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9 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
10 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
11 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

12 ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVIN,) CASE NO. C09-2143 RS
THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI,)
13 DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET) **PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO**
ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE) **DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL**
14 ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. SAN) **NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO**
FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE) **DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF**
15 OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,) **SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION**
16)
Plaintiffs)
17 vs.) Hearing Date: April 14, 2011
Time 1:30 p.m.
Place: Courtroom 3, 17th Floor
18)
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN)
19 FRANCISCO, MAYOR GAVIN)
NEWSOM, in his official capacity; POLICE)
20 CHIEF GEORGE GASCÓN, in his official)
capacity, and Does 1-10,)
21 Defendants.)
22)

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24 Please take notice that Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, will and hereby
25 do object to Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Defendants' Motion to
26 Dismiss, set for hearing before this Court on April 14, 2011.
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Section 22 of General Order 1,587 of the Board of Supervisors (“General Order”), Exhibit
3 “A” to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, is not relevant to this case and is thus not the
4 proper subject of a request for judicial notice. As such, the Court should decline to grant
5 Defendants’ request.

6 **II. IT IS IMPROPER TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE**

7 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
8 admissible.” And evidence submitted under the rules of judicial notice is not immune from the
9 core evidentiary requirement of relevance. *See Yanek v. STARR Surgical Co.*, 388 F. Supp. 2d
10 1110, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 402). So, even if a fact or document would
11 otherwise meet the requirements for judicial notice, i.e., it is “not subject to reasonable dispute,”
12 the Court should refrain from taking judicial notice of evidence that is irrelevant and inadmissible
13 pursuant to Rule 402.

14 “Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the statute’s language. Where the
15 statutory language is clear and consistent with the statutory scheme at issue, the plain language of
16 the statute is conclusive and the judicial inquiry is at an end.” *Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc.*, 481 F.3d
17 724, 732 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, any evidence used to interpret an ordinance that is clear and
18 unambiguous should not be considered, as it is irrelevant to a determination of the issues.

19 Here, Defendants request judicial notice of San Francisco General Order 1,587, section 22,
20 as amended on July 19, 1892, despite the clear language of San Francisco Police Code section
21 1290, the ordinance to which it purportedly relates, enacted in 1938. (Defs.’ Req. Jud. Notice,
22 Exh. A.) Section 1290 provides, in relevant part: “[N]o person or persons . . . shall fire or
23 discharge any firearms or fireworks of any kind or description within the limits of the City and
24 County of San Francisco.” The language of section 1290 is clear and unambiguous, and the
25 judicial inquiry need go no further than its plain meaning. Reference to the General Order—to the
26 extent that it indicates the legislative history of section 1290 at all—is unnecessary.

27 Moreover, Defendants provide no factual link between the 1892 General Order and Police
28 Code section 1290 beyond their bald assertion that the General Order was a “precursor” to section

1 1290. (*See* Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 5-6.) The General Order reads, in relevant part: “No person
2 shall discharge any firearms of any other description, or any firecrackers or bombs, or any
3 fireworks of any kind, character or description” Defendants suggest, without foundation, that
4 an express exception for “shooting destructive animals within or upon [one’s] own enclosure”
5 contained in the General Order somehow *implies* an exception to section 1290 for discharging a
6 firearm in self-defense against a criminal intruder within one’s home. In essence, Defendants ask
7 this Court to rewrite section 1290 to include a self-defense exception because the General Order
8 allowed for “shooting destructive animals,” without providing one scintilla of evidence linking
9 the two laws nor any explanation for how an exception for shooting “destructive animals” equates
10 with one for shooting violent human trespassers.

11 In sum, the Court need not resort to the text of the General Order to interpret the plain
12 language of section 1290. And even if section 1290 were ambiguous, Defendants provide no
13 foundation for the General Order’s alleged value in interpreting it. Thus, the General Order has no
14 bearing on this case or on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; it is irrelevant, inadmissible, and not
15 the proper subject of a request for judicial notice.

16 **III. CONCLUSION**

17 Because the General Order is irrelevant to this case, Plaintiffs request this Court deny
18 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice and sustain Plaintiffs’ objection. Should the Court find it
19 necessary, Plaintiffs request an opportunity to be heard as to the impropriety of taking judicial
20 notice of this document, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(e).

21 Date: March 24, 2011

MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, LLP

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