating all previous party attachments, names and predilections, we unite ourselves together in defense of the liberty and Constitution of the country, and will hereafter co-operate as the Republican party, pledged to the accomplishment of the following purposes: To bring the administration of the Government back to the control of first principles; to restore Nebraska and Kansas to the position of free territories; as the Constitution of the United States vests in the states, and not in Congress, the power to legislate for the extradition of fugitives from labor, to repeal and entirely abrogate the Fugitive Slave law; to restrict slavery to those states in which it exists; to prohibit the admission of any more slave states into the Union; to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; to exclude slavery from all the territories over which the
General Government has exclusive jurisdiction; and to resist the acquirements of any more territories unless the practice of slavery therein forever shall have been prohibited.'"

The facts regarding the resolutions as recorded by Lincoln's law partner, William H. Herndon (Life of Lincoln, Vol. ii. p. 36), are, briefly, as follows: In October of 1854, the State Fair was held at Springfield. To it came Douglas to defend the Kansas-Nebraska legislation especially before that section of his party which he had alienated. To it also came Lincoln, the spokesman for all who opposed Douglas and his new theory of Popular Sovereignty. Both made powerful speeches. Lincoln's address kindled anew the old anti-Nebraska spirit among his hearers, and Owen Lovejoy, a fiery, radical, fanatical Abolitionist, as soon as Lincoln finished speaking, rushed forward, and announced a meeting that same evening of the friends of Freedom. That meant all the Abolitionists. The plan was to have Lincoln speak again, but while Lovejoy was in search of him, Herndon, fearing the effect such an affiliation might have on Lincoln's senatorial ambitions, for the following year, sent him a message urging him to avoid Lovejoy. "Go home at once," said Herndon. "Take Bob with you and drive somewhere into the country, and stay till this thing is over."

Lincoln accepted the suggestion and drove over into Tazewell County to attend a session of court, where he remained until the Abolitionists had left Springfield and gone home. That is what saved Lincoln from an unfortunate political connection.

But the mass meeting thus assembled was in no sense a convention, much less a Republican Convention. It is hard to believe that Senator Douglas could have been ignorant of this fact. The very resolutions presented by him at Ottawa as having been passed by this convention were passed, charges Lincoln, by another
convention in another county. This fact is of course the basis of the accusation that the resolutions were forged. To this charge Douglas replies at length and with some acrimony on pages 43-49 of this debate. Lincoln returns to the matter in his reply in the Galesburg debate. (See pp. 113-118.)

Before leaving this topic, it should be noted that Lincoln has already (p. 15, line 12), stated in this debate that the Republican party of Illinois held its first state convention at Bloomington in 1856, two years after the date of the resolutions under discussion.

24:20. **There was a conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national.** This charge it will be remembered constitutes the body of Lincoln’s Address of Acceptance at Springfield on June 16, 1858. The attitude of Mr. Douglas toward it is expressed in the following selection from his rejoinder at Ottawa:

“In relation to Mr. Lincoln’s charge of conspiracy against me, I have a word to say. In his speech to-day he quotes a playful part of his speech at Springfield, about Stephen, and James, and Franklin, and Roger, and says that I did not take exception to it. I did not answer it, and he repeats it again. I did not take exception to this figure of his. He has a right to be as playful as he pleases in throwing his arguments together, and I will not object; but I did take objection to his second Springfield speech, in which he stated that he intended his first speech as a charge of corruption or conspiracy against the Supreme Court of the United States, President Pierce, President Buchanan, and myself. That gave the offensive character to the charge. He then said that when he made it he did not know whether it was true or not, but inasmuch as Judge Douglas had not denied it, although he had replied to the other parts of his speech three times, he repeated it as a charge of conspiracy against me, thus charging me with moral turpitude. When he put it in
that form, I did say, that inasmuch as he repeated the charge simply because I had not denied it, I would deprive him of the opportunity of ever repeating it again, by declaring that it was in all its bearings an infamous lie. He says he will repeat it until I answer his folly and nonsense about Stephen, and Franklin, and Roger, and Rob, and James.

"He studied that out—prepared that one sentence with the greatest care, committed it to memory, and put it in his first Springfield speech, and now he carries that speech around and reads that sentence to show how pretty it is. His vanity is wounded because I will not go into that beautiful figure of his about the building of a house. All I have to say is, that I am not green enough to let him make a charge which he acknowledges he does not know to be true, and then take up my time in answering it, when I know it to be false and nobody else knows it to be true.

"Mr. Lincoln has not character enough for integrity and truth, merely on his own ipse dixit, to arraign President Buchanan, President Pierce, and nine Judges of the Supreme Court, not one of whom would be complimented by being put on an equality with him. There is an unpardonable presumption in a man putting himself up before thousands of people, and pretending that his ipse dixit, without proof, without fact, and without truth, is enough to bring down and destroy the purest and best of living men." See text and notes, 8:17, 25:25, 31:2.

24:29. Observe the effectiveness of Lincoln's quaint humor, as a means of getting rid of the prejudicial acrimony of Senator Douglas's rejoinder just quoted.

25:25. By an amendment it was provided . . . not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory. Douglas proposed this amendment on February 7, 1854, two weeks after the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was introduced. It was, said Senator Benton of Missouri, "a
little stump speech injected into the belly of the bill.” The entire Bill, applying the principle of Popular Sovereignty, made slavery in any territory permissive upon the will of the people to introduce it. It amounted to an absolute repeal of the eighth section of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which prohibited slavery in the territory north of latitude 36° 30’. This repeal, alone by itself, opened the way for the Southern contention that slave-holders had “a constitutional right to go into any territory with their property—a right which could not be affected by act of Congress or Territorial legislature.” To admit this claim would have been a complete betrayal of Northern principles. Douglas had made a tremendous concession to the South. He sought now to allay the rising tide of Northern wrath and alarm. To be sure he had already embodied in the provisions of the Bill the principle of Popular Sovereignty, giving the people of the territories the right to decide for themselves whether slavery should exist among them, but further to appease many Northern Democrats who were willing to subscribe to that principle, but who repudiated the Southern belief in the constitutionality of slavery—to appease them, and thus prevent a threatened division of his forces, Douglas introduced the amendment quoted by Lincoln. Its purpose was purely persuasive. Its introduction of the word “State” into the bill was, however, regarded as ominous by Lincoln, who cited the circumstance in the Ottawa debate in corroboration of his theory of a conspiracy to nationalize slavery.

26:8. Mr. Chase of Ohio introduced an amendment . . . to exclude slavery if they saw fit. This amendment was introduced on Feb. 6, 1854, the day before Senator Douglas’s amendment just quoted was presented. Senator Salmon P. Chase, later appointed Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court by President Lincoln, was Douglas’s chief opponent in the warfare
over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Chase was a Free-
Soil Senator from Ohio, a radical anti-slavery man and
an able leader. Presumably he had no idea that Doug-
las would accept any amendment proposed by him of
the character described—any more than he had himself
of accepting the suggestion of General Cass, (28:2)
for an amendment that should give the people of
the territories the power to introduce as well as to
exclude slavery. The amendment was a phase of the
parliamentary battle which Chase was waging to expose
the extreme pro-slavery character of the bill, and thus
divide the Northern and Southern Democrats. This
division, threatened then, and avoided by various
temporary expedients of Douglas (see the previous
note), became a formally accomplished fact in the
presidential campaign of 1860. The replies of Doug-
las in this Freeport Debate to the questions of Mr.
Lincoln contain the doctrine which made the breach
inevitable.

For Douglas's reply to this argument of Lincoln,
see p. 36:14 et seq. Is Lincoln's use of the facts of
this amendment, as tending to prove the alleged con-
spiracy to nationalize slavery, conclusive?

26:18. A decision of the Supreme Court. The Dred
Scott decision of 1857, rendered three years after the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill became a law. For its bearing
on the conspiracy charge it should be remembered that
the Dred Scott case was first argued before the Supreme
Court of the United States in the spring of 1856. See
note on 8:17. See especially Douglas, p. 64:27.

28:2. General Cass. Lewis Cass (1782-1866), Dem-
ocratic Senator from Michigan, was an ardent supporter
and main ally of Henry Clay, in his compromise meas-
ures of 1850, and one of the most prominent leaders of
his party.

30:20. Upon his ipse dixit charging a conspiracy.
The language of Douglas appears in the last paragraph
cited from the Ottawa debate, in the annotation upon 24:20.

31:2. That he had made substantially the same charge against substantially the same persons. In the Ottawa Debate, Lincoln had quoted matter from a speech of Douglas in the Senate on March 22, 1858, in which Douglas, after reading certain passages from the Washington Union upon the Lecompton Constitution, pointed out their essential relation to certain passages in the Lecompton Constitution itself, and further declared that the evidence pointed to a common authoritative source for both expressions; that common source being he inferred none other than President Buchanan. This amounted to a charge on Douglas’s part that the Administration was conspiring to defraud Kansas of her right to determine for herself whether she should permit slavery within her borders or not. Thus Lincoln seeks Douglas’s admission that he believed Buchanan to be a party to a conspiracy to engraft slavery upon Kansas, and by so doing Lincoln seeks to forge another link in his circumstantial proof of a conspiracy to nationalize slavery. Douglas qualifies his own charge in his Reply, beginning 64:10, but see especially Lincoln’s reiteration of the whole matter in his Rejoinder, pages 72-78.

The elements of the conspiracy to nationalize slavery as thus far outlined in the campaign by Lincoln are: (1) the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, repealing the Missouri Compromise, and putting into operation the principle of popular sovereignty; (2) the defeat of the Chase amendment in 1854; (3) the Dred Scott decision of 1857, denying the rights of citizenship to the negro, affirming the constitutionality of slavery and denying the power of Congress or a territorial legislature to exclude slavery from any territory; (4) the implication of the Buchanan administration in the Lecompton scheme in November, 1857. (5) There is left a "vacant
niche,” yet to be filled by a new Dred Scott decision, soon to come, whereby slavery will be legalized in the states as well as in the territories. Then nationalization will be complete.

To what extent does Lincoln’s treatment of the several phases of this conspiracy amount to demonstration?

MR. DOUGLAS’S REPLY

The Questions of Mr. Lincoln, and their Answers by Senator Douglas

(The questions as Lincoln asked them appear on pages 20-21.)

33:7. Question 1. “If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a state constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite number of inhabitants according to the English Bill—some ninety-three thousand—will you vote to admit them?”

The Lecompton Constitution (see Introduction p. xxxii), after its adoption at the grossly unjust election of Dec. 21, 1857, at which, according to Douglas, “probably four-fifths of all the legal voters of Kansas were disfranchised and excluded from the polls,” was sent to Congress by President Buchanan on Feb. 2, 1858, with a special message recommending the admission of Kansas under that organic act. This recommendation was made by the President notwithstanding the fact that at a subsequent valid and lawful election on Jan. 4, 1858, the legal voters of the state, by a large majority had rejected the Lecompton Constitution. The Constitution, however, passed the Senate on March 23, despite the revolt of Douglas. On April 1, 1858, the bill was amended in the House by motion of Montgomery, a Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania. The Senate had voted down the same amendment, proposed
in that body by Senator Crittenden, a Kentucky Whig. The proposition, which came to be known as the Crittenden-Montgomery Compromise, "provided that the Lecompton Constitution should be submitted to a vote of the people of Kansas; if assented to, Kansas should become a state on the proclamation of the President; if rejected, the inhabitants of the territory were authorized to form a constitution and state government." (Rhodes: History of U. S., ii. 299.) The Senate refused to concur with the House in this measure. In the effort to reach an agreement between the Senate and the House, William H. English, a Representative from Indiana, proposed another Compromise, known as the English Bill. This measure offered Kansas a large grant of public lands, if the territory would vote to accept statehood under the Lecompton Constitution; if it refused to do so, Kansas could not be admitted until its population equaled the ratio required for a representative, i.e., 93,420. The population of Kansas in 1858 was about 35,000. Even with these bribes, the people of Kansas refused to ratify the Lecompton Constitution.

To return to the question asked Douglas by Lincoln. Lincoln and Douglas were in essential agreement upon the Lecompton issue. Why then did Lincoln press his opponent for an answer to this question? Just as Douglas had sought to divide Lincoln's followers by imputing Abolition tenets to him, so Lincoln sought now to take advantage of the open warfare on the Lecompton matter between Douglas and the Buchanan Administration, as a means of cutting off some of Douglas's support. There was a small and rather disreputable party of Buchanan Democrats in Illinois consisting mainly of office-holders, who had nominated candidates in this campaign in obedience to behests from Washington to do all in their power to injure Douglas. These people, called "Danites," cast about
5000 votes. Into these ranks pro-slavery Democrats at odds with Douglas's position on the Kansas question would naturally fall. To this question Lincoln probably expected a negative answer, but by his cleverly shielded affirmative answer Douglas avoided widening the breach with his own party, while at the same time, though his answer was a slight concession to pro-slavery interests, he did not drive from him voters that wavered between himself and Lincoln, but were essentially opposed to slavery. In short, Douglas's answer did not seriously disturb the delicate balance of political sentiment.

34:25. Whether he will vote to admit Oregon before . . . requisite population. Many Republicans opposed the admission of Oregon to the Union because she lacked sufficient population for a unit of representation in Congress. Kansas had already been held to this rule. Oregon, however, was admitted in 1859.

35:12. Question 2. Can the people of United States territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a state constitution? To appreciate the full force of this interrogatory, which embodies Lincoln's most vital thrust at his opponent, the student must bear in mind the nature of Douglas's doctrine of popular sovereignty, and the effect upon it of the Dred Scott decision. In his speech in the Senate on March 3, 1854, in defense of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, Douglas had thus defined popular sovereignty: The principle which we propose to carry into effect is this—That Congress shall neither legislate slavery into any territories or state, nor out of the same; but the people shall be left free to regulate their domestic concerns in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." This was the principle which the Kansas-Nebraska Act substituted for the plain provisions of the Missouri Compromise. Except in so far as it concerns slavery
Douglas's principle of Popular Sovereignty is identical with the principle of individual liberty for which the Revolutionary War was fought. (See Douglas at Alton 212:12.) The constitutional limitations suggested in the final clause of the quotation were left by agreement in a caucus of Northern and Southern Democrats to the courts to interpret. But the Dred Scott decision in 1857 provided the interpretation promised. It declared that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, nor authorize a territorial legislature to do so. Thus the Dred Scott decision annihilated "popular sovereignty."

To Douglas was left the task of reconciling his theory with the decision of the Supreme Court. If he gave up the principle he had so long fought for with such prodigious power, and accepted the decision of the court, he would thereby make a complete surrender to the South and forfeit his entire following in the North. That meant the loss of the senatorial campaign of 1858, and the destruction of his presidential aspirations for 1860. If on the other hand he maintained the principle and attacked the decision, he forfeited his pledge to the South, and occupied the questionable ground of refusing to abide by a decision of the highest judicial tribunal. Of the two alternatives, the latter was the less destructive of his chances in the present campaign; both were equally fatal to his presidential ambitions for two years hence. The dilemma was sufficiently serious, but his presidential more than his senatorial interests were in jeopardy. Was it to Lincoln's interest to force the issue? Could the resourceful Douglas discover or invent a way to extricate himself? Could he devise a way to reconcile the principle and the decision?

Since the Lecompton measure of 1857-8 Douglas had been employing his principle as a means of resisting the encroachments of slavery. To such an extent had he thereby separated himself from the Administration and
its Southern supporters, that many Northern Republicans sought to see in him a proselyte and new leader for their party, and were even supporting him against Lincoln in this campaign. If Douglas could satisfy his followers that the people of the territories still had the power to reject slavery, notwithstanding the Dred Scott decision, Lincoln's attempt to force the issue in this second question might result in strengthening this feeling of confidence in Douglas as a bulwark against the aggressions of the South, and exactly to that extent detract from the support of Lincoln.

Whether Lincoln should put the question to Douglas at Freeport or not was the subject of a conference the night before the debate, between Mr. Lincoln and a number of Republican leaders. All who were there counseled Lincoln not to put the question, because he would probably answer in the affirmative and secure a re-election. "It was their opinion," says Mr. Horace White, "that Lincoln should argue strongly from the Dred Scott decision, which Douglas endorsed, that the people of the territories could not lawfully exclude slavery prior to the formation of a State Constitution, but that he should not force Douglas to say yes or no. . . . Mr. Lincoln replied that to draw an affirmative answer from Douglas on this question was exactly what he wanted, and that his object was to make it impossible for Douglas to get the vote of the Southern States in the next Presidential election." "I am after larger game," Lincoln is said to have remarked; "the battle of 1860 is worth a hundred of this."

The following extract from Nicolay and Hay's Life of Lincoln, (vol. ii. p. 159), is pertinent:

"Nearly a month before, Lincoln in a private letter accurately foreshadowed Douglas's course on this question. 'You shall have hard work to get him directly to the point whether a territorial legislature has or has
not the power to exclude slavery. But if you succeed in bringing him to it—though he will be compelled to say it possesses no such power—he will instantly take ground that slavery cannot actually exist in the territories unless the people desire it and so give it protection by territorial legislation. If this offends the South, he will let it offend them, as at all events he means to hold on to his chances in Illinois.’”

The question was put, and Douglas’s reply formulated what is known as the “Freeport theory of ‘unfriendly legislation.’” In a subsequent speech in Ohio Lincoln paraphrased it as a policy which provided that “a thing may lawfully be driven away from a place where it has a lawful right to be.” (See Douglas’s further statement of his position on page 96:30 et seq.) But to the whole South it gave mortal offense, for, while professing allegiance to the Dred Scott decision, it put in the hands of the opponents of slavery in every territory a means of making the decision of none effect. Of this “Freeport theory,” to which Douglas had already given local expression on one or two occasions, a leading historian says: “This answer attracted more attention than any statement of Douglas during the campaign; and, while he could not have been elected Senator without taking that position, the enunciation of the doctrine was an insuperable obstacle to cementing the division in the Democratic party. The influence of this meeting at Freeport is an example of the greater interest incited by a joint debate than by an ordinary canvass, and illustrates the effectiveness of the Socratic method of reasoning. During this same campaign Douglas had twice before declared the same doctrine in expressions fully as plain and forcible, but without creating any particular remark; while now the country resounded with discussions of the Freeport theory of ‘unfriendly legislation.’” (J. F. Rhodes: Hist. of U. S., ii. p. 328.)
Douglas never regained the Southern support lost as a consequence of this reply. The feeling of the South toward him is expressed in this utterance from a speech by Senator Benjamin of Louisiana in the Senate, May 22, 1860: “It is impossible that confidence thus lost can be restored. On what ground has that confidence been forfeited, and why is it that we now refuse to him our support and fellowship? . . .

“We accuse him for this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon a point upon which we were at issue that it should be considered a judicial point; that he would abide by the decision; that he would act under the decision, and consider it a doctrine of the party; that having said that to us here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a local election, his knees gave way; his whole person trembled. His adversary stood upon principle and was beaten; and lo! he is the candidate of a mighty party for the Presidency of the United States. The Senator from Illinois faltered. He got the prize for which he faltered; but lo! the grand prize of his ambition to-day slips from his grasp because of his faltering in his former contest, and his success in the canvass for the Senate, purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him the loss of the Presidency of the United States.”

36:12. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory. Observe the splendid assurance which characterizes Douglas’s reply in this destructive dilemma, strongest here where his position is logically weakest. (See Lincoln’s reply at Alton, 199-201.)

36:15. In relation to Mr. Chase’s amendment. In reply to Lincoln’s allegation, 26:8. (See note on same passage.)

38:13. Question 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that states cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of
political action? If the same question had been asked in 1830 or 1840 regarding a hypothetical decision that territories, instead of states, could not exclude slavery from their limits, it would hardly have seemed more startling. (See Johnston: American Orations, iii. 388.) Among the most embarrassing aspects of Lincoln's position was that which required him to attack a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It was theoretically easy to maintain that the decision was law, and must be recognized as such while it existed, but that it was wrong in principle and would ultimately cease to be law. But the position was a hard one to maintain through a series of debates, for the American people have always been quick to resent any criticism of the decrees of their highest judicial tribunal.

Hence Lincoln reveals good strategy by anticipating Douglas's attack, and seeking to make Douglas meet the troublesome issue in an analogous form, first. Properly enough, however, since he has always denied the existence of any conspiracy to introduce slavery into the states, Douglas refuses to admit that such a decision is possible, and thus declines to assume the burden offered him. Lincoln returns to the matter in the Galesburgh debate (p. 118.) See also note on 39:2.

39:3. Seward, and Hale, and Wilson. William H. Seward, Senator from New York, was at this time the National Republican leader; later he was Lincoln's chief competitor for the presidential nomination, but was Secretary of State in his rival's cabinet throughout the Civil War. John P. Hale and Henry Wilson were Senators from New Hampshire and Massachusetts, respectively.

39:7. Mr. Toombs of Georgia. Robert Toombs was a leader of the secession forces in the Senate during the years just before the Civil War—one of the ablest, most uncompromising and aggressive statesmen, and one
of the most eloquent orators of his party, honest and outspoken.

39:26. Question 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may effect the nation on the slavery question? This question closely correlates with Question 7 in the series propounded by Judge Douglas at Ottawa. (See 17:1, et seq.) The significance of this question and Lincoln's attitude toward the matter involved is made plain in Lincoln’s discussion at Galesburgh (pp. 125-129). Among those indifferent to the spread of slavery Douglas's reply was no doubt as popular then as similar doctrines have been since. From the point of view of those believers in national expansion—who could, like Douglas, close their eyes to the moral evil of slavery, Lincoln was here forced to the unpopular side.

42:5. Lovejoy, Farnsworth, and Fred. Douglass. Noted Abolitionists, all. Owen Lovejoy (1811-64) was a Republican representative in Congress from 1856 to 1862. John F. Farnsworth was a lawyer of Chicago—who served three terms in Congress. Frederick Douglass (1817-1895), a mulatto ex-slave, was widely known as an orator in the anti-slavery cause.


43:25. He declared the Mexican War to be unjust and infamous, and would not support it. In general the Mexican War was condemned throughout the North, except by those who were favorable to the extension of slavery. In the Charleston debate of Sept. 18, Lincoln replied to the charge of Douglas as follows:

"[Here Mr. Lincoln turned to the crowd on the platform, and selecting Hon. Orlando B. Ficklin, led him forward, and said:—"]
"I do not mean to do anything with Mr. Ficklin except to present his face and tell you that he personally knows it to be a lie. He was a member of Congress at the only time I was in Congress, and knows that whenever there was an attempt to procure a vote of mine which would endorse the origin and justice of the war, I refused to give such endorsement, and voted against it; but I never voted against the supplies for the army and he knows, as well as Judge Douglas, that whenever a dollar was asked by way of compensation, otherwise, for the benefit of the soldiers, I gave all the votes that Ficklin or Douglas did, and perhaps more."

Mr. Ficklin thereupon publicly corroborated Mr. Lincoln's statement.

47:8. The following (Rockford) platform. This platform is almost identical with the alleged Springfield platform of 1854, printed on page 260, over which the original dispute arose.

49:30. The Crittenden-Montgomery Bill. This measure is described in the annotation upon Lincoln's first question. (See p. 268.)

50:6. The Black Republican Party. The organization of the Republican party of the disrupted elements of the Northern Whigs, Anti-Nebraska Democrats, and Free-Soilers, began in local centers in 1854. Its first national convention was held in 1856, and nominated Fremont and Dayton as candidates for President and Vice-President. Opposition to the extension of slavery to the territories was the strong tie which bound the members of the new party to a single platform.

The charge of a corrupt bargain between Trumbull and Lincoln to capture the organization of the new party, abolitionize it, and divide the spoils, which Douglas now makes with considerable elaboration, is denied by Lincoln in his rejoinder and in other speeches
in the campaign. The charge rests upon no evidence. (See note on 54:17.)

50:27. Giddings. Joshua R. Giddings (1795-1864) was one of the ablest anti-slavery leaders in Congress during most of the period from 1838 to 1859.

51:3 Clay and Webster. These statesmen were the leaders during this period of the Southern and Northern Whigs respectively. The Whig party, both North and South, believed that the preservation of the Union was of supreme importance. To ensure this they favored compromises with the slave power. The Northern Whigs were not like the Democrats, blind to the right or wrong of slavery. They believed it, however, subordinate in importance to the maintenance of the Union.

51:7. A bank, . . . distribution, the specie circular. (a) The attempt to renew the charter of the Second United States Bank, which expired in 1836, was defeated by President Jackson, and his veto was sustained at the polls in the succeeding national election. (b) The proposition to distribute the surplus of the national Treasury among the states was at various times a party issue. (c) The Specie Circular, issued in 1836, required that payments for public lands should, in all ordinary cases, be made in gold and silver. It was opposed by those who were interested in the prevailing inflation of the time, and in credit schemes.


52:7. John Wentworth. John Wentworth (1815-88) was editor of the Chicago Democrat from 1836 to 1861, and a representative in Congress for three terms. Beginning a Democrat, he became a Whig, and later a Republican under the influence of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation.

(1810-79), a soldier in the Mexican War, was United States Senator from Illinois from 1849 to 1855. Later he served with distinction in the Civil War. He is said to have been the only general who ever defeated "Stonewall" Jackson.

54: 17. **When Lincoln was beaten for Shield's place.** Douglas never afforded any evidence to sustain this charge. The facts as recorded in Morse's Life of Lincoln (Vol. i. p. 96) are as follows: On Feb. 8, 1855, the legislature began to ballot for Senator. The first ballot resulted: Lincoln (Whig), 45, Shields (Douglas Democrat), 41, Trumbull (Anti-Nebraska Democrat), 5, Scattering, 5. After several ballots, Lincoln fell to 15 votes and Trumbull rose to 35, but Matteson, who had been substituted for Shields, had 47 ballots, and his election was imminent. "Lincoln's weakness lay in the fact that the Abolitionists had too loudly praised him, and publicly counted him as one of themselves." For this reason five Democrats, supporters of Trumbull, were as bitter against Lincoln as they were against the candidate of Douglas, Matteson. "Lincoln could count upon his fifteen adherents to the extremity; but the five anti-Douglas Democrats were equally staunch against him, so that his chance was evidently gone. Trumbull was a Democrat, but he was opposed to the policy of Douglas's Kansas-Nebraska Bill; his following was not altogether trustworthy, and a trifling defection from it seemed likely to occur and make out Matteson's majority. Lincoln pondered briefly; then subjecting all else to the great principle of 'anti-Nebraska,' he urged his friends to transfer their votes to Trumbull. With grumbling and reluctance they did so, and by this aid on the tenth ballot, Trumbull was elected."

59: 19. **Either Mr. Lincoln was then committed to those propositions . . . violated his pledge.** Is the alternative fairly proved?
61:19. "In my opinion it will not cease until." . . . See the opening paragraph of the Springfield Speech, and the annotation thereon.

63:20. I will retire in shame from the United States Senate. Note the skill of Douglas in developing prejudice against his opponent. Is the method justifiable as here used?

64:19. Mr. Buchanan was . . . in England. James Buchanan was Minister to England from 1853 to 1856.

MR. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER

72:22. Judge Douglas says he made a charge upon the Editor of the Washington "Union" alone. See the annotation upon the passage on 32:2.

73:13. He had an eye farther north than he has to-day. Douglas's revolt from the Administration on the Lecompton matter aroused a suspicion on the part of many that he intended to become a Republican. See 77:31, et seq.

THE FIFTH JOINT DEBATE, AT GALESBURGH

October 7, 1858

The debate at Freeport, read to-day, clearly reveals Lincoln's supremacy in the great struggle. Events have long vindicated the soundness of his moral and political philosophy, and the ultimate wisdom of his strategy. Yet at the hour anxiety and alarm filled the minds of his advisers. "After the debate was finished," says Mr. Horace White (Herndon's Life of Lincoln, ii. 110) "we Republicans did not feel very happy. We held the same opinion that Mr. Judd and Dr. Ray had—that Douglas's answer (to Lincoln's second question) had probably saved him from defeat.
We did not look forward, and we did not look South, and even if we had done so, we were too much enlisted in this campaign to swap it for another one which was two years distant."

Between the debate at Freeport and that at Galesburg, besides numerous individual campaign speeches by each candidate, occurred the joint debates at Jonesboro, on September 15, and at Charleston, on September 18. Jonesboro was in Southern Illinois, and strong in pro-slavery sentiment. However, the place was a stronghold of the "Danites" or Buchanan Democrats, and therefore favorable to neither of the candidates. The audience was small and there was little enthusiasm. The debate at Charleston, in a region where the candidates had about equal following, drew an enormous crowd. The fever of the campaign was now well-nigh at its height. "Over long, weary miles of hot dusty prairie [writes an eye-witness], the processions of eager partisans come on foot, or horseback, in wagons drawn by horses or mules . . . pushing on in clouds of dust under a blazing sun . . . waiting in anxious groups for hours at the places of speaking." In this debate Lincoln produced documents to prove that Douglas had in 1856 tried to bring Kansas into the Union without allowing her people to vote upon their constitution. Douglas was hard pressed, and in the opinion of his friends Lincoln scored a distinct victory.

Nearly three weeks later the contestants met at Galesburgh. Mr. White (Herndon's Life of Lincoln, ii. 123) describes the circumstances as follows:

"Here we had the largest audience of the whole series and the worst day, the weather being very cold and raw, notwithstanding which, the people flocked from far and near. One feature of the Republican procession was a division of one hundred ladies and an equal number of gentlemen on horseback as a special escort
to the carriage containing Mr. Lincoln. The whole country seemed to be swarming and the crowd stood three hours in the college grounds, in a cutting wind, listening to the debate. Mr. Lincoln's speech at Galesburgh was, in my judgment, the best of the series."

The student should notice the altering status of the speakers as the campaign reaches its height. Douglas, with unabated assurance, continues the lines of attack and defense which he had marked out at the beginning of the campaign. But in Lincoln is growing a profounder sense of the tremendous and universal import of the real issue which lies at the bottom of party differences. With skill rapidly disciplined under the stress and shock of the attack of the greatest parliamentary debater of his time, Lincoln discards more and more whatever is local and personal in his argument. Before his clarifying vision loom with growing distinctness the larger aspects of the great issue—matters, not of personalities or politics, but of principle, phases of the national and universal issue—the great moral wrong of slavery.

The debates at Galesburgh present two of these larger aspects of the struggle not emphasized in the Freeport debate. They are the questions whether negroes have any share in the Declaration of Independence; and whether the Republican party represents a sectional, instead of a national movement. Aside from these two vital aspects of the debate the topics of discussion at Galesburgh are the same as those at Freeport. In addition to analyzing new arguments, the student should therefore concern himself, aside from the parry and thrust of each individual encounter, with the diminishing or growing emphasis upon specific issues as the campaign unfolds itself; with the appearance and manipulation of fresh evidence; with tendencies on the part of either debater to shift his ground, or to alter the character or form of his argument as he approaches
audiences of different sympathies, and as the campaign becomes more intense. From this point onward the annotation will seek only to correlate matters under discussion, to explain the few matters of historical reference not already explained, and to be merely suggestive upon points of logical or persuasive process. The arguments upon the questions whether negroes are included in the Declaration of Independence, and upon the charge of sectionalism, are so clear and universal in their character as to need little special annotation.

**MR. DOUGLAS'S SPEECH**

80: 17. *The Lecompton Constitution.* What exigency of the campaign induces Douglas to devote nearly one-third of his opening speech in this debate to the Lecompton question, upon which he and Lincoln are in essential agreement? (Compare Lincoln’s speech at Alton, p. 166.)

83: 24. *The effort has been made . . . by certain postmasters.* See the annotation upon 33: 7. (Lincoln’s first question to Douglas.)

84: 16. *Groesbeck and Pendleton and Cox.* (1) William S. Groesbeck (1815-1877), was a Democratic representative from Ohio from 1857 to 1859. At the impeachment of President Johnson in 1868 he was leading counsel for the defense. (2) George H. Pendleton (1825-1889) was at this time a Democratic representative. In 1860 he lacked 2 1-2 votes of the nomination of his party for the Presidency. (3) S. S. Cox (1824-1889) lived a long, varied, and conspicuous political and diplomatic career. From 1857 onward he served three terms in Congress.

84: 21. *The Joneses of Pennsylvania.* One of the “Joneses of Pennsylvania” was Jehu G. Jones (1811-78), a representative from 1851-8, and later minister to Austria.
87:8. The Republican party is availing itself of unworthy means. Has Douglas established the truth of his charge? Is it plausible?

87:30. But now you have a sectional organization. For another presentation of this issue by Douglas, see the Alton debate, p. 144, and Lincoln's speech in reply, p. 179; see also especially the Cooper Institute Address, p. 230.


89:3. Garrison. William Lloyd Garrison (1805-1879) was perhaps the most radical and conspicuous of the New England Abolitionists. He was almost anarchistic in his denunciation of the Constitution as "a Covenant with Death, and an agreement with Hell."

89:30. The doctrine of the Declaration of Independence. Douglas recurs to this argument at Alton. (See page 163, and especially Lincoln's Reply, pp. 171 to 178.)

97:3. How is it that in a territory the people can do as they please on the slavery question under the Dred Scott decision? See annotation of 35:12, Lincoln's second interrogatory to Douglas.

98:12. Mr. Orr of South Carolina. James L. Orr (1822-1873) was a representative from 1848 to 1858, and a conspicuous Southern leader.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY

Does Mr. Lincoln gain in confidence and assurance since the Freeport debate? Are there gains in other respects? Does he seek merely to answer his opponent now?

102:26. He spoke ... not venturing to use the word Democrat. What condition continues to embarrass Douglas? Why should Lincoln have hesitated to use the word Republican in all circumstances of the campaign?

103:2. The National Democracy. Douglas's rupture
with the National Democracy occurred in 1857 over the Lecompton issue.

106:4. The people of Chicago would not let Judge Douglas preach a certain favorite doctrine. On Sept. 1, 1854, Senator Douglas addressed a mass meeting in Chicago in defense of his Kansas-Nebraska Act. Public sentiment was bitter against him. "When the time came, flags at half-mast, and the dismal tolling of church bells welcomed him. A vast and silent crowd was gathered, but not to hear him. Hisses and groans broke in upon his opening sentences. Hour after hour, from eight o'clock until midnight he stood before them; time and again, as the uproar lessened, his voice combated it; but they would not let him speak. . . . On the way home his carriage was set upon and he was in danger of his life." (W. G. Brown: Stephen A. Douglas, p. 96.)

107:30. The Compromise of 1850. See Introduction. Lincoln's explanation which now follows is accurate and detailed.

112:29. He had . . . more to do with . . . the Lecompton Constitution than Buchanan had. See the reference to the Charleston debate in the preliminary note upon the Galesburgh debate.

113:11. The opponents of the Democratic party were divided. Fremont was the Republican nominee; Fillmore, that of the Know-Nothings and Whigs.

113:30. A set of resolutions . . . in October, 1854. See the Freeport debate (Lincoln) 21:20 et seq. and (Douglas) 43-49, with annotation upon the former reference.

118:13. If the Supreme Court . . . shall decide . . . are you in favor of acquiescing. See 38:13 et seq. and the annotation thereon.

119:30. Nothing in the constitution of any state can destroy. The precision of Lincoln's logic finds in this syllogism an excellent exemplification.
NOTES

121:18. The new Dred Scott decision. See the Springfield Speech (8:17,) and the latter half of the annotation upon (31:2.)

122:1. General Jackson . . . the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. In 1832, General Jackson practically refused to enforce a decision of the Supreme Court against the state of Georgia.

122:12. The Cincinnati platform. This Democratic platform of 1856 affirmed that Congress cannot charter a National Bank, though the Supreme Court had decided that the Bank, whose charter expired in 1836, was constitutional.

122:16. He himself was one . . . in breaking down the Supreme Court of the state of Illinois. In 1841, a Democratic legislature reconstructed the legislature in such a way as to increase the number of judges. Douglas, less than twenty-eight years old, was named for one of the new places.

125:16. Are you opposed to the acquisition of further territory, unless slavery is prohibited? See 20:5, and annotation thereon.


MR. DOUGLAS'S REJOINERDER

135: Does Mr. Lincoln wish to push these things to the point of personal difficulties here? Has Douglas really answered Lincoln on this much vexed issue?

136:25. And yet Lincoln . . . will not . . . sanction. . . . the doctrine of no more slave states. Is this a fair restatement of Lincoln's position at Freeport (18:5,)?

139:2. Suppose he succeeds in destroying public confidence in the court. In reference to the nature of his opposition to the Dred Scott decision, Mr. Lincoln in his opening speech in the debate at Quincy, one week later, made the following statement:
"We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation, not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundations for spreading that evil into the states themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject."

THE SEVENTH JOINT DEBATE, AT ALTON
October 15, 1858

On October 13 Mr. Lincoln met Douglas, in the sixth debate of the series, at Quincy. Like Galesburgh, the region was one in which each of the candidates had a good following. Lincoln, with continually increasing insistence, forced the issue of the right or wrong of slavery. Douglas, indifferent, always, to this issue, or feigning to be indifferent, generally chose to ignore it, but in this debate, he specifically declined in the following language to discuss it:

"He tells you that I will not argue the question whether slavery is right or wrong. I will tell you why
I will not do it. I hold that under the Constitution of the United States, each state of this Union has a right to do as it pleases on the subject of slavery. In Illinois we have exercised that sovereign right by prohibiting slavery within our own limits. I approve of that line of policy. We have done our whole duty in Illinois. We have gone as far as we had a right to go under the Constitution of our common country. It is none of our business whether slavery exists in Missouri or not. Missouri is a sovereign state of this Union, and has the same right to decide the slavery question for herself that Illinois has to decide it for herself. Hence I do not choose to occupy the time allotted to me in discussing a question that we have no right to act upon.

The student may now compare the issues in this debate with those of the Freeport meeting. Upon what issues do they still meet each other squarely? Does either of them give time to discussion of matters upon which the debaters themselves are in agreement? If so, for what reason? To what extent do they diverge from one another, in failing to meet squarely upon what one or the other insists are the real issues of the campaign? Does either of the speakers show any motive in his debating beyond defeating his opponent in the immediate campaign? If such a motive exists, in what terms may it be defined? Does Lincoln in this speech in Southern Illinois give substantiation to Douglas's charge that he has one doctrine for one part of the state, and another for a different part? What likenesses or contrasts exist in the kinds of persuasion which arise in this debate from the character of the two speakers? Compare their literary styles.

"The campaign," says Mr. Horace White, "was now drawing rapidly to a close. Everybody who had borne an active part in it was pretty well fagged out, except Mr. Lincoln. He showed no signs of fatigue. Douglas's voice was worn down to extreme huskiness. He
took great pains to save what was left of his throat, but to listen to him moved one's pity. Nevertheless, he went on doggedly, bravely, and with a jaunty air of confidence. Mr. Lincoln's voice was as clear and far-reaching as it was... two months before—a high pitched tenor, almost a falsetto, that could be heard at a greater distance than Douglas's heavy basso." The attendance at the debate was the smallest of the series except that at Jonesboro—and, as at that place, the audience held strong pro-slavery opinions. For a second time Douglas was "trotting Lincoln down" to the abiding place of pro-slavery sentiment in Illinois.

In this debate Lincoln, for the first time in the speeches of this volume, deals with the constitutionality of slavery. In this debate, too, he deals less than on any other with issues arising out of the politics of the day;—more clearly than in any other debate he builds his argument upon the high moral plane of the right or wrong of slavery.

146:22. Imagine... that Mr. Lincoln had been a member of the Convention that framed the Constitution. Compare this argument, and Lincoln's reply, beginning p. 182, with the opening sections of the speech at Cooper Institute.

148:2. Slavery was abolished in... New Jersey. New Jersey abolished slavery in 1804, being the seventh and last of the original thirteen states so to do.

148:25. The admission of... slave states. See 18:5, and annotation.

144:17. His proposition... Union could not exist as our fathers made it. See Douglas, 87:30, and Lincoln's reply, 105:13; also, the Cooper Institute Address, 230.

151:1. The contract with Texas. In 1845, Congress by joint action "passed a resolution providing for the admission of Texas, and, with her consent, the forma-
tion of four additional states out of the territory in states formed north of the line of 36° 30' north latitude, slavery to be prohibited. . . . Texas accepted the terms and at the next session of Congress was formally admitted." (Rhodes' History of U. S., i. 85.)


158:30. Nullification. In 1832, maintaining that a state can for its own purposes annul an Act of Congress, South Carolina passed the famous Ordinance of Nullification, declaring that acts of Congress relating to the collection of tariffs should not be binding in the ports of that state. The state threatened the use of force, but the firm stand of President Jackson saved the day, and South Carolina rescinded the Ordinance on March 2, 1833.

162:1. Hon. Jefferson Davis. The subsequent President of the Confederacy was at this time the Senator from Mississippi, and leader of his party in the Senate.

163:25. The Abolition party thinks that under the Declaration . . . the negro is equal. See the Galesburgh debate (89:30), and Lincoln's response in opening his Reply (101).

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY

167:18. The valiant advocate of the Missouri Compromise. This was before 1854, when the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was presented.

168:22. The Dred Scott decision in my Springfield speech. See 8:17, and annotation.

170:4. I desire to place myself in connection with Mr. Clay, as nearly right. The voters to whom Mr. Lincoln now addresses his plea are old line Whigs, followers of Clay, men who in this locality may have favored slavery—but considered the maintenance of the Union of more importance.
170:11. He read upon a former occasion . . . a speech . . . at Chicago. See 89 et seq.

171:30. Negroes were not included in the Declaration of Independence. See 89:30 et seq. in Douglas’s speech at Galesburgh, and Lincoln’s Reply (101-102).

179:22. “We are now far into the fifth year.” See 1:1, and annotation upon 1:12.

180:23. Mr. Crittenden. Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, joint author of the Crittenden-Montgomery Compromise (see annotation upon 33:7). Crittenden was a Kentucky Whig, and his support of Douglas in this campaign was a keen disappointment to Mr. Lincoln.

182:5. Where the public mind should rest in the belief that it was in course of ultimate extinction. Is Lincoln distinct upon this point? Does Lincoln deal effectively with the economic aspects of slavery or with its remedies?

182:26. Slavery . . . in the Constitution. See the first half of the Cooper Institute address.

189:12. What divided the great Methodist Church . . . Presbyterian General Assembly. Both these denominations were divided into Northern and Southern churches during the anti-slavery agitation.

192:21. The real issue in this controversy. Compare with Douglas’s statement (pp. 142-3).

199:2. Brooks of South Carolina. Preston S. Brooks, who assaulted Charles Sumner on the floor of the Senate, on May 22, 1856, after Senator Sumner had severely arraigned Senator Butler of South Carolina, a relative of Brooks, in a speech on the Kansas question.

199: By the invention of the cotton-gin. The cotton-gin, invented by Eli Whitney in 1793, multiplied the cotton-picking capacity of a slave by fifty. The resulting demand for negro labor had an essential bearing on the slavery issue.

199:20. This argument . . . sustains the Dred
Scott decision (and) still excludes slavery. See 35:12 and annotation.


205:6. The lead of Corwin. Thomas Corwin (1794-1865), a statesman of varied and important service from 1830 till his death. As Whig and later as Republican he served as Representative, Senator, Governor of his native state of Ohio, as a member of Taylor's and Fillmore's Cabinet.

206:11. Have you read General Singleton's speech? This is "new material in rebuttal."

THE COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH

Feb. 27, 1860

With the conclusion of the senatorial campaign of 1858, Mr. Lincoln, although a defeated candidate, had become a leader of national significance. Only Seward, among Republicans, equaled him in prestige. The desire to see and hear him was general throughout the East. In the fall of 1859 he was invited to deliver a "political lecture" before the Young Men's Central Republican Union of New York City. The invitation was accepted and the address was given in Cooper Institute on Feb. 27, 1860, before a large audience in which were many of the most influential men of the city. William Cullen Bryant was the presiding officer. "Since the days of Clay and Webster," said the Tribune, "no man has spoken to a larger assemblage of the intellect and culture of the city."

But the curiosity of the public in regard to Lincoln's personality was perhaps equaled by his own wish to test his arguments and his personal power upon the different tradition and culture of an Eastern audience. His address was more laboriously prepared than any
other of his life—yet he had strong misgivings about its reception, and as he at last stepped before the audience at the invitation of Mr. Bryant he felt miseries of embarrassment from his sense of the unaccustomed conditions, the critical and refined audience, his own ungainliness, and his ill-fitting and wrinkled clothes. But as the fervor of speaking grew upon him, his consciousness of these things faded away, while the audience with attention fixed upon the argument unfolding in matchless clearness and precision, saw only the swaying figure of one transfigured by lofty moral earnestness and the vision of a high ideal—"If any part of the audience," say Nicolay and Hay in their account, "came with the expectation of hearing the rhetorical fireworks of the 'half-horse, half-alligator' variety, they met novelty of an unlooked for kind. In Lincoln's entire address he neither introduced an anecdote nor essayed a witticism; and the first half of it does not contain even an illustrative figure or a poetical fancy. It was the quiet searching exposition of the historian, and the terse, compact reasoning of the statesman, about an abstract principle of philosophy in language well-nigh as restrained and colorless as he would have employed in arguing a case before a court. Yet such was the apt choice of words, the easy precision of sentences, the simple strength of propositions, the fairness of every point he assumed, and the force of every conclusion he drew—that his listeners followed him with the interest and delight a child feels in its easy mastery of a plain sum in arithmetic."

The effect of the speech was remarkable. All the daily papers printed it in full on the following day. The Tribune, said: "Mr. Lincoln is one of nature's orators. . . . The tones, the gestures, the kindling eye, and the mirth-provoking look defy the reporter's skill. The vast assemblage frequently rang with cheers and shouts of applause, which were prolonged and
intensified at the close. No man ever before made such an impression upon a New York audience."

"Before Lincoln made his Cooper Institute Speech," says Rhodes (Hist. of U. S. vol. ii. p. 458), "the mention of his name as a possible nominee for President would have been considered a joke anywhere except in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa." This and his other Eastern speeches, however, "made it patent that he might become a formidable opponent of Seward."

In criticism upon the speech, Horace Greeley, in a lecture published in the Century Magazine for July, 1892, has made this striking comment upon its quality: "Every citizen has certain conceptions, recollections, convictions, notions, prejudices, which together make up what he terms his politics. The canvasser's art consists in making him believe and feel that an over-ruling majority of these preconceptions ally him to that side whereof said canvasser is the champion. In other words he seeks to belittle those points wherein his auditor is at odds with him, and emphasizes those wherein they two are in accord; thus persuading the hearer to sympathize, act, and vote with the speaker. And with this conception in view, I do not hesitate to pronounce Mr. Lincoln's speech at Cooper Institute in the spring of 1860 the very best political address to which I ever listened, and I have heard some of Webster's grandest. As a literary effort, it would not of course bear comparison with many of Webster's speeches; but regarded as an effort to convince the largest possible number that they ought to be on the speaker's side, not on the other, I do not hesitate to pronounce it unsurpassed."

Divested, as it is, of the personality of debate and the incidents of local politics; developed without the restrictions imposed by the conditions of public debate, the Cooper Institute address is, in form and in substance, the best statement of the broad and universal princi-
pies of the anti-slavery argument made prior to the Civil War. The student will find it profitable to compare it with Lincoln's speeches in the Freeport Debate, with the view of contrasting its superiority in the art of expression. As showing the minute thoroughness of its preparation, it is said to have taken the New York Tribune three weeks to verify the statements of fact in this address.


216:19. Does the proper division of local from Federal authority. . . . The issue thus succinctly stated was of course a controlling issue of the previous debates. See Lincoln's second question in the Freeport Debate, p. 21.

216:31. In 1784. In this year Jefferson reported to the Congress of the Confederation "an ordinance that provided for the prohibition of slavery after the year 1800, above the parallel of 31° north latitude." (Rhodes: Hist. of U. S. i. 15.) The measure failed to pass by one vote, to Jefferson's keen disappointment.

219:10. North Carolina ceded . . . the state of Tennessee. "In 1790 Congress had accepted the cession of North Carolina back lands on the express condition that slavery there be undisturbed." Dubois: Suppression of the Slave Trade, p. 88.

219:12. A few years later Georgia ceded . . . Mississippi and Alabama. In 1798 this cession was accepted by Congress.

231:10. The warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. The passage alluded to includes the following: "It is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your National Union to your collective and individual happiness, that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming
yourselves to think and speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety: ... and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of any attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts."

233:18. What is your proof? Harper's Ferry!

John Brown's raid upon Harper's Ferry, beginning Oct. 16, 1859, was one of the most dramatic episodes of the anti-slavery agitation before the outbreak of the Civil War. John Brown, a native of Connecticut, with his sons an active participant in the Kansas border warfare in 1856, began early in 1857, on the pretext of securing aid for that contest, to collect material secretly for an invasion of Virginia; also to drill a military company. He gradually enlisted the sympathy and secured some contributions from Northern Abolitionists. But the impracticable character of the man and his enterprise for destroying slavery in Virginia became quickly apparent to most of them. Undaunted by his slender support, however, he appeared in Virginia in July, 1859, and for about three months was plotting the capture of Harper's Ferry, a small town in which was located a government arsenal. Brown's idea was that the slaves would flock to his standard as soon as it was raised, and that by arming them and withdrawing his force to the mountains, he would presently create an insurrection sufficiently formidable to destroy the system of slavery in Virginia and perhaps eventually throughout the South.

On Oct. 16, 1859, he captured the government arsenal with his force of eighteen men. For two days he held the works against an increasing force of assailants. At length Brevet Col. Robt. E. Lee, with eighty marines, captured Brown with six men, all that were left of his force. The seven were quickly tried, convicted of trea-
son, and hanged. John Brown met his fate with a heroism which extorted the admiration of his enemies.

John Brown was a fanatic. Yet there was ingrained in his character, inflexible resolution, unsurpassed physical and moral heroism, and a sort of stern Puritan idealism, all of which invite a comparison of the man with the psalm-singing warriors of Cromwell's time. These elements of character we must consider, as well as the political tension of the time, before we comprehend the tremendous moral effect of this Quixotic raid upon the country at large. For a considerable period it dominated all political discussion. Lincoln's judgment of the affair expressed in this address represents the general opinion of the present day.

235:6. What induced the Southampton insurrection. "In August of 1831, a slave insurrection broke out in Southampton, Va., under the leadership of Nat Turner, and more than sixty white persons, most of them women and children, were massacred in cold blood." (Burgess: The Middle Period, p. 249.) Both at the North and at the South it was generally believed that the insurrection was instigated by the Abolitionists. The Abolitionist historians deny that such was the case.

235:27. The slave revolution in Hayti. The slaves of Hayti rose in insurrection on August 23, 1791. For several years a terrible struggle went on between the representatives of French authority and the negroes under the leadership of Toussaint L'Ouverture and his successors, ending with the independence of the negro republic. The contest was waged throughout its length with extreme ferocity and cruelty.

235:29. The Gunpowder Plot. The Gunpowder Plot was a design to blow up the English House of Lords, conceived in 1604 by certain Catholic opponents of the religious policy of that body. Twenty-six barrels of powder were stored in a vault beneath the chamber in which the Lords met, and it was planned to explode the
powder on the 5th of November, 1605. Twenty persons were admitted to the plot, who kept it a secret for a year and a half. Ultimately, however, one of the number, wishing to warn a particular friend among the Lords, despatched him a mysterious note of warning, which led to an investigation, and the discovery of the plot. Guy Fawkes, the leader, and all his accomplices, were arrested and executed, or else killed in resisting arrest.

237:10. Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon. On January 14, 1858, a gang of desperadoes under Felice Orsini attempted to assassinate Napoleon III. As the gang had made London its base of operations, a strong feeling of resentment against England arose in France because its members had found shelter there.

237:17. Helper's Book. Hinton R. Helper was the author of "The Impending Crisis of the South," a book published in 1857. Because of its bitter attack upon the economic and moral aspects of slavery, the book produced a great sensation, and its author, a Southern man, writing from the point of view of the "poor whites," was obliged to become a fugitive.

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