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ELEMENTS
OF
RHE TORIC.

BY
RICHARD WHATELY, D.D.,
ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.

'O γὰρ γνωστ, καὶ μὴ σοφὸς διδάξαι, ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐνεπιστήμη.
Thucydides.

FROM THE LAST ENLARGED AND REVISED EDITION.

Nashville, Tenn.:
SOUTHERN METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE.
1861.
NOTE.

In reproducing this great work in the present form, we have bestowed much care upon it, that it might be free from the numerous typographical errors which disfigured other editions. We have designed to make it the most correct and beautiful reprint of Archbishop Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric issued this side of the Atlantic.

THOS. O. SUMMERS.

NASHVILLE, TENN., Feb. 22, 1861.
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PREFACE.

A brief outline of the principal part of the following work was sketched out several years ago for the private use of some young friends; and from that MS., chiefly, the article "Rhetoric" in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana was afterwards drawn up. I was induced to believe that it might be more useful, if published in a separate form; and I accordingly, with the assistance of some friends, revised the treatise, and made a few additions and other alterations which suggested themselves; besides dividing it in a manner more convenient for reference.

The title of "Rhetoric," I thought it best on the whole to retain, being that by which the article in the Encyclopaedia is designated; as I was unwilling to lay myself open to the suspicion of wishing to pass off as new, on the strength of a new name, what had been already before the public. But the title is, in some respects, open to objection. Besides that it is rather the more commonly employed in reference to public speaking alone, it is also apt to suggest to many minds an associated idea of empty declamation, or of dishonest artifice; or, at best, of a mere dissertation on tropes and figures of speech.

The subject, indeed, stands perhaps but a few degrees above logic in popular estimation; the one being generally regarded by the vulgar as the art of bewildering the learned.
by frivolous subtilties; the other, that of deluding the multitude by specious falsehood. And if a treatise on composition be itself more favorably received than the work of a logician, the author of it must yet labor under still greater disadvantages. He may be thought to challenge criticism, and his own performances may be condemned by a reference to his own precepts; or, on the other hand, his precepts may be undervalued, through his own failures in their application. Should this take place in the present instance, I have only to urge, with Horace in his Art of Poetry, that a whetstone, though itself incapable of cutting, is yet useful in sharpening steel. No system of instruction will completely equalize natural powers; and yet it may be of service towards their improvement. A youthful Achilles may acquire skill in hurling the javelin under the instruction of a Chiron, though the master may not be able to compete with the pupil in vigor of arm.

As for any display of florid eloquence and oratorical ornament, my deficiency in which is likely to be remarked, it may be sufficient to observe, that if I had intended to practice any arts of this kind, I should have been the less likely to treat of them. To develop and explain the principles of any kind of trick, would be a most unwise procedure in any one who purposes to employ it, though perfectly consistent for one whose object is to put others on their guard against it. The juggler is the last person that would let the spectators into his own secret.

It has been truly observed, that "genius begins where rules end." But to infer from this, as some seem disposed to do, that in any department wherein genius can be displayed, rules must be useless, or useless to those who possess genius, is a very rash conclusion. What I have observed elsewhere concerning Logic, that "a knowledge of it serves to save a waste of ingenuity," holds good in many other departments
also. In travelling through a country partially settled and explored, it is wise to make use of charts, and of high-roads with direction-posts, as far as these will serve our purpose; and to reserve the guidance of the compass or the stars for places where we have no other helps. In like manner, we should avail ourselves of rules as far as we can receive assistance from them, knowing that there will always be sufficient scope for genius in points for which no rules can be given.

In respect, however, of such matters as are treated of here and in the Elements of Logic, it has been sometimes maintained, or tacitly assumed, that all persons accomplish spontaneously, and all equally well, every thing for which any rules have been, or can be, laid down; and that the whole difference between better and worse success depends entirely on things independent of instruction, and which are altogether the gift of nature. I can only reply, that my own experience has led me most decidedly to an opposite conclusion: a conclusion which, I think, is also established by several of the instances given in this and in the other treatise. Persons not wanting in ability, or in knowledge of their subject, are frequently found either to have fallen into some fallacy, or to have weakened the force of what they had to say, or to have weakened the force of what they had to say, or to have committed some other mistake, from which an attentive study of the precepts that have been given might have saved them. There is hardly a single precept in the Elements of Logic, or in the present work, that is not frequently violated in the compositions of men not deficient in natural powers; as is proved, in several instances, by the examples adduced. And the precepts I allude to are such, exclusively, as it is possible to apply, practically, and, in the strict sense, to follow. I mention this, because one may sometimes find precepts—so called—laid down, on various subjects, of so vague and general a character as to be of no practical use; such as no
one, indeed, should depart from, but which no one can be really guided by, because he can never take any step in consequence of the enunciation of one of these barren truisms. If, e. g., we were to advise a sick man "to take whatever medicines were proper for him," and to "use a wholesome diet," or if we were to bid an orator "use forcible arguments, suited to the occasion," we should be, in fact, only telling them to "go the right way to work," without teaching them what is the right way. But no such empty pretence of instruction will be found, I trust, in the present treatise.

As for the complaint sometimes heard, of "fettering genius by systems of rules," I shall offer some remarks on that, in the course of the work.

It may, perhaps, be hardly necessary to observe, that the following pages are designed principally for the instruction of unpracticed writers. Of such as have long been in the habit of writing or speaking, those whose procedure has been conformable to the rules I have laid down will of course have anticipated most of my observations; and those, again, who have proceeded on opposite principles, will be more likely to pass censures, as it were, in self-defence, than laboriously to unlearn what they have, perhaps, laboriously acquired, and to set out afresh on a new system. But I am encouraged, partly by the result of experiments, to entertain a hope that the present system may prove useful to such as have their method of composition and their style of writing and of delivery to acquire. And an author ought to be content if a work be found in some instances not unprofitable, which cannot, from its nature, be expected to pass completely uncensured.

Whoever, indeed, in treating of any subject, recommends (whether on good or bad grounds) a departure from established practice, must expect to encounter opposition. This
opposition does not, indeed, imply that his precepts are right; but neither does it prove them wrong; it only indicates that they are new; since few will readily acknowledge the plans on which they have long been proceeding to be mistaken. If a treatise, therefore, on the present subject were received with immediate, universal, and unqualified approbation, this circumstance, though it would not, indeed, prove it to be erroneous, (since it is conceivable that the methods commonly pursued may be altogether right,) yet would afford a presumption that there was not much to be learned from it.

On the other hand, the more deep-rooted and generally prevalent any error may be, the less favorably, at first, will its refutation (though proportionally the more important) be for the most part received.

With respect to what are commonly called rhetorical artifices—contrivances for “making the worse appear the better reason”—it would have savored of pedantic morality to give solemn admonitions against employing them, or to enter a formal disclaimer of dishonest intention; since, after all, the generality will, according to their respective characters, make what use of a book they think fit, without waiting for the author’s permission. But what I have endeavored to do, is clearly to set forth, as far as I could, (as Bacon does in his Essay on Cunning,) these sophistical tricks of the art; and as far as I may have succeeded in this, I shall have been providing the only effectual check to the employment of them. The adulterators of food or of drugs, and the coiners of base money, keep their processes a secret, and dread no one so much as him who detects, describes, and proclaims their contrivances, and thus puts men on their guard; for “every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be made manifest.”

To the prevailing association of the term “Rhetoric” with the idea of these delusive contrivances, may be traced the
opinion (which I believe is also common) that the power of
elocution is lost on those who themselves possess it; or, at
least, that a critical knowledge of the art of composition for-
tifies any one, in proportion to his proficiency, against being
affected by the persuasive powers of another. This is un-
doubtedly true, as far as _sophistical_ skill is concerned. The
better acquainted one is with any kind of rhetorical trick,
the less liable he is to be misled by it. The _artifices_, strictly
so called, of the orator, are

—like tricks by sleight of hand,
Which, to admire, one should not understand;

and he who has himself been behind the scenes of a puppet-
show, and pulled the strings by which the figures are moved,
is not likely to be much affected by their performance. This
is indeed one great recommendation of the study of Rhetoric,
that it furnishes the most effectual antidote against deception
of this kind. But it is by no means true that acquaintance
with an art—in the nobler sense of the word, not as consist-
ing in juggling tricks—tends to diminish our sensibility to
the most excellent productions of art. The greatest pro-
ficients in music are usually the most enthusiastic admirers of
good music; the best painters and poets, and such as are best
versed in the principles of those arts, are in general (when
rivalry is out of the question) the most powerfully affected
by paintings and by poetry of superior excellence. And
none, I believe, are more open to the impression of sound,
honest, manly eloquence, than those who display it in their
own compositions, and are capable of analyzing critically the
mode in which its effects are produced.

I may add, that I have in one place (Part II., ch. i., § 2)
pointed out an important part of the legitimate art of the
orator, in respect of the minds of his hearers, as coinciding
exactly with the practice of a wise and good man in respect
of his own mind.
Several passages will be found in the following pages which presuppose some acquaintance with Logic; but the greatest part will, I trust, be intelligible to those who have not this knowledge. At the same time, it is implied by what I have said of that science, and indeed by the very circumstance of my having written on it, that I cannot but consider him as undertaking a task of unnecessary difficulty, who endeavors, without studying Logic, to become a thoroughly good argumentative writer.

It should be observed, however, that a considerable portion of what is by many writers reckoned as a part of Logic, has been treated of by me not under that head, but in Part I. of the present work.*

It may be thought that some apology is necessary for the frequent reference made to the treatise just mentioned, and, occasionally, to some other works of my own. It appeared to me, however, that either of the other two alternatives would have been more objectionable; viz., either to omit entirely much that was needful for the elucidation of the subject in hand, or to repeat, in the same or in other words, what had been already published.

Perhaps some apology may also be thought necessary for the various illustrations, selected from several authors, or framed for the occasion, which occur both in the present treatise and in that on Logic; and in which opinions on various subjects are incidentally conveyed; in all of which it

* I have recently been represented (while the sixth edition of this very work was before the public) as having declared the impossibility of making such an analysis and classification of the different kinds of arguments as I have here laid before the reader. Such a misapprehension seems very unaccountable; for if I ever had made such an assertion, I should have been, I suppose, the first person that ever proclaimed the impossibility of something which, at the same time, he professed to have accomplished.
cannot be expected that every one of my readers will concur. And some may accordingly be disposed to complain that they cannot put these works into the hands of any young person under their care, without a risk of his imbibing notions which they think erroneous. This objection, I have reason to believe, has been especially felt, though not always explicitly stated, by the most decidedly antichristian writers of the present day. But it should be remembered that Logic and Rhetoric having no proper subject-matter of their own, it was necessary to resort to other departments of knowledge for exemplifications of the principles laid down; and it would have been impossible, without confining myself to the most insipid truisms, to avoid completely all topics on which there exists any difference of opinion. If, in the course of either work, I have advocated any erroneous tenet, the obvious remedy is to refute it. I am utterly unconscious of having, in any instance, resorted to the employment of fallacy, or substituted declamation for argument; but if any such faults exist, it is easy to expose them. Nor is it necessary that when any book is put into the hands of a young student, he should understand that he is to adopt implicitly every doctrine contained in it, or should not be cautioned against any erroneous principles which it may inculcate; otherwise, indeed, it would be impossible to give young men what is called a classical education without making them pagans.

That I have avowed an assent to the evidences of Christianity, (that, I believe, is the point on which the greatest soreness is felt,) and that this does incidentally imply some censure of those who reject it, is not to be denied. But they again are at liberty—and they are not backward in using their liberty—to repel the censure by refuting, if they can, those evidences. And as long as they confine themselves to calm argumentation, and abstain from insult, libellous personality, and falsification of facts, I earnestly hope no force will
ever be employed to silence them, except force of argument. I am not one of those jealous lovers of freedom who would fain keep it all to themselves; nor do I dread ultimate danger to the cause of truth from fair discussion.*

It may be objected by some, that in the foregoing words I have put forth a challenge which cannot be accepted, inasmuch as it has been declared by the highest legal authorities that "Christianity is part of the law of the land;" and, consequently, any one who impugns it is liable to prosecution. What is the precise meaning of the above legal maxim I do not profess to determine, having never met with any one who could explain it to me; but evidently the mere circumstance that we have a "religion by law established," does not, of itself, imply the illegality of arguing against that religion. The regulations of trade and of navigation, for instance, are unquestionably part of the law of the land; but the question of their expediency is freely discussed, and frequently in no very measured language; nor did I ever hear of any one's being menaced with prosecution for censuring them.

I presume not, however, to decide what steps might legally be taken: I am looking only to facts and probabilities; and I feel a constant trust, as well as hope, (and that founded on experience of the past,) that no legal penalties will in fact be incurred by temperate, decent, argumentative maintainers even of the most erroneous opinions.

To the examples introduced by way of illustration, and to the incidental remarks on several points, I have now made (1846) some additions, the chief part of which have been also printed separately for the use of those who possess earlier editions. To some readers the work may appear to be even yet too scanty in this respect; while others, again, may have

* See Speech on Jews' Relief Bill, and Remarks appended to it. Vol. of Tracts, etc., pp. 419-446.
thought even the former editions too full and too digressive. Rhetoric having, as I have elsewhere observed, (like Logic,) no proper subject-matter of its own, it is manifestly impossible to draw the line precisely between what does and what does not strictly appertain to it. I have endeavored to introduce whatever may appear, to the majority of students, relevant, interesting, and instructive.

I have only to add my acknowledgments to many kind friends to whose judicious suggestions and careful corrections I am indebted, both in the original composition of the work and in the subsequent revisions and enlargements of it.
RHETORIC.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1.

Of Rhetoric various definitions have been given by different writers; who, however, seem not so much to have disagreed in their conceptions of the nature of the same thing, as to have had different things in view while they employed the same term. Not only the word Rhetoric itself, but also those used in defining it, have been taken in various senses: as may be observed with respect to the word "Art" in Cic. de Orat., where a discussion is introduced as to the applicability of that term to Rhetoric; manifestly turning on the different senses in which "Art" may be understood.

To enter into an examination of all the definitions that have been given, would lead to much uninteresting and uninstructive verbal controversy. It is sufficient to put the reader on his guard against the common error of supposing that a general term has some real object, properly corresponding to it, independent of our conceptions; that, consequently, some one definition in every case is to be found which will comprehend every thing that is rightly designated by that term; and that all others must be erroneous; whereas, in fact, it will often happen, as in the present instance, that both the wider and the more restricted sense of a term will be alike sanctioned by use, (the only competent authority,) and that the consequence will be a corresponding variation in the definitions employed; none of which, perhaps, may be fairly chargeable with error, though none can be framed that will apply to every acceptation of the term.

(15)
It is evident that, in its primary signification, Rhetoric had reference to public speaking alone, as its etymology implies. But, as most of the rules for speaking are of course applicable equally to writing, an extension of the term naturally took place; and we find even Aristotle, the earliest systematic writer on the subject whose works have come down to us, including in his treatise rules for such compositions as were not intended to be publicly recited.* And even as far as relates to speeches, properly so called, he takes, in the same treatise, at one time a wider, and at another a more restricted view of the subject; including under the term Rhetoric, in the opening of his work, nothing beyond the finding of topics of persuasion, as far as regards the matter of what is spoken; and afterwards embracing the consideration of style, arrangement, and delivery.

The invention of printing;† by extending the sphere of operation of the writer, has of course contributed to the extension of those terms which, in their primary signification, had reference to speaking alone. Many objects are now accomplished through the medium of the press which formerly came under the exclusive province of the orator; and the qualifications requisite for success are so much the same in both cases, that we apply the term "eloquent" as readily to a writer as to a speaker; though, etymologically considered, it could only belong to the latter. Indeed, "eloquence" is often attributed even to such compositions—e. g., historical works—as have in view an object entirely different from any that could be proposed by an orator; because some part of the rules to be observed in oratory, or rules analogous to these, are applicable to such compositions. (Conformably to this view, therefore, some writers have spoken of Rhetoric as the art of composition, universally;) or, with the exclusion of Poetry alone, as embracing all prose composition.

* Aristot. Rhet., Book III.
† Or rather of paper; for the invention of printing is too obvious not to have speedily followed, in a literary nation, the introduction of a paper sufficiently cheap to make the art available. Indeed, the seals of the ancients seem to have been a kind of stamps, with which they in fact printed their names. But the high price of books, caused by the dearness of paper, precluded the sale of copies, except in so small a number that the printing of them would have been more costly than transcribing.
§ 1.] INTRODUCTION.

A still wider extension of the province of Rhetoric has been contended for by some of the ancient writers; who, thinking it necessary to include, as belonging to the art, every thing that could conduce to the attainment of the object proposed, introduced into their systems Treatises on Law, Morals, Politics, etc., on the ground that a knowledge of these subjects was requisite to enable a man to speak well on them; and even insisted on virtue* as an essential qualification of a perfect orator; because a good character, which can in no way be so surely established as by deserving it, has great weight with the audience.

These notions are combated by Aristotle; who attributes them either to the ill-cultivated understanding (ἀπαθενσία) of those who maintained them, or to their arrogant and pretending disposition, (ἀλαζονεία;) i. e., a desire to extol and magnify the art they professed. In the present day, the extravagance of such doctrines is so apparent to most readers, that it would not be worth while to take much pains in refuting them. It is worthy of remark, however, that the very same erroneous view is, even now, often taken of Logic;† which has been considered by some as a kind of system of universal knowledge, on the ground that argument may be employed on all subjects, and that no one can argue well on a subject which he does not understand; and which has been complained of by others for not supplying any such universal instruction as its unskilful advocates have placed within its province; such as, in fact, no one art or system can possibly afford.

The error is precisely the same in respect of Rhetoric and of Logic; both being instrumental arts, and, as such, applicable to various kinds of subject-matter which do not properly come under them.

So judicious an author as Quinctilian would not have failed to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate veneration for his own art, that as the possession of building materials is no part of the art of architecture, though it is impossible to build without materials, so the knowledge of the subjects on which the orator is to speak constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its suc-

* See Quinctilian.
† Elements of Logic, Introd.
cessful employment; and that though virtue, and the good reputation it procures, add materially to the speaker's influence, they are no more to be, for that reason, considered as belonging to the orator, as such, than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have a tendency to produce the same effect.

In the present day, however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acceptation that would be reckoned admissible, comprehends all "Composition in Prose," in the narrowest sense, it would be limited to "Persuasive Speaking."

I propose, in the present work, to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points, and to treat of "Argumentative Composition, generally and exclusively; considering Rhetoric (in conformity with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle) as an offshoot from Logie.

I remarked, in treating of that science, that reasoning may be considered as applicable to two purposes, which I ventured to designate respectively by the terms "inferring" and "proving;" i.e., the ascertainment of the truth by investigation, and the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another; and I there remarked, that Bacon, in his Organon, has laid down rules for the conduct of the former of these processes, and that the latter belongs to the province of Rhetoric; and it was added, that to infer is to be regarded as the proper office of the philosopher or the judge—to prove, of the advocate. It is not, however, to be understood that philosophical works are to be excluded from the class to which rhetorical rules are applicable; for the philosopher who undertakes, by writing or speaking, to convey his notions to others, assumes, for the time being, the character of advocate of the doctrines he maintains. The process of investigation must be supposed completed, and certain conclusions arrived at by that process, before he begins to impart his ideas to others in a treatise or lecture; the object of which must, of course, be to prove the justness of those conclusions. And in doing this, he will not always find it expedient to adhere to the same course of reasoning by which his own discoveries were originally made; other arguments may occur to him after-
wards more clear or more concise, or better adapted to the understanding of those he addresses. In explaining, therefore, and establishing the truth, he may often have occasion for rules of a different kind from those employed in its discovery. Accordingly, when I remarked, in the work above alluded to, that it is a common fault for those engaged in philosophical and theological inquiries to forget their own peculiar office, and assume that of the advocate, improperly, this caution is to be understood as applicable to the process of forming their own opinions—not as excluding them from advocating, by all fair arguments, the conclusions at which they have arrived by candid investigation. But if this candid investigation do not take place in the first instance, no pains that they may bestow in searching for arguments will have any tendency to insure their attainment of truth. If a man begins (as is too plainly a frequent mode of proceeding) by hastily adopting or strongly leaning to some opinion which suits his inclination, or which is sanctioned by some authority that he blindly venerates, and then studies with the utmost diligence, not as an investigator of truth, but as an advocate laboring to prove his point, his talents and his researches, whatever effect they may produce in making converts to his notions, will avail nothing in enlightening his own judgment, and securing him from error.*

Composition, however, of the argumentative kind, may be considered (as has been above stated) as coming under the province of Rhetoric. And this view of the subject is the less open to objection, inasmuch as it is not likely to lead to discussions that can be deemed superfluous, even by those who may choose to consider Rhetoric in the most restricted sense, as relating only to "Persuasive Speaking;" since it is evident that argument must be, in most cases at least, the basis of persuasion.

I propose, then, to treat, first and principally, of the discovery of arguments, and of their arrangement; secondly, to lay down some rules respecting the excitement and management of what are commonly called the passions, (including every kind of feel-

* See Essay on the Love of Truth, 2d Series.
ing, sentiment, or emotion,) with a view to the attainment of any object proposed—principally persuasion, in the strict sense, i. e., the influencing of the will; thirdly, to offer some remarks on style; and, fourthly, to treat of elocution.

§ 2.

It may be expected that before I proceed to treat of the art in question, I should present the reader with a sketch of its history. Little, however, is required to be said on this head, because the present is not one of those branches of study in which we can trace with interest a progressive improvement from age to age. It is one, on the contrary, to which more attention appears to have been paid, and in which greater proficiency is supposed to have been made, in the earliest days of science and literature, than at any subsequent period. Among the ancients, Aristotle, the earliest whose works are extant, may safely be pronounced to be also the best of the systematic writers on Rhetoric. Cicero is hardly to be reckoned among the number; for he delighted so much more in the practice than in the theory of his art, that he is perpetually drawn off from the rigid philosophical analysis of its principles into discursive declamations, always eloquent indeed, and often highly interesting; but adverse to regularity of system, and frequently as unsatisfactory to the practical student as to the philosopher. He abounds, indeed, with excellent practical remarks—though the best of them are scattered up and down his works with much irregularity—but his precepts, though of great weight, as being the result of experience, are not often traced up by him to first principles; and we are frequently left to guess, not only on what basis his rules are grounded, but in what cases they are applicable. Of this latter defect a remarkable instance will be hereafter cited.*

Quintilian is indeed a systematic writer, but cannot be considered as having much extended the philosophical views of his predecessors in this department. He possessed much good sense, but this was tinctured with pedantry—with that pretension (ἀδαντότητα, as Aristotle

* See Part I., chap. iii., § 5.
calls it) which extends to an extravagant degree the province of the art which he professes. A great part of his work indeed is a treatise on education, generally; in the conduct of which he was no mean proficient; for such was the importance attached to public speaking, even long after the downfall of the Republic had cut off the orator from the hopes of attaining, through the means of this qualification, the highest political importance, that he who was nominally a professor of Rhetoric, had in fact the most important branches of instruction intrusted to his care.

Many valuable maxims, however, are to be found in this author; but he wanted the profundity of thought and power of analysis which Aristotle possessed.

The writers on Rhetoric among the ancients whose works are lost, seem to have been numerous; but most of them appear to have confined themselves to a very narrow view of the subject, and to have been occupied, as Aristotle complains, with the minor details of style and arrangement, and with the sophistical tricks and petty artifices of the pleader, instead of giving a masterly and comprehensive sketch of the essentials.

Among the moderns, few writers of ability have turned their thoughts to the subject; and but little has been added, either in respect of matter or of system, to what the ancients have left us. Bacon's "Antitheta," however—the rhetorical commonplaces—are a wonderful specimen of acuteness of thought and pointed conciseness of expression. I have accordingly placed a selection of them in the Appendix.*

It were most unjust in this place to leave unnoticed Dr. Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," a work which has not obtained indeed so high a degree of popular favor as Dr. Blair's once enjoyed, but is incomparably superior to it, not only in depth of thought and ingenious original research, but also in practical utility to the student. The title of Dr. Campbell's work has perhaps deterred many readers, who have concluded it to be more abstruse and less popular in its character than it really is. Amidst much, however, that is readily understood by any moderately intelligent reader, there is much also that calls

* See Appendix, [A.]
for some exertion of thought, which the indolence of most readers refuses to bestow. And it must be owned that he also in some instances perplexes his readers by being perplexed himself, and bewildered in the discussion of questions through which he does not clearly see his way. His great defect, which not only leads him into occasional errors, but leaves many of his best ideas but imperfectly developed, is his ignorance and utter misconception of the nature and object of Logic; on which some remarks are made in my treatise on that science. Rhetoric being in truth an offshoot of Logic, that rhetorician must labor under great disadvantages who is not only ill acquainted with that system, but also utterly unconscious of his deficiency.

§ 3.

From a general view of the history of Rhetoric, two questions naturally suggest themselves, which, on examination, will be found very closely connected together: first, what is the cause of the careful and extensive cultivation, among the ancients, of an art which the moderns have comparatively neglected; and, secondly, whether the former or the latter are to be regarded as the wiser in this respect: in other words, whether Rhetoric be worth any diligent cultivation.

With regard to the first of these questions, the answer generally given is, that the nature of the government in the ancient democratical States caused a demand for public speakers, and for such speakers as should be able to gain influence not only with educated persons in dispassionate deliberation, but with a promiscuous multitude; and, accordingly, it is remarked that the extinction of liberty brought with it, or at least brought after it, the decline of eloquence; as is justly remarked (though in a courtly form) by the author of the dialogue on Oratory which passes under the name of Tacitus: "What need is there of long discourses in the Senate, when the best of its members speedily come to an agreement? or of numerous harangues to the people, when deliberations on public affairs are conducted, not by a multitude of unskilled persons, but by a single individual, and that the wisest?"* 

* "Quid enim opus est longis in Senatu sententiis, cum optimi cito consentiant? quid, multis apud populum conscionibus, cum de republica non imperiti et multi deliberent, sed sapientissimus, et unus?"
The account of the matter is undoubtedly correct as far as it goes; but the importance of public speaking is so great in our own and all other countries that are not under a despotic government, that the apparent neglect of the study of Rhetoric seems to require some further explanation. Part of this explanation may be supplied by the consideration that the difference in this respect between the ancients and ourselves is not so great in reality as in appearance. When the only way of addressing the public was by orations, and when all political measures were debated in popular assemblies, the characters of orator, author, and politician almost entirely coincided: he who would communicate his ideas to the world, or would gain political power, and carry his legislative schemes into effect, was necessarily a speaker; since, as Pericles is made to remark by Thucydides, "one who forms a judgment on any point, but cannot explain himself clearly to the people, might as well have never thought at all on the subject." The consequence was, that almost all who sought and all who professed to give instruction in the principles of government, and the conduct of judicial proceedings, combined these in their minds and in their practice with the study of Rhetoric, which was necessary to give effect to all such attainments; and in time the rhetorical writers (of whom Aristotle makes that complaint) came to consider the science of legislation, and of politics in general, as a part of their own art.

Much therefore of what was formerly studied under the name of Rhetoric, is still, under other names, as generally and as diligently studied as ever. Much of what we now call literature, or "Belles Lettres," was formerly included in what the ancients called rhetorical studies.

It cannot be denied, however, that a great difference, though less, as I have said, than might at first sight appear, does exist between the ancients and the moderns in this point—that what is strictly and properly called Rhetoric, is much less studied, at least less systematically studied, now than formerly. Perhaps this also may be in some measure accounted for from the circumstances which have been just noticed. Such is the distrust excited by any suspicion of rhe-

* Thucydides, Book II. See the Motto.
Disavowal of rhetorical artifice, that every speaker or writer who is anxious to carry his point, endeavors to disown or to keep out of sight any superiority of skill; and wishes to be considered as relying rather on the strength of his cause, and the soundness of his views, than on his ingenuity and expertness as an advocate. Hence it is that even those who have paid the greatest and the most successful attention to the study of composition and of elocution are so far from encouraging others by example or recommendation to engage in the same pursuit, that they labor rather to conceal and disavow their own proficiency; and thus theoretical rules are decried even by those who owe the most to them. Whereas among the ancients, the same cause did not, for the reasons lately mentioned, operate to the same extent; since, however careful any speaker might be to disown the artifices of Rhetoric, properly so called, he would not be ashamed to acknowledge himself, generally, a student or a proficient in an art which was understood to include the elements of political wisdom.

§ 4.

With regard to the other question proposed, viz., concerning the utility of Rhetoric, it is to be observed that it divides itself into two: first, whether oratorical skill be, on the whole, a public benefit or evil; and, secondly, whether any artificial system of rules is conducive to the attainment of that skill.

The former of these questions was eagerly debated among the ancients; on the latter, but little doubt seems to have existed. With us, on the contrary, the state of these questions seems nearly reversed. It seems generally admitted that skill in composition and in speaking, liable as it evidently is to abuse, is to be considered, on the whole, as advantageous to the public, because that liability to abuse is neither in this nor in any other case to be considered as conclusive against the utility of any kind of art, faculty, or profession; because the evil effects of misdirected power require that equal powers should be arrayed on the opposite side; and because truth, having an intrinsic superiority over falsehood, may be expected to prevail when the skill of the contending parties is
equal, which will be the more likely to take place, the more widely such skill is diffused.*

But many, perhaps most persons, are inclined to the opinion that eloquence, either in writing or speaking, is either a natural gift, or, at least, is to be acquired by mere practice, and is not to be attained or improved by any system of rules. And this opinion is favored not least by those (as has been just observed) whose own experience would enable them to decide very differently; and it certainly seems to be in a great degree practically adopted. Most persons, if not left entirely to the disposal of chance in respect of this branch of education, are at least left to acquire what they can by practice, such as school or college-exercises afford, without much care being taken to initiate them systematically into the principles of the art; and that, frequently, not so much from negligence in the conductors of education, as from their doubts of the utility of any such regular system.

It certainly must be admitted, that rules not constructed on broad philosophical principles are more likely to cramp than to assist the operations of our faculties; that a pedantic display of technical skill is more detrimental in this than in any other pursuit, since, by exciting distrust, it counteracts the very purpose of it; that a system of rules imperfectly comprehended, or not familiarized by practice, will (while that continues to be the case) prove rather an impediment than a help—as indeed will be found in all other arts likewise; and that no system can be expected to equalize men whose natural powers are different. But none of these concessions at all invalidate the positions of Aristotle: that some succeed better than others in explaining their opinions, and bringing over others to

* Arist. Rhet., Ch. I.—He might have gone farther; for it will very often happen that, before a popular audience, a greater degree of skill is requisite for maintaining the cause of truth than of falsehood. There are cases in which the arguments which lie most on the surface, and are, to superficial reasoners, the most easily set forth in a plausible form, are those on the wrong side. It is often difficult to a writer, and still more to a speaker, to point out and exhibit in their full strength the delicate distinctions on which truth sometimes de-
them; and that not merely by superiority of natural gifts, but by acquired habit; and that consequently, if we can discover the causes of this superior success—the means by which the desired end is attained by all who do attain it—we shall be in possession of rules capable of general application; which is, says he, the proper office of an art.* Experience so plainly evinced, what indeed we might naturally be led antecedently to conjecture, that a right judgment on any subject is not necessarily accompanied by skill in effecting conviction—nor the ability to discover truth, by a facility in explaining it—that it might be matter of wonder how any doubt should ever have existed as to the possibility of devising, and the utility of employing, a system of rules for "argumentative composition" generally—distinct from any system conversant about the subject-matter of each composition.

I have remarked in the Lectures on Political Economy, (Lect. 9,) that "some persons complain, not altogether without reason, of the prevailing ignorance of facts, relative to this and to many other subjects; and yet it will often be found that the parties censured, though possessed of less knowledge than they ought to have, yet possess more than they know what to do with. Their deficiency in arranging and applying their knowledge, in combining facts, and correctly deducing and employing general principles, shall be greater than their ignorance of facts. Now to attempt remedying this fault by imparting to them additional knowledge—to confer the advantage of wider experience on those who have not the power of profiting by experience—is to attempt enlarging the prospect of a short-sighted man by bringing him to the top of a hill.

"In the tale of Sandford and Merton, where the two boys are described as amusing themselves with building a hovel with their own hands, they lay poles horizontally on the top, and cover them with straw, so as to make a flat roof: of course the rain comes through; and Master Merton then advises to lay on more straw; but Sandford, the more intelligent boy, remarks that as long as the roof is flat, the rain must, sooner or later, soak through; and that the remedy is

* "Οπερ εστὶ τεχνής ἔργον.—Rhet., Book I., chap. i.
INTRODUCTION.

§ 4.]
to make a new arrangement, and form the roof sloping. Now
the idea of enlightening incorrect reasoners by additional
knowledge, is an error similar to that of the flat roof: it is
merely laying on more straw: they ought first to be taught
the right way of raising the roof. Of course knowledge is
necessary; so is straw to thatch the roof; but no quantity
of materials will supply the want of knowing how to build.

"I believe it to be a prevailing fault of the present day,
not indeed to seek too much for knowledge, but to trust to
accumulation of facts as a substitute for accuracy in the logical
processes. Had Bacon lived in the present day, I am inclined
to think he would have made his chief complaint against un-
methodized inquiry and illogical reasoning. Certainly he
would not have complained of Dialectics as corrupting Phi-
losophy. To guard now against the evils prevalent in his
time, would be to fortify a town against battering-rams, in-
stead of against cannon. But it is remarkable that even that
abuse of Dialectics which he complains of, was rather an
error connected with the reasoning process than one arising
from a want of knowledge. Men were led to false conclu-
sions, not through mere ignorance, but from hastily assuming
the correctness of the data they reasoned from, without suf-
ficient grounds. And it is remarkable that the revolution
brought about in Philosophy by Bacon, was not the effect, but
the cause, of increased knowledge of physical facts: it was
not that men were taught to think correctly by having new
phenomena brought to light; but, on the contrary, they dis-
covered new phenomena in consequence of a new system of
philosophizing."

It is probable that the existing prejudices on the present
subject may be traced in great measure to the imperfect or
incorrect notions of some writers, who have either confined
their attention to trifling minutiae of style, or at least have
in some respect failed to take a sufficiently comprehensive
view of the principles of the art. One distinction especially
is to be clearly laid down and carefully borne in mind by
those who would form a correct idea of those principles; viz.,
the distinction already noticed in the "Elements of Logic,"
between an art, and the art. "An art of reasoning" would
imply "a method or system of rules by the observance of
which one may reason correctly;" "the art of reasoning"
would imply a system of rules to which every one does conform (whether knowingly or not) who reasons correctly; and such is Logic, considered as an art.

In like manner, "an art of composition" would imply "a system of rules by which a good composition may be produced;" "the art of composition," "such rules as every good composition must conform to," whether the author of it had them in his mind or not. Of the former character appear to have been (among others) many of the logical and rhetorical systems of Aristotle's predecessors in those departments. He himself evidently takes the other and more philosophical view of both branches: as appears (in the case of Rhetoric) both from the plan he sets out with, that of investigating the causes of the success of all who do succeed in effecting conviction, and from several passages occurring in various parts of his treatise, which indicate how sedulously he was on his guard to conform to that plan. Those who have not attended to the important distinction just alluded to, are often disposed to feel wonder, if not weariness, at his reiterated remarks, that "all men effect persuasion either in this way or in that;" "it is impossible to attain such and such an object in any other way," etc.; which doubtless were intended to remind his readers of the nature of his design; viz., not to teach an art of Rhetoric, but the art: not to instruct them merely how conviction might be produced, but how it must. *

If this distinction were carefully kept in view by the teacher and by the learner of Rhetoric, we should no longer hear complaints of the natural powers being fettered by the formalities of a system; since no such complaint can lie against a system whose rules are drawn from the invariable practice of all who succeed in attaining their proposed object.

No one would expect that the study of Sir Joshua Reynolds's lectures would cramp the genius of the painter. No one complains of the rules of Grammar as fettering language; because it is understood that correct use is not founded on Grammar, but Grammar on correct use. A just system of Logic or of Rhetoric is analogous, in this respect, to Grammar.

* See Appendix, note [AA.]
§ 4.] INTRODUCTION.

One may still, however, sometimes hear—though less now than a few years back—the hackneyed objections against Logic and Rhetoric, and even Grammar also. Cicero has been gravely cited (as Aristotle might have been also, in the passage just above alluded to, in his very treatise on Rhetoric) to testify that rhetorical rules are derived from the practice of oratory, and not vice versa; and that, consequently, there must have been—as there still is—such a thing as a speaker ignorant of those rules. A drayman, we are told, will taunt a comrade by saying, "You're a pretty fellow," without having learned that he is employing the figure called irony; and may employ "will" and "shall" correctly, without being able to explain the principle that guides him. And it might have been added, that perhaps he will go home whistling a tune, though he does not know the name of a note; that he will stir his fire, without knowing that he is employing the first kind of lever;* and that he will set his kettle on it to boil, though ignorant of the theory of caloric, and of all the technical

* It is a curious circumstance, that no longer ago than the early part of the last century, mathematical studies were a common topic of contemptuous ridicule among those ignorant of the subject; just as is the case, to a certain extent, even now, with Logic, (including great part of the matter treated of in this volume,) with Political Economy, and some others. Pope speaks of what he calls "mad Mathesis," as "running round the circle," and "finding it square!" One may find also among the fugitive poetry of his times, descriptions of a mathematician as something between fool and madman. And Swift's Voyage to Laputa evinces his utter contempt for such studies, and likewise his utter ignorance of them. He ridicules the Laputans for having their bread cut into "cycloids," which he conceived to be the name of a solid figure; and he (Newton's contemporary) indicates his conviction that the Aristotelian System of Astronomy was on a level with all others, and that various systems would always be successively coming into fashion and going out again, like modes of dress.

Now the case is altered, as far as regards mathematical pursuits, which are respected even by those not versed in them; but those other sciences above referred to, though studied by a very considerable and daily increasing number, are still sneered at—as was formerly the case with Mathematics—by many of those who have not studied them, (including some mathematicians,) and who know no more of the subject than Swift did of cycloids.
vocabulary of Chemistry. In short, of the two premises requisite for the conclusion contended for, the one about which there can be no possible doubt is dwelt on, and elaborately proved; and the other, which is very disputable, is tacitly assumed. That the systems of Logic, Rhetoric, Grammar, Music, Mechanics, etc., must have been preceded by the practice of speaking, singing, etc., which no one ever did or can doubt, is earnestly insisted on; but that every system of which this can be said must consequently be mere useless trifling, which is at least a paradox, is quietly taken for granted; or, at least, is supposed to be sufficiently established, by repeating, in substance, the poet's remark, that

"—all a rhetorician's rules
But teach him how to name his tools;"

and by observing that, for the most difficult points of all, natural genius and experience must do every thing, and systems of art nothing.

To this latter remark it might have been added, that in no department can systems of art equalize men of different degrees of original ability and of experience; or teach us to accomplish all that is aimed at. No system of agriculture can create land; nor can the art military teach us to produce, like Cadmus, armed soldiers out of the earth; though land, and soldiers, are as essential to the practice of these arts, as the well-known preliminary admonition in the cookery-book, "First take your carp," is to the culinary art. Nor can all the books that ever were written bring to a level with a man of military genius and experience, a person of ordinary ability who has never seen service.

As for the remark about "naming one's tools," which, with fair allowance for poetical exaggeration, may be admitted to be near the truth, it should be remembered, that if an inference be thence drawn of the uselessness of being thus provided with names, we must admit, by parity of reasoning, that it would be no inconvenience to a carpenter, or any other mechanic, to have no names for the several operations of sawing, planing, boring, etc., in which he is habitually engaged, or for the tools with which he performs them; and, in like manner, that it would also be no loss to be without names—
or without precise, appropriate, and brief names—for the various articles of dress and furniture that we use, for the limbs and other bodily organs, and the plants, animals, and other objects around us; in short, that it would be little or no evil to have a language as imperfect as Chinese, or no language at all.

The simple truth is, Technical Terms are a part of Language. Now any portion of one's language that relates to employments and situations foreign from our own, there is little need to be acquainted with. Nautical terms, e.g., it is little loss to a landman to be ignorant of; though, to a sailor, they are as needful as any part of language is to any one. And again, a deficiency in the proper language of some one department, even though one we are not wholly unconcerned in, is not felt as a very heavy inconvenience. But if it were absolutely no disadvantage at all, then it is plain the same might be said of a still further deficiency of a like character; and ultimately we should arrive at the absurdity above noticed, the uselessness of language altogether.

But though this is an absurdity which all would perceive, though none would deny the importance of language, the full extent and real character of that importance is far from being universally understood. There are still (as is remarked in the Logic, Introd., § 5) many—though I believe not near so many as a few years back—who, if questioned on the subject, would answer that the use of language in to communicate our thoughts to each other; and that it is peculiar to man: the truth being that that use of language is not peculiar to man, though enjoyed by him in a much higher degree than by the brutes; while that which does distinguish man from brute, is another, and quite distinct, use of language, viz., as an instrument of thought—a system of general signs, without which the reasoning process could not be conducted. The full importance, consequently, of language, and of precise technical language—of having accurate and well-defined "names for one's tools"—can never be duly appreciated by those who still cling to the theory of "ideas": those imaginary objects of thought in the mind, of which "common terms" are merely the names, and by means of which we are supposed to be able to do what
I am convinced is impossible—to carry on a train of reasoning without the use of language or of any general signs whatever.

But each, in proportion as he the more fully embraces the doctrine of Nominalism, and consequently understands the real character of language, will become the better qualified to estimate the importance of an accurate system of nomenclature.

§ 5.

The chief reason probably for the existing prejudice against technical systems of composition, is to be found in the cramped, meagre, and feeble character of most of such essays, etc., as are avowedly composed according to the rules of any such system. It should be remembered, however, in the first place, that these are almost invariably the productions of learners; it being usual for those who have attained proficiency, either to write without thinking of any rules, or to be desirous, (as has been said,) and, by their increased expertness, able, to conceal their employment of art. Now it is not fair to judge of the value of any system of rules—those of a drawing-master, for instance—from the first awkward sketches of tyros in the art.

Still less would it be fair to judge of one system from the ill success of another, whose rules were framed (as is the case with those ordinarily laid down for the use of students in composition) on narrow, unphilosophical, and erroneous principles.

But the circumstance which has mainly tended to produce the complaint alluded to is, that in this case the reverse takes place of the plan pursued in the learning of other arts; in which it is usual to begin, for the sake of practice, with what is easiest: here, on the contrary, the tyro has usually a harder task assigned him, and one in which he is less likely to succeed, than he will meet with in the actual business of life. For it is undeniable that it is much the most difficult to find either propositions to maintain, or arguments to prove them—to know, in short, what to say, or how to say it—on any subject on which one has hardly any infor-
§ 5.] INTRODUCTION.

mation, and no interest; about which he knows little, and cares still less.

Now the subjects usually proposed for school or college exercises are (to the learners themselves) precisely of this description. And hence it commonly happens, that an exercise composed with diligent care by a young student, though it will have cost him far more pains than a real letter written by him to his friends, on subjects that interest him, will be very greatly inferior to it. On the real occasions of after life, (I mean, when the object proposed is, not to fill up a sheet, a book, or an hour, but to communicate his thoughts, to convince, or persuade,) on these real occasions, for which such exercises were designed to prepare him, he will find that he writes both better, and with more facility, than on the artificial occasion, as it may be called, of composing a declamation—that he has been attempting to learn the easier, by practicing the harder.

But what is worse, it will often happen that such exercises will have formed a habit of stringing together empty commonplaces and vapid declamations—of multiplying words and spreading out the matter thin—of composing in a stiff, artificial, and frigid manner; and that this habit will more or less cling through life to one who has been thus trained, and will infect all his future compositions.

So strongly, it should seem, was Milton impressed with a sense of this danger, that he was led to condemn the use altogether of exercises in composition. In this opinion he stands perhaps alone among all writers on education. I should perhaps agree with him, if there were absolutely no other remedy for the evil in question; for I am inclined to think that this part of education, if conducted as it often is, does in general more harm than good. But I am convinced that practice in composition, both for boys and young men, may be so conducted as to be productive of many and most essential advantages.

The obvious and the only preventive of the evils which I have been speaking of, is a most scrupulous care in the selection of such subjects for exercises as are likely to be interesting to the student, and on which he has (or may, with pleasure, and without much toil,
acquire) sufficient information. Such subjects will of course vary, according to the learner's age and intellectual advancement; but they had better be rather below than much above him; that is, they should never be such as to induce him to string together vague general expressions, conveying no distinct ideas to his own mind, and second-hand sentiments which he does not feel. He may freely transplant indeed from other writers such thoughts as will take root in the soil of his own mind, but he must never be tempted to collect dried specimens. He must also be encouraged to express himself (in correct language indeed, but) in a free, natural, and simple style; which of course implies (considering who and what the writer is supposed to be) such a style as, in itself, would be open to severe criticism, and certainly very unfit to appear in a book.

Compositions on such subjects, and in such a style, would probably be regarded with a disdainful eye, as puerile, by those accustomed to the opposite mode of teaching. But it should be remembered that the compositions of boys must be puerile, in one way or the other; and to a person of unsophisticated and sound taste, the truly contemptible kind of puerility would be found in the other kind of exercises. Look at the letter of an intelligent youth to one of his companions, communicating intelligence of such petty matters as are interesting to both—describing the scenes he has visited, and the recreations he has enjoyed during a vacation; and you will see a picture of the youth himself—boyish indeed in looks and in stature, in dress and in demeanor, but lively, unfettered, natural, giving a fair promise for manhood, and, in short, what a boy should be. Look at a theme composed by the same youth on "Virtus est medium vitiorum," or "Natura beatis omnibus esse dedit," and you will see a picture of the same boy, dressed up in the garb and absurdly aping the demeanor of an elderly man. Our ancestors (and still more recently, I believe, the continental nations) were guilty of the absurdity of dressing up children in wigs, swords, huge buckles, hoops, ruffles, and all the elaborate full-dressed finery of grown-up people of that day.* It is surely reasonable that the analogous absurdity in greater matters also—

* See "Sanford and Merton," passim.
among the rest in that part of education I am speaking of—should be laid aside; and that we should in all points consider what is appropriate to each different period of life.

The subjects for composition to be selected on the principle I am recommending, will generally fall under one of three classes: first, subjects drawn from the studies the learner is engaged in; relating, for instance, to the characters or incidents of any history he may be reading; and sometimes, perhaps, leading him to forestall, by conjecture, something which he will hereafter come to in the book itself; secondly, subjects drawn from any conversation he may have listened to (with interest) from his seniors, whether addressed to himself, or between each other; or, thirdly, relating to the amusements, familiar occurrences, and every-day transactions, which are likely to have formed the topics of easy conversation among his familiar friends. The student should not be confined exclusively to any one of these three classes of subjects: they should be intermingled in as much variety as possible. And the teacher should frequently recall to his own mind these two considerations: first, that since the benefit proposed does not consist in the intrinsic value of the composition, but in the exercise to the pupil's mind, it matters not how insignificant the subject may be, if it will but interest him, and thereby afford him such exercise; secondly, that the younger and backwarder each student is, the more unfit he will be for abstract speculations, and the less remote must be the subjects proposed from those individual objects and occurrences which always form the first beginnings of the furniture of the youthful mind.*

It should be added, as a practical rule for all cases, whether it be an exercise that is written for practice' sake, or a com-

* For some observations relative to the learning of Elocution, see Part IV., chap. ii., § 5, and iv., § 2. See also some valuable remarks on the subject of exercises in composition in Mr. Hill's ingenious work on Public Education. It may be added, that if the teacher will, after pointing out any faults in the learner's exercise, and making him alter or rewrite it, if necessary, then put before him a composition on the same subject written by himself, or by some approved writer, such a practice, if both learner and teacher have patience and industry enough to follow it up, will be likely to produce great improvement.
position on some real occasion, that an outline should be first
drawn out—a skeleton, as it is sometimes called—
of the substance of what is to be said. The
more briefly this is done, so that it does but
exhibit clearly the several heads of the composition, the
better; because it is important that the whole of it be placed
before the eye and the mind in a small compass, and be taken
in as it were at a glance; and it should be written therefore
not in sentences, but like a table of contents. Such an out-
line should not be allowed to fetter the writer, if, in the course
of the actual composition, he find any reason for deviating
from his original plan. It should serve merely as a track to
mark out a path for him, not as a groove to confine him.
But the practice of drawing out such a skeleton will give a
coherence to the composition, a due proportion of its several
parts, and a clear and easy arrangement of them, such as can
rarely be attained if one begins by completing one portion
before thinking of the rest. And it will also be found a most
useful exercise for a beginner to practice—if possible under
the eye of a judicious lecturer—the drawing out of a great
number of such skeletons more than he subsequently fills up;
and likewise to practice the analyzing in the same way the
compositions of another, whether read or heard.

If the system which I have been recommending be pur-
sued, with the addition of sedulous care in correction, en-
couragement from the teacher, and inculcation of such general
rules as each occasion calls for, then, and not otherwise, ex-
ercises in composition will be of the most important and last-
ing advantage; not only in respect of the object immediately
proposed, but in producing clearness of thought, and in giv-
ing play to all the faculties. And if this branch of education
be thus conducted, then, and not otherwise, the greater part
of the present treatise will, it is hoped, be found not much
less adapted to the use of those who are writing for practice’
sake, than of those engaged in meeting the occasions of real life.

§ 6.

One kind of exercise there is—that of Debating Societies
—which ought not to be passed unnoticed, as
different opinions prevail respecting its utility. It is certainly free from the objections which
lie against the ordinary mode of theme-writing; since the subjects discussed are usually such as the speakers do feel a real interest in. On the other hand, it differs from the exercise afforded by the practice of public speaking on the real occasions of life, inasmuch as that which is the proper object of true eloquence—to carry one's point, to convince or persuade, rather than to display ability—is more likely to be lost sight of, when the main object avowedly is to learn to speak well, and to show how well one can speak; not to establish a certain conclusion, or effect the adoption of a certain measure.

It is urged in favor of this kind of exercise, that since in every art a beginner must expect his first essays to be comparatively unsuccessful, a man who has not had this kind of private practice beforehand must learn speaking in the course of actual business, and consequently at the expense of sundry failures in matters of real importance. Compared with those who have learned in Debating Societies, he will be like a soldier entering the field of battle without previous drills and reviews, and beginning to use his weapons and to practice his evolutions for the first time in actual combat.

And there is undoubtedly much weight in this reason. But, on the other hand, it is urged that there are dangers to be apprehended from the very early practice of extemporary speaking, even on occasions of real business; dangers which are of course enhanced, where it is not real business that the speaker is occupied with.

When young men's faculties are in an immature state, and their knowledge scanty, crude, and imperfectly arranged, if they are prematurely hurried into a habit of fluent elocution, they are likely to retain through life a careless facility of pouring forth ill-digested thoughts in well-turned phrases, and an aversion to cautious reflection. For when a man has acquired that habit of ready extemporaneous speaking which consists in thinking extempore, both his indolence and self-confidence will indispose him for the toil of carefully preparing his matter, and of forming for himself, by practice in writing, a precise and truly energetic style; and he will have been qualifying himself only for the "lion's part" in the in-
terlude of Pyramus and Thisbe.* On the other hand, a want of readiness of expression, in a man of well-disciplined mind, who has attentively studied his subject, is a fault much more curable by practice, even late in life, than the opposite.

In reference to this subject, I cannot refrain from citing some valuable remarks from an article in the "Edinburgh Review.†"

"... A politician must often talk and act before he has thought and read. He may be very ill-informed respecting a question; all his notions about it may be vague and inaccurate; but speak he must; and if he is a man of talents, of tact, and of intrepidity, he soon finds that, even under such circumstances, it is possible to speak successfully. He finds that there is a great difference between the effect of written words, which are perused and reperused in the stillness of the closet, and the effect of spoken words which, set off by the graces of utterance and gesture, vibrate for a single moment on the ear. He finds that he may blunder without much chance of being detected, that he may reason sophistically, and escape unrefuted. He finds that, even on knotty questions of trade and legislation, he can, without reading ten pages or thinking ten minutes, draw forth loud plaudits, and sit down with the credit of having made an excellent speech. Lysias, says Plutarch, wrote a defence for a man who was to be tried before one of the Athenian tribunals. Long before the defendant had learned the speech by heart, he became so much dissatisfied with it that he went in great distress to the author. 'I was delighted with your speech the first time I read it; but I liked it less the second time, and still less the third time; and now it seems to me to be no defence at all.' 'My good friend,' said Lysias, 'you quite forget that the judges are to hear it only once.' The case is the same in the English parliament. It would be as idle in an orator to waste deep meditation and long research on his speeches, as it would be in the manager of a theatre to adorn all the crowd of courtiers and ladies who cross over the stage

* "Snug.—Have you the lion's part written? Pray you, if it be, give it me; for I am slow of study.

"Quince.—You may do it extempore; for it is nothing but roaring."—Midsummer Night's Dream.

† April, 1839.
in a procession with real pearls and diamonds. It is not by accuracy or profundity that men become the masters of great assemblies. And why be at the charge of providing logic of the best quality, when a very inferior article will be equally acceptable? Why go as deep into a question, as Burke, only in order to be, like Burke, coughed down, or left speaking to green benches and red boxes? This has long appeared to us to be the most serious of the evils which are to be set off against the many blessings of popular government. It is a fine and true saying of Bacon, that reading makes a full man, talking a ready man, and writing an exact man. The tendency of institutions like those of England is to encourage readiness in public men, at the expense both of fulness and of exactness. The keepest and most vigorous minds of every generation, minds often admirably fitted for the investigation of truth, are habitually employed in producing arguments such as no man of sense would ever put into a treatise intended for publication, arguments which are just good enough to be used once, when aided by fluent delivery and pointed language. The habit of discussing questions in this way necessarily reacts on the intellects of our ablest men; particularly of those who are introduced into parliament at a very early age, before their minds have expanded to full maturity. The talent for debate is developed in such men to a degree which, to the multitude, seems as marvellous as the performances of an Italian improvisatore. But they are fortunate indeed if they retain unimpaired the faculties which are required for close reasoning or for enlarged speculation. Indeed, we should sooner expect a great original work on political science, such a work, for example, as the *Wealth of Nations,* from an apothecary in a country town, or from a minister in the Hebrides, than from a statesman who, ever since he was one-and-twenty, had been a distinguished debater in the House of Commons."

It may be said, however, in reference to the above remarks, that they do not prove any thing against the beneficial effects, with a view to oratorical excellence, (which is the point now in question,) of early practice in extemporary speaking, and, accordingly, of that afforded by Debating Societies. This excellence may indeed, we will suppose, be purchased at the
expense of impairing the philosophical powers, and, on the whole, deteriorating the mind; but the present question is as to the mere improvement of oratory. I will not indeed undertake to say that a man may not obtain an earlier—perhaps even a greater—proficiency in public speaking (especially with a view to immediate effect) by sacrificing to that object every other. But I doubt whether the advantage to be gained, even at such a cost, is not sometimes itself overrated. One speaker may have over another, who is a sounder reasoner and a man of more generally well-cultivated mind, an advantage more apparent than real; he may excite more admiration and be received with greater present applause, and yet may produce less conviction and less of permanent influence: the words of the other may sink deeper. And again, a showy and fluent but superficial orator, who may seem at the moment to be carrying every thing before him triumphantly, may be answered by those capable of discerning and exposing any weakness in his arguments. Moreover, that which will "only bear to be heard once," may subsequently be read over calmly, and its emptiness detected. There are, in short, but few cases in which accurate and well-digested knowledge, sound judgment, and clear and well-arranged arguments, will not have great weight, even when opposed by more showy but unsubstantial qualifications.

Although, however, I am convinced that an early-acquired habit of empty fluency is adverse to a man's success as an orator, I will not undertake to say that, as an orator, his attaining the very highest degree of success will be the more likely, from his possessing the most philosophical mind, trained to the most scrupulous accuracy of investigation. Inestimable in other respects as such an endowment is, and certainly compatible with very great eloquence, I doubt whether the highest degree of it is compatible with the highest degree of general oratorical power. If at least that man is to be accounted the most perfect orator who (as Cicero lays down) can speak the best and most persuasively on any question whatever that may arise, it may fairly be doubted whether a first-rate man can be a first-rate orator. He may indeed speak admirably in a matter he has well considered; but when any new subject or new point is started in the course of a debate, though he may take a juster view of it at the
first glance, on the exigency of the moment, than any one else could, he will not fail—as a man of more superficial cleverness would—to perceive how impossible it must be to do full justice to a subject demanding more reflection and inquiry; nor can he, therefore, place himself fully on a level, in such a case, with one of shallower mind, who being in all cases less able to look beneath the surface of things, obtains at the first glance the best view he can take of any subject, and therefore can display, without any need of artifice, that easy, unembarrassed confidence which can never be, with equal effect, assumed. To speak perfectly well, in short, a man must feel that he has got to the bottom of the subject; and to feel this on occasions where, from the nature of the case, it is impossible he really can have done so, is inconsistent with the character of great profundity.

Moreover, a person who is a little, and not very much, beyond the generality, will often be able to devise new and striking arguments in defence of popular errors, though not to perceive that they are errors; and will have just sufficient ingenuity to frame plausible sophisms, and to express them forcibly, though not to detect them. And this—which will often conduce to his present success at least—he will be likely to do with an air of natural earnestness which it would have been hardly possible to put on, supposing him aware of the unsoundness of what he is saying. When Hervey, the discoverer of the circulation, (by which he lost much of his practice,) was decried by the medical world, those doubtless argued best against him who really disbelieved his discovery. And when Dean Tucker first pointed out that the separation of our American Colonies would be no loss to the empire—for which he was universally derided, though now and for the last half century the correctness of his view is universally admitted—the great orators of his day doubtless argued against him all the better from being themselves partakers of the general delusion.

To return to the practical question respecting Debating Societies, it would appear, on balancing together what can be said for and against them, that the advantages they hold out, though neither unreal nor inconsiderable, are not unattended by considerable dangers, which should be very carefully
guarded against, lest more evil than good should be the result.

An early introduction to this kind of practice is especially to be deprecated, for the reasons above stated; and it should be preceded not only by general cultivation of the mind, but also by much practice in writing; if possible under the guidance of a competent instructor: an exercise which it is also most desirable not to discontinue when the practice of speaking extemporé is commenced. And the substance of what is to be spoken on each occasion should be, after reflection, written down; not in the words designed to be uttered, (for that would, instead of a help towards the habit of framing expressions extemporé, prove an embarrassment,) but in brief heads, forming such an outline as in the preceding section has been recommended; that as little as possible be left for the speaker to frame at the moment except the mere expressions. By degrees, when practice shall have produced greater self-possession and readiness, a less and less full outline—previously written down will suffice; and in time the habit will be generated of occasionally even forming correct judgments, and sound and well-expressed arguments, on the spur of the moment.

But a premature readiness is more likely than the opposite extreme to lead to incurable faults. And all the dangers that attend this kind of exercise, the learner who is engaged in it should frequently recall to his mind and reflect on, that he may the better guard against them; never allowing himself, in one of these mock-debates, to maintain any thing that he himself believes to be untrue, or to use an argument which he perceives to be fallacious.

The temptation to transgress this rule will often be very strong; because, to such persons as usually form the majority in one of those societies—youths of immature judgment, superficial, and half-educated—specious falsehood and sophistry will often appear superior to truth and sound reasoning, and will call forth louder plaudits; and the wrong side of a question will often afford room for such a captivating show of ingenuity, as to be, to them, more easily maintained than the right. And scruples of conscience, relative to veracity and fairness, are not unlikely to be silenced by the consideration that after all it is no real battle, but a tournament;
there being no real and important measure to be actually decided on, but only a debate carried on for practice's sake.

But unreal as is the occasion, and insignificant as may be the particular point, a habit may be formed which will not easily be unlearned afterwards, of disregarding right reason, and truth, and fair argument. And such a habit is not merely debasing to the moral character, but also, in a rhetorical point of view, if I may so speak, often proves hurtful. It has often weakened the effect, to a far greater degree than most persons suppose, of what has been written and said by men of great ability; by depriving it of that air of simple truthfulness which has so winning a force, and which it is so impossible completely to feign.
PART I.

OF THE INVENTION, ARRANGEMENT, AND INTRODUCTION
OF PROPOSITIONS AND ARGUMENTS.

CHAPTER I.

OF PROPOSITIONS.

§ 1.

It was remarked in the treatise on Logic, that in the process of investigation, properly so called, viz., that by which we endeavor to discover truth, it must of course be uncertain to him who is entering on that process, what the conclusion will be to which his researches will lead; but that in the process of conveying truth to others by reasoning, (i.e., in what may be termed, according to the view I have at present taken, the rhetorical process,) the conclusion or conclusions which are to be established must be present to the mind of him who is conducting the argument, and whose business is to find proofs of a given proposition.

It is evident, therefore, that the first step to be taken by him, is to lay down distinctly in his own mind the proposition or propositions to be proved. It might indeed at first sight appear superfluous even to mention so obvious a rule; but experience shows that it is by no means uncommon for a young or ill-instructed writer to content himself with such a vague and indistinct view of the point he is to aim at, that the whole train of his reasoning is in consequence affected with a corresponding perplexity, obscurity, and looseness. It may be worth while, therefore, to give
some hints for the conduct of this preliminary process—the choice of propositions. Not, of course, that I am supposing the author to be in doubt what opinion he shall adopt; the process of investigation* (which does not fall within the province of Rhetoric) being supposed to be concluded; but still there will often be room for deliberation as to the form in which an opinion shall be stated, and, when several propositions are to be maintained, in what order they shall be placed.

On this head, therefore, I shall proceed to propose some rules; after having premised (in order to anticipate some objections or doubts which might arise) one remark relative to the object to be effected. This is, of course, what may be called, in the widest sense of the word, conviction; but under that term are comprehended, first, what is strictly called instruction; and, secondly, conviction in the narrower sense; i.e., the conviction of those who are either of a contrary opinion to the one maintained, or who are in doubt whether to admit or deny it. By instruction, on the other hand, is commonly meant the conviction of those who have neither formed an opinion on the subject, nor are deliberating whether to adopt or reject the proposition in question, but are merely desirous of ascertaining what is the truth in respect of the case before them. The former are supposed to have before their minds the terms of the proposition maintained, and are called upon to consider whether that particular proposition be true or false: the latter are not supposed to know the terms of the conclusion, but to be inquiring what proposition is to be received as true. The former may be described, in logical language, as doubting respecting the copula; the latter, respecting the predicate. It is evident that the speaker or writer is, relatively to these last, (though not to himself,) conducting a process of investigation; as is plain from what has been said of that subject in the treatise on Logic.

The distinction between these two objects gives rise in some points to corresponding differences in the mode of procedure, which will be noticed hereafter; these differences, however, are not sufficient to require that Rhetoric should on

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* Logic, Book IV., chap. iii., § 2.
that account be divided into two distinct branches; since, generally speaking, though not universally, the same rules will be serviceable for attaining each of these objects.

§ 2.

The first step is, as I have observed, to lay down (in the author's mind) the proposition or propositions to be maintained, clearly, and in a suitable form.

He who strictly observes this rule, and who is thus brought to view steadily the point he is aiming at, will be kept clear, in a great degree, of some common faults of young writers; viz., entering on too wide a field of discussion, and introducing many propositions not sufficiently connected; an error which destroys the unity of the composition.

This last error those are apt to fall into who place before themselves a term instead of a proposition; and imagine that because they are treating of one thing, they are discussing one question. In an ethical work, for instance, one may be treating of virtue, while discussing all or any of these questions: "Wherein virtue consists?" "Whence our notions of it arise?" "Whence it derives its obligations?" etc.; but if these questions were confusedly blended together, or if all of them were treated of, within a short compass, the most just remarks and forcible arguments would lose their interest and their utility, in so perplexed a composition.

Nearly akin to this fault is the other just mentioned, that of entering on too wide a field for the length of the work; by which means the writer is confined to barren and uninteresting generalities; as, e. g., general exhortations to virtue (conveyed, of course, in very general terms) in the space of a discourse only of sufficient length to give a characteristic description of some one branch of duty, or of some one particular motive to the practice of it. Unpracticed composers are apt to fancy that they shall have the greater abundance of matter, the wider extent of subject they comprehend; but experience shows that the reverse is the fact: the more general and extensive view will often suggest nothing to the mind but vague and trite remarks; when, upon narrowing the field of discus-
sion, many interesting questions of detail present themselves. Now a writer who is accustomed to state to himself precisely, in the first instance, the conclusions to which he is tending, will be the less likely to content himself with such as consist of very general statements; and will often be led, even where an extensive view is at first proposed, to distribute it into several branches, and, waiving the discussion of the rest, to limit himself to the full development of one or two; and thus applying, as it were, a microscope to a small space, will present to the view much that a wider survey would not have exhibited.

§ 3.

It may be useful for one who is about thus to lay down his propositions, to ask himself three questions: first, What is the fact? secondly, Why* (i.e., from what cause) is it so? or, in other words, How is it accounted for? and thirdly, What consequence results from it?

The last two of these questions, though they will not in every case suggest such answers as are strictly to be called the cause and the consequence of the principal truth to be maintained, may, at least, often furnish such propositions as bear a somewhat similar relation to it.

It is to be observed, that in recommending the writer to begin by laying down in his own mind the propositions to be maintained, it is not meant to be implied that they are always to be stated first: that will depend upon the nature of the case; and rules will hereafter be given on that point.

It is to be observed, also, that by the word "proposition" or "assertion," throughout this treatise, is to be understood some conclusion to be established for itself; not with a view to an ulterior conclusion: those propositions which are intended to serve as premises being called, in allowable conformity with popular usage, arguments; it being customary to argue in the enthymematic form, and to call, for brevity's sake, the expressed premises of an enthymeme, the argument by which the conclusion of it is proved.†

* See Logic. Appendix, Article "Why."
† Logic, Book 1, § 2.
CHAPTER II.

OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 1.

The finding of suitable arguments to prove a given point, and the skilful arrangement of them, may be considered as the immediate and proper province of Rhetoric, and of that alone.*

The business of Logic is, as Cicero complains, to judge of arguments, not to invent them: ("In inveniendis argumentis muta nimium est; in judicandis, nimium loquax.")† The knowledge, again, in each case, of the subject in hand is essential; but it is evidently borrowed from the science or system conversant about that subject-matter, whether Politics, Theology, Law, Ethics, or any other. The art of addressing the feelings, again, does not belong exclusively to Rhetoric; since Poetry has at least as much to do with that branch. Nor are the considerations relative to style and elocution confined to argumentative and persuasive compositions. The art of inventing and arranging arguments is, as has been said, the only province that Rhetoric can claim entirely and exclusively.

Arguments are divided according to several different principles: i.e., logically speaking, there are several divisions of them. And these cross-divisions have proved a source of endless perplexity to the

* Aristotle's division of persuasives into "artificial" and "inartificial," (ἐντεχνοῦ and ἀτεχνοῦ) including under the latter head, "witnesses, laws, contracts, etc.," is strangely unphilosophical. The one class, he says, the orator is to make use of; the other, to devise. But it is evident that, in all cases alike, the data we argue from must be something already existing, and which we are not to make, but to use; and that the arguments derived from these data are the work of art. Whether these data are general maxims or particular testimony—laws of nature, or laws of the land—makes, in this respect, no difference.
† Cic. de Orat.
logical and rhetorical student, because there is perhaps no writer on either subject that has been aware of their character. Hardly any thing perhaps has contributed so much to lessen the interest and the utility of systems of Rhetoric as the indistinctness hence resulting. When in any subject the members of a division are not opposed, [contradistinguished,] but are in fact members of different divisions, crossing each other, it is manifestly impossible to obtain any clear notion of the species treated of; nor will any labor or ingenuity bestowed on the subject be of the least avail, till the original source of perplexity is removed; till, in short, the cross-division is detected and explained.

Arguments then may be divided,
First, into irregular and regular, i. e., syllogisms; these last into categorical and hypothetical; and the categorical, into syllogisms in the first figure, and in the other figures, etc., etc.

Secondly, They are frequently divided into "probable," [or "moral,"] and "demonstrative," [or "necessary."]
Thirdly, into the "direct" and the "indirect;" [or reduc-tio ad absurdum]—the deictic, and the elenctic, of Aristotle.
Fourthly, into arguments from "example," from "testimony," from "cause to effect," from "analogy," etc., etc.

It will be perceived, on attentive examination, that several of the different species just mentioned will occasionally contain each other: e. g., a probable argument may be at the same time a categorical argument, a direct argument, and an argument from testimony, etc.; this being the consequence of arguments having been divided on several different principles; a circumstance so obvious the moment it is distinctly stated, that I apprehend such of my readers as have not been conversant in these studies will hardly be disposed to believe that it could have been (as is the fact) generally overlooked, and that eminent writers should in consequence have been involved in inextricable confusion. I need only remind them, however, of the anecdote of Columbus breaking the egg. That which is perfectly obvious to any man of common sense, as soon as it is mentioned, may nevertheless fail to occur, even to men of considerable ingenuity.

It will also be readily perceived, on examining the principles of these several divisions, that the last of them alone
is properly and strictly a division of arguments as such. The first is evidently a division of the forms of stating them; for every one would allow that the same argument may be either stated as an enthymeme, or brought into the strict syllogistic form, and that either categorically or hypothetically, etc.: e.g., "Whatever has a beginning has a cause: the earth had a beginning; therefore it had a cause; or, If the earth had a beginning, it had a cause: it had a beginning," etc., every one would call the same argument, differently stated. This, therefore, evidently is not a division of arguments as such.

The second is plainly a division of arguments according to their subject-matter, whether necessary or probable, [certain or uncertain.] In Mathematics, e.g., every proposition that can be stated is either an immutable truth, or an absurdity and self-contradiction; while in human affairs the propositions which we assume are only true for the most part, and as general rules; and in Physics, though they must be true as long as the laws of nature remain undisturbed, the contradiction of them does not imply an absurdity; and the conclusions, of course, in each case, have the same degree and kind of certainty with the premises. This therefore is properly a division, not of arguments as such, but of the propositions of which they consist.

The third is a division of arguments according to the purpose for which they are employed; according to the intention of the reasoner; whether that be to establish "directly" [or "ostensively"] the conclusion drawn, or ["indirectly"] by means of an absurd conclusion to disprove one of the premises; (i.e., to prove its contradictory;) since the alternative proposed in every valid argument is, either to admit the conclusion, or to deny one of the premises. Now it may so happen that in some cases one person will choose the former, and another the latter, of these alternatives. It is probable, e.g., that many have been induced to admit the doctrine of transubstantiation, from its clear connection with the infallibility of the Romish Church; and many others, by the very same argument, have surrendered their belief in that infallibility. Again, Berkeley and Reid seem to have alike admitted that
the non-existence of matter was a necessary consequence of Locke's Theory of Ideas; but the former was hence led, bona fide, to admit and advocate that non-existence; while the latter was led by the very same argument to reject the ideal theory. Thus, we see it possible for the very same argument to be direct to one person, and indirect to another; leading them to different results, according as they judge the original conclusion, or the contradictory of a premiss, to be the more probable. This, therefore, is not properly a division of the purposes for which they are on each occasion employed.

The fourth, which alone is properly a division of arguments as such, and accordingly will be principally treated of, is a division according to the ‘relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion.’ I say, ‘of the subject-matter,’ because the logical connection between the premises and conclusion is independent of the meaning of the terms employed, and may be exhibited with letters of the alphabet substituted for the terms; but the relation I am now speaking of between the premises and conclusion, (and the varieties of which form the several species of arguments,) is in respect of their subject-matter: as, e.g., an ‘argument from cause to effect’ is so called and considered in reference to the relation existing between the premis, which is the cause, and the conclusion, which is the effect; and an ‘argument from example,’ in like manner, from the relation between a known and an unknown instance, both belonging to the same class. And it is plain that the present division, though it has a reference to the subject-matter of the premises, is yet not a division of propositions considered by themselves, (as in the case with the division into ‘probable’ and ‘demonstrative,’) but of arguments considered as such; for when we say, e.g., that the premiss is a cause, and the conclusion the effect, these expressions are evidently relative, and have no meaning, except in reference to each other; and so also when we say that the premiss and the conclusion are two parallel cases, that very expression denotes their relation to each other.

In the annexed Table I have sketched an outline of the several divisions of arguments here treated of.
Arguments are divided according to

the form in which they are stated, into

irregular syllogisms,

categorical, hypothetical,

their subject-matter, the intention of the person who adduces them, into

necessary, probable or moral. direct, indirect, or reductio ad absurdum.

the relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion:

a priori; viz., such an argument that the premiss would account for the conclusion were that conclusion granted.

arguments whose premises could not have been used to account for the conclusion:

sign. induction or example.

etc., etc., etc. etc.
§ 2.

In distributing, then, the several kinds of arguments, according to this division, it will be found convenient to lay down first two great classes, under one or other of which all can be brought: viz., first, such arguments as might have been employed—not as arguments, but—to account for the fact or principle maintained, supposing its truth granted: secondly, such as could not be so employed. The former class (to which in this treatise the name "à priori" argument will be confined) is manifestly argument from cause to effect; since to account for any thing, signifies, to assign the cause of it. The other class, of course, comprehends all other arguments; of which there are several kinds, which will be mentioned hereafter.

The two sorts of proof which have been just spoken of, Aristotle seems to have intended to designate by the titles of ὁδὸς for the latter, and διὸς for the former; but he has not been so clear as could be wished in observing the distinction between them. The only decisive test by which to distinguish the arguments which belong to the one and to the other of these classes is, to ask the question, "Supposing the proposition in question to be admitted, would this statement here used as an argument serve to account for and explain the truth, or not?" It will then be readily referred to the former or to the latter class, according as the answer is in the affirmative or the negative; as, e. g., if a murder were imputed to any one on the grounds of his "having a hatred to the deceased, and an interest in his death," the argument would belong to the former class; because, supposing his guilt to be admitted, and an inquiry to be made how he can commit the murder, the circumstances just mentioned would serve to account for it; but not so with respect to such an argument as his "having blood on his clothes;" which would therefore be referred to the other class.

And here let it be observed, once for all, that when I speak of arguing from cause to effect, it is not intended to maintain the real and proper efficacy of what are called physical causes to produce their respective effects, nor to enter into any discussion of the controversies which have been raised on that point, which would be foreign from the present pur-
pose. The word "cause," therefore, is to be understood as employed in the popular sense; as well as the phrase of "accounting for" any fact.

As far, then, as any cause, popularly speaking, has a tendency to produce a certain effect, so far its existence is an argument for that of the effect. If the cause be fully sufficient, and no impediments intervene, the effect in question follows certainly; and the nearer we approach to this, the stronger the argument.

This is the kind of argument which produces (when short of absolute certainty) that species of the probable which is usually called the "plausible." On this subject, Dr. Campbell has some valuable remarks in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," (Book I, § 5, ch. vii.) though he had been led into a good deal of perplexity, partly by not having logically analyzed the two species of probabilities he is treating of, and partly by departing, unnecessarily, from the ordinary use of terms, in treating of the plausible as something distinct from the probable, instead of regarding it as a species of probability.*

This is the chief kind of probability which poets or other writers of fiction aim at; and in such works it is often designated by the term "natural."† Writers of this class, as

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* I do not mean, however, that every thing to which the term "plausible" would apply, would be in strict propriety called "probable;" as, e. g., if we had fully ascertained some story that had been told us to be an imposition, we might still say, it was a "plausible" tale; though, subsequent to the detection, the word "probable" would not be so properly applied. But certainly common usage warrants the use of "probable" in many cases, on the ground of this plausibility alone; viz., the adequacy of some cause known, or likely to exist, to produce the effect in question. I could have wished that there had been some other word to designate what I have called, after Dr. Campbell’s example, the "plausible," because it sometimes suggests the idea of "untrue." But "likely," which, according to etymology, ought to be the suitable term, is often used to denote the "probable," generally.

When, however, we have clearly defined the technical sense in which we propose to employ a certain term, it may fairly be so taken, even though not invariably bearing that sense in common usage.

† It is also important for them, though not so essential, to keep clear of the improbable air produced by the introduction of events, which, though not unnatural, have a great preponderance of chances
they aim not at producing belief, are allowed to take their "causes" for granted, i. e., to assume any hypothesis they please, provided they make the effects follow naturally; representing, that is, the personages of the fiction as acting, and the events as resulting, in the same manner as might have been expected, supposing the assumed circumstances to have been real.* And hence the great father of criticism establishes his paradoxical maxim, that impossibilities which appear probable, are to be preferred to possibilities which appear improbable. For, as he justly observes, the impossibility of the hypothesis, as, e. g., in Homer, the familiar intercourse of gods with mortals, is no bar to the kind of probability (i. e., verisimilitude) required, if those mortals are represented as acting in the manner men naturally would have done under those circumstances.

The probability, then, which the writers of fiction aim at, has, for the reason just mentioned, no tendency to produce a particular, but only a general, belief; i. e., not that these particular events actually took place, but that such are likely, generally, to take place under such circumstances:† this kind of belief (unconsciously entertained) being necessary, and all that is necessary, to produce that sympathetic feeling which is the writer's object. In argumentative compositions, however, as the object of course is to produce conviction as to the particular point in question, the causes from which our arguments are drawn must be such as are either admitted, or may be proved, to be actually existing, or likely to exist.

It is worthy of remark, in reference to this kind of probability—the "plausible" or "natural"—that men are apt to judge amiss of situations, persons, and circumstances, concerning which they have no exact knowledge, by applying to these the measure of their own feelings and experience:‡ the result of which is, that a cor-

* For some remarks on this point, see the preface to a late (purified) edition of the "Tales of the Genii."

† On which ground Aristotle contends that the end of fiction is more philosophical than that of history, since it aims at general, instead of particular, truth.

‡ See Part II., ch. ii., § 2.
rect account of these will often appear to them unnatural, and an erroneous one natural. E. g.: A person born with the usual endowments of the senses, is apt to attribute to the blind-born, and the deaf-mutes, such habits of thought and such a state of mind as his own would be, if he were to become deaf or blind, or to be left in the dark; which would be very wide of the truth. That a man born blind would not, on obtaining sight, know apart, on seeing them, a ball and a cube, which he had been accustomed to handle, nor distinguish the dog from the cat, would appear to most persons unacquainted with the result of experiments, much less "natural" than the reverse.* So it is also with those brought up free, in reference to the feelings and habits of thought of born-slaves;† with civilized men, in reference to savages;‡ and of men living in society, in reference to one who passes whole years in total solitude. I have no doubt that the admirable fiction of Robinson Crusoe would have been not only much less amusing, but to most readers less apparently natural, if Friday and the other savages had been represented with the indocility and other qualities which really belong to such beings as the Brazilian cannibals; and if the hero himself had been represented with that half-brutish apathetic despondency, and carelessness about all comforts demanding steady exertion, which are the really natural results of a life of utter solitude; and if he had been described as almost losing the use of his own language, instead of remembering the Spanish.

Again, I remember mentioning to a very intelligent man

* See an account, in a note to the First Series of Essays, of a blind youth couched by Mr. Cheselden.
† This has, in various ways, proved an obstacle to the abolition of slavery. It has also caused great difficulty to some readers of the Book of Exodus.
‡ In the Fifth Lecture on Political Economy (an extract from which is subjoined in the Appendix, Note C,) I have noticed the descriptions usually given of the origin of civilization, which are generally received as perfectly natural, though they are, as I have shown, such as never were or can be realized. I mean in the English, not in the American sense of the word "realize." To realize a scheme, etc., means, with us, to make it "real," to "carry into effect;" with the Americans it means to "form a strong and vivid conception of it." I acknowledge the want, in our language, of a single word adequately expressing this; but circumlocution is better than ambiguity.
the description given by the earliest missionaries to New Zealand of their introduction of the culture of wheat; which he derided as an absurd fabrication, but which appeared to me what might have been reasonably conjectured. The savages were familiar with bread, in the form of ship-biscuit; and accordingly, roots being alone cultivated by them, and furnishing their chief food, they expected to find at the roots of the wheat, tubers which could be made into biscuits. They accordingly dug up the wheat; and were mortified at the failure of their hopes. The idea of collecting small seeds, pulverizing these, and making the powder into a paste which was to be hardened by fire, was quite foreign from all their experience. Yet here, an unnatural representation would, to many, have appeared the more natural.

Much pains, therefore, must in many cases be taken in giving such explanations as may put men on their guard against this kind of mistake, and enable them to see the improbability, and sometimes utter impossibility, of what at the first glance they will be apt to regard as perfectly natural; and to satisfy them that something which they were disposed to regard as extravagantly unnatural, is just what might have been reasonably anticipated.

One way in which the unnatural is often made to appear, for a time, natural, is by giving a lively and striking description which is correct in its several parts, and unnatural only when these are combined into a whole: like a painter who should give an exact picture of an English country-house, of a grove of palm-trees, an elephant, and an iceberg, all in the same landscape. Thus, a vivid representation of a den of infamy and degradation, and of an ingenious and well-disposed youth, may each be, in itself, so natural, as to draw off, for a time, the attention from the absurdity of making the one arise out of the other.

On the appropriate use of the kind of argument now before us, (which is probably the εἰκώς of Aristotle, though unfortunately he has not furnished any example of it,) some rules will be laid down hereafter; my object at present having been merely to ascertain the nature of it. And here it may be worth while to remark, that though I have applied to this mode of reasoning the title of "à priori," it is not meant to be
maintained that all such arguments as have been by other writers so designated correspond precisely with what has been just described.* The phrase, "à priori" argument, is not indeed employed by all in the same sense; it would, however, generally be understood to extend to any argument drawn from an antecedent or forerunner, whether a cause or not: e.g., "The mercury sinks, therefore it will rain." Now this argument being drawn from a circumstance which, though an antecedent, is in no sense a cause, would fall not under the former, but the latter, of the classes laid down; since when rain comes, no one would account for the phenomenon by the falling of the mercury; which they would call a sign of rain; and yet most, perhaps, would class this among "à priori" arguments. In like manner, the expression "à posteriori" arguments would not in its ordinary use coincide precisely, though it would very nearly, with the second class of arguments.

The division, however, which has here been adopted, appears to be both more philosophical and also more precise, and consequently more practically useful, than any other; since there is so easy and decisive a test by which an argument may be at once referred to the one or to the other of the classes described.

* Some students, accordingly, partly with a view to keep clear of any ambiguity that might hence arise, and partly for the sake of brevity, have found it useful to adopt, in drawing up an outline or analysis of any composition, certain arbitrary symbols, to denote respectively, each class of arguments and of propositions: viz., A, for the former of the two classes of arguments just described, (to denote "à priori," or "antecedent," probability,) and B, for the latter, which, as consisting of several different kinds, may be denominated "the body of evidence." Again, they designate the proposition, which accounts for the principal and original assertion, by a small "a," or Greek a, to denote its identity in substance with the argument bearing the symbol "A," though employed for a different purpose; viz., not to establish a fact that is doubtful, but to account for one that is admitted. The proposition, again, which results as a consequence or corollary from the principal one, they designate by the symbol C. There seems to be the same convenience in the use of these symbols as logicians have found in the employment of A, E, I, O, to represent the four kinds of propositions according to quantity and quality.
§ 3.

The second, then, of these classes, (viz., "arguments drawn from such topics as could not be used to account for the fact, etc., in question, supposing it granted," ) may be subdivided into two kinds; which will be designated by the terms "sign" and "example."

By "sign" (so called from the Σημεῖον of Aristotle) is meant what may be described as an "argument from an effect to a condition"—a species of argument of which the analysis is as follows: As far as any circumstance is what may be called a condition of the existence of a certain effect or phenomenon, so far it may be inferred from the existence of that effect: if it be a condition absolutely essential, the argument is, of course, demonstrative; and the probability is the stronger in proportion as we approach to that case.*

Of this kind is the argument in the instance lately given: A man is suspected as the perpetrator of the supposed murder, from the circumstance of his clothes being bloody; the murder being considered as in a certain degree a probable condition of that appearance: i.e., it is presumed that his clothes would not otherwise have been bloody. Again, from the appearance of ice, we infer, decidedly, the existence of a temperature not above freezing-point; that temperature being an essential condition of the crystallization of water.

Among the circumstances which are conditional to any effect, must evidently come the cause or causes; and if there be only one possible cause, this being absolutely essential, may be demonstratively proved from the effect: if the same effect might result from other causes, then the argument is, at best, but probable. But it is to be observed that there are also many circumstances which have no tendency to produce a certain effect, though it cannot exist without them, and from which effect, consequently, they may be inferred, as conditions, though not causes: e.g., a man's being "alive one day," is

* To this head we may refer all mathematical reasoning. Every property, e.g., of a triangle, may be regarded as a "condition" of the supposition that a "triangle" is what is defined. A figure would not be a triangle unless its angles were equal to two right angles, etc.
a circumstance necessary, as a condition, to his "dying the next;" but has no tendency to produce it; his having been alive, therefore, on the former day, may be proved from his subsequent death, but not vice versa.*

It is to be observed, therefore, that though it is very common for the cause to be proved from its effect, it is never so proved, so far forth as it is a cause, but so far forth as it is a condition, or necessary circumstance.

A cause, again, may be employed to prove an effect, (this being the first class of arguments already described,) so far as it has a tendency to produce the effect, even though it be not at all necessary to it; (i. e., when other causes may produce the same effect;) and in this case, though the effect may be inferred from the cause, the cause cannot be inferred from the effect: e. g., from a mortal wound you may infer death; but not vice versa.

Lastly, when a cause is also a necessary or probable condition, i. e., when it is the only possible or only likely cause, then we may argue both ways: e. g., we may infer a general’s success from his known skill, or his skill from his known success; (in this, as in all cases, assuming what is the better known as a proof of what is less known, denied, or doubted;) these two arguments belonging, respectively, to the two classes originally laid down.

And it is to be observed that, in such arguments from sign as this last, the conclusion which follows, logically, from the premiss, being the cause from which the premiss follows, physically, (i. e., as a natural

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* It is, however, very common, in the carelessness of ordinary language, to mention, as the causes of phenomena, circumstances which every one would allow, on consideration, to be not causes, but only conditions, of the effects in question: e. g., it would be said of a tender plant, that it was destroyed in consequence of not being covered with a mat; though every one would mean to imply that the frost destroyed it; this being a cause too well known to need being mentioned; and that which is spoken of as the cause, viz., the absence of a covering, being only the condition, without which the real cause could not have operated.

How common it is to confound a sign with a cause is apparent in the resentment men are prone to feel against the prophets of evil; as Ahab “hated” the prophet Micaiah, and gave as a reason, "He doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil.”
there are in this case two different kinds of sequence opposed to each other: e. g., "With many of them God was not well pleased; for they were overthrown in the wilderness." In arguments of the first class, on the contrary, these two kinds of sequence are combined; i. e., the conclusion which follows logically from the premiss, is also the effect following physically from it as a cause: a general's skill, e. g., being both the cause and the proof of his being likely to succeed.

It is most important to keep in mind the distinction between these two kinds of sequence, which are, in argument, sometimes combined, and sometimes opposed. There is no more fruitful source of confusion of thought than that ambiguity of the language employed on these subjects, which tends to confound together these two things, so entirely distinct in their nature. There is hardly any argumentative writer on subjects involving a discussion of the causes or effects of any thing, who has clearly perceived and steadily kept in view the distinction I have been speaking of, or who has escaped the errors and perplexities thence resulting. The wide extent accordingly, and the importance, of the mistakes and difficulties arising out of the ambiguity complained of, are incautious. Of all the "Idola Fori," none is perhaps more important in its results. To dilate upon this point as fully as might be done with advantage, would exceed my present limits; but it will not be irrelevant to offer some remarks on the origin of the ambiguity complained of, and on the cautions to be used in guarding against being misled by it.

The premiss by which any thing is proved, is not necessarily the cause of the fact's being such as it is; but it is the cause of our knowing, or being convinced, that it is so: e. g., the wetness of the earth is not the cause of rain, but it is the cause of our knowing that it has rained. These two things—the premiss which produces our conviction, and the cause which produces that of which we are convinced—are the more likely to be confounded together, in the looseness of colloquial language, from the circumstance that (as has been above remarked) they fre-

* Bacon.
quently coincide; as, e. g., when we infer that the ground will be wet, from the fall of rain which produces that wetness. And hence it is that the same words have come to be applied, in common, to each kind of sequence: e. g., an effect is said to “follow” from a cause, and a conclusion to “follow” from the premises; the words “cause” and “reason” are each applied indifferently, both to a cause, properly so called, and to the premiss of an argument; though “reason,” in strictness of speaking, should be confined to the latter.

Ambiguity of “because,” “Therefore,” “hence,” “consequently,” etc., and “therefore,” also “since,” “because,” and “why,” have likewise a corresponding ambiguity.

The multitude of the words which bear this double meaning (and that in all languages) greatly increases our liability to be misled by it; since thus the very means men resort to for ascertaining the sense of any expression, are infected with the very same ambiguity: e. g., if we inquire what is meant by a “cause,” we shall be told that it is that from which something “follows;” or which is indicated by the words “therefore,” “consequently,” etc., all which expressions are as equivocal and uncertain in their signification as the original one. It is in vain to attempt ascertaining by the balance the true amount of any commodity, if uncertain weights are placed in the opposite scale. Hence it is that so many writers, in investigating the cause to which any fact or phenomenon is to be attributed, have assigned that which is not a cause, but only a proof that the fact is so; and have thus been led into an endless train of errors and perplexities.

Several, however, of the words in question, though employed indiscriminately in both significations, seem (as was observed in the case of the word “reason”) in their primary and strict sense to be confined to one. “Δικαστήριον,” in Greek, and “ergo,”* or “itaque,” in Latin, seem originally and properly to denote the sequence of effect from cause; “ἀπάντα,”† and “igitur,” that of conclusion from premises. The English

* Most logical writers seem not to be aware of this, as they generally, in Latin treatises, employ “ergo” in the other sense. It is from the Greek ἐπίγον, i. e., “in fact.”

† Ἀπάντα having a signification of fitness or coincidence; whence ἀπάντω.
word "accordingly" will generally be found to correspond with the Latin "itaque."

The interrogative "why" is employed to inquire, either, first, the "reasons," (or "proof;"") secondly, the "cause;" or, thirdly, the "object proposed," or "why." Ambiguity of final cause: e. g., first, Why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? secondly, Why are the days shorter in winter than in summer? thirdly, Why are the works of a watch constructed as they are?"*

It is to be observed that the discovery of causes belongs properly to the province of the philosopher; that of "reasons," strictly so called, (i. e., arguments,) to that of the rhetorician; and that, though each will have frequent occasion to assume the character of the other, it is most important that these two objects should not be confounded together.

§ 4.

Of signs, then, there are some which, from a certain effect or phenomenon, infer the "cause" of it; and others which, in like manner, infer some "condition" which is not the cause.

Of these last, one species is the argument from testimony; the premiss being the existence of the testimony; the conclusion, the truth of what is attested; which is considered as a "condition" of the testimony having been given; since it is evident that so far only as this is allowed, (i. e., so far only as it is allowed that the testimony would not have been given, had it not been true,) can this argument have any force. Testimony is of various kinds; and may possess various degrees of force,† not only in reference to its own intrinsic character, but in reference also to the kind of conclusion that it is brought to support.

* See the article Why, in the Appendix to the treatise on Logic.
† Locke has touched on this subject, though slightly and scantily. He says, "In the testimony of others, is to be considered, 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies.
In respect of this latter point, the first and great distinction is between testimony to matters of fact, and to matters of opinion, or doctrines.

The expressions "matters of fact," and "matters of opinion," are not employed by all persons with precision and uniformity. But the notion most nearly conformable to ordinary usage seems to be this: by a "matters of fact" is meant something which might, conceivably, be submitted to the senses; and about which it is supposed there could be no disagreement among persons who should be present, and to whose senses it should be submitted; and by a "matters of opinion" is understood any thing respecting which an exercise of judgment would be called for on the part of those who should have certain objects before them, and who might conceivably disagree in their judgment thereupon.

This, I think, is the description of what people in general intend to denote (though often without having themselves any very clear notion of it) by these phrases. Decidedly it is not meant, by those at least who use language with any precision, that there is greater certainty, or more general and ready agreement, in the one case than in the other. E. g.: That one of Alexander's friends did, or did not, administer poison to him, every one would allow to be a question of fact, though it may be involved in inextricable doubt; while the question, what sort of an act that was, supposing it to have taken place, all would allow to be a question of opinion; though probably all would agree in their opinion thereupon.

Again, it is not, apparently, necessary that a "matters of fact," in order to constitute it such, should have ever been actually submitted—or likely to be so—to the sense of any human being; only, that it should be one which conceivably might be so submitted. E. g.: Whether there is a lake in the centre of New Holland, whether there is land at the South Pole, whether the moon is inhabited, would generally be admitted to be questions of fact; although no one has been able to bear testimony concerning them; and, in the last case, we are morally certain that no one ever will.
The circumstance that chiefly tends to produce indistinctness and occasional inconsistency in the use of these phrases is, that there is often much room for the exercise of judgment, and for difference of opinion, in reference to things which are, themselves, matters of fact. E. g.: The degree of credibility of the witnesses who attest any fact, is, itself, a matter of opinion; and so in respect of the degree of weight due to any other kind of probabilities. That there is, or is not, land at the South Pole, is a matter of fact; that the existence of land there is likely, or unlikely, is matter of opinion.

And in this and many other cases, different questions very closely connected are very apt to be confounded together,* and the proofs belonging to one of them brought forward as pertaining to the other. E. g.: A case of alleged prophecy shall be in question: the event said to have been foretold shall be established as a fact; and also the utterance of the supposed prediction before the event; and this will perhaps be assumed as proof of that which is in reality another question, and a "question of opinion:" whether the supposed prophecy related to the event in question; and, again, whether it were merely a conjecture of human sagacity, or such as to imply superhuman prescience.

Again, whether a certain passage occurs in certain MSS. of the Greek Testament, is evidently a question of fact; but whether the words imply such and such a doctrine, however indubitable it may justly appear to us, is evidently a "matter of opinion."† It is to be observed also, that, as there may be (as I have just said) questions of opinion relative to facts, so there may also be questions of fact relative to opinions: i. e., that such and such opinions were, or were not, maintained at such a time and place, by such and such persons, is a question of fact.

When the question is as to a fact, it is plain we have to look chiefly to the honesty of a witness, his accuracy, and his means of gaining information. When the question is about a matter of opinion, it is equally plain that his ability to form

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* See Treatise on Fallacies, "Irrelevant Conclusion."
† See preface to vol. ii. of Translation of Neander.
a judgment is no less to be taken into account.* But though this is admitted by all, it is very common with inconsiderate persons to overlook, in practice, the distinction, and to mistake as to what it is that, in each case, is attested. Facts, properly so called, are, we should remember, individuals; though the term is often extended to general statements; especially when these are well established. And again, the causes or other circumstances connected with some event or phenomenon are often stated as a part of the very fact attested. If, for instance, a person relates his having found coal in a certain stratum; or if he states that in the East Indies he saw a number of persons, who had been sleeping exposed to the moon’s rays, afflicted with certain symptoms, and that after taking a certain medicine they recovered, he is bearing testimony as to simple matters of fact; but if he declares that the stratum in question constantly contains coal; or that the patients in question were so affected in consequence of the moon’s rays—that such is the general effect of them in that climate;† and that that medicine is a cure for such symptoms, it is evident that this testimony, however worthy of credit, is borne to a different kind of conclusion; namely, not an individual, but a general, conclusion, and one which must rest, not solely on the veracity, but also on the judgment, of the witness.

Even in the other case, however, when the question relates to what is strictly a matter of fact, the intellectual character of the witness is not to be wholly left out of the account. A man strongly influenced by prejudice, to which the weakest men are ever the most liable, may even fancy he sees what he does not. And some degree of suspicion may thence attach to the testimony of prejudiced though honest men, when their prejudices are on the same side with their testimony; for otherwise their testimony may even be the stronger. E. g.: The early

* Testimony to matters of opinion usually receives the name of authority; which term, however, is also applied when facts are in question; as when we say indifferently, “The account of this transaction rests on the authority”—or “on the testimony—of such and such an historian.” See Logic, Appendix, Art. “Authority.”

† Such is the prevailing, if not universal, belief of those who have resided in the East Indies.
disciples of Jesus were, mostly, ignorant, credulous, and prejudiced men; but all their expectations, all their early prejudices, ran counter to almost every thing that they attested. They were, in that particular case, harder to be convinced than more intelligent and enlightened men would have been. It is most important, therefore, to remember—what is often forgotten—that credulity and incredulity are the same habit considered in reference to different things. The more easy of belief any one is in respect of what falls in with his wishes or preconceived notions, the harder of belief he will be of any thing that opposes these.*

Again, in respect of the number of witnesses, it is evident that, other points being equal, many must have more weight than one, or a few; but it is no uncommon mistake to imagine many witnesses to be bearing concurrent testimony to the same thing, when in truth they are attesting different things. One or two men may be bearing original testimony to some fact or transaction; and one or two hundred, who are repeating what they had heard from these, may, in reality, only bear witness to their having heard it, and to their own belief. Multitudes may agree in maintaining some system or doctrine, which perhaps one out of a million may have convinced himself of by research and reflection; while the rest have assented to it in implicit reliance on authority. These are not, in reality, attesting the same thing. The one is, in reality, declaring that so and so is, as he conceives, a conclusion fairly established by reasons pertaining to the subject-matter; the rest, that so and so is the established belief, or is held by persons on whose authority they rely. These last may indeed have very good ground for their belief; for no one would say that a man who is not versed in astronomy is not justified in believing the earth’s motion; or that the many millions of persons who have never seen the sea, are credulous in believing, on testimony, its existence; but still it is to be remembered that they are not, in reality, bearing witness to the same thing as the others.

Undesigned testimony is manifestly, so far, the stronger; the suspicion of fabrication being thus precluded. Slight

* See Logic, Book II., chap. ii., § 1.
incidental hints, therefore, and oblique allusions to any fact, have often much more weight than distinct, formal assertions of it. And, moreover, such allusions will often go to indicate not only that the fact is true, but that it was, at the time when so alluded to, notorious and undisputed. The account given by Herodotus, of Xerxes cutting a canal through the isthmus of Athos, which is ridiculed by Juvenal,* is much more strongly attested by Thucydides in an incidental mention of a place “near which some remains of the canal might be seen,” than if he had distinctly recorded his conviction of the truth of the narrative.

So, also, the many slight allusions in the apostolic Epistles to the sufferings undergone and the miracles wrought by disciples, as things familiar to the readers, are much more decisive than distinct descriptions, narratives, or assertions, would have been.

Paley, in that most admirable specimen of the investigation of this kind of evidence, the “Horæ Pauline,” puts in a most needful caution against supposing that because it is on very minute points this kind of argument turns, therefore the importance of these points in establishing the conclusion is small.† The reverse, as he justly observes, is the truth; for the more minute and intrinsically trifling, and likely to escape notice, any point is, the more does it preclude the idea of design and fabrication. Imitations of natural objects—flowers, for instance—when so skilfully made as to deceive the naked eye, are detected by submitting the natural and the artificial to a microscope.

The same remarks will apply to other kinds of sign also. The number and position of the nails in a man’s shoe, cor-

* "Velificatus Athos, et quicquid Græcie mendax Audet in historia."
† Thus Swift endeavored (in Gulliver’s Voyage to Laputa, and in some of his poems) to cast ridicule on some of the evidence on which Bishop Atterbury’s reasonable correspondence was brought home to him; the medium of proof being certain allusions, in some of the letters, to a lame lap-dog; as if the importance of the evidence were to be measured by the intrinsic importance of the dog. But Swift was far too acute a man probably to have fallen himself into such an error as he was endeavoring, for party purposes, to bring his readers into.
responding with a foot-mark, or a notch in the blade of a knife, have led to the detection of a murderer.

The testimony of adversaries*—including under this term all who would be unwilling to admit the conclusion to which their testimony tends—has, of course, great weight derived from that circumstance. And as it will, oftener than not, fall under the head of “undesigned,” much minute research will often be needful, in order to draw it out.

In oral examination of witnesses, a skilful cross-examiner will often elicit from a reluctant witness most important truths, which the witness is desirous of concealing or disguising. There is another kind of skill, which consists in so alarming, misleading, or bewildering an honest witness as to throw discredit on his testimony, or pervert the effect of it.† Of this kind of art, which may be characterized as the most, or one of the most, base and depraved of all possible employments of intellectual power, I shall only make one further observation. I am convinced that the most effectual mode of eliciting truth, is quite different from that by which an honest, simple-minded witness is most easily baffled and confused. I have seen the experiment tried, of subjecting a witness to such a kind of cross-examination, by a practiced lawyer, as would have been, I am convinced, the most likely to alarm and perplex many an honest witness—without any effect in shaking the testimony; and afterwards, by a totally opposite mode of examination, such as would not have at all perplexed one who was honestly telling the truth, that same witness was drawn on, step by step, to acknowledge the utter falsity of the whole.

Generally speaking, I believe that a quiet, gentle, and straightforward, though full and careful examination, will be the most adapted to elicit truth; and that the manoeuvres

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* E. g.: I have seen, in a professedly argumentative work, a warning inserted against the alleged unsound doctrine contained in the Article “Person” in Appendix to the Logic; which being unaccompanied by any proofs of unsoundness, may be regarded as a strong testimony to the unanswerable character of the reasons I have there adduced.

† See an extract from a valuable pamphlet on the “License of Counsel,” cited in the Lecture appended to Part II.
and the browbeating, which are the most adapted to confuse an honest witness, are just what the dishonest one is the best prepared for. The more the storm blusters, the more carefully he wraps round him the cloak, which a warm sunshine will often induce him to throw off.

In any testimony (whether oral or written) that is unwillingly borne, it will more frequently consist in something *incidentally implied* than in a distinct statement. For instance, the generality of men, who are accustomed to cry up common sense as preferable to systems of art, have been brought to bear witness, collectively, (see Preface to "Elements of Logic,"') on the opposite side; inasmuch as each of them gives the preference to the latter, in the subject, whatever it may be, in which he is most conversant.

Sometimes, however, an adversary will be compelled distinctly to admit something that makes against him, in order to contest some other point. Thus, the testimony of the Evangelists that the miracles of Jesus were acknowledged by the unbelievers, and attributed to magic, is confirmed by the Jews, in a work called "Toldoth Jeschu;" (the "Generation of Jesus;") which must have been compiled (at whatever period) from traditions existing from the very first; since it is incredible that if those contemporaries of Jesus who opposed him had denied the fact of the miracles having been wrought, their descendants should have admitted the facts, and resorted to the hypothesis of magic.

The *negative* testimony, either of adversaries or of indifferent persons, is often of great weight. When statements or arguments, publicly put forth and generally known, remain *uncontradicted*, an appeal may fairly be made to this circumstance, as a confirmatory testimony on the part of those acquainted with the matter, and interested in it; especially if they are likely to be unwilling to admit the conclusion.*

It is manifest that the concurrent testimony, positive or negative, of several witnesses, when there can have been no concert, and especially when there is any rivalry or hostility between them, carries

* See Hinds on the "Inspiration of Scripture."
with it a weight independent of that which may belong to each of them considered separately. For though, in such a case, each of the witnesses should be even considered as wholly undeserving of credit, still the chances might be incalculable against their all agreeing in the same falsehood. It is in this kind of testimony that the generality of mankind believe in the motions of the earth, and of the heavenly bodies, etc. Their belief is not the result of their own observation and calculations; nor yet again of their implicit reliance on the skill and the good faith of any one or more astronomers; but it rests on the agreement of many independent and rival astronomers, who want neither the ability nor the will to detect and expose each other's errors. It is on similar grounds, as Dr. Hinds has justly observed,* that all men, except about two or three in a million, believe in the existence and in the genuineness of manuscript of ancient books, such as the Scriptures. It is not that they have themselves examined these; or, again, (as some represent,) that they rely implicitly on the good faith of those who profess to have done so; but they rely on the concurrent and uncontradicted testimony of all who have made, or who might make, the examination; both unbelievers, and believers of various hostile sects; any one of whom would be sure to seize any opportunity to expose the forgeries or errors of his opponents.

This observation is the more important, because many persons are liable to be startled or dismayed on its being pointed out to them that they have been believing something—as they are led to suppose—on very insufficient reasons; when the truth is, perhaps, that they have been misstating their reasons.†

A remarkable instance of the testimony of adversaries, both positive and negative, has been afforded in the questions respecting penal colonies. The pernicious character of the system was proved in various publications, and subsequently, before two committees of the House of Commons, from the testimony of persons who were friendly to that system: the report and evidence taken before those committees was published; and all this remained uncontradicted for years; till,

* Hinds on Inspiration.  † See Appendix, [D.]*
on motions being made for the abolition of the system,* persons had the effrontery to come forward at the eleventh hour and deny the truth of the representations given: thus pronouncing on themselves a heavy condemnation, for having either left that representation—supposing they thought it false—so long unrefuted, or else denying what they knew to be true.

Misrepresentation, again, of argument—attempts to suppress evidence, or to silence a speaker by clamor—reviling and personality, and false charges—all these are presumptions of the same kind: that the cause against which they are brought is—in the opinion of adversaries at least—unassailable on the side of truth.

As for the character of the particular things that in any case may be attested, it is plain that we have to look to the probability or improbability, on the one hand, of their being real, and, on the other hand, of their having been either imagined or invented by the persons attesting them.

Any thing unlikely to occur, is, so far, the less likely to have been feigned or fancied; so that its antecedent improbability may sometimes add to the credibility of those who bear witness to it.† And again, any thing which, however likely to take place, would not have been likely, otherwise, to enter the mind of those particular persons who attest to it, or would be at variance with their interest or prejudices, is thereby rendered the more credible. Thus, as has been above remarked, when the disciples of Jesus record occurrences and discourses such as were both foreign to all the notions, and at variance with all the prejudices, of any man living in those days, and of Jews more especially, this is a strong confirmation of their testimony.

It is also, in some cases, a strongly confirmatory circumstance that the witness should appear not to believe, himself, or not to understand, the thing he is reporting, when it is such as is, to us, not unintelligible nor incredible. E. g.: When an ancient historian records a report of certain voyagers

* See "Substance of a Speech on Transportation, delivered in the House of Lords, on the 19th of May, 1840," etc.
† See Sermon IV., on "A Christian Place of Worship."
having sailed to a distant country in which they found the shadows falling on the opposite side to that which they had been accustomed, and regards the account as incredible, from not being able to understand how such a phenomenon could occur, we—recognizing at once what we know takes place in the Southern hemisphere, and perceiving that he could not have invented the account—have the more reason for believing it. The report thus becomes analogous to the copy of an inscription in a language unknown to him who copied it.

The negative circumstance, also, of a witness's omitting to mention such things as it is morally certain he would have mentioned had he been inventing, adds great weight to what he does say.

And it is to be observed* that, in many cases, silence, omission, absence of certain statements, etc., will have even greater weight than much that we do find stated. E. g.: Suppose we meet with something in a passage of one of Paul's Epistles which indicates with a certain degree of probability the existence of such and such a custom, institution, etc., and suppose there is just the same degree of probability that such and such another custom, institution, or event, which he does not mention anywhere, would have been mentioned by him in the same place, supposing it to have really existed or occurred: this omission, and the negative argument resulting, has incomparably the more weight than the other, if we also find that same omission in all the other Epistles, and in every one of the books of the New Testament.

E. g.: The universal omission of all notice of the office of Hiercus (a sacerdotal priest) among the Christian ministers†—of all reference to one supreme Church bearing rule over all the rest‡—of all mention of any transfer of the Sabbath from the seventh day to the first§—are instances of decisive negative arguments of this kind.

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* See Essay on the "Omission of Creeds," etc.
† See Discourse on the Christian Priesthood, appended to the Rampton Lectures. Also, Bernard's translation of Vitringa on the "Synagogue and the Church."
‡ See Essay II., on the "Kingdom of Christ."
§ See "Thoughts on the Sabbath."
So, also, the omission of all allusion to the future state, in those parts of the writings of Moses in which he is urging the Israelites to obedience by appeals to their hopes and fears; and, again, in the whole of the early part of the Book of Job, in which that topic could not have failed to occur to persons believing in the doctrine—this is a plain indication that no revelation of the doctrine was intended to be given in those books; and that the passage, often cited, from the Book of Job, as having reference to the resurrection, must be understood as relating to that temporal deliverance which is narrated immediately after: since else it would (as Bishop Warburton has justly remarked) make all the rest of the book unintelligible and absurd.*

Again, "although we do not admit the positive authority of antiquity in favor of any doctrine or practice which we do not find sanctioned by Scripture, we may yet, without inconsistency, appeal to it negatively, in refutation of many errors. . . . It is no argument in favor of the millennium that it was a notion entertained by Justin Martyr, since we do not believe him to have been inspired, and he may therefore have drawn erroneous inferences from certain texts of Scripture; but it is an argument against the doctrine of transubstantiation that we find no traces of it for above six centuries; and against the adoration of the Virgin Mary, that in like manner it does not appear to have been inculcated till the sixth century. It is very credible that the first Christian writers, who were but men, should have made mistakes to which all men are liable, in their interpretations of Scripture; but it is not credible that such important doctrines as transubstantiation and the adoration of the Virgin Mary should have been transmitted from the apostles, if we find no trace of them for five or six centuries after the birth of our Saviour." †

To take another instance: I have remarked in the Lectures on Political Economy, (Lect. 5,) that the descriptions some writers give of the civilization of mankind; by the spontaneous origin, among tribes of savages, of the various arts of life, one by one, are to be regarded as wholly imaginary, and not agreeing

* See "Essay on a Future State." (First Series.)
† Bishop Pepys's Charge, 1845.
with any thing that ever did or can actually take place; inasmuch as there is no record or tradition of any race of savages having ever civilized themselves without external aid. Numerous as are the accounts we have of savages who have not received such aid, we do not hear, in any one instance, of their having ceased to be savages. And, again, abundant as are the traditions (though mostly mixed up with much that is fabulous) of the origin of civilization in various nations, all concur in tracing it up to some foreign, or some superhuman, instructor. If ever a nation did emerge, unassisted, from the savage state, all memory of such an event is totally lost.

Now the absence of all such records or traditions, in a case where there is every reason to expect that an instance could be produced if any had ever occurred—this negative circumstance (in conjunction with the other indications there added) led me, many years ago, to the conclusion that it is impossible for mere savages to civilize themselves—that consequently man must at some period have received the rudiments of civilization from a superhuman instructor—and that savages are probably the descendants of civilized men, whom wars and other afflictive visitations have degraded.*

It might seem superfluous to remark that none but very general rules, such as the above, can be profitably laid down; and that to attempt to supersede the discretion to be exercised on each individual case, by fixing precisely what degree of weight is to be allowed to the testimony of such and such persons, would be, at least, useless trifling, and, if introduced in practice, a most mischievous hindrance of a right decision. But attempts of this kind have actually been made, in the systems of jurisprudence of some countries; and with such results as might have been anticipated. The reader will find an instructive account of some of this unwise legislation in an article on "German Jurisprudence" in the Edinburgh Review; from which an extract is subjoined in the Appendix.†

* See an extract in the Appendix [DD] from the Lecture above alluded to.
† Appendix [DD.]
Testimony on oath is commonly regarded as far more to be relied on—other points being equal—than any that is not sworn to. This, however, holds good not universally, but only in respect of certain intermediate characters between the truly respectable and the worthless. For these latter will either not scruple to take a false oath, or if they do, will satisfy their conscience by various evasions and equivocations, such as are vulgarly called "cheating the devil;" so as to give, substantially, false testimony, while they cheat (in reality) themselves, by avoiding literal perjury. An upright man, again, considers himself as virtually on his oath whenever he makes a deliberate, solemn assertion, and feels bound to guard against conveying any false impression.

But, even in respect of those intermediate characters, the influence of an oath in securing veracity is, I conceive, far less than some suppose. Let any one compare the evidence given on oath, with that of those religionists who are allowed by law to substitute a "solemn affirmation," and he will find no signs of the advantage of sworn testimony. Or, if he consider these religionists as, generally, more conscientious than the average, let him compare the evidence (of which we have such voluminous records) given before committees of the House of Lords, which is on oath, with that before committees of the Commons, which is not; and he will find about the same proportion of honest and of dishonest testimony in each.

Still, there doubtless are persons who would scruple to swear to a falsehood which they would not scruple deliberately to affirm. But I doubt whether this proves much in favor of the practice of requiring oaths—whether its chief effect is not to lower men's sense of the obligations to veracity on occasions when they are not on oath. The expressions which the practice causes to be so much in use, of "calling God to witness," and of "invoking the Divine judgment," tend to induce men to act as if they imagined that God does not witness their conduct unless specially "called on," and that he will not judge false testimony unless with our permission; and thus an habitual disregard for veracity is fostered. If oaths were abolished—leaving the penalties for false-witness (no unimportant part of our security) unaltered—I am convinced that, on the whole, testimony would be more trustworthy than it is.
Still, since there are, as I have said, persons whose oath—as matters now stand—is more worthy of credit than their word, this circumstance must be duly considered in weighing the value of testimony. *

The remark above made, as to the force of concurrent testimonies, even though each, separately, might have little or none,† but whose accidental agreement in a falsehood would be extremely improbable, is not solely applicable to the argument from testimony, but may be extended to many arguments of other kinds also; in which a similar calculation of chances will enable us to draw a conclusion, sometimes even amounting to moral certainty, from a combination of data which singly would have had little or no weight. E. g.: If any one out of a hundred men throw a stone which strikes a certain object;† there is but a slight probability, from that fact alone, that he aimed at that object; but if all the hundred threw stones which struck the same object, no one would doubt that they aimed at it. It is from such a combination of argument that we infer the existence of an intelligent Creator, from the marks of contrivance visible in the universe, though many of these are such as, taken singly, might well be conceived undesigned and accidental; but that they should all be such, is morally impossible.

And here it may be observed that there may be such a concurrence of testimonies or other signs as shall have very considerable weight, even though they do not relate directly to one individual conclu-

* See Appendix, Note [DDD.]
† It is observed by Dr. Campbell that "it deserved likewise to be attended to on this subject, that in a number of concurrent testimonies, (in cases wherein there could have been no previous concert,) there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the witnesses, a probability which would remain even though the witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all. This probability arises purely from the concurrence itself. That such a concurrence should spring from chance, is as one to infinite; that is, in other words, morally impossible. If, therefore, concert be excluded, there remains no other cause but the reality of the fact."—Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, Ch. V., Book I., Part III., p. 125.
‡ If I recollect rightly, these are the words of Mr. Dugald Stewart.
sion, but to similar ones. E. g.: Before the reality of aerolites [meteoric stones] was established as it now is, we should have been justified in not giving at once full credit to some report, resting on ordinary evidence, of an occurrence so antecedently improbable as that of a stone's falling from the sky. But if twenty distinct accounts had reached us, from various parts of the globe, of a like phenomenon, though no two of the accounts related to the same individual stone, still, we should have judged this a decisive concurrence; (and this is in fact the way in which the reality of the phenomenon was actually established;) because each testimony, though given to an individual case, has a tendency towards the general conclusion in which all concur, viz., the possibility of such an event; and this being once admitted, the antecedent objection against each individual case is removed. The same reasoning applies to several of the New Testament parables, as that of the Prodigal Son, the Laborers in the Vineyard, the Rich Man and Lazarus, etc., each of which contains an allusion to the future call of the Gentiles—so little obvious, however, that it would have been hardly warrantable so to interpret any one of them, if it had stood alone.

Great care is requisite in setting forth clearly, especially in any popular discourse, arguments of this nature: the generality of men being better qualified for understanding (to use Lord Bacon's words) "particulars, one by one," than for taking a comprehensive view of a whole; and therefore in a galaxy of evidence, as it may be called, in which the brilliancy of no single star can be pointed out, the lustre of the combination is often lost on them.

Hence it is, as was remarked in the Treatise on Fallacies, that the sophism of "composition," as it is called, so frequently misleads men. It is not improbable (in the above example) that each of the stones, considered separately, may have been thrown at random; and therefore the same is concluded of all, considered in conjunction. Not that, in such an instance as this, any one would reason so weakly; but that a still greater absurdity of the very same kind is involved in the rejection of the evidences of our religion, will be plain to any one
who considers, not merely the individual force, but the number and variety of those evidences.*

§ 5.

And here it may be observed, that though the easiest popular way of practically refuting the fallacy just mentioned (or indeed any fallacy) is by bringing forward a parallel case, where it leads to a manifest absurdity, a metaphysical objection may still be urged against many cases in which we thus reason from calculation of chances; an objection not perhaps likely practically to influence any one, but which may afford the sophist a triumph over those who are unable to find a solution; and which may furnish an excuse for the rejection of evidence which one is previously resolved not to admit. If it were answered then, to those who maintain that the universe, which exhibits so many marks of design, might be the work of non-intelligent causes, that no one would believe it possible for such a work as, e. g., the Iliad, to be produced by a fortuitous shaking together of the letters of the alphabet, the sophist might challenge us to explain why even this last supposition should be regarded as less probable than any other; since the letters of which the Iliad is composed, if shaken together at random, must fall in some form or other; and though the chances are millions of millions to one against that, or any other determinate order, there are precisely as many chances against one as against another, whether more or less regular. And in like manner, astonished as we should be, and convinced of the intervention of artifice, if we saw any one draw out all the cards in a pack in regular sequences, it is demonstrable that the chances are not more against that order than against any one determinate order we might choose to fix upon; against that one, for instance, in which the cards are at this moment actually lying in any individual pack. The multitude of the chances, therefore, he would say, against any series of events, does not constitute it improbable; since the like happens to every one every day.

* Mr. Davison, in the introduction to his work on Prophecy, states strongly the cumulative force of a multitude of small particulars. See chap. iii., § 4, of this treatise.
E. g.: A man walking through London streets, on his business, meets accidentally hundreds of others passing to and fro on theirs; and he would not say at the close of the day that any thing improbable had occurred to him; yet it would almost baffle calculation to compute the chances against his meeting precisely those very persons, in the order and at the times and places of his actually meeting each. The paradox thus seemingly established, though few might be practically misled by it, many would be at a loss to solve, and an effect may sometimes thus be produced analogous to that of what is sometimes, in war, called a "barren victory;" i. e., one which has no direct immediate result, but which yet will often produce a most important moral result, by creating an impression of military superiority.

The truth is, that any supposition is justly called improbable, not from the number of chances against it, considered independently, but from the number of chances against it compared with those which lie against some other supposition. We call the drawing of a prize in the lottery improbable, though there be but five to one against it; because there are more chances of a blank: on the other hand, if any one were cast on a desert island under circumstances which warranted his believing that the chances were a hundred to one against any one's having been there before him, yet if he found, on the sand, pebbles so arranged as to form distinctly the letters of a man's name, he would not only conclude it probable, but absolutely certain that some human being had been there; because there would be millions of chances against those forms having been produced by the fortuitous action of the waves. Yet if, instead of this, I should find some tree on the island such that the chances appeared to me five to one against its having grown there spontaneously, still, if, as before, I conceive the chances a hundred to one against any man's having planted it there, I should at once reckon this last as the more unlikely supposition.

So also, in the instance above given, any meaning form into which a number of letters might fall, would not be called improbable, countless as the chances are against that particular order, because there are just as many against each one of all other meaning forms; so that no one would be compa-
convictly improbable; but if the letters formed a coherent poem, it would then be called incalculably improbable that this form should have been fortuitous, though the chances against it remain the very same; because there must be much fewer chances against the supposition of its having been the work of design. The probability, in short, of any supposition, is estimated from a comparison with each of its alternatives. The inclination of the balance cannot be ascertained from knowing the weights in one scale, unless we know what is in the opposite scale. So also the pressure of the atmosphere (equivalent to about thirty thousand pounds on the body of an ordinary man) is unfelt, while it is equal on all parts, and balanced by the air within the body; but is at once perceived, when the pressure is removed from any part, by the air-pump or cupping-glass.

The foregoing observations, however, as was above remarked, are not confined to arguments from testimony, but apply to all cases in which the degree of probability is estimated from a calculation of chances.

For some further remarks on this subject the reader is referred to § 17 of the Treatise on Fallacies,* where the "Fallacy of Objections" is discussed.

It is most important to keep in mind the self-evident but often-forgotten maxim that disbelief is belief; only, they have reference to opposite conclusions. E. g.: To disbelieve the real existence of the city of Troy, is to believe that it was feigned; and which conclusion implies the greater credulity, is the question to be decided. To some it may appear more, to others less, probable, that a Greek poet should have celebrated (with whatever exaggerations) some of the feats of arms in which his countrymen had actually been engaged, than that he should have passed by all these, and resorted to such as were wholly imaginary.

So also, though the terms "infidel" and "unbeliever" are commonly applied to one who rejects Christianity, it is plain that to disbelieve its Divine origin is to believe its human origin; and which belief requires the more credulous mind, is the very question at issue.

* Logic, Book III.
The proper opposite to belief is either conscious ignorance, or doubt. And even doubt may sometimes amount to a kind of belief; since deliberate and confirmed doubt, on a question that one has attended to, implies a "verdict of not proven"—a belief that there is not sufficient evidence to determine either one way or the other. And in some cases this conclusion would be accounted a mark of excessive credulity. A man who should doubt whether there is such a city as Rome, would imply his belief in (what most would account a moral impossibility) the possibility of such multitudes of independent witnesses having concurred in a fabrication.

It is worth remarking, that many persons are of such a disposition as to be nearly incapable of remaining in doubt on any point that is not wholly uninteresting to them. They speedily make up their minds on each question, and come to some conclusion, whether there are any good grounds for it or not. And judging—as men are apt to do in all matters—of others from themselves, they usually discredit the most solemn assurances of any one who professes to be in a state of doubt on some question; taking for granted that if you do not adopt their opinion, you must be of the opposite.

Others again there are, who are capable of remaining in doubt as long as the reasons on each side seem exactly balanced; but not otherwise. Such a person, as soon as he perceives any—the smallest—preponderance of probability on one side of a question, can no more refrain from deciding immediately, and with full conviction, on that side, than he could continue to stand, after having lost his equilibrium, in a slanting position, like the famous tower at Pisa. And he will accordingly be disposed to consider an acknowledgment that there are somewhat the stronger reasons on one side, as equivalent to a confident decision.

The tendency to such an error is the greater, from the circumstance that there are so many cases, in practice, wherein it is essentially necessary to come to a practical decision, even where there are no sufficient grounds for feeling fully convinced that it is the right one. A traveller may be in doubt, and may have no means of deciding with just confidence, which of two roads he ought to take; while yet he must, at
a venture, take one of them. And the like happens in numberless transactions of ordinary life, in which we are obliged practically to make up our minds at once to take one course or another, even where there are no sufficient grounds for a full conviction of the understanding.

The infirmities above mentioned are those of ordinary minds. A smaller number of persons, among whom, however, are to be found a larger proportion of the intelligent, are prone to the opposite extreme: that of not deciding, as long as there are reasons to be found on both sides, even though there may be a clear and strong preponderance on the one, and even though the case may be such as to call for a practical decision. As the one description of men rush hastily to a conclusion, and trouble themselves little about premises, so the other carefully examine premises, and care too little for conclusions. The one decide without inquiring, the other inquire without deciding.

§ 6.

Before I dismiss the consideration of signs, it may be worth while to notice another case of combined argument different from the one lately mentioned, yet in some degree resembling it. The combination just spoken of is where several testimonies or other signs, singly perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by their coincidence, a degree of probability far exceeding the sum of their several forces, taken separately: in the case I am now about to notice, the combined force of the series of arguments results from the order in which they are considered, and from their progressive tendency to establish a certain conclusion. E. g.: One part of the law of nature called the "vis inertia" is established by the argument alluded to: viz., that a body set in motion will eternally continue in motion with uniform velocity in a right line, so far as it is not acted upon by any causes which retard or stop, accelerate or divert, its course. Now, as in every case which can come under our observation some such causes do intervene, the assumed supposition is practically impossible, and we have no opportunity of verifying the law by direct experiment; but we may gradually approach indefinitely near to the case sup-
posed; and on the result of such experiments our conclusion is founded. We find that when a body is projected along a rough surface, its motion is speedily retarded and soon stopped; if along a smoother surface, it continues longer in motion; if upon ice, longer still; and the like with regard to wheels, etc., in proportion as we gradually lessen the friction of the machinery; and if we remove the resistance of the air, by setting a wheel or pendulum in motion under an exhausted receiver, the motion is still longer continued. Finding, then, that the effect of the original impulse is more and more protracted, in proportion as we more and more remove the impediments to motion from friction and resistance of the air, we reasonably conclude that if this could be completely done, (which is out of our power,) the motion would never cease, since what appear to be the only causes of its cessation would be absent.*

Again, in arguing for the existence and moral attributes of the Deity from the authority of men's opinions, great use may be made of a like progressive course of argument, though it has been often overlooked. Some have argued for the being of a God from the universal, or at least general, consent of mankind; and some have appealed to the opinions of the wisest and most cultivated portion, respecting both the existence and the moral excellence of the Deity. It cannot be denied that there is a presumptive force in each of these arguments; but it may be answered, that it is conceivable, an opinion common to almost all the species may possibly be an error resulting from a constitutional infirmity of the human intellect;† that if we are to acquiesce in the belief of the majority, we shall be led to Polytheism, such being the creed of the greater part; and that though more weight may reasonably be attached to the opinions of the wisest and best-instructed, still, as we know that such men are not exempt from error, we cannot be perfectly safe in adopting the belief they hold, unless they are convinced that they hold it in consequence of their being the wisest and best-instructed—so far forth as

* See the argument in Butler's Analogy to prove the advantage which virtue, if perfect, might be expected to obtain.
† One of Bacon's "Idola Tribus."
they are such. Now this is precisely the point which may be established by the above-mentioned progressive argument. Nations of Atheists, if there are any such, are confessedly among the rudest and most ignorant savages: those who represent their god or gods as malevolent, capricious, or subject to human passions and vices, are invariably to be found (in the present day at least) among those who are brutal and uncivilized; and among the most civilized nations of the ancients, who professed a similar creed, the more enlightened members of society seem either to have rejected altogether, or to have explained away, the popular belief. The Moham-
medan nations, again, of the present day, who are certainly more advanced in civilization than their Pagan neighbors, maintain the unity and the moral excellence of the Deity; but the nations of Christendom, whose notions of the Divine goodness are more exalted, are undeniably the most civilized part of the world, and possess, generally speaking, the most cultivated and improved intellectual powers. Now if we would ascertain, and appeal to, the sentiments of man as a rational being, we must surely look to those which not only prevail most among the most rational and cultivated, but towards which also a progressive tendency is found in men in proportion to their degrees of rationality and cultivation. It would be most extravagant to suppose that man's advance towards a more improved and exalted state of existence should tend to obliterate true and instil false notions. On the contrary, we are authorized to conclude that those notions would be the most correct which men would entertain whose knowledge, intelligence, and intellectual cultivation should have reached comparatively the highest pitch of perfection; and that those consequently will approach the nearest to the truth which are entertained, more or less, by various nations, in proportion as they have advanced towards this civilized state.

Again, "if we inquire what is the lesson that Scripture is calculated to convey to mankind, we should look Progressive argument for not to the conclusions adopted by the majority of mankind, but to the conclusions towards which there has been more or less tendency, in proportion as men have been more or less attentive, intelligent, and candid searchers into Scripture.

"Before the gospel appeared, we find all legislators and
philosophers agreed in regarding 'human good universally' as coming under the cognizance of the civil magistrate; who accordingly was to have a complete control over the moral and religious conduct of the citizens.

"We find again that, when the Scriptures were wholly unread by all but one in ten thousand of professed Christians, the duty of rulers to wage war against infidels and to extirpate heretics was undisputed.

"When the Scriptures began to be a popular study, but were studied crudely and rashly, and when men were dazzled by being brought suddenly from darkness into light, intolerant principles did indeed still prevail, but some notions of religious liberty began to appear. As, towards the close of a rigorous winter, the earliest trees begin to open their buds, so, a few distinguished characters begun to break the icy fetters of bigotry, and principles of tolerance were gradually developed.

"As the study, and the intelligent study, of Scripture extended, in the same degree, the opening bud, as it were, made continually further advances. In every age and country, as a general rule, tolerant principles have (however imperfectly) gained ground wherever scriptural knowledge has gained ground. And a presumption is thus afforded that a still further advance of the one would lead to a corresponding advance in the other."*

Many other instances might be adduced in which truths of the highest importance may be elicited by this process of argumentation; which will enable us to decide with sufficient probability what consequence would follow from an hypothesis which we have never experienced. It might, not improperly, be termed the argument from progressive approach.

§ 7.

The third kind of arguments to be considered, (being the other branch of the second of the two classes originally laid down, see § 3,) may be treated of under the general name of example; taking that term in its widest acceptation, so as to comprehend the arguments designated by the various names of induction, experience, analogy, parity of reasoning, etc., all of which are essentially

* See Essays on the Kingdom of Christ, Note A, Appendix.
the same, as far as regards the fundamental principles I am
here treating of. For in all the arguments designated by
these names, it will be found that we consider one or more
known, individual objects or instances, of a certain class, as
a fair sample, in respect of some point or other, of that class;
and consequently draw an inference from them respecting
either the whole class, or other, less known, individuals of it.

In arguments of this kind,* then, it will be found that,
universally, we assume as a major premiss that what is true
(in regard to the point in question) of the individual or
individuals which we bring forward and appeal to, is true
of the whole class to which they belong; the minor premiss
next asserts something of that individual; and the same
is then inferred respecting the whole class; whether we stop
at that general conclusion, or descend from thence to another,
unknown, individual; in which last case, which is the most
usually called the argument from example, we generally omit,
for the sake of brevity, the intermediate step, and pass at
once, in the expression of the argument, from the known to
the unknown individual. This ellipsis, however, does not,
as some seem to suppose, make any essential difference in the
mode of reasoning; the reference to a common class being
always, in such a case, understood, though not expressed; for
it is evident that there can be no reasoning from one individ-
dual to another, unless they come under some common genus,
and are considered in that point of view;† e. g.:

"Astronomy was decried at its first introduction, as ad-
verse to religion;" therefore

"Geology is likely to be de-
cried," etc.

"Every science is likely to be decried at its first intro-
duction, as adverse to religion."

* See Logic, B. IV., ch. i., § 1. In the new edition, uniform in
size with this, some additional explanations have been given of the
principles there laid down, together with answers to some objections
that have been recently started against them.

† This view having recently been controverted, I have introduced
some additional confirmations of it into the last edition of the "Lo-
This kind of example, therefore, appears to be a compound argument, consisting of two enthymemes; and when (as often happens) we infer from a known effect a certain cause, and again, from that cause, another unknown effect, we then unite in this example the argument from effect to cause, and that from cause to effect. E. g.: We may, from the marks of Divine benevolence in this world, argue that "the like will be shown in the next;" through the intermediate conclusion that "God is benevolent." This is not indeed always the case; but there seems to be in every example a reference to some cause, though that cause may frequently be unknown: e. g., we suppose, in the instance above given, that there is some cause, though we may be at a loss to assign it, which leads men generally to decry a new science.

Induction.

The term "induction" is commonly applied to such arguments as stop short at the general conclusion; and is thus contradistinguished, in common use, from example. There is also this additional difference, that when we draw a general conclusion from several individual cases, we use the word induction in the singular number; while each one of these cases, if the application were made to another individual, would be called a distinct example. This difference, however, is not essential; since whether the inference be made from one instance or from several, it is equally called an induction, if a general conclusion be legitimately drawn.

And this is to be determined by the nature of the subject-matter. In the investigation of the laws of matter, a single experiment, fairly and carefully made, is usually allowed to be conclusive; because we can then pretty nearly ascertain all the circumstances operating. A chemist who had ascertained, in a single specimen of gold, its capability of combining with mercury, would not think it necessary to try the same experiment with several other specimens, but would draw the conclusion concerning those metals, universally, and with certainty. In human affairs, on the contrary, our uncertainty respecting many of the circumstances that may affect the result, obliges us to collect many coinciding instances to warrant even a probable conclusion. From one instance, e. g., of the assassination of a usurper, it would not
be allowable to infer the certainty, or even the probability, of a like fate attending all usurpers. *

Experience, in its original and proper sense, is applicable to the premises from which we argue, not to the inference we draw. Strictly speaking, we know by experience only the past, and what has passed under our own observation: thus, we know by experience that the tides have daily ebbed and flowed, during such a time; and, from the testimony of others as to their own experience, that the tides have formerly done so; and from this experience, we conclude, by induction, that the same phenomenon will continue. †

"Men are so formed as (often unconsciously) to reason, whether well or ill, on the phenomena they observe, and to mix up their inferences with their statements of those phenomena, so as in fact to theorize (however scantily and crudely) without knowing it. If you will be at the pains carefully to analyze the simplest descriptions you hear of any transaction or state of things, you will find that the process which almost invariably takes place is, in logical language, this: that each individual has in his mind certain major premises or principles, relative to the subject in question; that observation of what actually presents itself to the senses supplies minor premises; and that the statement given (and which is reported as a thing experienced) consists in fact of the conclusions drawn from the combinations of those premises." ‡  E. g.: "A farmer or a gardener will tell you that he 'knows by experience' that such and such a crop succeeds best if sown in autumn, and such a crop again, if sown in spring. And in most instances they will be right; that is, their experience will have led them to right conclusions. But what they have actually known by experience, is the success or the failure of certain individual crops.

"And it is remarkable that for many ages all farmers and gardeners without exception were no less firmly convinced—and convinced of their knowing it by experience—that the

* See Logic, "On the Province of Reasoning."
† See the article "Experience" in the Appendix to the Treatise on Logic.
‡ Political Economy, Lect. III.
crops would never turn out good unless the seed were sown during the increase of the moon: a belief which is now completely exploded, except in some remote and unenlightened districts."*

"Hence it is that several different men, who have all had equal, or even the very same, experience—i. e., have been witnesses or agents in the same transactions—will often be found to resemble so many different men looking at the same book: one perhaps, though he distinctly sees black marks on white paper, has never learned his letters; another can read, but is a stranger to the language in which the book is written; another has an acquaintance with the language, but understands it imperfectly; another is familiar with the language, but is a stranger to the subject of the book, and wants power, or previous instruction, to enable him fully to take in the author's drift; while another, again, perfectly comprehends the whole.

"The object that strikes the eye is to all of these persons the same: the difference of the impressions produced on the mind of each is referable to the differences in their minds.

"And this explains the fact, that we find so much discrepancy in the results of what are called experience and common sense, as contradistinguished from theory. In former times, men knew by experience that the earth stands still, and the sun rises and sets. Common sense taught them that there could be no antipodes, since men could not stand with their heads downwards, like flies on the ceiling. Experience taught the King of Bantam that water could not become solid. And (to come to the consideration of human affairs) the experience and common sense of one of the most observant and intelligent of historians, Tacitus, convinced him, that for a mixed government to be so framed as to combine the elements of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, must be next to impossible, and that if such a one could be framed, it must inevitably be very speedily dissolved."†

Analogy.    The word analogy, again, is generally employed in the case of arguments in which the instance adduced is somewhat more remote from that to which it is

* Lessons on Reasoning.
† Political Economy, Lect. III., pp. 69-71.
applied. E. g.: A physician would be said to know by experience the noxious effect of a certain drug on the human constitution, if he had frequently seen men poisoned by it; but if he thence conjectured that it would be noxious to some other species of animal, he would be said to reason from analogy; the only difference being that the resemblance is less between a man and a brute than between one man and another; and accordingly it is found that many brutes are not acted upon by some drugs which are pernicious to man.

But more strictly speaking, analogy ought to be distinguished from direct resemblance, with which it is often confounded, in the language even of eminent writers (especially on Chemistry and Natural History) in the present day. Analogy being a "resemblance of ratios,"* that should strictly be called an argument from analogy in which the two things (viz., the one from which, and the one to which, we argue) are not, necessarily, themselves alike, but stand in similar relations to some other things; or, in other words, that the common genus which they both fall under consists in a relation. Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike, but bear a like relation, to the parent bird and to her future nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant on the other, respectively; this relation being the genus which both fall under; and many arguments might be drawn from this analogy. Again, the fact that from birth different persons have different bodily constitutions, in respect of complexion, stature, strength, shape, liability to particular disorders, etc., which constitutions, however, are capable of being, to a certain degree, modified by regimen, medicine, etc., affords an analogy by which we may form a presumption that the like takes place in respect of mental qualities also; though it is plain that there can be no direct resemblance either between body and mind, or their respective attributes.

In this kind of argument, one error, which is very common, and which is to be sedulously avoided, is that of concluding the things in question to be alike, because they are analogous—to resemble each other in themselves, because there is a resemblance in the relation

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* Λόγον ὁμοίωτης. Aristotle.
they bear to certain other things; which is manifestly a
groundless inference.

Sometimes the mistake is made of supposing this direct
resemblance to exist, when it does not; sometimes of suppos-
ing, or sophistically representing, that such resemblance is
asserted, when no such thing was intended. One may often
hear a person reproached with having compared such and
such a person or thing to this or that, and with having in so
doing introduced a most unjust, absurd, and indecorous com-
parison; when, in truth, the object in question had not been,
properly speaking, compared to any of these things, an an-
alogy only having been asserted. And it is curious that
many persons are guilty of this mistake or misrepresentation
who are, or ought to be, familiar with the Scripture parables;
in which the words “compare” and “liken” are often intro-
duced, where it is evident that there could have been no
thought of any direct resemblance. A child of ten years old
would hardly be guilty of such a blunder as to suppose that
members of the Church are literally “like” plants of corn,
sheep, fish caught in a net, and fruit trees.

Another caution is applicable to the whole class of argu-
ments from example; viz., not to consider the resemblance
or analogy to extend farther (i. e., to more particulars) than
it does. The resemblance of a picture to the object it repre-
sents is direct; but it extends no farther than the one sense,
of seeing, is concerned. In the parable of the unjust steward,
an argument is drawn from analogy, to recommend prudence
and foresight to Christians in spiritual concerns; but it would
be absurd to conclude that fraud was recommended to our
imitation; and yet mistakes very similar to such a perversion
of that argument are by no means rare.

“Thus, because a just analogy has been discerned between
the metropolis of a country and the heart of the animal body,
it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a
disease—that it may impede some of its most important func-
tions, or even be the cause of its dissolution.”

* See Copleston’s Inquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Prede-
sination, note to Disc. III., Q. V., for a very able dissertation on the
subject of Analogy, in the course of an analysis of Dr. King’s Dis-
course on Predestination. (See Appendix [E].) In the preface to the
last edition of that Discourse, I have offered some additional remarks
Against both these mistakes our Lord's parables are guarded in two ways: 1st. He selects, in several of them, images the most remote possible from the thing to be illustrated, in almost every point except the one that is essential; as in the parable referred to just above, in that of the unjust judge and impor-
tunate widow, etc. 2dly. He employs a great variety of images in illustrating each single point; e.g., a field of corn, a net cast into the sea, a grain of mustard-seed, a lump of leaven, a feast, a treasure hidden in a field, etc. For as the thing to be illustrated cannot have a direct resemblance or a complete analogy to all these different things, we are thus guarded against taking for granted that this is the case with any one of them.

It may be added, that the variety, and also the extreme commonness of the images introduced, serve as a help to the memory, by creating a multitude of associations. Our Lord has inscribed, as it were, his lessons on almost every object around us.

And, moreover, men are thus guarded against the mistake they are so prone to, and which, even as it is, they are continually falling into, of laying aside their common sense altogether in judging of any matter connected with religion; as if the rules of reasoning which they employ in temporal mat-
ters were quite unfit to be applied in spiritual.

It may be added, that illustrations drawn from things con-
siderably remote from what is to be illustrated will often have the effect of an "a fortiori" argument: as in some of the parables just alluded to, and in that where Jesus says, "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more," etc.

So also in the Apostle Paul's illustration from the Isthmian and other games: "Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible."

Sound judgment and vigilant caution are nowhere more called for than in observing what differences (perhaps seemingly small) do, and what do not, nullify the analogy between two
cases. And the same may be said in regard to the applicability of precedents, or acknowledged decisions of any kind, such as Scripture precepts, etc.; all of which indeed are, in their essence, of the nature of example; since every recorded declaration, or injunction, (of admitted authority,) may be regarded—in connection with the persons to whom, and the occasion on which, it was delivered—as a known case; from which, consequently, we may reason to any other parallel case; and the question which we must be careful in deciding will be, to whom, and to what, it is applicable. For, as I have said, a seemingly small circumstance will often destroy the analogy, so as to make a precedent—precept, etc.—inapplicable; and often, on the other hand, some difference, in itself important, may be pointed out between two cases, which shall not at all weaken the analogy in respect of the argument in hand. And thus there is a danger both of being misled by specious arguments of this description, which have no real force, and also of being staggered by plausible objections against such examples or appeals to authority, etc., as are perfectly valid. Hence Aristotle observes, that an opponent, if he cannot show that the majority of instances is on his side, or that those adduced by his adversary are inapplicable, contends that they, at any rate, differ in something from the case in question.*

Many are misled, in each way, by not estimating aright the degree, and the kind, of difference between two cases. E. g.: It would be admitted that a great and permanent diminution in the quantity of some useful commodity, such as corn, or coal, or iron, throughout the world, would be a serious and lasting loss; and, again, that if the fields and coal-mines yielded regularly double quantities, with the same labor, we should be so much the richer; hence it might be inferred that if the quantity of gold and silver in the world were diminished one-half, or were doubled, like results would follow; the utility of these metals, for the purposes of coin, being very great. Now there are many points of resemblance, and many of difference, between the precious metals on the one hand, and corn, coal, etc., on the other;

* Διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει.—Rhet., Book II., ch. xxvii.
but the important circumstance to the supposed argument is, that the utility of gold and silver (as coin, which is far the chief) depends on their value, which is regulated by their scarcity, or, rather, to speak strictly, by the difficulty of obtaining them; whereas, if corn and coal were ten times more abundant, (i.e., more easily obtained,) a bushel of either would still be as useful as now. But if it were twice as easy to procure gold as it is, a sovereign would be twice as large; if only half as easy, it would be of the size of a half-sovereign; and this (besides the trifling circumstance of the cheapness or dearness of gold ornaments) would be all the difference. The analogy, therefore, fails in the point essential to the argument.

Again, Mandeville's celebrated argument against educating the laboring classes, "If a horse knew as much as a man, I would not be his rider," holds good in reference to slaves, or subjects of a tyranny; governed, as brutes, for the benefit of a master, not for their own; but it wholly fails in reference to men possessing civil rights. If a horse knew as much as a man—i.e., were a rational being—it would be not only unsafe, but unjust, to treat him as a brute. But a government that is for the benefit of the subject, will be the better obeyed, the better informed the people are as to their real interests.

Again, the Apostle Paul recommends to the Corinthians celibacy as preferable to marriage; hence some religionists have inferred that this holds good in respect of all Christians. Now in many most important points, Christians of the present day are in the same condition as the Corinthians; but they were liable to plunder, exile, and many kinds of bitter persecutions from their fellow-citizens; and it appears that this was the very ground on which celibacy was recommended to them, as exempting them from many afflictions and temptations which in such troublous times a family would entail; since, as Bacon observes, "He that hath a wife and children hath given pledges to fortune." Now, it is not, be it observed, on the intrinsic importance of this difference between them and us that the question turns, but on its importance in reference to the advice given.

On the other hand, suppose any one had, at the opening
of the French Revolution, or at any similar conjunction, expressed apprehensions, grounded on a review of history, of the danger of anarchy, bloodshed, destruction of social order, general corruption of morals, and the long train of horrors so vividly depicted by Thucydides as resulting from civil discord, especially in his account of the sedition at Coreya; it might have been answered, that the example does not apply, because there is a great difference between the Greeks in the time of Thucydides, and the nations of modern Europe. Many and great, no doubt, are the differences that might be enumerated: the ancient Greeks had not the use of firearms, nor of the mariner’s compass; they were strangers to the art of printing; their arts of war and of navigation, and their literature, were materially influenced by these differences; they had domestic slaves; they were inferior to us in many manufactures; they excelled us in sculpture, etc., etc. The historian himself, while professing to leave a legacy of instruction for future ages* in the examples of the past, admits that the aspect of political transactions will vary from time to time in their particular forms and external character, as well as in the degrees in which the operation of each principle will, on different occasions, be displayed;† but he contends, that “as long as human nature remains the same,” like causes will come into play, and produce, substantially, like effects.

In Coreya, and afterwards in other of the Grecian States, such enormities, he says, were perpetrated as were the natural result of pitiless oppression, and inordinate thirst for revenge on the oppressors; of a craving desire, in some, to get free from their former poverty, and still more, in others, to gratify their avarice by unjust spoliation; and of the removal of legal restraints from “the natural character of man,” (ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις,) which, in consequence, “eagerly displayed itself as too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and hostile to every superior.”‡ Now the question important

* Κτήμα εἰς ἄει.
† Τὴν γνώμην μὲν, καὶ ἄει ἐσόμενα, ἔως ἄν Ἠ ΛΥΘΗ ΦΥΣΙΣ ἀνθρώπων ἦ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἁγιακήτερα, καὶ τοὺς εἰδέσει διηγαγόμενα, ὥς ἄν, εἰς, τὸν, III., § 82.
‡ Τῳ ὑπὶ ἀνὴρ ἐν Κερερί τὰ θελλά αὐτῶν προεκτελέσθη, καὶ ποιός ὅπερ ἔμεν ἀρχύμενοι τὸ πλέον ἰσοπληροφορία, ὑπὸ τῷ τὴν ἐνεπωρίαν παρατηθοῦντες ἄντιμωμένοι διδασκαλίαν εἰς τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαλλαξιοῦστιν τόσος, μάλιστα δὲ ἀν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμώσεις τὰ τῶν πέλας ἐχειν, παρὰ δίκυρ γεγραμμένοι ... ἐνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ, βιόν, εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τούτον, τῇ πόλει, καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰς ὁμοια καὶ
to the argument is, Are the differences between the ancient Greeks and modern nations of such a character as to make the remarks of Thucydides, and the examples he sets before us, inapplicable? or are they (as he seems to have expected) merely such as to alter the external shape (εἰδος) of the transactions springing from similar human passions? Surely no mere external differences in customs, or in the arts of life, between the ancient Greeks and the French (our supposed disputant might have urged) can produce an essential and fundamental difference of results from any civil commotion; for this, some new vital principle of action must be introduced and established in the heart—something capable of overruling (φύσις ἄνθρωπων) man's natural character. "As long as this remains the same," (ἐὼς ἡ αὐτή ἡ, as the historian himself remarks,) substantially the same results may be looked for.

Again, when the French Revolution did break out, in all its horrors, many apprehended that the infection would spread to England. And there are not a few who are convinced at this day, that but for the interruption of intercourse between the two countries by the war, and the adoption of certain other measures, we should have had a revolution, and one accompanied by nearly equal extravagancies and atrocities. Now the justness of this inference must of course depend on the correctness of the "analogy," in respect of the points most important to the question. All history teaches that the probability of a revolution, and also the violence with which it is conducted, depend, chiefly, on the degree in which a people has been not only exasperated, but also degraded and brutalized by a long course of oppressive misgovernment, and partly on the character of the people themselves (whether arising from those or from any other causes) in respect of blind and precipitate rashness, gross ignorance, and ferocity of disposition. In proportion as these causes exist, a nation is more or less a heap of combustibles ready to catch fire from a spark, and to blaze into a fierce conflagration. A small number of persons endeavored, with very little success, to persuade the English that they were nearly as much

παρὰ τοῦς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀμελῆν ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατῆς μὲν ὀργῆς οὕσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχωντος.—Thucyd., Book III. § 84.
oppressed as the French had been; and the French were partly so far persuaded of this, that they labored to kindle among us a conflagration, from their own. And, on the other hand, there were (and still are) a much greater number who conceived the former condition of the French people to be much nearer our own than in fact it was; who were to a great degree unaware of the full extent of misgovernment under which that country had long suffered, and of the ignorant and degraded—as well as irritated state of the great mass of its population; and who consequently saw no reason to feel confidence that an outbreak nearly resembling that in France might not be apprehended here.*

* The following is an extract from a very able article in the Edinburgh Review, (October, 1842,) on Alison's Europe:

"We do not comprehend the argument which attributes the crimes and impieties of that unhappy time to the demoralizing effects of the Revolution itself. Sudden anarchy may bring evil passions and infidel opinions to light; but we do not understand how it can bring them into existence. Men do not insult their religion and massacre their fellow-creatures, simply because it is in their power. The desire to do so must previously exist, and in France we have every proof that it did exist. We might give innumerable instances of the cruel and vindictive temper displayed from the most ancient times by the lower classes in France. In the Jacquerie, in the civil wars of the Bourguignons and Armagnacs, and in the seditions of the League and the Fronde, they constantly displayed the ferocity naturally excited by slavery and oppression. Their scorn for Christianity, though more recently acquired, had become, long before the Revolution of 1789, as inveterate as their desire for revenge. We shall give, in Mr. Alison's own words, one very singular proof of the extent to which it prevailed. In speaking of the Egyptian expedition, he says: 'They [the French soldiers] not only considered the Christian faith as an entire fabrication, but were for the most part ignorant of its very elements. Lavalette has recorded that hardly one of them had ever been in a church, and that in Palestine they were ignorant even of the name of the holiest places in sacred history.' (III., 419.) This was in 1799, only ten years after the first symptoms of popular innovation. Here, then, were thirty thousand full-grown men, collected promiscuously from all parts of France—many of them well educated, and all of sound mind and body—who appear to have felt about as much interest in the religion of their ancestors as in that of Brahma or Confucius. And yet the great majority of this army must have been born fifteen or twenty years before the first outbreak of the Revolution; and the very youngest of them must have passed their childhood entirely under the ancient
Again, "the argument drawn from the Babylonian and other ancient states having employed Jews in civil capacities, without finding them disloyal, or experiencing any disadvantage from their national attachment, or their peculiar opinions and customs, was met by the reply, that the case of those ancient Jews is not parallel to that of the Jews in the present day; the former having been guilty of the sin of rejecting the Messiah, but being professors of the only true religion then revealed.

"My reason for saying that the above objection is irrelevant, is that the whole question turns on the discrepancy likely to exist between the Jews and those of another religion; and that modern Judaism is not more hostile to Christianity than ancient Judaism was to heathen idolatry. The religious opinions and observances of the Jews, in the days of Daniel for instance, do not appear (it has been urged) to have unfitted them for the civil service of Babylonian or Median princes. And as no one will contend that Daniel, and the rest, were less at variance, in point of religion, with the idolatry of Babylon, than the modern Jews are with Christianity, it is inferred (and surely with great fairness) that these last are as fit for civil employments under Christian princes as their ancestors under Pagan.

"If the question were, what judgment ought to be formed in a religious point of view, of the ancient and of the modern Jews, respectively, we should of course take into account the important distinction which the advent of Christ places between the two. But in a question respecting civil rights and disabilities, this distinction is nothing to the purpose. To allege that the ancient Jews at Babylon professed a true religion in the midst of falsehood, and that their descendants adhere to an erroneous religion in the midst of truth, does not impair the parallel between the two cases, in respect of the present argument, so long as it is but admitted (which no one denies) that the Jews are not now led, by their religion,
to entertain a greater repugnance for Christianity than their ancestors did for Paganism."

Again, to take an instance from another class of political affairs, the manufacture of beet-sugar in France, instead of importing West Indian sugar at a fourth of the price, (and to the English corn-laws nearly similar reasons will apply,) and the prohibition, by the Americans, of British manufactures, in order to encourage home production, (i. e., the manufacture of inferior articles at a much higher cost,) etc., are reprobated as unwise by some politicians, from the analogy of what takes place in private life; in which every man of common prudence prefers buying, whenever he can get them cheapest and best, many commodities which he could make at home, but of inferior quality, and at a greater expense; and confines his own labor to that department in which he finds he can labor to the best advantage. To this it is replied, that there is a great difference between a nation and an individual. And so there is, in many circumstances: a little parcel of sugar or cloth from a shop is considerably different from a ship-load of either; and again, a nation is an object more important, and which fills the mind with a grander idea, than a private individual; it is also a more complex and artificial being; and of indefinite duration of existence; and, moreover, the transactions of each man, as far as he is left free, are regulated by the very person who is to be a gainer or loser by each—the individual himself; who, though his vigilance is sharpened by interest, and his judgment by exercise in his own department, may yet chance to be a man of confined education, possessed of no general principles, and not pretending to be versed in philosophical theories; whereas the affairs of a state are regulated by a Congress, Chamber of Deputies, etc., consisting perhaps of men of extensive reading and speculative minds. Many other striking differences might be enumerated; but the question important to the argument is, Does the expediency, in private

* Remarks on the Jewish Relief Bill, volume of Charges, etc., pp. 454-457. It is remarkable that the very persons who spoke against me on that occasion, (1833,) have since brought forward and carried the very measure I then advocated.
life, of obtaining each commodity at the least cost, and of the best quality we can, depend on any of the circumstances in which an individual differs from a community?

These instances may suffice to illustrate the importance of considering attentively in each case, not what differences or resemblances are intrinsically the greatest, but what are those that do, or that do not, affect the argument. Those who do not fix their minds steadily on this question, when arguments of this class are employed, will often be misled in their own reasonings, and may easily be deceived by a skilful sophist.

In fact, it may be said almost without qualification, that "Wisdom consists in the ready and accurate perception of analogies." Without the former quality, knowledge of the past is nearly uninstructive: without the latter, it is deceptive.

The argument from contraries, (ἐξ ἐναντίων,) noticed by Aristotle, falls under the class I am now treating of; as it is plain that contraries must have something in common; and it is so far forth only as they agree, that they are thus employed in argument. Two things are called "contrary," which, coming under the same class, are the most dissimilar in that class. Thus, virtue and vice are called contraries, as being, both, "moral habits," and the most dissimilar of moral habits. Mere dissimilarity, it is evident, would not constitute contrariety; for no one would say that "virtue" is contrary to a "mathematical problem;" the two things having nothing in common. In this, then, as in other arguments of the same class, we may infer that the two contrary terms have a similar relation to the same third, or, respectively, to two corresponding (i. e., in this case contrary) terms: we may conjecture, e. g., that since virtue may be acquired by education, so may vice; or, again, that since virtue leads to happiness, so does vice to misery.

The phrase "parity of reasoning" is commonly employed to denote analogical reasoning.

This would be the proper place for an explanation of several points relative to "induction," "analogy," etc., which have been treated of in the Elements of Logic. I have only to refer the reader therefore to that work, B. IV., ch. i. and v.; and Appendix, article "Experience."
Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, has divided examples into *real* and *invented*: the one being drawn from actual matter of fact; the other from a supposed case. And he remarks, that though the latter is more easily adduced, the former is more convincing. If, however, due care be taken that the fictitious instance, the supposed case, adduced, be not wanting in *probability*, it will often be no less convincing than the other. For it may so happen, that one, or even several, historical facts may be appealed to, which, being nevertheless exceptions to a general rule, will not prove the probability of the conclusion. Thus, from several known instances of ferocity in black tribes, we are not authorized to conclude that blacks are universally, or generally, ferocious; and, in fact, many instances may be brought forward on the other side. Whereas in the supposed case (instance by Aristotle, as employed by Socrates) of mariners choosing their steersman by lot, though we have no reason to suppose such a case ever occurred, we see so plainly the *probability* that, if it did occur, the lot might fall on an unskilful person, to the loss of the ship, that the argument has considerable weight against the practice, so common in the ancient republics, of appointing magistrates by lot.

There is, however, this important difference: that a fictitious case which has not this intrinsic probability, has absolutely no weight whatever; so that of course such arguments might be multiplied to any amount, without the smallest effect: whereas any matter of fact which is well established, however *unaccountable* it may seem, has *some* degree of weight in reference to a parallel case; and a sufficient number of such arguments may fairly establish a general rule, even though we may be unable, after all, to account for the alleged fact in any of the instances. E. g.: No satisfactory reason has yet been assigned for a connection between the absence of *upper cutting teeth*, or of the presence of *horns*, and *rumination*; but the instances are so numerous and constant of this connection, that no naturalist would hesitate, if, on examination of a new species, he found those teeth absent, and the head horned, to pronounce the animal a ruminant. Whereas, on the other
hand, the fable of the countryman who obtained from Jupiter the regulation of the weather, and in consequence found his crops fail, does not go one step towards proving the intended conclusion; because that consequence is a mere gratuitous assumption without any probability to support it. In fact, the assumption there is not only gratuitous, but is in direct contradiction to experience; for a gardener has, to a certain degree, the command of rain and sunshine, by the help of his watering-pots, glasses, hot-beds, and flues; and the result is not the destruction of his crops.

There is an instance of a like error in a tale of Cumberland's, intended to prove the advantage of a public over a private education. He represents two brothers, educated on the two plans, respectively; the former turning out very well, and the latter very ill; and had the whole been matter of fact, a sufficient number of such instances would have had weight as an argument; but as it is a fiction, and no reason is shown why the result should be such as is represented, except the supposed superiority of a public education, the argument involves a manifest petito principio; and resembles the appeal made, in the well-known fable, to the picture of a man conquering a lion; a result which might just as easily have been reversed, and which would have been so, had lions been painters. It is necessary, in short, to be able to maintain, either that such and such an event did actually take place, or that, under a certain hypothesis, it would be likely to take place.

On the other hand, it is important to observe, with respect to any imaginary case, whether introduced as an argument, or merely for the sake of explanation, that, as it is (according to what I have just said) requisite that the hypothesis should be conceivable, and that the result supposed should follow naturally from it, so, nothing more is to be required. No fact being asserted, it is not fair that any should be denied. Yet it is very common to find persons, "either out of ignorance and infirmity, or out of malice and obstinaey," joining issue on the question whether this or that ever actually took place; and representing the whole controversy as turning on the literal truth of something that had never been affirmed. [See Treatise on Fallacies, Chapter III., § "Irrelevant Conclusion," of which this
is a case.] To obviate this mistake, more care must be taken than would at first sight seem necessary, to remind the hearers that you are merely supposing a case, and not asserting any fact: especially when (as it frequently happens) the supposed case is one which might actually occur, and perhaps does occur.

I can well sympathize with the contempt mingled with indignation expressed by Cicero against certain philosophers who found fault with Plato for having, in a case he proposes, alluded to the fabulous ring of Gyges, which had the virtue of making the wearer invisible. They had found out, it seems, that there never was any such ring.*

It is worth observing, that arguments from example, whether real or invented, are the most easily comprehended by the young and the uneducated; because they facilitate the exercise of abstraction—a power which in such hearers is usually the most imperfect. This mode of reasoning corresponds to a geometrical demonstration by means of a diagram; in which the figure placed before the learner is an individual, employed, as he soon comes to perceive, as a sign—though not an arbitrary sign†—representing the whole class. The algebraic signs, again, are arbitrary; each character not being itself an individual of the class it represents. These last, therefore, correspond to the abstract terms of a language.

Under the head of Invented Example, a distinction is

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* Atque hoc loco, philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fietam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone: quasi vero ille, aut factum id esse, aut fieri potuisse defendat. Hae est vis hujus annuli et hujus exempli, si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem sit, cum aliquld, divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis, caussa feceris—si id diis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sitne facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Quanquam potest id quidem; sed quapro, quod negant posse, id si posset, quiddam facerent? Urgent rustice sane: negant enim posse, et in eo perstant. Hoc verbum quid valeat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si possint celare, quid facturi sint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, etc. (Cic. de Off., B. III., c. ix.)

† The words, written or spoken, of any language, are arbitrary signs; the characters of picture-writing or hieroglyphic are natural signs.
drawn by Aristotle between Parabolē and Logos. From the instances he gives, it is plain that the former corresponds (not to parable, in the sense in which we use the word, derived from that of Parabolē in the sacred writers, but) to illustration; the latter to fable or tale. In the former, an allusion only is made to a case easily supposable; in the latter, a fictitious story is narrated. Thus, in his instance above cited, of illustration, if any one; instead of a mere allusion, should relate a tale of mariners choosing a steersman by lot, and being wrecked in consequence, Aristotle would evidently have placed that under the head of Logos. The other method is of course preferable, from its brevity, whenever the allusion can be readily understood; and accordingly it is common, in the case of well-known fables, to allude to, instead of narrating them. That, e. g., of the horse and the stag, which he gives, would, in the present day, be rather alluded to than told, if we wished to dissuade a people from calling in a too powerful auxiliary. It is evident that a like distinction might have been made in respect of historical examples; those cases which are well known being often merely alluded to and not recited.

The word "fable" is at present generally limited to those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in question is not direct, but analogous; the other class being called novels, tales, etc.* Those resemblances are (as Dr. A. Smith has observed) the most striking, in which the things compared are of the most dissimilar nature; as is the case in what we call fables; and such accordingly are generally preferred for argumentative purposes, both from that circumstance itself, and also on account of the greater brevity which is, for that reason, not only allowed but required in them. For a fable spun out to a great length becomes an allegory, which generally satiates and disgusts: on the other hand, a fictitious tale, having a more direct, and therefore less striking resemblance to reality, requires that an interest in the events and persons should be created by a longer detail, without which it would be insipid. The fable of the Old Man and the Bundle of Sticks, com-

* A novel or tale may be compared to a picture; a fable, to a device.
pared with the Iliad, may serve to exemplify what has been said: the moral conveyed by each being the same, viz., the strength acquired by union, and the weakness resulting from division: the latter fiction would be perfectly insipid if conveyed in a few lines; the former, in twenty-four books, insupportable.

Of the various uses, and of the real or apparent refutation, of examples, (as well as of other arguments,) I shall treat hereafter; but it may be worth while here to observe, that I have been speaking of example as a kind of argument, and with a view therefore to that purpose alone; though it often happens that a resemblance, either direct or analogical, is introduced for other purposes; viz., not to prove anything, but either to illustrate and explain one's meaning, (which is the strict etymological use of the word illustration,) or to amuse the fancy by ornament of language; in which case it is usually called a simile: as, for instance, when a person whose fortitude, forbearance, and other such virtues, are called forth by persecutions and afflictions, is compared to those herbs which give out their fragrance on being bruised. It is of course most important to distinguish, both in our own compositions and those of others, between these different purposes. I shall accordingly advert to this subject in the course of the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE VARIOUS USE AND ORDER OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS AND OF ARGUMENTS IN DIFFERENT CASES.

§ 1.

The first rule to be observed is, that it should be considered whether the principal object of the discourse be to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it, or to compel the assent, or silence the objections, of an opponent. For cases may occur in which
the arguments to be employed with most effect will be different, according as it is the one or the other of these objects that we are aiming at. It will often happen that of the two great classes into which arguments were divided, the "à priori" [or argument from cause to effect] will be principally employed when the chief object is to instruct the learner; and the other class, when our aim is to refute the opponent. And to whatever class the arguments we resort to may belong, the general tenor of the reasoning will, in many respects, be affected by the present consideration. The distinction in question is nevertheless in general little attended to. It is usual to call an argument, simply, strong or weak, without reference to the purpose for which it is designed; whereas, the arguments which afford the most satisfaction to a candid mind are often such as would have less weight in controversy than many others, which again would be less suitable for the former purpose. E. g.: There are some of the internal evidences of Christianity which, in general, are the most satisfactory to a believer’s mind, but are not the most striking in the refutation of unbelievers: the arguments from analogy, on the other hand, which are (in refuting objections) the most unanswerable, are not so pleasing and consolatory.

My meaning cannot be better illustrated than by an instance referred to in that incomparable specimen of reasoning, Dr. Paley’s Horæ Paulinæ: "When we take into our hands the letters" (viz., Paul’s Epistles) "which the suffrage and consent of antiquity hath thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction, which pervades the whole. Let the skeptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be—if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances—I would wish it to be observed, that the proof which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out in words, or of being conveyed to the apprehension of the reader in any other way than by sending him to the books themselves."*

* P. 403.
There is also a passage in Dr. A. Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which illustrates very happily one of the applications of the principle in question: "Sometimes we have occasion to defend the propriety of observing the general rules of justice, by the consideration of their necessity to the support of society. We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more frequently from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxims of conduct. Our indignation rouses, and we are eager to refute and expose such detestable principles. But though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness which originally inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be conclusive. Yet why should it not, if we hate and detest them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation? But when we are asked why we should not act in such or such a manner, the very question seems to suppose that, to those who ask it, this manner of acting does not appear to be so for its own sake the natural and proper object of those sentiments. We must show them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else. Upon this account we generally cast about for other arguments; and the consideration which first occurs to us, is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail, therefore, to insist upon this topic."*

It may serve to illustrate what has been just said, to remark that our judgment of the character of any individual is often not originally derived from such circumstances as we should assign, or could adequately set forth in language, in justification of our opinion. When we undertake to give our reasons for thinking that some individual, with whom we are personally acquainted, is or is not a gentleman, a man of taste, humane, public-spirited, etc., we of course appeal to his conduct, or his distinct avowal of his own sentiments; and if

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these furnish sufficient proof of our assertions, we are admitted to have given good reasons for our opinion; but it may be still doubted whether these were, in the first instance at least, our reasons, which led us to form that opinion. If we carefully and candidly examine our own mind, we shall generally find that our judgment was, originally, (if not absolutely decided,) at least strongly influenced, by the person's looks, tones of voice, gestures, choice of expressions, and the like; which, if stated as reasons for forming a conclusion, would in general appear frivolous, merely because no language is competent adequately to describe them; but which are not necessarily insufficient grounds for beginning at least to form an opinion; since it is notorious that there are many acute persons who are seldom deceived in such indications of character.

In all subjects, indeed, persons unaccustomed to writing or discussion, but possessing natural sagacity, and experience in particular departments, have been observed to be generally unable to give a satisfactory reason for their judgments, even on points on which they are actually very good judges.* This is a defect which it is the business of education (especially the present branch of it) to surmount or diminish. After all, however, in some subjects, no language can adequately convey (to the inexperienced at least) all the indications which influence the judgment of an acute and practiced observer. And hence it has been justly and happily remarked, that "he must be an indifferent physician who never takes any step for which he cannot assign a satisfactory reason."

§ 2.

It is a point of great importance to decide in each case, at the outset, in your own mind, and clearly to point out to the hearer, as occasion may serve, on which side the presumption lies, and to which belongs the [onus probandi] burden of proof. For though it may often be expedient to bring forward more proofs than can be fairly demanded of you, it is always desirable, when this is the case, that it should be known, and that the strength of the cause should be estimated accordingly.

* See Aristotle's Ethics, B. VI.
According to the most correct use of the term, a "presumption" in favor of any supposition means, not (as has been sometimes erroneously imagined) a preponderance of probability in its favor, but such a preoccupation of the ground as implies that it must stand good till some sufficient reason is adduced against it; in short, that the burden of proof lies on the side of him who would dispute it.

Thus, it is a well-known principle of the law, that every man (including a prisoner brought up for trial) is to be presumed innocent till his guilt is established. This does not, of course, mean that we are to take for granted he is innocent; for if that were the case, he would be entitled to immediate liberation; nor does it mean that it is antecedently more likely than not that he is innocent, or that the majority of those brought to trial are so. It evidently means only that the "burden of proof" lies with the accusers; that he is not to be called on to prove his innocence, or to be dealt with as a criminal till he has done so; but that they are to bring their charges against him, which if he can repel, he stands acquitted.

Thus, again, there is a "presumption" in favor of the right of any individuals or bodies corporate to the property of which they are in actual possession. This does not mean that they are, or are not, likely to be the rightful owners; but merely, that no man is to be disturbed in his possessions till some claim against him shall be established. He is not to be called on to prove his right; but the claimant to disprove it; upon whom, consequently, the "burden of proof" lies.

A moderate portion of common sense will enable any one to perceive, and to show, on which side the presumption lies, when once his attention is called to this question; though, for want of attention, it is often overlooked; and on the determination of this question the whole character of a discussion will often very much depend. A body of troops may be perfectly adequate to the defence of a fortress against any attack that may be made on it; and yet, if, ignorant of the advantage they possess, they sally forth into the open field to encounter the enemy, they may suffer a repulse. At any rate, even if strong enough to act on the offensive, they ought
still to keep possession of their fortress. In like manner, if you have the "presumption" on your side, and can but refute all the arguments brought against you, you have, for the present at least, gained a victory; but if you abandon this position, by suffering this presumption to be forgotten, which is in fact leaving out one of; perhaps, your strongest arguments, you may appear to be making a feeble attack, instead of a triumphant defence.

Such an obvious case as one of those just stated, will serve to illustrate this principle. Let any one imagine a perfectly unsupported accusation of some offence to be brought against himself; and then let him imagine himself—instead of replying (as of course he would do) by a simple denial, and a defiance of his accuser to prove the charge—setting himself to establish a negative—taking on himself the burden of proving his own innocence, by collecting all the circumstances indicative of it that he can muster; and the result would be, in many cases, that this evidence would fall far short of establishing a certainty, and might even have the effect of raising a suspicion against him;* he having in fact kept out of sight the important circumstance, that these probabilities in one scale, though of no great weight perhaps in themselves, are to be weighed against absolutely nothing in the other scale.

The following are a few of the cases in which it is important, though very easy, to point out where the presumption lies.

There is a presumption in favor of every existing institution. Many of these (we will suppose the majority) may be susceptible of alteration for the better; but still the "burden of proof" lies with him who proposes an alteration; simply on the ground that since a change is not a good in itself, he who demands a change should show cause for it. No one is called on (though he may find it advisable) to defend an existing institution, till some argument is adduced against it; and that argument ought in fairness to prove, not merely an actual inconvenience, but the possibility of a change for the better.

Every book again, as well as person, ought to be pre-

* Hence the French proverb, "Qui s'excuse, s'accuse."
sumed harmless (and consequently the copyright protected by our courts) till something is proved against it. It is a hardship to require a man to prove, either of his book, or of his private life, that there is no ground for any accusation, or else to be denied the protection of his country. The burden of proof, in each case, lies fairly on the accuser. I cannot but consider therefore as utterly unreasonable the decisions (which some years ago excited so much attention) to refuse the interference of the Court of Chancery in cases of piracy, whenever there was even any doubt whether the book pirated might not contain something of an immoral tendency.

There is a "presumption" against any thing paradoxical, i.e., contrary to the prevailing opinion: it may be true; but the burden of proof lies with him who maintains it; since men are not to be expected to abandon the prevailing belief till some reason is shown.

Hence it is, probably, that many are accustomed to apply "paradox" as if it were a term of reproach, and implied absurdity or falsity. But correct use is in favor of the etymological sense. If a paradox is unsupported, it can claim no attention; but if false, it should be censured on that ground; but not for being new. If true, it is the more important, for being a truth not generally admitted. "Interdum vulgus rectum videt; est ubi peccat." Yet one often hears a charge of "paradox and nonsense" brought forward, as if there was some close connection between the two. And indeed, in one sense this is the case; for to those who are too dull, or too prejudiced, to admit any notion at variance with those they have been used to entertain, (παρὰ δόξαν,) that may appear nonsense which to others is sound sense. Thus "Christ crucified" was "to the Jews a stumbling-block," (paradox,) "and to the Greeks foolishness;" because the one "required a sign" of a different kind from any that appeared; and the others "sought after wisdom" in their schools of philosophy.

Accordingly, there was a presumption against the gospel in its first announcement. A Jewish peasant claimed to be the promised Deliverer, in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.
The burden of proof lay with him. No one could be fairly called on to admit his pretensions till he showed cause for believing in him. If he "had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin."

Now, the case is reversed. Christianity exists; and those who deny the Divine origin attributed to it, are bound to show some reasons for assigning to it a human origin: not indeed to prove that it did originate in this or that way, without supernatural aid; but to point out some conceivable way in which it might have so arisen.

It is indeed highly expedient to bring forward evidence to establish the Divine origin of Christianity; but it ought to be more carefully kept in mind than is done by most writers, that all this is an argument "ex abundanti," as the phrase is—over and above what can fairly be called for, till some hypothesis should be framed to account for the origin of Christianity by human means. The burden of proof, now, lies plainly on him who rejects the gospel; which, if it were not established by miracles, demands an explanation of the greater miracle—its having been established, in defiance of all opposition, by human contrivance.

The burden of proof, again, lay on the authors of the Reformation: they were bound to show cause for every change they advocated; and they admitted the fairness of this requisition, and accepted the challenge. But they were not bound to show cause for retaining what they left unaltered. The presumption was, in those points, on their side; and they had only to reply to objections. This important distinction is often lost sight of, by those who look at the "doctrines, etc., of the Church of England as constituted at the Reformation," in the mass, without distinguishing the altered from the unaltered parts. The framers of the Articles kept this in mind in their expression respecting infant baptism, that it "ought by all means to be retained." They did not introduce the practice, but left it as they found it; considering the burden to lie on those who denied its existence in the primitive Church, to show when it did arise.

The case of Episcopacy is exactly parallel; but Hooker seems to have overlooked this advantage: he sets himself to prove the apostolic origin of the institution, as if his task
had been to introduce it.* Whatever force there may be in arguments so adduced, it is plain they must have far more force if the important presumption be kept in view, that the institution had notoriously existed many ages, and that consequently, even if there had been no direct evidence for its being coeval with Christianity, it might fairly be at least supposed to be so, till some other period should be pointed out at which it had been introduced as an innovation.

In the case of any doctrines, again, professing to be essential parts of the gospel revelation, the fair presumption is that we shall find all such distinctly declared in Scripture. And again, in respect of commands or prohibitions as to any point, which our Lord or his apostles did deliver, there is a presumption that Christians are bound to comply. If any one maintains, on the ground of tradition, the necessity of some additional article of faith, (as for instance that of purgatory,) or the propriety of a departure from the New Testament precepts, (as for instance in the denial of the cup to the laity in the eucharist,) the burden of proof lies with him. We are not called on to prove that there is no tradition to the purpose; much less, that no tradition can have any weight at all in any case. It is for him to prove, not merely generally, that there is such a thing as tradition, and that it is entitled to respect, but that there is a tradition relative to each of the points which he thus maintains; and that such tradition is, in each point, sufficient to establish that point. For want of observing this rule, the most vague and interminable disputes have often been carried on respecting tradition, generally.

It should be also remarked under this head, that in any one question the presumption will often be found to lie on different sides, in respect of different parties. E. g.: In the question between a member of the Church of England and a Presbyterian, or member of any other Church, on which side does the presumption lie? Evidently, to each, in favor of the religious community to which he at present belongs. He

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* On the ambiguous employment of the phrase "Divine origin"—a great source of confused reasoning among theologians—I have offered some remarks in Essay II., "On the Kingdom of Christ," § 17, 4th edit.
is not to separate from the Church of which he is a member, without having some sufficient reason to allege.

A presumption evidently admits of various degrees of strength, from the very faintest, up to a complete and confident acquiescence.

The person, body, or book, in favor of whose decisions there is a certain presumption, is said to have, so far, "authority," in the strict sense of the word. And a recognition of this kind of authority—an habitual presumption in favor of such a one's decisions or opinions—is usually called "deference."

It will often happen that this deference is not recognized by either party. A man will perhaps disavow with scorn all deference for some person—a son or daughter, perhaps, or an humble companion—whom he treats, in manner, with familiar superiority; and the other party will as readily and sincerely renounce all pretension to authority; and yet there may be that "habitual presumption" in the mind of the one, in favor of the opinions, suggestions, etc., of the other, which we have called deference. These parties, however, are not using the words in a different sense, but are unaware of the state of the fact. There is a deference; but unconscious.

Those who are habitually wanting in deference towards such as we think entitled to it, are usually called "arrogant;" the word being used as distinguished from self-conceited, proud, vain, and other kindred words. Such persons may be described as having an habitual and exclusive "self-deference."

Of course the persons and works which are looked up to as high authorities, or the contrary, will differ in each age, country, and class of men. But most people are disposed—measuring another by their own judgment—to reckon him arrogant who disregards what they deem the best authorities. That man, however, may most fairly and strictly be so called who has no deference for those whom he himself thinks most highly of. And instances may be found of this character: i.e., of a man who shall hold in high estimation the ability and knowledge of certain persons—rating them perhaps

* See article "Authority," in Appendix to "Elements of Logic."
above himself—whose most deliberate judgments, even on matters they are most conversant with, he will nevertheless utterly set at naught, in *each particular case* that arises, if they happen not to coincide with the idea that first strikes his mind.

For it is to be observed that *admiration, esteem, and concurrence in opinion* are quite distinct from "deference," and not necessarily accompanied by it.

If any one makes what appears to us to be a very just remark, or if we acquiesce in what he proposes on account of the reasons he alleges, this is not deference. And if this has happened many times, and we thence form a high opinion of his ability, this again neither implies nor even necessarily produces deference; though, in reason, such *ought* to be the result. But one may often find a person conversant with two others, A and B, and estimating A without hesitation as the superior man of the two; and yet, in any case whatever that may arise, where A and B differ in their judgment, taking for granted at once that B is in the right.

*Admiration, esteem, etc., are more the result of a judgment of the understanding; (though often of an erroneous one;) "deference" is apt to depend on feelings; often on whimsical and unaccountable feelings. It is often yielded to a vigorous claim—to an authoritative and overbearing demeanor. With others, of an opposite character, a soothing, insinuating, flattering, and seemingly submissive demeanor will often gain great influence. They will yield to those who seem to yield to them; the others, to those who seem resolved to yield to no one. Those who seek to gain adherents to their school or party by putting forth the claim of *antiquity* in favor of their tenets, are likely to be peculiarly successful among those of an arrogant disposition. A book or a tradition of a thousand years old appears to be rather a *thing* than a *person*; and will thence often be regarded with blind deference by those who are prone to treat their contemporaries with insolent contempt, but who "will not go to compare with an old man."*

*Shakspeare, Twelfth Night.*
fifteen or sixteen centuries ago, and whom, if now living, they would not treat with decent respect.

With some persons, again, authority seems to act according to the law of gravitation—inversely as the squares of the distances. They are inclined to be of the opinion of the person who is nearest. Personal affection, again, in many minds, generates deference. They form a habit of first wishing, secondly hoping, and thirdly believing a person to be in the right, whom they would be sorry to think mistaken. In a state of morbid depression of spirits, the same cause leads to the opposite effect. To a person in that state, whatever he would be "sorry to think" appears probable; and consequently there is a presumption in his mind against the opinions, measures, etc., of those he is most attached to. That the degree of deference felt for any one's authority ought to depend not on our feelings, but on our judgment, it is almost superfluous to remark; but it is important to remember that there is a danger on both sides—of an unreasonable presumption either on the side of our wishes, or against them.

It is obvious that deference ought to be, and usually is, felt in reference to particular points. One has a deference for his physician, in questions of medicine; and for his bailiff, in questions of farming; but not vice versa. And, accordingly, deference may be misplaced in respect to the subject, as well as of the person. It is conceivable that one may have a due degree of deference, and an excess of it, and a deficiency of it, all towards the same person, but in respect of different points.

It is worth remarking, as a curious fact, that men are liable to deceive themselves as to the degree of deference they feel towards various persons. But the case is the same (as I shall have occasion hereafter to point out*) with many other feelings also, such as pity, contempt, love, joy, etc.; in respect of which we are apt to mistake the conviction that such and such an object deserves pity, contempt, etc., for the feeling itself; which often does not accompany that conviction. And so, also, a person will perhaps describe himself (with sincere good faith) as feeling great deference towards some one, on

* Part II., ch. i., § 2.
the ground of his believing him to be entitled to it; and perhaps being really indignant against any one else who does not manifest it. Sometimes, again, one will mistake for a feeling of deference his concurrence with another's views, and admiration of what is said or done by him. But this, as has been observed above, does not imply deference, if the same approbation would have been bestowed on the same views, supposing them stated and maintained in an anonymous paper. The converse mistake is equally natural. A man may fancy that, in each case, he acquiesces in such a one's views or suggestions from the dictates of judgment, and for the reasons given; ("What she does seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best;"*) when yet perhaps the very same reasons, coming from another, would have been rejected.

Statements of facts liable to be disregarded, when coming from those whose judgment is undervalued.

It is worth observing, also, that though, as has been above remarked, (Ch. II., § 4,) questions of fact and of opinion ought to be decided on very different grounds, yet, with many persons, a statement of facts is very little attended to when coming from one for whose judgment (though they do not deliberately doubt his veracity) they have little or no deference. For, by common minds, the above distinction, between matters of fact and opinion, is but imperfectly apprehended.† It is not therefore always superfluous to endeavor to raise a presumption in favor of the judgment of one whom you wish to obtain credit, even in respect of matters in which judgment has, properly, little or no concern.

It is usual, and not unreasonable, to pay more deference—other points being equal—to the decisions of a council or assembly of any kind, (embodied in a manifesto, act of parliament, speech from the throne, report, set of articles, etc.,) than to those of an individual, equal or even superior to any member of such assembly. But in one point—and it is a very important one, though usually overlooked—this rule is subject to something of an exception; which may be thus stated: in any composition of an individual who is deemed worthy of respect, we presume that whatever he says must

* Milton.

† It is a curious characteristic of some of our older writers, that they are accustomed to cite authorities, and that most profusely, for matters of opinion, while for facts they often omit to cite any.
have some meaning—must tend toward some object which could not be equally accomplished by erasing the whole passage. He is expected never to lay down a rule, and then add exceptions, nearly or altogether coëxtensive with it; nor in any way to have so modified and explained away some assertion, that each portion of a passage shall be virtually neutralized by the other. Now if we interpret in this way any joint production of several persons, we shall often be led into mistakes. For those who have had experience as members of any deliberative assembly, know by that experience (what indeed any one might conjecture) how much compromise will usually take place between conflicting opinions, and what will naturally thence result. One person, e. g., will urge the insertion of something which another disapproves; and the result will usually be, after much debate, something of what is popularly called "splitting the difference:" the insertion will be made, but accompanied with such limitations and modifications as nearly to nullify it. A fence will be erected in compliance with one party, and a gap will be left in it to gratify another. And again, there will often be, in some document of this class, a total silence on some point, whereon, perhaps, most of the assembly would have preferred giving a decision, but could not agree what decision it should be.

A like character will often be found also in the composition of a single individual, when his object is to conciliate several parties whose views are conflicting. He then represents, as it were, in his own mind, an assembly composed of those parties.

Any one, therefore, who should think himself bound, in due deference for the collective wisdom of some august assembly, to interpret any joint composition of it exactly as he would that of a respectable individual, and never to attribute to it any thing of that partially inconsistent and almost nugatory character which the writings of a sensible and upright man would be exempt from—any one, I say, who should proceed (as many do) on such a principle, would be often greatly misled.*

* In studying the Scriptures, we must be on our guard against the converse mistake, of interpreting the Bible as if it were one book, the joint work of the sacred writers, instead of, what it is, several distinct books, written by individuals independently of each other.
It may be added, that the deference due to the decisions of an assembly is sometimes, erroneously, transferred to those of some individual member of it; that is, it is sometimes taken for granted that what they have, jointly, put forth, is to be interpreted by what he, in his own writings, may have said on the same points. And yet it may sometimes be the fact, that the strong expressions of his sentiments in his own writings may have been omitted in the joint production of the assembly, precisely because not approved by the majority in that assembly.

It is to be observed, that a presumption may be rebutted by an opposite presumption, so as to shift the burden of proof to the other side. E. g.: Suppose you had advised the removal of some existing restriction: you might be, in the first instance, called on to take the burden of proof, and allege your reasons for the change, on the ground that there is a presumption against every change. But you might fairly reply, "True, but there is another presumption which rebuts the former: every restriction is in itself an evil;* and therefore there is a presumption in favor of its removal, unless it can be shown necessary for prevention of some greater evil: I am not bound to allege any specific inconvenience; if the restriction is unnecessary, that is reason enough for its abolition: its defenders therefore are fairly called on to prove its necessity."

Again, in reference to the prevailing opinion, that the "Nathanael" of John's Gospel was the same person as the Apostle "Bartholomew" mentioned in the others, an intelligent friend once remarked to me that two names afford a "prima facie" presumption of two persons. But the name of Bartholomew, being a "patronymic," (like Simon Peter's designation Bar-Jona, and Joseph's surname of Barsabas, mentioned in Acts—he being probably the same with the Apostle "Joseph Barnabas," etc.,) affords a counter-presumption that he must have had another name, to distinguish him from his own kindred. And thus we are left open to the arguments drawn from the omission, by the other Evangelists, of the name of Nathanael—evidently a very eminent

* See "Charges and other Tracts," p. 447.
† See Essay II., "On the Kingdom of Christ," § 38.
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disciple—the omission by John of the name of the Apostle Bartholomew, and the recorded intimacy with the Apostle Philip.

In one of Lord Dudley's (lately published) letters to Bishop Copleston, of the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the science of Logic, that it was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods when the intellectual powers of mankind seemed nearly paralyzed—when no discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and deep-rooted; and that when the mental activity of the world revived, and philosophical inquiry flourished, and bore its fruits, logical studies fell into decay and contempt. To many minds this would appear a decisive argument. The author himself was too acute to see more in it than—what it certainly is—a fair presumption. And he would probably have owned that it might be met by a counter-presumption.

When any science or pursuit has been unduly and unwiseiy followed, to the neglect of others, and has even been intruded into their province, we may Presumption against Logic. presume that a reaction will be likely to ensue, and an equally excessive contempt, or dread, or abhorrence, to succeed.* And the same kind of reaction occurs in every department of life. It is thus that the thraldom of gross superstition and tyrannical priestcraft have so often led to irreligion. It is thus that "several valuable medicines, which, when first introduced, were proclaimed each as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite disorders, fell, consequently, in many instances, for a time, into total disuse; though afterwards they were established in their just estimation, and employed conformably to their real properties."†

So, it might have been said, in the present case, the mistaken and absurd cultivation of Logic during ages of great intellectual darkness might be expected to produce, in a subsequent age of comparative light, an association, in men's minds, of Logic with the idea of apathetic ignorance, prejudice, and adherence to error; so that the legitimate uses and

* I dwelt on this subject in a charge to the Dioceses of Dublin, 1843.
† Elements of Logic, Preface, p. 13.
just value of Logic, supposing it to have any, would be likely to be scornfully overlooked. Our ancestors, it might have been said, having neglected to raise fresh crops of corn, and contented themselves with vainly threshing over and over again the same straw, and winnowing the same chaff, it might be expected that their descendants would, for a time, regard the very operations of threshing and winnowing with contempt, and would attempt to grind corn, chaff, and straw, all together.

Such might have been, at that time, a statement of the counter-presumptions on this point.

Subsequently, the presumption in question has been completely done away. And it is a curious circumstance that the very person to whom that letter was addressed should have witnessed so great a change in public opinion—brought about (in great measure through his own instrumentality) within a small portion of the short interval between the writing of that letter and its publication—that the whole ground of Lord Dudley's argument is cut away. During that interval the article on Logic in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana" (great part of the matter of it having been furnished by Bishop Copleston) was drawn up; and attracted so much attention as to occasion its publication in a separate volume; and this has been repeatedly reprinted both at home and in the United States of America, (where it is used as a text-book in, I believe, every college throughout the Union,) with a continually increasing circulation, which all the various attempts made to decry the study seem only to augment; while sundry abridgments, and other elementary treatises on the subject, have been appearing with continually increased frequency.

Certainly, Lord Dudley, were he now living, would not speak of the "general neglect and contempt" of Logic at present; though so many branches of science, philosophy, and literature have greatly flourished during the interval.

The popularity indeed, or unpopularity, of any study, does not furnish, alone, a decisive proof as to its value; but it is plain that a presumption—whether strong or weak—which is based on the fact of general neglect and contempt, is destroyed, when these have ceased.

It has been alleged, however, that "the science of mind"
has not flourished during the last twenty years; and that, consequently, the present is to be accounted such a dark period as Lord Dudley alludes to.

Supposing the statement to be well founded, it is nothing to the purpose; since Lord Dudley was speaking, not of any one science in particular, but of the absence or presence of intellectual cultivation, and of knowledge generally—the depressed or flourishing condition of science, arts, and philosophy on the whole.

But as for the state of the "science of mind" at any given period, that is altogether a matter of opinion. It was probably considered by the Schoolmen to be most flourishing in the ages which we call "dark." And it is not unlikely that the increased attention bestowed, of late years, on Logic, and the diminished popularity of those metaphysicians who have written against it, may appear to the disciples of these last a proof of the low state (as it is, to logical students, a sign of the improving state) of "the science of mind." That is, regarding the prevalence at present of logical studies as a sign that ours is "a dark age," this supposed darkness, again, furnishes in turn a sign that these studies flourish only in a dark age!

Again, there is (according to the old maxim of "peritis credendum est in arte sua") a presumption, (and a fair one,) in respect of each question, in favor of the judgment of the most eminent men in the department it pertains to: of eminent physicians, e. g., in respect of medical questions; of theologians, in theological, etc. And by this presumption many of the Jews in our Lord's time seem to have been influenced, when they said, "Have any of the rulers or of the Pharisees believed on him?"

But there is a counter-presumption, arising from the circumstance that men eminent in any department are likely to regard with jealousy any one who professes to bring to light something unknown to themselves; especially if it promise to supersede, if established, much of what they have been accustomed to learn, and teach, and practice. And moreover, in respect of the medical profession, there is an obvious danger of a man's being regarded as a dangerous experimentalist who adopts any novelty, and of his thus losing
practice even among such as may regard him with admiration as a philosopher. In confirmation of this, it may be sufficient to advert to the cases of Harvey and Jenner. Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood is said to have lost him most of his practice, and to have been rejected by every physician in Europe above the age of forty. And Jenner's discovery of vaccination had, in a minor degree, similar results.

There is also this additional counter-presumption against the judgment of the proficients in any department: that they are prone to a bias in favor of every thing that gives the most palpable superiority to themselves over the uninitiated, [the idiot,] and affords the greatest scope for the employment and display of their own peculiar acquirements. Thus, e. g., if there be two possible interpretations of some clause in an act of parliament, one of which appears obvious to every reader of plain good sense, and the other can be supported only by some ingenious and far-fetched legal subtility, a practiced lawyer will be liable to a bias in favor of the latter, as setting forth the more prominently his own peculiar qualifications. And on this principle in great measure seems founded Bacon's valuable remark: "Harum artium sepe pravus fit usus, ne sit nullus." Rather than let their knowledge and skill lie idle, they will be tempted to misapply them: like a schoolboy, who, when possessed of a knife, is for trying its edge on every thing that comes in his way. On the whole, accordingly, I think that of these two opposite presumptions, the counter-presumption has often as much weight as the other, and sometimes more.

It might be hastily imagined that there is necessarily an advantage in having the presumption on one's side, and the burden of proof on the adversary's. But it is often much the reverse. E. g.: "In no other instance perhaps," (says Dr. Hawkins, in his valuable "Essay on Tradition,"" "besides that of religion, do men commit the very illogical mistake, of first canvassing all the objections against any particular system whose pretensions to truth they would examine, before they consider the direct arguments in its favor." (P. 82.) But why, it may be asked, do they make such a mistake in this case? An answer which I think would apply to a large proportion
of such persons, is this: Because a man having been brought up in a Christian country has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from their infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to regard an uninquiring assent as a mark of commendable faith; and hence he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself the question, Why should I receive Christianity as a Divine revelation? Christianity being nothing new to him, and the presumption being in favor of it, while the burden of proof lies on its opponents, he is not stimulated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted. And when it is controverted—when an opponent urges, How do you reconcile this, and that, and the other, with the idea of a Divine revelation? these objections strike by their novelty—by their being opposed to what is generally received. He is thus excited to inquiry; which he sets about—naturally enough, but very unwisely—by seeking for answers to all these objections; and fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily solved, he ought not to receive the religion.* "As if (says the author already cited) there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable arguments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections, numerous, plausible, and by no means easy of solution." "There are objections (said Dr. Johnson) against a plenum and objections against a vacuum; but one of them must be true." He adds that "sensible men really desirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to examine first the argument in favor of that side of the question where the first presumption of truth appears. And the presumption is manifestly in favor of that religious creed already adopted by the country. . . . Their very earliest inquiry, therefore, must be into the direct arguments for the authority of that book on which their country rests its religion."

But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a strong temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded against, to adopt the opposite course—to attend first to the objections which are brought against what is estab-

* See the Lessons on Objections, in the "Easy Lessons on Christian Evidences," (published by Parker, West Strand, and also by the Christian Knowledge Society.)
lished, and which, for that very reason, rouse the mind from a state of apathy. Accordingly, I have not found that this "very illogical mistake" is by any means peculiar to the case of religion.

When Christianity was first preached, the state of things was reversed. The presumption was against it, as being a novelty. "Seeing that these things cannot be spoken against, ye ought to be quiet," was a sentiment which favored an in-dolent acquiescence in the old Pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the side of those who came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The first inquiry of any one who at all attended to the subject must have been, not, What are the objections to Christianity? but, On what grounds do these men call on me to receive them as Divine messengers? And the same appears to be the case with those Polynesians among whom our missionaries are laboring: they begin by inquiring, "Why should we receive this religion?" And those of them accordingly who have embraced it, appear to be Christians on a much more rational and deliberate conviction than many among us, even of those who, in general maturity of intellect and civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders.

I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious education, but pointing out the peculiar temptations which accompany it. The Jews and Pagans had, in their early prejudices, greater difficulties to surmount than ours; but they were difficulties of a different kind.*

Thus much may suffice to show the importance of taking this preliminary view of the state of each question to be discussed.

§ 3.

Matters of opinion (as they are called; i. e., where we are not said properly to know, but to judge, see Ch. II., § 4) are established chiefly by antecedent probability; [arguments of the first class, viz., from cause to effect;] though the testimony (i. e., authority) of wise men is also admissible: past facts, chiefly by signs, of various kinds; (that term, it must be remembered, in-

* Logic, Appendix.
eluding testimony;) and future events, by antecedent probabilities, and examples.

Example, however, is not excluded from the proof of matters of opinion; since a man’s judgment in one case may be aided or corrected by an appeal to his judgment in another similar case. It is in this way that we are directed, by the highest authority, to guide our judgment in those questions in which we are most liable to deceive ourselves; viz., what, on each occasion, ought to be our conduct towards another: we are directed to frame for ourselves a similar supposed case, by imagining ourselves to change places with our neighbor, and then considering how, in that case, we should in fairness expect to be treated.

This, however, which is the true use of the celebrated precept “to do as we would be done by;” is often overlooked; and it is spoken of as if it were a rule designed to supersede all other moral maxims, and to teach us the intrinsic character of right and wrong. This absurd mistake may be one cause why the precept is so much more talked of than attempted to be applied. For it could not be applied with any good result by one who should have no notions already formed of what is just and unjust. To take one instance out of many: if he had to decide a dispute between two of his neighbors, he would be sure that each was wishing for a decision in his own favor; and he would be at a loss therefore how to comply with the precept in respect of either, without violating it in respect of the other. The true meaning of the precept plainly is, that you should do to another not necessarily what you would wish, but what you would expect as fair and reasonable, if you were in his place. This evidently presupposes that you have a knowledge of what is fair and reasonable; and the precept then furnishes a formula for the application of this knowledge in a case where you would be liable to be blinded by self-partiality.

A very good instance of an argument drawn from a “parallel case” in which most men’s judgments would lead them aright, I have met with in a memoir of Roger Williams, a settler in North America in the seventeenth century, who was distinguished as a zealous missionary among the Indians, and also as an advocate of the then unpopular doctrine of religious liberty:
"He was at all times and under all changes the undaunted champion of religious freedom. It was speedily professed by him on his arrival among those who sought in America a refuge from persecution; and, strange as it may seem, it was probably the first thing that excited the prejudices of the Massachusetts and Plymouth rulers against him. He was accused of carrying this favorite doctrine so far, as to exempt from punishment any criminal who pleaded conscience. But let his own words exculpate him from this charge: 'That ever I should speak or write a tittle that tends to such an infinite liberty of conscience, is a mistake, and which I have ever disclaimed and abhorred. To prevent such mistakes, I at present shall only propose this case. There goes many a ship to sea with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is common; and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or an human combination or society. It hath fallen out, sometimes, that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked into one ship. Upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty of conscience that ever I pleaded for turns upon these two hinges, that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers, nor compelled from their own particular prayers or worship, if they practice any. I further add, that I never denied that, notwithstanding this liberty, the commander of the ship ought to command the ship's course; yea, and also command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and practiced both among the seamen and all the passengers. If any of the seamen refuse to perform their service, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse to help, in person or purse, towards the common charges or defence; if any refuse to obey the common laws and order of the ship concerning their common peace and preservation; if any shall mutiny and rise up against their commanders and officers; if any should preach or write that there ought to be no commanders or officers, because all are equal in Christ, therefore no masters nor officers, no laws nor orders, no corrections nor punishments, I say I never denied but in such cases, whatever is pretended, the commander or commanders may judge, resist, compel, and punish such transgressors, according to their deserts and merits.'"

It happens more frequently than not, however, that when,
in the discussion of matters of opinion, an example is introduced, it is designed, not for argument, but, strictly speaking, for illustration; not to prove the proposition in question, but to make it more clearly understood: e. g., the proposition maintained by Cicero (de Off., Book III.) is what may be accounted a matter of opinion; viz., that "nothing is expedient which is dishonorable:" when then he adduces the example of the supposed design of Themistocles to burn the allied fleet, which he maintains, in contradiction to Aristides, would have been inexpedient, because unjust, it is manifest that we must understand the instance brought forward as no more than an illustration of the general principle he intends to establish; since it would be a plain begging of the question to argue from a particular assertion, which could only be admitted by those who assented to the general principle.

It is important to distinguish between these two uses of example; that, on the one hand, we may not be led to mistake for an argument such a one as the foregoing; and that, on the other hand, we may not too hastily charge with sophistry him who adduces such a one simply with a view to explanation.

Our Lord's parables are mostly of the explanatory kind. His discourses generally, indeed, are but little argumentative. "He taught as one having authority;" stating and explaining his doctrines, and referring for proof to his actions: "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me."

It is also of the greatest consequence to distinguish between examples (of the invented kind) properly so called—i. e., which have the force of arguments—and comparisons introduced for the ornament of style, in the form, either of simile, as it is called, or metaphor. Not only is an ingenious comparison often mistaken for a proof, though it be such as, when tried by the rules laid down here and in the treatise on Logic, affords no proof at all;* but also, on the other hand, a real and valid

* The pleasure derived from taking in the author's meaning when an ingenious comparison is employed, (referred by Aristotle to the pleasure of the act of learning,) is so great, that the reader or hearer
argument is not unfrequently considered merely as an ornament of style, if it happen to be such as to produce that effect; though there is evidently no reason why that should not be fair analogical reasoning, in which the new idea introduced by the analogy chances to be a sublime or a pleasing one. E. g.: "The efficacy of penitence, and piety, and prayer, in rendering the Deity propitious, is not irreconcilable with the immutability of his nature, and the steadiness of his purposes. It is not in man's power to alter the course of the sun; but it is often in his power to cause the sun to shine or not to shine upon him: if he withdraws from its beams, or spreads a curtain before him, the sun no longer shines on him; if he quits the shade, or removes the curtain, the light is restored to him; and though no change is in the meantime effected in the heavenly luminary, but only in himself, the result is the same as if it were. Nor is the immutability of God any reason why the returning sinner, who tears away the veil of prejudice or of indifference, should not again be blessed with the sunshine of Divine favor." The image here introduced is ornamental, but the argument is not the less perfect; since the case adduced fairly establishes the general principle required, that "a change effected in one of two objects having a certain relation to each other, may have the same practical result as if it had taken place in the other."* 

The mistake in question is still more likely to occur when such an argument is conveyed in a single term employed metaphorically; as is generally the case where the allusion is common and obvious: e. g., "We do not receive as the genuine doctrines of the primitive Church what have passed down the polluted stream of tradition." The argument here is not the less valid for being conveyed in the form of a metaphor.†

is apt to mistake his apprehension of this for a perception of a just and convincing analogy. See Part III., ch. ii., § 3. See Appendix [F] for two instances of "explanatory illustration," both of them highly ornamental also.

* For an instance of a highly beautiful, and at the same time argumentative comparison, see Appendix, [G.] It appears to me that the passage printed in italics affords a reason for thinking it probable that the causes of the apostles' conduct are rightly assigned.

† See Part III., ch. ii., § 4.
The employment, in questions relating to the future, both of the argument from example, and of that from cause to effect, may be explained from what has been already said concerning the connection between them; some cause, whether known or not, being always supposed, whenever an example is adduced.

§ 4.

When arguments of each of the two formerly mentioned classes are employed, those from cause to effect (antecedent probability) have usually the precedence.

Men are apt to listen with prejudice to the arguments adduced to prove any thing which appears abstractedly improbable; i. e., according to what has been above laid down, unnatural, or (if such an expression might be allowed) un plausible; and this prejudice is to be removed by the argument from cause to effect, which thus prepares the way for the reception of the other arguments. E. g.: If a man who bore a good character were accused of corruption, the strongest evidence against him might avail little; but if he were proved to be of a covetous disposition, this, though it would not alone be allowed to substantiate the crime, would have great weight in inducing his judges to lend an ear to the evidence. And thus in what relates to the future also, the a priori argument and example support each other, when thus used in conjunction, and in the order prescribed. A sufficient cause being established, leaves us still at liberty to suppose that there may be circumstances which will prevent the effect from taking place; but examples subjoined show that these circumstances do not, at least always, prevent that effect. On the other hand, examples introduced at the first, may be suspected (unless they are very numerous) of being exceptions to the general rule, instead of being instances of it; which an adequate cause previously assigned will show them to be. E. g.: If any one had argued, from the temptations and opportunities occurring to a military commander, that Buonaparte was likely to establish a despotism on the ruins of the French Republic, this argument, by itself, would have left men at liberty to suppose that such a result would be prevented by a jealous attachment to liberty in the citi-
zens, and a fellow-feeling of the soldiery with them; then, the examples of Caesar and of Cromwell would have proved that such preventives are not to be trusted.

Aristotle accordingly has remarked on the expediency of not placing examples in the foremost rank of arguments; in which case, he says, a considerable number would be requisite; whereas, in confirmation, even one will have much weight. This observation, however, he omits to extend, as he might have done, to testimony and every other kind of sign, to which it is no less applicable.

Another reason for adhering to the order here prescribed is, that if the argument from cause to effect were placed after the others, a doubt might often exist, whether we were engaged in proving the point in question, or (assuming it as already proved) in seeking only to account for it; that argument being, by the very nature of it, such as would account for the truth contended for, supposing it were granted. Constant care, therefore, is requisite to guard against any confusion or indistinctness as to the object in each case proposed; whether that be, when a proposition is admitted, to assign a cause which does account for it, (which is one of the classes of propositions formerly noticed,) or, when it is not admitted, to prove it by an argument of that kind which would account for it, if it were granted.

With a view to the arrangement of arguments, no rule is of more importance than the one now under consideration; and arrangement is a more important point than is generally supposed; indeed, it is not perhaps of less consequence in composition than in the military art; in which it is well known, that with an equality of forces, in numbers, courage, and every other point, the manner in which they are drawn up, so as either to afford mutual support, or, on the other hand, even to impede and annoy each other, may make the difference of victory or defeat.*

* A great advantage in this point is possessed by the speaker over the writer. The speaker compels his hearers to consider the several points brought before them, in the order which he thinks best. Readers, on the contrary, will sometimes, by dipping into a book or examining the table of contents, light on something so revolting to some prejudice, that, though they might have admitted the proofs of it if they had read in the order designed, they may at once close the book in disgust.
E. g.: In the statement of the evidences of our religion, so as to give them their just weight, much depends on the order in which they are placed. The antecedent probability that a revelation should be given to man, and that it should be established by miracles, all would allow to be, considered by itself, in the absence of strong direct testimony, utterly insufficient to establish the conclusion. On the other hand, miracles considered abstractedly, as represented to have occurred without any occasion or reason for them being assigned, carry with them such a strong intrinsic improbability as could not be wholly surmounted even by such evidence as would fully establish any other matters of fact. But the evidences of the former class, however inefficient alone towards the establishment of the conclusion, have very great weight in preparing the mind for receiving the other arguments; which, again, though they would be listened to with prejudice if not so supported, will then be allowed their just weight. The writers in defence of Christianity have not always attended to this principle; and their opponents have often availed themselves of the knowledge of it, by combating in detail, arguments, the combined force of which would have been irresistible.* They argue respecting the credibility of the Christian miracles abstractedly, as if they were insulated occurrences, without any known or conceivable purpose; as, e. g., "What testimony is sufficient to establish the belief that a dead man was restored to life?" and then they proceed to show that the probability of a revelation, abstractedly considered, is not such at least as to establish the fact that one has been given. Whereas, if it were first proved (as may easily be done) merely that there is no such abstract improbability of a revelation as to exclude the evidence in favor of it, and that if one were given, it must be expected to be supported by miraculous evidence, then, just enough reason would be assigned for the occurrence of miracles, not indeed to establish them, but to allow a fair hearing for the arguments by which they are supported.†

The importance attached to the arrangement of arguments by the two great rival orators of Athens, may serve to illustrate and enforce

* See § 4, Ch. II.  
† See Paley's Evidences, Introd.
what has been said. Æschines strongly urged the judges (in the celebrated contest concerning the crown) to confine his adversary to the same order, in his reply to the charges brought, which he himself had observed in bringing them forward. Demosthenes, however, was far too skilful to be thus entrapped; and so much importance does he attach to this point, that he opens his speech with a most solemn appeal to the judges for an impartial hearing; which implies, he says, not only a rejection of prejudice, but no less, also, a permission for each speaker to adopt whatever arrangement he should think fit. And accordingly he proceeds to adopt one very different from that which his antagonist had laid down, for he was no less sensible than his rival, that the same arrangement which is the most favorable to one side is likely to be the least favorable to the other.

It is to be remembered, however, that the rules which have been given respecting the order in which different kinds of argument should be arranged, relate only to the different kinds adduced in support of each separate proposition; since, of course, the refutation of an opposed assertion, effected (suppose) by means of “signs,” may be followed by an “à priori” argument in favor of our own conclusion; and the like in many other such cases.

§ 5.

A proposition that is well known, (whether easy to be established or not,) and which contains nothing particularly offensive, should in general be stated at once, and the proofs subjoined; but one not familiar to the hearers, especially if it be likely to be unacceptable, should not be stated at the outset. It is usually better in that case to state the arguments first, or at least some of them, and then introduce the conclusion: thus assuming in some degree the character of an investigator.

There is no question relating to arrangement more important than the present; and it is, therefore, the more unfortunate that Cicero, who possessed so much practical skill, should have laid down no rule on this point, (though it is one which evidently had engaged his attention,) but should content himself with saying that sometimes he adopted the one
mode, and sometimes the other,* (which doubtless he did not do at random,) without distinguishing the cases in which each is to be preferred, and laying down principles to guide our decision. Aristotle also, when he lays down the two great heads into which a speech is divisible, the proposition and the proof;† is equally silent as to the order in which they should be placed; though he leaves it to be understood, from his manner of speaking, that the conclusion [or question] is to be first stated, and then the premises, as in Mathematics. This indeed is the usual and natural way of speaking or writing: viz., to begin by declaring your opinion, and then to subjoin the reasons for it. But there are many occasions on which it will be of the highest consequence to reverse this plan. It will sometimes give an offensively dogmatical air to a composition, to begin by advancing some new and unexpected assertion; though sometimes, again, this may be advisable when the arguments are such as can be well relied on, and the principal object is to excite attention and awaken curiosity. And accordingly, with this view, it is not unusual to present some doctrine, by no means really novel, in a new and paradoxical shape. But when the conclusion to be established is one likely to hurt the feelings and offend the prejudices of the hearers, it is essential to keep out of sight, as much as possible, the point to which we are tending, till the principles from which it is to be deduced shall have been clearly established; because men listen with prejudice, if at all, to arguments that are avowedly leading to a conclusion which they are indisposed to admit; whereas, if we thus, as it were, mask the battery, they will not be able to shelter themselves from the discharge. The observance, accordingly, or neglect of this rule, will often make the difference of success or failure.‡

It may be observed, that if the proposition to be maintained be such as the hearers are likely to regard as insignificant, the question should be at first suppressed; but if there

* De Orat.
† Rhet., Book III.
‡ See note in § 4. It may be added, that it is not only nothing dishonest, but is a point of pacific charitableness as well as of discretion, in any discussion with any one, to begin with points of agreement rather than of disagreement.
be any thing offensive to their prejudices, the question may be stated, but the decision of it, for a time, kept back.

And it will often be advisable to advance very gradually to the full statement of the proposition required, and to prove it, if one may so speak, by instalments; establishing separately, and in order, each part of the truth in question. It is thus that Aristotle establishes many of his doctrines, and among others his definition of happiness, in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics: he first proves in what it does not consist, and then establishes, one by one, the several points which together constitute his notion.

Thus, again, Paley (in his Evidences) first proves that the apostles, etc., suffered; next, that they encountered their sufferings knowingly; then, that it was for their testimony that they suffered; then, that the events they testified were miraculous; then, that those events were the same as are recorded in our books, etc., etc.

In public meetings the measure ultimately adopted will usually have been proposed in a series of resolutions; each of which successively will perhaps have been carried by a large majority, in cases where, if the whole had been proposed in a mass, it would have been rejected—some persons feeling objections to one portion, and others to another.

It will often happen, again, that some general principle of no very paradoxical character may be proposed in the outset; (just as besiegers break ground at a safe distance, and advance gradually till near enough to batter;) and when that is established, an unexpected and unwelcome application of it may be proved irresistibly.

And it may be worth observing, that we shall thus have to reverse, in many cases, the order in which, during the act of composition, the thoughts will have occurred to our minds. For in reflecting on any subject, we are usually disposed to generalize—to proceed from the particular point immediately before us, successively, to more and more comprehensive views; the opposite order to which will usually be the better adapted to engage and keep up attention, and to effect conviction. E. g.: Suppose I am thinking of engaging the co-
operation of the laity in some measure designed for the diffusion of the gospel, which they are perhaps disposed to regard too much as the business of the clergy exclusively: this may lead me to reflect, generally, how prone laymen are in many points to confound Christian duties with clerical duties, and to speak and act as if they thought that a less amount of Christian virtue were amply sufficient for those who have not taken holy orders; and this again might carry me on to reflect yet more generally, on the prevalent error of imagining two kinds of Christianity, one for a certain select and preeminent few, and the other for the generality; and of supposing that those whom in latter ages it has been customary to denominate "saints,"* namely, the apostles, evangelists, and others, who possessed inspiration, and other miraculous gifts, (such as Judas, among others, exercised,) had a degree of personal holiness, and a kind of Christian character, beyond what is at all expected of Christians generally, and which it would be even presumptuous for us to emulate.

Now to bring forward these topics in this order would not produce so good an effect as to reverse it: beginning with the more general remarks, and gradually narrowing, as it were, the circle, till the particular point in question was reached. The interest is the better kept up by advancing successively from the more to the less general; and moreover, as has been just remarked, the establishment of some general principle will in many cases be less unwelcome, and more fairly listened to, than the particular application of it.

It is often expedient, sometimes unavoidable, to waive for the present some question or portion of a question, while our attention is occupied with another point. Now it cannot be too carefully kept in mind, that it is a common mistake with inaccurate reasoners (and a mistake which is studiously kept up by an artful sophist) to suppose that what is thus waived is altogether given up.† "Such a one does not attempt to prove this or that;"

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* The term by which all Christians are denoted in Scripture.
† An instance of this procedure is noticed in the Essay on Persecution, (3d Series,) Note A. The writer I am there speaking of "proceeds to censure, not merely the enemies of a religious establishment, but also some of those who admit the lawfulness and necessity of an establishment;" including, particularly, Warburton;
"He does not deny so and so;" "He tacitly admits that such and such may be the case;" etc., are expressions which one may often hear triumphantly employed, on no better grounds. And yet it is very common in Mathematics for a question to be waived in this manner. Euclid, e. g., first asserts and proves that the exterior angle of a triangle is greater than either of the interior opposite angles—without being able to determine at once how much greater—and that any two angles of a triangle are less than two right angles; waiving for the present the question, how much less. He is enabled to prove, at a more advanced stage, that the exterior angle is equal to two interior opposite angles together; and that all the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

The only remedy is, to state distinctly and repeatedly that you do not abandon, as untenable, such and such a position, which you are not at present occupied in maintaining; that you are not to be understood as admitting the truth of this or that, though you do not at present undertake to disprove it.

§ 6.

If the argument à priori has been introduced in the proof of the main proposition in question, there will generally be no need of afterwards adducing causes to account for the truth established, since that will have been already done in the course of the argument: on the other hand, it will often be advisable to do this, when arguments of the other class have alone been employed.

For it is in every case agreeable and satisfactory, and may often be of great utility, to explain, where it can be done, the whom he describes as 'feeling no concern for the truth of the religion which he calls to his aid,' and as representing that there is 'no difference between false and true religion in their influence on society!' This is the inference drawn from Warburton's just and undeniable remark, that, in discussing questions respecting the establishment of a religion by the civil magistrate, we must waive the question as to the truth of each, because each man will of course regard his own as the true one, and there is no appeal to any authority on earth to decide between the different sovereigns. Whether Warburton's views are correct or not, (which it is not my present object to inquire,) so gross a misrepresentation of him is neither fair nor wise."
causes which produce an effect that is itself already admitted to exist. But it must be remembered that it is of great importance to make it clearly appear which object is, in each case, proposed: whether to establish the fact, or to account for it; since otherwise we may often be supposed to be employing a feeble argument. For that which is a satisfactory explanation of an admitted fact, will frequently be such as would be very insufficient to prove it, supposing it were doubted.

§ 7.

Refutation of objections should generally be placed in the midst of the argument; but nearer the beginning than the end.

If indeed very strong objections have obtained much currency, or have been just stated by an opponent, so that what is asserted is likely to be regarded as paradoxical, it may be advisable to begin with a refutation; but when this is not the case, the mention of objections in the opening will be likely to give a paradoxical air to our assertion, by implying a consciousness that much may be said against it. If, again, all mention of objections be deferred till the last, the other arguments will often be listened to with prejudice by those who may suppose us to be overlooking what may be urged on the other side.

Sometimes indeed it will be difficult to give a satisfactory refutation of the opposed opinions, till we have gone through the arguments in support of our own: even in that case, however, it will be better to take some brief notice of them early in the composition, with a promise of afterwards considering them more fully, and refuting them. This is Aristotle's usual procedure.

A sophistical use is often made of this last rule, when the objections are such as cannot really be satisfactorily answered. The skilful sophist will often, by the promise of a triumphant refutation hereafter, gain attention to his own statement; which, if it be made plausible, will so draw off the hearer's attention from the objections, that a very inadequate fulfilment of that promise will pass unnoticed, and due weight will not be allowed to the objections.

It may be worth remarking, that refutation will often
occasion the introduction of fresh propositions; i. e., we may have to disprove propositions, which, though incompatible with the principal one to be maintained, will not be directly contradictory to it: e. g., Burke, in order to the establishment of his theory of beauty, refutes the other theories which have been advanced by those who place it in "fitness" for a certain end—in "proportion"—in "perfection," etc.; and Dr. A. Smith, in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," combats the opinion of those who make "expediency the test of virtue"—of the advocates of a "moral sense," etc., which doctrines respectively are at variance with those of these authors, and imply, though they do not express, a contradiction of them.

Though I am at present treating principally of the proper collocation of refutation, some remarks on the conduct of it will not be unsuitable in this place. In the first place, it is to be observed that there is* no distinct class of refutatory argument; since they become such merely by the circumstances under which they are employed. There are two ways in which any proposition may be refuted:† first, by proving the contradictory of it; secondly, by overthrowing the arguments by which it has been supported. The former of these is less strictly and properly called refutation; being only accidentally such, since it might have been employed equally well had the opposite argument never existed; and in fact it will often happen that a proposition maintained by one author may be in this way refuted by another, who had never heard of his arguments. Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as proving, in a speech to the Athenians, the probability of their success against the Peloponnesians; and thus, virtually, refuting the speech of the Corinthian ambassador at Sparta, who had labored to show the probability of their speedy downfall.§

* As Aristotle remarks, Rhet., Book II., apparently in opposition to some former writers.
† Αντικαθιστήμενος and ένστασις of Aristotle, Book II.
‡ The speeches indeed appear to be in great part the composition of the historian; but he professes to give the substance of what was either actually said, or likely to be said, on each occasion; and the arguments urged in the speeches now in question are undoubtedly such as the respective speakers would be likely to employ.
In fact, every one who argues in favor of any conclusion is virtually refuting, in this way, the opposite conclusion.

But the character of refutation more strictly belongs to the other mode of proceeding: viz., in which a reference is made, and an answer given, to some specific arguments in favor of the opposite conclusion. This refutation may consist either in the denial of one of the premises,* or an objection against the conclusiveness of the reasoning. And here it is to be observed that an objection is often supposed, from the mode in which it is expressed, to belong to this last class, when perhaps it does not, but consists in the contradiction of a premisss; for it is very common to say, "I admit your principle, but deny that it leads to such a consequence;" "The assertion is true, but it has no force as an argument to prove that conclusion:" this sounds like an objection to the reasoning itself; but it will not unfrequently be found to amount only to a denial of the suppressed premisss of an enthymeme; the assertion which is admitted being only the expressed premisss, whose "force as an argument" must of course depend on the other premisss, which is understood.† Thus Warburton admits that in the law of Moses the doctrine of a future state was not revealed; but contends that this, so far from disproving, as the Deists pretend, his Divine mission, does, on the contrary, establish it. But the objection is not to the Deist's argument properly so called, but to the other premisss, which they so hastily took for granted, and which he disproves, viz., "that a divinely commissioned lawgiver would have been sure to reveal that doctrine." The objection is then only properly said to lie against the reasoning itself, when it is shown that, granting all that is assumed on the other side, whether expressed or understood, still the conclusion contended for would not follow from the premises; either on

* If the premisss to be refuted be a "universal," (See Logic, B. II., ch. ii., § 3,) it will be sufficient to establish its contradictory, which will be a particular; which will often be done by an argument that will naturally be exhibited in the third figure, whose conclusions are always particulars. Hence, this may be called the enstastic, or refutatory figure. (See Logic, B. II., ch. iii., § 4.)

† It has been remarked to me by an intelligent friend, that in common discourse the word "principle" is usually employed to designate the major premisss of an argument, and "reason" the minor.
account of some ambiguity in the middle term, or some other fault of that class.

This is the proper place for a treatise on Fallacies; but as this has been inserted in the "Elements of Logic," I have only to refer the reader to it. (Book III.)

It may be proper in this place to remark, that "indirect reasoning" is sometimes confounded with "refutation," or supposed to be peculiarly connected with it; which is not the case; either direct or indirect reasoning being employed indifferently for refutation, as well as for any other purpose. The application of the term "elenctic" (from ἐλέγξεων, to refute or disprove) to indirect arguments has probably contributed to this confusion; which, however, principally arises from the very circumstances that occasioned such a use of that term; viz., that in the indirect method the absurdity or falsity of a proposition (opposed to our own) is proved; and hence is suggested the idea of an adversary maintaining that proposition, and of the refutation of that adversary being necessarily accomplished in this way. But it should be remembered that Euclid and other mathematicians, though they can have no opponent to refute, often employ the indirect demonstration; and that, on the other hand, if the contradictory of an opponent's premiss can be satisfactorily proved in the direct method, the refutation is sufficient.

It is true, however, that while, in science, the direct method is considered preferable, in controversy the indirect is often adopted by choice, as it affords an opportunity for holding up an opponent to scorn and ridicule, by deducing some very absurd conclusion from the principles he maintains, or according to the mode of arguing he employs. Nor indeed can a fallacy be so clearly exposed to the unlearned reader in any other way. For it is no easy matter to explain, to one ignorant of Logic, the ground on which you object to an inconclusive argument; though he will be able to perceive its correspondence with another, brought forward to illustrate it, in which an absurd conclusion may be introduced, as drawn from true premises.

It is evident that either the premiss of an opponent, or his
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proving too much.

Conclusion, may be disproved, either in the direct or in the indirect method; i.e., either by proving the truth of the contradictory, or by showing that an absurd conclusion may fairly be deduced from the proposition you are combating. When this latter mode of refutation is adopted with respect to the premiss, the phrase by which this procedure is usually designated is, that the "argument proves too much;" i.e., that it proves, besides the conclusion drawn, another, which is manifestly inadmissible. E.g.: The argument by which Dr. Campbell labors to prove that every correct syllogism must be nugatory, as involving a "petitio principii," proves, if admitted at all, more than he intended; since it may easily be shown to be equally applicable to all reasoning whatever.

It is worth remarking, that an indirect argument may easily be altered in form so as to be stated in the direct mode. For, strictly speaking, that is indirect reasoning in which we assume as true the proposition whose contradictory it is our object to prove; and deducing regularly from it an absurd conclusion, infer thence that the premiss in question is false; the alternative proposed in all correct reasoning being, either to admit the conclusion, or to deny one of the premises. But by adopting the form of a destructive conditional,* the same argument as this, in substance, may be stated directly. E.g.: We may say, "Let it be admitted that no testimony can satisfactorily establish such a fact as is not agreeable to our experience; thence it will follow that the Eastern prince judged wisely and rightly, in at once rejecting, as a manifest falsehood, the account given him of the phenomenon of ice; but he was evidently mistaken in so doing; therefore the principle assumed is unsound."

Now the substance of this argument remaining the same, the form of it may be so altered as to make the argument a direct one; viz., "If it be true that no testimony, etc., that Eastern prince must have judged wisely, etc., but he did not; therefore that principle is not true."

Universally, indeed, a conditional proposition may be regarded as an assertion of the validity of a certain argument; the antecedent corresponding to the premises, and the consequent to the conclusion; Character of conditional propositions.

* See Logie, B. II., ch. iv., § 6.
and neither of them being asserted as true, only the *dependence* of the one on the other; the alternative then is, to acknowledge as a conclusion, either the truth of the consequent, as in the constructive syllogism, or (as in the destructive) the falsity of the antecedent; and the former accordingly corresponds to direct reasoning, the latter to indirect; being, as has been said, a mode of stating it in the direct form; as is evident from the examples adduced.

The difference between these two modes of stating such an argument is considerable, when there is a long chain of reasoning. For when we employ the categorical form, and assume as true the premises we design to disprove, it is evident we must be speaking *ironically*, and in the character, assumed for the moment, of an adversary: when, on the contrary, we use the hypothetical form, there is no irony. Butler's *Analogy* is an instance of the latter procedure: he contends that *if* such and such objections were admissible against religion, they *would* be applicable equally to the constitution and course of nature. Had he, on the other hand, assumed, for the argument's sake, that such objections against religion *are* valid, and had thence proved the condition of the natural world to be totally different from what we see it to be, his arguments, which would have been the same in substance, would have assumed an ironical form. This form has been adopted by Burke in his celebrated "Defence of Natural Society, by a late noble Lord;" in which, assuming the person of Bolingbroke, he proves, according to the principles of that author, that the arguments he brought against ecclesiastical, would equally lie against civil, institutions. This is an argument from *analogy*, as well as Bishop Butler's, though not relating to the same point; Butler's being a defence of the doctrines of religion; Burke's; of its institutions and practical effects. A defence of the evidences of our religion, (the third point against which objections have been urged,) on a similar plan with the work of Burke just mentioned, and consequently, like that, in an ironical form, I attempted some years ago, in a pamphlet, (published anonymously, merely for the preservation of its ironical character,) whose object was to show that objections ("Historic Doubts") similar to those against the Scripture history, and much more plausible, might be
urged against all the received accounts of Napoleon Buonaparte.*

It is in some respects a recommendation of this latter method, and in others an objection to it, that the sophistry of an adversary will often be exposed by it in a *ludicrous* point of view; and this even where no such effect is designed; the very essence of jest being its *mimic sophistry.* † This will often give additional force to the argument, by the vivid impression which ludicrous images produce;‡ but again it will not unfrequently have this disadvantage, that weak men, perceiving the wit, are apt to conclude that nothing *but* wit is designed; and lose sight perhaps of a solid and convincing argument, which they regard as no more than a good joke. Having been warned that “ridicule is not the test of truth,” and “that wisdom and wit” are not the same thing, they distrust every thing that can possibly be regarded as witty; not having judgment to perceive the combination, when it occurs, of wit with sound reasoning. The ivy-wreath completely conceals from their view the point of the thrysus.

And, moreover, if such a mode of argument be employed on serious subjects, the “weak brethren” are sometimes scandalized by what appears to them *a profanation;* not having discernment to perceive when it is that the ridicule does, and when it does not, affect the solemn subject itself. But for the respect paid to holy writ, the taunt of Elijah against the prophets of Baal, and Isaiah’s against those who “bow down to the stock of a tree,” would probably appear to such persons irreverent. And the caution now implied will appear more important, when it is considered how large a majority they are who, in this point, come under the description of “weak brethren.”

* To these examples may be added the “Pastoral Epistle to some Members of the University of Oxford,” (Fellowes,) first published in 1835, and now reprinted in the “Remains of Bishop Dickinson.” It is the more valuable now from the *verification* of the predictions it contains, which, when it first appeared, many were disposed to regard as extravagant.†

† See Logic, Chapter on *Fallacies,* at the conclusion.

‡ *Disct enim citius, meminitque libentius illud,
Quod quis deridet, quam quod probat et veneratur.*

—*Hor., Ep. I., B. 2.*
He that can laugh at what is ludicrous, and at the same time preserve a clear discernment of sound and unsound reasoning, is no ordinary man. And, moreover, the resentment and mortification felt by those whose unsound doctrines or sophistry are fully exposed and held up to contempt or ridicule, this they will often disguise from others, and sometimes from themselves, by representing the contempt or ridicule as directed against serious or sacred subjects, and not against their own absurdities: just as if those idolaters above alluded to had represented the prophets as ridiculing devotional feelings, and not merely the absurd misdirection of them to a log of wood. And such persons will often in this way exercise a powerful influence on those whose understanding is so cloudy that they do not clearly perceive against what the ridicule is directed, or who are too dull to understand it at all. For there are some persons so constituted as to be altogether incapable of even comprehending the plainest irony; though they have not in other points any corresponding weakness of intellect. The humorous satirical pamphlet, (attributed to an eminent literary character,) entitled "Advice to a Reviewer," I have known persons read without perceiving that it was ironical. And the same with the "Historic Doubts" lately referred to. Such persons, when assured that such and such a work contains ridicule, and that it has some reference to matters of grave importance, take for granted that it must be a work of profane levity.

There is also this danger in the use of irony: that sometimes when titles, in themselves favorable, are applied (or their application retained) to any set of men in bitter scorn, they will then sometimes be enabled to appropriate such titles in a serious sense; the ironical force gradually evaporating. I mean, such titles as "Orthodox," "Evangelical," "Saints," "Reformers," "Liberals," "Political Economists," "Rational," etc. The advantage thus given may be illustrated by the story of the cocoa-nuts in Sinbad the Sailor's fifth voyage.

It may be observed generally, that too much stress is often laid, especially by unpracticed reasoners, on refutation; (in the strictest and narrowest sense, i. e., of objections to the premises, or to the reasoning;) I mean, that they are apt both to expect a refutation where none can fairly be expected,
and to attribute to it, when satisfactorily made out, more than it really accomplishes.

For first, not only specious, but real and solid arguments, such as it would be difficult or impossible to refute, may be urged against a proposition which is nevertheless true, and may be satisfactorily established by a preponderance of probability.* It is in strictly scientific reasoning alone that all the arguments which lead to a false conclusion must be fallacious. In what is called moral or probable reasoning, there may be sound arguments, and valid objections, on both sides.†

E. g.: It may be shown that each of two contending parties has some reason to hope for success; and this, by irrefragable arguments on both sides; leading to conclusions which are not (strictly speaking) contradictory to each other; for though only one party can obtain the victory, it may be true that each has some reason to expect it. The real question in such cases is, which event is the more probable—on which side the evidence preponderates. Now it often happens that the inexperienced reasoner, thinking it necessary that every objection should be satisfactorily answered, will have his attention drawn off from the arguments of the opposite side, and will be occupied perhaps in making a weak defence, while victory was in his hands. The objection perhaps may be unanswerable, and yet may safely be allowed, if it can be shown that more and weightier objections lie against every other supposition. This is a most important caution for those who are studying the evidences of religion. Let the opposer of them be called on, instead of confining himself to detached cavils, and saying, "How do you answer this?" and "How do you explain that?" to frame some consistent hypothesis to account for the introduction of Christianity by human means; and then to consider whether there are more or fewer difficulties in his hypothesis than in the other.

On the other hand, one may often meet with a sophistical

* See above, chap. ii., § 4, and also Logic, Part III., § 17.
† Bacon, in his rhetorical commonplaces—heads of arguments pro and contra, on several questions—has some admirable illustrations of what has been here remarked. I have accordingly (in Appendix A) inserted some selections from them.
refutation of objections, consisting in counter-
objections urged against something else which is
taken for granted to be, though it is not, the only
alternative. E. g.: Objections against an unlimited mo-
narchy may be met by a glowing description of the horrors
of the mob-government of the Athenian and Roman repub-
lics. If an exclusive attention to mathematical pursuits be
objected to, it may be answered by depreciating the exclusion
of such studies. It is thus that a man commonly replies to
the censure passed on any vice he is addicted to, by repres-
senting some other vice as worse: e. g., if he is blamed for
being a sot, he dilates on the greater enormity of being a
thief; as if there were any need he should be either. And
it is in this way alone that the advocates of transportation
have usually defended it: describing some very ill-managed
penitentiary system, and assuming, as self-evident and ad-
mitted, that this must be the only possible substitute for penal
colonies.* This fallacy may be stated logically, as a disjunc-
tive hypothetical, with the major, false.

Secondly, the force of a refutation is often overrated: an
argument which is satisfactorily answered ought
merely to go for nothing: it is possible that the
conclusion drawn may nevertheless be true; yet
men are apt to take for granted that the conclu-
sion itself is disproved, when the arguments brought forward
to establish it have been satisfactorily refuted; assuming,
when perhaps there is no ground for the assumption, that
these are all the arguments that could be urged.† This may

* See Letters to Earl Grey on the subject—Report of Committee,
and "Substance of a Speech," etc.
† Another form of ignoratio elenchi, (irrelevant conclusion,) which
is rather the more serviceable on the side of the respondent, is, to
prove or disprove some part of that which is required, and dwell on
that, suppressing all the rest.

"Thus, if a university is charged with cultivating only the mere
elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list of the books studied
there is produced, should even any one of those books be not element-
ary, the charge is in fairness refuted; but the sophist may then
earnestly contend that some of those books are elementary; and thus
keep out of sight the real question, viz., whether they are all so.
This is the great art of the answerer of a book: suppose the main
positions in any work to be irrefragable, it will be strange if some
be considered as the fallacy of denying the consequent of a conditional proposition, from the antecedent having been denied. "If such and such an argument be admitted, the assertion in question is true; but that argument is inadmissible; therefore the assertion is not true." Hence the injury done to any cause by a weak advocate; the cause itself appearing to the vulgar to be overthrown, when the arguments brought forward are answered.

"Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can be well maintained; since the refutation of that will often quash the whole. A guilty person may often escape by having too much laid to his charge; so he may also by having too much evidence against him, i. e., some that is not in itself satisfactory: thus a prisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses against him is an infamous informer and spy; though perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient for conviction."*

The maxim here laid down, however, applies only to those causes in which, (waiving the consideration of honesty,) first, it is wished to produce not merely a temporary, but a lasting

* See Logic, B. III., § 18.
impression, and that on readers or hearers of some judgment; and secondly, when there really are some weighty arguments to be urged. When no charge, e. g., can really be substantiated, and yet it is desired to produce some present effect on the unthinking, there may be room for the application of the proverb, “Slander stoutly, and something will stick;” the vulgar are apt to conclude, that where a great deal is said, something must be true; and many are fond of that lazy contrivance for saving the trouble of thinking—“splitting the difference;” imagining that they show a laudable caution in believing only a part of what is said. And thus a malignant sophist may gain such a temporary advantage by the multiplicity of his attacks, as the rabble of combatants described by Homer sometimes did by their showers of javelins, which encumbered and weighed down the shield of one of his heroes, though they could not penetrate it.

On the above principle, that a weak argument is positively hurtful, is founded a most important maxim, that it is not only the fairest, but also the wisest plan, to state objections in their full force; at least, wherever there does exist a satisfactory answer to them; otherwise, those who hear them stated more strongly than by the uncandid advocate who had undertaken to repel them, will naturally enough conclude that they are unanswerable. It is but a momentary and ineffective triumph that can be obtained by manoeuvres like those of Turnus’s charioteer, who furiously chased the feeble stragglers of the army, and evaded the main front of the battle.

And when the objections urged are not only unanswerable, but (what is more) decisive—when some argument that has been adduced, or some portion of a system, etc., is perceived to be really unsound—it is the wisest way fairly and fully to confess this, and abandon it altogether. There are many who seem to make it a point of honor never to yield a single point, never to retract; or (if this be found unavoidable) “to back out”—as the phrase is—of an untenable position, so as to display their reluctance to make any concession; as if their credit was staked on preserving unbroken the talisman of professed infallibility. But there is little wisdom (the question of honesty is out of the province of this treatise) in such a procedure; which in fact is very liable to cast a sus-
It is important to observe, that too earnest and elaborate a refutation of arguments which are really insignificant, or which their opponent wishes to represent as such, will frequently have the effect of giving them importance. Whatever is slightly noticed, and afterwards passed by with contempt, many readers and hearers will very often conclude (sometimes for no other reason) to be really contemptible. But if they are assured of this again and again with great earnestness, they often begin to doubt it. They see the respondent plying artillery and musketry, bringing up horse and foot to the charge; and conceive that what is so vehemently assailed must possess great strength. One of his refutations might perhaps have left them perfectly convinced: all of them together, leave them in doubt.

But it is not to refutation alone that this principle will apply. In other cases also it may happen (paradoxical as it is at first sight) that it shall be possible, and danger-

Dangers of writing too forcibly. Such a caution may remind some readers of the personage in the fairy-tale, whose swiftness was so prodigious, that he was obliged to tie his legs, lest he should overrun, and thus miss, the hares he was pursuing. But on consideration it will be seen that the caution is not unreasonable. When indeed the point maintained is one which most persons admit or are disposed to admit, but which they are prone to lose sight of, or to underrate in respect of its importance, or not to dwell on with an attention sufficiently practical, that is just the occasion which calls on us to put forth all our efforts in setting it forth in the most forcible manner possible. Yet even here, it is often necessary to caution the hearers against imagining that a point is difficult to establish, because its importance leads us to dwell very much on it. Some, e. g., are apt to suppose, from the copious and elaborate arguments which have been urged in defence of the authenticity of the Christian Scriptures, that these are books whose authenticity is harder to be established than that of other supposed ancient works;* whereas the fact is very much the reverse. But the importance, and the difficulty, of proving any point, are very apt to be confounded together, though easily distinguishable. We bar the doors carefully, not merely when we expect an unusually formidable attack, but when we have an unusual treasure in the house.

But when any principle is to be established, which, though in itself capable of being made evident to the humblest capacity, yet has been long and generally overlooked, and to which established prejudices are violently opposed, it will sometimes happen that to set forth the absurdity of such prejudices in the clearest point of view, (though in language perfectly decent and temperate,) and to demonstrate the conclusion, over and over, so fully and forcibly that it shall seem the most palpable folly or dishonesty to deny it, will, with some minds, have an opposite tendency to the one desired. Some, perhaps, conscious of having been the slaves or the

* See Taylor's "History of the Transmission of Ancient Books"—a very interesting and valuable work; and also the Review of it—which is still more so—in the "London Review," Nov. 2, 1829. (Saunders and Otley.)
supporters of such prejudices as are thus held up to contempt, (not indeed by disdainful language, but simply by being placed in a very clear light,) and of having overlooked truths which, when thus clearly explained and proved, appear perfectly evident even to a child, will consequently be stung by a feeling of shame passing off into resentment, which stops their ears against argument. They could have borne perhaps to change their opinion, but not so to change it as to tax their former opinion with the grossest folly. They would be so sorry to think they had been blinded to such an excess, and are so angry with him who is endeavoring to persuade them to think so, that these feelings determine them not to think it. They try (and it is an attempt which few persons ever make in vain) to shut their eyes against a humiliating conviction; and thus, the very triumphant force of the reasoning adduced serves to harden them against admitting the conclusion: much as one may conceive Roman soldiers desperately holding out an untenable fortress to the last extremity, from apprehension of being made to pass under the yoke by the victors, should they surrender.

Others, again, perhaps comparatively strangers to the question, and not prejudiced, or not strongly prejudiced, against your conclusion, but ready to admit it if supported by sufficient arguments, will sometimes, if your arguments are very much beyond what is sufficient, have their suspicions roused by this very circumstance. “Can it be possible,” they will say, “that a conclusion so very obvious as this is made to appear, should not have been admitted long ago? Is it conceivable that such and such eminent philosophers, divines, statesmen, etc., should have been all their lives under delusions so gross?” Hence they are apt to infer, either that the author has mistaken the opinions of those he imagines opposed to him, or else that there is some subtle fallacy in his arguments.

The former of these suspicions is a matter of little or no consequence, except as far as regards the author’s credit for acuteness.* As far as the legitimate province of the orator

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* "The more simple, clear, and obvious any principle is rendered, the more likely is its exposition to elicit those common remarks, ‘Of course! of course! no one could ever doubt that; this is all very
is concerned, he may be satisfied with establishing a just principle, and leaving men to imagine, if they will, that nobody had ever doubted it. But the other suspicion may lead to very serious evil; and it is not by any means unlikely to occur. Many a one will be convinced that there must be some flaw in a course of argument in which he is conscious, and perhaps ready to confess, that he cannot point out any; merely on the ground, that if there is none, but the whole is perfectly sound and valid, he cannot conceive that it should have been overlooked, (so obvious as it is made to appear,) for perhaps ages together, by able men who had devoted their thoughts to the subject. That of so many thousands of physicians who for ages had been in the daily habit of feeling the pulse, no one before Harvey should have suspected the circulation of the blood, was probably a reason with many for denying that discovery. And a man's total inability, as I have said, to point out any fallacy, will by no means remove his conviction or suspicion that there must be some, if the conclusion be one which, for the reason just mentioned, seems to him inconceivable. There are many persons unable to find out the flaw in the argument, e. g., by which it is pretended to be demonstrated that Achilles could not overtake the tortoise; but some flaw every one is sure there must be, from his full conviction that Achilles could overtake the tortoise.

In this way it is very possible that our reasoning may be "dark with excess of light."

Of course it is not meant that a refutation should ever appear (when that can be avoided) insufficient; that a conclusion should be left doubtful which we are able to establish fully. But in combating deep-rooted prejudices, and maintaining unpopular and paradoxical truths, the point to be aimed at should be to adduce what is sufficient, and not much

true, but there is nothing new brought to light; nothing that was not familiar to every one; 'There needs no ghost to tell us that.' I am convinced that a verbose, mystical, and partially obscure way of writing on such a subject, is the most likely to catch the attention of the multitude. The generality verify the observation of Tacitus, 'Omne ignotum pro magnifico;' and when any thing is made plain to them, are apt to fancy that they knew it already."—Preface to Elements of Logic.
more than is sufficient, to prove your conclusion. If (in such a case) you can but satisfy men that your opinion is decidedly more probable than the opposite, you will have carried your point more effectually, than if you go on, much beyond this, to demonstrate, by a multitude of the most forcible arguments, the extreme absurdity of thinking differently, till you have affronted the self-esteem of some, and awakened the distrust of others.* Laborers who are employed in driving wedges into a block of wood, are careful to use blows of no greater force than is just sufficient. If they strike too hard, the elasticity of the wood will throw out the wedge.

There is in some cases another danger also to be apprehended from the employment of a great number and variety of arguments; (whether for refutation, or otherwise;) namely, that some of them, though really unanswerable, may be drawn from topics of which the unlearned reader or hearer is not, by his own knowledge, a competent judge; and these a crafty opponent will immediately assail, keeping all the rest out of sight; knowing that he is thus transferring the contest to another field, in which the result is sure to be, practically, a drawn battle.

Suppose, for instance, you could maintain or oppose some doctrine or practice, by arguments drawn from Scripture, and also from the most eminent of the Fathers, and from a host of the ablest commentators and biblical critics: in a work designed for the learned few, it might be well to employ all these; but in a popular work, designed for the uneducated—and nine-tenths of what are called the educated classes—it would be better to omit all except those drawn from plain undisputed passages of the common version of the Bible. Else, however decisively your conclusion might be established in the eyes of competent judges, you might expect to be met by an artful opponent who would join issue on that portion of the arguments (keeping the rest out of sight) which turned most on matters of multifarious and deep research:

* A French writer, M. Say, relates a story of some one who, for a wager, stood a whole day on one of the bridges in Paris, offering to sell a five-franc piece for one franc, and (naturally) not finding a purchaser.
boldly denying your citations, or alleging misrepresentation of the authors appealed to, or asserting that you had omitted the weightiest authorities, and that these were on the opposite side, etc. Who, of the unlearned, could tell which was in the right? You might reply, and might fully disprove all that had been urged; but you might be met by fresh and fresh assertions, fresh denials, fresh appeals to authorities, real or feigned; and so the contest might be kept up for ever. The mass of the readers, meantime, would be in the condition of a blind man who should be a bystander at a battle, and could not judge which party was prevailing, except from the reports of those who stood near him.*

It is generally the wisest course, therefore, not only to employ such arguments as are directly accessible to the persons addressed, but to confine oneself to these, lest the attention should be drawn off from them.

On the whole, the arguments which it requires the greatest nicety of art to refute effectually, (I mean, for one who has truth on his side,) are those which are so very weak and silly that it is difficult to make their absurdity more palpable than it is already; at least, without a risk of committing the error formerly noticed. The task reminds one of the well-known difficult feat of cutting through a cushion with a sword. And what augments the perplexity is, that such arguments are usually brought forward by those who, we feel sure, are not themselves convinced by them, but are ashamed to avow their real reasons. So that in such a case we know that the refutation of these pretexts will not go one step towards convincing those who urge them; any more than the justifications of the lamb in the fable against the wolf’s charges.

The last remark to be made under this head is as to the difference between simply disproving an error, and showing whence it arose. Merely to prove that a certain position is untenable, if this be done quite decisively, ought indeed to be sufficient to induce every one to abandon it; but if we can also succeed (which is usually a more difficult task) in tracing the erroneous opinion up to its origin—in destroying not only the branches but the root of the error—this will

afford much more complete satisfaction, and will be likely to produce a more lasting effect. E. g.: It has been repeatedly proved that the distinction, made by A. Smith and some other writers, between “productive” and “unproductive laborers,” leads to absurd conclusions; but in the article on Political Economy in the “Encyclopaedia Metropolitana” there is, in addition to this disproof, a clear and useful explanation given of the way in which this fanciful distinction arose: viz., from the different modes of paying different classes of laborers.

For another instance, see the article “Tendency” in the Appendix to “Elements of Logic,” and the passage in the “Lectures on Political Economy” there referred to; which contains an explanation of the origin (from the ambiguity of a word) of a prevailing and most dangerous mistake.

§ 9.

The arguments which should be placed first in order are, *ceteris paribus*, the most *obvious*, and such as naturally first occur.

This is evidently the natural order; and the adherence to it gives an easy, natural air to the composition. It is seldom therefore worth while to depart from it for the sake of beginning with the most powerful arguments, (when they happen not to be also the most obvious,) or, on the other hand, for the sake of reserving these to the last, and beginning with the weaker; or, again, of imitating, as some recommend, Nestor’s plan of drawing up troops, placing the best first and last, and the weakest in the middle. It will be advisable, however, (and by this means you may secure this last advantage,) when the strongest arguments naturally occupy the foremost place, to *recapitulate in a reverse order*; which will destroy the appearance of anti-climax, and is also in itself the most easy and natural mode of recapitulation. Let, e. g., the arguments be A, B, C, D, E, etc., each less weighty than the preceding; then, in recapitulating, proceed from E to D, C, B, concluding with A.
CHAPTER IV.

OF INTRODUCTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

§ 1.

An introduction, exordium, or proeme, is, as Aristotle has justly remarked, not to be accounted one of the essential parts of a composition, since it is not in every case necessary. In most, however, except such as are extremely short, it is found advisable to premise something before we enter on the main argument, to avoid an appearance of abruptness, and to facilitate, in some way or other, the object proposed. In larger works this assumes the appellation of preface or advertisement; and not unfrequently two are employed, one under the name of preface, and another, more closely connected with the main work, under that of introduction.

The rules which have been laid down already will apply equally to that preliminary course of argument of which introductions often consist.

The writers before Aristotle are censured by him for inaccuracy, in placing under the head of introductions, as properly belonging to them, many things which are not more appropriate in the beginning than elsewhere; as, e. g., the contrivances for exciting the hearers' attention; which, as he observes, is an improper arrangement; since, though such an introduction may sometimes be required, it is, generally speaking, anywhere else rather than in the beginning that the attention is likely to flag.

It is to be observed, however, that there is one kind of fault sometimes committed in introductions, which does lead to this result. If a speaker alarms his audience in the outset, by announcing a great number of topics to be handled, and perhaps also several preliminary considerations, preparatory explanations, etc., they will be likely (especially after a protracted debate) to listen with impatience to what they expect will prove tedious, and to feel an anticipated weariness even from the very commencement.
The rule laid down by Cicero, (De Orat.,) not to compose the introduction first, but to consider first the main argument, and let that suggest the exordium, is just and valuable; for otherwise, as he observes, seldom any thing will suggest itself but vague generalities—"common" topics, as he calls them—i. e., what would equally well suit several different compositions; whereas an introduction that is composed last, will naturally spring out of the main subject, and appear appropriate to it.

§ 2.

1st. One of the objects most frequently proposed in an introduction is, to show that the subject in question is important, curious, or otherwise interesting, and worthy of attention. This may be called an "introduction inquisitive."*

2dly. It will frequently happen also, when the point to be proved or explained is one which may be very fully established, or on which there is little or no doubt, that it may nevertheless be strange, and different from what might have been expected; in which case it will often have a good effect in rousing the attention, to set forth as strongly as possible this paradoxical character, and dwell on the seeming improbability of that which must, after all, be admitted. This may be called an "introduction paradoxical." For instance: "If you should see a flock of pigeons in a field of corn; and if (instead of each picking where and what it liked, taking just as much as it wanted, and no more) you should see ninety-nine of them gathering all they got into a heap; reserving nothing for themselves but the chaff and the refuse; keeping this heap for one, and that the weakest, perhaps worst, of the flock; sitting round, and looking on, all the winter, whilst this one was devouring, throwing about, and wasting it; and if a pigeon, more hardy or hungry than the rest, touched a grain of the hoard, all the others instantly flying upon it, and tearing it to pieces; if you should see this, you would see nothing more than what

* See Tacitus in the opening of his "History," and the beginning of Paley's Natural Theology.
is every day practiced and established among men. Among men you see the ninety and nine toiling and scraping together a heap of superfluities for one; (and this one, too, oftentimes the feeblest and worst of the whole set, a child, a woman, a madman, or a fool;) getting nothing for themselves all the while, but a little of the coarsest of the provision which their own industry produces; looking quietly on, while they see the fruits of all their labor spent or spoiled; and if one of the number take or touch a particle of the hoard, the others joining against him, and hanging him for the theft.

"There must be some very important advantages to account for an institution which, in the view of it above given, is so paradoxical and unnatural.

"The principal of these advantages are the following:" etc.*

3dly. What may be called an "introduction corrective," is also in frequent use; viz., to show that the subject has been neglected, misunderstood, or misrepresented by others. This will, in many cases, remove a most formidable obstacle in the hearer's mind, the anticipation of triteness, if the subject be, or may be supposed to be, a hackneyed one; and it may also serve to remove or loosen such prejudices as might be adverse to the favorable reception of our arguments.

4thly. It will often happen, also, that there may be need to explain some peculiarity in the mode of reasoning to be adopted; to guard against some possible mistake as to the object proposed; or to apologize for some deficiency. This may be called the "introduction preparatory."

5thly, and lastly, in many cases there will be occasion for what may be called a "narrative introduction," to put the reader or hearer in possession of the outline of some transaction, or the description of some state of things, to which references and allusions are to be made in the course of the composition. Thus, in preaching, it is generally found advisable to detail, or at least briefly to sum up, a portion of Scripture history, or a parable, when either of these is made the subject of a sermon.

* Paley's Moral Philosophy, Book III., Part I., ch. i. and ii.
Two or more of the introductions that have been mentioned are often combined; especially in the preface to a work of any length.

And very often the introduction will contain appeals to various passions and feelings in the hearers; especially a feeling of approbation towards the speaker, or of prejudice against an opponent who has preceded him; but this is, as Aristotle has remarked, not confined to introductions.

The title of a book is evidently of the character of an introduction; being indeed sometimes the only one: so that what has been just said respecting introductions, will, for the most part, be applicable to titles.

It is a matter of considerable nicety to make choice of a good title; neither unattractive, nor yet so full of pretension as either to excite disgust or lead to disappointment. It is also, in one respect, more important than the exordium of a speech; because the orator who has opened injudiciously will yet usually obtain a hearing, in the course of which he may recover the lost ground; while an ill-chosen title may prevent a book from being read at all.

The fault committed in respect of the title of the present work is alluded to in the beginning of the Preface.

§ 3.

Concerning the "conclusion" [peroration of the Latins, and epilogus of the Greeks] it is not necessary to say much; since the general rules, that it should be neither so sudden and abrupt as to induce the hearer to say, "I did not know he was going to leave off;" nor again so long as to excite impatience, are so obvious as not to need being dwelt on at large.

Both faults, however, are common; and the latter, both the more common and the worse. It is rather more common, because the writer or speaker is liable to find fresh and fresh thoughts occur to him as he proceeds, which he is loath to omit; especially if he have not, in the outset, drawn out, on paper, or mentally, (according to the recommendation formerly given,) a skeleton outline of his discourse. And it is also a worse fault than the other—the abrupt conclusion—be-
cause the disappointment caused is not, as in that case, single, but repeated and prolonged. And, moreover, it not only excites immediate disapprobation, but weakens in the hearers' minds the force of all that had gone before.

The caution against these faults is evidently far the more important in reference to a discourse orally delivered, because, to a reader, the eye sufficiently shows the approach to the end. It should therefore be carefully recollected by one who is delivering orally a written discourse, that though to him it is written, it is not so to his hearers; and he is consequently in danger of overlooking a fault in the conclusion, such as I have been speaking of, while they will be struck by it.

In all compositions, however, it is an advantage—though far the more important in those addressed to the ear—that notice should be given, a little, and but a little, beforehand, of the approach to a close; by saying, "I will conclude by remarking," etc., or the like; and the closing remark should be not a long one, and should be not the least important and striking of the whole discourse; and if it contain a compressed repetition of something that had been before dwelt on, this is all the better.

Indeed, in any composition that is not very short, the most frequent and the most appropriate kind of conclusion is a recapitulation, either of the whole, or of part of the arguments that have been adduced: respecting which a remark has been made at the end of Ch. III., § 7.

It may be worth while here to remark that it is a common fault of an extemporary speaker, to be tempted, by finding himself listened to with attention and approbation, to go on adding another and another sentence (what is called, in the homely language of the jest, "more last words") after he had intended, and announced his intention, to bring his discourse to a close; till at length the audience becoming manifestly weary and impatient, he is forced to conclude in a feeble and spiritless manner, like a half-extinguished candle going out in smoke. Let the speaker decide beforehand what shall be his concluding topic; and let him premeditate thoroughly, not only the substance of it, but the mode of treating it, and all but the very words; and let him resolve that whatever liberty he may reserve to himself of expanding or contracting other parts of his speech, according as he finds the hearers
more or less interested, (which is, for an extemporary speaker, natural and proper,) he will strictly adhere to his original design in respect of what he has fixed on for his conclusion; and that whenever he shall see fit to arrive at that, nothing shall tempt him either to expand it beyond what he had determined on, or to add any thing else beyond it.

Any thing relative to the feelings and the will, that may be especially appropriate to the conclusion, will be mentioned in its proper place in the ensuing Part.
PART II.

OF PERSUASION.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

§ 1.

Persuasion, properly so called, i. e., the art of influencing the will, is the next point to be considered. And Rhetoric is often regarded (as was formerly remarked) in a more limited sense, as conversant about this head alone. But even, according to that view, the rules above laid down will be found not the less relevant; since the conviction of the understanding (of which I have hitherto been treating) is an essential part of persuasion, and will generally need to be effected by the arguments of the writer or speaker. For in order that the will may be influenced, two things are requisite: viz., 1, that the proposed object should appear desirable; and, 2, that the means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this last, evidently, must depend on a process of reasoning. In order, e. g., to induce the Greeks to unite their efforts against the Persian invader, it was necessary both to prove that coöperation could alone render their resistance effectual, and also to awaken such feelings of patriotism and abhorrence of a foreign yoke, as might prompt them to make these combined efforts. For it is evident that, however ardent their love of liberty, they would make no exertions if they apprehended no danger; or if they thought
themselves, able, separately, to defend themselves, they would be backward to join the confederacy; and, on the other hand, that if they were willing to submit to the Persian yoke, or valued their independence less than their present case, the fullest conviction that the means recommended would secure their independence, would have had no practical effect.

Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first, argument, (to prove the expediency of the means proposed,) Exhortation. and, secondly, what is usually called exhortation, i. e., the excitement of men to adopt those means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable. It will happen, indeed, not unfrequently, that the one or the other of these objects will have been already, either wholly or in part, accomplished; so that the other shall be the only one that it is requisite to insist on: viz., sometimes the hearers will be sufficiently intent on the pursuit of the end, and will be in doubt only as to the means of attaining it; and sometimes, again, they will have no doubt on that point, but will be indifferent, or not sufficiently ardent, with respect to the proposed end, and will need to be stimulated by exhortations. Not sufficiently ardent, I have said, because it will not so often happen that the object in question will be one to which they are totally indifferent, as that they will, practically at least, not reckon it, or not feel it, to be worth the requisite pains. No one is absolutely indifferent about the attainment of a happy immortality; and yet a great part of the preacher's business consists in exhortation, i. e., endeavoring to induce men to use those exertions which they themselves believe to be necessary for the attainment of it.

Aristotle, and many other writers, have spoken of appeals to the passions as an unfair mode of influencing the hearers; in answer to which Dr. Campbell has remarked, that there can be no persuasion without an address to the passions;* and it is evident, from what has

* "To say that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions, is but at best a kind of specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always, in persuading, addresseth himself to the passions some way or other. This he cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies
been just said, that he is right, if under the term passion be included every active principle of our nature. This, however, is a greater latitude of meaning than belongs even to the Greek work ἔθια; though the signification of that is wider than, according to ordinary use, that of our term "passions."

But Aristotle by no means overlooked the necessity with a view to persuasion, properly so termed, of calling into action some motive that may influence the will: it is plain that whenever he speaks with reprobation of an appeal to the passions, his meaning is, the excitement of such feelings as ought not to influence the decision of the question in hand. A desire to do justice may be called, in Dr. Campbell's wide acceptance of the term, a "passion" or "affection;" this is what ought to influence a judge; and no one would ever censure a pleader for striving to excite and heighten this desire; but if the decision be influenced by an appeal to anger, pity, etc., the feelings thus excited being such as ought not to have operated, the judge must be allowed to have been unduly biased. And that this is Aristotle's meaning is evident from his characterizing the

no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me 'It is for my honor.' Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, 'It is for my interest.' Now you bespeak my self-love. 'It is for the public good.' Now you rouse my patriotism. 'It will relieve the miserable.' Now you touch my pity. So far, therefore, is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them.

"But if so much depend on passion, where is the scope for argument? Before I answer this question, let it be observed that, in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgment that there is a connection between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. This is the analysis of persuasion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unless so evident of itself as to supersede the necessity, by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits. In the one lies the pathetic, in the other the argumentative. These incorporated together constitute that vehemence of contention to which the greatest exploits of eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed."—Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book I., ch. vii., § 4.
introduction of such topics as "foreign to the matter in hand." It is evident, also, that as the motives which ought to operate will be different in different cases, the same may be objectionable and not fairly admissible, in one case, which in another would be perfectly allowable.

An instance occurs in Thucydides, in which this is very judiciously and neatly pointed out: in the debate respecting the Mityleneans, who had been subdued after a revolt, Cleon is introduced contending for the justice of inflicting on them capital punishment; to which Diodorus is made to reply, that the Athenians are not sitting in judgment on the offenders, but in deliberation as to their own interest; and ought, therefore, to consider, not the right they may have to put the re-

* "Εξω του πράγματος.
† See the Treatise on Fallacies, § 14. The following very sensible remarks on this subject are extracted from an article in the Edinburgh Review: "As to all truths capable of being established by evidence either on certain or probable grounds, God has given us the faculty of judging of that evidence, as the instrument of obtaining a belief in them. Any belief acquired not through the use of this instrument, but by pressing into the service faculties intended for other purposes, be the subject of belief never so true, rests on defective grounds as regards the party believing. If truth have really any objective existence at all—if it be anything more than that which every man trueth—it is the merest truism to say, that to believe as truth that which is established on slight evidence or no evidence, or arguments addressed to the conscience and not to the reason, may be an act piously done, but must proceed from a neglect of that portion of the faculties which are specially assigned to us by our Creator for that special purpose. This is an error which may often lead to good results in particular cases, as it has led, and still leads, to fearful evils in many others; but all the sophistry in the world cannot make it other than an error. . . . He [Loyola] fixes on a particular defect in human nature as a means of government, and consequently as something to be encouraged and cultivated. He would have obedience, as far as possible, comprehend the acts of judgment, as well as the acts of the will. He would have men strive to give a false bias to their minds; to stifle the light within them. He is not content with knowing that they will do so, and availing himself of the weakness: he would implant it in them as a principle.

"It would take but a short process to show that it is this fatal notion of governing men by their failings which has led, in the main, to all the perverse and irreligious portions of the developments of Jesuitism; to condescensions to every weakness, apologies for every crime, and serious defences of every unnatural absurdity."—Edin-

burgh Review, April, 1845.
volters to death, but the expediency or inexpediency of such a procedure.*

In judicial cases, on the contrary, any appeal to the personal interests of the judge, or even to public expediency, would be irrelevant. In framing laws, indeed, and (which comes to the same thing) giving those decisions which are to operate as precedents, the public good is the object to be pursued; but in the mere administering of the established laws, it is inadmissible.

There are many feelings, again, which it is evident should in no case be allowed to operate; as envy, thirst for revenge, etc., the excitement of which by the orator is to be reprobated as an unfair artifice; but it is not the less necessary to be well acquainted with their nature, in order to allay them when previously existing in the hearers, or to counteract the efforts of an adversary in producing or directing them. It is evident, indeed, that all the weaknesses, as well as the powers, of the human mind, and all the arts by which the sophist takes advantage of these weaknesses, must be familiarly known by a perfect orator; who, though he may be of such a character as to disdain employing such arts, must not want the ability to do so, or he would not be prepared to counteract them. An acquaintance with the nature of poisons is necessary to him who would administer antidotes.

§ 2.

There is, I conceive, no point in which the idea of dishonest artifice is in most people’s minds so intimately associated with that of Rhetoric, as the address to the feelings, or active princi-

* Much declamation may be heard in the present day against “expediency,” as if it were not the proper object of a deliberative assembly, and as if it were only pursued by the unprincipled. And this kind of declamation is represented as a sign of superior moral rectitude; though in truth it implies very unsound morality, in any one who is not led into it through mere confusion of thought and inaccuracy of language.

I have accordingly thought it advisable to insert in the Appendix [GG] a passage relating to the subject, extracted from a speech delivered in the House of Lords, and afterwards introduced into a charge.
PERSUASION.

This is usually stigmatized as "an appeal to the passions instead of the reason;" as if reason alone could ever influence the will, and operate as a motive; which it no more can, than the eyes, which show a man his road, can enable him to move from place to place; or than a ship provided with a compass can sail without a wind. It may be said indeed, with truth, that an orator does often influence the will by improper appeals to the passions; but it is no less true that he often imposes on the understanding of his hearers by sophistical arguments; yet this does not authorize us to reprobate the employment of argument. But it seems to be commonly taken for granted, that whenever the feelings are excited, they are of course over-excited. Now so far is this from the fact—so far is it from being true that men are universally, or even generally, in danger of being misled in conduct by an excess of feeling—that the reverse is at least as often the case. The more generous feelings, such as compassion, gratitude, devotion, nay, even rational and rightly-directed self-love, hope, and fear, are oftener defective than excessive; and that even in the estimation of the parties themselves, if they are well-principled, judicious, reflective, and candid men. Do the feelings of such a man, when contemplating, for instance, the doctrines and the promises of the Christian religion, usually come up to the standard which he himself thinks reasonable? And not only in the case of religion, but in many others also, a man will often wonder at, and be rather ashamed of, the coldness and languor of his own feelings, compared with what the occasion calls for; and even make efforts to rouse in himself such emotions as he is conscious his reason would approve.

In making such an effort, a curious and important fact is forced on the attention of every one who reflects on the operations of his own mind; viz., that the feelings, propensities, and sentiments of our nature are not, like the intellectual faculties, under the direct control of volition. The distinction is much the same as between the voluntary and the involuntary actions of different parts of the body. One may, by a deliberate act of the will, set himself to calculate, to reason, to recall historical facts, etc., just as he does to move any of
his limbs: on the other hand, a volition to hope or fear, to love or hate, to feel devotion or pity, and the like, is as ineffec- tual as to will that the pulsations of the heart, or the secre-tions of the liver, should be altered. Many indeed are, I believe, (strange as it would seem,) not aware of the total inefficacy of their own efforts of volition in such cases: that is, they mistake for a feeling of gratitude, compassion, etc., their voluntary reflections on the subject, and their conviction that the case is one which calls for gratitude or compassion. A very moderate degree of attention, however, to what is passing in the mind, will enable any one to perceive the dif-fERENCE. A blind man may be fully convinced that a soldier’s coat is of a different color from a coal; and this his convic-tion is not more distinct from a perception of the colors, than a belief that some one is very much to be pitied, from a feel-ing of pity for him.

It is a very strange thing, certainly, that men should be so often greatly self-deceived in respect of their own feelings; and still more strange perhaps that this self-deceit, consider-ing how very common it is, should have been seldom if ever noticed. Many a man would be most indignant at having it suggested, when he professes himself “very glad” of this, and “very sorry” for that, (speaking with perfect sincerity as far as his own belief goes,) that his feelings are in truth the reverse: that the event which he professes to rejoice at, and which perhaps he would really, from conscientious mo-tives, have exerted himself to bring about, does in reality mortify and annoy him; and that he feels an inward relief and satisfaction at that which he professes, and believes him-self, to lament. But let any one carefully and candidly look around him, and look within himself, and he will see reason for assenting to what has been here said. Of course this kind of self-deceit is the more likely to occur, and the less likely to be detected; when it happens, as it often will, that there is a mixture of truth with error. We are often really under the influence of different and even opposite emotions at once: e. g., we are in some respects gratified, and in others pained, by the same occurrence; and it is in such cases most natural to imagine ourselves wholly under the influence of the feeling which our reason approves.
How then is the difficulty to be surmounted which arises from the feelings not being (any more than certain muscles) under the direct control of the will? Good sense suggests, in each case, an analogous remedy. It is in vain to form a will to quicken or lower the circulation; but we may, by a voluntary act, swallow a medicine which will have that effect; and so also, though we cannot, by a direct effort of volition, excite or allay any sentiment or emotion, we may, by a voluntary act, fill the understanding with such thoughts as shall operate on the feelings. Thus, by attentively studying and meditating on the history of some extraordinary personage—by contemplating and dwelling on his actions and sufferings, his virtues and his wisdom, and by calling on the imagination to present a vivid picture of all that is related and referred to—in this manner, we may at length succeed in kindling such feelings, suppose, of reverence, admiration, gratitude, love, hope, emulation, etc., as we were already prepared to acknowledge are suitable to the case. So, again, if a man of sense wishes to allay in himself any emotion, that of resentment for instance, though it is not under the direct control of the will, he deliberately sets himself to reflect on the softening circumstances; such as the provocations the other party may suppose himself to have received; perhaps his ignorance, or weakness, or disordered state of health: he endeavors to imagine himself in the place of the offending party; and above all, if he is a sincere Christian, he mediates on the parable of the debtor who, after having been himself forgiven, claimed payment with rigid severity from his fellow-servant; and on other similar lessons of Scripture.

Now in any such process as this, (which is exactly analogous to that of taking a medicine that is to operate on the involuntary bodily organs,) a process to which a man of well-regulated mind continually finds occasion to resort, he is precisely acting the part of a skilful orator, to himself; and that, too, in respect of the very point to which the most invidious names are usually given, "the appeal to the feelings."

Such being then the state of the case, how, it may be said, can it be accounted for, that the idea of unfair artifice should be so commonly associated not only with Rhetoric in
general, but most especially with that particular part of it
now under consideration? though no other artifice is neces-
sarily employed by the orator than a man of sense makes use
of towards himself.

Many different circumstances combine to produce this
effect. In the first place, the intellectual powers being, as
has been said, under the immediate control of the will,
which the feelings, sentiments, etc., are not, an address to the
understanding is consequently, from the nature of the case,
direct; to the feelings, indirect. The conclu-
sion you wish to draw, you may state plainly, as
such; and avow your intention of producing
reasons which shall effect a conviction of that conclusion:
you may even entreat the hearers' steady attention to the
point to be proved, and to the process of argument by which
it is to be established. But this, for the reasons above men-
tioned, is widely different from the process by which we ope-
rate on the feelings. No passion, sentiment, or emotion is
excited by thinking about it, and attending to it; but by
thinking about, and attending to, such objects as are calcu-
lated to awaken it. Hence it is, that the more oblique and
indirect process which takes place when we are addressing
ourselves to this part of the human mind, is apt to suggest
the idea of trick and artifice; although it is, as I have said,
just such as a wise man practices towards himself.

In the next place, though men are often deluded by sophis-
tical arguments addressed to the understanding,
they do not, in this case, so readily detect the
deceit that has been practiced on them, as they
do in the case of their being misled by the ex-
citement of passions. A few days, or even hours, will often
allow them to cool, sufficiently, to view in very different colors
some question on which they have perhaps decided in a
moment of excitement; whereas any sophistical reasoning by
which they have been misled, they are perhaps as unable to
detect as ever. The state of the feelings, in short, varies
from day to day; the understanding remains nearly the same;
and hence the idea of deceit is more particularly associated
with that kind of deceit which is the less permanent in its
effects, and the sooner detected.

To these considerations it may be added, that men have in
general more confidence in the soundness of their understanding than in their self-command and due regulation of feelings; they are more unwilling, consequently, to believe that an orator has misled or can mislead them by sophistical arguments—that is, by taking advantage of their intellectual weakness—than by operating on their feelings; and hence, the delusions which an artful orator produces are often attributed in a greater degree than is really the case, to the influence he has exerted on the passions.

But if every thing were to be regarded with aversion or with suspicion that is capable of being employed dishonestly, or for a bad purpose, the use of language might be condemned altogether. It does indeed often happen that men's feelings are extravagantly excited on some inadequate occasion: this only proves how important it is that either they, or the person who undertakes to advise them, should understand how to bring down these feelings to the proper pitch. And it happens full as often (which is what most persons are apt to overlook) that their feelings fall far short of what, even in their own judgment, the occasion would call for; and in this case an excitement of such feelings, though not effected directly by a process of reasoning, is very far from being any thing opposed to reason, or tending to mislead the judgment. Stimulants are not to be condemned as necessarily bringing the body into an unnatural state because they raise the circulation: in a fever this would be hurtful; but there may be a torpid, lethargic disease, in which an excitement of the circulation is precisely what is wanted to bring it into a healthy condition.

When, however, it is said that a good and wise man often has to act the part of an orator towards himself, in respect of that very point—the excitement of the feelings—which in many minds is the most associated with the idea of dishonest artifice, it must not be forgotten that a man is in danger—the more, in proportion to his abilities—of exercising on himself, when under the influence of some passion, a most pernicious oratorical power, by pleading the cause, as it were, before himself, of that passion. Suppose it anger, e. g., that he is feel-
ing: he is naturally disposed to dwell on and amplify the aggravating circumstances of the supposed provocation, so as to make out a good case for himself; a representation such as may—or might, if needed—serve to vindicate him in the eyes of a bystander, and to give him the advantage in a controversy. This of course tends to heighten his resentment, and to satisfy him that he “doth well to be angry;” or perhaps to persuade him that he is not angry, but is a model of patience under intolerable wrongs. And the man of superior ingenuity and eloquence will do this more skilfully than an ordinary man, and will thence be likely to be the more effectually self-deceived; for though he may be superior to the other in judgment, as well as in ingenuity, it is to be remembered that while his judgment is likely to be, in his own cause, biased, and partially blinded, his ingenuity is called forth to the utmost.

And the like takes place, if it be selfish cupidity, unjust partiality in favor of a relative or friend, party spirit, or any other passion, that may be operating. For, universally, men are but too apt to take more pains in justifying their propensities, than it would cost to control them. And a man of superior powers will often be in this way entrapped by his own ingenuity, like a spider entangled in the web she has herself spun. Most persons are fearful, even to excess, of being misled by the eloquence of another;* but an ingenious reasoner ought to be especially fearful of his own. There is no one whom he is likely so much and so hurtfully to mislead as himself, if he be not sedulously on his guard against this self-deceit.

§ 3.

The active principles of our nature may be classed in various ways. The arrangement adopted by Mr. Dugald Stewart† is, perhaps, the

* I have known a man accordingly shun the acquaintance of another of whom he knew no harm, solely from his dread of him as a man who, he imagined, “could prove any thing.” Men of a low tone of morality, judging from themselves, take for granted that whoever “has a giant’s strength” will not scruple to “use it like a giant.”

† Outlines of Moral Philosophy.
most correct and convenient: the heads he enumerates are appetites, (which have their origin in the body,) desires, and affections; these last being such as imply some kind of disposition relative to another person; to which must be added self-love, or the desire of happiness, as such; and the moral faculty, called by some writers conscience, by others conscientiousness, by others the moral sense, and by Dr. A. Smith the sense of propriety.

Under the head of affections may be included the sentiments of esteem, regard, admiration, etc., which it is so important that the audience should feel towards the speaker. Aristotle has considered this as a distinct head; separating the consideration of the speaker's character (ἕθες τοῦ λέγουσα) from that of the disposition of the hearers; under which, however, it might, according to his own views, have been included; it being plain from his manner of treating of the speaker's character, that he means, not his real character, (according to the fanciful notion of Quintilian,) but the impression produced on the minds of the hearers, by the speaker, respecting himself.

He remarks, justly, that the character to be established is that of, first, good principle; secondly, good sense; and, thirdly, good will and friendly disposition towards the audience addressed;* and that if the orator can completely succeed in this, he will persuade more powerfully than by the strongest arguments. He might have added, (as indeed he does slightly hint, at the conclusion of his treatise,) that, where there is an opponent, a like result is produced by exciting the contrary feelings respecting him; viz., holding him up to contempt, or representing him as an object of reprobation or suspicion.

To treat fully of all the different emotions and springs of action which an orator may at any time find it necessary to call into play, or to contend against, would be to enter on an almost boundless field of metaphysical inquiry, which does not properly fall within the limits of the subject now before us; and, on the other hand, a brief definition of each passion, etc., and a few general remarks on it, could hardly fail to be trite and uninteresting. A few miscellaneous rules therefore

* Ἀρετή, Φρόνησις, Εὐνοια, Book II., ch. i.
may suffice, relative to the conduct, generally, of those parts of any composition which are designed to influence the will.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CONDUCT OF ANY ADDRESS TO THE FEELINGS, GENERALLY.

§ 1.

The first and most important point to be observed in every address to any passion, sentiment, feeling, etc., is, (as has been already hinted,) that it should not be introduced as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure, if not entirely, lost. This circumstance forms a remarkable distinction between the head now under consideration, and that of argumentation. When engaged in reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not only need not be concealed, but may, (as I have said,) without prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared: on the other hand, even when the feelings we wish to excite are such as ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of the endeavors thus to influence the hearer, still our purpose and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet not openly declared and made prominent. Whether the motives which the orator is endeavoring to call into action be suitable or unsuitable to the occasion—such as it is right, or wrong, for the hearer to act upon—the same rule will hold good. In the latter case, it is plain that the speaker who is seeking to bias unfairly the minds of the audience, will be the more likely to succeed by going to work clandestinely, in order that his hearers may not be on their guard, and prepare and fortify their minds against the impression he wishes to produce. In the other case—where the motives dwelt on are such as ought to be present, and strongly to operate—men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they need to have these motives urged upon them, and that they are not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments as the occasion calls for. A man may
indeed be convinced that he is in such a predicament, and may ultimately feel obliged to the orator for exciting or strengthening such sentiments; but while he confesses this, he cannot but feel a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority in a speaker who seems to say, "Now I will exhort you to feel as you ought on this occasion;" "I will endeavor to inspire you with such noble and generous and amiable sentiments as you ought to entertain;" which is, in effect, the tone of him who avows the purpose of exhortation. The mind is sure to revolt from the humiliation of being thus moulded and fashioned, in respect to its feelings, at the pleasure of another; and is apt, perversely, to resist the influence of such a discipline.

On the other hand, there is no such implied superiority in avowing the intention of convincing the understanding. Men know, and (what is more to the purpose) feel, that he who presents to their minds a new and cogent train of argument, does not necessarily possess or assume any offensive superiority; but may, by merely having devoted a particular attention to the point in question, succeed in setting before them arguments and explanations which have not occurred to themselves. And even if the arguments adduced, and the conclusions drawn, should be opposite to those with which they had formerly been satisfied, still there is nothing in this so humiliating, as in that which seems to amount to the imputation of a moral deficiency.

It is true that sermons not unfrequently prove popular, which consist avowedly and almost exclusively of exhortation, strictly so called—in which the design of influencing the sentiments and feelings is not only apparent, but prominent throughout; but it is to be feared that those who are the most pleased with such discourses are more apt to apply these exhortations to their neighbors than to themselves; and that each bestows his commendation rather from the consideration that such admonitions are much needed, and must be generally useful, than from finding them thus useful to himself.

When indeed the speaker has made some progress in exciting the feelings required, and has in great measure gained possession of his audience, a direct and distinct exhortation
to adopt the conduct recommended will often prove very effectual; but never can it be needful or advisable to tell them (as some do) that you are going to exhort them.

It will, indeed, sometimes happen that the excitement of a certain feeling will depend, in some measure, on the process of reasoning: e. g., it may be requisite to prove, where there is a doubt on the subject, that the person so recommended to the pity, gratitude, etc., of the hearers, is really an object deserving of these sentiments; but even then it will almost always be the case, that the chief point to be accomplished shall be to raise those feelings to the requisite height, after the understanding is convinced that the occasion calls for them. And this is to be effected not by argument, properly so called, but by presenting the circumstances in such a point of view, and so fixing and detaining the attention upon them, that corresponding sentiments and emotions shall gradually, and as it were spontaneously, arise.

Sermons would probably have more effect, if, instead of being, as they frequently are, directly hortatory, they were more in a didactic form; occupied chiefly in explaining some transaction related, or doctrine laid down, in Scripture. The generality of hearers are too much familiarized to direct exhortation to feel it adequately: if they are led to the same point obliquely as it were, and induced to dwell with interest for a considerable time on some point, closely, though incidentally, connected with the most awful and important truths, a very slight application to themselves might make a greater impression than the most vehement appeal in the outset. Often indeed they would themselves make this application unconsciously; and if on any this procedure made no impression, it can hardly be expected that any thing else would. To use a homely illustration, a moderate charge of powder will have more effect in splitting a rock, if we begin by deep boring and introducing the charge into the very heart of it, than ten times the quantity, exploded on the surface.

§ 2.

Hence arises another rule closely connected with the foregoing, though it also so far relates to style, that it might with sufficient propriety have
been placed under that head; viz., that in order effectually to excite feelings of any kind, it is necessary to employ some copiousness of detail, and to *dwell* somewhat at large on the several circumstances of the case in hand; in which respect there is a wide distinction between strict argumentation, with a view to the conviction of the understanding alone, and the attempt to influence the will, by the excitement of any emotion.* With respect to argument itself, indeed, different occasions will call for different degrees of copiousness, repetition, and expansion; the chain of reasoning employed may, in itself, consist of more or fewer links; abstruse and complex arguments must be unfolded at greater length than such as are more simple; and the more uncultivated the audience, the more full must be the explanation and illustration, and the more frequent the repetition, of the arguments presented to them; but still the same general principle prevails in all these cases; viz., to aim merely at letting the arguments be fully *understood and admitted*. This will indeed occupy a shorter or longer space, according to the nature of the case and the character of the hearers; but all expansion and repetition *beyond* what is necessary to accomplish conviction, is in every instance tedious and disgusting. In a description, on the other hand, of any thing that is likely to act on the feelings, this effect will by no means be produced as soon as the understanding is sufficiently informed; detail and expansion are here not only admissible, but indispensable, in order that the mind may have leisure and opportunity to form vivid and distinct ideas. For as Quinctilian well observes, he who tells us that a city was sacked, although that one word implies all that occurred, will produce little if any impression on the feelings,† in comparison of one who sets before us a lively

* “Non enim, sicut argumentum, simulatque positum est, arripit, alterumque et tertium poscitur; ita misericordiam aut invidiam aut iraundiam, simulatque intuleris, possis commovere: argumentum enim ratio ipsa confirmat, quae, simulatque emissa est, adherescit; illud autem genus orationis non cognitionem judicis, sed magis perturbationem requirit, quam consequi, nisi multa et varia et copiosa oratione, et simili contentione actionis, nemo potest. Quare qui aut breviter aut summisse dicunt, docere judicem possunt, commovere non possunt; in quo sunt omnia.”—Cic. *de Orat.*, Lib. II., C. 53.

† Dr. Campbell has treated very ably of some circumstances which
description of the various lamentable circumstances. To tell the whole, he adds, is by no means the same as to tell every thing.

Accordingly it may be observed, that though every one understands what is meant by a "wound," there are some who cannot hear a minute description of one without fainting.

The death of Patroclus is minutely related by Homer, for the interest of the reader; though to Achilles, whose feelings would be sufficiently excited by the bare fact, it is told in two words: κείται Πάτροκλος.

There is an instance related in a number of the Adventurer, of a whole audience, being moved to tears by a minute detail of the circumstances connected with the death of a youthful pair at the battle of Fontenoy; though they had previously listened without emotion to a general statement of the dreadful carnage in that engagement.

It is not, however, with a view to the feelings only that some copiousness of detail will occasionally be needful: it will often happen that the judgment cannot be correctly formed without dwelling on circumstances. It has seldom if ever been noticed, how important among the intellectual qualifications for the study of history is a vivid imagination: a faculty which consequently a skilful narrator must himself possess, and to which he must be able to furnish excitement in others. Some may perhaps be startled at this remark, who have been accustomed to consider imagination as having no other office than to feign and falsify. Every faculty is liable to abuse and misdirection, and imagination among the rest; but it is a mistake to suppose that it necessarily tends to pervert the truth of history, and to mislead the judgment. On the contrary, our view of any transaction, especially one that is remote in time or place, will necessarily be imperfect, generally incorrect, unless it embrace something more than the bare outline of the occurrences; unless we have before the mind a lively idea of the scenes in which the events took place, the habits of thought and of feeling of the actors, and

Imagination needed in the study of history.

tend to heighten any impression. The reader is referred to the Appendix [H] for some extracts.
all the circumstances connected with the transaction; unless, in short, we can in a considerable degree transport ourselves out of our own age, and country, and persons, and imagine ourselves the agents or spectators. It is from a consideration of all these circumstances that we are enabled to form a right judgment as to the facts which history records, and to derive instruction from it.* What we imagine, may indeed be merely imaginary, i.e., unreal; but it may, again, be what actually does or did exist. To say that imagination, if not regulated by sound judgment and sufficient knowledge, may chance to convey to us false impressions of past events, is only to say that man is fallible. But such false impressions are even much the more likely to take possession of one whose imagination is feeble or uncultivated. He will be apt to imagine the things, persons, times, countries, etc., which he reads of, as much less different from what he sees around him than is really the case. And hence he will be the most liable to the mistake noticed above, [Part I., ch. ii., § 2,] of viewing an unnatural representation as natural, and vice versa.

§ 3.

It is not always advisable to enter into a direct detail of circumstances; which would often have the effect of wearying the hearer beforehand, with the expectation of a long description of something in which he probably does not, as yet, feel much interest; and would also be likely to prepare him too much, and forewarn him, as it were, of the object proposed—the design laid against his feelings. It is observed by opticians and astronomers that a side view of a faint star, or, especially, of a comet, presents it in much greater brilliancy than a direct view. To see a comet in its full splendor, you should look not straight at it, but at some star a little beside it. Something analogous to this often takes place in mental perceptions. It will often, therefore, have a better effect to describe obliquely, (if I may so speak,) by introducing circumstances connected with the main object or event, and affected by it, but not absolutely forming a part of it. And circumstances

* See Appendix, [I.]
of this kind may not unfrequently be so selected as to produce a more striking impression of any thing that is in itself great and remarkable, than could be produced by a minute and direct description; because in this way the general and collective result of a whole, and the effects produced by it on other objects, may be vividly impressed on the hearer's mind; the circumstantial detail of collateral matters not drawing off the mind from the contemplation of the principal matter as one and complete. Thus, the woman's application to the King of Samaria, to compel her neighbor to fulfil the agreement of sharing with her the infant's flesh, gives a more frightful impression of the horrors of the famine than any more direct description could have done; since it presents to us the picture of that hardening of the heart to every kind of horror, and that destruction of the ordinary state of human sentiment, which is the result of long-continued and extreme misery. Nor could any detail of the particular vexations to be suffered by the exiled Jews for their disobedience, convey so lively an idea of them as that description of their result contained in the denunciation of Moses: "In the evening thou shalt say, Would God it were morning! and in the morning thou shalt say, Would God it were evening!"

In the poem of Rokeby, a striking exemplification occurs of what has been said: Bertram, in describing the prowess he had displayed as a buccaneer, does not particularize any of his exploits, but alludes to the terrible impression they had left:

"Panama's maids shall long look pale,
When Risingham inspires the tale;
Chili's dark matrons long shall tame
The froward child with Bertram's name."

The first of dramatists, who might have been perhaps the first of orators, has offered some excellent exemplifications of this rule, especially in the speech of Antony over Caesar's body.

§ 4.

Comparison is one powerful means of exciting or heightening any emotion; viz., by presenting a parallel between the case in hand and some other that is calculated to call forth such emotions; taking care, of course,
to represent the present case as stronger than the one it is compared with, and such as ought to affect us more powerfully.

When several successive steps of this kind are employed to raise the feelings gradually to the highest pitch, (which is the principal employment of what rhetoricians call the climax,* ) a far stronger effect is produced than by the mere presentation of the most striking object at once. It is observed by all travellers who have visited the Alps, or other stupendous mountains, that they form a very inadequate notion of the vastness of the greater ones, till they ascend some of the less elevated, (which yet are huge mountains,) and thence view the others still towering above them. And the mind, no less than the eye, cannot so well take in and do justice to any vast object at a single glance, as by several successive approaches and repeated comparisons. Thus in the well-known climax of Cicero in the oration against Verres, shocked as the Romans were likely to be at the bare mention of the crucifixion of one of their citizens, the successive steps by which he brings them to the contemplation of such an event were calculated to work up their feelings to a much higher pitch: "It is an outrage to bind a Roman citizen; to scourge him is an atrocious crime; to put him to death is almost parricide; but to crucify him—what shall I call it?"

It is observed, accordingly, by Aristotle, in speaking of panegyric, that the person whom we would hold up to admiration should always be compared, and advantageously compared, if possible, with those that are already illustrious; but if not, at least with some person whom he excels: to excel being in itself, he says, a ground of admiration. The same rule will apply, as has been said, to all other feelings as well as to admiration: anger or pity, for instance, are more effectually excited if we produce cases such as would call forth those passions, and which, though similar to those before us, are not so strong; and so with respect to the rest.

* An analogous arrangement of arguments, in order to set forth the full force of the one we mean to dwell upon, would also receive the same appellation; and in fact is very often combined and blended with that which is here spoken of.
When it is said, however, that the object which we compare with another, introduced for the purpose, shall be one which ought to excite the feeling in question in a higher degree than that other, it is not meant that this must actually be, already, the impression of the hearers: the reverse will more commonly be the case: that the instances adduced will be such as actually affect their feelings more strongly than that to which we are endeavoring to turn them, till the flame spreads, as it were, from the one to the other. This will especially hold good in every case where self is concerned: e. g., men feel naturally more indignant at a slight affront offered to themselves, or those closely connected with them, than at the most grievous wrong done to a stranger: if, therefore, you would excite their utmost indignation in such a case, it must be by comparing it with a parallel case that concerns themselves; i. e., by leading them to consider how they would feel were such and such an injury done to themselves. And, on the other hand, if you would lead them to a just sense of their own faults, it must be by leading them to contemplate like faults in others; of which the celebrated parable of Nathan, addressed to David, affords an admirable instance.

It often answers very well to introduce in this manner an instance not only avowedly fictitious, but even manifestly impossible, provided it be but conceivable. A case may thus be exhibited more striking and apposite than any real or possible one that could be found. I have inserted in the Appendix some examples of this kind.*

§ 5.

Another rule (which also is connected in some degree with style) relates to the tone of feeling to be manifested by the writer or speaker himself, in order to excite the most effectually the desired emotions in the minds of the hearers. And this is to be accomplished by two opposite methods: the one, which is the more obvious, is to express openly the feeling in question; the other, to seem laboring to suppress it. In the former method, the most forcible remarks are introduced; the most direct as well as impassioned kind of description is employed;

* See Appendix, [K.]
and something of exaggeration introduced, in order to carry
the hearers as far as possible in the same direction in which
the orator seems to be himself hurried, and to infect them to
a certain degree with the emotions and sentiments which he
thus manifests: the other method, which is often no less suc-
cessful, is to abstain from all remarks, or from all such as
come up to the expression of feeling which the occasion seems
to authorize; to use a gentler mode of expression than the
case might fairly warrant; to deliver "an unvarnished tale,"
leaving the hearers to make their own comments; and to
appear to stifle and studiously to keep within bounds such
emotions as may seem natural. This produces a kind of re-
action in the hearers' minds; and being struck with the in-
adequacy of the expressions, and the studied calmness of the
speaker's manner of stating things, compared with what he
may naturally be supposed to feel, they will often rush into
the opposite extreme, and become the more strongly affected
by that which is set before them in so simple and modest a
form. And though this method is in reality more artificial
than the other, the artifice is the more likely (perhaps for
that very reason) to escape detection; men being less on their
guard against a speaker who does not seem so much laboring
to work upon their feelings, as to repress or moderate his
own; provided that this calmness and coolness of manner be
not carried to such an extreme as to bear the appearance of
affectation; which caution is also to be attended to in the
other mode of procedure no less—an excessive hyperbolical
exaggeration being likely to defeat its own object. Aristotle
mentions, (Rhet., Book IX.,) though very briefly, these two
modes of rousing the feelings, the latter under the name of
cironeia, which in his time was commonly employed to signify,
not according to the modern use of " irony," saying "the
contrary" to what is meant," but what later writers usually ex-
press by litotes, i. e., saying less than is meant.

The two methods may often be both used on the same oc-
casion, beginning with the calm, and proceeding to the im-
passioned afterwards, when the feelings of the
hearers are already wrought up to a certain pitch.*

Universally, indeed, it is a fault carefully to be

* "Οταν ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἄκροατας, καὶ πωληθεὶς ἐνθοσιώδας.—Aristotle,
Rhet., Book III., chap. 7.
avoided, to express feelings more vehemently than that the audience can go along with the speaker; who would, in that case, as Cicero observes, seem like one raving among the sane, or intoxicated in the midst of the sober. And accordingly, except where from extraneous causes the audience are already in an excited state, we must carry them forward gradually, and allow time for the fire to kindle. The blast which would heighten a strong flame, would, if applied too soon, extinguish the first faint spark. The speech of Antony over Caesar's corpse, which has been already mentioned, affords an admirable example of that combination of the two methods which has just been spoken of.

Generally, however, it will be found that the same orators do not excel equally in both modes of exciting the feelings; and it should be recommended to each to employ principally that in which he succeeds best; since either, if judiciously managed, will generally prove effectual for its object. The well-known tale of Inkle and Yarico, which is an instance of the extenuating method, (as it may be called,) could not, perhaps, have been rendered more affecting, if equally so, by the most impassioned vehemence and rhetorical heightening.

In no point, perhaps, more than in that now under consideration, is the importance of a judicious arrangement to be perceived. The natural and suitable order of the parts of a discourse (natural it may be called, because corresponding with that in which the ideas suggest themselves to the mind) is, that the statements and arguments should first be clearly and calmly laid down and developed, which are the ground and justification of such sentiments and emotions as the case calls for; and that, then, the impassioned appeal (supposing the circumstances such as admit of or demand this) should be made, to hearers well prepared by their previous deliberate conviction, for resigning themselves to such feelings as fairly arise out of that conviction. The former of these two parts may be compared to the back of a sabre; the latter to its edge. The former should be firm and weighty; the latter keen. The writer who is deficient in strength of argument, seems to want weight and stoutness of metal; his strokes make but a superficial impression, or the weapon is shivered to fragments in his hand. He, again, whose Logie is convincing,
but whose deficiency is in the keenness of his application to
the heart and to the will of the hearer, seems to be wielding
a blunt though ponderous weapon: we wonder to find that
such weighty blows have not cut deeper. And he who re-
verses the natural order—who begins with a vehement ad-
dress to the feelings, and afterwards proceeds to the argu-
ments which alone justify such feelings—reminds us of one
wielding an excellent sword, but striking with the back of it:
if he did but turn it round, its blows would take effect.

§ 6.

When the occasion or object in question is not such as
calls for, or as is likely to excite in those parti-
cular readers or hearers, the emotions required,
it is a common rhetorical artifice to turn their at-
tention to some object which will call forth these feelings;
and when they are too much excited to be capable of judging
calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their passions, once
roused, in the direction required, and to make them view the
case before them in a very different light. When the metal
is heated, it may easily be moulded into the desired form.
Thus, vehement indignation against some crime may be di-
rected against a person who has not been proved guilty of it;
and vague declamations against corruption, oppression, etc.,
or against the mischiefs of anarchy, with highflown panegy-
ries on liberty, rights of man, etc., or on social order, justice,
the constitution, law, religion, etc., will gradually lead the
hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the measure
proposed will lead to these evils or these advantages; and it
will in consequence become the object of groundless abhor-
rence or admiration. For the very utterance of such words
as have a multitude of what may be called stimulating ideas
associated with them, will operate like a charm on the minds,
especially of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a
tumult of feeling as will effectually blind their judgment; so
that a string of vague abuse or panegyrile will often have the
effect of a train of sound argument. This artifice falls under
the head of "irrelevant conclusion," or ignoratio elenchii,
mentioned in the treatise on Fallacies.
CHAPTER III.

OF THE FAVORABLE OR UNFAVORABLE DISPOSITION OF THE HEARERS TOWARDS THE SPEAKER OR HIS OPPONENT.

§ 1.

In raising a favorable impression of the speaker, or an unfavorable one of his opponent, a peculiar tact will of course be necessary; especially in the former, since direct self-commendation will usually be disgusting to a greater degree even than a direct personal attack on another; though, if the orator is pleading his own cause, or one in which he is personally concerned, (as was the case in the speech of Demosthenes concerning the "Crown,"”) a greater allowance will be made for him on this point; especially if he be a very eminent person, and one who may safely appeal to public actions performed by him. Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as claiming, directly, when speaking in his own vindication, exactly the qualities (good sense, good principle, and good will) which Aristotle lays down as constituting the character which we must seek to appear in. But then it is to be observed, that the historian represents him as accustomed to address the people with more authority than others for the most part ventured to assume. It is by the expression of wise, amiable, and generous sentiments that Aristotle recommends the speaker to manifest his own character;* but even this must generally be done in an oblique† and seemingly incidental manner, lest the hearers be disgusted with a pompous and studied display

* When (as of course will often happen) the hearers are thus induced, on insufficient grounds, to give the speaker full credit for moral excellence, from his merely uttering the language of it, the fallacy which in this case misleads them may be regarded as that of "undistributed middle:” "A good man would speak so and so: the speaker does this; therefore he must be a good man."

† E. g. : "It would be needless to impress upon you the maxim," etc. "You cannot be ignorant," etc., etc. "I am not advancing any high pretensions in expressing the sentiments which such an occasion must call forth in every honest heart,” etc.
of fine sentiments; and care must also be taken not to affront them by seeming to inculcate, as something likely to be new to them, maxims which they regard as almost truisms. Of course the application of this last caution must vary according to the character of the persons addressed: that might excite admiration and gratitude in one audience which another would receive with indignation and ridicule. Most men, however, are disposed rather to overrate than to extenuate their own moral judgment, or at least to be jealous of any one's appearing to underrate it.

Universally indeed, in the arguments used, as well as in the appeals made to the feelings, a consideration must be had of the hearers, whether they are learned or ignorant; of this or that profession, nation, character, etc.; and the address must be adapted to each; so that there can be no excellence of writing or speaking, in the abstract; nor can we any more pronounce on the eloquence of any composition, than upon the wholesomeness of a medicine, without knowing for whom it is intended.*

The less enlightened the hearers, the harder, of course, it is to make them comprehend a long and complex train of reasoning; so that sometimes the arguments, in themselves the most cogent, cannot be employed at all with effect; and the rest will need an expansion and copious illustration which would be needless, and therefore tiresome, (as has been above remarked,) before a different kind of audience. On the other hand, their feelings may be excited by much bolder and coarser expedients, such as those are the most ready to employ, and the most likely to succeed in, who are themselves

* Aristotle has given, in his Rhetoric, besides a very curious and valuable analysis of the passions, a description of the prevailing characters of men of different ages and situations in life—in reference to the different modes in which they are to be addressed. With a similar view, I have appended to the present Part a Lecture delivered a few years ago, on the moral and intellectual influences of the several professions.

It was composed without any reference to the present subject; and it omits several points which might, not unsuitably, have been introduced. But it will be easy for the reader to make the requisite application of the remarks it contains, and to fill up for himself the outline sketched out in it.
only a little removed above the vulgar; as may be seen in
the effects produced by fanatical preachers.

But there are none whose feelings do not occasionally need
and admit of excitement by the powers of elo-
queness; only there is a more exquisite skill re-
quired in thus affecting the educated classes than
the populace. "The less improved in knowledge
and discernment the hearers are, the easier it is
for the speaker to work upon their passions, and, by working
on their passions, to obtain his end. This, it must be owned,
appears on the other hand to give a considerable advantage
to the preacher; as in no congregation can the bulk of the
people be regarded as on a footing, in point of improvement,
with either house of parliament, or with the judges in a
court of judicature. It is certain, that the more gross the
hearers are, the more avowedly may you address yourself to
their passions, and the less occasion there is for argument;
whereas, the more intelligent they are, the more covertly
must you operate on their passions, and the more attentive
must you be in regard to the justness, or at least the specious-
ness, of your reasoning. Hence some have strangely con-
cluded, that the only scope for eloquence is in haranguing
the multitude; that in gaining over to your purpose men of
knowledge and breeding, the exertion of oratorical talents
hath no influence. This is precisely as if one should argue,
because a mob is much more easily subdued than regular
troops, there is no occasion for the art of war, nor is there a
proper field for the exertion of military skill, unless when
you are quelling an undisciplined rabble. Everybody sees
in this case, not only how absurd such a way of arguing
would be, but that the very reverse ought to be the conclu-
sion. The reason why people do not so quickly perceive the
absurdity in the other case is, that they affix no distinct
meaning to the word eloquence, often denoting no more by
that term than simply the power of moving the passions.
But even in this improper acceptation, their notion is far
from being just; for wherever there are men, learned or
ignorant, civilized or barbarous, there are passions; and the
greater the difficulty is in affecting these, the more art is
requisite."*

* Campbell's "Rhetoric," B. I., chap. x., sec. 2, pp. 224, 225.
It may be added to what Dr. Campbell has here remarked, that the title of *eloquent* may have come to be often limited to such compositions as he is speaking of, from the circumstance that their eloquence is (to readers of cultivated mind) more *conspicuous*. That which affects our own feelings is not, by us, at the time at least, perceived to be eloquence. (See note to the next section.)

On the other hand, it is, as has been said, in the same degree more difficult to bring the uneducated to a comprehension of the arguments employed; and this not only from their reasoning powers having less general cultivation, but also, in many instances, from their ignorance of the subject—their needing to be informed of the facts, and to have the principles explained to them, on which the argument proceeds. And I cannot but think that the generality of sermons seem to presuppose a degree of religious knowledge in the hearers greater than many of them would be found on examination to possess. When this is the case, the most angelic eloquence must be unavailing to any practical purpose.

In no point more than in that now under consideration, viz., the conciliation (to adopt the term of the Latin writers) of the hearers, is it requisite to consider who and what the hearers are; for when it is said that good sense, good principle, and good will, constitute the character which the speaker ought to establish of himself, it is to be remembered that every one of these is to be considered in reference to the opinions and habits of the audience. To think very differently from his hearers, may often be a sign of the orator's wisdom and worth; but they are not likely to consider it so. A witty satirist* has observed, that "it is a short way to obtain the reputation of a wise and reasonable man, whenever any one tells you his opinion, to agree with him." Without going the full length of completely acting on this maxim, it is quite necessary to remember, that in proportion as the speaker manifests his dissent from the opinions and principles of his audience, so far he runs the risk at least of impairing their estimation of

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* Swift.
his judgment. But this it is often necessary to do when any serious object is proposed; because it will commonly happen that the very end aimed at shall be one which implies a change of sentiments, or even of principles and character, in the hearers.

This must be very much the case with any preacher of the gospel; but must have been much more so with its first pro- nulgators. "Christ crucified" was "to the Jews a stumbling- block, and to the Greeks foolishness." The total change required in all the notions, habits, and systems of conduct in the first converts, constituted an obstacle to the reception of the new religion, which no other that has prevailed ever had to contend with. The striking contrast which Moham- medanism presents, in this respect, to Christianity, consti- tutes the rapid diffusion of the two by no means parallel cases.

Those indeed who aim only at popularity, are right in conforming their sentiments to those of the hearers, rather than the contrary; but it is plain that though in this way they obtain the greatest reputation for eloquence, they deserve it the less; it being much easier, according to the tale related of Mohammed, to go to the mountain, than to bring the mountain to us. "Little force is necessary to push down heavy bodies placed on the verge of a declivity; but much force is requisite to stop them in their progress, and push them up. If a man should say, that because the first is more frequently effected than the last, it is the best trial of strength, and the only suitable use to which it can be applied, we should at least not think him remarkable for distinctness in his ideas. Popularity alone, therefore, is no test at all of the eloquence of the speaker, no more than velocity alone would be, of the force of the external impulse originally given to the body moving. As in this the direction of the body, and other circumstances, must be taken into the account; so, in that, you must consider the tendency of the teaching, whether it favors or opposes the vices of the hearers. To head a sect, to infuse party spirit, to make men arrogant, unchari- table, and malevolent, is the easiest task imaginable, and to which almost any blockhead is fully equal. But to produce the contrary effect—to subdue the spirit of faction, (in re- ligious matters,) and that monster, spiritual pride, with which it is invariably accompanied; to inspire equity, moderation,
and charity into men's sentiments and conduct with regard to others—is the genuine test of eloquence."* There is but little eloquence in convincing men that they are in the right, or inducing them to approve a character which coincides with their own.

The Christian preacher, therefore, is in this respect placed in a difficult dilemma; since he may be sure that the less he complies with the depraved judgments of man's corrupt nature, the less acceptable is he likely to be to that depraved judgment.

But he who would claim the highest rank as an orator, (to omit all nobler considerations,) must be the one who is the most successful, not in gaining popular applause, but in carrying his point, whatever it be; especially if there are strong prejudices, interests, and feelings opposed to him. The preacher, however, who is intent on this object, should use all such precautions as are not consistent with it, to avoid raising unfavorable impressions in his hearers. Much will depend on a gentle and conciliatory manner; nor is it necessary that he should, at once, in an abrupt and offensive form, set forth all the differences of sentiment between himself and his congregation, instead of winning them over by degrees; and in whatever point, and to whatever extent, he may suppose them to agree with him, it is allowable, and for that reason advisable, to dwell on that agreement; as the apostles began every address to the Jews by an appeal to the prophets, whose authority they admitted; and as Paul opens his discourse to the Athenians (though unfortunately the words of our translation are likely to convey an opposite idea†) by a commendation of their respect for religion. And above all, where censure is called for, the speaker should avoid, not merely on Christian, but also on rhetorical principles, all appearance of exultation in his own superiority, of contempt, or of uncharitable triumph in the detection of faults: "in meekness, instructing them that oppose themselves."

Of all hostile feelings, envy is perhaps the hardest to be

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* Campbell's "Rhetoric," B. I., chap. x., sec. 5, p. 239.
† Δεισιδαμωνεστέρους, not "too superstitious," but (as almost all commentators are now agreed) "very much disposed to the worship of Divine Beings."
subdued; because hardly any one owns it, even to himself; but looks out for one pretext after another to justify the hostility which in reality springs from envy.

One considerable difficulty there is, which is peculiar to him who has been accustomed to an audience of which he is the recognized instructor, when he comes to address those who are, or who account themselves, his equals or superiors. Such is the case with a professor, college tutor, or clergyman, when he has to speak in parliament, or before a judge. He will have been accustomed, without any offensive arrogance or conceit, to speak in a tone of superiority, which, though perfectly suitable in the one case, would in the other be intolerable. And he will find himself called on to assume, with much difficulty, a tone of such deference and respect for his audience as perhaps he does not feel, but which they will have been accustomed to, and prepared to expect; though they may be not at all intrinsically superior to the pupils or the congregation he has been in the habit of instructing.

§ 2.

Of intellectual qualifications, there is one which, it is evident, should not only not be blazoned forth, but should in a great measure be concealed, or kept out of sight; viz., rhetorical skill; since whatever is attributed to the eloquence of the speaker, is so much deducted from the strength of his cause. Hence, Pericles is represented by Thucydides as artfully claiming, in his vindication of himself, the power of explaining the measures he proposes, not eloquence in persuading their adoption.* And accordingly a skilful orator seldom fails to notice and extol the eloquence of his opponent, and to warn the hearers against being misled by it.

There is indeed a class of persons, and no inconsiderable one, who have a suspicion and dread of all intellectual superiority. Such, especially, are men who possess, and are proud of, the advantages of birth, rank, high connections, and wealth, while they are deficient in others, and have a half-conscious-

* See the Motto, which is from his speech.
ness of that deficiency; who, being partly conscious of their own ignorance, dislike, dread, and endeavor to despise, extensive knowledge; who, being half aware of their own dulness, (which they call "common sense" and "sound discretion") eagerly advocate that maxim which, it has been well remarked, has been always a favorite with dunces, that a man of genius is unfit for business; and who accordingly regard with a curious mixture of disdain, jealousy, and alarm, any of those superior intellectual qualifications which seem to threaten rivalry to the kind of advantages possessed by themselves.

But it is only a particular class of men that are subject to this kind of dread. Eloquence, on the other hand, is, in some degree, dreaded by all; and the reputation for it, consequently, will always be, in some degree, a disadvantage.

It is a peculiarity therefore in the rhetorical art, that in it, more than in any other, vanity has a direct and immediate tendency to interfere with the proposed object. Excessive vanity may indeed, in various ways, prove an impediment to success in other pursuits; but in the endeavor to persuade, all wish to appear excellent in that art operates as a hindrance. A poet, a statesman, or a general, etc., though extreme covetousness of applause may mislead them, will, however, attain their respective ends certainly not the less for being admired as excellent in poetry, politics, or war; but the orator attains his end the better the less he is regarded as an orator. If he can make the hearers believe that he is not only a stranger to all unfair artifice, but even destitute of all persuasive skill whatever, he will persuade them the more effectually,* and if there ever could be an absolutely perfect orator, no one would (at the time at least) discover that he was so.†

* "I am no orator, as Brutus is," etc.—Shaksp. Julius Caesar.
† The following passage from a review of "The Heart of Mid-Lothian" coincides precisely with what has been here remarked: "We cannot bestow the same unqualified praise on another celebrated scene, Jeannie’s interview with Queen Caroline. Jeannie’s pleading appears to us much too rhetorical for the person and for the occasion; and the queen’s answer, supposing her to have been overpowered by Jeannie’s entreaties, ‘This is eloquence,’ is still worse. Had it been eloquence, it must necessarily have been unperceived by the queen.
It is true, a *general* reputation for eloquence will often gain a man great influence; especially in a free country, governed in great measure by means of party, having open debates, and appeals made to public opinion through the press. In such a country—next to the reputation of great political wisdom, spotless integrity, and zealous public spirit—there is nothing more influential than the reputation of being a powerful speaker. He who is sure to detect and skilfully expose any error of his opponents, and who may be relied on, if not to propose always good measures, at least never to propose any of which he cannot give a plausible vindication, and always to furnish, for those already prepared to side with him, some specious reasons to justify their vote—such a man will be regarded as a powerful supporter and a formidable adversary. But this is not at variance with what has been above said. For though a reputation for eloquence, *generally*, is thus influential, still in each *individual* case that arises, the more is thought of the eloquence of the speaker, the less of the strength of his cause; and consequently the less will he be, really, persuasive. And it may be added that, in proportion as he has the skill to transfer the admiration from his eloquence to his supposed political wisdom, the more will his influence be increased. And it is nearly the same with a pleader. A reputation, generally, for eloquence will gain him clients; but, in each particular pleading, will tend to produce distrust, in proportion as the force of what he urges is attributed rather to his ingenuity than to the justice of the cause. And again, as far as he can succeed in transferring the admiration from his eloquence to his supposed soundness in law, his influence will in the same degree be increased. And

If there is any art of which *celare artem* is the basis, it is this. The instant it peeps out, it defeats its own object, by diverting our attention from the subject to the speaker, and that, with a suspicion of his sophistry equal to our admiration of his ingenuity. A man who, in answer to an earnest address to the feelings of his hearer, is told, 'You have spoken eloquently,' feels that he has failed. Effie, when she entreats Sharpitlaw to allow her to see her sister, *is* eloquent; and his answer accordingly betrays perfect unconsciousness that she has been so: 'You shall see your sister,' he began, 'if you tell me;' then interrupting himself, he added in a more hurried tone, 'No, you shall see your sister, whether you tell me or no.'"—Quarterly Review, No. ii., p. 118.
universally, if, along with a character for eloquence, a man acquires (as he often will) the character of being fond of displaying it, by speaking on all occasions, and on all subjects, well or ill understood, and of sometimes choosing the wrong side as affording more scope for his ingenuity, this will greatly lessen his influence.

The above considerations may serve to account for the fact which Cicero remarks upon (De Oratore, book i.) as so inexplicable; viz., the small number of persons who, down to his time, had obtained high reputation as orators, compared with those who had obtained eminence in other pursuits. Few men are destitute of the desire of admiration, and most are especially ambitious of it in the pursuit to which they have chiefly devoted themselves; the orator therefore is continually tempted to sacrifice the substance to the shadow, by aiming rather at the admiration of the hearers than their conviction; and thus to fail of that excellence in his art which he might otherwise be well qualified to attain, through the desire of a reputation for it. And, on the other hand, some may have been really persuasive speakers, who yet may not have ranked high in men's opinion, and may not have been known to possess that art of which they gave proof by their skilful concealment of it. There is no point, in short, in which report is so little to be trusted.

If I were asked to digress a little from my subject, and to say what I should recommend in point of morality and of prudence to the speaker or writer, and to those whom he addresses, with respect to the precept just given, I should, in reply, counsel him who wishes to produce a permanent effect, (for I am not now adverting to the case of a barrister,) to keep on the side of what he believes to be truth; and, avoiding all sophistry, to aim only at setting forth that truth as strongly as possible, (combating, of course, any unjust personal prejudice against himself,) without any endeavor to gain applause for his own abilities. If he is himself thoroughly convinced, and strongly impressed, and can keep clear of the seductions of vanity, he will be more likely in this way to gain due credit for the strength of his cause, than by yielding to a feverish anxiety about the opinion that others may form of him. And as I should of course advise the reader or hearer to endeavor, in
each case, to form his judgment according to the real and valid arguments urged, and to regulate his feelings and sentiments according to what the case justly calls for, so, with a view to this end, I would suggest these two cautions: first, to keep in mind that there is danger of overrating as well as of underrating the eloquence of what is said; and that to attribute to the skill of the advocate what really belongs to the strength of his cause, is just as likely to lead to error as the opposite mistake; and, secondly, to remember that when the feelings are strongly excited, they are not necessarily over-excited: it may be that they are only brought into the state which the occasion fully justifies; or even that they still fall short of this.*

§ 3.

Of the three points which Aristotle directs the orator to claim credit for, it might seem at first sight that one, viz., "good will," is unnecessary to be mentioned; since ability and integrity would appear to comprehend, in most cases at least, all that is needed. A virtuous man, it may be said, must wish well to his countrymen, or to any persons whatever whom he may be addressing. But on a more attentive consideration, it will be manifest that Aristotle had good reason for mentioning this head. If the speaker were believed to wish well to his country, and to every individual of it, yet if he were suspected of being unfriendly to the political or other party to which his hearers belonged, they would listen to him with prejudice. The abilities and the conscientiousness of Phocion seem not to have been doubted by any; but these were so far from gaining him a favorable hearing among the democratical party at Athens, (who knew him to be no friend to democracy,) that they probably distrusted him the more; as one whose public spirit would induce him, and whose talents might enable him, to subvert the existing constitution.

One of the most powerful engines, accordingly, of the orator, is this kind of appeal to party spirit. Party spirit may, indeed, be considered in another point of view, as one of the passions which may be directly ap-

* See Part II., chap. i., § 2.
pealed to, when it can be brought to operate in the direction required; i.e., when the conduct the writer or speaker is recommending appears likely to gratify party spirit; but it is the indirect appeal to it which is now under consideration; viz., the favor, credit, and weight which the speaker will derive from appearing to be of the same party with the hearers, or at least not opposed to it. And this is a sort of credit which he may claim more openly and avowedly than any other; and he may likewise throw discredit on his opponent in a less offensive but not less effectual manner. A man cannot say in, direct terms, "I am a wise and worthy man, and my adversary the reverse;" but he is allowed to say, "I adhere to the principles of Mr. Pitt, or of Mr. Fox;" "I am a friend to Presbyterianism, or to Episcopacy," (as the case may be,) and "my opponent the reverse;" which is not regarded as an offence against modesty, and yet amounts virtually to as strong a self-commendation, and as decided vituperation, in the eyes of those imbued with party spirit, as if every kind of merit and of demerit had been enumerated; for to zealous party men, zeal for their party will very often either imply, or stand as a substitute for, every other kind of worth.*

Hard, indeed, therefore is the task of him whose object is to counteract party spirit, and to soften the violence of those prejudices which spring from it.† His only resource must

* One of the strangest phenomena of the present day is the kind of deference shown by men of each party for the authority of the newspapers of their respective parties; both in respect of facts and of opinions.

A stranger from a distant country would probably suppose that the writer to whom he saw thousands habitually surrendering their judgment, must be a person well known to them, and highly respected by them. He would be much surprised to find that most of them did not even know who he was. But great indeed would be his astonishment at finding that many of these very persons, if they chanced to meet the editor in society, and were inclined from what they saw of him to estimate him highly, would, as soon as they learned his occupation, deem him, however respectable in character, hardly fit company for themselves. He would be, as a man, lowered in their estimation, by the very circumstance which gives him, as a writer, a complete control over their judgment.

† Of all the prepossessions in the minds of the hearers, which tend to impede or counteract the design of the speaker, party spirit, where
be to take care that he give no ground for being supposed imbued with the violent and unjust prejudices of the opposite party; that he give his audience credit (since it rarely happens but that each party has some tenets that are reasonable) for whatever there may be that deserves praise; that he proceed gradually and cautiously in removing the errors with which they are infected; and, above all, that he studiously disclaim and avoid the appearance of any thing like a feeling of personal hostility or personal contempt.

If the orator's character can be sufficiently established in respect of ability, and also of good-will towards the hearers, it might at first sight appear as if this would be sufficient; since the former of these would imply the power, and the latter the inclination, to give the best advice, whatever might be his moral character. But Aristotle (in his "Politics") justly remarks that this last is also requisite to be insisted on, in order to produce entire confidence; for, says he, though a man cannot be suspected of wanting good will towards himself, yet many very able men act most absurdly, even in their own affairs, for want of moral virtue—being either blinded or overcome by their passions, so as to sacrifice their own most important interests to their present gratification—and much more, therefore, may they be expected to be thus seduced by personal temptations in the advice they give to others. Pericles, accordingly, in the speech which has been already referred to, is represented by Thucydides as insisting not only on his political ability and his patriotism, but also on his unimpeached integrity, as a qualification absolutely necessary to entitle him to their confidence; "for the man," says he, "who possesses every other requisite, but is overcome by the temptation of interest, will be ready to sell every thing for the gratification of his avarice."

It may be added that a pleader often finds it advisable to aim at establishing—in reference to the feelings entertained towards himself—what may be regarded as a distinct point from any of the above; namely, the sincerity of his own conviction. In it happens to prevail, is the most pernicious; being at once the most inflexible, and the most unjust. . . . . Violent party men not only lose all sympathy with those of the opposite side, but even contract an antipathy to them. This, on some occasions, even the divinest eloquence will not surmount.—Campbell's Rhetoric.
any description of composition, except the speech of an advocate, a man's maintaining a certain conclusion is a presumption that he is convinced of it himself. Unless there be some special reason for doubting his integrity and good faith, he is supposed to mean what he says, and to use arguments that are at least satisfactory to himself. But it is not so with a pleader, who is understood to be advocating the cause of the client who happens to have engaged him, and to have been equally ready to take the opposite side. The fullest belief in his uprightness goes no farther, at the utmost, than to satisfy us that he would not plead a cause which he was conscious was grossly unjust, and that he would not resort to any unfair artifices.* But to allege all that can fairly be urged on behalf of his client, even though, as a judge, he might be inclined to decide the other way, is regarded as his professional duty.

If, however, he can induce a jury to believe not only in his own general integrity of character, but also in his sincere conviction of the justice of his client's cause, this will give great additional weight to his pleading, since he will thus be regarded as a sort of witness in the cause. And this accordingly is aimed at, and often with success, by practiced advocates. They employ the language, and assume the manner, of full belief and strong feeling.

§ 4.

From what has been said of the speaker's recommendation of himself to the audience, and establishment of his authority with them, sufficient rules may readily be deduced for the analogous process, the depreciation of an opponent. Both of these, and especially the latter, under the offensive title of personality, are by many indiscriminately decried as unfair rhetorical tricks; and doubtless they are, in the majority of cases, sophistically employed, and by none more effectually than by those who are perpetually declaiming against such fallacies; the unthinking hearers not being prepared to expect any, from one who represents himself as holding them in such abhorrence. But surely it is not in itself an unfair topic of argument, in cases not admitting of decisive and unquestionable proof, to urge

* See the Discourse appended to this Part.
that the one party deserves the hearers' confidence, or that
the other is justly an object of their distrust. "If the mea-
sure is a good one," it has been said, "will it become bad
because it is supported by a bad man? if it is bad, will it
become good because supported by a good man? If the mea-
sure be really inexpedient, why not at once show that it is
so? Your producing these irrelevant and inconclusive argu-
ments, in lieu of direct ones, though not sufficient to prove that
the measure you thus oppose is a good one, contributes to prove
that you yourself regard it as a good one." Now to take this
for granted, that, in every case, decisive arguments to prove
a measure bad or good, independent of all the consideration
of the character of its advocates, could be found, and also
could be made clear to the persons addressed, is a manifest
begging of the question. There is no doubt that the gen-
erality of men are too much disposed to consider more who
proposes a measure, than what it is that is proposed; and a
warning against an excessive tendency to this way of judging
is reasonable, and may be useful; nor should any one escape
censure who confines himself to these topics, or dwells prin-
cipally on them, in cases where "direct" arguments are to be
expected; but they are not to be condemned in toto as "irre-
levant and inconclusive," on the ground that they are only
probable, and not in themselves decisive. It is only in mat-
ters of strict science, and that, too, in arguing to scientific
men, that the character of the advocates (as well as all other
probable arguments) should be wholly put out of the ques-
tion. Is every one chargeable with weakness or absurdity
who believes that the earth moves round the sun, on the au-
thority of astronomers, without having himself scientifically
demonstrated it?

And it is remarkable that the necessity of allowing some
weight to this consideration, in political matters, increases in proportion as any country enjoys a
free government. If all the power be in the
hands of a few of the higher orders, who have
the opportunity, at least, of obtaining education,
it is conceivable, whether probable or not, that
they may be brought to try each proposed measure exclu-
sively on its intrinsic merits by abstract arguments; but can
any man, in his senses, really believe that the great mass of
the *people*, or even any considerable portion of them, can ever possess so much political knowledge, patience in investigation, and sound Logic, (to say nothing of candor,) as to be able and willing to judge, and to judge correctly, of every proposed political measure, in the abstract, without any regard to their opinion of the persons who propose it? And it is evident, that in every case in which the hearers are *not* completely competent judges, they not only will but must take into consideration the characters of those who propose, support, or dissuade any measure—the persons they are connected with, the designs they may be supposed to entertain, etc.; though, undoubtedly, an *excessive* and *exclusive* regard to persons rather than arguments, is one of the chief fallacies against which men ought to be cautioned.

But if the opposite mode of judging, in every case, were to be adopted without limitation, it is plain that *children* could not be educated. Indeed, happily for the world, most of them, who should be allowed to proceed on this plan, would, in consequence, perish in childhood. A pious Christian, again, has the same implicit reliance on his God, even where unable to judge of the reasonableness of his commands and dispensations, as a dutiful and affectionate child has on a tender parent. Now though such a man is of course regarded by an Atheist as weak and absurd, it is surely on account of his *belief*, not of his *consequent conduct*, that he is so regarded. Even Atheists would in general admit that he is acting reasonably, on the *supposition* that there is a God, who has revealed himself to man.

§ 5.

In no way, perhaps, are men, not bigoted to party, more likely to be misled by their favorable or unfavorable judgment of their advisers, than in what relates to the authority derived from *experience*. Not that experience ought not to be allowed to have great weight; but that men are apt not to consider with sufficient attention what it is that constitutes experience in each point; so that frequently one man shall have credit for much experience, in what relates to the matter in hand, and another, who, perhaps, possesses as much, or more, shall be underrated as wanting it. The vulgar, of all ranks, need to
be warned, first, that *time* alone does not constitute experience; so that many years may have passed over a man's head, without his even having had the same opportunities of acquiring it, as another, much younger: secondly, that the longest practice in conducting any business in one way, does not necessarily confer any experience in conducting it in a different way: e. g., an experienced husbandman, or minister of state, in Persia, would be much at a loss in Europe; and if they had some things less to learn than an entire novice, on the other hand they would have much to unlearn; and, thirdly, that merely being conversant about a certain class of subjects, does not confer experience in a case where the operations, and the end proposed, are different. It is said that there was an Amsterdam merchant, who had dealt largely in corn all his life, who had never seen a field of wheat growing: this man had doubtless acquired, by experience, an accurate judgment of the qualities of each description of corn, of the best methods of storing it, of the arts of buying and selling it at a proper time, etc.; but he would have been greatly at a loss in its cultivation; though he had been, in a certain way, long conversant about corn. Nearly similar is the experience of a practiced lawyer (supposing him to be nothing more) in a case of legislation. Because he has been long conversant about law, the unreflecting attribute great weight to his legislative judgment; whereas his constant habits of fixing his thoughts on what the law is, and withdrawing it from the irrelevant question of what the law ought to be—his careful observance of a multitude of rules, (which afford the more scope for the display of his skill, in proportion as they are arbitrary and unaccountable,) with a studied indifference as to that which is foreign from his business, the convenience or inconvenience of those rules—may be expected to operate unfavorably on his judgment in questions of legislation, and are likely to counterbalance the advantages of his superior knowledge, even in such points as do bear on the question.

Again, a person who is more properly to be regarded as an antiquarian than any thing else, will sometimes be regarded as high authority in some subject respecting which he has perhaps little or no real knowledge or capacity, if he have collected a multitude of
facts relative to it. Suppose, for instance, a man of much reading, and of retentive memory, but of unphilosophical mind, to have amassed a great collection of particulars respecting the writers on some science, the times when they flourished, the numbers of their followers, the editions of their works, etc., it is not unlikely he may lead both others and himself into the belief that he is a great authority in that science, when perhaps he may in reality know—though a great deal about it—nothing of it. (See Logic, Introd., § 1, p. 37.) Such a man's mind, compared with that of one really versed in the subject, is like an antiquarian armory, full of curious old weapons—many of them the more precious from having been long since superseded—as compared with a well-stocked arsenal, containing all the most approved warlike implements fit for actual service.

In matters connected with Political Economy, the experience of practical men is often appealed to in opposition to those who are called theorists; even though the latter perhaps are deducing conclusions from a wide induction of facts, while the experience of the others will often be found only to amount to their having been long conversant with the details of office, and having all that time gone on in a certain beaten track, from which they never tried, or witnessed, or even imagined a deviation.

So also the authority derived from experience of a practical miner—i.e., one who has wrought all his life in one mine—will sometimes delude a speculator into a vain search for metal or coal, against the opinion perhaps of theorists, i.e., persons of extensive geological observation.

"It may be added, that there is a proverbial maxim which bears witness to the advantage sometimes possessed by an observant bystander over those actually engaged in any transaction: 'The looker-on often sees more of the game than the players.' Now the looker-on is precisely [in Greek ὀφθαλμός] the theorist.

"When then you find any one contrasting, in this and in other subjects, what he calls 'experience,' with 'theory,' you will usually perceive, on attentive examination, that he is in reality comparing the results of a confined, with that of a wider, experience—a more imperfect and crude theory, with
one more cautiously framed, and based on a more copious induction."*

The consideration then of the character of the speaker, and of his opponent, being of so much importance, both as a legitimate source of persuasion, in many instances, and also as a topic of fallacies, it is evidently incumbent on the orator to be well versed in this branch of the art, with a view both to the justifiable advancement of his own cause, and to the detection and exposure of unfair artifice in an opponent. It is neither possible, nor can it in justice be expected, that this mode of persuasion should be totally renounced and exploded, great as are the abuses to which it is liable; but the speaker is bound, in conscience, to abstain from those abuses himself; and, in prudence, to be on his guard against them in others.

To enumerate the various kinds of impressions, favorable and unfavorable, that hearers or readers may entertain concerning any one, would be tedious and superfluous. But it may be worth observing, that a charge of inconsistency, as it is one of the most disparaging, is also one that is perhaps the most frequently urged with effect, on insufficient grounds. Strictly speaking, inconsistency (such at least as a wise and good man is exempt from) is the maintaining at the same time of two contradictory propositions; whether expressed in language, or implied in sentiments or conduct. As, e. g., if an author,† in an argumentative work, while he represents every syllogism as futile and fallacious reasoning, admits that all reasoning may be exhibited in the form of syllogisms; or if the same person who censures and abhors oppression, yet practices it towards others; or if a man prescribes two medicines which neutralize each other's effects, etc.

But a man is often censured as inconsistent, if he changes his plans or his opinions on any point. And certainly if he does this often, and lightly, that is good ground for withholding confidence from him. But it would be more precise to characterize him as fickle and unsteady, than as inconsistent; because this use

* See Political Economy, Lect. III., p. 68.
† D. Stewart.
of the term tends to confound one fault with another: viz., with the holding of two incompatible opinions at once.

But, moreover, a man is often charged with inconsistency for approving some parts of a book, system, character, etc., and disapproving others; for being now an advocate for peace, and now for war; in short, for accommodating his judgment or his conduct to the circumstances before him, as the mariner sets his sails to the wind. In this case there is not even any change of mind implied; yet for this a man is often taxed with inconsistency; though in many instances there would even be an inconsistency in the opposite procedure; e.g., in not shifting the sails, when the wind changes.

In the other case indeed—when a man does change his mind—he implies some error, either first or last. But some errors every man is liable to, who is not infallible. He therefore who prides himself on his consistency, on the ground of resolving never to change his plans or opinions, does virtually (unless he means to proclaim himself either too dull to detect his mistakes, or too obstinate to own them) lay claim to infallibility. And if at the same time he ridicules (as is often done) the absurdity of a claim to infallibility, he is guilty of a gross inconsistency in the proper and primary sense of the word.

But it is much easier to boast of consistency than to preserve it. For as, in the dark, or in a fog, adverse troops may take post near each other, without mutual recognition, and consequently without contest, but, soon as daylight comes, the weaker gives place to the stronger; so, in a misty and darkened mind, the most incompatible opinions may exist together without any perception of their discrepancy; till the understanding becomes sufficiently enlightened to enable the man to reject the less reasonable opinions, and retain the opposite.

It may be added, that it is a very fair ground for disparaging any one's judgment, if he maintains any doctrine or system, avowedly for the sake of consistency. That must always be a bad reason. If the system, etc., is right, you should pursue it because it is right, and not because you have pursued it hitherto; if it is wrong, your having once committed a fault is a poor reason to give for persisting in it. He therefore who makes such an avowal may fairly be con-
sidered as thenceforward entitled to no voice in the question. His decision having been already given, once for all, with a resolution not to reconsider it, or to be open to conviction from any fresh arguments, his re-declarations of it are no more to be reckoned repeated acts of judgment, than new impressions from a stereotype plate are to be regarded as new editions. In short, according to the proverbial phrase, "His bolt is shot."

It only remains to observe, on this head, that (as Aristotle teaches) the place for the disparagement of an opponent is, for the first speaker, near the close of his discourse, to weaken the force of what may be said in reply; and, for the opponent, near the opening, to lessen the influence of what has been already said.

§ 6.

*Either a personal prejudice, such as has been just mentioned, or some other passion unfavorable to the speaker's object, may already exist in the minds of the hearers, which it must be his business to allay.*

It is obvious that this will the most effectually be done, not by endeavoring to produce a state of perfect calmness and apathy, but by exciting some contrary emotion. And here it is to be observed that some passions may be, *rhetorically speaking,* opposite to each other, though in strictness they are not so; viz., whenever they are incompatible with each other. E. g.: The opposite, strictly speaking, to anger, would be a feeling of good will and approbation towards the person in question; but it is, not by the excitement of this, alone, that anger may be allayed; for fear is, practically, contrary to it also; as is remarked by Aristotle, who philosophically accounts for this, on the principle that anger, implying a desire to inflict *punishment,* must imply also a supposition that it is *possible* to do so; and accordingly men do not, he says, feel anger towards one who is so much superior as to be manifestly out of their reach; and the object of their anger ceases to be so, as soon as he becomes an object of apprehension. Of course the converse also of this holds good: anger, when it prevails, in like manner subduing fear. Savage nations, ac-
Accordingly, having no military discipline, are accustomed to work themselves up into a frenzy of rage by their war-songs and dances, in order to excite themselves to courage.* Compassion, likewise, may be counteracted either by disapprobation, by jealousy, by fear, by ridicule, or by disgust and horror; and envy, either by good will or by contempt.

This is the more necessary to be attended to, in order that the orator may be on his guard against inadvertently defeating his own object, by exciting feelings at variance with those he is endeavoring to produce, though not strictly contrary to them. Aristotle accordingly notices, with this view, the difference between the "pitiable" (ἐλεηηνόν) and the "horrible or shocking," (δεινόν,) which, as he observes, excite different feelings, destructive of each other; so that the orator must be warned, if the former is his object, to keep clear of any thing that may excite the latter.

The remark, cited by Aristotle, of the rhetorician Gorgias, that the serious arguments of an opponent are to be met by ridicule, and his ridicule by serious argument, (which is evidently one that might be extended, in principle, to other feelings besides the sense of the ludicrous,) is, of course, only occasionally applicable in practice; and considerable tact is requisite for perceiving suitable occasions, and employing them judiciously. For a failure does great injury to him who makes the attempt. If you very gravely deprecate some ridicule that has been thrown out, without succeeding in destroying its force, you increase its force; because a contrast between the solemn and the ludicrous heightens the effect of the latter. And if, again, you attempt unsuccessfully to make a jest of what the persons addressed regard as strong arguments and serious subjects, you raise indignation or contempt; and are also considered as having, confessedly, no serious and valid objections to offer.

Of course, regard must be had to the character of those you are addressing. If these are ignorant of the subject, superficial, and unthinking, they will readily join in ridicule of such reasoning as the better-informed and more judicious

* See Arist. "Rhet.," B. II., in his Treatises on Οργή and Φόβος; and "Ethics," B. III., on Θυμός.
would despise them for not appreciating. And again, they may easily be brought (as has been remarked above, Part I., chap. iii., § 7) to regard a valid argument which exposes to ridicule some sophistry, as nothing more than a joke.*

But when you wish to expose to ridicule something really deserving of it which has been advanced seriously, or to rescue from ridicule what has been unfairly made a jest of, it will usually be advisable to keep a little aloof, for a time, from the very point in question, till you have brought men's minds, by the introduction of suitable topics, into the mood required—the derisive, or the serious, as the case may be—and then to bring them up to that point, prepared to view it quite differently from what they had done. And if this be skilfully managed, the effect will sometimes be very striking.

Such a procedure, it should be added, is sometimes (as I have above remarked, Part I., chap. iii., § 7) adopted unfairly; that is, men who are mortified at finding the absurdity of their conduct, their tenets, or their arguments exposed to contemptuous ridicule, will often persuade others, and even themselves, that this mortification is a feeling of pious indignation in behalf of a serious or sacred subject, against which they falsely represent the ridicule as having been directed. Great caution, therefore, is requisite—as is formerly remarked—in employing such a weapon as ridicule.

It will often happen that it will be easier to give a new direction to the unfavorable passion than to subdue it; e. g.,

* It is almost superfluous to remark, that there is a dignified and an undignified way of employing either irony or any kind of ridicule. The sort of character which Aristotle calls "Bomolochus"—answering apparently to what we call in colloquial language a "wag," or a "jack-pudding"—one who lays himself out to divert the hearers or readers at any cost; or any one, again, who displays a flippant and trifling levity of character that seems incapable of viewing any thing seriously, or such a tone of heartless and unfeeling mockery as denotes an incapacity for any tender or kindly sentiment—any such person, though he may manifest such ability as to make one dread him for an opponent, is likely to be still more dangerous to the cause he espouses.

And it is a common practice of skilful sophists to confound with such a character as one of these last, any one, however opposite to it, who may have successfully derided some absurdity they may have been maintaining; and thus to hold him up to detestation and scorn.
to *turn* the indignation, or the laughter, of the hearers against a different object. Indeed, whenever the case will admit of this, it will generally prove the more successful expedient; because it does not imply the accomplishment of so great a change in the minds of the hearers. See above, Chap. II., § 6.

**LECTURE ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL INFLUENCES OF THE PROFESSIONS. DELIVERED BEFORE THE SOCIETY OF THE DUBLIN LAW INSTITUTE, ON THE 31ST OF JANUARY, 1842. [SEE NOTE ON PAGE 189.]**

Some ancient writer relates of the celebrated Hannibal, that during his stay at some regal court, the evening entertainment on one occasion consisted of a discourse, (what we in these days should call a "lecture,"*) which an aged Greek philosopher, named Phormio, if I remember rightly, had the honor of being permitted to deliver before the king and courtiers. It was on the qualifications and duties of a general. The various high endowments, the several branches of knowledge, and the multifarious cares and labors appertaining to an accomplished military leader, were set forth, as most of the hearers thought, with so much ability and elegance, that the discourse was received with general applause. But, as was natural, eager inquiries were made what was thought of it by so eminent a master in the art military as Hannibal. On his opinion being asked, he replied, with soldier-like bluntness, that he had often heard old men talk dotage, but that a greater dotard than Phormio he had never met with.

He would not, however, have been reckoned a dotard—at least he would not have deserved it (as he did)—if he had had the sense, instead of giving instructions in the military art to one who knew so much more of it than himself, to have addressed an audience of military men, not as soldiers, but as human beings; and had set before them, correctly and clearly, the effects, intellectual and moral, likely to be produced on them, as *men*, by the study and the exercise of their profession. For that is a point on which men of each profession
respectively are so far from being necessarily the best judges, that, other things being equal, they are likely to be rather less competent judges than those in a different walk of life.

That each branch of study, and each kind of business, has a tendency to influence the character, and that any such tendency, if operating in excess, exclusively, and unmodified by other causes, is likely to produce a corresponding mental disease or defect, is what no one I suppose would deny. It would be reasonable as an antecedent conjecture; and the confirmation of it by experience is a matter of common remark. I have heard of a celebrated surgeon, whose attention had been chiefly directed to cases of deformity, who remarked that he scarcely ever met an artisan in the street but he was able to assure himself at the first glance what his trade was. He could perceive, in persons not actually deformed, that particular gait or attitude—that particular kind of departure from exact symmetry of form—that disproportionate development and deficiency in certain muscles, which distinguished, to his anatomical eye, the porter, the smith, the horse-breaker, the stone-cutter, and other kinds of laborers, from each other. And he could see all this, through, and notwithstanding, all the individual differences of original structure, and of various accidental circumstances.

Bodily peculiarities of this class may be, according to the degree to which they exist, either mere inelegancies hardly worth noticing, or slight inconveniences, or serious deformities, or grievous diseases. The same may be said of those mental peculiarities which the several professional studies and habits tend, respectively, to produce. They may be, according to the degree of them, so trifling as not to amount even to a blemish; or slight, or more serious defects; or cases of complete mental distortion.

You will observe that I shall throughout confine myself to the consideration of the disadvantages and dangers pertaining to each profession, without touching on the intellectual and moral benefits that may result from it. You may often hear from persons gifted with what the ancients called epideictic eloquence, very admirable and gratifying panegyrics on each profession. But with a view to practical utility, the consideration of dangers to be guarded against is incomparably the most important; because to men in each respective
profession, the beneficial results will usually take place even without their thinking about them; whereas the dangers require to be carefully noted, and habitually contemplated, in order that they may be effectually guarded against. A physician who had a friend about to settle in a hot climate, would be not so likely to dwell on the benefits he would derive spontaneously from breathing a warmer air, as to warn him of the dangers of sun-strokes and of marsh exhalations.

And it may be added that a description of the faulty habits which the members of each profession are in especial danger of acquiring, amounts to a high eulogium on each individual, in proportion as he is exempt from those faults.

To treat fully of such a subject would of course require volumes; but it may be not unsuitable to the present occasion to throw out a few slight hints, such as may be sufficient to turn your attention to a subject which appears to me not only curious and interesting, but of great practical importance.

There is one class of dangers pertaining alike to every profession, every branch of study, every kind of distinct pursuit. I mean the danger in each, to him who is devoted to it, of overrating its importance as compared with others; and, again, of unduly extending its province. To a man who has no enlarged views, no general cultivation of mind, and no familiar intercourse with the enlightened and the worthy of other classes besides his own, the result must be more or less of the several forms of narrow-mindedness. To apply to all questions, on all subjects, the same principles and rules of judging that are suitable to the particular questions and subjects about which he is especially conversant; to bring in those subjects and questions on all occasions, suitable or unsuitable —like the painter Horace alludes to, who introduced a cypress tree into the picture of a shipwreck; to regard his own peculiar pursuit as the one important and absorbing interest; to look on all other events, transactions, and occupations, chiefly as they minister more or less to that—to view the present state and past history of the world chiefly in reference to that; and to feel a clannish attachment to the members of the particular profession or class he belongs to, as a body or class, (an attachment, by-the-by, which is often limited to the collective class, and not accompanied with kindly feelings
towards the individual members of it,) and to have more or less an alienation of feeling from those of other classes—all these, and many other such, are symptoms of that narrow-mindedness which is to be found, alike, mutatis mutandis, in all who do not carefully guard themselves against it, whatever may be the profession or department of study of each.*

Against this kind of danger the best preservative, next to that of being thoroughly aware of it, will be found in varied reading and varied society; in habitual intercourse with men—whether living or dead, whether personally or in their works—of different professions and walks of life, and, I may add, of different countries and different ages from our own. It is remarked, in a work by Bishop Copleston, "that Locke, like most other writers on education, occasionally confounds two things, which ought to be kept perfectly distinct: viz., that mode of education which would be most beneficial, as a system, to society at large, with that which would contribute most to the advantage and prosperity of an individual. These things are often at variance with each other. The former is that alone which deserves the attention of a philosopher; the latter is narrow, selfish, and mercenary. It is the last indeed on which the world are most eager to inform themselves; but the persons who instruct them, however they may deserve the thanks and esteem of those whom they benefit, do no service to mankind. There are but so many good places in the theatre of life; and he who puts us in the way of procuring one of them, does to us indeed a great favor, but none to the whole assembly." And in the same work it is further observed, that, "In the cultivation of literature is found that common link, which among the higher and middling departments of life unites the jarring sects and subdivisions in one interest; which supplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with those narrow prejudices with which all professions are more or less infected. The knowledge, too, which is thus acquired, expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls those limbs and muscles into freer exercise, which, by too constant use in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt also to lose some-

* See above, Part I., chap. iii., § 2, on the presumption for and against the judgment of professional men.
what of their native play and energy. And thus, without
directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life,
it enriches and ennobles all: without teaching him the pecu-
liar benefits of any one office or calling, it enables him to act
his part in each of them with better grace and more ele-
vated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a
main ingredient in that complete and generous education,
which fits a man* 'to perform justly, skilfully, and magnani-
mously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and
war.'"

But to pass from the consideration of the dangers common
to all, and to proceed to what is peculiar to each, I will begin
by pointing out one or two of those which especially pertain
to the clerical profession.

The first that I shall notice is one to which I have fre-
quently called attention, as being likely to beset all persons in
proportion as they are occupied about things sacred; in dis-
scussing, and especially in giving instruction on, moral and
religious subjects—and the clergy accordingly must be the
most especially exposed to this danger—to the danger, I mean,
of that callous indifference, which is proverbially apt to be
the result of familiarity. On this point there are some most
valuable remarks by Bishop Butler, which I have adverted to
on various occasions, and, among others, in a portion (which
I will here take the liberty of citing) of the last unpublished
Charge I had occasion to deliver.

"'Going over,' says Bishop Butler, 'the theory of virtue
in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of
it—this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to
form a habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it
may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it
gradually more insensible, i. e., form an habit of insensibility
to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of
habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker;
thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt less
sensibly. Being accustomed to danger begets intrepidity,
i. e., lessens fear; to distress, lessens the passion of pity; to
instances of others' mortality, the sensible apprehension of
our own. And from these two observations together—that

* Milton.
practical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us—it must follow that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening; by a course of acting upon such motives and excitements, while these motives and excitements themselves are by proportionable degrees growing less sensible, i. e., are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And experience confirms this; for active principles, at the very same time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be somehow wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it: perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution; and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it; but let a man set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen; and whilst he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying around us gives us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; i. e., to forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it. And this seems again further to show that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition, experience, example, though they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a course of action; and that it is not being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those habits. Only it must always be remembered, that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action.” Thus far Bishop Butler. “That moral habits,” I proceeded
to say, "can only be acquired by practical efforts, was long since remarked by Aristotle; who ridicules those that attended philosophical discourses with an expectation of improvement, while they contented themselves with listening, understanding, and approving: comparing them to a patient who should hope to regain health by listening to his physician's directions, without following them. But he omitted to add, as Bishop Butler has done, that such a procedure is much worse than useless, being positively dangerous.

"I need hardly remark, that what the author says of virtue is at least equally applicable to religion; and that, consequently, no one is so incurably and hopelessly hardened in practical irreligion as one who has the most perfect familiarity with religious subjects and religious feelings, without having cultivated corresponding active principles. It is he that is, emphatically, 'the barren fig tree' which has 'no fruit on it, but leaves only!' not a tree standing torpid and destitute of all vegetation, during the winter's frost or summer's drought, and capable of being called into life and productiveness by rain and sunshine; but a tree in full vigor of life and growth, whose sap is all diverted from the formation of fruit, and is expended in flourishing boughs that bear only barren leaves."

I need hardly say that the danger I have been now alluding to, as it is one which besets each person the more in proportion as he is conversant about religious and moral discussions, studies and reflections, is accordingly one which the clergy most especially should be vigilantly on their guard against, as being professionally occupied with this class of subjects.

They are professionally exposed again to another danger, chiefly intellectual, from the circumstance of their having usually to hold so much intercourse, in their private ministrations, with persons whose reasoning powers are either naturally weak, or very little cultivated, or not called forth on those subjects and on those occasions on which they are conversing professionally with a clergyman. How large a proportion of mankind, taken indiscriminately, must be expected to fall under one or other of these descriptions, we must be well aware; and it is with mankind thus taken indiscriminately, that the clergy in the domestic portion of their ministrations are to hold intercourse. Even a dispropor-
tionate share of their attention is usually claimed by the poorer, the younger, and, in short, generally the less educated among their people. Among these there must of course always be a large proportion who will be often more readily influenced by a fallacious than by a sound reason; who will often receive readily an insufficient explanation, and will often be prevented by ignorance, or dulness, or prejudice, from admitting a correct one. And moreover, of those whose qualifications are higher, as respects other subjects, there are not a few who, on moral and religious subjects, (from various causes,) fall far short of themselves. There are not a few, e. g., who, while in the full vigor of body and mind, pay little or no attention to any such subjects; and when enfeebled in their mental powers by sickness, or sudden terror, or decrepit age, will resign themselves to indiscriminate credulity—who at one time will listen to nothing, and at another will listen to any thing.

With all these classes of persons, then, a clergyman is led, in the course of his private duty, to have much intercourse. And that such intercourse is likely to be any thing but improving to the reasoning faculties—to their development, or their correction, or even to sincerity and fairness in the exercise of them—is sufficiently evident. The danger is one which it is important to have clearly before us. When a man of good sense distinctly perceives it, and carefully and habitually reflects on it, he will not be much at a loss as to the means by which it is to be guarded against.

You will observe that I have pointed out under this head a moral as well as an intellectual danger. And in truth the temptation is by no means a weak one, even to one who is far from an insincere character altogether, to lead ignorant, or ill-educated, and prejudiced men into what he is convinced is best for them, by unsound reasons, when he finds them indisposed to listen to sound ones; thus satisfying his conscience that he is making a kind of compensation, since there really are good grounds (though they cannot see them) for the conclusion he advocates; till he acquires a habit of tampering with truth, and finally loses all reverence and all relish for it.*

* See Essay on "Pious Frauds," Third Series; and Dr. West's Discourse on "Reserve."
Another class of dangers, and perhaps the greatest of all to which the clergy are professionally exposed, and which is the last I shall mention, is the temptation to prefer popularity to truth, and the present comfort and gratification of the people to their ultimate welfare. The well-known fable of Mohammed and the mountain, which he found it easier to go to, himself, than to make the mountain come to him, may be regarded as a sort of allegorical type of any one who seeks to give peace of conscience and satisfaction to his hearers, and to obtain applause for himself, by bringing his doctrine and language into a conformity with the inclinations and the conduct of his hearers, rather than by bringing the character of the hearers into a conformity with what is true and right. Not that there are many who are, in the outset at least, so unprincipled as deliberately to suppress essential truths, or to inculcate known falsehood, for the sake of administering groundless comfort, or gaining applause; but as "a gift" is said in Scripture to "blind the eyes," so the bribe of popularity (especially when the alternative is perhaps severe censure, and even persecution) is likely, by little and little, to bias the judgment—to blind the eyes first to the importance, and afterwards to the truth, of unpopular doctrines and precepts, and ultimately to bring a man himself to believe what his hearers wish him to teach.

Popularity has, of course, great charms for all classes of men; but in the case of a clergyman it offers this additional temptation: that it is to him, in a great degree, the favorable opinion, not merely of the world in general, or of a multitude assembled on some special occasion, but of the very neighbors by whom he is surrounded, and with whom he is in habits of daily intercourse.

There is another most material circumstance also which (in respect of this point) distinguishes the case of the clerical profession from that of any other. It is true that a medical man may be under a temptation to flatter his patients with false hopes, to indulge them in unsuitable regimen, to substitute some cordial that gives temporary relief, for salutary but unpleasant medicines, or painful operations, such as are really needful for a cure. But those (and there are such, as is well known) who pursue such a course, can seldom obtain more than temporary success. When it is seen that their patients
do not ultimately recover, and that all the fair promises given, and sanguine hopes raised, end in aggravation of disease, or in premature death, the bubble bursts; and men quit these pretenders, for those whose practice bears the test of experience. These, therefore, are induced by a regard for their own permanent success in their profession, as well as by higher motives, to prefer the correct and safe mode of treating their patients. But it is far otherwise with those whose concern is with the diseases of the soul, not of the body—with the next life, instead of this. Their treatment cannot be brought to the same test of experience till the day of judgment. If they shall have deluded both their hearers and themselves by "speaking peace when there is no peace," the flattering cordial, however deleterious, may remain undetected, and both parties may continue in the error all their lives, and the error may even survive them.*

So also again in the legal profession: one who gives flattering but unsound advice to his clients, or who pleads causes with specious elegance, unsupported by accurate legal knowledge, may gain a temporary, but seldom more than a temporary, popularity. It is his interest, therefore, no less than his duty, to acquire this accurate knowledge; and if he is mistaken on any point, the decisions of a court will give him sufficient warning to be more careful in future. But the Court which is finally to correct the other class of mistakes, is the one that will sit on that last great day, when the tares will be finally separated from the wheat, and when the "wood, hay, and stubble," that may have been built up on the Divine foundation, by human folly or artifice, will be burned up.

The clergy therefore have evidently more need than others to be on their guard against a temptation, from which they are not, like others, protected by considerations of temporal interest, or by the lessons of daily experience.

With regard to the medical profession, there used to be (for of late I think it is otherwise) a remark almost proverbially common, that the members of it were especially prone to infidelity, and even to Atheism. And the same imputation was by many persons extended to those occupied in such branches of physical science as are the most connected with

medicine; and even to scientific men generally. Of late years, as I have said, this impression has become much less prevalent.

In a question of fact, such as this, open to general observation, there is a strong presumption afforded by the prevalence of any opinion, that it has at least some kind of foundation in truth. There is a presumption, that either medical men were more generally unbelievers than the average, or, at least, that those of them who were so were more ready to avow it. In like manner there is a corresponding presumption that in the present generation of medical men there is a greater proportion than among their predecessors, who are either believers in revelation, or at least not avowed unbelievers.

It will be more proper, however, instead of entering on any question as to the amount and extent, present or past, of the danger to which I have been alluding, to offer some conjectures as to the cause of it.

The one which I conceive occurs the most readily to most men's minds is, that a medical practitioner has no Sunday. The character of his profession does not admit of his regularly abandoning it for one day in the week, and regularly attending public worship along with Christians of all classes. Now, various as are the modes of observing the Lord's day in different Christian countries, and diverse as are the modes of worship, there is perhaps no point in which Christians of all ages and countries have been more agreed, than in assembling together for some kind of joint worship on the first day of the week. And no one, I think, can doubt that, independently of any edification derived from the peculiar religious services which they respectively attend, the mere circumstance of doing something every week as a religious observance, must have some tendency to keep up in men's minds a degree of respect, rational or irrational, for the religion in whose outward observances they take a part.

A physician in considerable practice must, we know, often be prevented from doing this. And the professional calls, it may be added, which make it often impossible for him to attend public worship, will naturally tend, by destroying the habit, to keep him away, even when attendance is possible. Any thing that a person is prevented from doing habitually, he is likely habitually to omit. There is nothing peculiar in
the case of attendance on public worship. The same thing
may be observed in many others equally. A man placed in
circumstances which interfere with his forming or keeping
up *domestic* habits, or *literary* habits, or habits of bodily *ac-
tivity*, is likely to be less *domestic*, less *literary*, more *seden-
tary*, than his circumstances require.

I have no doubt that the cause I have now been adverting
to does operate. But there are others, less obvious perhaps,
but I think not less important. A religion which represents
man's whole existence as divided into two portions, of which
his life on earth is every way incalculably the smaller, is
forcibly brought before the mind in a way to excite serious
reflections, by such an event as *death*, when occurring before
our eyes, or within our perfect knowledge. Now a medical
man is *familiar* with death; i. e., with the sight and the
idea of it. And the indifference which is likely to result
from such familiarity, I need not here dwell on, further than
to refer you to the passage of Bishop Butler already cited.

But moreover, death is not only familiar to the physician,
but it is also familiar to him as the final *termination* of that
state of existence with which alone he has *professionally* any
concern. As a Christian, he may regard it as preparatory to
a new state of existence; but as a *physician*, he is concerned
only with life in this world, which it is his business to invig-
orate and to prolong; and with death only as the final *catas-
trophe* which he is to keep off as long as possible, and in
reference merely to the physical causes which have pro-
duced it.

Now the habit of *thus* contemplating death must have a
tendency to divert the mind from reflecting on it with refer-
cence to other and dissimilar considerations. For it may be
laid down as a general maxim, that the habit of contemplating
any class of objects in such and such a particular point of
view, tends, so far, to render us the less qualified for contem-
plating them in any other point of view. And this maxim,
I conceive, is capable of very *extensive* application in refer-
ce to *all* professional studies and pursuits; and goes far
towards furnishing an explanation of their effects on the mind
of the individual.

But there is another cause, and the last I shall notice
under the present head, which I conceive coöperates fre-
quently with those above mentioned: I mean the practice common with many divines of setting forth certain physiological or metaphysical theories as part and parcel of the Christian revelation, or as essentially connected with it. If any of these be unsound, they may, nevertheless, pass muster with the generality of readers and hearers; and, however unprofitable, may be, to them, at least harmless; but they present a stumbling-block to the medical man, and to the physiologist, who may perceive that unsoundness. For example, I have known divines not only maintaining the immateriality of the soul as a necessary preliminary to the reception of Christianity—as the very basis of gospel revelation—but maintaining it by such arguments as go to prove the entire independence of mind on matter; urging, e. g., among others, the instances of full manifestation of the intellectual powers in persons at the point of death. Now this, or the opposite, the physiologist will usually explain from the different parts of the bodily frame that are affected in each different disease. If he believes the brain to be necessarily connected with the mind, this belief will not be shaken by the manifestation of mental powers in a person who is dying of a disease of the lungs. He will no more infer from this that mind is wholly independent of the body, than he would, that sight is independent of the body, because a man may retain his powers of vision when his limbs are crippled.

The questions concerning materialism I do not mean to enter upon: I only wish to call your attention to the mistake common to both parties—that of supposing that these questions are vitally connected with Christianity; whereas there is not one word relating to them in the Christian Scriptures. Indeed, even at this day a large proportion of sincere Christians among the humbler classes are decidedly materialists; though, if you inquired of them, they would deny it, because they are accustomed to confine the word matter to things perceptible to the touch; but their belief in ghosts or spirits having been seen and heard, evidently implies the possession by these of what philosophers reckon attributes of matter. And the disciples of Jesus were terrified, we are told, when they saw him after his resurrection, "supposing that they saw a spirit." He convinced them, we read, of his being real flesh and blood; but whatever may have been
their error as to the visible—and consequently material—character of a spirit, it does not appear that he thought it essential to instruct them on that head. He who believed that Jesus was truly risen from the dead, and that the same power would raise up his followers at the last day, had secured the foundation of the Christian faith.

It is much to be wished that religious persons would be careful to abstain—I do not say, from entering on any physiological or metaphysical speculations (which they have a perfect right to do)—but from mixing up these with Christianity, and making every thing that they believe on matters at all connected with religion, a part of their religious faith. I remember conversing with an intelligent man on the subject of some speculations tending to a revival of the doctrine of equivocal generation, which he censured, as leading to Atheism. He was somewhat startled on my reminding him that two hundred years ago many would have as readily set a man down as an Athest who should have denied that doctrine. Both conclusions I conceive to be alike rash and unwarrantable.

I cannot but advert, in concluding this head, to the danger likely to arise from the language of some divines respecting a peaceful or troubled departure, as a sure criterion of a Christian or an unchristian life. "A death-bed's a detector of the heart," is the observation of one of them, who is well known as a poet. Now, that a man's state of mind on his death-bed is often very much influenced by his past life, there is no doubt; but I believe most medical men can testify that it is quite as often and as much influenced by the disease of which he dies. The effects of certain nervous and other disorders in producing distressing agitation—of the process of suppuration, in producing depression of spirits—the calming and soothing effects of a mortification in its last stage, and many other such phenomena, are, I believe, familiar to practitioners. When then they find promises and threats boldly held out which are far from being regularly fulfilled—when they find various statements confidently made, some of which appear to them improbable, and others at variance with facts coming under their own experience, they are in danger of drawing conclusions unfavorable to the truth of Christianity, if they apply too hastily the maxim of "Peritis credendum
est in arte sua;" and take for granted on the word of divines that whatever they teach as a part of Christianity, really is so; without making inquiry for themselves. They are indeed no less culpably rash in such a procedure than any one would have been who should reason in a similar manner from the works of medical men two or three hundred years ago, who taught the influence of the stars on the human frame, the importance of the moon's phases to the efficacy of medicines, and other such fancies. Should any one have thence inferred that astronomy and medicine never could have any claims to attention, and were merely idle dreams of empty pretenders, he would not have been more rash than a physician or physiologist who judges of Christianity by the hypotheses of all who profess to teach it.

The effects, moral and intellectual, of the study and practice of the law, is a subject to which I could not have done justice within the limits of a single lecture, even had I confined myself to that one department. For the law—especially considered in this point of view—is not one profession, but many: a judge, an attorney, a solicitor, a common law barrister, a chancery barrister, a special pleader, etc., are all occupied with law; but widely different are the effects, advantageous and disadvantageous, likely to be produced on their minds by their respective occupations.*

* It is worth remarking that there is one point wherein some branches of the law differ from others, and agree with some professions of a totally different class. Superior ability and professional skill in a judge, a solicitor, or a conveyancer, are, if combined with integrity, a public benefit. They confer a service on certain individuals, not at the expense of any others; and the death or retirement of a man thus qualified is a loss to the community. And the same may be said of a physician, a manufacturer, a navigator, etc., of extraordinary ability. A pleader, on the contrary, of powers far above the average, is not, as such, serviceable to the public. He obtains wealth and credit for himself and his family; but any especial advantage accruing from his superior ability, to those who chance to be his clients, is just so much loss to those he chances to be opposed to; and which party is, on each occasion, in the right, must be regarded as an even chance. His death, therefore, would be no loss to the public; only to those particular persons who might have benefited by his superior abilities, at their opponents' expense. It is not that advocates, generally, are not useful to the public; they are
On this point I have thrown out a slight hint in a treatise on Logic, (the joint work of Bishop Copleston and myself;) from which I will take the liberty of citing a short passage: [Book IV., ch. iii., §§ 1, 2.]

"Reasoning comprehends inferring and proving; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in two different points of view: like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London. He who infers, proves; and he who proves, infers; but the word 'infer' fixes the mind first on the premiss, and then on the conclusion: the word 'prove,' on the contrary, leads the mind from the conclusion to the premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is last in the mind; inference being often used to signify the conclusion, (i.e., proposition inferred,) and proof the premiss. We say, also, 'How do you prove that?' and 'What do you infer from that?' which sentences would not be so properly expressed if we were to transpose those verbs. One might, therefore, define proving, 'The assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a given proposition;' and inferring, 'The deduction of a conclusion from given premises.'

"In the one case our conclusion is given, (i.e., set before us as the question,) and we have to seek for arguments; in the other, our premises are given, and we have to seek for a conclusion—i.e., to put together our own propositions, and try what will follow from them; or, to speak more logically, in one case we seek to refer the subject of which we would predicate something to a class to which that predicate will (affirmatively or negatively) apply; in the other, we seek to find comprehended in the subject of which we have predi-

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even necessary. But extraordinary ability in an advocate is an advantage only to himself and his friends. To the public, the most desirable thing is that pleaders should be as equally matched as possible; so that neither John Doe nor Richard Roe should have any advantage independent of the goodness of his cause. Extraordinary ability in an advocate may indeed raise him to great wealth, or to a seat on the bench or in the senate; and he may use these advantages—as many illustrious examples show—greatly to the public benefit. But then, it is not as an advocate, directly, but as a rich man, as a judge, or as a senator, that he thus benefits his country.
cated something, some other term to which that predicate had not been before applied. Each of these is a definition of reasoning. To infer, then, is the business of the philosopher; to prove, of the advocate: the former, from the great mass of known and admitted truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional truth whatever that has been hitherto unperceived, and perhaps without knowing with certainty what will be the terms of his conclusion. Thus the mathematician, e. g., seeks to ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each other, or what is the line whose square will be equal to a given circle. The advocate, on the other hand, has a proposition put before him, which he is to maintain as well as he can. His business, therefore, is to find middle terms; (which is the inventio of Cicero;) the philosopher's, to combine and select known facts or principles, suitably for gaining from them conclusions which, though implied in the premises, were before unperceived; in other words, for making 'logical discoveries.'

To this I will take the liberty of adding another short extract from the treatise on Rhetoric; which may furnish a hint as to a class of dangers common to men of every pursuit and profession: that of a person supposing himself, from having been long conversant with a certain subject, to be qualified for every kind of business, or of discussion that relates to the same subject: [Rhet., Part II., chap. iii., § 5.]

"The longest practice in conducting any business in one way does not necessarily confer any experience in conducting it in a different way: e. g., an experienced husbandman, or minister of state, in Persia, would be much at a loss in Europe; and if they had some things less to learn than an entire novice, on the other hand they would have much to unlearn; and, again, merely being conversant about a certain class of subjects, does not confer experience in a case where the operations and the end proposed are different. It is said that there was an Amsterdam merchant, who had dealt largely in corn all his life, who had never seen a field of wheat growing. This man had doubtless acquired, by experience, an accurate judgment of the qualities of each description of corn—of the best methods of storing it—of the arts of buying and selling it at proper times, etc.; but he would have been greatly at a loss in its cultivation, though he had been,
in a certain way, long conversant about corn. Nearly similar
is the experience of a practiced lawyer, (supposing him to be
nothing more,) in a case of legislation: because he has been
long conversant about law, the unreflecting attribute great
weight to his judgment; whereas his constant habits of fixing
his thoughts on what the law is, and withdrawing them from the
irrelevant question of what the law ought to be—his careful
observance of a multitude of rules, (which afford the more
scope for the display of his skill, in proportion as they are
arbitrary, unreasonable, and unaccountable,) with a studied
indifference as to (that which is foreign from his business,) the
convenience or inconvenience of those rules—may be ex-
pected to operate unfavorably on his judgment in questions
of legislation; and are likely to counterbalance the advan-
tages of his superior knowledge, even in such points as do
bear on the question."

And here I may remark, by the way, that a person engaged
habitually in state affairs—a politician by profession—ought
to be peculiarly on his guard against supposing his mode of
life to generate especial qualifications in those very points in
which its tendency is—unless particular care be taken to
guard against the danger—to produce rather a disqualification.
Who is likely to be the best judge, (other points being
equal,) it might be asked, of the relative importance of poli-
tical questions? At the first glance many would be disposed
to answer, "Of course, a politician." But the disproportion-
ate attention necessarily bestowed on different questions, ac-
cording as they are or are not made party questions—the
fields of battle on which the contests for political superiority
are to be carried on, independently of the intrinsic impor-
tance of each—this is a cause which must be continually
operating to disturb the judgment of one practically en-
gaged in politics. Every one at all versed in history must be
acquainted with many instances of severe and protracted
struggles concerning matters which are now remembered only
on account of the struggles they occasioned; and, again, of
enactments materially affecting the welfare of unborn millions,
which hardly attracted any notice at the time, and were

* These short extracts I have thought it best to reprint, instead of
troubling the reader to refer to them.
slipped into one of the heterogeneous clauses of an act of parliament.

Precluded, then, as I find myself, for the reasons above mentioned, from entering fully on the consideration of the several departments of legal study and practice, I will detain you only with a few brief hints respecting some of the dangers to be guarded against from the barrister's profession.

He is, as I have already observed, in less danger than a clergyman of settling down into some confirmed incorrect view of any particular points connected with his profession; both for the reason there given—there being a court on earth to correct any mistake he may make—and also because, having to plead various causes, he is called upon to extenuate to-day what he aggravated yesterday—to attach more and less weight, at different times, to the same kind of evidence—to impugn and to enforce the same principles, according as the interests of his clients may require.

But this very circumstance must evidently have a tendency, which ought to be sedulously guarded against, to alienate the mind from the investigation of truth. Bishop Butler observes, and laments, that it is very common for men to have "a curiosity to know what is said, but no curiosity to know what is true." Now none can be (other points being equal) more in need of being put on his guard against this fault, than he who is professionally occupied with a multitude of cases, in each of which he is to consider what may be plausibly urged on both sides; while the question, what ought to be the decision, is out of his province as a pleader. I am supposing him not to be seeking to mislead a judge or jury by urging fallacious arguments; but there will often be sound and valid arguments—real probabilities—on opposite sides. A judge, or any one whose business is to ascertain truth, is to decide according to the preponderance of the reasons; but the pleader's business is merely to set forth, as forcibly as possible, those on his own side. And if he thinks that the habitual practice of this has no tendency to generate in him, morally, any indifference, or, intellectually, any incompetency, in respect of the ascertainment of truth—if he considers himself quite safe from any such danger—I should then say that he is in very great danger.

I have been supposing (as has been said) that he is one
who would scruple to mislead wilfully a judge or jury by specious sophistry, or to seek to embarrass an honest witness, and bring his testimony into disrepute; but there is no denying that he is under a great temptation even to resort to this. Nay, it has even been maintained by no mean authority, that it is part of a pleader's duty to have no scruples about this or any other act whatever that may benefit his client. "There are many whom it may be needful to remind," says an eminent lawyer, "that an advocate, by the sacred duty of his connection with his client, knows in the discharge of that office but one person in the world—that client, and none other. To serve that client, by all expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others, (even the party already injured,) and amongst others to himself, is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties. And he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon any others. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, he must go on, reckless of the consequences, if his fate should unhappily be to involve his country in confusion for his client." (License of Counsel, p. 3.)

On the other hand, it is recorded that "Sir Matthew Hale, whenever he was convinced of the injustice of any cause, would engage no more in it than to explain to his client the grounds of that conviction: he abhorred the practice of misreciting evidence, quoting precedents in books falsely or unfairly, so as to deceive ignorant juries or inattentive judges; and he adhered to the same scrupulous sincerity in his pleadings which he observed in the other transactions of life. It was as great a dishonor as a man was capable of, that for a little money he was hired to say otherwise than he thought." (License of Counsel, p. 4.)

"The advocate," says another eminent legal writer, "observing in an honest witness a deponent whose testimony promises to be adverse, assumes terrific tones and deportment, and, pretending to find dishonesty on the part of the witness, strives to give his testimony the appearance of it. I say a bona fide witness; for in the case of a witness who by an adverse interrogator is really looked upon as dishonest, this is not the proper course, nor is it taken with him. For bringing to light the falsehood of a witness really believed to
be mendacious, the more suitable, or rather the only suitable course, is to forbear to express the impression he has inspired. Supposing his tale clear of suspicion, the witness runs on his course with fluency till he is entangled in some irretrievable contradiction, at variance with other parts of his own story, or with facts notorious in themselves, or established by proofs from other sources." (License of Counsel, p. 5.)

"We happen to be aware, from the practice of persons of the highest experience in the examination of witnesses, that this description is almost without exception correct, and that, as a general rule, it is only the honest and timid witness who is confounded by imperious deportment. The practice gives preéminence to the unscrupulous witness who can withstand such assaults. Sir Roger North, in his Life of Sir Dudley North, relates that the law of Turkey, like our absurd law of evidence in some cases, required the testimony of two witnesses in proof of each fact; and that a practice had in consequence arisen, and had obtained the sanction of general opinion, of using a false witness in proof of those facts which admitted of only one witness. Sir Dudley North, while in Turkey, had numerous disputes, which it became necessary to settle by litigation; 'and,' says his biographer, 'our merchant found, by experience, that in a direct fact a false witness was a surer card than a true one; for if the judge has a mind to baffle a testimony, an honest, harmless witness, that doth not know his play, cannot so well stand his many cautious questions as a false witness used to the trade will do; for he hath been exercised, and is prepared for such handling, and can clear himself, when the other will be confounded: therefore circumstances may be such as to make the false one more eligible.'"

According to one, then, of the writers I have cited, an advocate is justified, and is fulfilling a duty, not only in protesting with solemnity his own full conviction of the justice of his client's cause, though he may feel no such conviction—not only in feigning various emotions, (like an actor; except that the actor's credit consists in its being known that he is only feigning,) such as pity, indignation, moral approbation, or disgust, or contempt, when he neither feels any thing of the kind, nor believes the case to be one that justly calls for such feelings—but he is also occasionally to entrap
or mislead, to revile, insult, and calumniate persons whom he may in his heart believe to be respectable persons and honest witnesses. Another, on the contrary, observes: "We might ask our learned friend and fellow-Christian, as well as the learned and noble editor of 'Paley's Natural Theology,' and his other fellow-professors of the religion which says that 'lying lips are an abomination to the Lord,' to explain to us how they reconcile the practice under their rule with the Christian precepts, or avoid the solemn scriptural denunciation, 'Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter;... which justify the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him.'" (License of Counsel, p. 10.)

I have brought forward by choice the opinions of legal writers both for and against the necessity and allowableness of certain practices; leaving each person to decide for himself both what is the right course for a pleader to pursue, and what is the probable effect produced on the mind by the course pursued respectively by each. I will add only one remark, extracted from a work of my own, indicative of my own judgment as to the points touched on:*

"In oral examinations of witnesses, a skilful cross-examiner will often elicit from a reluctant witness most important truths, which the witness is desirous of concealing or disguising. There is another kind of skill, which consists in so alarming, misleading, or bewildering an honest witness, as to throw discredit on his testimony, or pervert the effect of it. Of this kind of art, which may be characterized as the most, or one of the most, base and depraved of all possible employments of intellectual power, I shall only make one further observation. I am convinced that the most effectual mode of eliciting truth is quite different from that by which an honest, simple-minded witness is most easily baffled and confused. I have seen the experiment tried, of subjecting a witness to such a kind of cross-examination, by a practiced lawyer, as would have been, I am convinced, the most likely to alarm and perplex many an honest witness, without any effect in shaking the testimony; and afterwards, by a totally opposite

* See above, Note, p. 228.
mode of examination, such as would not have at all perplexed one who was honestly telling the truth, that same witness was drawn on, step by step, to acknowledge the utter falsity of the whole. Generally speaking, I believe that a quiet, gentle, and straightforward, though full and careful, examination, will be the most adapted to elicit truth; and that the manœuvres, and the browbeating, which are the most adapted to confuse an honest witness, are just what the dishonest one is the best prepared for. The more the storm blusters, the more carefully he wraps round him the cloak, which a warm sunshine will often induce him to throw off.”*

I have thought it best, for the reasons formerly given, to omit all notice of the advantages to be derived from each class of professional pursuits, and to confine myself to the dangers which are to be guarded against, and which, consequently, require to be carefully contemplated. Even in respect of these, however, I have been compelled, not only to omit many remarks that will perhaps occur to your own minds, relative to each of the professions I have spoken of, but also to leave several of the most important professions wholly unnoticed; (the military, the naval, the mercantile, etc.;) not from their not exercising as important an influence, for good or evil, on the human mind as those which I have mentioned, but because I could not trespass further on your patience; and also because I conceive that any one, in whatever walk of life, whose attention is so awakened to that class of considerations which I have laid before you, as to be put on the watch for the peculiar effects on his own character likely to result from his own profession, will be induced to follow up the investigation for himself, to his own practical benefit.

PART III.

OF STYLE.

CHAPTER I.

OF PERSPICUITY.

§ 1.

Though the consideration of style has been laid down as holding a place in a treatise on Rhetoric, it would be neither necessary nor pertinent to enter fully into a general discussion of the subject; which would evidently embrace much that by no means peculiarly belongs to our present inquiry. It is requisite for an orator, e. g., to observe the rules of grammar; but the same may be said of the poet and the historian, etc.; nor is there any peculiar kind of grammatical propriety belonging to persuasive or argumentative compositions; so that it would be a departure from our subject to treat at large, under the head of Rhetoric, of such rules as equally concern every other of the purposes for which language is employed.

Conformably to this view, I shall, under the present head, notice but slightly such principles of composition as do not exclusively or especially belong to the present subject: confining my attention chiefly to such observations on style as have an especial reference to argumentative and persuasive works.

§ 2.

It is sufficiently evident (though the maxim is often prae-
tically disregarded) that the first requisite of style, not only in rhetorical but in all compositions,* is perspicuity; since, as Aristotle observes, language which is not intelligible, or not clearly and readily intelligible, fails, in the same proportion, of the purpose for which language is employed. And it is equally self-evident (though this truth is still more frequently overlooked) that perspicuity is a relative quality, and consequently cannot properly be predicated of any work, without a tacit reference to the class of readers or hearers for whom it is designed.

Nor is it enough that the style be such as they are capable of understanding, if they bestow their utmost attention: the degree and the kind of attention which they have been accustomed or are likely to bestow, will be among the circumstances that are to be taken into the account, and provided for. I say the kind, as well as the degree, of attention, because some hearers and readers will be found slow of apprehension indeed, but capable of taking in what is very copiously and gradually explained to them; while others, on the contrary, who are much quicker at catching the sense of what is expressed in a short compass, are incapable of long attention, and are not only wearied, but absolutely bewildered, by a diffused style.

When a numerous and very mixed audience is to be addressed, much skill will be required in adapting the style, (both in this and in other respects,) and indeed the arguments also, and the whole structure of the discourse, to the various minds which it is designed to impress; nor can the utmost art and diligence prove, after all, more than partially successful in such a case; especially when the diversities are so many and so great as exist in the congregations to which most sermons are addressed, and in the readers for whom popular works of an argumentative, instructive, and hortatory character are intended. It is possible, however, to approach indefinitely to an object which cannot be completely attained; and to adopt such a style, and likewise such a mode of reasoning, as shall be level to the comprehension of the greater part,

* In poetry, perspicuity is indeed far from unimportant; but the most perfect degree of it is by no means so essential as in prose works. See Part III., chap. iii., § 3.
at least, even of a promiscuous audience, without being dis-
tasteful to any.

It is obvious, and has often been remarked, that extreme
conciseness is ill-suited to hearers or readers
whose intellectual powers and cultivation are but
small. The usual expedient, however, of em-
ploying a *prolix* style, by way of accommodation to such minds,
is seldom successful. Most of those who could have compre-
hended the meaning, if more briefly expressed, and many of
those who could not do so, are likely to be bewildered by tedious
expansion; and being unable to maintain a steady attention
to what is said, they forget part of what they have heard, be-
fore the whole is completed. Add to which, that the feeble-
ness produced by excessive dilution, (if such an
expression may be allowed,) will occasion the at-
tention to languish; and what is imperfectly at-
tended to, however clear in itself, will usually be but imper-
fectly understood. Let not an author, therefore, satisfy him-
self by finding that he has expressed his meaning so that, *if*
attended to, he cannot fail to be understood; he must con-
sider also (as was before remarked) *what* attention is likely
to be paid to it. If, on the one hand, much matter is ex-
pressed in very few words to an unreflecting audience, or if,
on the other hand, there is a wearisome prolixity, the requisite
attention may very probably *not* be bestowed.

It is remarked by anatomists, that the nutritive quality is
not the only requisitive in food; that a certain
degree of *distention* of the stomach is required,
to enable it to act with its full powers; and that
it is for this reason hay or straw must be given to horses, as
well as corn, in order to supply the necessary bulk. Some-
thing analogous to this takes place with respect to the gene-
rality of minds; which are incapable of thoroughly digesting
and assimilating what is presented to them, however clearly,
in a very small compass. Many a one is capable of deriving
that instruction from a moderate-sized volume, which he could
not receive from a very small pamphlet, even more perspi-
cuously written, and containing every thing that is to the pur-
pose. It is necessary that the attention should be detained
for a certain time on the subject; and persons of unphilo-
sophical mind, though they can attend to what they read or
hear, are unapt to dwell upon it in the way of subsequent meditation.

The best general rule for avoiding the disadvantages both of conciseness and of prolixity is to employ repetition: to repeat, that is, the same sentiment and argument in many different forms of expression; each, in itself brief, but all, together, affording such an expansion of the sense to be conveyed, and so detaining the mind upon it, as the case may require. Cicero among the ancients, and Burke among the modern writers, afford, perhaps, the most abundant practical exemplifications of this rule. The latter sometimes shows a deficiency in correct taste, and lies open to Horace's censure of an author, "Qui variare cupit rem prodigaliter unam;" but it must be admitted that he seldom fails to make himself thoroughly understood, and does not often weary the attention, even when he offends the taste, of his readers.

Care must of course be taken that the repetition may not be too glaringly apparent; the variation must not consist in the mere use of other, synonymous, words; but what has been expressed in appropriate terms may be repeated in metaphorical; the antecedent and consequent of an argument, or the parts of an antithesis, may be transposed; or several different points that have been enumerated, presented in a varied order, etc.

It is not necessary to dwell on that obvious rule laid down by Aristotle, to avoid uncommon, and, as they are vulgarly called, hard words, i.e., those which are such to the persons addressed; but it may be worth remarking, that to those who wish to be understood by the lower orders of the English,* one of the best principles of selection is to prefer terms of Saxon origin, which will generally be more familiar to them than those derived from the Latin, (either directly or through the medium of the French,) even when the latter are more in use among persons of education.† Our language being (with

* This does not hold good in an equal degree in Ireland, where the language was introduced by the higher classes.

† A remarkable instance of this is, that while the children of the higher classes almost always call their parents "Papa!" and
very trifling exceptions) made up of these elements, it is very easy for any one, though unacquainted with Saxon, to observe this precept, if he has but a knowledge of French or of Latin; and there is a remarkable scope for such a choice as I am speaking of, from the multitude of synonyms derived, respectively, from those two sources. The compilers of our Liturgy being anxious to reach the understandings of all classes, at a time when our language was in a less settled state than at present, availed themselves of this circumstance in employing many synonymous, or nearly synonymous, expressions, most of which are of the description just alluded to. Take, as an instance, the exhortation—"acknowledge" and "confess;" "dissemble" and "cloke;" "humble" and "lowly;" "goodness" and "mercy;" "assemble" and "meet together." And here it may be observed, that (as in this last instance) a word of French origin will very often not have a single word of Saxon derivation corresponding to it, but may find an exact equivalent in a phrase of two or more words; e. g., "constitute," "go to make up;" "suffice," "be enough for;" "substitute," "put in the stead," etc., etc.

It is worthy of notice, that a style composed chiefly of the words of French origin, while it is less intelligible to the lowest classes, is characteristic of those who in cultivation of taste are below the highest. As in dress, furniture, deportment, etc., so also in language, the dread of vulgarity constantly besetting those who are half-conscious that they are in danger of it, drives them into the extreme of affected finery. So that the precept which has been given with a view to perspicuity, may, to a certain degree, be observed with an advantage in point of elegance also.

In adapting the style to the comprehension of the illiterate,* a caution is to be observed against the ambiguity of the word "plain;" which is opposed sometimes to obscurity, and sometimes to ornament. The vulgar require a perspicuous, but by no means a dry and unadorned style; on the contrary, they have a taste rather for the over-florid, tawdry, and bombastic: nor are the

*See Elements of Logic. Fallacies, Book III., § 5, p. 178.
ornaments of style by any means necessarily inconsistent with perspicuity; indeed, metaphor, which is among the principal of them, is, in many cases, the clearest mode of expression that can be adopted; it being usually much easier for uncultivated minds to comprehend a similitude or analogy than an abstract term. And hence the language of savages, as has often been remarked, is highly metaphorical; and such appears to have been the case with all languages in their earlier, and consequently ruder and more savage state; all terms relating to the mind and its operations being, as appears from the etymology of most of them, originally metaphorical; though by long use they have ceased to be so; e.g., the words "ponder," "deliberate," "reflect," and many other such, are evidently drawn by analogy from external sensible bodily actions.

§ 3.

In respect to the construction of sentences, it is an obvious caution to abstain from such as are too long; but it is a mistake to suppose that the obscurity of many long sentences depends on their length alone. A well-constructed sentence of very considerable length may be more readily understood than a shorter one which is more awkwardly framed. If a sentence be so constructed that the meaning of each part can be taken in as we proceed, (though it be evident that the sense is not brought to a close,) its length will be little or no impediment to perspicuity; but if the former part of the sentence convey no distinct meaning till we arrive nearly at the end, (however plain it may then appear,) it will be, on the whole, deficient in perspicuity; for it will need to be read over, or thought over, a second time, in order to be fully comprehended; which is what few readers or hearers are willing to be burdened with. Take as an instance such a sentence as this: "It is not without a degree of patient attention and persevering diligence, greater than the generality are willing to bestow, though not greater than the object deserves, that the habit can be acquired of examining and judging of our own conduct with the same accuracy and impartiality as that of another:" this labors under the defect I am speaking of; which may be remedied by some such alteration as the following:
"The habit of examining our own conduct as accurately as that of another; and judging of it with the same impartiality, cannot be acquired without a degree of patient attention and persevering diligence, not greater indeed than the object deserves, but greater than the generality are willing to bestow." The two sentences are nearly the same in length, and in the words employed; but the alteration of the arrangement allows the latter to be understood clause by clause, as it proceeds.* The caution just given is the more necessary to be insisted on, because an author is apt to be misled by reading over a sentence to himself, and being satisfied on finding it perfectly intelligible; forgetting that he himself has the advantage, which a hearer has not, of knowing at the beginning of the sentence what is coming in the close.

Universally, indeed, an unpracticed writer is liable to be misled, by his own knowledge of his own meaning, into supposing those expressions clearly intelligible which are so to himself, but which may not be so to the reader, whose thoughts are not in the same train. And hence it is that some do not write or speak with so much perspicuity on a subject which has long been very familiar to them, as on one which they understand indeed, but with which they are less intimately acquainted, and in which their knowledge has been more recently acquired. In the former case it is a matter of some difficulty to keep in mind the necessity of carefully and copiously explaining principles which by long habit have come to assume in our minds the appearance of self-evident truths. Utterly incorrect, therefore, is Blair's notion, that obscurity of style necessarily springs from indistinctness of conception. A little conversation on nautical affairs with sailors, or on agriculture with farmers, would soon have undeceived him.

* Care must be taken, however, in applying this precept, not to let the beginning of a sentence so forestall what follows as to render it apparently feeble and impertinent: e. g., "Solomon, one of the most celebrated of men for wisdom and prosperity." . . . . "Why, who needs" (the hearer will be apt to say to himself) "to be told that?" And yet it may be important to the purpose in hand to fix the attention on these circumstances: let the description come before the name, and the sentence, while it remains equally perspicuous, will be free from the fault complained of.
§ 4.

The foregoing rules have all, it is evident, proceeded on the supposition that it is the writer's intention to be understood; and this cannot but be the case in every legitimate exercise of the rhetorical art; and, generally speaking, even where the design is sophistical. For, as Dr. Campbell has justly remarked, the sophist may employ for his purpose what are in themselves real and valid arguments; since probabilities may lie on opposite sides, though truth can be but on one; his fallacious artifice consisting only in keeping out of sight the stronger probabilities which may be urged against him, and in attributing an undue weight to those which he has to allege. Or, again, he may, either directly or indirectly, assume as self-evident a premiss which there is no sufficient ground for admitting; or he may draw off the attention of the hearers to the proof of some irrelevant point, etc., according to the various modes described in the treatise on FALLACIES;* but in all this there is no call for any departure from perspicuity of style, properly so called; not even when he avails himself of an ambiguous term. "For though," as Dr. Campbell says, "a sophism can be mistaken for an argument only where it is not rightly understood," it is the aim of him who employs it, rather that the matter should be misunderstood than not understood—that his language should be deceitful, rather than obscure or unintelligible. The hearer must not indeed form a correct, but he must form some, and if possible a distinct, though erroneous, idea of the arguments employed, in order to be misled by them. The obscurity, in short, if it is to be so called, must not be, strictly speaking, obscurity of style; it must be, not like a mist which dims the appearance of things, but like a colored glass which disguises them.

The nearest approach perhaps to obscurity of style that can serve a sophistical purpose, is when something is said which would be at once rejected if understood fully, and in the established sense of the words; those words, however, being capable of dimly suggesting some different sense or senses, in which the

* Logic, B. III.
assertion would be true, though irrelevant or nugatory. When an assertion has thus passed unchallenged, from being imperfectly understood, it may be assumed afterwards in its proper sense, and in one which is to the purpose, but which would have been rejected if plainly stated in the outset.

To take one example out of many that could be found: "Though religious liberty," I have heard it said, "ought to be enjoyed by all, we should remember that religious liberty does not imply irreligious liberty:" this proposition is one which I have known intelligent and well-principled men led to assent to; and which, I have no doubt, would in many circles be received with hearty acquiescence and applause. Yet, according to the established usage of language, it is utterly untrue, and self-contradictory. When we speak of a man's being at "liberty" to act in a certain way, we always understand that he is at liberty to act differently; that it depends on himself to do, or not to do, so and so. It would be thought absurd to speak of a dean and chapter being "at liberty" to elect a certain individual, but not at liberty to refuse him; or to say of a man imprisoned, that he has liberty to remain in jail, though not liberty to leave it.* And any one would say that the freedom of parliament was at an end, if they were authorized to pass any bill the ministry might propose, but not to reject it.

According to the usual and proper sense of the words, therefore, it is plain that religious liberty does imply irreligious liberty; and liberty to do right, liberty to do wrong. How then are men brought to assent to that which, if plainly understood, according to their own habitual use of language, they would instantly perceive to be a contradiction? Doubtless, by an indistinct apprehension of it. For there are other senses, which, though not such as the expression can properly bear, may yet be faintly suggested by it, and in which the assertion would be an undeniable and nugatory truism.

E. g.: Liberty, in the sense of absence of external coercion, does not imply liberty from conscientious obligation. One who is at liberty, in any case, to act rightly, and of course, also, to act wrongly—i. e., left free to choose between good and evil—is not at liberty, in point of duty, to choose the evil.

* See Essay, "On the Kingdom of Christ," Note A.
And as there is, morally, no "liberty" to do wrong, so neither is there, in that sense, liberty to do right. We do not say that a man is "at liberty" to obey the Divine laws, but that he is "bound" to obey them. In every instance and in every sense in which a man is "at liberty" to act in one way, it is implied that he is at liberty to act in another way.

To say that freedom from external compulsion does not leave one free from moral obligation, is not only true, but self-evident, and needless to be stated.

Again, a certain degree of liberty as to any matter, does not imply complete liberty therein. A man has a certain degree of religious liberty who is compelled indeed to profess some religion, but left free to choose what; and, again, he has some, though a less degree, if he is compelled to profess Christianity, but left free to choose the Christian denomination he may prefer; or yet, again, if he be compelled to conform to a certain Church, but allowed to choose his own confessor or preacher. So, also, a man in prison may be allowed his choice of rooms; but in that case (and it is the same with the other analogous ones) we should say, not that he is "at liberty" to remain in the prison, which he is not allowed to quit, but that he is "at liberty" to inhabit such and such a room in it; inasmuch as he is allowed to occupy another instead.

Now the two propositions which I have supposed may be suggested to the mind by the expression in question, are both of them mere truisms, not worth being stated. That freedom from external coercion in religious matters does not render them morally indifferent; and, again, that a certain degree of liberty does not imply full liberty—each of these is an assertion which, if plainly made, would be perceived to be nugatory. Yet it is doubtless some indistinct idea of one or both of these, floating, as it were, in the mind, that leads men to acquiesce in and applaud an assertion which, in the proper sense of the words, they would perceive on reflection to be absurd.

Numerous similar instances might be found of fallacies thus veiled by indistinctness of language in most of the treatises extant on "fatalism," "free agency," and other kindred matters; in which the words "may," "can," "possible," etc.,
are understood partly in reference to \textit{power}, partly to \textit{probability}.*

In these, however, and in all other cases where indistinctness of language serves to veil sophistry from a man's hearers, or—which is quite as common—from himself, the expressions must always \textit{appear} intelligible, and we must follow, or imagine we follow the meaning, as we proceed.

There are, however, certain spurious kinds, as they may be called, of writing or speaking, (distinct from what is strictly termed sophistry,) in which obscurity of style may be apposite. The \textit{object} which has all along been supposed, is that of \textit{convinging} or \textit{persuading}; but there are some kinds of oratory, if they are to be so named, in which some \textit{different} end is proposed.

One of these ends is, (when the cause is such that it cannot be sufficiently supported even by specious fallacies,) to \textit{appear to say something}, when there is in fact nothing to be said; so as at least to avoid the ignominy of being silenced. To this end, the more confused and unintelligible the language, the better, provided it carry with it the appearance of profound wisdom, and of being something to the purpose.

"Now though nothing (says Dr. Campbell) would seem to be easier than this kind of style, where an author falls into it naturally—that is, when he deceives himself as well as his reader—nothing is more difficult when attempted of design. It is besides requisite, if this manner must be continued for any time, that it be artfully blended with some glimpses of meaning; else, to persons of discernment, the charm will at length be dissolved, and the nothingness of what has been spoken will be detected; nay, even the attention of the unsuspecting multitude, when not relieved by any thing that is level to their comprehension, will infallibly flag. The \textit{Invocation} in the \textit{Dunciad} admirably suits the orator who is unhappily reduced to the necessity of taking shelter in the unintelligible:

\begin{quote}
Of darkness visible so much he lent,
As half to show, half veil the deep intent."
\end{quote}

(Chap. VIII., Sec. 1, p. 119.)

* See Appendix to Logic, articles "May," "Necessary," etc.
This artifice is distinguished from sophistry, properly so called, (with which Dr. Campbell seems to confound it,) by the circumstance that its tendency is not, as in sophistry, to convince, but to have the appearance of argument, when in fact nothing is urged. For in order for men to be convinced, on however insufficient grounds, they must (as was remarked above) understand something from what is said, though, if it be fallacious, they must not understand it rightly; but if this cannot be accomplished, the sophist's next resort is the unintelligible; which indeed is very often intermixed with the sophistical, when the latter is of itself too scanty or too weak. Nor does the adoption of this style serve merely to save his credit as an orator or author; it frequently does more: ignorant and unreflecting persons, though they cannot be, strictly speaking, convinced, by what they do not understand, yet will very often suppose, each, that the rest understand it; and each is ashamed to acknowledge, even to himself, his own darkness and perplexity: so that, if the speaker with a confident air announces his conclusion as established, they will often, according to the maxim "Omne ignotum pro magnifico," take for granted that he has advanced valid arguments, and will be loath to seem behindhand in comprehending them. It usually requires that a man should have some confidence in his own understanding, to venture to say, "What has been spoken is unintelligible to me."

Another purpose sometimes answered by a discourse of this kind is, that it serves to furnish an excuse, flimsy indeed, but not unfrequently sufficient, for men to vote or act according to their own inclinations; which they would perhaps have been ashamed to do, if strong arguments had been urged on the other side, and had remained confessedly unanswered; but they satisfy themselves, if something has been said in favor of the course they wish to adopt, though that something be only fair-sounding sentences that convey no distinct meaning. They are content that an answer has been made, without troubling themselves to consider what it is.

§ 5.

Another end, which in speaking is sometimes proposed,
and which is, if possible, still more remote from the legitimate province of Rhetoric, is to occupy time. When an unfavorable decision is apprehended, and the protraction of the debate may afford time for fresh voters to be summoned, or may lead to an adjournment, which will afford scope for some other manoeuvre; when there is a chance of so wearying out the attention of the hearers, that they will listen with languor and impatience to what shall be urged on the other side; when an advocate is called upon to plead a cause in the absence of those whose opinion it is of the utmost importance to influence, and wishes to reserve all his arguments till they arrive, but till then must apparently proceed in his pleading; in these and many similar cases, which it is needless to particularize,* it is a valuable talent to be able to pour forth with fluency an unlimited quantity of well-sounding language which has little or no meaning, yet which shall not strike the hearers as unintelligible or nonsensical, though it convey to their minds no distinct idea.

Perspicuity of style—real, not apparent perspicuity—is in this case never necessary, and sometimes studiously avoided. If any distinct meaning were conveyed, then, if that which was said were irrelevant, it would be perceived to be so, and would produce impatience in the hearers, or afford an advantage to the opponents; if, on the other hand, the speech were relevant, and there were no arguments of any force to be urged, except such as either had been already dwelt on, or were required to be reserved (as in the case last alluded to) for a fuller audience, the speaker would not further his cause by bringing them forward. So that the usual resource on these occasions, of such orators as thoroughly understand the tricks of their art, and do not disdain to employ them, is to amuse their audience with specious emptiness.

It is most unfortunate that in sermons there should be so much temptation to fall into the first two (to say nothing of the third) of these kinds of spurious oratory. When it is appointed that a sermon shall be preached, and custom requires that it shall be of a certain length, there cannot but

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* I have heard an anecdote of an advocate who occupied the court with his "chronotriptic" oratory (as it might be styled) for six hours, while a messenger was dispatched for an important document which had been accidentally left behind at a town twenty-five miles off.
be more danger that the preacher should chiefly consider himself as bound to say something, and to occupy the time prescribed, without keeping in mind the object of leaving his hearers the wiser or the better, than if he were to preach solely in consequence of his having such a specific object to accomplish.*

§ 6.

Another kind of spurious oratory, and the last that will be noticed, is that which has for its object to gain the hearer’s admiration of the eloquence displayed. This, indeed, constitutes one of the three kinds of oratory enumerated by Aristotle,† and is regularly treated of by him, along with the deliberative and judicial branches; though it hardly deserves the place he has bestowed on it.

When this is the end pursued, perspicuity is not indeed to be avoided, but it may often without detriment be disregarded.‡ Men frequently admire as eloquent, and sometimes admire the most, what they do not at all, or do not fully comprehend, if elevated and high-sounding words be arranged in graceful and sonorous periods. Those of uncultivated or ill-cultivated minds, especially, are apt to think meanly of any thing that is brought down perfectly to the low level of their capacity; though to do this with respect to valuable truths which are not trite, is one of the most admirable feats of genius. They admire the profundity of one who is mystical and obscure; mistaking the muddiness of the water for depth, and magnifying in their imaginations what is viewed through a fog; and they conclude that brilliant language must represent some brilliant ideas, without troubling themselves to inquire what those ideas are.

Many an enthusiastic admirer of a “fine discourse,” or a piece of “fine writing,” would be found on examination to

* See Part III., chap. iii., § 2.
† For he says that in each of the two other kinds, the hearer is a “judge”—in the first of the “expedient,” in the other of the “just;” but in the third kind he is only ὑπαράγω, literally a spectator; and is a judge merely (τῆς ὑπάραγως) of the ability of the orator.
‡ See Appendix, [L.]
retain only a few sonorous but empty phrases; and not only to have no notion of the general drift of the argument, but not even to have ever considered whether the author had any such drift or not.

It is not meant to be insinuated that in every such case the composition is in itself unmeaning; or that the author had no other object than the credit of eloquence; he may have had a higher end in view; and he may have expressed himself very clearly to some hearers, though not to all; but it is most important to be fully aware of the fact, that it is possible to obtain the highest applause from those who not only receive no edification from what they hear, but absolutely do not understand it. So far is popularity from being a safe criterion of the usefulness of a preacher.

It should be added that it is (as has indeed been already hinted) not for eloquence alone that a man will sometimes obtain credit by means of an imposing and mystical obscurity of language. That pompous kind of half-German dialect, for instance, which has of late years been particularly in fashion, and some other such, have sometimes succeeded in raising the admiration even of those who condemn the affectation and obscurity of the style, but who consider the thoughts conveyed as something very profound and original. For many persons, especially those of a somewhat enthusiastic temperament, (the Schwärmerei of the Germans,) and a certain craving after the sublime, and who at the same time are deficient in the habit of close and patient thinking, are apt, when any thing is made very clear to them, to fancy that they knew it before, and to underrate an author who enlightens them without any dazzling flashes, as a second-rate or third-rate person, destitute of genius; while they admire the supposed wisdom which is partially veiled by a kind of dazzling haze. And yet perhaps these admirers, if called on themselves to explain in their own words the meaning of what has been said, would find that much of it is unsound and worthless, and that most of the remainder is what has been often said before—and much better said—in plain English; and that a style not wholly unintelligible, yet not readily and fully intelligible, has deceived them as to the real value of
the matter.* They would find, like the antiquarian in "Martinus Scriblerus," that the supposed curious old shield turned out, when its rust was scoured off, to be no more than a pot-lid.

**CHAPTER II.**

**OF ENERGY.**

§1. The next quality of style to be noticed is what may be called energy; the term being used in a wider sense than the Εὐροπεία of Aristotle, and nearly corresponding with what Dr. Campbell calls vivacity; so as to comprehend every thing that may conduce to stimulate attention—to impress strongly on the mind the arguments adduced—to excite the imagination, and to arouse the feelings.

This energy, then, or vivacity of style, must depend (as is likewise the case in respect of perspicuity) on three things: 1st, the choice of words; 2d, their number; and 3d, their arrangement.

With respect to the choice of words, it will be most convenient to consider them under those two classes which Aristotle has described under the titles of Kuria and Xena, for which our language does not afford precisely corresponding names: "proper," "appropriate," or "ordinary" terms will the most nearly designate the former; the latter class (literally the "strange")

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* "These matters are treated of in solemn and imposing language, of that peculiar kind of dazzling mistiness whose effect is to convey, at first, to ordinary readers, a striking impression, with an appearance of being perfectly intelligible at the first glance, but to become more obscure and doubtful at the second glance, and more and more so, the more attentively it is studied by a reader of clear understanding; so as to leave him utterly in doubt, at the last, which of several meanings it is meant to convey, or whether any at all."—Essay II., On the Kingdom of Christ, § 38, p. 273.
including all others—all that are in any way removed from common use—whether uncommon terms, or ordinary terms transferred to a different meaning from that which strictly belongs to them, or employed in a different manner from that of common discourse. All the tropes and figures enumerated by grammatical and rhetorical writers, will of course fall under this head.

With respect then to "proper" terms, the principal rule for guiding our choice with a view to energy, is to prefer, ever, those words which are the least abstract and general. Individuals alone having a real existence,* the terms denoting them (called by logicians "singular terms") will of course make the most vivid impression on the mind, and exercise most the power of conception; and the less remote any term is from these, i. e., the more specific or individual, the more energy it will possess, in comparison of such as are more general. The impression produced on the mind by a "singular term" may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye of any object (suppose some particular man) near at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to distinguish the features of the individual; in a fainter light, or rather farther off, we merely perceive that the object is a man; this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the name of the species; yet farther off, or in a still feebler light, we can distinguish merely some living object; and, at length, merely some object; these views corresponding respectively with the terms denoting the genera, less or more remote. And as each of these views conveys, as far as it goes, an equally correct impression to the mind, (for

* Thence called by Aristotle (Categ., sec. 3) "primary substances," (πρῶται νόσιαι,) genus and species being denominated "secondary," as not properly denoting a "really existing thing," (τόδε τι,) but rather an attribute. He has, indeed, been considered as the great advocate of the opposite doctrine; i. e., the system of "Realism;" which was certainly embraced by many of his professed followers; but his own language is sufficiently explicit: Πᾶσα δὲ νόσια δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων νόσιων ἀναφοραβῆτημον καὶ ἥλθες εἰσιν, ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει άτομων γὰρ, καὶ ἐν ἄριστω τὸ σημαίνεινόν ἐστιν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων νόσιων ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχῆματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπη, ἄνθρωπος, η ἡμών. ΟΥ ΜΗΝ ΓΕ ΛΔΗΟΕΣ: ὀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει. κ. τ. λ.—Aristotle, Categ., § 3. See Logic, Dissert., Ch. V.
we are equally certain that the object at a distance is something, as that the one close to us is such and such an individual,) though each, successively, is less vivid; so, in language, a generic term may be as clearly understood as a specific or a singular term, but will convey a much less forcible impression to the hearer's mind. "The more general the terms are," (as Dr. Campbell justly remarks,) "the picture is the fainter; the more special they are, the brighter. The same sentiment may be expressed with equal justness, and even equal perspicuity, in the former way as in the latter; but as the coloring will in that case be more languid, it cannot give equal pleasure to the fancy, and by consequence will not contribute so much either to fix the attention or to impress the memory."

It might be supposed, at first sight, that an author has little or no choice on this point, but must employ either more or less general terms according to the objects he is speaking of. There is, however, in almost every case, great room for such a choice as we are speaking of; for, in the first place, it depends on our choice whether or not we will employ terms more general than the subject requires; which may almost always be done consistently with truth and propriety, though not with energy. If it be true that a man has committed murder, it may be correctly asserted that he has committed a crime; if the Jews were "exterminated" and "Jerusalem demolished" by "Vespasian's army," it may be said, with truth, that they were "subdued" by "an enemy," and their "capital" taken. This substitution, then, of the general for the specific, or of the specific for the singular, is always within our reach; and many, especially unpracticed writers, fall into a feeble style by resorting to it unnecessarily; either because they imagine there is more appearance of refinement or of profundity in the employment of such terms as are in less common use among the vulgar, or, in some cases, with a view to give greater comprehensiveness to their reasonings, and to increase the utility of what they say, by enlarging the field of its application. Inexperienced preachers frequently err in this way, by dwelling on virtue and vice, piety and irreligion, in the abstract,
without particularizing; forgetting that while they include much, they impress little or nothing.

The only appropriate occasion for this generic language is when we wish to avoid giving a vivid impression—when our object is to soften what is offensive, disgusting, or shocking; as when we speak of an "execution," for the infliction of the sentence of death on a criminal: of which kind of expressions, common discourse furnishes numberless instances. On the other hand, in Antony's speech over Caesar's body, his object being to excite horror, Shakspeare puts into his mouth the most particular expressions: "Those honorable men (not, who killed Caesar, but) whose daggers have stubbed Caesar."

§ 2.

But in the second place, not only does a regard for energy require that we should not use terms more general than are exactly adequate to the objects spoken of, but we are also allowed, in many cases, to employ less general terms than are exactly appropriate. In this case we are employing words not "appropriate," but belonging to the second of the two classes just mentioned. The use of this trope* (enumerated by Aristotle among the metaphors, but since more commonly called synecdoche) is very frequent; as it conduces much to the energy of the expression, without occasioning, in general, any risk of its meaning being mistaken. The passage cited by Dr. Campbell,† from one of our Lord's discourses, (which are in general of this character,) together with the remarks made upon it, will serve to illustrate what has been just said: "'Consider,' says our Lord, 'the lilies, how they grow: they toil not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. If then God so clothe the grass, which to-day is in the field, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more will he clothe you!'‡ Let us here adopt a little of the tasteless manner of modern para-

* From τρεπω; any word turned from its primary signification.
† The ingenious author cites this in the section treating of "proper terms," which is a trifling oversight; as it is plain that "lily" is used for the genus "flower,"—"Solomon," for the species "king," etc.
‡ Luke xii. 27, 28.
phrasts by the substitution of more general terms, one of their many expedients of infrigidating, and let us observe the effect produced by this change. 'Consider the flowers, how they gradually increase in their size: they do no manner of work, and yet I declare to you, that no king whatever, in his most splendid habit, is dressed up like them. If then God in his providence doth so adorn the vegetable productions, which continue but little time on the land, and are afterwards devoted to the meanest uses, how much more will he provide clothing for you!' How spiritless is the same sentiment rendered by these small variations! The very particularizing of to-day and to-morrow is infinitely more expressive of tran-
sitoriness, than any description wherein the terms are gen-
eral, that can be substituted in its room." It is a remarkable circumstance that this characteristic of style is perfectly re-
tained in translation, in which every other excellence of ex-
pression is liable to be lost; so that the prevalence of this kind of language in the sacred writers may be regarded as something exhibiting wisdom of design. It may be said with truth, that the book which it is the most necessary to translate into every language, is chiefly characterized by that kind of excellence in diction which is least impaired by trans-
lation.

§ 3.

But to proceed with the consideration of tropes: the most employed and most important of all those kinds of expressions which depart from the plain and
strictly appropriate style—all that are called by
Aristotle, Xena—is the metaphor, in the usual and limited
sense; viz., a word substituted for another, on account of the resemblance or analogy between their significations. The simile or comparison may be considered as differing in form only from a metaphor; the resemblance being in that case stated, which in the metaphor is implied.* Each may be founded either on resemblance, strictly so called, i. e., direct resemblance between the objects themselves in question, (as when we speak of "table-land," or compare great waves to
mountains,) or on analogy, which is the resemblance of

* See Logic, Chap. III.
ratios—a similarity of the relations they bear to certain other objects; as when we speak of the "light of reason," or of "revelation;" or compare a wounded and captive warrior to a stranded ship.*

The analogical metaphors and comparisons are both the more frequent and the more striking. They are the more frequent, because almost every object has such a multitude of relations, of different kinds, to many other objects; and they are the more striking, because (as Dr. A. Smith has well remarked) the more remote and unlike in themselves any two objects are, the more is the mind impressed and gratified by the perception of some point in which they agree.

It has been already observed, under the head of example, that we are carefully to distinguish between an illustration, (i. e., an argument from analogy or resemblance,) and what is properly called a simile or comparison, introduced merely to give force or beauty to the expression. And it was added, that the aptness and beauty of an illustration sometimes lead men to overrate, and sometimes to underrate, its force as an argument.†

With respect to the choice between the metaphorical form and that of comparison, it may be laid down as a general rule, that the former is always to be preferred,‡ wherever it is sufficiently simple and plain to be immediately comprehended; but that which as a metaphor would sound obscure and enigmatical, may be well received if expressed as a comparison. We may say, e. g., with propriety, that "Cromwell trampled on the laws:" it would sound feeble to say that "he treated the laws with the same contempt as a man does any thing which he tramples under his feet." On the other hand it would be harsh and obscure to say, "The stranded vessel lay shaken by the waves," meaning the wounded chief tossing on the bed of sickness; it is therefore necessary in such a case to state the resemblance. But this is never to be done more fully than is necessary to perspicuity; because all men are more gratified at catching the resemblance for themselves,

* Rhoderic Dhu, in the "Lady of the Lake."
† See Part I., chap. iii., § 3.
‡ Ἐστὶν ἡ εἰκών μεταφορὰ, διαφέρωσα προσθέσει, διὸ ἡπτον ἥδι, ὅτι μακροτέρως, κ. τ. λ.—Aristotle, Rhet., Rook III., chap. x.
than at having it pointed out to them.* And accordingly the greatest masters of this kind of style, when the case will not admit of pure metaphor, generally prefer a mixture of metaphor with simile; first pointing out the similitude, and afterwards employing metaphorical terms which imply it; or, vice versa, explaining a metaphor by a statement of the comparison. To take examples of both kinds from an author who particularly excels in this point: (speaking of a morbid fancy,)

—like the bat of Indian brakes,
Her pinions fan the wound she makes,
And soothing thus the dreamer’s pain,
She drinks the life-blood from the vein.†

The word “like” makes this a comparison; but the three succeeding lines are metaphorical. Again, to take an instance of the other kind:

They melted from the field, as snow,
When streams are swollen, and south winds blow,
Dissolves in silent dew.‡

Of the words here put in italics, the former is a metaphor, the latter introduces a comparison. Though the instances here adduced are taken from a poet, the judicious management of comparison which they exemplify is even more essential to a prose writer, to whom less license is allowed in the employment of it. It is a remark of Aristotle, (Rhet., Book III., chap. iv.,) that the simile is more suitable in poetry, and that metaphor is the only ornament of language in which the orator may freely indulge. He should therefore be the more careful to bring a simile as near as possible to the metaphorical form. The following is an example of the same kind of expression: “These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed, in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of man undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction.”§

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† Rokeby.
‡ Marmion.
§ On the French Revolution.
Metaphors may be employed, as Aristotle observes, either
to elevate or to degrade the subject, according to
the design of the author; being drawn from
similar or corresponding objects of a higher or
lower character. Thus a loud and vehement speaker may be
described either as bellowing or as thundering. And in both
cases, if the metaphor is apt and suitable to the purpose
designed, it is alike conducive to energy. He remarks that the
same holds good with respect to epithets also, which may be
drawn either from the highest or the lowest attributes of the
thing spoken of. Metonymy likewise (in which a part is put
for a whole, a cause for an effect, etc.) admits of a similar
variety in its applications.

A happier example cannot be found than the one which
Aristotle cites from Simonides, who, when offered a small
price for an ode to celebrate a victory in a mule race, expressed
his contempt for half-asses, (ημιονοτοι,) as they were commonly
called; but when a larger sum was offered, addressed them
in an ode as “Daughters of steeds swift as the storm:”
(ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἑπιων.)

Any trope (as is remarked by Dr. Campbell) adds force to
the expression when it tends to fix the mind on that part, or
circumstance, in the object spoken of, which is most essential
to the purpose in hand. Thus, there is an energy in Abra-
ham’s periphrasis for “God,” when he is speaking of the
allotment of Divine punishment: “Shall not the Judge of all
the earth do right?” If, again, we were alluding to his
omniscience, it would be more suitable to say, “This is known
only to the Searcher of hearts;” if to his power, we should
speak of him as “the Almighty,” etc.

Of metaphors, those generally conduce most to that energy
or vivacity of style we are speaking of, which illustrate an
intellectual by a sensible object; the latter being always the
most early familiar to the mind, and generally giving the
most distinct impression to it. Thus we speak of “unbridled
rage,” “deep-rooted prejudice,” “glowing eloquence,” a
“stony heart,” etc. And a similar use may be made of
metonymy also: as when we speak of the “throne,” or the
“crown,” for “royalty,” the “sword” for “military violence,”
etc.

But the highest degree of energy (and to which Aristotle
chiefly restricts the term) is produced by such metaphors as attribute *life* and *action* to things inanimate; and that, even when by this means the last-mentioned rule is violated, i.e., when sensible objects are illustrated by intellectual. For the disadvantage is over-balanced by the vivid impression produced by the idea of *personality* or *activity*; as when we speak of the *rage* of a torrent, a *furious* storm, a river *disdaining* to endure its bridge, etc.*

The figure called by rhetoricians *prosopopoeia* (literally, *personification*) is, in fact, no other than a metaphor of this kind: thus, in Demosthenes, *Greece* is represented as *addressing* the Athenians. So also in the book of Genesis, (chap. iv., verse 10,) "the voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the ground."

Many such expressions, indeed, are in such common use as to have lost all their metaphorical force, since they cease to suggest the idea belonging to their primary signification, and thus are become, practically, proper terms. But a new, or at least un hackneyed, metaphor of this kind, if it be not far-fetched and obscure, adds greatly to the force of the expression. This was a favorite figure with Homer, from whom Aristotle has cited several examples of it; as "the raging arrow," "the darts eager to taste of flesh,"† "the shameless" (or, as it might be rendered with more exactness, though with less dignity, "the provoking" stone," (λαας ἀναιδῆς,) which mocks the efforts of Sisyphus, etc.

Our language possesses one remarkable advantage, with a view to this kind of energy, in the constitution of its genders. All nouns in English which express objects that are really neuter, are considered as strictly of the neuter gender; the Greek and Latin, though possessing the advantage (which is wanting in the languages derived from Latin) of having a neuter gender, yet lose the benefit of it, by fixing the masculine or feminine genders upon many nouns denoting things inanimate; whereas in English, when we speak of any such

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* Pontem indignatus.
† There is a peculiar aptitude in some of these expressions, which the modern student is very likely to overlook: an arrow or dart, from its flying with a *spinning* motion, *quivers* violently when it is fixed; thus suggesting the idea of a person *trembling with eagerness.*
object in the masculine or feminine gender, that form of expression at once confers *personality* upon it. When "virtue," e. g., or our "country," are spoken of as females, or "ocean" as a male, etc., they are by that very circumstance *personified*; and a stimulus is thus given to the imagination, from the very circumstance that in a calm discussion or description, all of these would be neuter; whereas in Greek or Latin, as in French or Italian, no such distinction could be made. The employment of "*virtus,*" and "*ārētē,*" in the feminine gender, can contribute, accordingly, no animation to the style, when they could not, without a solecism, be employed otherwise.

There is, however, very little, comparatively, of energy produced by any metaphor or simile that is in common use, and already familiar to the hearer. Indeed, what were originally the boldest metaphors, are become, by long use, virtually, proper terms; (as is the case with the words "source," "reflection," etc., in their transferred senses;) and frequently are even nearly obsolete in the literal sense, as in the words "ardor," "acuteness," "ruminate," "edification," etc. If, again, a metaphor or simile that is not so hackneyed as to be considered common property, be taken from any known author, it strikes every one as no less a plagiarism than if an entire argument or description had been thus transferred. And hence it is that, as Aristotle remarks, the skilful employment of these, more than of any other ornaments of language, may be regarded as a "mark of genius," (ἐν δὲ τοιούτῳ ἐς τὴν ἐμήν.) Not that he means to say, as some interpreters suppose, that this power is entirely a gift of nature, and in no degree to be learned; on the contrary, he expressly affirms that "the perception of resemblances," on which it depends, is the fruit of "philosophy;" but he means that any metaphor which is striking from being not in common use, is a kind of *property* of him who has invented it, and cannot be transferred from his composition to another's.
Some care is accordingly requisite, in order that they may be readily comprehended, and may not have the appearance of being far-fetched and extravagant. For this purpose it is usual to combine with the metaphor a proper term which explains it; viz., either attributing to the term in its transferred sense something which does not belong to it in its literal sense; or, vice versa, denying of it in its transferred sense something which does belong to it in its literal sense. To call the sea the "watery bulwark" of our island, would be an instance of the former kind; an example of the latter is the expression of a writer who speaks of the dispersion of some hostile fleet by the winds and waves, "those ancient and unsubsidized allies of England."

It is hardly necessary to mention the obvious and hackneyed cautions against mixture of metaphors; and against any that are complex and far-pursued, so as to approach to allegory.

In reference to the former of these faults, Dr. Johnson justly censures Addison for speaking of "bridling in his muse, who longs to launch into a nobler strain;" "which," says the critic, "is an act that was never restrained by a bridle." Some, however, are too fastidious on this point. Words which, by long use in a transferred sense, have lost nearly all their metaphorical force, may fairly be combined in a manner which, taking them literally, would be incongruous. It would savor of hypercriticism to object to such an expression as "fertile source."

In reference to the other fault—that of the too complex metaphor—it should be observed that the more apt and striking is the analogy suggested, the more will it have of an artificial appearance; and will draw off the reader's attention from the subject, to admire the ingenuity displayed in the style. Young writers of genius ought especially to be admonished to ask themselves frequently, not whether this or that is a striking expression, but whether it makes the meaning more striking than another phrase would—whether it impresses more forcibly the sentiment to be conveyed.

§ 4.

Epithets, in the rhetorical sense, denote, not every adjec-
Epithets. But those only which do not add to the sense, but signify something already implied in the noun itself; as, if one says, "the glorious sun:" on the other hand, to speak of the "rising" or "meridian sun" would not be considered as, in this sense, employing an epithet.

It is a common practice with some writers to endeavor to add force to their expressions by accumulating high-sounding epithets, denoting the greatness, beauty, or other admirable qualities of the things spoken of; but the effect is generally the reverse of what is intended. Most readers, except those of a very vulgar or puerile taste, are disgusted at studied efforts to point out and force upon their attention whatever is remarkable; and this, even when the ideas conveyed are themselves striking. But when an attempt is made to cover poverty of thought with mock sublimity of language, and to set off trite sentiments and feeble arguments by tawdry magnificence, the only result is, that a kind of indignation is superadded to contempt; as when (to use Quintilian's comparison) an attempt is made to supply, by paint, the natural glow of a youthful and healthy complexion.

"A principal device in the fabrication of this style" (the mock-eloquent) "is to multiply epithets—dry epithets, laid on the outside, and into which none of the vitality of the sentiment is found to circulate. You may take a great number of the words out of each page, and find that the sense is neither more nor less for your having cleared the composition of these epithets of chalk of various colors, with which the tame thoughts had submitted to be rubbed over, in order to be made fine."*

We expect, indeed, and excuse in ancient writers, as a part of the unrefined simplicity of a ruder language, such a redundant use of epithets as would not be tolerated in a modern, even in a translation of their works: the "white milk," and "dark gore," etc., of Homer must not be retained; at least, not so frequently as they occur in the original. Aristotle, indeed, gives us to understand that in his time this liberty was still allowed to poets; but later taste is more fastidious. He censures, however, the adoption, by prose writers, of this, and of every other kind of ornament.

* Foster, Essay IV.
that might seem to border on the poetical; and he bestows on such a style the appellation of "frigid," (ψυχρόν, which at first may appear somewhat remarkable, (though the same expression, "frigid," might very properly be so applied in our own language also,) because the words "warm," "glowing," and such like metaphors, seem naturally applicable to poetry. This very circumstance, however, does in reality account for the use of the other expression. We are, in poetical prose, reminded of, and for that reason disposed to miss, the "warmth and glow" of poetry. It is on the same principle that we are disposed to speak of coldness in the rays of the moon, because they remind us of sunshine, but want its warmth; and that (to use an humbler and more familiar instance) an empty fireplace is apt to suggest an idea of cold.

The use of epithets, however, in prose composition, is not to be proscribed; as the judicious employment of them is undoubtedly conducive to energy. It is extremely difficult to lay down any precise rules on such a point. The only safe guide in practice must be a taste formed from a familiarity with the best authors, and from the remarks of a skilful critic on one's own compositions. It may, however, be laid down as a general caution, more particularly needful for young writers, that an excessive luxuriance of style, and especially a redundancy of epithets, is the worse of the two extremes; as it is a positive fault, and a very offensive one; while the opposite is but the absence of an excellence.

It is also an important rule, that the boldest and most striking, and almost poetical, turns of expression, should be reserved (as Aristotle has remarked, Book III., chap. vii.) for the most impassioned parts of a discourse; and that an author should guard against the vain ambition of expressing every thing in an equally high-wrought, brilliant, and forcible style. The neglect of this caution often occasions the imitation of the best models to prove detrimental. When the admiration of some fine and animated passages leads a young writer to take those passages for his general model, and to endeavor to make every sentence he composes equally fine, he will, on the contrary, give a flatness to the whole, and destroy the effect of those portions which would have been forcible if they had been allowed to stand prominent. To brighten the dark
parts of a picture, produces much the same result as if one had darkened the bright parts: in either case there is a want of relief and contrast; and composition, as well as painting, has its lights and shades, which must be distributed with no less skill, if we would produce the desired effect.*

In no place, however, will it be advisable to introduce any epithet which does not fulfil one of these two purposes: 1st, to explain a metaphor; a use which has been noticed under that head, and which will justify, and even require, the introduction of an epithet, which, if it had been joined to the proper term, would have been glaringly superfluous: thus Æschylus† speaks of the “winged hound of Jove,” meaning the eagle: to have said the “winged eagle,” would have had a very different effect. 2dly. When the epithet expresses something which, though implied in the subject, would not have been likely to occur at once spontaneously to the hearer’s mind, and yet is important to be noticed with a view to the purpose in hand. Indeed, it will generally happen that the epithets employed by a skilful orator will be found to be, in fact, so many abridged arguments, the force of which is sufficiently conveyed by a mere hint: e. g., if any one says, “We ought to take warning from the bloody revolution of France,” the epithet suggests one of the reasons for our being warned; and that not less clearly, and more forcibly, than if the argument had been stated at length.‡

§ 5.

With respect to the use of antiquated, foreign, new-coined, or new-compounded words,§ or words applied in an unusual sense, it may be sufficient to observe, that all writers, and prose writers most, should be

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* Omnia vult bella Matho dicere; dic aliquando. Et bene; dic neutrum: dic aliquando male.
† Prometheus.
‡ See Part I., chap. iii., § 3.
§ It is a curious instance of whimsical inconsistency, that many who, with justness, censure as pedantic the frequent introduction of Greek and Latin words, neither object to, nor refrain from, a similar pedantry with respect to French and Italian.

This kind of affectation is one of the "dangers" of "a little learn-
very cautious and sparing in the use of them; not only because in excess they produce a barbarous dialect, but because they are so likely to suggest the idea of artifice; the perception of which is most especially adverse to energy. The occasional apt introduction of such a term will sometimes produce a powerful effect; but whatever may seem to savor of affectation, or even of great solicitude and study in the choice of terms, will effectually destroy the true effect of eloquence. The language which betrays art, and carries not an air of simplicity and sincerity, may, indeed, by some hearers, be thought not only very fine, but even very energetic; this very circumstance, however, may be taken for a proof that it is not so; for if it had been, they would not have thought about it, but would have been occupied, exclusively, with the subject. An unstudied and natural air, therefore, is an excellence to which the true orator, i. e., he who is aiming to carry his point, will be ready to sacrifice any other that may interfere with it.

The principle here laid down will especially apply to the choice of words, with a view to their imitative, or otherwise appropriate sound. The attempt to make "the sound an echo to the sense," is indeed more frequently to be met with in poets than in prose writers; but it may be worth remarking, that an evident effort after this kind of excellence, as it is offensive in any kind of composition, would in prose appear peculiarly disgusting. Critics treating on this subject have gone into opposite extremes: some, fancifully attributing to words, or combinations of words, an imitative power far beyond what they can really

ing:” those who are really good linguists are seldom so anxious to display their knowledge.

It has been the fashion of late years with some few authors to write a sort of bastard English, full of German idioms, and of new-coined words, fashioned on a German model. This passes with some persons for uncommon eloquence; which it resembles in being “uncommon.” Some readers, again, of better taste than not to condemn this style, are yet so far deceived by it as to imagine a great profundity in the thoughts conveyed; the oddness of the expression giving an air of originality to much that would probably appear trite if said in plain English.
possess,* and representing this kind of imitation as deserving to be studiously aimed at; and others, on the contrary, considering nearly the whole of this kind of excellence as no better than imaginary, and regarding the examples which do occur, and have been cited, of a congruity between the sound and the sense, as purely accidental.

The truth probably lies between these two extremes.

In the first place, that words denoting sounds, or employed in describing them, may be imitative of those sounds, must be admitted by all; indeed, this kind of imitation is, to a certain degree, almost unavoidable, in our language at least; which abounds, perhaps more than any other, in these, as they may be called, naturally expressive terms; such as “hiss,” “rattle,” “clatter,” “splash,” and many others.†

In the next place, it is also allowed by most, that quick or slow motion may, to a certain degree, at least, be imitated or represented by words; many short syllables (unencumbered by a clash either of vowels, or of consonants coming together) being pronounced in the same time with a smaller number of long syllables, abounding with these encumbrances, the former seems to have a natural correspondence to a quick, and the latter to a slow motion; since in the one a greater, and in the other a less space, seem to be passed over in the same time. In the ancient poets, their hexameter verses being always considered as of the same length, i.e., in respect of the time taken to pronounce them, whatever proportion of dactyls or spondees they contained, this kind of imitation of quick or slow motion is the more apparent; and after making all allowances for fancy, it seems impossible to doubt that in many in-

* Pope has accordingly been censured for his inconsistency in making the Alexandrine represent both a quick and a slow motion:

1. “Flies o'er th' unbending corn, and skims along the main.”
2. “Which, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along.”

In the first instance, he forgot that an Alexandrine is long, from containing more feet than a common verse; whereas a long hexameter has but the same number of feet as a short one, and therefore, being pronounced in the same time, seems to move more rapidly.

In the former of these verses the crowd of consonants in “o'er th' unbending” does not seem well adapted to express swift and smooth motion.

† See Wallis, Gram. Anglic.
stances it does exist; as, e.g., in the often-cited line which expresses the rolling of Sisyphus's stone down the hill:

\[ \text{Aḯðeis ἔπειτα πέδονὸς κυλινδέτο λῴας ἡναῦδης.} \]

The following passage from the \textit{Aeneid} can hardly be denied to exhibit a correspondence with the slow and quick \textit{motions}, at least, which it describes: that of the Trojans laboriously hewing the foundations of a tower on the top of Priam's palace, and that of its sudden and violent fall:

\[ \text{Aggressō fērō cīrcūm, quā sūm̄ma labantes*} \\
\text{Jūncēūrās tabulāta dabant, dēvēlimus altis} \\
\text{Sedībūs, impūlīmusque, ēt lapsū rēpentē rūīnam} \\
\text{Cum sōnītu trāhīt, et Dānāum sūpēr amīnā late incīdīt.} \]

But, lastly, it seems not to require any excessive exercise of fancy to perceive, if not, properly speaking, an \textit{imitation}, by words, of other things besides sound and motion, at least an analogical aptitude. That there is at least an apparent analogy between things sensible and things intelligible, is implied by numberless metaphors; as when we speak of \textit{"rough, or harsh, soft, or smooth, manners,\textquotedblright} \textit{"turbulent passions,"} the \textit{"stroke or the storms of adversity,"} etc. Now if there are any words or combinations of words which have in their sound a congruity with certain sensible objects, there is no reason why they should not have the same congruity with those \textit{emotions, actions,} etc., to which these sensible objects are analogous. Especially, as it is universally allowed that certain musical combinations are, respectively, appropriate to the expression of grief, anger, agitation, etc.

On the whole, the most probable conclusion seems to be, that many at least of the celebrated passages that are cited as imitative in sound, were, on the one hand, not the result of \textit{accident,} nor yet, on the other hand, of \textit{study;} but that

\* The slow movement of this line would be much more perceptible, if we pronounced (as doubtless the Latins did) the doubled consonants, \textit{"ag-gres-si fer-ro—sum-ma;\textquotedblright} but in English, and consequently in the English way of reading Latin or Greek, the doubling of a consonant only serves to fix the place of the accent; the latter of the two being never pronounced, except in a very few compound words; as \textit{"innate,\textquotedblright} \textit{"con-natural,\textquotedblright} \textit{"poor-rate,\textquotedblright} \textit{"hop-pole."}
the idea in the author's mind spontaneously suggested appropriate sounds: thus, when Milton's mind was occupied with the idea of the opening of the infernal gates, it seems natural that his expression,

— and on their hinges grate
Harsh thunder,

should have occurred to him without any distinct intention of imitating sounds.

It will be the safest rule, therefore, for a prose writer at least, never to make any distinct effort after this kind of energy of expression, but to trust to the spontaneous occurrence of suitable sounds on every occasion where the introduction of them is likely to have good effect.

§ 6.

It is hardly necessary to give any warning, generally, against the unnecessary introduction of technical language of any kind, when the meaning can be adequately, or even tolerably, expressed in common, i.e., unscientific words. The terms and phrases of art have an air of pedantic affectation, for which they do not compensate, by even the smallest appearance of increased energy.* But there is an apparent exception to this rule in the case of what may be called the "theological style": a peculiar phraseology, adopted more or less by a large proportion of writers of sermons

Theological style.

* Of course this rule does not apply to avowedly technical systems of instruction. In such works the usual and the best rule is, to employ as far as possible such technical terms as custom has already established; defining, modifying, restricting, extending, etc., these, if necessary, as the occasion may require. Sometimes, however, the introduction of new ones will be called for, either in addition to the others, or in their stead, when there are very strong objections against these. See Introduction: latter part of § 4.

It is no uncommon trick with some writers to invent and adopt, on the slightest pretext, complete new sets of technical terms, the more strange and uncouth, the better for their purpose; and thus to pass off long-known truths for prodigious discoveries, and gain the credit of universal originality by the boldness of their innovations in language: like some voyagers of discovery, who take possession of countries, whether before visited or not, by formally giving them new names.
and other religious works; consisting partly of peculiar terms, but chiefly of common words used in a peculiar sense or combination, so as to form altogether a kind of diction widely differing from the classical standard of the language. This phrasology, having been formed partly from the style of some of the most eminent divines, partly, and to a much greater degree, from that of the Scriptures, i. e., of our version, has been supposed to carry with it an air of appropriate dignity and sanctity, which greatly adds to the force of what is said. And this may, perhaps, be the case when what is said is of little or no intrinsic weight, and is only such meagre commonplace as many religious works consist of: the associations which such language will excite in the minds of those accustomed to it, supplying in some degree the deficiencies of the matter. But this diction, though it may serve as a veil for poverty of thought, will be found to produce no less the effect of obscuring the lustre of what is truly valuable: if it adds an appearance of strength to what is weak, it adds weakness to what is strong; and if pleasing to those of narrow and ill-cultivated minds, it is in a still higher degree repulsive to persons of taste.

It may be said, indeed, with truth, that the improvement of the majority is a higher object than the gratification of a refined taste in a few; but it may be doubted whether any real energy, even with respect to any class of hearers, is gained by the use of such a diction as that of which I am speaking. For it will often be found that what is received with great approbation, is yet (even if, strictly speaking, understood) but very little attended to, or impressed upon the minds of the hearers. Terms and phrases which have been long familiar to them, and have certain vague and indistinct notions associated with them, men often suppose themselves to understand much more fully than they do; and still oftener give a sort of indolent assent to what is said, without making any effort of thought.

It is justly observed by Mr. Foster, (Essay IV.,) when treating on this subject, that “with regard to a considerable proportion of Christian readers and hearers, a reformed language would be excessively strange to them;” but that “its being so strange to them, would be a proof of the necessity of adopting it, at least in part, and by degrees. For the
manner in which some of them would receive this altered diction, would prove that the customary phraseology had scarcely given them any clear ideas. It would be found that the peculiar phrases had been not so much the vehicles of ideas, as the substitutes for them.* These readers and hearers have been accustomed to chime to the sound, without apprehending the sense; insomuch, that if they hear the very ideas which these phrases signify, expressed ever so simply in other language, they do not recognize them."

He observes also, with much truth, that the studied incorporation and imitation of the language of the Scriptures in the texture of any discourse, neither indicates reverence for the sacred composition, nor adds to the dignity of that which is human; but rather diminishes that of such passages as might be introduced from the sacred writings in pure and distinct quotation, standing contrasted with the general style of the work.

Of the technical terms, as they may be called, of Theology, there are many, the place of which might easily be supplied by corresponding expressions in common use; and there are many, again, which are remnants of the philosophy of the schoolmen, but are employed frequently by persons who know nothing of the metaphysical theories which gave rise to the use of such terms.† There are others, doubtless, which, denoting ideas exclusively belonging to the subject, could not be avoided without a tedious circumlocution; these, therefore, may be admitted as allowable peculiarities of diction; and the others, perhaps, need not be entirely disused; but it is highly desirable that both should be very frequently exchanged for words or phrases entirely free from any technical peculiarity, even at the expense of some circumlocution. Not that this should be done so constantly as to render the terms in question obsolete; but by introducing frequently both the term, and a sentence explanatory of the same idea, the evil just mentioned—the habit of not thinking, or not

* It may be added that many would at once take for granted that any alteration in the statement of any doctrine—though the phrases they had been accustomed to were avowedly of man's framing—implies a rejection of the doctrine itself; and they would accordingly raise a cry of Heresy.
† See Hampden, "Bampton Lect."

[PART III.]
thinking attentively, of the meaning of what is said—will be, in great measure, guarded against; the technical words themselves will make a more forcible expression, and the danger of sliding into unmeaning cant will be materially lessened. Such repetitions, therefore, will more than compensate for, or rather will be exempt from, any appearance of tediousness, by the addition both of perspicuity and energy.

"It must indeed be acknowledged, that in many cases innovations have been introduced, partly by the ceasing to employ the words designating those doctrines which were designed to be set aside; but it is probable they may have been still more frequently and successfully introduced under the advantage of retaining the terms, while the principles were gradually subverted. And therefore, since the peculiar words can be kept to one invariable signification only by keeping that signification clearly in sight, by means of something separate from these words themselves, it might be wise in Christian authors and speakers sometimes to express the ideas in common words, either in connection with the peculiar terms, or, occasionally, instead of them. Common words might less frequently be applied as affected denominations of things which have their own direct and common denominations, and be less frequently combined into uncouth phrases. Many peculiar and antique words might be exchanged for other single words of equivalent signification, and in common use. And the small number of peculiar terms acknowledged and established as of permanent use and necessity, might, even separately from the consideration of modifying the diction, be, occasionally, with advantage to the explicit declaration and clear comprehension of Christian truth, made to give place to a fuller expression, in a number of common words, of those ideas of which they are single signs."

It may be asserted but with too much truth that a very considerable proportion of Christians have a habit of laying aside in a great degree their common sense, and letting it, as it were, lie dormant, when points of religion come before them: as if reason were utterly at variance with religion, and the ordinary principles of sound judgment were to be completely superseded on that subject. And accordingly it

* Foster, Essay IV., p. 304.
will be found that there are many errors which are adopted, many truths which are overlooked or not clearly understood, and many difficulties which stagger and perplex them, for want, properly speaking, of the exercise of their common sense; i.e., in cases precisely analogous to such as daily occur in the ordinary affairs of life; in which those very same persons would form a correct, clear, prompt, and decisive judgment. It is well worthy of consideration, how far the tendency to this habit might be diminished by the use of a diction conformable to the suggestions which have been here brought forward.

§ 7.

With respect to the number of words employed, "it is certain," as Dr. Campbell observes, "that of whatever kind the sentiment be, witty, humorous, grave, animated, or sublime, the more briefly it is expressed, the energy is the greater." "As when the rays of the sun are collected into the focus of a burning-glass, the smaller the spot is which receives them compared with the surface of the glass, the greater is the splendor; so, in exhibiting our sentiments by speech, the narrower the compass of words is, wherein the thought is comprised, the more energetic is the expression. Accordingly, we find that the very same sentiment expressed diffusely, will be admitted barely to be just; expressed concisely, will be admired as spirited." He afterwards remarks, that though a languid redundancy of words is in all cases to be avoided, the energetic brevity which is the most contrary to it, is not adapted alike to every subject and occasion. "The kinds of writing which are less susceptible of this ornament, are the descriptive, the pathetic, the declamatory,* especially the last. It is, besides, much more suitable in writing than in speaking. A reader has the command of his time; he may read fast or slow, as he finds convenient; he can peruse a sentence a second time when necessary, or lay down the book and think. But if, in haranguing the people, you comprise a great deal in a few words, the hearer must

* This remark is made, and the principle of it (which Dr. Campbell has omitted) subjoined, in Part II., chap. ii., § 2, of this treatise.
have uncommon quickness of apprehension to catch the meaning before you have put it out of his power, by engaging his attention to something else."

The mode in which this inconvenience should be obviated, and in which the requisite expansion may be given to any thing which the persons addressed cannot comprehend in a very small compass, is, as I have already remarked, not so much by increasing the number of words in which the sentiment is conveyed in each sentence, (though in this, some variation must of course be admitted,) as by repeating it in various forms. The uncultivated and the dull will require greater expansion and more copious illustration of the same thought than the educated and the acute; but they are even still more liable to be wearied or bewildered by prolixity. If the material is too stubborn to be speedily cleaved, we must patiently continue our efforts for a longer time, in order to accomplish it; but this is to be done, not by making each blow fall more slowly, which would only enfeeble them, but by often-repeated blows.

It is needful to insist the more on the energetic effect of conciseness, because so many, especially young writers and speakers, are apt to fall into a style of pompous verbosity, not from negligence, but from an idea that they are adding both perspicuity and force to what is said, when they are only encumbering the sense with a needless load of words. And they are the more likely to commit this mistake, because such a style will often appear not only to the author, but to the vulgar, (i. e., the vulgar in intellect,) among his hearers, to be very majestic and impressive. It is not uncommon to hear a speaker or writer of this class mentioned as having a "very fine command of language," when, perhaps, it might be said with more correctness that "his language has a command of him;" i. e., that he follows a train of words rather than of thought, and strings together all the striking expressions that occur to him on the subject, instead of first forming a clear notion of the sense he wishes to convey, and then seeking for the most appropriate vehicle in which to convey it. He has but the same "command of language" that the rider has of a horse which runs away with him.

If, indeed, any class of men are found to be the most effect-
ually convinced, persuaded, or instructed, by a turgid amplification, it is the orator's business, true to his object, not to criticize or seek to improve their taste, but to accommodate himself to it. But it will be found that this is not near so often the case as many suppose. The orator may often by this kind of style gain great admiration, without being the nearer to his proper end, which is to carry his point. It will frequently happen that not only the approbation, but the whole attention of the hearers will have been confined to the style, which will have drawn their minds, not to the subject, but from it. In those spurious kinds of oratory, indeed, which have been above mentioned, [Part III., chap. ii., §§ 4, 5, 6,] in which the inculcation of the subject-matter is not the principal object proposed, a redundancy of words may often be very suitable; but in all that comes within the legitimate province of Rhetoric, there is no fault to be more carefully avoided.*

It will therefore be advisable for a tyro in composition to look over what he has written, and to strike out every word and clause which he finds will leave the passage neither less perspicuous nor less forcible than it was before: "quamvis invita recedant;" remembering that, as has been aptly observed, "nobody else knows what good things you leave out;"

* "By a multiplicity of words the sentiment is not set off and accommodated, but like David, in Saul's armor, it is encumbered and oppressed.

"Yet this is not the only, or perhaps the worst consequence resulting from this manner of treating sacred writ: [paraphrasing:] we are told of the torpedo that it has the wonderful quality of numbing every thing it touches: a paraphrase is a torpedo. By its influence the most vivid sentiments become lifeless, the most sublime are flattened, the most fervid chilled, the most vigorous enervated. In the very best compositions of this kind that can be expected, the Gospel may be compared to a rich wine of a high flavor diluted in such a quantity of water as renders it extremely vapid."—Campbell, Rhetoric, Book III., chap. ii, § 2.

It should be observed, however, that in some palates or stomachs a dilution may be necessary. Nor does Dr. Campbell mean, I apprehend, that there are not many passages in Scripture which require expansion with a view to their being fully comprehended by an ordinary reader. But a regular paraphrase generally expands every passage, hard or easy, nearly to the same degree: it applies a magnifying-glass of equal power to the gnat and to the camel.
if the general effect is improved, that advantage is enjoyed by the reader, unalloyed by the regret which the author may feel at the omission of any thing which he may think in itself excellent.

But this is not enough: he must study contraction as well as omission. There are many sentences which would not bear the omission of a single word consistently with perspicuity, which yet may be much more concisely expressed, with equal clearness, by the employment of different words, and by recasting a great part of the expression. Take for example such a sentence as the following:

"A severe and tyrannical exercise of power must become a matter of necessary policy with kings, when their subjects are imbued with such principles as justify and authorize rebellion:" this sentence could not be advantageously, nor to any considerable degree, abridged, by the mere omission of any of the words; but it may be expressed in a much shorter compass, with equal clearness and far greater energy, thus: "Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle."*

The hints I have thrown out on this point coincide pretty nearly with Dr. Campbell's remark on "verbosity," as contradistinguished from "tautology"† and from "pleonasm." "The third and last fault I shall mention against vivid conciseness is verbosity. This, it may be thought, coincides with the pleonasm already discussed. One difference, however, is this: in the pleonasm there are words which add nothing to the sense; in the verbose manner, not only single words, but

* Burke.
† Tautology, which he describes as "either a repetition of the same sense in different words, or a representation of any thing as the cause, condition, or consequence of itself," is, in most instances, (of the latter kind at least,) accounted an offence rather against correctness than brevity; the example he gives from Bolingbroke, "How many are there by whom these tidings of good news were never heard," would usually be reckoned a blunder rather than an instance of prolixity like the expression of "Sinecure places which have no duty annexed to them." "The pleonasm," he observes, "implies merely superfluity. Though the words do not, as in the tautology, repeat the sense, they add nothing to it; e. g.: They returned [back again] to the [same] city [from] whence they came [forth]."—*Campbell's Rhetoric, Book III., chap. ii., § 2.
whole clauses, may have a meaning, and yet it were better to omit them, because what they mean is unimportant. Instead, therefore, of enlivening the expression, they make it languish. Another difference is, that in a proper pleonasm, a complete correction is always made by razing. This will not always answer in the verbose style; it is often necessary to alter as well as blot.”*

§ 8.

Conciseness to be reconciled with perspicuity.

It is of course impossible to lay down precise rules as to the degree of conciseness which is, on each occasion that may arise, allowable and desirable; but to an author who is, in his expression of any sentiment, wavering between the demands of perspicuity and of energy, (of which the former of course requires the first care, lest he should fail of both,) and doubting whether the phrase which has the most of forcible brevity will be readily taken in, it may be recommended to use both expressions—first to expand the sense, sufficiently to be clearly understood, and then to contract it into the most compendious and striking form. This expedient might seem at first sight the most decidedly adverse to the brevity recommended; but it will be found, in practice, that the addition of a compressed and pithy expression of the sentiment, which has been already stated at greater length, will produce the effect of brevity. For it is to be remembered that it is not on account of the actual number of words that diffuseness is to be condemned, (unless one were limited to a certain space, or time,) but to avoid the flatness and tediousness resulting from it; so that if this appearance can be obviated by the insertion of such an abridged repetition as is here recommended, which adds poignancy and spirit to the whole, conciseness will be, practically, promoted by the addition. The hearers will be struck by the forcibleness of the sentence which they will have been prepared to comprehend; they will understand the longer expression, and remember the shorter. But the force will, in general, be totally destroyed, or much enfeebled, if the order be reversed—if the brief expression be first put, and afterwards expanded and explained; for it loses much of its force if it be not clearly understood

* Campbell, Rhetoric, Book III., chap. ii., § 2, Part III.
the moment it is uttered; and if it be, there is no need of the subsequent expansion. The sentence recently quoted from Burke, as an instance of energetic brevity, is in this manner brought in at the close of a more expanded exhibition of the sentiment, as a condensed conclusion of the whole: "Power, of some kind or other, will survive the shock in which manners and opinions perish; and it will find other and worse means for its support. The usurpation which, in order to subvert ancient institutions, has destroyed ancient principles, will hold power by arts similar to those by which it has acquired it. When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of fealty, which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and subjects from the precaution of tyranny, shall be extinct in the minds of men, plots and assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation, and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims which form the political code of all power not standing on its own honor, and the honor of those who are to obey it. Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle."*

The same writer, in another passage of the same work, has a paragraph in like manner closed and summed up by a striking metaphor, (which will often prove the most concise, as well as in other respects striking, form of expression,) such as would not have been so readily taken if placed at the beginning: "To avoid, therefore, the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we have consecrated the state, that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions but with due caution; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion; that he should approach to the faults of the state as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude. By this wise prejudice we are taught to look with horror on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that, by their poisonous weeds and wild in-

* Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France," Works, vol. v., p. 153. The reader will please to observe that I do not pledge myself to an approval of his opinions. I am at present concerned only with his style.
cantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father's life."*

This, however, being an instance of what may be called the classical metaphor, no preparation or explanation, even though sufficient to make it intelligible, could render it very striking to those not thoroughly and early familiar with the ancient fables of Medea.

The preacher has a considerable resource, of an analogous kind, in similar allusions to the history, descriptions, parables, etc., of Scripture; which will often furnish useful illustrations and forcible metaphors, in an address to those well acquainted with the Bible; though these would be frequently unintelligible, and always comparatively feeble, to persons not familiar with Scripture.†

So great, indeed, is the effect of a skilful interspersion of short, pointed, forcible sentences, that even a considerable violation of some of the foregoing rules may be, by this means, in a great degree, concealed; and vigor may thus be communicated (if vigor of thought be not wanting) to a style chargeable even with tautology. This is the case with much of the language of Dr. Johnson, who is certainly on the whole an energetic writer; though he would have been much more so, had not an over-attention to the roundness and majestic sound of his sentences, and a delight in balancing one clause against another, led him so frequently into a faulty redundancy. Take, as an instance, a passage in his life of Prior, which may be considered as a favorable specimen of his style: "'Solomon' is the work to which he intrusted the protection of his name, and which he expected succeeding ages to regard with veneration. His affection was natural; it had undoubtedly been written with great labor; and who is willing to think that he has been laboring in vain? He had infused into it much knowledge, and much thought; and often polished it to elegance, often dignified it with splendor, and sometimes heightened it to sublimity; he perceived in it many excellences, and did not discover that it wanted that without which

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† See Appendix, [M.]
all others are of small avail, the power of engaging attention and alluring curiosity. Tediousness is the most fatal of all accidents; negligence or errors are single or local; but tediousness pervades the whole; other faults are censured and forgotten, but the power of tediousness propagates itself. He that is weary the first hour, is more weary the second; as bodies forced into motion contrary to their tendency, pass more and more slowly through every successive interval of space. Unhappily, this pernicious failure is that which an author is least able to discover. We are seldom tiresome to ourselves; and the act of composition fills and delights the mind with change of language and succession of images: every couplet when produced is new; and novelty is the great source of pleasure. Perhaps no man ever thought a line superfluous when he first wrote it; or contracted his work till his ebulitions of invention had subsided."

It would not have been just to the author, nor even so suitable to the present purpose, to cite less than the whole of this passage, which exhibits the characteristic merits, even more strikingly than the defects, of the writer. Few could be found in the works of Johnson, and still fewer in those of any other writer, more happily and forcibly expressed; yet it can hardly be denied that the parts here distinguished by italics are chargeable, more or less, with tautology.

It happens, unfortunately, that Johnson's style is particularly easy of imitation, even by writers utterly destitute of his vigor of thought; and such imitators are intolerable. They bear the same resemblance to their model, that the armor of the Chinese, as described by travellers, consisting of thick quilted cotton covered with stiff glazed paper, does to that of the ancient knights: equally glittering and bulky, but destitute of the temper and firmness which was its sole advantage. At first sight, indeed, this kind of style appears far from easy of attainment, on account of its being remote from the colloquial, and having an elaborately artificial appearance; but, in reality, there is none less difficult to acquire. To string together substantives, connected by conjunctions, which is the characteristic of Johnson's style, is, in fact, the rudest and clumsiest mode of expressing our thoughts: we have only to find names for our ideas, and then put them together
by connectives, instead of interweaving, or rather *felting* them together, by a due admixture of verbs, participles, prepositions, etc. So that this way of writing, as contrasted with the other, may be likened to the primitive rude carpentry, in which the materials were united by coarse external implements, pins, nails, and cramps, when compared with that art in its most improved state, after the invention of dove-tail-joints, grooves, and mortices, when the junctions are effected by forming properly the extremities of the pieces to be joined, so as at once to consolidate and conceal the juncture.

If any one will be at the pains to compare a few pages, taken from almost any part of Johnson's Works, with the same quantity from any other of our admired writers, noting down the number of *substantives* in each, he will be struck with the disproportion. This would be still greater, if he were to examine with the same view an equal portion of Cicero; but it must be acknowledged that the genius of the Latin language allows and requires a much smaller proportion of substantives than are necessary in our own; especially such as express qualities in the abstract.

§ 9.

In aiming at a concise style, however, care must of course be taken that it be not *crowded*. The frequent recurrence of considerable ellipses, even when obscurity does not result from them, will produce an appearance of affected and laborious compression, which is offensive. The author who is studious of energetic brevity, should aim at what may be called a *suggestive* style; such, that is, as, without making a distinct, though brief, mention of a multitude of particulars, shall put the hearer's mind into the same *train of thought* as the speaker's, and suggest to him more than is actually expressed.

Such a style may be compared to a good map, which marks distinctly the great outlines, setting down the principal rivers, towns, mountains, etc., leaving the imagination to supply the villages, hillocks, and streamlets; which, if they were all inserted in their due proportions, would crowd the map, though after all they could not be discerned without a microscope.
Aristotle's style, which is frequently so elliptical as to be dry and obscure, is yet often, at the very same time, unnecessarily diffuse, from his enumerating much that the reader would easily have supplied, if the rest had been fully and forcibly stated. He seems to have regarded his readers as capable of going along with him readily, in the deepest discussions, but not of going beyond him, in the most simple; i.e., of filling up his meaning, and inferring what he does not actually express; so that in many passages a free translator might convey his sense in a shorter compass, and yet in a less cramped and elliptical diction.

A particular statement, example, or proverb, of which the general application is obvious, will often save a long abstract rule, which needs much explanation and limitation; and will thus suggest much that is not actually said; thus answering the purpose of a mathematical diagram, which, though itself an individual, serves as a representative of a class. Slight hints also respecting the subordinate branches of any subject, and notices of the principles that will apply to them, etc., may often be substituted for digressive discussions, which, though laboriously compressed, would yet occupy a much greater space. Judicious divisions likewise and classifications save much tedious enumeration; and, as has been formerly remarked, a well-chosen epithet may often suggest, and therefore supply the place of, an entire argument.

It would not be possible, within a moderate compass, to lay down precise rules for the suggestive kind of writing I am speaking of; but if the slight hints here given are sufficient to convey an idea of the object to be aimed at, practice will enable a writer gradually to form the habit recommended. It may be worth while, however, to add, that those accustomed to rational conversation, will find in that a very useful exercise, with a view to this point, (as well as to almost every other connected with Rhetoric;) since, in conversation, a man naturally tries first one and then another mode of conveying his thoughts, and stops as soon as he perceives that his companion fully comprehends his sentiments, and is sufficiently impressed with them.

§ 10.

I have dwelt the more earnestly on the head of concise-
ness, because it is a quality in which young writers (who are
the most likely to seek for practical benefit in a treatise of
this kind) are usually most deficient; and because it is com-
monly said that, in them, exuberance is a promising sign;
without sufficient care being taken to qualify this remark, by
adding, that this over-luxuriance must be checked by judi-
cious pruning. If an early proneness to redundancy be an
indication of natural genius, those who possess this genius
should be the more sedulously on their guard against that
fault. And those who do not, should be admonished that the
want of a natural gift cannot be supplied by copying its
attendant defects.

The praises which have been bestowed on copiousness of
diction have probably tended to mislead authors
into a cumbrous verbosity. It should be re-
membered that there is no real copiousness in a
multitude of synonyms and circumlocutions. A house would
not be the better furnished for being stored with ten times as
many of some kinds of articles as were needed, while it was
perhaps destitute of those required for other purposes; nor
was Lucullus’s wardrobe, which, according to Horace, boasted
five thousand mantles, necessarily well stocked, if other
articles of dress were wanting. The completeness of a
library does not consist in the number of volumes, especially
if many of them are duplicates; but in its containing copies
of each of the most valuable works. And, in like manner,
true copiousness of language consists in having at command,
as far as possible, a suitable expression for each different
modification of thought. This, consequently, will often save
much circumlocution; so that the greater our command of
language, the more concisely we shall be enabled to write.

In an author who is attentive to these principles, diffuse-
ess may be accounted no dangerous fault of style, because
practice will gradually correct it; but it is otherwise with
one who pleases himself in stringing together well-sounding
words into an easy, flowing, and (falsely called) copious style,
destitute of nerve; and who is satisfied with a small portion
of matter; seeking to increase, as it were, the appearance of
his wealth by hammering out his metal thin. This is far from
a curable fault. When the style is fully formed in other
respects, pregnant fulness of meaning is seldom superadded;
but when there is a basis of energetic condensation of thought, the faults of harshness, baldness, or even obscurity, are much more likely to be remedied. Solid gold may be new-moulded and polished; but what can give solidity to gilding?

§ 11.

Lastly, the arrangement of words may be made highly conducive to energy. The importance of an attention to this point, with a view to perspicuity, has been already noticed; but of two sentences equally perspicuous, and consisting of the very same words, the one may be a feeble and languid, the other a striking and energetic expression, merely from the difference of arrangement.

Some, among the moderns, are accustomed to speak of the natural order of the words in a sentence, and to consider, each, the established arrangement of his own language as the nearest to such a natural order; regarding that which prevails in Latin and in Greek as a sort of deranged and irregular structure. We are apt to consider that as most natural and intrinsically proper, which is the most familiar to ourselves; but there seems no good ground for asserting that the customary structure of sentences in the ancient languages is less natural, or less suitable for the purposes for which language is employed, than in the modern. Supposing the established order in English or in French, for instance, to be more closely conformed to the grammatical or logical analysis of a sentence than that of Latin or Greek, because we place the subject first, the copula next, and the predicate last, etc., it does not follow that such an arrangement is necessarily the best fitted, in every case, to excite the attention, to direct it to the most essential points, to gratify the imagination, or to affect the feelings. It is, surely, the natural object of language to express as strongly as possible the speaker's sentiments, and to convey the same to the hearers; and that arrangement of words may fairly be accounted the most natural, by which all men are naturally led, as far as the rules of their respective languages allow them, to accomplish this object. The rules of many of the modern languages do indeed frequently con-
fine an author to an order which he would otherwise never have chosen; but what translator of any taste would ever voluntarily alter the arrangement of the words in such a sentence as, Μεγάλη ἡ Ἀρτέμις Ἑφέσιων, which our language allows us to render exactly, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" How feeble in comparison is the translation of Le Clerc, "La Diane des Ephésiens est une grande Déesse!" How imperfect that of Beausobre, "La grande Diane des Ephésiens!" How undignified that of Saci, "Vive la grande Diane des Ephésiens!"

Our language indeed is, though to a less degree, very much hampered by the same restrictions; it being in general necessary, for the expression of the sense, to adhere to an order which may not be in other respects the most eligible: "Cicero praised Cæsar," and "Cæsar praised Cicero," would be two very different propositions; the situation of the words being all that indicates (from our want of cases) which is to be taken as the nominative, and which as the accusative; but such a restriction is far from being an advantage. The transposition of words which the ancient languages admit of, conduces, not merely to a variety, but to energy, and even to precision.

If, for instance, a Roman had been directing the attention of his hearers to the circumstance that even Cæsar had been the object of Cicero's praise, he would, most likely, have put "Cæsarem" first; but he would have put "Cicero" first if he had been remarking that not only others, but even he had praised Cæsar.*

It is for want of this liberty of arrangement that we are often compelled to mark the emphatic words of our sentences, by the voice in speaking, and by italics in writing; which would, in Greek or in Latin, be plainly indicated, in most instances, by the collocation alone. The sentence which has been often brought forward as an example of the varieties of expression which may be given to the same words, "Will you ride to London to-morrow?" and which may be pronounced and understood in at least five different ways, according as the first, second,

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* See Logic, Book II., chap. iv., § 1.
etc., of the words is printed in italics, would be, by a Latin or Greek writer, arranged in as many different orders, to answer these several intentions. The advantage thus gained must be evident to any one who considers how important the object is which is thus accomplished, and for the sake of which we are often compelled to resort to such clumsy expedients: it is like the proper distribution of the lights in a picture; which is hardly of less consequence than the correct and lively representation of the objects.

The 4th book of Q. Curtius begins with a passage which affords a good instance of the energetic effect produced by a skilful use of the license of the Latin arrangement: "Darius tanti modo exercitus rex, qui triumphatis magis quam dimicantis more, currur sublimis inierat prædium, per loca quæ prope immensis agminibus compleverat, jam inania, et ingenti solitudine vasta, fugiebat." The effect of the concluding verb, placed where it is, is most striking.

It must be the aim then of an author, who would write with energy, to avail himself of all the liberty which our language does allow, so to arrange his words that there shall be the least possible occasion for underscoring and italics; and this, of course, must be more carefully attended to by the writer than by the speaker; who, may, by his mode of utterance, conceal, in great measure, a defect in this point. It may be worth observing, however, that some writers, having been taught that it is a fault of style to require many of the words to be in italics, fancy they avoid the fault by omitting those indications where they are really needed; which is no less absurd than to attempt remedying the intricacies of a road by removing the direction-posts.* The proper remedy is, to endeavor so to construct the style, that the collocation of the words may, as far as is possible, direct the attention to those which are emphatic.

And the general maxim that should chiefly guide us is, as Dr. Campbell observes, the homely saying, "Nearest the

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* The censure of frequent and long parentheses also leads some writers into the like preposterous expedient of leaving out the marks ( ) by which they are indicated, and substituting commas; instead of so framing each sentence that they shall not be needed. It is no cure to a lame man to take away his crutches.
Elements of Rhetoric. [Part III.

heart, nearest the mouth:" the idea which is the most forcibly impressed on the author’s mind will naturally claim the first utterance, as nearly as the rules of the language will permit. And it will be found that, in a majority of instances, the most emphatic word will be the predicate; contrary to the rule which the nature of our language compels us, in most instances, to observe. It will often happen, however, that we do place the predicate first, and obtain a great increase of energy by this arrangement. Of this license our translators of the Bible have, in many instances, very happily availed themselves; as, e. g., in the sentence lately cited, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" so also, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord;" it is evident how much this would be enfeebled by altering the arrangement into "He that cometh in the name of the Lord is blessed." And, again, "Silver and gold have I none; but what I have, that give I unto thee."* Another passage, in which they might advantageously have adhered to the order of the original, is, "'Επεσεν, επεσε Βαβυλων, ἣ µεγάλη,"† which would certainly have been rendered as correctly, and more forcibly, as well as more closely, "Fallen, fallen is Babylon, that great city," than, "Babylon is fallen, is fallen."

The word "IT" is frequently very serviceable in enabling us to alter the arrangement: thus, the sentence, "Cicero praised Caesar," which admits of at least two modifications of sense, may be altered so as to express either of them, by thus varying the order: "It was Cicero that praised Caesar," or, "It was Caesar that Cicero praised." "IT" is, in this mode of using it, the representative of the subject, which it thus enables us to place, if we will, after the predicate.

Of whatever gender or number the subject referred to may be, "IT" may, with equal propriety, be employed to represent that subject. Our translators of the Bible have not scrupled to make "IT" refer to a masculine noun: "It is I, be not afraid;" but they seem to have thought it not allowable, as perhaps it was not, at the time when they wrote, to make such a reference to a plural noun. "Search the Scriptures—

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* Acts iii. 6.  † Rev. xviii. 2.
they are they which testify of me:" we should now say, without any impropriety, "It is they," etc.

§ 12.

With respect to periods, it would be neither practically useful, nor even suitable to the present object, to enter into an examination of the different senses in which various authors have employed the word. A technical term may allowably be employed, in a scientific work, in any sense not very remote from common usage, (especially when common usage is not uniform and invariable in the meaning affixed to it,) provided it be clearly defined, and the definition strictly adhered to.

By a period, then, is to be understood, in this place, any sentence, whether simple or complex, which is so framed that the grammatical construction will not admit of a close before the end of it; in which, in short, the meaning remains suspended, as it were, till the whole is finished. A loose sentence, on the contrary, is any that is not a period; any whose construction will allow of a stop, so as to form a perfect sentence, at one or more places before we arrive at the end. E. g.: "We came to our journey's end—at last—with no small difficulty—after much fatigue—through deep roads—and bad weather." This is an instance of a very loose sentence; (for it is evident that this kind of structure admits of degrees;) there being no less than five places marked by dashes, at any one of which the sentence might have terminated, so as to be grammatically perfect. The same words may be formed into a period, thus: "At last, after much fatigue, through deep roads, and bad weather, we came, with no small difficulty, to our journey's end." Here no stop can be made at any part, so that the preceding words shall form a sentence before the final close. These are both of them simple sentences; i. e., not consisting of several clauses, but having only a single verb; so that it is plain we ought not, according to this view, to confine the name of period to complex sentences; as Dr. Campbell has done, notwithstanding his having adopted the same definition as has been here laid down.

Periods, or sentences nearly approaching to periods, have certainly, when other things are equal, the advantage in point
of energy. An unexpected continuation of a sentence which
the reader had supposed to be concluded, es-
pecially if, in reading aloud, he had, under that
supposition, dropped his voice, is apt to pro-
duce a sensation in the mind of being disagreeably balked:

Periods
conduce to
energy.

An analogous to the unpleasant jar which is felt when, in ascend-
ing or descending stairs, we meet with a step more than we
expected; and if this be often repeated, as in a very loose
sentence, a kind of weary impatience results from the uncer-
tainty when the sentence is to close. The objection, however,
to loose sentences, and consequent tendency towards the
periodic structure, must have been greater among the ancients
than the moderns; because the variety of arrangement which
the ancient languages permitted, and, in particular, the liberty
of reserving the verb, on which the whole sense depends, to
the end, made that structure natural and easy, in many in-
stances in which, in our language, it would appear forced,
unnatural, and affected.

But the agreeableness of a certain degree, at least, of
periodic structure, in all languages, is apparent
from this: that they all contain words which may
be said to have no other use or signification but
to suspend the sense, and lead the hearer of the
first part of the sentence to expect the remainder. He who
says, "The world is not eternal, nor the work of chance," expresses the same sense as if he said, "The world is neither eternal, nor the work of chance;" yet the latter would be generally preferred. So also, "The vines afforded both a refreshing shade and a delicious fruit;" the word "both" would be missed, though it adds nothing to the sense. Again, "While all the Pagan nations consider religion as one part of virtue, the Jews, on the contrary, regard virtue as a part of religion;"* the omission of the first word would not alter the sense, but would destroy the period; to produce which is its only use. The MEN, ΔΕ,† and TE of the Greek are, in
many places, subservient to this use alone.

The modern languages do not indeed admit, as was ob-

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* Josephus.
† These two particles seem to be formed from μένων, to "stop—
wait," and δέειν, to "bind—add on."
served above, of so periodic a style as the ancients do; but an author who does but clearly understand what a period is, and who applies the test I have laid down, will find it very easy, after a little practice, to compose in periods, even to a greater degree than, in an English writer, good taste will warrant. His skill and care will be chiefly called for in avoiding all appearance of stiffness and affectation in the construction of them; in not departing, for the sake of a period, too far from colloquial usage; and in observing such moderation in the employment of this style as shall prevent any betrayal of artifice—any thing savoring of elaborate state-
liness; which is always to be regarded as a worse fault than the slovenliness and languor which accompany a very loose style.

§ 13.

It should be observed, however, that as a sentence which is not strictly a period, according to the foregoing definition, may yet approach indefinitely near to it, so as to produce nearly the same effect; so, on the other hand, periods may be so constructed as to produce much of the same feeling of weariness and impatience which results from an excess of loose sentences. If the clauses be very long, and contain an enumeration of many circumstances, though the sentence be so framed that we are still kept in expectation of the conclusion, yet it will be an impatient expectation, and the reader will feel the same kind of uneasy uncertainty when the clause is to be finished, as would be felt respecting the sentence, if it were loose. And this will especially be the case, if the rule formerly given with a view to perspicuity be not observed,* of taking care that each part of the sentence be understood, as it proceeds. Each clause, if it consist of several parts, should be continued with the same attention to their mutual connection, so as to suspend the sense, as is employed in the whole sentence; that it may be, as it were, a periodic clause. And if one clause be long and another short, the shorter should, if possible, be put last.

* Part III., chap. i., § 3.
Universally indeed a sentence will often be, practically, too long, i. e., will have a tedious dragging effect, merely from its concluding with a much longer clause than it began with; so that a composition which most would censure as abounding too much in long sentences, may often have its defects, in great measure, remedied, without shortening any of them—merely by reversing the order of each. This of course holds good with respect to all complex sentences of any considerable length, whether periods or not. An instance of the difference of effect produced by this means may be seen in such a sentence as the following: "The State was made, under the pretence of serving it, in reality the prize of their contention, to each of those opposite parties, who professed in specious terms, the one a preference for moderate aristocracy, the other a desire of admitting the people at large to an equality of civil privileges." This may be regarded as a complete period; and yet, for the reason just mentioned, has a tedious and cumbrous effect. Many critics might recommend, and perhaps with reason, to break it into two or three; but it is to our present purpose to remark, that it might be, in some degree at least, decidedly improved by merely reversing the clauses; as thus: "The two opposite parties, who professed in specious terms, the one a preference for moderate aristocracy, the other a desire of admitting the people at large to an equality of civil privileges, made the State, which they pretended to serve, in reality the prize of their contentions."

Another instance may be cited from a work in which any occasional awkwardness of expression is the more conspicuous, on account of its general excellence—the Church Liturgy; the style of which is so justly admired for its remarkable union of energy, with simplicity, smoothness, and elegance: the following passage from the Exhortation is one of the very few which, from the fault just noticed, it is difficult for a good reader to deliver with spirit: "And although we ought at all times humbly to acknowledge our sins before God, || yet ought we most chiefly so to do, || when we assemble—and meet together—to render thanks for the great benefits that we have received at his hands—to set forth his most worthy

* Thucydides, on the Coreyrean sedition.
praise, to hear his most holy word, and to ask those things which are requisite and necessary—as well for the body as the soul.” This is evidently a very loose sentence, as it might be supposed to conclude at any one of the three places which are marked by dashes (—); this disadvantage, however, may easily be obviated by the suspension of voice, by which a good reader, acquainted with the passage, would indicate that the sentence was not concluded; but the great fault is the length of the last of the three principal clauses, in comparison of the former two—(the conclusions of which are marked ||;) by which a dragging and heavy effect is produced, and the sentence is made to appear longer than it really is. This would be more manifest to any one not familiar, as most are, with the passage; but a good reader of the Liturgy will find hardly any sentence in it so difficult to deliver to his own satisfaction. It is perhaps the more profitable to notice a blemish occurring in a composition so well known, and so deservedly valued for the excellence, not only of its sentiments, but of its language.

It is a useful admonition to young writers, with a view to what has lately been said, that they should always attempt to recast a sentence which does not please; altering the arrangement and entire construction of it, instead of merely seeking to change one word for another. This will give a great advantage in point of copiousness also; for there may be, suppose, a substantive, which, either because it does not fully express our meaning, or for some other reason, we wish to remove, but can find no other to supply its place; but the object may perhaps be easily accomplished by means of a *verb*, *adverb*, or some other part of speech, the substitution of which implies an alteration of the construction. It is an exercise accordingly which may be recommended as highly conducive to the improvement of style, to practice casting a sentence into a variety of different forms.

It is evident, from what has been said, that in compositions intended to be delivered, the periodic style is much less necessary, and therefore much less suitable, than in those designed for the closet. The *speaker* may, in most instances, by the skilful suspension of his voice, give to a loose sentence

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the effect of a period; and though in both species of composition the display of art is to be guarded against, a more unstudied air is looked for in such as are spoken.

The study of the best Greek and Latin writers may be of great advantage towards the improvement of the style in the point concerning which I have now been treating, (for the reason lately mentioned,) as well as in most others; and there is this additional advantage, (which, at first sight, might appear a disadvantage,) that the style of a foreign writer cannot be so closely imitated as that of one in our own language: for which reason there will be the less danger of falling into an obvious and servile imitation.*

§ 14.

Antithesis has been sometimes reckoned as one form of the period; but it is evident that, according to the view here taken, it has no necessary connection with it. One clause may be opposed to another, by means of some contrast between corresponding words in each, whether or not the clauses be so connected that the former could not, by itself, be a complete sentence. Tacitus, who is one of the most antithetical, is at the same time one of the least periodic, of all the Latin writers.

There can be no doubt that this figure is calculated to add greatly to energy. Every thing is rendered more striking by contrast; and almost every kind of subject-matter affords materials for contrasted expressions. Truth is opposed to error; wise conduct to foolish; different causes often produce opposite effects; different circumstances dictate to prudence opposite conduct; opposite impressions may be made by the same object, on different minds; and every extreme is opposed both to the mean, and to the other extreme. If, therefore, the language be so constructed as to contrast together these opposites, they throw light on each other by a kind of mutual reflection, and the view thus presented will be the more striking.

By this means also we may obtain, consistently with per-

* Bolingbroke may be noted as one of the most periodic of English writers; Swift and Addison (though in other respects very different from each other) are among the most loose.
spicuity, a much greater degree of conciseness; which in itself is so conducive to energy: e. g., "When reason is against a man, he will be against reason;"* it would be hardly possible to express this sentiment not antithetically, so as to be clearly intelligible, except in a much longer sentence. Again, "Words are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools;" here we have an instance of the combined effect of antithesis and metaphor in producing increased energy, both directly, and, at the same time, (by the conciseness resulting from them,) indirectly; and accordingly in such pointed and pithy expressions, we obtain the gratification which, as Aristotle remarks, results from "the act of learning quickly and easily." The antithetical expression, "Party is the madness of many, for the gain of a few," affords an instance of this construction in a sentence which does not contain two distinct clauses. So also, "A proverb is the wisdom of many, and the wit of one."

Frequently the same words, placed in different relations with each other, will stand in contrast to themselves; as in the expression, "A fool with judges; among fools, a judge," and in that given by Quinctilian, "Non ut edam vivo, sed ut vivam edo:" "I do not live to eat, but eat to live;" again, "Persecution is not wrong because it is cruel; but it is cruel because it is wrong;" and again, in the beautiful lines, from the Arabic, by Sir W. Jones:

On parent knees, a naked new-born child
Weeping thou sat'st, while all around thee smiled:
So live, that sinking on thy last long sleep,
Thou then may smile, while all around thee weep.

All of these are instances also of perfect antithesis, without period; for each of these sentences might, grammatically, be concluded in the middle. So also, "It is [indeed] a just maxim, that honesty is the best policy; but he who is governed by that maxim is not an honest man."§ This antithetical sentence is or is not a period, according as the word "indeed" is inserted or omitted. Of the same kind is an expression in a speech of Mr. Wyndham’s, "Some contend that I disap-

* Hobbes. † Cowper. ‡ Essays, 3d Series, Essay V., § 3.
§ Essay I., 2d Series.
prove of this plan, because it is not my own; it would be more correct to say, that it is not my own, because I disapprove it.”*

The use of antithesis has been censured by some, as if it were a paltry and affected decoration, unsuitable to a chaste, natural, and masculine style. Pope, accordingly, himself one of the most antithetical of our writers, speaks of it, in the *Dunciad*, with contempt:

I see a chief, who leads my chosen sons,
All armed with points, antitheses, and puns.

The excess, indeed, of this style, by betraying artifice, effectually destroys energy; and draws off the attention, even of those who are pleased with effeminate glitter, from the matter to the style. But, as Dr. Campbell observes, “the excess itself into which some writers have fallen is an evidence of its value—of the lustre and emphasis which antithesis is calculated to give to the expression. There is no risk of intemperance in using a liquor which has neither spirit nor flavor.”

It is, of course, impossible to lay down precise rules for determining what will amount to excess, in the use of this or of any other figure: the great safeguard will be the formation of a pure taste, by the study of the most chaste writers, and unsparing self-correction. But one rule always to be observed in respect to the antithetical construction, is to remember that in a true antithesis the opposition is always in the *ideas* expressed. Some writers abound with a kind of mock-antithesis, in which the same or nearly the same sentiment which is expressed by the first clause is repeated in a second; or, at least, in which there is but little of real contrast between the clauses which are expressed in a contrasted form. This kind of style not only produces disgust instead of pleasure, when once the artifice is detected, which it soon must be, but also, instead of the brevity and vigor resulting from true antithesis, labors under the fault of prolixity and heaviness. Sentences which might have been expressed as simple ones, are expanded into complex, by the addition of clauses, which add little or

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*Great pointedness and force is added to the argument from *contraries* (Part I. chap. ii., § 6) by the antithetical form of expression. See Note to Part IV., chap. iv., § 1.*
nothing to the sense; and which have been compared to the false handles and key-holes with which furniture is decorated, that serve no other purpose than to correspond to the real ones. Much of Dr. Johnson's writing is chargeable with this fault.

Bacon, in his Rhetoric,* furnishes, in his commonplace, (i. e., heads of arguments, pro and contra, on a variety of subjects,) some admirable specimens of compressed and striking antitheses; many of which are worthy of being enrolled among the most approved proverbs: e. g., "He who dreads new remedies, must abide old evils." "Some things alter for the worse spontaneously: if they be not altered for the better designedly, what end will there be of the evil?" "The humblest of the virtues the vulgar praise, the middle ones they admire, of the highest they have no perception:" etc.†

It will not unfrequently happen that an antithesis may be even more happily expressed by the sacrifice of the period, if the clauses are by this means made of a more convenient length, and a resting-place provided at the most suitable point: e. g., "The persecutions undergone by the apostles, furnished both a trial to their faith, and a confirmation to ours: a trial to them, because if human honors and rewards had attended them, they could not, even themselves, have been certain that these were not their object; and a confirmation to us, because they would not have encountered such sufferings in the cause of imposture." If this sentence were not broken as it is, but compacted into a period, it would have more heaviness of effect, though it would be rather shorter: e. g., "The persecutions undergone by the apostles, furnished both a trial of their faith, since if human honors, etc., etc., and also a confirmation of ours, because," etc. Universally, indeed, a complex sentence, whether antithetical or not, will often have a degree of spirit and liveliness from the latter clause being made to turn back, as it were, upon the former, by containing or referring to some word that had there been mentioned: e. g., "The introducers of the now-established principles of Political Economy may fairly be considered to have made a great discovery; a discovery the more creditable, from the circumstance that the facts on which it was founded had long been well known to

* De Augmentis, Lib. VI., c. 3.
† See Appendix [A] for some additional specimens.
all." This kind of style also may, as well as the antithetical, prove offensive if carried to such an excess as to produce an appearance of affectation or mannerism.

The English reader will find the substance of most of these "antitheta" in Bacon's Essays; though not arranged in the same manner; and, in some instances, considerably amplified.*

§ 15.

Lastly, to the speaker especially, the occasional employment of the interrogative form will often prove serviceable with a view to energy. It calls the hearer's attention more forcibly to some important point, by a personal appeal to each individual, either to assent to what is urged, or to frame a reasonable objection; and it often carries with it an air of triumphant defiance of an opponent to refute the argument if he can. Either the premiss† or the conclusion, or both, of any argument, may be stated in this form; but it is evident, that if it be introduced too frequently, it will necessarily fail of the object of directing a particular attention to the most important points. To attempt to make every thing emphatic, is to make nothing emphatic. The utility, however, of this figure, to the orator at least, is sufficiently established by the single consideration, that it abounds in the speeches of Demosthenes.

CHAPTER III.

OF ELEGANCE.

§ 1.

On the last quality of style to be noticed—elegance, or beauty—it is the less necessary to enlarge, both because the most appropriate and characteristic excellence of the class of compositions here treated of, is that energy of which I have

* See Appendix, [A.]
† The interrogative form is particularly suitable to the minor premiss of a dilemma, because that does not categorically assert, but leaves an opponent his choice of several alternatives. See Logic, Supp. to Part III., § 5.
been speaking; and also because many of the rules laid down under that head are equally applicable with a view to elegance. The same choice, number, and arrangement of words, will, for the most part, conduce both to energy and to beauty. The two qualities, however, are by no means indistinguishable: a metaphor, for instance, may be apt and striking, and consequently conducive to energy of expression, even though the new image, introduced by it, have no intrinsic beauty, or be even unpleasant; in which case it would be at variance with elegance, or at least would not conduce to it. Elegance requires that all homely and coarse words and phrases should be avoided, even at the expense of circumlocution; though they may be the most apt and forcible that language can supply. And elegance implies a smooth and easy flow of words in respect of the sound of the sentences; though a more harsh and abrupt mode of expression may often be, at least, equally energetic.

Accordingly, many are generally acknowledged to be forcible writers, to whom no one would give the credit of elegance; and many others, who are allowed to be elegant, are yet by no means reckoned among the vigorous and energetic.

§ 2.

When the two excellences of style are at variance, the general rule to be observed by the orator is to prefer the energetic to the elegant. Sometimes, indeed, a plain, or even a somewhat homely expression, may have even a more energetic effect, from that very circumstance, than one of more studied refinement; since it may convey the idea of the speaker's being thoroughly in earnest, and anxious to convey his sentiments, where he uses an expression that can have no other recommendation; whereas a strikingly elegant expression may sometimes convey a suspicion that it was introduced for the sake of its elegance; which will greatly diminish the force of what is said. The appearance of a too uniform elegance or stateliness of style is apt to cloy; like a piece of music without any discords.

Universally, a writer or speaker should endeavor to maintain the appearance of expressing himself, not as if he wanted to say something, but as if he had something to say: i.e., not as if he had a subject set him, and was anxious to compose the best
essay or declamation on it that he could; but as if he had some ideas to which he was anxious to give utterance: not as if he wanted to compose (for instance) a sermon, and was desirous of performing that task satisfactorily; but as if there was something in his mind which he was desirous of communicating to his hearers.

It is an admonition which probably will give offence to some, and excite the scorn of others, but which I cannot but think may sometimes prove useful to a young preacher, that he should ask himself, at the beginning and in the course of his composition, "For what purpose am I going to preach? Wherein would any one be a loser if I were to keep silence? Is it likely that any one will learn something he was ignorant of, or be reminded forcibly of something he had forgotten, or that something he was familiar with shall be set before him in a new and striking point of view, or that some difficulty will have been explained, or some confused ideas rendered clear; or, in short, that I shall at all have edified any one? Let it not be said that I preached because there was to be a sermon, and concluded when I had said enough to—occupy the requisite time;* careful only to avoid any thing that could excite censure, and content to leave the hearers just as I found them. Let me not be satisfied with the thousandth iteration of commonplaces, on the ground that it is all very true, and that it is the fault of the congregation if they do not believe and practice it; for all this is equally the case whether I preach or not; and if all I say is what they not only knew before, but had heard in the same trite and general statements a hundred times before, I might as well hold my peace. I ought not to be considering merely whether these arguments, motives, doctrines, etc., are themselves likely to produce an effect; but whether my urging them will be likely to make any difference as to the effect. Am I then about to preach merely because I want to say something, or because I have something to say?"

It is true, a man cannot expect constant success in his endeavors; but he is not very likely to succeed in any thing that is not even the object of his endeavors.

This speaking as if one had something to say, is probably what Bishop Butler means by the expression of a man's writ-

* See above, Part III., chap. i., § 5.
ing "with simplicity and in earnest." His manner has this advantage, though it is not only inelegant, but often obscure: Dr. Paley's is equally earnest, and very perspicuous; and though often homely, is more impressive than that of many of our most polished writers. It is easy to discern the prevalence of these two different manners in different authors, respectively, and to perceive the very different effects produced by them; it is not so easy for one who is not really writing "with simplicity and in earnest," to assume the appearance of it.* But certainly nothing is more adverse to this appearance than over-refinement. Any expression indeed that is vulgar, in bad taste, and unsuitable to the dignity of the subject or of the occasion, is to be avoided; since, though it might have, with some hearers, an energetic effect, this would be more than counterbalanced by the disgust produced in others; and where a small accession of energy is to be gained at the expense of a great sacrifice of elegance, the latter will demand a preference. But still, the general rule is not to be lost sight of by him who is in earnest aiming at the true ultimate end of the orator, to which all others are to be made subservient; viz., not the amusement of his hearers, nor their admiration of himself, but their conviction or persuasion.

It is from this view of the subject that I have dwelt most on that quality of style which seems most especially adapted to that object. Perspicuity is required in all compositions; and may even be considered as the ultimate end of a scientific writer, considered as such. He may indeed practically increase his utility by writing so as to excite curiosity, and recommend his subject to general attention; but in doing so, he is, in some degree, superadding the office of the orator to his own; as a philosopher, he may assume the existence in his reader of a desire for knowledge, and has only to convey that knowledge in language that may be clearly understood. Of the style of the orator, (in the wide sense in which I have been using this appellation, as including all who are aiming at conviction,) the appropriate object is to impress the meaning strongly upon men's minds. Of the poet, again, as

* This may be one reason why an author's notes are often more spirited and more interesting than the rest of his work.
such,* the ultimate end is to give pleasure; and accordingly
elegance or beauty (in the most extensive sense of those
terms) will be the appropriate qualities of his language.

§ 3.

Some indeed have contended, that to give pleasure is not.
the ultimate end of poetry;† not distinguishing
between the object which the poet may have in
view, as a man, and that which is the object of
poetry, as poetry. Many, no doubt, may have
proposed to themselves the far more important
object of producing moral improvement in their bearers
through the medium of poetry; and so have others, the in-
culcation of their own political or philosophical tenets; or
(as is supposed in the case of the Georgics) the encour-
agement of agriculture. But if the views of the individual are
to be taken into account, it should be considered that the
personal fame or emolument of the author is very frequently
his ultimate object. The true test is easily applied: that
which to competent judges affords the appropriate pleasure
of poetry, is good poetry, whether it answer any other purpose
or not; that which does not afford this pleasure, however in-
structive it may be, is not good poetry, though it may be a
valuable work.

It may be doubted, however, how far these remarks apply
to the question respecting beauty of style; since the chief
gratification afforded by poetry arises, it may be said, from
the beauty of the thoughts. And undoubtedly
if these be mean and commonplace, the poetry
will be worth little; but still, it is not any quality
of the thoughts that constitutes poetry. Notwith-
standing all that has been advanced by some French critics‡
to prove that a work not in metre may be a poem, (which
doctrine was partly derived from a misinterpretation of a
passage in Aristotle's "Poetics,"§) universal opinion has
always given a contrary decision. Any composition in verse

* See Bishop Copleston's "Lectures on Poetry."
† Supported in some degree by the authority of Horace:
"Aut prodesse volunt, aut delectare poetae."
‡ See Preface to "Télémaque."
§ Υιλοί λόγου has been erroneously interpreted language without
(and none that is not) is always called, whether good or bad, a poem, by all who have no favorite hypothesis to maintain. It is indeed a common figure of speech to say, in speaking of any work that is deficient in the qualities which poetry ought to exhibit, that it is not a poem; just as we say of one who wants the characteristic excellences of the species, or the sex, that he is not a man;* and thus some have been led to confound together the appropriate excellence of the thing in question, with its essence;† but the use of such an expression as an "indifferent" or a "dull poem," shows plainly that the title of poetry does not necessarily imply the requisite beauties of poetry.

Poetry is not distinguished from prose by superior beauty of thought or of expression, but is a distinct kind of composition;‡ and they produce, when each is excellent in its kind, distinct kinds of pleasure.

Try the experiment of merely breaking up the metrical structure of a fine poem, and you will find it inflated and bombastic prose;§ remove this defect by altering the words and the metre, in a passage where it certainly means metre without music; or, as he calls it in another part of the same work, φιλομετρία.

* "I dare do all that may become a man; Who dares do more is none."—Macbeth.

† It is perhaps hardly necessary to remark that I do not mean to employ the word "essential" in a sense which it sometimes bears, viz., important. The essential circumstance in "fresco-painting" is that the colors are laid on wet plaster; in an "oil-painting," that they shall have been mixed in oils; in an "etching," that aqua-fortis shall have been employed; etc. But no one would be understood to mean by this, that these circumstances are of more consequence (and in that sense more essential) than the display of the artist's genius. So, in the present case, the beauty of the thoughts is a more important, and, in that sense, a more essential circumstance, than metre.

‡ I wish it to be observed, that I am not defending or seeking to introduce any unusual or new sense of the word poetry; but, on the contrary, explaining and vindicating that which is the most customary among all men who have no particular theory to support. The mass of mankind often need, indeed, to have the meaning of a word (i.e., their own meaning) explained and developed; but not to have it determined what it shall mean, since that is determined by their use; the true sense of each word being, that which is understood by it.

§ Hence the impropriety of the practice, by no means uncommon, of learning a language from its poetry. It is like learning Botany in
arrangement, and it will be better prose than before; then arrange this again into metre, without any other change, and it will be tame and dull poetry; but still it will be poetry, as is indicated by the very censure it will incur; for if it were not, there would be no fault to be found with it; since, while it remained prose, it was (as we have supposed) unexceptionable. The circumstance that the same style which was even required in one kind of composition, proved offensive in the other, shows that a different kind of language is suitable for a composition in metre.

Another indication of the essential difference between the two kinds of composition, and of the superior importance of the expression in poetry, is, that a good translation of a poem (though, perhaps, strictly speaking, what is so called is rather an imitation*) is read by one well acquainted with the original, with equal or even superior pleasure to that which it affords to one ignorant of that original; whereas, the best translation of a prose work (at least of one not principally valued for beauty of style) will seldom be read by one familiar with the original. And for the same reason, a fine passage of poetry will be re-perused, with unabated pleasure, for the twentieth time, even by one who knows it by heart.†

According to the views here taken, good poetry might be defined, "Elegant and decorated language, in metre, expressing such and such thoughts;" and good prose composition, "Such and such thoughts expressed in good language:" that which is primary in each, being subordinate in the other.

§ 4.

What has been said may be illustrated as fully, not as it

*a flower-garden; which is filled with what are, to the botanist's eye, beautiful monsters—every variety of curious and ornamental deviation from the simple forms.

* And accordingly it should be observed, that, as all admit, none but a poet can be qualified to translate a poem.

† Hence it is that the want of complete perspicuity (such, i. e., as puts the reader instantly in possession of the whole sense) is a far less fault in poetry than in prose. For poetry, if it be worth reading at all, is worth reading over and over; which it will be, if it be sufficiently intelligible, on a first perusal, to excite vivid and pleasing emotions.
might be, but as is suitable to the present occasion, by the following passages from Dr. A. Smith's admirable fragment of an "Essay on the Imitative Arts:"

"Were I to attempt to discriminate between dancing and any other kind of movement, I should observe, that though in performing any ordinary action—in walking, for example, across the room—a person may manifest both grace and agility, yet if he betrays the least intention of showing either, he is sure of offending more or less, and we never fail to accuse him of some degree of vanity and affectation. In the performance of any such ordinary action, every one wishes to appear to be solely occupied about the proper purpose of the action; if he means to show either grace or agility, he is careful to conceal that meaning; and in proportion as he betrays it, which he almost always does, he offends. In dancing, on the contrary, every one professes and avows, as it were, the intention of displaying some degree either of grace or of agility, or of both. The display of one or other, or both of these qualities, is, in reality, the proper purpose of the action; and there can never be any disagreeable vanity or affectation in following out the proper purpose of any action. When we say of any particular person, that he gives himself many affected airs and graces in dancing, we mean either that he exhibits airs and graces unsuitable to the nature of the dance, or that he exaggerates those which are suitable. Every dance is, in reality, a succession of airs and graces of some kind or other, which, if I may say so, profess themselves to be such. The steps, gestures, and motions which, as it were, avow the intention of exhibiting a succession of such airs and graces, are the steps, gestures, and motions which are peculiar to dancing. . . . The distinction between the sounds or tones of singing, and those of speaking, seems to be of the same kind with that between the steps, etc., of dancing, and those of any other ordinary action. Though in speaking a person may show a very agreeable tone of voice, yet if he seems to intend to show it—if he appears to listen to the sound of his own voice, and as it were to tune it into a pleasing modulation—he never fails to offend, as guilty of a most disagreeable affectation. In speaking, as in every other ordinary action, we expect and require that the speaker should attend only to
the proper purpose of the action—the clear and distinct expression of what he has to say. In singing, on the contrary, every one professes the intention to please by the tone and cadence of his voice; and he not only appears to be guilty of no disagreeable affectation in doing so, but we expect and require that he should do so. To please by the choice and arrangement of agreeable sounds, is the proper purpose of all music, vocal as well as instrumental; and we always expect that every one should attend to the proper purpose of whatever action he is performing. A person may appear to sing, as well as to dance, affectedly; he may endeavor to please by sounds and tones which are unsuitable to the nature of the song, or he may dwell too much on those which are suitable to it. The disagreeable affectation appears to consist always, not in attempting to please by a proper, but by some improper modulation of the voice."

It is only necessary to add, (what seems evidently to have been in the author’s mind, though the dissertation is left unfinished,) that poetry has the same relation to prose, as dancing to walking, and singing to speaking; and that what has been said of them, will apply exactly, mutatis mutandis, to the other. It is needless to state this at length, as any one, by going over the passages just cited, merely substituting for "singing," "poetry"—for "speaking," "prose"—for "voice," "language," etc., will at once perceive the coincidence.*

What has been said will not be thought an unnecessary digression by any one who considers (not to mention the direct application of Dr. Smith’s remarks to elocution) the important principle thus established in respect of the decorations of style: viz., that though it is possible for a poetical style to be affectedly and offensively ornamented, yet the same degree and kind of decoration which is not only allowed, but required, in verse, would in prose be disgusting; and that the appearance of attention to the beauty of the expression, and to the arrangement of the words, which in verse is essential, is to be carefully avoided in prose.

* This probably was in Aristotle’s mind when he reckoned poetry among the imitative arts; viz., that it is imitative of prose composition, in the same manner as singing, of ordinary speaking; and dancing, of ordinary action.
And since, as Dr. Smith observes, "such a design, when it exists, is almost always betrayed," the safest rule is, never, during the act of composition, to study elegance, or think about it at all. Let an author study the best models—mark their beauties of style, and dwell upon them, that he may insensibly catch the habit of expressing himself with elegance; and when he has completed any composition, he may revise it, and cautiously alter any passage that is awkward and harsh, as well as those that are feeble and obscure; but let him never, while writing, think of any beauties of style, but content himself with such as may occur spontaneously. He should carefully study perspicuity as he goes along; he may also, though more cautiously, aim, in like manner, at energy; but if he is endeavoring after elegance, he will hardly fail to betray that endeavor; and in proportion as he does this, he will be so far from giving pleasure, to good judges, that he will offend more than by the rudest simplicity.
§ 1. On the importance of this branch, it is hardly necessary to offer any remark. Few need to be told that the effect of the most perfect composition may be entirely destroyed, even by a delivery which does not render it unintelligible; that one which is inferior both in matter and style, may produce, if better spoken, a more powerful effect than another which surpasses it in both these points; and that even such an elocution as does not spoil the effect of what is said, may yet fall far short of doing full justice to it. "What would you have said," observed Æschines, when his recital of his great rival's celebrated speech on the Crown was received with a burst of admiration—"what would you have said, had you heard him speak it?"

The subject is far from having failed to engage attention. Of the prevailing deficiency of this, more than of any other qualification of a perfect orator, many have complained; and several have labored to remove it; but it may safely be asserted, that their endeavors have been, at the very best, entirely unsuccessful. Probably not a single instance could be found of any one who has attained, by the study of any system of instruction that has hitherto appeared, a really good delivery; but there are many—probably nearly as many as
have fully tried the experiment—who have by this means been totally spoiled; who have fallen irrecoverably into an affected style of spouting, worse, in all respects, than their original mode of delivery. Many accordingly have, not unreasonably, conceived a disgust for the subject altogether; considering it hopeless that elocution should be taught by any rules; and acquiescing in the conclusion that it is to be regarded as entirely a gift of nature, or an accidental acquirement of practice.

It is to counteract the prejudice which may result from these feelings, that I have thought it needful to profess in the outset a dissent from the principles generally adopted, and to lay claim to some degree of originality in my own. Novelty affords at least an opening for hope; and the only opening, when former attempts have met with total failure.*

§ 2.

The requisites of elocution correspond in great measure with those of style: correct enunciation, in opposition both to indistinct utterance, and to vulgar and provincial pronunciation, may be considered as answering to purity, grammatical propriety, and absence of obsolete or otherwise unintelligible words. These qualities, of style and of elocution, being equally required in common conversation, do not fall within the proper province of Rhetoric. The three qualities, again, which have been treated of under the head of Style, viz., perspicuity, energy, and elegance, may be regarded as equally requisites of elocution; which, in order to be perfect, must convey the meaning clearly, forcibly, and agreeably.

§ 3.

Before, however, I enter upon any separate examination of these requisites, it will be necessary to premise a few remarks on the distinction between the two branches of delivery: viz., reading aloud, and speaking. The object of correct reading is to convey to the hearers, through the medium of the ear, what is conveyed to the reader by the eye; to put them in the same

* This is, in substance, one of Bacon’s aphorisms.
situation with him who has the book before him; to exhibit to them, in short, by the voice, not only each word, but also all the stops, paragraphs, italic characters, notes of interro-gation, etc.,* which his sight presents to him. His voice seems to indicate to them, "Thus and thus it is written in the book or manuscript before me."

**Impressive reading** superadds to this some degree of adaptation of the tones of voice to the character of the subject, and of the style.

What is often termed *fine* reading seems to convey, in addition to these, a kind of admonition to the hearers respecting the feelings which the composition ought to excite in them: it appears to say, "This deserves your admiration; this is sublime; this is pathetic," etc.

But speaking, i. e., *natural* speaking, when the speaker is uttering his own sentiments, and is thinking exclusively of them, has something in it distinct from all this: it conveys, by the sounds which reach the ear, the idea that what is said is the immediate effusion of the speaker's own mind, which he is desirous of imparting to others. A decisive proof of which is, that if any one overhears the voice of another, to whom he is an utter stranger—

* It may be said, indeed, that even tolerable reading aloud supplies more than is exhibited by a book to the eye; since though italics, e. g., indicate which word is to receive the emphasis, they do not point out the tone in which it is to be pronounced; which may be essential even to the right understanding of the sentence. E. g., in such a sentence as in Genesis i., "God said, Let there be light; and there was light;" here we can indicate indeed to the eye that the stress is to be upon "was;" but it may be pronounced in different tones; one of which would alter the sense, by implying that there was light already.

This is true indeed; and it is also true, that the very words themselves are not always presented to the eye with the same distinctions as are to be conveyed to the ear; as, e. g., "abuse," "refuse," "project," and many others, are pronounced differently, as nouns and as verbs. This ambiguity, however, in our written signs, as well as the other, relative to the emphatic words, are imperfections which will not mislead a moderately practiced reader. My meaning, in saying that such reading as I am speaking of puts the hearers in the same situation as if the book were before them, is to be understood on the supposition of their being able not only to read, but to read so as to take in the full sense of what is written.
suppose in the next room—without being able to catch the sense of what is said, he will hardly ever be for a moment at a loss to decide whether he is reading or speaking; and this, though the hearer may not be one who has ever paid any critical attention to the various modulations of the human voice. So wide is the difference of the tones employed on these two occasions, be the subject what it may.*

The difference of effect produced is proportionally great: the personal sympathy felt towards one who appears to be delivering his own sentiments, is such, that it usually rivets the attention, even involuntarily, though to a discourse which appears hardly worthy of it. It is not easy for an auditor to fall asleep while he is hearing even perhaps feeble reasoning, clothed in indifferent language, delivered extemporaneously, and in an unaffected style; whereas it is common for men to find a difficulty in keeping themselves awake while listening even to a good dissertation of the same length, or even shorter, on a subject not uninteresting to them, when read, though with propriety, and not in a languid manner. And the thoughts, even of those not disposed to be drowsy, are apt to wander, unless they use an effort from time to time to prevent it; while, on the other hand, it is notoriously difficult to withdraw our attention, even from a trifling talker of whom we are weary, and to occupy the mind with reflections of its own.

Of the two branches of elocution which have been just mentioned, it might at first sight appear as if one only, that

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* "At every sentence let them ask themselves this question: How should I utter this, were I speaking it as my own immediate sentiments?—I have often tried an experiment to show the great difference between these two modes of utterance, the natural and the artificial; which was, that when I found a person of vivacity delivering his sentiments with energy, and of course with all that variety of tones which nature furnishes, I have taken occasion to put something into his hand to read, as relative to the topic of conversation; and it was surprising to see what an immediate change there was in his delivery, from the moment he began to read. A different pitch of voice took the place of his natural one, and a tedious uniformity of cadence succeeded to a spirited variety; insomuch that a blind man could hardly conceive the person who read to be the same who had just been speaking."—Sheridan, Art of Reading.
of the speaker, came under the province of Rhetoric. But it will be evident, on consideration, that both must be, to a certain extent, regarded as connected with our present subject; not merely because many of the same principles are applicable to both, but because any one who delivers (as is so commonly the case) a written composition of his own, may be reckoned as belonging to either class; as a reader who is the author of what he reads, or as a speaker who supplies the deficiency of his memory by writing. And again, in the (less common) cases where a speaker is delivering without book, and from memory alone, a written composition, either his own or another's, though this cannot in strictness be called reading, yet the tone of it will be very likely to resemble that of reading. In the other case—that where the author is actually reading his own composition—he will be still more likely, notwithstanding its being his own, to approach, in the delivery of it, to the elocution of a reader; and, on the other hand, it is possible for him, even without actually deceiving the hearers into the belief that he is speaking extempore, to approach indefinitely near to that style.

The difficulty, however, of doing this, to one who has the writing actually before him, is considerable; and it is of course far greater when the composition is not his own. And as it is evident from what has been said that this (as it may be called) extemporaneous style of elocution is—in any case where it is not improper—much the more impressive, it becomes an interesting inquiry, how the difficulty in question may be best surmounted.

§ 4.

Little, if any, attention has been bestowed on this point by the writers on elocution; the distinction above pointed out between reading and speaking having seldom or never been precisely stated and dwelt on. Several, however, have written elaborately on "good reading," or on elocution generally; and it is not to be denied, that some ingenious and (in themselves) valuable remarks have been thrown out relative to such qualities in elocution as might be classed under the three heads I have laid down, of perspicuity, energy, and eloquence; but there is
one principle running through all their precepts, which being, according to my views, radically erroneous, must (if those views be correct) vitiate every system founded on it. The principle I mean is, that in order to acquire the best style of delivery, it is requisite to fix the attention on the voice; to study analytically the emphases, tones, pauses, degrees of loudness, etc., which give the proper effect to each passage that is well delivered; to frame rules founded on the observation of these; and then, in practice, deliberately and carefully to conform the utterance to these rules, so as to form a complete artificial system of elocution.

That such a plan not only directs us into a circuitous and difficult path, towards an object which may be reached by a shorter and straighter, but also, in most instances, completely fails of that very object, and even produces, oftener than not, effects the very reverse of what is designed, is a doctrine for which it will be necessary to offer some reasons; especially as it is undeniable that the system here reprobated, as employed in the case of elocution, is precisely that recommended and taught in this very treatise, in respect of the conduct of arguments. By analyzing the best compositions, and observing what kinds of arguments, and what modes of arranging them, in each case, prove most successful, general rules have been framed, which an author is recommended studiously to observe in composition; and this is precisely the procedure which, in elocution, I deplore.

The reason for making such a difference in these two cases is this: Whoever (as Dr. A. Smith remarks in the passage lately cited*) appears to be attending to his own utterance, which will almost inevitably be the case with every one who is doing so, is sure to give offence, and to be censured for an affected delivery; because every one is expected to attend exclusively to the proper object of the action he is engaged in; which, in this case, is the expression of the thoughts—not the sound of the expressions. Whoever therefore learns, and endeavors to apply in practice, any artificial rules of elocution, so as deliberately to modulate his voice conformably to the principles he has adopted, (however just they may be

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* See Part III., chap. iii., § 4.
in themselves,) will hardly ever fail to betray his intention; which always gives offence when perceived. Arguments, on the contrary, must be deliberately framed. Whether any one's course of reasoning be sound and judicious, or not, it is necessary, and it is expected, that it should be the result of thought. No one, as Dr. Smith observes, is charged with affectation for giving his attention to the proper object of the action he is engaged in. As therefore the proper object of the orator is to adduce convincing arguments, and topics of persuasion, there is nothing offensive in his appearing deliberately to aim at this object. He may indeed weaken the force of what is urged by too great an appearance of elaborate composition, or by exciting suspicion of rhetorical trick; but he is so far from being expected to pay no attention to the sense of what he says, that the most powerful argument would lose much of its force, if it were supposed to have been thrown out casually and at random. Here therefore the employment of a regular system (if founded on just principles) can produce no such ill effects as in the case of elocution; since the habitual attention which that implies, to the choice and arrangement of arguments, is such as must take place, at any rate; whether it be conducted on any settled principles or not. The only difference is, that he who proceeds on a correct system, will think and deliberate concerning the course of his reasoning, to better purpose, than he who does not: he will do well and easily what the other does ill and with more labor. Both alike must bestow their attention on the matter of what they say, if they would produce any effect; both are not only allowed, but expected to do so.

The two opposite modes of proceeding, therefore, which are recommended in respect of these two points, (the argument and the delivery,) are, in fact, both the result of the same circumstance; viz., that the speaker is expected to bestow his whole attention on the proper business of his speech; which is, not the elocution, but the matter.*

* Style occupies in some respects an intermediate place between these two; in what degree each quality of it should or should not be made an object of attention at the time of composing, and how far the appearance of such attention is tolerated, has been already treated of in the preceding Part.
§ 5.

When, however, I protest against all artificial systems of elocution, and all direct attention to delivery, at the time, it must not be supposed that a general inattention to that point is recommended; or that the most perfect elocution is to be attained by never thinking at all on the subject; though it may safely be affirmed that even this negative plan would succeed far better than a studied modulation. But it is evident that if any one wishes to assume the speaker as far as possible, i.e., to deliver a written composition with some degree of the manner and effect of one that is extemporaneous, he will have a considerable difficulty to surmount; since though this may be called, in a certain sense, the natural manner, it is far from being what he will naturally, i.e., spontaneously, fall into. It is by no means natural for any one to read as if he were not reading, but speaking. And again, even when any one is reading what he does not wish to deliver as his own composition, as, for instance, a portion of the Scriptures, or the Liturgy, it is evident that this may be done better or worse, in infinite degrees; and that though (according to the views here taken) a studied attention to the sounds uttered, at the time of uttering them, leads to an affected and offensive delivery, yet, on the other hand, an utterly careless reader cannot be a good one.

CHAPTER II.

ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL METHODS COMPARED.

§ 1.

With a view to perspicuity then—the first requisite in all delivery, viz., that quality which makes the meaning fully understood by the hearers—the great point is, that the reader (to confine our attention for the present to that branch) should appear to understand what he reads. If the composition be, in itself, intelligible to the
persons addressed, he will make them fully understand it, by so delivering it. But to this end, it is not enough that he should himself actually understand it; it is possible, notwithstanding, to read it as if he did not. And in like manner with a view to the quality, which has been here called energy, it is not sufficient that he should himself feel and be impressed with the force of what he utters; he may, notwithstanding, deliver it as if he were unimpressed.

§ 2.

The remedy that has been commonly proposed for these defects, is to point out in such a work, for instance, as the Liturgy, which words ought to be marked as emphatic—in what places the voice is to be suspended, raised, lowered, etc. One of the best writers on the subject, Sheridan, in his "Lectures on the Art of Reading,"* (whose remarks on many points coincide with the principles here laid down, though he differs from me on the main question—as to the system to be practically followed with a view to the proposed object,) adopted a peculiar set of marks for denoting the different pauses, emphases, etc., and applied these, with accompanying explanatory observations, to the greater part of the Liturgy, and to an essay subjoined;† recommending that the habit should be formed of regulating the voice by his marks; and that afterwards readers should "write out such parts as they want to deliver properly, without any of the usual stops; and, after having considered them well, mark the pauses and emphases by the new signs which have been annexed to them, according to the best of their judgment," etc.

To the adoption of any such artificial scheme there are three weighty objections: first, that the proposed system must necessarily be imperfect; secondly, that if it were perfect, it would be a circuitous path to the object in view; and

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* See note, ch. i., § 3. It is to be observed, however, that most of the objections I have adduced do not apply to this or that system in particular; to Sheridan's, for instance, as distinguished from Walker's; but to all such systems generally; as may be seen from what is said in the present section.

† See Appendix, [N.]
thirdly, that even if both these objections were removed, the object would not be effectually obtained.

First, such a system must necessarily be imperfect; because though the emphatic word in each sentence may easily be pointed out in writing, no variety of marks that could be invented—not even musical notation*—would suffice to indicate the different tones† in which the different emphatic words should be pronounced; though on this depends frequently the whole force and even sense of the expression. Take, as an instance, the words of Macbeth in the witches' cave, when he is addressed by one of the spirits which they raise, "Macbeth! Macbeth! Macbeth!" on which he exclaims, "Had I three ears, I'd hear thee;" no one would dispute that the stress is to be laid on the word "three," and thus much might be indicated to the reader's eye; but if he had nothing else to trust to, he might chance to deliver the passage in such a manner as to be utterly absurd; for it is possible to pronounce the emphatic word "three" in such a tone as to indicate that "since he has but two ears, he cannot hear." Again, the following passage, (Mark iv. 21,) "Is a candle brought to be put under a bushel, or under a bed," I have heard so pronounced as to imply that there is no other alternative; and yet the emphasis was laid on the right words. It would be moreover a task almost equally hopeless to attempt adequately to convey, by any written marks, precise directions as to the rate—the degree of rapidity or slowness—with which each sentence and clause should be delivered. Longer and shorter pauses may indeed be easily denoted; and marks may be used, similar to those in music, to indicate, generally, quick, slow, or moderate time; but it is evident that the variations which actually take place are indefinite—far beyond what any marks could suggest; and that much of the force of what is said depends on the degree of rapidity with which it is uttered; chiefly on the relative rapidity of one part in comparison of another. For instance, in such a sentence as the following, in one of the Psalms, which one may

* And even in music, the notation, though so much more complete than any that could be adapted to speaking, yet leaves much to be supplied by the intelligence, taste, and feeling of the performer.
† See first note, ch. i., § 3.
usually hear read at one uniform rate: "All men that see it
shall say, This hath God done; for they shall perceive that
it is his work;" the four words, "this hath God done,"
though monosyllables, ought to occupy very little less time in
utterance than all the rest of the verse together.

2dly. But were it even possible to bring to the highest
perfection the proposed system of marks, it would
still be a circuitous road to the desired end. Sup-
pose it could be completely indicated to the eye,
in what tone each word and sentence should be
pronounced according to the several occasions, the learner
might ask, "But why should this tone suit the awful—this
the pathetic—this the narrative style? why is this mode of
delivery adopted for a command—this for an exhortation—
this for a supplication?" etc. The only answer that could
be given is, that these tones, emphases, etc., are a part of the
language; that nature, or custom, which is a second nature,
suggests spontaneously these different modes of giving ex-
pression to the different thoughts, feelings, and designs which
are present to the mind of any one who, without study, is
speaking in earnest his own sentiments. Then, if this be
the case, why not leave nature to do her own work? Impress
but the mind fully with the sentiments, etc., to be uttered;
withdraw the attention from the sound, and fix it on the
sense; and nature, or habit, will spontaneously suggest the
proper delivery. That this will be the case, is not only true,
but is the very supposition on which the artificial system pro-
ceeds; for it professes to teach the mode of delivery naturally
adapted to each occasion. It is surely, therefore, a circuit-
ous path that is proposed, when the learner is directed, first
to consider how each passage ought to be read; i.e., what
mode of delivering each part of it would spontaneously occur
to him, if he were attending exclusively to the matter of it;
(and this is what, it appears to me, should alone be studied,
and most attentively studied;) then, to observe all the modu-
lations, etc., of voice, which take place in such a delivery;
then, to note these down, by establishing marks, in writing;
and, lastly, to pronounce according to these marks. This
seems like recommending, for the purpose of raising the
hand to the mouth, that he should first observe, when per-
forming that action without thought of any thing else, what
muscles are contracted—in what degrees—and in what order; then, that he should note down these observations; and lastly, that he should, in conformity with these notes, contract each muscle in due degree and in proper order; to the end that he may be enabled, after all, to—lift his hand to his mouth; which by supposition he had already done. Such instruction is like that bestowed by Molière's pedantic tutor upon his Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who was taught, to his infinite surprise and delight, what configurations of the mouth he employed in pronouncing the several letters of the alphabet, which he had been accustomed to utter all his life, without knowing how.*

3. Lastly, waiving both the above objections, if a person could learn thus to read and speak, as it were, by note, with the same fluency and accuracy as are attainable in the case of singing, still the desired object of a perfectly natural as well as correct elocution would never be in this way attained. The reader's attention being fixed on his own voice, (which in singing, and there only, is allowed and expected,) the inevitable consequence would be that he would betray more or less his studied and artificial delivery; and would, in the same degree, manifest an offensive affectation.

It should be observed, however, that, in the reading of the Liturgy especially, so many gross faults are become quite familiar to many, from what they are accustomed to hear, if not from their own practice, as to render it peculiarly difficult to unlearn or even detect them; and as an aid towards the exposure of such faults, there may be great advantage in studying Sheridan's observations and directions respecting the delivery of it; provided care be taken, in practice, to keep clear of his faulty principle, by withdrawing the attention from the sound of the voice, as carefully as he recommends it to be directed to that point.

§ 3.

The practical rule then to be adopted, in conformity with

* "Qu'est-ce que vous faîtes quand vous prononcez O? Mais, je dis, O!"—an answer which, if not savoring of philosophical analysis, gave at least a good practical solution of the problem.
the principles here maintained, is, not only to pay no studied
attention to the voice, but studiously to with-
draw the thoughts from it, and to dwell as in-
tently as possible on the sense, trusting to nature
to suggest spontaneously the proper emphases and tones.

Many persons are so far impressed with the truth of the
document here inculcated, as to acknowledge that "it is a great
fault for a reader to be too much occupied with thoughts re-
specting his own voice;" and thus they think to steer a mid-
course between opposite extremes. But it should be re-
membered that this middle course entirely nullifies the whole
advantage proposed by the plan recommended. A reader is
sure to pay too much attention to his voice, not only if he
pays any at all, but if he does not strenuously labor to with-
draw his attention from it altogether.

He who not only understands fully what he is reading, but
is earnestly occupying his mind with the matter of it, will be
likely to read as if he understood it, and thus to make others
understand it;* and in like manner, with a view to the im-
pressiveness of the delivery, he who not only feels it, but is
exclusively absorbed with that feeling, will be likely to read
as if he felt it, and to communicate the impression to his
hearers. But this cannot be the case if he is occupied with
the thought of what their opinion will be of his reading,
and how his voice ought to be regulated; if, in short, he is
thinking of himself, and, of course, in the same degree, ab-
stracting his attention from that which ought to occupy it
exclusively.

It is not, indeed, desirable, that in reading the Bible, for

* Who, for instance, that was really thinking of a resurrection
from the dead, would ever tell any one that our Lord "rose again
from the dead," (which is so common a mode of reading the Creed,)
as if He had done so more than once?

It is to be observed, however, that it is not enough for a reader to
have his mind fixed on the subject; without regard to the occasion,
etc. It is possible to read a prayer well, with the tone and manner
of a man who is not praying, i.e., addressing the Deity, but address-
ing the audience, and reciting a form of words for their instruction;
and such is generally the case with those who are commended as
"fine readers" of the Liturgy. Extemporaneous prayers, again,
are generally delivered, with spirit indeed, but (after the first few
sentences) not as prayers, but as exhortations to the congregation.
example, or any thing which is not intended to appear as his own composition, he should deliver what are, avowedly, another's sentiments, in the same style as if they were such as arose in his own mind; but it is desirable that he should deliver them as if he were reporting another's sentiments, which were both fully understood and felt in all their force by the reporter; and the only way to do this effectually—with such modulations of voice, etc., as are suitable to each word and passage—is to fix his mind earnestly on the meaning, and leave nature and habit to suggest the utterance.

§ 4.

Some may, perhaps, suppose that this amounts to the same thing as taking no pains at all; and if, with this impression, they attempt to try the experiment of a natural delivery, their ill-success will probably lead them to censure the proposed method, for the failure resulting from their own mistake. In truth, it is by no means a very easy task to fix the attention on the meaning, in the manner and to the degree now proposed. The thoughts of one who is reading anything very familiar to him are apt to wander to other subjects, though perhaps such as are connected with that which is before him. If, again, it be something new to him, he is apt (not indeed to wander to another subject, but) to get the start, as it were, of his readers, and to be thinking, while uttering each sentence, not of that, but of the sentence which comes next. And in both cases, if he is careful to avoid those faults, and is desirous of reading well, it is a matter of no small difficulty, and calls for a constant effort, to prevent the mind from wandering in another direction; viz., into thoughts respecting his own voice—respecting the effect produced by each sound—the approbation he hopes for from the hearers, etc. And this is the prevailing fault of those who are commonly said to take great pains in their reading; pains which will always be taken in vain with a view to the true object to be aimed at, as long as the effort is thus applied in a wrong direction. With a view, indeed, to a very different object, the approbation bestowed on the reading, this artificial delivery will often be more successful than the natural. Pompous spouting, and many other descriptions of unnatural tone and measured
cadence, are frequently admired by many as excellent reading; which admiration is itself a proof that it is not deserved; for when the delivery is really good, the hearers (except any one who may deliberately set himself to observe and criticize) never think about it, but are exclusively occupied with the sense it conveys, and the feelings it excites.

Still more to increase the difficulty of the method here recommended, (for it is no less wise than honest to take a fair view of difficulties,) this circumstance is to be noticed, that he who is endeavoring to bring it into practice, is in a great degree precluded from the advantage of imitation. A person who hears and approves a good reader in the natural manner, may, indeed, so far imitate him with advantage, as to adopt his plan, of fixing his attention on the matter, and not thinking about his voice; but this very plan, evidently, by its nature, precludes any further imitation; for if, while reading, he is thinking of copying the manner of his model, he will, for that very reason, be unlike that model; the main principle of the proposed method being, carefully to exclude every such thought. Whereas, any artificial system may as easily be learned by imitation as the notes of a song.

Practice also (i. e., private practice for the sake of learning) is much more difficult in the proposed method; because, the rule being to use such a delivery as is suited, not only to the matter of what is said, but also, of course, to the place and occasion, and this, not by any studied modulations, but according to the spontaneous suggestions of the matter, place, and occasion, to one whose mind is fully and exclusively occupied with these, it follows, that he who would practice this method in private, must, by a strong effort of a vivid imagination, figure to himself a place and an occasion which are not present; otherwise, he will either be thinking of his delivery, (which is fatal to his proposed object,) or else will use a delivery suited to the situation in which he actually is, and not to that for which he would prepare himself. Any system, on the contrary, of studied emphasis and regulation of the voice, may be learned in private practice, as easily as singing.
§ 5.

It has been thought best, as has been above said, to state fairly the difficulties of a regular training in really good elocution; not, of course, with a view to discourage exertion for an object so important, but as a reason for laboring the more sedulously to overcome those difficulties. In fact, nothing tends more to discourage assiduous study in this department, than the ill-effect produced by the faulty methods commonly in use. For when it is found—as it too often will be—that those who have taken most pains in the study, acquit themselves even worse than those who have wholly neglected it, the natural result will be, that, instead of inquiring whether a better plan might not be adopted, men will be apt to sit down contented with the ordinary slovenly style of delivery, supposing that whatever superiority any one may manifest is altogether a gift of nature.

Accordingly, little or no care is usually taken, either in schools or in private families, to teach young persons to read well. What is called the "English master" in most seminaries, is usually a person of very humble qualifications; and, for the most part, either contents himself with making his pupils "mind their stops," or else teaches them an affected spout. And the consequence is, that, of men otherwise well educated, a considerable number are found to have acquired an offensively artificial delivery, and a far greater number a habit of reading as if they neither felt nor even understood what they read.

And even men of good sense and good taste often acquire, through undesigned and unconscious imitation, an absurd style of reading those passages which they have been from infancy accustomed to hear ill-read by others. To the member of our Church, accordingly, the difficulty of reading the Liturgy with spirit, or even with propriety, is greatly enhanced by the long-established and inveterate faults to which almost every one's ears are become familiar; so that such a delivery as would shock any one of even moderate taste, in any other composition, he will, in this, be likely to tolerate, and to practice. Some, e. g., in the Litany, read, "Have mercy upon us, mis-
erable sinners;" and others, "Have mercy upon us, miserable sinners;" both laying the stress on a wrong word, and mak- ing the pause in the wrong place, so as to disconnect "us" and "miserable sinners;" which the context requires us to combine. Every one, in expressing his own natural senti- ments, would say, "Have mercy upon us miserable sinners."

Many are apt even to commit so gross an error as to lay the chief stress on the words which denote the most impor- tant things; without any consideration of the emphatic word of each sentence; e. g., in the Absolution, many read, "Let us beseech Him to grant us true repentance;" because, for- sooth, "true repentance" is an important thing; not consider- ing that, as it has been just mentioned, it is not the new idea, and that to which the attention should be directed by the emphasis; the sense being, that since God pardoneth all that have true repentance, therefore we should "beseech Him to grant it to us."

In addition to the other difficulties of reading the Liturgy well, it should be mentioned, that prayer, thanksgiving, and the like, even when avowedly not of our own composition, should be delivered as (what in truth they ought to be) the genuine sentiments of our own minds at the moment of utter- ance; which is not the case with the Scriptures, or with any thing else that is read, not professing to be the speaker’s own composition.

But the department of education I am speaking of, instead of being intrusted to such persons as usually conduct it, is one which calls for the assiduous attention of some one well qualified in point of good taste and sound judgment. Let young persons be accustomed much to reading aloud to a parent or other teacher thus qualified, and who shall be ready to point out and correct any faults they may commit; and let this be done in strict conformity with the principles above laid down. Let the instructor, accordingly, remem- ber that the pupil’s attention is then, and then only, to be called to the sounds uttered, when the fault is one which he would wish corrected (and which indeed he should be ready to correct) in the utterance of ordinary conversation. E. g., many young persons have habits—and such as not seldom grow up with them—either of an indistinct pronunciation, which
makes the vowels audible, while the consonants are slurred,* or of dropping the voice toward the close of each sentence so as to be nearly inaudible, or of rising into a scream, or of too rapid and hurried an utterance, or of some provincial vulgarity, etc. All such faults should, as has been said, be corrected not in reading only, but in ordinary speaking.

But on the other hand, all those faults of delivery which, though common in reading, do not occur in ordinary speaking, constitute a distinct class, and must be carefully indeed corrected, but in a totally different manner. For hardly any one in ordinary conversation speaks as if he did not understand, or did not really mean, what he is saying. In reference therefore to correct reading, (in respect of the sense,) and impressive reading—such as shall convey the true import and full force of what is said—the appeal must be made to the learner's own mind; and his attention should be drawn from the sound, to the sense of what he is reading. And the instructor should give admonitions, when needed, not, as in the other case, by saying, "You have pronounced that word wrong; pronounce it so and so;" or "You read too quick," etc.; but "Read that passage as if you understood it: read this suitably to a command, that to an interrogation, etc.: express the scorn, the exultation, the earnestness, etc., of that passage, as if you were expressing such a feeling of your own in your own words," etc.

That such an exercise as this, under a judicious guide, will have most beneficial results, I am convinced from experience. And if the study of Elocution, thus conducted, were made, as it manifestly ought to be, an indispensable part of a liberal education, I have no doubt that good reading would be no longer the exception, but the rule. For though the method I have been recommending will not, as I have said, so readily and so easily accomplish its object as the opposite method does its own object, on the other hand this latter is in reality no benefit at all, but a great evil; while, on the other plan, the student is at least put on the right course, and will be in the way of indefinitely improving himself in after-life.

It is almost superfluous to remark, how utterly at variance

* A useful maxim as to this point is, to "take care of the consonants, and the vowels will take care of themselves."
with all that I have been here recommending is the practice of setting children to learn by heart and recite, before they are able to understand, poems, chapters of the Bible, collects, etc., to which they attach little or no meaning, while they repeat the words by rote. A habit of reading in an artificial tone, offensive to those of good taste, and tending to impair the force of what is so read, is one natural result—though far from the worst*—of such a practice. If any who have been thus brought up are found, in after-life, to have a good elocution—and, I may add, to have their intellectual and moral powers unimpaired—this must be, not in consequence of such a training, but in spite of it.

CHAPTER III.

CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN READING AND SPEAKING.

§ 1.

Some additional objections to the method I have recommended, and some further remarks on the counterbalancing advantages of it, will be introduced presently, when I shall have first offered some observations on speaking, and on that branch of reading which the most nearly approaches to it.

When any one delivers a written composition, of which he is, or is supposed to profess himself, the author, he has peculiar difficulties to encounter, if his object be to approach as nearly as possible to the extemporaneous style. It is indeed impossible to produce the full effect of that style, while the audience are aware that the words he utters are before him; but he may approach indefinitely near to such an effect; and in proportion as he succeeds in this object, the impression produced will be the greater.

It has been already remarked, how easy it is for the hearers

* See Appendix, [0.]
to keep up their attention—indeed, how difficult for them to withdraw it—when they are addressed by one who is really speaking to them in a natural and earnest manner; though perhaps the discourse may be encumbered with a good deal of the repetition, awkwardness of expression, and other faults, incident to extemporaneous language; and though it be prolonged for an hour or two, and yet contain no more matter than a good writer could have clearly expressed in a discourse of half an hour; which last, if read to them, would not, without some effort on their part, have so fully detained their attention. The advantage in point of style, arrangement, etc., of written over extemporaneous discourses, (such at least as any but the most accomplished orators can produce,) is sufficiently evident;* and it is evident also that other advantages, such as have been just alluded to, belong to the latter. Which is to be preferred on each occasion, and by each orator, it does not belong to the present discussion to inquire; but it is evidently of the highest importance to combine, as far as possible, in each case, the advantages of both.

A perfect familiarity with the rules laid down in the First Part of this treatise, would be likely, it is hoped, to give the extemporaneous orator that habit of quickly methodizing his thoughts on a given subject, which is essential (at least where no very long premeditation is allowed) to give to a speech something of the weight of argument, and clearness of arrangement, which characterize good writing.† In order to

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* Practice in public speaking generally—practice in speaking on the particular subject in hand—and (on each occasion) premeditation of the matter, and arrangement, are all circumstances of great consequence to a speaker.

Nothing but a miraculous gift can supersede these advantages. The apostles, accordingly, were forbidden to use any premeditation, being assured that it "should be given them, in that same hour, what they should say;" and, when they found, in effect, this promise fulfilled to them, they had experience, within themselves, of a sensible miracle.

† Accordingly, it may be remarked, that, (contrary to what might at first sight be supposed,) though the preceding Parts, as well as the present, are intended for general application, yet it is to the extemporary speaker that the rules laid down in the former Part (supposing them correct) will be the most peculiarly useful; while the suggestions offered in this last, respecting Elocution, are more especially designed for the use of the reader.
attain the corresponding advantage—to impart to the delivery of a written discourse something of the vivacity and interesting effect of real, earnest speaking—the plan to be pursued, conformably with the principles I have been maintaining, is, for the reader to draw off his mind as much as possible from the thought that he is reading, as well as from all thought respecting his own utterance; to fix his mind as earnestly as possible on the matter, and to strive to adopt as his own, and as his own at the moment of utterance, every sentiment he delivers; and to say it to the audience, in the manner which the occasion and subject spontaneously suggest to him who has abstracted his mind both from all considerations of himself, and from the consideration that he is reading.

§ 2.

The advantage of this natural manner—i.e., the manner which one naturally falls into who is really speaking in earnest, and with a mind exclusively intent on what he has to say—may be estimated from this consideration: that there are few (as was remarked in the preceding chapter) who do not speak so as to give effect to what they are saying. Some, indeed, do this much better than others. Some have, as I observed above, in ordinary conversation, an indistinct or incorrect pronunciation, an embarrassed and hesitating utterance, or a bad choice of words; but hardly any one fails to deliver (when speaking earnestly) what he does say, so as to convey the sense and the force of it, much more completely than even a good reader would, if those same words were written down and read. The latter might, indeed, be more approved; but that is not the present question; which is, concerning the impression made on the hearers' minds. It is not the polish of the blade that is to be considered, or the grace with which it is brandished, but the keenness of the edge, and the weight of the stroke.

There is, indeed, as I have said, a wide difference between different men, in respect of the degrees of impressiveness with which, in earnest conversation, they deliver their sentiments; but it may safely be laid down, that he who delivers a written composition with the same degree of spirit and energy
with which he would naturally speak on the same subject, has attained, not indeed, necessarily, absolute perfection, but the utmost excellence attainable by him. Any attempt to outdo his own natural manner, will inevitably lead to something worse than failure.

On the contrary, it can hardly be denied that the elocution of most readers, even when delivering their own compositions, (suppose in the pulpit,) is such as to convey the notion, at the very best, not that the preacher is expressing his own real sentiments, but that he is making known to his audience what is written in the book before him; and, whether the composition is professedly the reader's own or not, the usual mode of delivery, though grave and decent, is so remote from the energetic style of real natural speech, as to furnish, if one may so speak, a kind of running comment on all that is uttered, which says, "I do not mean, think, or feel, all this; I only mean to recite it with propriety and decorum;" and what is usually called fine reading, only superadds to this (as has been above remarked) a kind of admonition to the hearers, that they ought to believe, to feel, and to admire, what is read.

§ 3.

It is easy to anticipate an objection which many will urge against what they will call a colloquial style of delivery; viz., that it is undignified, and unsuitable to the solemnity of a serious, and especially of a religious discourse. The objection is founded on a mistake. Those who urge it derive all their notions of a natural delivery from two, irrelevant, instances: that of ordinary conversation, the usual objects of which, and consequently its usual tone, are comparatively light; and that of the coarse and extravagant rant of vulgar fanatical preachers. But to conclude that the objections against either of these styles would apply to the natural delivery of a man of sense and taste, speaking earnestly, on a serious subject and on a solemn occasion, or that he would naturally adopt, and is here advised to adopt, such a style as those objected to, is no less absurd than if any one, being recommended to walk in a natural and unstudied manner, rather than in a dancing step, (to employ Dr. A. Smith's illustration,) or a formal march,
should infer that the natural gait of a clown following the plough, or of a child in its gambols, were proposed as models to be imitated in walking across a room. Should any one, on being told that both tragic acting and comic acting ought to be a natural representation of man, interpret this to mean that tragedy ought to be performed exactly like comedy, he would be thought very absurd, if he were supposed to be speaking seriously. It is evident, that what is natural in one case, or for one person, may be, in a different one, very unnatural. It would not be by any means natural to an educated and sober-minded man to speak like an illiterate enthusiast; or to discourse on the most important matters in the tone of familiar conversation respecting the trifling occurrences of the day. Any one who does but notice the style in which a man of ability, and of good choice of words, and utterance, delivers his sentiments in private, when he is, for instance, earnestly and seriously admonishing a friend, defending the truths of religion, or speaking on any other grave subject on which he is intent, may easily observe how different his tone is from that of light and familiar conversation — how far from deficient in the dignified seriousness which befits the case. Even a stranger to the language might guess that he was not engaged on any frivolous topic. And yet, when an opportunity occurs of observing how he delivers a written discourse, of his own composition, on perhaps the very same or a similar subject, will it not often be perceived how comparatively stiff, languid, and unimpressive is the effect?

It may be said, indeed, that a sermon should not be delivered before a congregation assembled in a place of worship, in the same style as one would employ in conversing across a table, with equal seriousness on the same subject. This is undoubtedly true; and it is evident that it has been implied in what has here been said; the natural manner having been described as accommodated, not only to the subject, but to the place, occasion, and all other circumstances; so that he who should preach exactly as if he were speaking in private, though with the utmost earnestness, on the same subject, would, so far, be departing from the genuine natural manner. But it may be safely asserted, that even this would be far the
less fault of the two. He who appears unmindful, indeed, of the place and occasion, but deeply impressed with the subject, and utterly forgetful of himself, would produce a much, stronger effect than one who, going into the opposite extreme, is, indeed, mindful of the place and the occasion, but not fully occupied with the subject, (though he may strive to appear so;) being partly engaged in thoughts respecting his own voice. The latter would, indeed, be the less likely to incur censure; but the other would produce the deeper impression.

The object, however, to be aimed at, (and it is not unattainable,) is to avoid both faults: to keep the mind impressed both with the matter spoken, and with all the circumstances also of each case; so that the voice may spontaneously accommodate itself to all; carefully avoiding all studied modulations, and, in short, all thoughts of self; which, in proportion as they intrude, will not fail to diminish the effect.

§ 4.

It must be admitted, indeed, that the different kinds of natural delivery of any one individual on different subjects and occasions, various as they are, do yet bear a much greater resemblance to each other, than any of them does to the artificial style usually employed in reading; a proof of which is, that a person familiarly acquainted with the speaker, will seldom fail to recognize his voice, amidst all the variations of it, when he is speaking naturally and earnestly; though it will often happen that, if he have never before heard him read, he will be at a loss, when he happens accidentally to hear without seeing him, to know who it is that is reading; so widely does the artificial cadence and intonation differ in many points from the natural. And a consequence of this is, that the natural manner, however perfect, however exactly accommodated to the subject, place, and occasion, will, even when these are the most solemn, in some degree remind the hearers of the tone of conversation. Amidst all the differences that will exist, this one point of resemblance—that of the delivery being unforced and unstudied—will be likely, in some degree, to strike them. Those who are good judges will
perceive at once, and the rest, after being a little accustomed to the natural manner, that there is not necessarily any thing irreverent or indecorous in it; but that, on the contrary, it conveys the idea of the speaker’s being deeply impressed with that which is his proper business. But, for a time, many will be disposed to find fault with such a kind of elocution; and, in particular, to complain of its indicating a want of respect for the audience. Yet even while this disadvantage continues, a preacher of this kind may be assured that the doctrine he delivers is much more forcibly impressed, even on those who censure his style of delivering it, than it could be in the other way.

A discourse delivered in this style has been known to elicit the remark, from one of the lower orders, who had never been accustomed to any thing of the kind, that “it was an excellent sermon, and it was a great pity it had not been preached” a censure which ought to have been very satisfactory to the preacher. Had he employed a pompous spout, or modulated whine, it is probable such an auditor would have admired his preaching, but would have known and thought little or nothing about the matter of what was taught.

Which of the two objects ought to be preferred by a Christian minister on Christian principles, is a question, not indeed hard to decide, but foreign to the present discussion. It is important, however, to remark, that an orator is bound, as such, not merely on moral, but (if such an expression may be used) on rhetorical principles, to be mainly, and indeed exclusively, intent on carrying his point; not on gaining approbation, or even avoiding censure, except with a view to that point. He should, as it were, adopt as a motto the reply of Themistocles to the Spartan commander, Eurybiades, who lifted his staff to chastise the earnestness with which his own opinion was controverted: “Strike, but hear me.”

I would not, indeed, undertake to maintain (like Quintilian) that no one can be an orator who is not a virtuous man; but there certainly is a kind of moral excellence implied in that renunciation of all effort after display, in that forgetfulness of self, which is absolutely necessary, both in the manner of writing, and in the delivery, to give the full force to what is said.
§ 5.

Besides the inconvenience just mentioned—the censure which the proposed style of elocution will be liable to, from perhaps the majority of hearers, till they shall have become somewhat accustomed to it—this circumstance also ought to be mentioned, as what many, perhaps, would reckon (or at least feel) to be one of the disadvantages of it: that, after all, even when no disapprobation is incurred, no praise will be bestowed, (except by observant critics,) on a truly natural delivery; on the contrary, the more perfect it is, the more will it withdraw, from itself, to the arguments and sentiments delivered, the attention of all but those who are studiously directing their view to the mode of utterance, with a design to criticize or to learn. The credit, on the contrary, of having a very fine elocution, is to be obtained at the expense of a very moderate share of pains; though at the expense, also, inevitably, of much of the force of what is said.

§ 6.

One inconvenience, which will at first be experienced by a person who, after having been long accustomed to the artificial delivery, begins to adopt the natural, is, that he will be likely suddenly to feel an embarrassed, bashful, and, as it is frequently called, nervous sensation, to which he had before been comparatively a stranger. He will find himself in a new situation—standing before his audience in a different character—stripped, as it were, of the sheltering veil of a conventional and artificial delivery; in short, delivering to them his thoughts, as one man speaking to other men; not, as before, merely reading in public. And he will feel that he attracts a much greater share of their attention, not only by the novelty of a manner to which most congregations are little accustomed, but also (even supposing them to have been accustomed to extemporary discourses) from their perceiving themselves to be personally addressed, and feeling that he is not merely reciting something before them, but saying it to them. The speaker and the hearers will thus be brought
into a new and closer relation to each other; and the increased interest thus excited in the audience, will cause the speaker to feel himself in a different situation—in one which is a greater trial of his confidence, and which renders it more difficult than before to withdraw his attention from himself. It is hardly necessary to observe that this very change of feelings experienced by the speaker ought to convince him the more, if the causes of it (to which I have just alluded) be attentively considered, how much greater impression this manner is likely to produce. As he will be likely to feel much of the bashfulness which a really extemporary speaker has to struggle against, so he may produce much of a similar effect.*

After all, however, the effect will never be completely the same. A composition delivered from writing, and one actually extemporaneous, will always produce feelings, both in the hearer and the speaker, considerably different; even on the supposition of their being word for word the same, and delivered so exactly in the same tone, that by the ear alone no difference could be detected: still the audience will be differently affected, according to their knowledge that the words uttered are, or are not, written down and before the speaker's eyes. And the consciousness of this will produce a corresponding effect on the mind of the speaker. For were this not so, any one who, on any subject, can speak (as many can) fluently and correctly in private conversation, would find no greater difficulty in saying the same things

* The question between preaching extempore and from a written discourse, it does not properly fall within the province of this treatise to discuss on any but what might be called rhetorical principles. It may be worth while, however, to remark, incidentally, that one who possesses the power of preparing and arranging his matter, and retaining it in his memory, and expressing it fluently in well-chosen language, extempore—in short, who is qualified to produce the best effects of this kind of preaching—should remember, as a set-off against its advantages, that he may be holding out an example and encouragement to others who are not thus qualified. He may perhaps find himself cited as approving of extemporary preaching, and appealed to as an authority, and imitated by those who perhaps resemble him only in fluency, and who, by not merely speaking extempore, but also thinking extempore, leave some of their readers disgusted, and the rest unedified.
before a large congregation, than in reading to them a written discourse.

§ 7.

And here it may be worth while briefly to inquire into the causes of that remarkable phenomenon, as it may justly be accounted, that a person who is able with facility to express his sentiments in private to a friend, in such language and in such a manner as would be perfectly suitable to a certain audience, yet finds it extremely difficult to address to that audience the very same words, in the same manner; and is, in many instances, either completely struck dumb, or greatly embarrassed, when he attempts it. Most persons are so familiar with the fact, as hardly to have ever considered that it requires explanation, but attentive consideration shows it to be a very curious as well as important one; and of which no explanation, as far as I know, has been attempted. It cannot be from any superior deference which the speaker thinks it right to feel for the judgment of the hearers; for it will often happen that the single friend, to whom he is able to speak fluently, shall be one whose good opinion he more values, and whose wisdom he is more disposed to look up to, than that of all the others together. The speaker may even feel that he himself has a decided and acknowledged superiority over every one of the audience; and that he should not be the least abashed in addressing any two or three of them, separately; yet still all of them, collectively, will often inspire him with a kind of dread.

Closely allied in its causes with the phenomenon I am considering, is that other curious fact, that the very same sentiments expressed in the same manner, will often have a far more powerful effect on a large audience, than they would have on any one or two of these very persons, separately. That is in a great degree true of all men which was said of the Athenians, that they were like sheep, of which a flock is more easily driven than a single one.

Another remarkable circumstance, connected with the foregoing, is the difference in respect of the style which is
suitable, respectively, in addressing a multitude, and two or three even of the same persons. A much bolder, as well as less accurate, kind of language is both allowable and advisable, in speaking to a considerable number; as Aristotle has remarked,* in speaking of the graphic and agonistic styles—the former suited to the closet, the latter to public speaking before a large assembly. And he ingeniously compares them to the different styles of painting: the greater the crowd, he says, the more distant is the view; so that in scene-painting, for instance, coarser and bolder touches are required, and the nice finish, which would delight a close spectator, would be lost. He does not, however, account for the phenomena in question.

§ 8.

The solution of them will be found by attention to a very curious and complex play of sympathies which takes place in a large assembly, and (within certain limits) the more, in proportion to its numbers. First, it is to be observed that we are disposed to sympathize with any emotion which we believe to exist in the mind of any one present; and hence, if we are at the same time otherwise disposed to feel that emotion, such disposition is in consequence heightened. In the next place, we not only ourselves feel this tendency, but we are sensible that others do the same; and thus, we sympathize not only with the other emotions of the rest, but also with their sympathy towards us. Any emotion accordingly which we feel, is still further heightened by the knowledge that there are others present who not only feel the same, but feel it the more strongly in consequence of their sympathy with ourselves. Lastly, we are sensible that those around us sympathize not only with ourselves, but with each other also; and as we enter into this heightened feeling of theirs likewise, the stimulus to our own minds is thereby still further increased.

The case of the ludicrous affords the most obvious illustration of these principles, from the circumstance that the

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* "Rhetoric," Book III.
effects produced are so open and palpable. If any thing of this nature occurs, you are disposed, by the character of the thing itself, to laugh; but much more, if any one else is known to be present whom you think likely to be diverted with it; even though that other should not know of your presence; but much more still if he does know it, because you are then aware that sympathy with your emotion heightens his; and most of all will the disposition to laugh be increased, if many are present; because each is then aware that they all sympathize with each other, as well as with himself. It is hardly necessary to mention the exact correspondence of the fact with the above explanation. So important, in this case, is the operation of the causes here noticed, that hardly any one ever laughs when he is quite alone; or if he does, he will find, on consideration, that it is from a conception of the presence of some companion whom he thinks likely to have been amused, had he been present, and to whom he thinks of describing, or repeating, what had diverted himself. Indeed, in other cases, as well as the one just instanced, almost every one is aware of the infectious nature of any emotion excited in a large assembly. It may be compared to the increase of sound by a number of echoes, or of light by a number of mirrors; or to the blaze of a heap of firebrands, each of which would speedily have gone out if kindled separately, but which, when thrown together, help to kindle each other.

The application of what has been said to the case before us is sufficiently obvious. In addressing a large assembly, you know that each of them sympathizes both with your own anxiety to acquit yourself well, and also with the same feeling in the minds of the rest. You know also, that every slip you may be guilty of, that may tend to excite ridicule, pity, disgust, etc., makes the stronger impression on each of the hearers, from their mutual sympathy, and their consciousness of it. This augments your anxiety. Next, you know that each hearer, putting himself mentally in the speaker's place,* sympathizes with this augmented anxiety; which is

* Hence it is that shy persons are, as is matter of common remark, the more distressed by this infirmity when in company with those who are subject to the same.
by this thought increased still further. And if you become at all embarrassed, the knowledge that there are so many to sympathize, not only with that embarrassment, but also with each other's feelings on the perception of it, heightens your confusion to the utmost.*

The same causes will account for a skilful orator's being able to rouse so much more easily, and more powerfully, the passions of a multitude: they inflame each other by mutual sympathy, and mutual consciousness of it. And hence it is that a bolder kind of language is suitable to such an audience: a passage which, in the closet, might, just at the first glance, tend to excite awe, compassion, indignation, or any other such emotion, but which would on a moment's cool reflection appear extravagant, may be very suitable for the agonistic style; because, before that moment's reflection could take place in each hearer's mind, he would be aware that every one around him sympathized in that first emotion, which would thus become so much heightened as to preclude, in a great degree, the ingress of any counteracting sentiment.

If one could suppose such a case as that of a speaker (himself aware of the circumstance) addressing a multitude, each of whom believed himself to be the sole hearer, it is probable that little or no embarrassment would be felt, and a much more sober, calm, and finished style of language would be adopted.

And here it may be observed, incidentally, that a person of superior ability will often, through the operation of this reflex sympathy, operate powerfully on his own mind, in heightening some passion, or fortifying some prejudice of his own. He will act on others, who in turn will react on him.

* It may be remarked, by way of corollary from what has been here said, how injudicious is the method commonly employed by those who wish to cure a young person of bashfulness. They tell him incessantly of the unfavorable impression it creates, the ridicule to which it exposes him, etc., and exhort him to try to make a better appearance, etc., all of which is pouring oil on the fire which we are seeking to quench. If they could induce him (pursuing just the opposite course) to think less of the appearance he makes, and not to be occupied with the idea of what others are thinking of him, they would be administering the specific remedy for the disease.
I have already remarked (Part II., chap. i., § 2) on the danger, to a person of great ingenuity, of being himself, unless carefully on his guard, misled by it; since though it requires greater skill to mislead him than an ordinary man, he himself possesses that superior skill. It is no feeble blow that will destroy a giant; but if a giant resolve to kill himself, it is a giant that deals the blow. And then, the man of preëminent ability has, in the supposed case, his judgment blinded by the very passion which calls forth all his argumentative skill. But in addition to this, such a man is qualified strongly to influence (whether in a public speech or in private conversation) those whose abilities are inferior to his own; and they again, by adopting and sympathizing with his passion or prejudice, heighten it in himself. He will, naturally, be disposed to overrate their judgment when it coincides with his own; and thence, to find himself confirmed in what he thinks and feels, by listening to what is, in fact, the echo of his own voice; and thus, what is in reality self-reliance, presents itself in the specious garb of modest deference for the opinion of others.

This accordingly is a danger which any man of superior talents should sedulously guard against in his intercourse with persons—the members, for instance, of his own family—who are his inferiors in ability.

§ 9.

The impossibility of bringing the delivery of a written composition completely to a level with real extemporary speaking, (though, as has been said, it may approach indefinitely near to such an effect,) is explained on the same principle. Besides that the audience are more sure that the thoughts they hear expressed are the genuine emanation of the speaker's mind at the moment,* their attention and interest are the more excited by their sympathy with one whom

* It is not meant by this that an extemporary speaker necessarily compoes (in respect of his matter) extempore, or that he professes to do so; but only that if he frames each sentence at the moment, he must, at that moment, have the sentiment which is expressed in it strongly present to his mind.
they perceive to be carried forward solely by his own unaided and unremitted efforts, without having any book to refer to; they view him as a swimmer supported by his own constant exertions; and in every such case, if the feat be well accomplished, the surmounting of the difficulty affords great gratification; especially to those who are conscious that they could not do the same. And one proof that part of the pleasure conveyed does arise from this source is, that as the spectators of an exhibition of supposed unusual skill in swimming would instantly withdraw most of their interest and admiration if they perceived that the performer was supported by corks or the like, so would the feelings alter of the hearers of a supposed extemporaneous discourse, as soon as they should perceive, or even suspect, that the orator had it written down before him.

§ 10.

The way in which the respective inconveniences of both kinds of discourses may best be avoided, is evident from what has been already said. Let both the extemporary speaker, and the reader of his own compositions, study to avoid, as far as possible, all thoughts of self; earnestly fixing the mind on the matter of what is delivered; and the one will feel the less of that embarrassment which arises from the thought of what opinion the hearers will form of him; while the other will appear to be speaking, because he actually will be speaking, the sentiments, not indeed which at that time first arise in his own mind, but which are then really present to and occupy his mind.
CHAPTER IV.

PRACTICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM THE FOREGOING VIEWS.

§ 1.

One of the consequences of the adoption of the mode of elocution here recommended is, that he who endeavors to employ it will find a growing reluctance to the delivery, as his own, of any but his own compositions. Conclusions, indeed, and arguments he may freely borrow; but he will be led to compose his own discourses, from finding that he cannot deliver those of another to his own satisfaction, without laboriously studying them, as an actor does his part, so as to make them, in some measure, his own: And with this view, he will generally find it advisable to introduce many alterations in the expression, not with any thought of improving the style, absolutely, but only with a view to his own delivery. And, indeed, even his own previous compositions he will be led to alter almost as much, in point of expression, in order to accommodate them to the natural manner of delivery. Much that would please in the closet, much of the graphic style described by Aristotle, will be laid aside for the agonistic—for a style somewhat more blunt and homely—more simple, and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic. And if, again, he is desirous of fitting his discourses for the press, he will find it expedient to reverse this process, and alter the style afresh. In many instances, accordingly, the perusal of a manuscript sermon would afford, from the observation of its style, a tolerably good ground of conjecture as to the author's customary elocution. For instance, a rapid elocution suits the more full, and a slow one the more concise style; and great variations in the degree of rapidity of delivery are suited to the corresponding variations in the style.

A mere sermon-reader, on the contrary, will avoid this inconvenience and this labor; he will be able to deliver another's discourses nearly as well as his own; and may send
his own to the press without the necessity of any great preparation; but he will purchase these advantages at the expense of more than half the force which might have been given to the sentiments uttered. And he will have no right to complain that his discourses, though replete perhaps with good sense, learning, and eloquence, are received with languid apathy, or that many are seduced from their attendance on this teaching, by the empty rant of an illiterate fanatic. Much of these evils must indeed be expected, after all, to remain; but he does not give himself a fair chance for diminishing them, unless he does justice to his own arguments, instructions, and exhortations, by speaking them, in the only effectual way, to the hearts of his hearers; that is, as uttered naturally from his own.

I have seen somewhere an anecdote of some celebrated actor being asked by a divine, "How is it that people listen with so much emotion to what you say, which they know to be all fictitious, besides that it would be no concern of theirs, even if true; while they hear with comparative apathy, from us, truths the most sublime, and the most important to them?" The answer was, "Because we deliver fiction like truth, and you deliver truth like fiction."

The principles here laid down may help to explain a remarkable fact which is usually attributed to other than the true causes. The powerful effects often produced by some fanatical preachers, not superior in pious and sincere zeal, and inferior in learning, in good sense, and in taste, to men who are listened to with comparative apathy, are frequently considered as a proof of superior eloquence; though an eloquence tarnished by barbarism and extravagant mannerism. Now may not such effects result, not from any superior powers in the preacher, but merely from the intrinsic beauty and sublimity and the measureless importance of the subject? But why, then, it may be replied, does not the other preacher, whose subject is the very same, produce the same effect? The answer is, because he is but half-attended to. The ordinary measured cadence of reading is not only in itself dull, but is what men are familiarly accustomed to: religion itself also is a subject so familiar, in a certain sense, (familiar, that is, to the ear,) as to be trite, even to those who know and think little about
it. Let but the attention be thoroughly roused, and intently fixed on such a stupendous subject, and that subject itself will produce the most overpowering emotion. And not only unaffected earnestness of manner, but, perhaps, even still more, any uncouth oddity, and even ridiculous extravagance, will, by the stimulus of novelty, have the effect of thus rousing the hearers from their ordinary lethargy. So that a preacher of little or no real eloquence will sometimes, on such a subject, produce the effects of the greatest eloquence, by merely forcing the hearers (often even by the excessively glaring faults of his style and delivery) to attend to a subject which no one can really attend to unmoved.

It will not of course be supposed that my intention is to recommend the adoption of extravagant rant. The good effects which it undoubtedly does sometimes produce, incidentally, on some, are more than counterbalanced by the mischiefvous consequences to others.

§ 2.

One important practical maxim resulting from the views here taken, is the decided condemnation of all recitation of speeches by schoolboys; a practice so much approved and recommended by many, with a view to preparing youths for public speaking in after-life. It is to be condemned, however, (supposing the foregoing principle correct,) not as useless merely, but absolutely pernicious, with a view to that object. The justness, indeed, of this opinion will, doubtless, be disputed; but its consistency with the plan I have been recommending is almost too obvious to be insisted on. In any one who should think a natural delivery desirable, it would be an obvious absurdity to think of attaining it by practicing that which is the most completely artificial. If there is, as is evident, much difficulty to be surmounted, even by one who is delivering, on a serious occasion, his own composition, before he can completely succeed in abstracting his mind from all thoughts of his own voice, of the judgment of the audience on his performance, etc., and in fixing it on the matter, occasion, and place—on every circumstance which ought to give the character to his elocution—how much must this difficulty be
enhanced, when neither the sentiments he is to utter, nor the character he is to assume, are his own, or even supposed to be so, or anywise connected with him; when neither the place, the occasion, nor the audience, which are actually present, have any thing to do with the substance of what is said! It is therefore almost inevitable that he will studiously form to himself an artificial manner;* which (especially if he succeed in it) will probably cling to him through life, even when he is delivering his own compositions on real occasions. The very best that can be expected is, that he should become an accomplished actor—possessing the plastic power of putting himself, in imagination, so completely into the situation of him whom he personates, and of adopting for the moment, so perfectly, all the sentiments and views of that character, as to express himself exactly as such a person would have done, in the supposed situation. Few are likely to attain such perfection; but he who shall have succeeded in accomplishing this, will have taken a most circuitous route to his proposed object, if that object be, not to qualify himself for the stage, but to be able impressively to deliver in public, on real and important occasions, his own sentiments. He will have been carefully learning to assume what, when the real occasion occurs, need not be assumed, but only expressed. Nothing surely can be more preposterous than laboring to acquire the art of pretending to be what he is not, and to feel what he does not, in order that he may be enabled, on a real emergency, to pretend to be and to feel just what the occasion requires and suggests: in short, to personate himself.

The Barmecide, in the Arabian Nights, who amused himself by setting down his guest to an imaginary feast, and trying his skill in imitating, at an empty table, the actions of eating and drinking, did not propose this as an advisable mode of instructing him how to perform those actions in reality.

* Some have used the expression of "a conscious manner" to denote that which results (either in conversation—in the ordinary actions of life—or in public speaking) from the anxious attention which some persons feel to the opinion the company may form of them; a consciousness of being watched and scrutinized in every word and gesture, together with an extreme anxiety for approbation, and dread of censure.
Let all studied recitation, therefore—every kind of speaking which from its nature must necessarily be artificial—be carefully avoided, by one whose object is to attain the only truly impressive, the natural delivery.

It should be observed, that the censure here pronounced on school-recitations, and all exercises of the like nature, relates, exclusively, to the effect produced on the style of elocution. With any other objects that may be proposed, the present work has, obviously, no concern. Nor can it be doubted that a familiarity with the purest forms of the Latin and Greek languages may be greatly promoted by committing to memory, and studying, not only to understand, but to recite with propriety, the best orations and plays in those languages. The familiar knowledge, too, and temporary adoption of the characters and sentiments, can hardly fail to produce a powerful effect on the moral character. If the spectators of a play which strongly interests them are in any degree disposed (as the poet expresses it) to "live o'er each scene, and be what they behold," much more may this be expected in the actor, who studies to give the fullest effect to his performance, by fancying himself, as far as possible, the person he represents.*

* If there are any, as I must hope there are not a few, who would deprecate such a result from the acting of Terence's plays by schoolboys, and who yet patronize the practice, I cannot but express my unfeigned wonder at their doing so. Can they doubt that some effect is likely to be produced upon a young and uninformed mind, forwarder in passions than in reasoning, by—not reading merely, not learning by heart merely—but studying as an actor, and striving to deliver with effect, the part of an accomplished debauche? And this, too, such a character as Terence's poetical justice never fails to crown with success and applause. The foulest obscenity, such as would create disgust in any delicate mind, would probably be less likely to corrupt the principles, than the more gentleman-like profligacy, which is not merely represented, but recommended in Terence; and which approaches but too nearly to what the youth may find exemplified in some persons among the higher classes in this country.

Will it be answered that because the same boys are taught to say their catechism—are sent to chapel—and are given to understand that they are not to take Pamphilus as a model, a sufficient safeguard is thus provided against the effects of an assiduous effort to gain applause by a lively and spirited representation of such a character? I can only reply, in the words of Thucydides, "We give you the joy.
But let no one seek to attain a natural, simple, and forcible *elocution* by a practice which, the more he applies to it, will carry him still the farther from the object he aims at.

What has been said may perhaps be considered by some as applicable only in the case where the design is merely to qualify a man for extemporaneous *speaking*—not for delivering a *written* discourse with the effect of one that is actually extemporaneous. For it may be urged that he who attempts *this*, must be, to a certain extent, an actor: he may indeed really think, and strongly feel at the moment, all that he is saying; but though, thus far, no disguise is needed, he cannot, without a distinct effort, deliver what he is, in fact, reading, with the air of one who is *not* reading, but is framing each sentence as he delivers it; and to learn to do this, it may be said, practice is requisite; not such practice indeed as that of ordinary school-recitations, which has a directly contrary tendency, but such as *might* be adopted on the principles above laid down. And it must be admitted, (indeed, the remark has been frequently made in the foregoing pages,) that the task of him who delivers a written discourse is very different from that of the truly extemporary speaker, supposing the object be to produce at all a similar effect. For, as I have formerly observed, what has been here called the *natural* delivery, is that which is *natural to the real speaker* alone; and is by no means what will spontaneously suggest itself to one who has (even his own) written words before

of your innocence, but covet not your silliness;” ΜΑΚΑΡΙΣΑΝΤΕΣ ὙΜΩΝ ΤΟ ἈΠΕΙΡΟΚΑΚΩΝ, ΟΥ ΖΗΛΩΥΜΕΝ ΤΟ ΑΦΡΟΝ.

I am aware that I run a risk of giving offence by these remarks; but a sense of duty forbids their suppression. If the practice is capable of vindication, let it receive one; if not, let it be abolished.

It is now (1846) a good many years since this remonstrance was first published; during which interval the work has gone through several editions. I cannot but suppose, therefore, that some refutation of my reasoning would, before now, have been at least attempted, (which, as far as I know, no one ever did attempt,) were it not felt and practically acknowledged by the parties concerned to be unanswerable.

Let the experiment be tried, of placing in the hands of the *mothers* of the boys, when they come to witness the exhibition, a close *translation* of the play their sons are acting. I will be satisfied to abide by the decision of the right-minded and judicious among them.
him. To attain the delivery I have been recommending, he must make a strong and continual effort so to withdraw his mind, not only from studied modulation of voice, but from the consciousness that he is reading, and so to absorb himself, as it were, not only in the general sentiments, but in each separate expression, as to make it thoroughly his own at the moment of utterance. And I am far from supposing that in doing this he will not improve by practice; indeed, I have all along implied that no one can expect at once to attain perfection in it. But whether any such system of recitation as would afford beneficial practice could be adopted at schools, I am more doubtful. Supposing the established mode of spouting to be totally exploded, and every effort used to make a boy deliver a speech of Cæsar, for instance, or Lear, in the natural manner, i. e., according to the master’s view of what is natural, still, the learner himself will be reciting in a manner, to him, wholly artificial; not merely because he is reading, or repeating from memory, what he is endeavoring to utter as if extempore; nor, again, merely because the composition is another’s, and the circumstances fictitious; but because the composition, the situation, and the circumstances could not have been his own. A schoolboy has no natural way of his own to express himself on the topics on which he is made to declaim, because as yet these topics form no part of the furniture of his mind. And thus the object proposed, viz., to qualify him for delivering well, on real occasions, his own, or such as his own, written compositions, will have been defeated; and we shall have anticipated, and corrupted, by a studied elocution, what would have been, in after-life, his own natural mode of expressing himself on such occasions.

However serviceable practice may be, there is none, I think, that will not do more harm than good, except the practice of reciting, either on real occasions, or on such as one can fully conceive and enter into, expressions either actually his own, or at least such as he would naturally have uttered on the occasion. Should the schoolboy be limited to the recitation of compositions of his own, or of a fellow-student, and that, too, compositions not written as a task, on a given subject, (on such subjects, at least, as are usually set for exercises,*) but on some real occasion interesting to a

* See Introd., § 5.
youthful mind, (e. g., of some recent occurrence, or the like,) a system of practice might perhaps be adopted which would prove beneficial.

Such exercises as these, however, would make but a sorry display, in comparison of the customary declamations. The "pomp and circumstance" of annual public recitations has much that is attractive to masters, parents, and scholars; and it is easily believed, by those who wish to believe it, that for a boy who is destined hereafter to speak in public, the practice of making public speeches, and of taking great pains to deliver them well, must be a very beneficial exercise.

§ 3.

The last circumstance to be noticed among the results of the mode of delivery recommended is, that the speaker will find it much easier in this natural manner to make himself heard: he will be heard, that is, much more distinctly, at a greater distance, and with far less exertion and fatigue to himself. This is the more necessary to be mentioned, because it is a common, if not prevailing opinion, that the reverse of this is the fact. There are not a few who assign as a reason for their adoption of a certain unnatural tone and measured cadence, that it is necessary, in order to be heard by a large congregation. But though such an artificial voice and utterance will often appear to produce a louder sound, (which is the circumstance that probably deceives such persons,) yet a natural voice and delivery, provided it be clear, though it be less labored, and may even seem low to those who are near at hand, will be distinctly heard at a much greater distance. The only decisive proof of this must be sought in experience; which will not fail to convince of the truth of it any one who will fairly make the trial.

The requisite degree of loudness will be best obtained, conformably with the principles here inculcated, not by thinking about the voice, but by looking at the most distant of the hearers, and addressing one's self especially to him. The voice rises spontaneously when we are speaking to a person who is not very near.

It should be added, that a speaker's being well heard does not depend near so much on the loudness of the sounds, as
on their distinctness; and especially on the clear pronunciation of the consonants.

That the organs of voice are much less strained and fatigued by the natural action which takes place in real speaking than by any other, (besides that it is what might be expected à priori,) is evident from daily experience. An extemporary speaker will usually be much less exhausted in two hours, than an elaborate reciter (though less distinctly heard) will be in one. Even the ordinary tone of reading aloud is so much more fatiguing than that of conversation, that feeble patients are frequently unable to continue it for a quarter of an hour without great exhaustion; even though they may feel no inconvenience from talking, with few or no pauses, and in no lower voice, for more than double that time.*

§ 4.

He then who shall determine to aim at the natural manner, though he will have to contend with considerable difficulties and discouragements, will not be without corresponding advantages in the course he is pursuing.

He will be at first, indeed, repressed to a greater degree than another, by emotions of bashfulness; but it will be more speedily and more completely subdued; the very system pursued, since it forbids all thoughts of self, striking at the root of the evil.

He will, indeed, on the outset, incur censure, not only critical, but moral: he will be blamed for using a colloquial delivery; and the censure will very likely be, as far as relates to his earliest efforts, not wholly undeserved; for his

* "We can at will enlarge or diminish the area of the chest, and stop, accelerate, or retard the act of respiration. When we attend to our breathing, and regulate its rate, it quickly becomes fatigueing; but the same happens with any voluntary and habitual action, if we attempt to perform it analytically, by directing the attention to every step in its progress."—Mayo's Physiology, p. 107.

It may be added that there is a disease of the larynx to which those professionally engaged in reading aloud are often subject, but which, as I have learned from medical men, is seldom or never found among pleaders and other extemporary speakers.
manner will probably at first too much resemble that of conversation, though of serious and earnest conversation; but by perseverance he may be sure of avoiding deserved, and of mitigating, and ultimately overcoming, undeserved, censure.

He will, indeed, never be praised for a "very fine delivery;" but his matter will not lose the approbation it may deserve, as he will be the more sure of being heard and attended to. He will not, indeed, meet with many who can be regarded as models of the natural manner; and those he does meet with, he will be precluded, by the nature of the system, from minutely imitating; but he will have the advantage of carrying with him an infallible guide, as long as he is careful to follow the suggestions of Nature; abstaining from all thoughts respecting his own utterance, and fixing his mind intently on the business he is engaged in.

And though he must not expect to attain perfection at once, he may be assured that, while he steadily adheres to this plan, he is in the right road to it: instead of becoming, as on the other plan, more and more artificial, the longer he studies. And every advance he makes will produce a proportional effect: it will give him more and more of that hold on the attention, the understanding, and the feelings of the audience, which no studied modulation can ever attain. Others indeed may be more successful in escaping censure, and insuring admiration; but he will far more surpass them, in respect of the proper object of the orator, which is, to carry his point.

§ 5.

Much need not be said on the subject of action, which is at present so little approved, or, designedly, employed, in this country, that it is hardly to be reckoned as any part of the orator's art.

Action, however, seems to be natural to man, when speaking earnestly; but the state of the case at present seems to be, that the disgust excited, on the one hand, by awkward and ungraceful motions, and, on the other, by studied gesticulations, has led to the general disuse of action altogether; and has induced men to form the habit (for it certainly is a formed habit) of keeping themselves quite still, or
nearly so, when speaking. This is supposed to be, and perhaps is, the more rational and dignified way of speaking; but so strong is the tendency to indicate vehement internal emotion by some kind of outward gesture, that those who do not encourage or allow themselves in any, frequently fall unconsciously into some awkward trick of swinging the body,* folding a paper, twisting a string, or the like. But when any one is reading, or even speaking, in the artificial manner, there is little or nothing of this tendency; precisely because the mind is not occupied by that strong internal emotion which occasions it. And the prevalence of this (the artificial) manner may reasonably be conjectured to have led to the disuse of all gesticulation, even in extemporary speakers; because if any one whose delivery is artificial does use action, it will of course be, like his voice, studied and artificial, and savoring still more of disgusting affectation; from the circumstance that it evidently might be entirely omitted.† And hence the practice came to be generally disapproved and exploded.

It need only be observed, that, in conformity with the principles maintained throughout this Book, no care should, in any case, be taken to use graceful or appropriate action; which, if not perfectly unstudied, will always be (as has been just remarked) intolerable. But if any one spontaneously falls into any gestures that are unbecoming, care should then be taken to break the habit; and that, not only in public speaking, but on all occasions. The case, indeed, is the same with utterance: if any one has, in common discourse, an indistinct, hesitating, provincial, or otherwise faulty delivery, his natural manner certainly is not what he should adopt in public speaking; but he should endeavor, by care, to remedy the defect, not in public speaking only, but in ordinary con-

* Of one of the ancient Roman orators it was satirically remarked, (on account of his having this habit,) that he must have learned to speak in a boat. Of some other orators, whose favorite action is rising on tiptoe, it would perhaps have been said that they had been accustomed to address their audience over a high wall.

† "——Gratas inter menas symphonia discors,
Et crassum unguentem, et Sardo cum melle papaver
Offendunt poterat duci quia coena sine istis."

HORACE, Ars Poet.
versation also. And so also with respect to attitudes and gestures. It is in these points, principally, if not exclusively, that the remarks of an intelligent friend will be beneficial.

If, again, any one finds himself naturally and spontaneously led to use, in speaking, a moderate degree of action, which he finds from the observation of others not to be ungraceful or inappropriate, there is no reason that he should study to repress this tendency.

§ 6.

It would be inconsistent with the principle just laid down, to deliver any precepts for gesture; because the observance of even the best conceivable precepts would, by destroying the natural appearance, be fatal to their object; but there is a remark which is worthy of attention, from the illustration it affords of the erroneousness, in detail, as well as in principle, of the ordinary systems of instruction in this point. Boys are generally taught to employ the prescribed action either after or during the utterance of the words it is to enforce. The best and most appropriate action must, from this circumstance alone, necessarily appear a feeble affectation. It suggests the idea of a person speaking to those who do not fully understand the language, and striving by signs to explain the meaning of what he has been saying. The very same gesture, had it come at the proper, that is, the natural point of time, might, perhaps, have added greatly to the effect; viz., had it preceded somewhat the utterance of the words. That is always the natural order of action. An emotion,* struggling for utterance, produces a tendency to a bodily gesture, to express that emotion more quickly than words can be framed; the words follow as soon as they can be spoken. And this being always the case with a real, earnest, unstudied speaker, this mode of placing the action foremost gives (if it be otherwise appropriate) the

* "Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem
Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram:
Aut ad humum merore gravi deducit, et angit:
Post effert animi motus interprete lingua."

Horace, Ars Poet.
appearance of earnest emotion actually present in the mind. And the reverse of this natural order would alone be sufficient to convert the action of Demosthenes himself into unsuccessful and ridiculous pantomime.
Omnia hoc volumus, locos omnes, quorum frequens est usus (sive ad probationes et refutationes, sive ad suasiones et dissuasiones, sive ad laudes et vituperia spectent) meditatos jam haberis, eosque ultimis ingenii viribus, et tanquam improbe, et prorsus præter veritatem, attolli et deprimi. Modum autem hujus collectionis, tam ad usum, quam ad brevitatem, optimum fore censemus, si hujusmodi loci contrahantur in sententias quasdam acutas et concisas; tanquam glomos quosdam, quorum fila in fusorem discursum, cum res postulat, explicari possint. . . . . Ejus generis, cum plurima parata habeamus, aliqua ad exemplum proponere visum est. Ea autem antitheta rerum nominamus.

It is worth observing that several of these commonplaces of Bacon have become PROVERBS; and others of them are well calculated to become so. And most of the proverbs that are in use in various languages are of a similar character to these.

Considering that proverbs have been current in all ages and countries, it is a curious circumstance that so much difference of opinion should exist as to the utility and as to the design of them. Some are accustomed to speak as if proverbs contained a sort of concentrated essence of the wisdom of all ages, which will enable any one to judge and act aright on every emergency. Others, on the contrary, represent them as fit only to furnish occasionally a motto for a book, a theme for a schoolboy's exercise, or a copy for children learning to write.
To me, both these opinions appear erroneous.

That proverbs are not generally regarded, by those who use them, as, necessarily, propositions of universal and acknowledged truth, like mathematical axioms, is plain from the circumstance that many of those most in use are—like these commonplaces of Bacon—opposed to each other; as, e. g., "Take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves," to "Be not penny-wise and pound-foolish;" and again, "The more haste, the worse speed," or, "Wait a while, that we may make an end the sooner," to "Take time by the forelock," or "Time and tide for no man bide," etc.

It seems, I think, to be practically understood, that a proverb is merely a compendious expression of some principle, which will usually be, in different cases, and with or without certain modifications, true or false, applicable or inapplicable. When then a proverb is introduced, the speaker usually employs it as a major premiss, and is understood to imply, as a minor, that the principle thus referred to is applicable in the existing case. And what is gained by the employment of the proverb is, that his judgment, and his reason for it, are conveyed, through the use of a well-known form of expression, clearly, and at the same time in an incomparably shorter space, than if he had had to explain his meaning in expressions framed for the occasion. And the brevity thus obtained is often still further increased by suppressing the full statement even of the very proverb itself, if a very common one, and merely alluding to it in a word or two.

Proverbs accordingly are somewhat analogous to those medical formulas which, being in frequent use, are kept ready-made-up in the chemists' shops, and which often save the framing of a distinct prescription.

And the usefulness of this brevity will not be thought, by any one well conversant with reasoning, to consist merely in the saving of breath, paper, or time. Brevity, when it does not cause obscurity, conduces much to the opposite effect, and causes the meaning to be far more clearly apprehended than it would have been in a longer expression. More than half the cases, probably, in which men either misapprehend what is said, or confuse one question with another, or are misled by any fallacy, are traceable in great measure to want of sufficient conciseness of expression.]
APPENDIX [A].

Nobilitas laurea, qua tempus homines coronat.
Antiquitatem etiam in monumentis mortuis veneramur: quanto magis in vivis?

Nobilitas virtutem invidiæ subducit, gratiæ tradit.

PRO.

Senes sibi sapiunt magis; aliis et reipublicæ minus.
Si conspici daretur, magis deformat animos, quam corpora, senectus.
Senes omnia metuunt, præter Deos.

UXOR ET LIBERI.

Charitas reipublicæ incipit a familia.
Uxor et liberi disciplina dedit.

* This observation, in substance, is attributed to Bishop Warburton.
quædem humanitatis; et coelites tetrici et severi.

Cœlibatus et orbitas ad nil aliud conferunt, quam ad fugam.

Contrariis honoriis magnarum vel custodia est, vel dispensatio quædam, vel fama; at nullus usus.

Anon vides lapillis, et id genus deliciis, fingi pretia, ut possit esse aliquid magnarum divitiarum usus.

Multi, dum divitiis suis omnia venalia fore crediverunt, ipsi in primis venierunt.

Non aliud divitiarum impedita virtutis; nam virtuti et necessariis sunt, et graves.

Vertus per divitiis vertitur in commune bonum.

Vertus per divitiis vertitur in commune bonum.

Non novit quispiam, quantum in virtutis cursu profecerit, nisi honores ei campum præbeant apertum.

Honorum ascensus arduus, statio lubrica, regressus præceps.

Qui in honore sunt, vulgi opinionem mutuentur oportet, ut seipsos beatus putent.
APPENDIX [A].

IMPERIA.

PRO.  
Felicitate frui, magnum bonum est; sed eam et aliis impertiri posse, adhuc majus.

CONTRA.  
Quam miserum, habere nil fere, quod appetas; infinita, quae metuas!

LAUS, EXISTIMATIO.

PRO.  
Virtutis radii reflexi laudes.  
Laus honor is est, ad quem liberis suffragiis pervenitur.  
Honores diverse a diversis politis conferuntur; sed laudes ubique sunt libertatis.

CONTRA.  
Fama deterior judex, quam nuncia.  
Fama veluti fluvius, levia attollit, solida mergit.  
Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, mediaram admiratio, supremarum sensus* nullus.

NATURA.

PRO.  
Consuetudo contra naturam, quasi tyrannis quaedam est: et ito, ac levi occasione corruit.

CONTRA.  
Cogitamus secundum naturam; loquimur secundum præcepta; sed agimus secundum consuetudinem.

FORTUNA.

PRO.  
Virtutes apertae laudes pariunt, occultæ, fortunas.  
Fortuna veluti galaxia; hoc est, nodus quarandum obscurarum virtutum, sine nomine.

CONTRA.  
Stultitia unius, fortuna alterius.

* This is perhaps under-stated. The vulgar are apt, not merely not to understand, but to contemn, the highest virtues; such as even-handed justice, and disinterested public spirit; attributing such conduct as results from these to want of feeling, stupidity, or a whimsical half-insanity.
VITA.

**PRO.**
Præstat ad omnia, etiam ad virtutem, curriculum longum, quam breve.
Absque spatiis vitae majoribus, nec perficere datur, nec perdiscere, nec pœnitere.

**CONTRA.**
Non invenias inter humanos affectum tam pusillum, qui si intendatur paulo vehementius, non mortis metum superet.

SUPERSTITIO.

**PRO.**
Qui zelo peceant, non probandi, sed tamen amandi sunt.

**CONTRA.**
Ut simiæ, similitudo cum homine, deformitatem addit; ita superstitioni, similitudo cum religione.
Præstat nullam habere de diis opinionem, quam contumeliosam.

SUPERBIA.

**PRO.**
Superbia etiam vitiiis insoociabilis; atque ut venenum veneno, ita hand paucæ vitia superbia expelluntur.
Facilis, etiam alienis vitiiis obnoxius est: superbus tan tum suis.

**CONTRA.**
Hedera virtutum ac bonorum omnium, superbia.
Caæteræ vitæ virtutibus tantum contraria; superbia sola contagiosa.

INVIDIA.

**PRO.**
Invidia in rebus publicis, tanquam salubris ostracismus.

**CONTRA.**
Nemo virtuti invidiam reconciliaverit præter mortem.
Invidia virtutes laboribus exercet, ut Juno Herculæm.

IMPUDICITIA.

**PRO.**
Omnes, ut Paris qui formæ optionem faciunt, prudentiæ et potentiae jacturam faciunt.
GLORIA VANA.

PRO.
Qui suas laudes appetit, aliorum simul appetit utilitates.

CONTRA.
Turpe est proco solicitare ancillam; est autem virtutis ancilla laus.

FORTITUDO.

PRO.
Nil aut in voluptate solidum, aut in virtute munitum, ubi timur infestat.
Caeterae virtutes nos a dominatu liberant vitiorum; fortitudo sola a dominatu fortunae.

CONTRA.
Vitae suae prodigus, alienae periculosus.
Virtus ferrear aetatis fortitudo.

CONSTANTIA.

PRO.
Basis virtutum constantia.
Miser est, qui qualis ipse futurus sit, non novit.
Etiam vitiiis decus aspirat constantia.
Si ad fortunae inconstantiam accedat etiam inconstantia mentis, in quantis tenebris vivitur!
Fortuna, tanquam Proteus, si perseveres, ad formam redit.

CONTRA.
Constantia, ut janitrix morosa, multa utilia indicia abigit.
Æquum est, ut constantia res adversas bene toleret; nam fere inducit. Stultitia brevissima optima.

SCIENTIA, CONTEMPLATIO.

PRO.
Ea demum voluptas est secundum naturam, cujus non est satietas.

CONTRA.
Contemplatio, speciosa incerta.
Bene cogitare, non multo melius est, quam bene somniare.
LITERÆ.

PRO.

Lectio est conversatio cum prudentibus; actio fere cum stultis.

Non inutiles scientiae existimandæ sunt, quarum in se nullus est usus, si ingenia aequant, et ordinent.

CONTRA.

Quæ unquam ars docuit tempestivum artis usum?

Artis sæpissime ineptus usus est, ne sit nullus.

PROMPTITUDO.

PRO.

Opportuna prudentia non est, quæ celeris non est.

Qui cito errat, cito errorem emendat.

CONTRA.

Cujus consilia non maturat deliberatio, nec prudentiam ætæs.

POPULARITAS.

PRO.

Qui ipsi magni viri sunt, neminem unum fere habent, quem verseantur, sed populum.

CONTRA.

Infima assentatio est assentatio vulgi.

DISSIMULATIO.

PRO.

Dissimulatio, compendiara sapientia.

Sepes consiliorum, dissimulatio.

Qui indissimulanter omnia agit, æque decipit; nam plurimi, aut non capiunt, aut non credunt.

CONTRA.

Quibus artes civiles supra captum ingenii sunt, iis dissimulatio pro prudentia erit.

Qui dissimulat, præcipue ad agendum instrumento se privat, i. e., fide.

Dissimulatio dissimulatio nem invitat.

CEREMONIÆ, PUNCTI, AFFECTATIO.

PRO.

Si et in verbis vulgo paremus, quidni in habitu, et gestu?

Virtus et prudentia sine

CONTRA.

Quid deformius, quam scene nam in vitam transferre?

Magis placent cerussatæ buccæ, et calamistrata coma
punctis, velut peregrinæ linguae sunt; nam vulgo non intelleguntur.
Puncti translatio sunt virtutis in linguam vernaculum.

AMICITIA.

**PRO.**
Pessima solitudo, non veras habere amicitias.
Digna malæ fidei ultio, amicitiiis privari.

**CONTRA.**
Qui amicitias aretas copulat, novas necessitates sibi imponit.
Animi imbecilei est, partiri fortunam.

VINDICTA.

**PRO.**
Vindicta privata, justitia agrestis.
Qui vim rependit, legem tantum violat, non hominem.
Utilis metus ultionis privatae; nam leges nimium sæpe dormiunt.

**CONTRA.**
Qui injuriam fecit, principium malo dedit; qui reddidit, modum abstulit.
Vindicta, quo magis naturalis, co magis coercenda.
Qui facile injuriam reddit, is fortasse tempore, non voluntate posterior erat.

INNOVATIO.

**PRO.**
Omnis medicina innovatio.
Qui nova remedia fugit, nova mala operitur.
Novator maximus tempus: quidni igitur tempus imitemur?
Morosa morum retentio, res turbulenta est, æque ac novitas.
Cum per se res mutentur in deterius, si consilio in melius non mutentur, quis finis erit mali?

**CONTRA.**
Nullus auctor placet, præter tempus.
Nulla novitas absque injuria; dam praesentia eonvellit.
Quae usu obtinuere, si non bona, at saltem apta inter se sunt.
Quis novator tempus imitatur, quod novationes ita sinuat, ut sensus fallant?
Quod præter spem evenit, cui prodest, minus acceptum; cui obest, magis molestum.
MORA.  
Fortuna multa, festinanti venlit, quibus morantem donat.  

CONTRA.  
Occasio instar Sibyllae minuit oblatum, pretium auget. Celeritas, Orci galea.

SUSPICIO.  
Merito ejus fides suspecta est, quam suspicio labefacit.  

CONTRA.  
Suspicio fidem absolvit.

VERBA LEGIS.  
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a litera. Cum receditur a litera, iudex transit in legislatorem.  

CONTRA.  
Ex omnibus verbis eliciendus est sensus, qui interpretetur singula. Pessima tyrannis lex in equuleo.

PRO TESTIBUS CONTRA ARGUMENTA.  
Secundum oratorem, non secundum causam pronunciat, qui argumentis nititur. Tutum foret argumentis credere, si homines nihil absurdi facerent. Argumenta, cum sint contra testimonia, hoc præstant, ut res mira videatur, non autem ut non vera.  

CONTRA.  
Si testibus credendum sit contra argumenta, sufficit, tantum jüdicem esse non surdum. Iis probationibus tutissimo creditur, quæ rarissime mentiuntur.

[AA.] Introd., § 4, p. 28.  
"Sometimes men will tell us that they prefer a natural and artless eloquence, and that very diligent preparation is inconsistent with such qualities. We verily believe that this fallaey, though it lurks under an almost transparent ambi-
guity, is of most prejudicial consequence. Nature and art, so
far from being always opposed, are often the very same thing.
Thus—to adduce a familiar example, and closely related to
the present subject—it is natural for a man who feels that
he has not given adequate expression to a thought, though
he may have used the first words suggested, to attempt it
again and again. He each time approximates nearer to the
mark, and at length desists, satisfied either that he has done
what he wishes, or that he cannot perfectly do it, as the case
may be. A writer, with this end, is continually transposing
clauses, reconstructing sentences, striking out one word and
putting in another. All this may be said to be art, or the
deliberate application of means to ends; but is it art incon-
sistent with nature? It is just such art as this that we ask
of the preacher, and no other: simply that he shall take di-
gent heed to do what he has to do as well as he can. Let
him depend upon it, that no such art as this will ever make
him appear the less natural.

"A similar fallacy lurks under the unmeaning phrases
which are often bestowed upon simplicity. We love sim-
plicity as much as any of its eulogists can do; but we should
probably differ about the meaning of the word. While some
men talk as if to speak naturally were to speak like a natural,
others talk as if to speak with simplicity meant to speak like
a simpleton. True simplicity does not consist in what is
trite, bald, or commonplace. So far as regards the thought,
it means, not what is already obvious to everybody, but what,
though not obvious, is immediately recognized, as soon as
propounded, to be true and striking. As it regards the ex-
pression, it means, that thoughts worth hearing are expressed
in language that every one can understand. In the first
point of view, it is opposed to what is abstruse; in the second,
to what is obscure. It is not what some men take it to mean,
threadbare commonplace, expressed in insipid language. It
can be owing only to a fallacy of this kind, that we so often
hear discourses consisting of little else than meagre truisms,
expanded and diluted till every mortal ear aches that listens.
We have heard preachers commence with the tritest of
truths—'All men are mortals'—and proceed to illustrate it
with as much prolixity as though they were announcing it as
a new proposition to a company of immortals in some distant
planet, brought with difficulty to believe a fact so portentous, and unauthenticated by their own experience.

"True simplicity is the last and most excellent grace which can belong to a speaker, and is certainly not to be attained without much effort. Those who have attentively read the present article, will not suspect us of demanding more deliberate preparation on the part of the preacher that he may offer what is profound, recondite, or abstruse; but that he may say only what he ought to say, and that what he does say may be better said. When the topics are such only as ought to be insisted on, and the language such as is readily understood, the preacher may depend upon it that no pains he may take will be lost—that his audience, however homely, will be sure to appreciate them—and that the better a discourse is, the better they will like it.

"We have stated as the other great cause of the failure of preachers, that they are not sufficiently instructed in the principles of pulpit eloquence. We are far from contending that a systematic exposition of the laws in conformity with which all effective discourses to the people must be constructed, should be made a part of general education; or that it ought to be imparted even to him who is destined to be a public speaker till 'his general training—and that a very ample one—has been completed.' But that such knowledge should be acquired by every one designed for such an office, and that all universities and colleges should furnish the means of communicating it, we have no manner of doubt.

"Youthful vanity and inexperience alone sufficiently account for the greater part of the deviations from propriety, simplicity, and common sense, now adverted to. Those who laud nature in opposition to art, are too apt to forget that this very vanity forms a part of it. It is natural for a youth, whether with or without cultivation, to fall into these errors; and all experience loudly proclaims that, on such a point, nature alone is no safe guide. Who, that has arrived at maturity in intellect, taste and feeling, does not recollect how hard it was in early life to put the extinguisher upon a fine metaphor or dazzling expression; to reject tinsel, however worthless, if it did but glare—and epithets, however superfluous, if they but sounded grand? how hard it was to forget one's self, and to become sincerely intent upon the best, sim-
plerest, strongest, briefest mode of communicating what we deemed important truth to the minds of others? Surely it is not a little ridiculous then, when so obvious a solution offers itself, to charge the faults of young speakers upon the very precepts which condemn them. It is sufficient to vindicate the utility of such precepts, if they tend only in some measure to correct the errors they cannot entirely suppress, and to abridge the duration of follies which they cannot wholly prevent.

"But it is further said, that, somehow or other, any such system of instruction does injury, by laying upon the intellect a sort of constraint, and substituting a stiff mechanical movement for the flexibility and freedom of nature.

"We reply, that if the system of instruction be too minute, or if the pupil be told to employ it mechanically, we can easily conceive that such effects will follow; but not otherwise. We plead for no system of minute technical rules; still less for the formal application of any system whatever. But to imbue the mind with great general principles, leaving them to operate imperceptibly upon the formation of habit, and to suggest, without distinct consciousness of their presence, the lesson which the occasion demands, is a very different thing, and is all we contend for. One would think, to hear some men talk, that it was proposed to instruct a youth to adjust beforehand the number of sentences of which each paragraph should consist, and the lengths into which the sentences should be cut—to determine how many should be perfect periods, and how many should not—what allowance of antitheses, interrogatives, and notes of admiration shall be given to each page—where he shall stick on a metonymy or a metaphor, and how many niches he shall reserve for gilded ornaments. Who is pleading for any such nonsense as this? All that we contend for is, that no public speaker should be destitute of a clear perception of those principles of man's nature on which conviction and persuasion depend; and of those proprieties of style which ought to characterize all discourses which are designed to effect these objects. General as all this knowledge must be, we cannot help thinking that it would be most advantageous. One great good it would undoubtedly in many cases effect: it would prevent men from setting out wrong, or abridge the amount or duration of their
errors; in other words, prevent the formation of vicious habits, or tend to correct them when formed. Nothing is more common than for a speaker to set out with false notions as to the style which effective public speaking requires—to suppose it something very remote from what is simple and natural. Still more are led into similar errors by their vanity. The young especially are apt to despise the true style for what are its chief excellences—its simplicity and severity. Let them once be taught its great superiority to every other, and they will at least be protected from involuntary errors, and less likely to yield to the seductions of vanity. Such a knowledge would also (perhaps the most important benefit of all) involve a knowledge of the best models, and secure timely appreciation of them.

"But it is frequently urged that, after all, the practical value of all the great lessons of criticism must be learned from experience, and that mere instruction can do little. Be it so. Is this any reason why that little should be withheld? Besides, is it nothing to put a youth in the right way? to abridge the lessons of experience? to facilitate the formation of good habits, and to prevent the growth of bad ones? to diminish the probabilities of failure, and to increase those of success? Is there any reason why we should suffer the young speaker to grope out his way by the use of the lead-line alone, when we could give him the aid of the chart and compass; or to find his way to truth at last by a series of painful blunders, when any part of the trouble might be spared him? Can any one doubt that a great speaker might be able to give a young beginner many profitable hints which would save him both much time and many errors, and make the lessons of experience not only a great deal shorter, but vastly less troublesome?"—Edinburgh Review, (Oct., 1840,) pp. 94-98.


". . . . . . . there is a distinction to be made between the unnatural and the merely improbable: a fiction is unnatural, when there is some assignable reason against the events taking place as described—when men are represented as acting contrary to the character assigned them, or to human
nature in general; as when a young lady of seventeen, brought up in case, luxury, and retirement, with no companions but the narrow-minded and illiterate, displays, (as a heroine usually does,) under the most trying circumstances, such wisdom, fortitude, and knowledge of the world, as the best instructors and the best examples can rarely produce without the aid of a more mature age and longer experience.* On the other hand, a fiction is still improbable, though not unnatural, when there is no reason to be assigned why things should not take place as represented, except that the overbalance of chances is against it. The hero meets, in his utmost distress, most opportunely with the very person to whom he had formerly done a signal service, and who happens to communicate to him a piece of intelligence which sets all to rights. Why should he not meet him as well as any one else? All that can be said is, that there is no reason why he should. The infant who is saved from a wreck, and who afterwards becomes such a constellation of virtues and accomplishments, turns out to be no other than the nephew of the very gentleman on whose estate the waves had cast him, and whose lovely daughter he had so long sighed for in vain: there is no reason to be given, except from the calculation of chances, why he should not have been thrown on one part of the coast as well as another. Nay, it would be nothing unnatural, though the most determined novel-reader would be shocked at its improbability, if all the hero's enemies, while they were conspiring his ruin, were to be struck dead together by a lucky flash of lightning; yet many denouements which are decidedly unnatural, are better tolerated than this would be. We shall perhaps best explain our meaning by examples, taken from a novel of great merit in many respects. When Lord Glenthorn, in whom a most unfavorable education has acted on a most unfavorable disposition, after a life of torpor, broken only by short sallies of forced exertion, on a sudden reverse of fortune displays at

* Or, one might add, when a lad born and reared in a workhouse filled with reprobates, and afterwards further trained among hardened thieves, exhibits a character just the reverse of what all reason and all experience would anticipate from such an education, this is grossly unnatural; though many readers may fail to perceive the fault, or, at least, the magnitude of it, through the fallacy noticed in the text.
once the most persevering diligence in the most repulsive studies; and in middle life, without any previous habits of exertion, any hope of early business, or the example of friends, or the stimulus of actual want, to urge him, outstrips every competitor, though every competitor has every advantage against him—this is unnatural. When Lord Glenthorn, the instant he is stripped of his estates, meets, falls in love with, and is conditionally accepted by the very lady who is remotely entitled to those estates; when the instant he has fulfilled the conditions of their marriage, the family of the person possessed of the estates becomes extinct, and by the concurrence of circumstances, against every one of which the chances were enormous, the hero is reinstated in all his old domains—this is merely improbable.

"The distinction which we have been pointing out may be plainly perceived in the events of real life: when any thing takes place of such a nature as we should call, in a fiction, merely improbable, because there are many chances against it; we call it a lucky or unlucky accident, a singular coincidence, something very extraordinary, odd, curious, etc.; whereas any thing which, in a fiction, would be called unnatural, when it actually occurs, (and such things do occur,) is still called unnatural, inexplicable, unaccountable, inconceivable, etc., epithets which are not applied to events that have merely the balance of chances against them."—Quarterly Review, No. xlviii., pp. 354, 355. The whole article has been published in Lockhart's edition of the Works of Sir W. Scott, (who however is not the author,) vol. xviii., p. 209: Miscellaneous Prose Works.


The following is the passage from the Fifth Lecture on Political Economy referred to in the text:

"Several writers on Political Economy have described the case of a supposed race of savages subsisting on the spontaneous productions of the earth, and the precarious supplies of hunting and fishing; and have then traced the steps by which

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* The matter of the Note C, in the Appendix to the former editions, is to be found in the Lecture subjoined to Part II.
the various arts of life would gradually have arisen, and advanced more and more towards perfection.

"One man, it is supposed, having acquired more skill than his neighbors in the making of bows and arrows, or darts, would find it advantageous, both for them and for himself, to devote himself to this manufacture, and to exchange these implements for the food procured by others, instead of employing himself in the pursuit of game. Another, from a similar cause, would occupy himself exclusively in the construction of huts, or of canoes; another, in the preparing of skins for clothing, etc. And the division of labor having thus begun, the advantages of it would be so apparent, that it would rapidly be extended, and would occasion each person to introduce improvements into the art to which he would have chiefly confined his attention. Those who had studied the haunts and the habits of certain kinds of wild animals, and had made a trade of supplying the community with them, would be led to domesticate such species as were adapted for it, in order to secure a supply of provisions, when the chase might prove insufficient. Those who had especially studied the places of growth, and times of ripening, of such wild fruits or other vegetable productions as were in request, would be induced to secure themselves a readier supply, by cultivating them in suitable spots. And thus the society, being divided into husbandmen, shepherds, and artificers of various kinds, exchanging the produce of their various labors, would advance, with more or less steadiness and rapidity, towards the higher stages of civilization.

"On this subject I will take the liberty of citing a passage from a very well-written and instructive book, the account of the New Zealanders, in the Library of Entertaining Knowledge; a passage which is the more valuable to our present purpose, inasmuch as the writer is not treating of the subject with any view whatever to the evidences of religion, and is apparently quite unconscious of the argument which (as I shall presently show) may be deduced from what he says:

"The especial distinction of the savage, and that which, more than any other thing, keeps him a savage, is his ignorance of letters. This places the community almost in the same situation with a herd of the lower animals, in so far as
the accumulation of knowledge, or, in other words, any kind of movement forward, is concerned; for it is only by means of the art of writing that the knowledge acquired by the experience of one generation can be properly stored up, so that none of it shall be lost, for the use of all that are to follow. Among savages, for want of this admirable method of preservation, there is reason to believe the fund of knowledge possessed by the community, instead of growing, generally diminishes with time. If we except the absolutely necessary arts of life, which are in daily use and cannot be forgotten, the existing generation seldom seems to possess anything derived from the past. Hence the oldest man of the tribe is always looked up to as the wisest—simply because he has lived the longest; it being felt that an individual has scarcely a chance of knowing any thing more than his own experience has taught him. Accordingly, the New Zealanders, for example, seem to have been in quite as advanced a state when Tasman discovered the country in 1642, as they were when Cook visited it, one hundred and twenty-seven years after.'

"It may be remarked, however, with reference to this statement, that the absence of written records is, though a very important, rather a secondary than a primary obstacle. It is one branch of that general characteristic of the savage, improvidence. If you suppose the case of a savage taught to read and write, but allowed to remain, in all other respects, the same careless, thoughtless kind of being, and afterwards left to himself, he would most likely forget his acquisition; and would certainly, by neglecting to teach it to his children, suffer it to be lost in the next generation. On the other hand, if you conceive such a case (which certainly is conceivable, and I am disposed to think it a real one) as that of a people ignorant of this art, but acquiring in some degree a thoughtful and provident character, I have little doubt that their desire, thence arising, to record permanently their laws, practical maxims, and discoveries, would gradually lead them, first to the use of memorial verses, and afterwards to some kind of material symbols, such as picture-writing, and then hieroglyphics; which might gradually be still further improved into writing, properly so called."
To say that numerous old manuscripts exist; that they admit of classification and date, and other characteristics; to speak of evidence, derived from contemporary history, from the monuments of art, from national manners and customs; to assert that there have been persons qualified for the task, who have examined duly these several branches of evidence, and have given a satisfactory report of that research, is to make a statement concerning the evidence of Christianity, which is intelligible indeed, but is not itself the evidence, not itself the proof, of which you speak. So far from this being the case, we cannot but feel that the author who is guiding us, and pointing out these pillars of our faith, as they appear engraved on his chart of evidence, can himself, whatever be his learning, be personally acquainted with but a very small portion. The most industrious and able scholar, after spending a life on some individual point of evidence, the collation of manuscripts, the illustrations derived from uninspired authors, translations, or whatever the inquiry be, must, after all, (it would seem,) rest by far the greater part of his faith immediately on the testimony of others; as thousands in turn will rest their faith on his testimony to the existence of such proof as he has examined. There is no educated Christian who is not taught to appreciate the force of that proof in favor of the genuineness of the New Testament, which may be derived from the consent of ancient copies, and the quotations found in a long line of fathers and other writers; and yet not one in a thousand ever reads the works of the fathers, or sees a manuscript, or is even capable of deciphering one, if presented to him. He admits the very groundwork of his faith on the assertion of those who profess to have ascertained these points; and even the most learned are no further exceptions to this case, than in the particular branch of evidence which they have studied. Nay, even in their use of this, it will be surprising, when we come to reflect on it, how great a portion must be examined only through statements resting on the testimony of others.

Nor is it a question which can be waived, by throwing the weight of disproof on those who cavil and deny. It turns upon the use which is made, more or less, by all, of the
positive proofs urged in defence of Christianity. Christianity is established; and it may be fair to bid its assailants prove that it is not what it professes to be, the presumption and prescriptive title being on its side; but Christianity does not intrench itself within this fortress: it brings out into the field an array of evidence to establish that which, on the former view of the case, its adherents are supposed not to be called on to maintain. It boasts of the sacred volume having been transmitted pure by means of manuscripts; and by asserting the antiquity, the freedom from corruption, and the independence and agreement of the several classes of these, the Christian contends for the existence of his religion at the time when Christ and the apostles lived. Ancient writings are appealed to, and quotations cited by various authors from the New Testament are adduced, which go to prove the same. Even profane history is made to furnish contemporary evidence of the first rise of Christianity. Now it is the way in which this evidence is employed that is the point to be considered. The question is, in what sense all this can be called evidence to the mass of Christians. All this is, in short, positive proof; and he who has examined manuscripts, or read the works in question, has gone through the demonstration; but he who has not, (and this is the case with all, making a very few exceptions,) has not gone through the process of proof himself, but takes the conclusion on the word of others. He believes those who inform him that they, or others, have examined manuscripts, read the fathers, compared profane history with holy writ. Can this be called reasonable faith? or, at least, do we not pretend to be believing on proofs of various kinds, when, in fact, our belief rests on the bare assertions of others?

"It is very important that the case should be set in its true light, because, supposing the Christian ministry able, and at leisure, to investigate and sift the Christian evidence for themselves, the same cannot be done by the barrister, the physician, the professional man of whatever department besides theology, however enabled by education; and then, what is to be the lot of the great mass of the people? They, clearly, are incompetent even to follow up the several steps of proof which each proposition would require. They take it for granted, if they apply the evidence at all, that these
things are so, because wiser persons than they say it is so. In the same spirit as the question was put of old, 'Have any of the rulers believed on Christ? but this people who know-eth not the law are cursed,' Christians must generally, it would seem, believe in Christ, because their spiritual rulers do, and reject the infidel's views, because these people are pronounced accursed. Nay, the supposition of the clergy themselves having the qualification, and the opportunity to go through the process of proof, is only a supposition. They often want either or both; and it is impossible that it should not be so. The labor of a life is scarcely sufficient to examine for one's self one branch alone of such evidence. For the greater part, few men, however learned, have satisfied themselves by going through the proof. They have admitted the main assertions, because proved by others.

"And is this conviction then reasonable? Is it more than the adoption of truth on the authority of another? It is. The principle on which all these assertions are received, is not that they have been made by this or that credible individual or body of persons who have gone through the proof—this may have its weight with the critical and learned—but the main principle adopted by all, intelligible by all, and reasonable in itself, is, that these assertions are set forth, bearing on their face a challenge of refutation. The assertions are like witnesses placed in a box to be confronted. Skepticism, infidelity, and scoffing, form the very groundwork of our faith. As long as these are known to exist and to assail it, so long are we sure that any untenable assertion may and will be refuted. The benefit accruing to Christianity in this respect from the occasional success of those who have found flaws in the several parts of evidence, is invaluable. We believe what is not disproved, most reasonably, because we know that there are those abroad who are doing their utmost to disprove it. We believe the witness, not because we know him and esteem him, but because he is confronted, cross-examined, suspected, and assailed by arts fair and unfair. It is not his authority, but the reasonableness of the case. It becomes conviction well-grounded, and not assent to man's words.

"At the same time, nothing has perhaps more contributed to perplex the Christian inquirer, than the impression which vague language creates of our conviction arising, not out of
the application of this principle to the external and monumental evidences of Christianity, but out of the examination of the evidence itself. The mind feels disappointed and unsatisfied, not because it has not ground for belief, but because it misnames it. The man who has not examined any branch of evidence for himself, may, according to the principle above stated, very reasonably believe in consequence of it; but his belief does not arise immediately out of it—is not the same frame of mind which would be created by an actual examination for himself. It may be more, or it may be less, a sure source of conviction; but the discontent is occasioned, not by this circumstance, but by supposing that it is one of these things that does or ought to influence us, when in fact it is the other; by putting ourselves in the attitude of mind which belongs to the witness, instead of that which belongs to the bystander. We very well know the unbroken testimony of writers during eighteen centuries to the truth of Christianity ought to make us feel, if we had ascertained the fact by an examination of their writings; and we are surprised at finding that we are not in that frame of mind; forgetting that our use of the evidence may be founded on a different principle.”—HINDS, on Inspiration.

[DD.] Part I., Chap. ii., § 4, p. 75.

The following extracts are from the Fifth Lecture on Political Economy, being the portion alluded to in the text:

"When we dismiss for a moment all antecedent conjectures, and look around us for instances, we find, I think I may confidently affirm, no one recorded of a tribe of savages, properly so styled, rising into a civilized state, without instruction and assistance from people already civilized. And we have, on the other hand, accounts of various savage tribes, in different parts of the globe, who have been visited from time to time at considerable intervals, but have had no settled intercourse with civilized people, and who appear to continue, as far as can be ascertained, in the same uncultivated condition. . . . No savage tribe appears to have risen into civilization, except through the aid of others who were civilized. We have, I think, in this case, all the historical evidence that a negative is susceptible of: viz., we have the
knowledge of numerous cases in which such a change has not taken place, and of none where it has, while we have every reason to expect that, if it had occurred, it would have been recorded. . . . There are several circumstances which have conduced to keep out of sight the important fact I have been alluding to. The chief of these probably is, the vagueness with which the term 'savage' is applied. I do not profess, and indeed it is evidently not possible, to draw a line by which we may determine precisely to whom that title is, and is not, applicable; since there is a series of almost insensible gradations between the highest and the lowest state of human society. Nor is any such exact boundary-line needed for our present purpose. It is sufficient if we admit, what is probably very far short of the truth, that those who are in as low a state as some tribes with which we are acquainted, are incapable of emerging from it, by their own unassisted efforts. . . . There will be no reason, I think, for believing that there is any exception to the positions I have here laid down: the impossibility of men's emerging unaided from a completely savage state; and, consequently, the descent of such as are in that state (supposing mankind to have sprung from a single pair) from ancestors less barbarous, and from whom they have degenerated.

"Records of this descent, and of this degeneracy, it is, from the nature of the case, not likely we should possess; but several indications of the fact may often be found among savage nations. Some have even traditions to that effect; and almost all possess some one or two arts not of a piece with their general rudeness, and which plainly appear to be remnants of a different state of things; being such, that the first invention of them implies a degree of ingenuity beyond what the savages who retain those arts, now possess. . . . As to the causes which have occasioned any portions of mankind thus to degenerate, we are, of course, in most instances, left to mere conjecture; but there seems little reason to doubt that the principal cause has been war. A people perpetually harassed by predatory hostile incursions, and still more, one compelled to fly their country and take refuge in mountains or forests,* or to wander to some distant unoccupied region,

* Whence the name of "savage," silvagio.
(and this we know to have been anciently a common occurrence,) must of course be likely to sink in point of civilization. They must, amidst a series of painful struggles for mere existence, have their attention drawn off from all other subjects; they must be deprived of the materials and the opportunities for practicing many of the arts, till the knowledge of them is lost; and their children must grow up, in each successive generation, more and more uninstructed, and disposed to be satisfied with a life approaching to that of the brutes. But whatever may have been the causes which in each instance have tended to barbarize each nation, of this we may, I think, be well assured, that though, if it have not sunk below a certain point, it may, under favorable circumstances, be expected to rise again, and gradually even more than recover the lost ground; on the other hand, there is a stage of degradation from which it cannot emerge, but through the means of intercourse with some more civilized people. The turbulent and unrestrained passions, the indolence, and, above all, the want of forethought, which are characteristic of savages, naturally tend to prevent, and, as experience seems to show, always have prevented, that process of gradual advancement from taking place, which was sketched out in the opening of this Lecture; except when the savage is stimulated by the example, and supported by the guidance and instruction, of men superior to himself.

"Any one who dislikes the conclusions to which these views lead, will probably set himself to contend against the arguments which prove it unlikely that savages should civilize themselves; but how will he get over the fact, that they never yet have done this? That they never can, is a theory; and something may always be said, well or ill, against any theory; but facts are stubborn things; and that no authenticated instance can be produced of savages that ever did emerge unaided from that state, is no theory, but a statement, hitherto uncontradicted, of a matter of fact.

"Now if this be the case, when and how did civilization first begin? If man when first created was left, like the brutes, to the unaided exercise of his natural powers of body and mind—those powers which are common to the European and to the New Hollander—how comes it that the European is not now in the condition of the New Hollander? As the
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soil itself, and the climate, of New Holland are excellently adapted to the growth of corn, and yet (as corn is not indigenous there) could never have borne any to the end of the world, if it had not been brought thither from another country, and sown, so, the savage himself, though he may be, as it were, a soil capable of receiving the seeds of civilization, can never, in the first instance, produce it, as of spontaneous growth; and, unless those seeds be introduced from some other quarter, must remain for ever in the sterility of barbarism. And from what quarter then could this first beginning of civilization have been supplied to the earliest race of mankind? According to the present course of nature, the first introducer of cultivation among savages is, and must be, man, in a more improved state; in the beginning, therefore, of the human race, this, since there was no man to effect it, must have been the work of another Being. There must have been, in short, a revelation made, to the first or some subsequent generation of our species. And this miracle (for such it is, as being an impossibility according to the present course of nature) is attested, independently of the authority of Scripture, and consequently in confirmation of the Scripture accounts, by the fact that civilized man exists at the present day.

"Taking this view of the subject, we have no need to dwell on the utility—the importance—the antecedent probability—of a revelation: it is established as a fact, of which a monument is existing before our eyes. Divine instruction is proved to be necessary, not merely for an end which we think desirable, or which we think agreeable to Divine wisdom and goodness, but for an end which we know has been attained. That man could not have made himself, is appealed to as a proof of the agency of a Divine Creator; and that mankind could not in the first instance have civilized themselves, is a proof, exactly of the same kind, and of equal strength, of the agency of a Divine Instructor.

"You will, I suspect, find this argument press so hard on the adversaries of religion, that they will be not unlikely to attempt evading its force, by calling on you to produce an instance of some one art, peculiar to civilized men, and which it may be proved could not have been derived but from inspiration. But this is a manifest evasion of the argument.
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For, so far from representing as peculiar to civilized men all arts that seem beyond the power of savages to invent, I have remarked the direct contrary: which indeed is just what might be expected, supposing savages to be, as I have contended, in a degenerated state.

"The argument really employed (and all attempts to misrepresent it are but fresh presumptions that it is unanswerable) consists in an appeal, not to any particular art or arts, but to a civilized condition generally. If this was not the work of a Divine Instructor, produce an instance, if you can, of a nation of savages who have civilized themselves!"

The arguments urged against these conclusions by writers not deficient in intelligence, are such as to furnish no small confirmation to any unbiased mind; being what no man of sense would resort to, except when very hard pressed indeed. E. g.: It has been urged that no superhuman instruction in any of the arts of life could ever have been afforded to man, because the Jews, who are supposed to have been peculiarly favored with revelations respecting religion, were, in the days of Solomon, ignorant that the diameter of a circle is less than one-third of the circumference. This is inferred from what is said in the Second Book of Chronicles, (iv. 2,) though the inference is somewhat hasty; since the difference is so minute between one-third of the circumference and the diameter, (which is less than \( \frac{7}{11} \) and more than \( \frac{7}{12} \) of the circumference,) that practically it may generally be disregarded altogether; and many a person well aware of the geometrical truth, will yet, in describing some building, etc., speak as if the circumference were treble the diameter; even as he might speak of a straight line from one place to another on the earth's surface; though well knowing that in reality the line must be not quite straight, but a very small arch of a circle. However, let it be supposed that the Jews were thus ignorant: the conclusion thence drawn is such as, in any other subject, would be laughed to scorn. E. g.: A man has his several sons educated for the different professions he designs them for—the Church, the Law, Medicine, the Navy, etc.—and then if it be found that the lawyer is no anatomist, that the sailor has but little knowledge of law and medicine, and that the clergyman does not understand navigation, this objector would be bound, on his own principle, to infer that
the father cannot have provided any education at all for any of his children!

More recently, the assertion has been made that a solution has been found of the problem I proposed: that there is an instance of savages civilizing themselves without external aid. Such, it has been said, were the tribe of American Indians called the Mandans, near the Rocky Mountains; who have been described by Mr. Catlin as having possessed a considerable degree of civilization, though surrounded by savage tribes. These latter, not long ago, fell upon and destroyed the whole remnant of the tribe, after it had been thinned by small-pox.

Now all that is wanted, in reference to the case here produced, is—precisely the very thing that is wanted in all others—proof that they had been savages, and had civilized themselves. And this, which is the very point at issue, instead of being proved, is taken for granted! Such is the short and easy refutation which "science," we are told, furnishes of the position I was maintaining!

It is assumed, 1st, that these Mandans were of the same race with the savage tribes around them; 2dly, that the state in which all of them had originally been was that of savages; and 3dly, that the Mandans raised themselves from that state without any external aid. And of no one of these assumptions is there, or can there be found, even a shadow of proof! To assume at pleasure any premises whatever that may suit one's purpose, is certainly neither Baconian nor Aristotelian "science."

1st. How do we know that these Mandans were of the same race as their neighbors? I had an opportunity, in a casual interview with Mr. Catlin, of asking his opinion on this point; he instantly replied that he had never doubted their being a different race: their complexion, he said, their very remarkable and peculiar kind of hair, their customs and whole character, all indicated a distinct nation.

They may, for aught we know, have been a remnant either of the aboriginal inhabitants of the region, or of some colony which had been fixed there; the others having been destroyed—as these Mandans ultimately were—by the surrounding savages.

2d. Again, if we suppose, in defiance of all indications to
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the contrary, that this tribe did belong to the same race as their neighbors, and that consequently all were, once, at the same level, how do we know that this may not have been the higher level, from which the others had degenerated?

3dly, and lastly, supposing that the Mandans did emerge from the savage state, how do we know that this may not have been through the aid of some strangers coming among them—like the Manco-capac of Peru—from some more civilized country, perhaps long before the days of Columbus?

Of all these different suppositions, there is not one that is not incomparably more probable (since there are recorded instances of the like) than that which is so coolly assumed.

On the whole, the reasoning employed in this case much resembles that of some of the alchemists. When they found a few grains of gold in a large mass of ore of some base metal, they took for granted that the whole had been originally one kind of metal; and also, that this one was, not gold, of which part had degenerated into lead, but lead, of which part had ripened into gold; and thence they easily inferred the possibility of transmutation.

Such attempts at refutation as this, serve to show the strength of the position assailed. The position, however, was one which it was necessary to assail somehow or other, from its being fatal to the attempt made to revive Lamarck’s theory of the spontaneous transition of one species into another of a higher character; the lowest animalcules having, it seems, in many generations, ripened into fish, thence into reptiles, beasts, and men. Of the earlier stages of these supposed transmutations I never had occasion to treat; but the view I took of the condition of savages, “breaks the pitcher” (as the Greek proverb expresses it) “at the very threshold;” supposing the animalcule safely conducted, by a series of bold conjectures, through the several transmutations, till from an ape it became a man, there is, as I have shown, an insuperable difficulty in the last step of all, from the savage to the civilized man.

There is, however, in truth, a similar difficulty—or rather impossibility—in every preceding stage. The theory proceeds throughout on unsupported and most improbable conjectures. One, and only one, fact is alleged that is open to the test of experiment; on the reality of which fact, there-
fore, the whole theory may be considered as staked. It is asserted that oats, if kept constantly mown down during the summer, will, the next year, become rye. And this being the only instance adduced that is not, confessedly, a mere conjecture, it is consequently the basis—supposing it established—of all the conjectures thrown out. Now I would suggest to some of our agriculturists to offer a trial of the experiment, proposing to the speculators a wager on its success. If the oats do become rye, the conjectures as to other transmutations will at least be worth listening to: should it prove—as I have no doubt it will—a failure, the keystone of the whole structure will have been taken away.

It may be worth while to add, that I have seen it suggested—apparently as a hasty conjecture—that there may perhaps be different species or varieties of mankind; of which some are capable of originating civilization by their own natural powers, while others are only capable of receiving it by instruction. What I wish chiefly to point out is, that admitting—and it would be a great deal to admit—the possibility of the supposition, it would leave unsolved the main problem: to produce an instance of savages who have civilized themselves. None can be found; and the supposed capability of self-civilization, if it has ever existed, seems never to have been called into play.

Of the hypothesis itself, the utmost that can be said is, that it cannot be demonstrated to be impossible. There is not only no proof of it whatever, but all the evidence that the case admits of is on the opposite side.

Great as are the differences in respect of size, color, and outward appearance, in those different races of animals (such as dogs and horses of different breeds) which are capable—as we know is the case with the human races—of free intermixture, there is no case, I think, of so great and essential a difference in these, as there would be between the supposed two varieties of man: the "self-civilizing," and man such as we know to exist. That difference indeed would hardly be less than between man and brute. If a good physiologist were convinced of the existence of two such races, (whether called species or varieties,) one of them a being capable—when left, wholly untrained, to the mere spontaneous exercise of his natural endowments—of emerging from the savage
state, so as to acquire, in the course of successive generations, the highest point of civilization, and the other such as actual experience presents to us, he would, I think, assign to this latter an intermediate place between the self-civilizing man and the orang-outang, and nearly equidistant from each; and he would not conceive the possibility of an intermixture of any two of the three races.

However, allowing the abstract possibility of the conjecture I have been alluding to, the main argument, as I have said, remains untouched. If man, generally, or some particular race, be capable of "self-civilization," in either case it may be expected that some record, or tradition, or monument of the actual occurrence of such an event should be found; and all attempts to find any have failed.

See Dr. Taylor's Natural History of Society.


"Witnesses are divided into incompetent, suspicious, (verdächtig,) and sufficient, (vollgültig.) Children under the age of eight years, those who have accepted any reward or promise for their evidence, those who have an immediate and certain interest in the success or failure of the prosecution, those who have been accused of calumny, of giving false information, or of perjury, and have been convicted or not fully acquitted, and those who, in any material part of their evidence, have been guilty of falsehood or of inconsistency, are all incompetent witnesses. Their evidence is to be rejected in toto. Persons under the age of eighteen, the injured party, informers, (unless officially bound to inform,) accomplices, persons connected with the party for whom they depose, by blood, by marriage, by friendship, by office, or by dependence—persons opposed to the party against whom they depose, by strife or by hatred, those who may obtain by the result of the inquiry any remote or contingent benefit, persons of suspicious character, persons unknown to the court, and those whose manner gives the appearance of insincerity or of partiality—are all suspicious witnesses.

"The testimony of two sufficient witnesses, stating not mere inferences, but facts which they have perceived with their own senses, amounts to proof. That of one sufficient witness amounts to half-proof."
"Two suspicious witnesses, whose testimony agrees, are equal to one sufficient witness. Therefore the testimony of two suspicious witnesses agreeing with that of one sufficient witness, or the testimony of four suspicious witnesses by themselves, amounts to proof.

"When the evidence on each side, taken per se, amounts to proof, the decision is to be in favor of the accused. In other cases, contradictory testimonies neutralize one another. So that if there be two sufficient witnesses on one side, and two suspicious witnesses on the other, it is as if there were a single sufficient witness, and consequently a half-proof. But if the number of sufficient witnesses had been three, it would have amounted to proof—the two suspicious witnesses merely neutralizing the evidence of one of the three sufficient witnesses, and therefore still leaving the fact proved. So the testimony of seven suspicious witnesses, opposed only by three similar witnesses, amounts to proof—that of six to half-proof. Circumstantial evidence amounts to proof when each fact of which it consists is fully proved, (that is to say, by two sufficient witnesses, or by one such witness and two suspicious ones, or by four suspicious ones,) and when these facts cannot be rationally accounted for on any hypothesis except the prisoner's guilt.* If any other is possible, though it may be improbable, or if the facts are imperfectly proved, the circumstantial evidence is imperfect.† The Code does not state with its usual arithmetical preciseness the gradations in value of imperfect circumstantial evidence. It seems, however, that it may amount to half-proof; for (by Art. 324) if it coalesce with direct evidence amounting to half-proof, the mixture amounts to whole proof. The most complete circumstantial evidence, however, does not authorize the infliction of death.‡

"Let us now see how such rules may work. A man meets two others in a path through a wood. Soon after he has passed and lost sight of them, he hears screams. He turns back and finds one of them lying senseless on the ground, and sees the other running away. He overtakes him, and finds on him the purse and watch of the wounded man, who, by this time, is dead. The murderer and robber, unless he will

* Art. 328. † Art. 327. ‡ Art. 330.
confess, must escape. In the first place, the evidence is only circumstantial—no one saw him give the fatal blow; and secondly, as there is only one witness, there is only a half-proof even of the circumstances to which the witness deposes. We will suppose, however, that the wounded man revives, and deposes that the prisoner demanded his watch and purse, and on his refusal struck him down, and took them. Even then the prisoner, unless, we repeat it, he will confess, cannot be convicted even of the robbery. For the only direct evidence is that of the injured person, and he is, as we have seen, a suspicious witness; his testimony, therefore, amounts to only half of a half-proof, and, as that of the other witness amounts to only a half-proof, the prisoner must be discharged for defect of evidence. Well might Feuerbach say, that unless a man choose to pervert his crimes in public, or to confess them, he need not fear a conviction.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct., 1845, pp. 328–330.

Another country might have been mentioned, in which, though great stress is laid by many persons on the utility of oaths, and much outcry is raised at any proposal for doing away with the numerous oaths of office, etc., that are required, as if the safety of the community depended on these, yet, at the same time, with strange inconsistency, it is taken for granted that every individual, without exception, is, not merely likely, but certain to be ready to perjure himself for the value of a penny: the evidence of any one in a cause in which he has an interest, however small, being not only regarded with suspicion, but totally rejected and disallowed.

As for promissory oaths of office, it would have been beside the purpose of this treatise to enter on the question how far any one is likely to be induced to do his duty, by swearing to do so, who would not have been induced by a sense of duty itself: how far, e. g., any king is likely to have been induced by the oath taken at his coronation (which, be it remembered, he can defer, or wholly omit, at his own pleasure) to be more attentive to his duties as a sovereign than he felt bound to be before.

The objections which have been brought against oaths of this class, lie against them, in fact, rather as promises, than simply as oaths. A man is then only, strictly speaking, bound by (i. e., in consequence of) a promise, when he
engages to do something which he was not bound to previously; as, to deliver such and such articles of merchandise at a stipulated price, to vote for a certain candidate, etc. But any promise to fulfil a previous obligation should be understood (and it would be much better that it should be so expressed) as merely a declaration that he owns and is sensible of that obligation; which he does not—as in the other case—then take upon him. But oaths of office are often made to supply topics for rhetorical purposes, in the worst sense of the word. A man will try to convince others, and often himself also, that the course he prefers is one to which he is bound by oath; and will maintain or insinuate that all who do not agree with him are perjured.

In reference to this point I subjoin a passage from a Charge containing the substance of a speech in the House of Lords on the question of the increased grant to Maynooth College:

"The solemn vow by which we are bound to 'banish and drive out all erroneous and strange doctrines, contrary to God's word,' has been again and again brought forward on this and several other analogous occasions; and it has been either distinctly asserted, or by implication insinuated, that any one who has taken that vow, cannot, without a violation of it, support such a measure as the one lately passed. For there are some, I am sorry to say, among the loudest censurers of Romish claims to infallibility, who yet have such full confidence in their own infallibility, as to make no scruple of imputing breach of a vow to any one who does not interpret that vow in the same sense as themselves. And since such imputations are, I suppose, listened to by some persons, (as may be inferred from their being on so many occasions and so pertinaciously urged,) I feel bound to protest against them, in behalf not only of myself but also of many of my brother-clergy who think with me on these points, and among whom are to be found some of the most truly pious and able, and unostentatiously zealous and useful Christian ministers.

"I am not, I trust, more forgetful of the vows I have made than those whose interpretation of them is utterly at variance with mine. But from their interpretation would follow consequences from which not only I, but probably...
most of themselves also would recoil. We have vowed not merely not to promote and encourage, but to 'banish and drive out erroneous doctrines.' This vow, therefore, cannot, at any rate, be fulfilled by simply voting against a pecuniary grant. We are actively to 'drive out doctrines contrary to God's word.' But whence are we to drive them out? and by what means? Is it by penal laws, by secular coercion, by the point of the bayonet, that we are to drive out religious error? And again, is it from these islands—from the soil of the British empire—that we are bound to banish false doctrines? This can only be effectually done by banishing the professors of them; as Ferdinand and Isabella expelled from Spain the Moors and Jews. And are these the measures which Christian bishops and other clergy are bound to recommend, and the Legislature to adopt?

"We have heard of late much complaint of the unscriptural and immoral, and indeed seditious and dangerous doctrines taught at Roman Catholic seminaries; and we have been called upon, on that ground, by virtue of our vows, to—vote against an increased grant to such seminaries! Manifestly, if the statements be admitted and the reasoning assented to, we must not stop there. All allowances to Roman Catholic chaplains of regiments, jails, and workhouses, must be stopped; as well as the grants and endowments enjoyed by Roman Catholic ministers in the colonies and dependencies. Nor can we consistently stop at the withdrawing of all grants to Roman Catholic seminaries: we must call for the total suppression of the seminaries. Nor will even this be enough: we must go on to prohibit the teaching, in any way, or in any place, at home or abroad,* of the obnoxious doctrines: in short, we must urge the total suppression of the Roman Catholic religion, by the forcible expulsion of all its adherents.

"If such were the vow proposed to me, sooner than fulfil or undertake so unchristian an engagement, I would resign my office—I would abandon my profession—I would abjure the Church that imposed such vows. But I have always considered the vows I have taken as binding me—or rather as reminding me of the duty—to drive out, as far as lies in me, erroneous doctrines from my own Church, and especially

* See Speech of the Lord Bishop of St. David's.
from that portion of it committed to my own immediate superintendence.

"By instruction, by admonition and remonstrance, and finally by ecclesiastical censure, when applicable and necessary, a bishop is bound to endeavor to drive away from among those of his own communion 'all strange doctrines contrary to God's word.' Over those of another communion I claim no control. But I have expressed, openly, in many works which are before the public, my utter disapprobation of what appear to me erroneous doctrines, and have given my reasons for thinking them such; without, indeed, any polemical bitterness, but without any suppression, through fear of man's censure, of what I hold to be God's truth! endeavoring, according to the apostolic precepts, to be 'gentle unto all men, in meekness instructing them that oppose themselves,' and 'speaking the truth in love.'

"But though I presume not to pass any authoritative censure on the members of other communions, I have exerted myself; I think I may say, as zealously as any of my brethren, to banish strange doctrines from our own communion, and to counteract the disingenuous procedure of those who hold the doctrines of one Church and the emoluments of another.

"It is thus that I have always interpreted the vows alluded to. But were the other interpretation of them to be adopted, no man of logical mind could stop short of consequences which most, I believe and trust, of those who urge such arguments, would themselves shrink from."

The following extract from a number (published about the same time) of a clever periodical, contains some just remarks on some of the points above noticed:

"Among other apparitions of sophisms supposed defunct, the Coronation-oath argument has been resuscitated in the course of the Maynooth debate, and even in the solemn shape of a protest in the House of Lords! Reasonable men interpret the Coronation-oath as binding the king not to encroach on the laws of his prerogative. The opponents of the increased allowance to Maynooth view it as binding him to refuse his assent to certain laws: they deem the oath a means of restricting the royal prerogative and diminishing the liberty of the subject at the same time. This view is the standing consolation of politicians beaten in argument: they seek to
persuade themselves, that though the king be convinced, and
the people be convinced, yet neither one nor other, nor both
together, can act upon their convictions notwithstanding.

"The consolation, it is true, does not last long; for the
impossibility is always achieved. The Coronation-oath, in
their acceptation of it, may be compared to the mirage of the
desert. The mirage looks like a vast lake, in which the
traveller will be drowned if he advances; but when he does
advance to the place of the supposed water, he finds dry land
and the lake still before him; which again and again recedes
as he marches on. George the Third took the Coronation-
oath, which some maintain binds the king to allow of no
change in what pertains to religion; he found no perjury in
relaxing the penal laws, and granting the elective franchise
to Roman Catholics; but he stumbled at Emancipation—that
was his 'lake.' George the Fourth, after much apparent
fear of drowning in his father's lake, stepped on as far as
Emancipation, with dry clothes; there he stopped. William
the Fourth was threatened with being overwhelmed in the
sea of perjury, and losing his crown, Pharaoh-like, in the
waves, if he assented to the Church Temporalities Act: he
reached this point, however, and the shore; the receding
mirage being yet at some distance before him. And now the
queen is to be over head and ears in perjury, and lose her
crown, for assenting to the Maynooth grant; and she will be
threatened with the like again and again, for making still
further advances in the same direction. When shall we get
over this low arid region of prejudiced sophistry, in which
the mirage is perennial?

"If there were a shadow of reason in the allegation that
the queen has forfeited the crown by recognizing the Roman
Catholics, Ireland would have been forfeited, at the Reforma-
tion; since the king of England for a long time claimed that
country as a gift from the pope, on the condition of bringing
it into subjection to him. And the case of the pope was even
stronger. Parliament may interpret or relax conditions im-
posed by parliament: it cannot be supposed that parliament
would bind a king to refuse his assent to a bill passed through
parliament. But the pope and the Irish nation did not give
their sanction to the Reformation; and therefore, on this
hypothesis, may fairly demand the forfeit.
"If the interpretation of the Coronation-oath, put forth by some with such apparent seriousness, should ever prevail, there would still be one resource left for English kings wishing to deal justly by their subjects. From this interpretation it follows that we have in the realm two kinds of regal government—that of an uncrowned and that of a crowned king. The latter is bound to certain things which the former is not. Every king has at the outset his choice which of these two he will be; for he is king at once; and may reign as long as he likes without being crowned, or may decline it altogether."


"Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things, but the similarity or sameness of two relations. There must be more than two things to give rise to two relations: there must be at least three; and in most cases there are four. Thus A may be like B, but there is no analogy between A and B: it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an analogy. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but, on the contrary, tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations; and so assists the mind instead of misleading it.

"In this manner, things most unlike and discordant in their nature may be strictly analogous to one another. Thus a certain proposition may be called the basis of a system. The proposition is to the system what the basis is to a building: it serves a similar office and purpose; and this last relation being well known, is of use to illustrate the other which was less known. E. g.: The system rests upon it; it is useless to proceed with the argument till this is well established; if this were removed, the system must fall. The only conditions requisite in the use of this kind of analogy are, first, not to proceed to a comparison of the corresponding terms as they are intrinsically in themselves or in their own nature, but merely as they are in relation to the other terms respect-
ively; and, secondly, not to presume that because the relation is the same or similar in one or two points, therefore it is the same or similar in all.

"The first of these errors cannot be committed in the instance before us, because the two things are of such different nature that they have no one point of resemblance. But when the first and the third term are not only corresponding in relation, but chance also to be of a kindred nature, or when, from the circumstance of one being visible, and the other invisible, their discrepancies do not strike us, it often happens that a comparison is pursued between the things themselves; and this is one cause of the promiscuous use of the terms similitude and analogy. As, for example, when Locke, having once established the comparison, proceeds to talk of ideas as if they were really images in the mind, or traces in the brain.

"It is from observing this tendency in men to regard the metaphorical or analogous name as bringing along with it something of the nature of the thing it originally signified, that Mr. Stewart is led to make the remark, not less original than just, that it is well for the understanding, though it may be a loss to the fancy, when a metaphorical word has lost its pedigree; that* is, when it no longer excites the primary idea denoted by it, and is reduced by custom to a plain and direct appellation in its secondary sense. He suggests also† with equal ingenuity, in cases where words have not yet been worn down to this use, the expedient of varying our metaphor when speaking of the same subject, as a preservative against this dangerous and encroaching error. Of the utility of this practice, I have no doubt; and I think it may be regarded as an advantage of the same kind, that the parables of the New Testament are drawn from such a great

* Philosophical Essays, Ess. v., chap. 3.
† Ibid. In the analysis here given of analogy, it will be perceived, by those who are conversant with Mr. Stewart's writings, that I have ventured to depart widely from his use of the word. Indeed, M. Prevost's etymology, as given in a passage quoted with approbation by Mr. Stewart, vol. ii., chap. iv., § 4, appears to me quite erroneous. "Le mot Analogue, dans l'origine, n'exprime que la ressemblance." The reverse of which I take to be the fact. But this is not the place for entering further into the discussion.
diversity of objects, as to check the propensity in man, especially in matters of religion, to attach some mystical character to the images so employed, and to look upon them as emblems possessing an intrinsic virtue, or at least a secret affinity with those spiritual truths, to the illustration of which they are made subservient.

"When the points in which the similarity of relation holds are of secondary importance—when, instead of being essential and characteristic, they are slight and superficial—the analogy is often called a metaphor, and often a similitude, as being addressed rather to the fancy than to the judgment, and intended rather to adorn and illustrate than to explain. But it would perhaps be better to avoid the name similitude in these cases, and to regard them as being, what they really are, analogies, although subsisting in points of inferior moment.

"Thus when the swallow is called the herald of summer, or a ship is said to plough the waves, it is easy to resolve the phrase into the form of analogy or proportion: the swallow is to the summer what the herald is to his prince—he announces his approach. So the action of a ship is to the sea what the action of a plough is to the land. But because in these cases the relation is fanciful rather than real—that is, it consists, not in essential points, but in mere circumstances of inferior importance—we leave such things to the province of taste or amusement, and no considerate man ever attempts to reason from them.

"I am not of the mind of those speculators," said Mr. Burke, 'who seem assured that all States have the same period of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude, that are found in individuals. Parallels of this sort rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, than supply analogies from whence to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings—commonwealths are not physical but moral essences.'*

*A remarkable example of this kind is that, argument of Toplady against free-will, who, after quoting the text, Ye also as lively stones are built up a spiritual house,† triumphantly

* Letters on a Regicide Peace, p. 4.  † 1 Pet. ii. 5.
exclaims, 'This is giving free-will a stab under the fifth rib; for can stones hew themselves, and build themselves in a regular house?'

"Even when we attribute to inanimate things the qualities of animals, the same analysis may be adopted as before. Thus the rage of the sea denotes a similarity of effect to the effect of rage in animals. This is even more the work of fancy than the example before given; for in reducing it to the form of a proportion, one term is wholly supplied by the imagination. We do not really believe there is a principle in the sea producing these effects, answering to rage in animals, but the imagination suggests such a principle, and transfers the name of rage to it.

"In those cases where the analogy is traced between things perfectly heterogeneous, there is little danger of confounding the idea with that of similitude. But when the subjects we are comparing are of a kindred nature, so that the things spoken of not only stand in the same relation, but also bear a close resemblance to each other, then it is we are most apt to confound them together, and to substitute resemblance for analogy. Thus because the heart or the tooth of an animal not only serves the same office to the animal that the heart or the tooth of a man does to him, but is also an object very nearly resembling it in its structure and outward appearance, we are apt to imagine that the same name is given to it solely on this last account. But if we pursue the inquiry throughout the animal creation, we shall find that the form of the corresponding parts is infinitely varied, although the analogy remains the same; till at length we arrive at such diversities, that it is only persons conversant with comparative anatomy who can readily detect the analogy. And long before the difference has reached this length in popular discourse, the analogical name is dropped, and the scientific use of it in such cases sounds pedantic to unlearned ears. Thus the beak of a bird answers to the tooth of a man, and the shell of a lobster to the bones of other animals. If the use and office remain the same, no diversity of form impairs the analogy; but we ought from such examples to learn, even

* Christian and Philosophical Necessity Asserted, p. 56. See 1 Cor. xiv. 4.
when similitude of form does exist, not to regard it as the true ground of the comparison we make, and of our affixing the same name.

"Thus too when we speak of qualities of things which are not cognizable by our senses except in their effects, we bestow the same name on account of a real or supposed analogy, not on account of any similarity in the qualities themselves, which may or may not exist, according as the things we speak of are more or less of a kindred nature. Sagacity, courage, fidelity, love, jealousy, revenge, are all predicated of brute animals not less than of man, although they are not things or existences themselves, but certain attributes or affections in them, exhibiting symptoms and producing effects corresponding with the symptoms and effects attendant upon those qualities in ourselves. In these instances still more than in the former, we are prone to confound analogy with resemblance; because as these things have no form or existence of their own—as the whole essence of them consists in their relation to something else—if the relations be alike, the things are necessarily alike, and we naturally slide into that form of speaking which makes no distinction between analogy and resemblance; but even then we regard the qualities as identical, only in proportion as the nature of the respective subjects to which they belong may be regarded as the same.

"The second error above noticed as carefully to be avoided in the use of analogy is, when we do not indeed treat the corresponding terms as resembling one another in their own nature, but when we presume that a similarity of relation subsists in other points besides those which are the foundation of the analogy.

"When the analogy consists in slight or superficial circumstances, still more when it is fanciful only, no attempt whatever should be made to reason from it; as was exemplified in the passage produced from Burke's writings; but even when the analogy is solid and well founded we are liable to fall into error, if we suppose it to extend farther than it really does. Errors of this nature are often committed by men of lively fancies or of ardent minds, and they are the more seducing because they set out not only with a show of reason, but with reason and truth actually on their side.

"Thus because a just analogy has been discerned between
the metropolis of a country and the heart in the animal body, it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a disease—that it may impede some of its most important functions, or even be the means of its dissolution.

"Another frequent example of this second error is found in the use of the same titles of office or dignity in different nations or in distant times. Although the relation denoted by them be the same in one or in several important particulars, yet it scarcely ever holds throughout; and the most false notions are in consequence entertained by people of the nature of these corresponding offices in every country but their own. We have known what mischief has been produced by the adoption of the phrase, 'servant of the people,' although it cannot be denied that in some points the duty of the magistrate is the same as the duty of a servant*—that his time, for instance, his thoughts, his abilities, should be devoted to the benefit of the people; and again, on the other hand, because the duty of a subject towards his sovereign coincides in many respects with the duty of a child towards his parent, some speculative writers have hastily concluded that the institution of monarchy is equally founded in nature, and possesses the same inherent authority with the parental."—Copleston's *Four Discourses on the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination*, note to Disc. III., pp. 122–130.


"No man is so obstinate an admirer of the old times, as to

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* "The ‘servants’ that we read of in the Bible, and in other translations of ancient books, are so called by analogy to servants among us; and that analogy consists in the offices which a ‘servant’ performs, in waiting on his master, and doing his bidding. It is in this respect that the one description of ‘servant’ corresponds ["answers" to the other. And hence some persons have been led to apply all that is said in Scripture respecting master and servants, to these times and this country; forgetting that the analogy is not complete, and extends no farther than the point above mentioned. For the ancient ‘servants’ (except when expressly spoken of as hired servants) were slaves; a part of the master’s possessions.”

For a remarkable instance of the kind of mistake the author is speaking of, see Appendix to Logic, Art. “God.”
deny that medicine, surgery, botany, chemistry, engineering, navigation, are better understood now than in any former age. We conceive that it is the same with political science. Like those other sciences which we have mentioned, it has always been working itself clearer and clearer, and depositing impurity after impurity. There was a time when the most powerful of human intellects were deluded by the gibberish of the astrologer and the alehymist; and just so there was a time when the most enlightened and virtuous statesmen thought it the first duty of a government to persecute heretics, to found monasteries, to make war on Saracens. But time advances, facts accumulate, doubts arise. Faint glimpses of truth begin to appear, and shine more and more unto the perfect day. The highest intellects, like the tops of mountains, are the first to catch and to reflect the dawn. They are bright while the level below is still in darkness. But soon the light, which at first illuminated only the loftiest eminences, descends on the plain, and penetrates to the deepest valley. First come hints, then fragments of systems, then defective systems, then complete and harmonious systems. The sound opinion, held for a time by one bold speculator, becomes the opinion of a small minority, of a strong minority, of a majority—of mankind. Thus, the great progress goes on, till schoolboys laugh at the jargon which imposed on Bacon—till country rectors condemn the illiberality and intolerance of Sir Thomas More."—Edinburgh Review, July, 1835, p. 282.

"We have said that the history of England is the history of progress, and, when we take a comprehensive view of it, it is so. But when examined in small separate portions, it may with more propriety be called a history of actions and reactions. We have often thought that the motion of the public mind in our country resembles that of the sea when the tide is rising. Each successive wave rushes forward, breaks, and rolls back; but the great flood is steadily coming in. A person who looked on the waters only for a moment might fancy that they were retiring, or that they obeyed no fixed law, but were rushing capriciously to and fro. But when he keeps his eye on them for a quarter of an hour, and sees one sea-mark disappear after another, it is impossible for him to doubt of the general direction in which the ocean is
moved. Just such has been the course of events in England. In the history of the national mind, which is, in truth, the history of the nation, we must carefully distinguish that recoil which regularly follows every advance from a general ebb. If we take short intervals—if we compare 1640 and 1660, 1680 and 1685, 1708 and 1712, 1782 and 1794, we find a retrogression. But if we take centuries—if, for example, we compare 1794 with 1660, or with 1685—we cannot doubt in which direction society is proceeding.”—Edinburgh Review, July, 1839, pp. 228, 229.

This last passage closely resembles the following one in the Lectures on Political Economy:

“Another point which is attainable is, to perceive, amidst all the admixture of evil, and all the seeming disorder of conflicting agencies, a general tendency nevertheless towards the accomplishment of wise and beneficent designs.

“As in contemplating an ebbing tide, we are sometimes in doubt, on a short inspection, whether the sea is really receding, because from time to time a wave will dash farther up the shore than those which had preceded it, but if we continue our observation long enough, we see plainly that the boundary of the land is on the whole advancing; so here, by extending our view over many countries and through several ages, we may distinctly perceive the tendencies which would have escaped a more confined research.”—Lecture iv., p. 106.

The following, from the Edinburgh Review,* is an admirable specimen of illustrative argument:

“A blade which is designed both to shave and to carve will certainly not shave so well as a razor, or carve so well as a carving-knife. An academy of painting, which should also be a bank, would in all probability exhibit very bad pictures and discount very bad bills. A gas company, which should also be an infant-school society, would, we apprehend, light the streets ill, and teach the children ill. On this principle, we think that government should be organized solely with a view to its main end; and that no part of its efficiency for that end should be sacrificed in order to promote any other end, however excellent.

* No. cxxxix., April, 1839.
"But does it follow from hence that governments ought never to promote any end other than their main end? In nowise. Though it is desirable that every institution should have a main end, and should be so formed as to be in the highest degree efficient for that main end; yet if, without any sacrifice of its efficiency for that end, it can promote any other good end, it ought to do so. Thus, the end for which a hospital is built is the relief of the sick, not the beautifying of the street. To sacrifice the health of the sick to splendor of architectural effect—to place the building in a bad air only that it may present a more commanding front to a great public place—to make the wards hotter or cooler than they ought to be, in order that the columns and windows of the exterior may please the passers-by, would be monstrous. But if, without any sacrifice of the chief object, the hospital can be made an ornament to the metropolis, it would be absurd not to make it so.

"In the same manner, if a government can, without any sacrifice of its main end, promote any other good end, it ought to do so. The encouragement of the fine arts, for example, is by no means the main end of government; and it would be absurd, in constituting a government, to bestow a thought on the question, whether it would be a government likely to train Raphaels and Domenichinos. But it by no means follows that it is improper for a government to form a national gallery of pictures. The same may be said of patronage bestowed on learned men—of the publication of archives—of the collecting of libraries, menageries, plants, fossils, antiques—of journeys and voyages for purposes of geographical discovery or astronomical observation. It is not for these ends that government is constituted. But it may well happen that a government may have at its command resources which will enable it, without any injury to its main end, to serve these collateral ends far more effectually than any individual or any voluntary association could do. If so, government ought to serve these collateral ends.

"It is still more evidently the duty of government to promote—always in subordination to its main end—every thing which is useful as a means for the attaining of that main end. The improvement of steam navigation, for example, is by no means a primary object of government. But as steam
vessels are useful for the purpose of national defence, and for the purpose of facilitating intercourse between distant provinces, and thereby consolidating the force of the empire, it may be the bounden duty of government to encourage ingenious men to perfect an invention which so directly tends to make the state more efficient for its great primary end.

"Now, on both these grounds, the instruction of the people may with propriety engage the care of the government." Pp. 273–275.

"We may illustrate our view of the policy which governments ought to pursue with respect to religious instruction, by recurring to the analogy of a hospital. Religious instruction is not the main end for which a hospital is built; and to introduce into a hospital any regulations prejudicial to the health of the patients, on the plea of promoting their spiritual improvement—to send a ranting preacher to a man who has just been ordered by the physician to lie quiet and try to get a little sleep—to impose a strict observance of Lent on a convalescent who has been advised to eat heartily of nourishing food—to direct, as the bigoted Pius the Fifth actually did, that no medical assistance should be given to those who declined spiritual attendance—would be the most extravagant folly. Yet it by no means follows that it would not be right to have a chaplain to attend the sick, and to pay such a chaplain out of the hospital funds. Whether it will be proper to have such a chaplain at all, and of what religious persuasion that chaplain ought to be, must depend on circumstances. There may be a town in which it would be impossible to set up a good hospital without the help of people of different opinions. And religious parties may run so high, that, though people of different opinions are willing to contribute for the relief of the sick, they will not concur in the choice of any one chaplain. The high-churchman insists that if there is a paid chaplain, he shall be a high-churchman. The evangelicals stickle for an evangelical. Here it would evidently be absurd and cruel to let a useful and humane design, about which all are agreed, fall to the ground, because all cannot agree about something else. The governors must either appoint two chaplains, and pay them both, or they must appoint none; and every one of them must, in his indi-
individual capacity, do what he can for the purpose of providing the sick with such religious instruction and consolation as will, in his opinion, be most useful to them.

"We should say the same of government. Government is not an institution for the propagation of religion, any more than St. George's hospital is an institution for the propagation of religion. And the most absurd and pernicious consequences would follow, if government should pursue, as its primary end, that which can never be more than its secondary end, though intrinsically more important than its primary end. But a government which considers the religious instruction of the people as a secondary end, and follows out that principle faithfully, will, we think, be likely to do much good, and little harm." Pp. 275, 276.

[G.] Part I., Chap. iii., § 3, p. 130.

"Theirs" (the New Testament writers) "is a history of miracles: the historical picture of the scene in which the Spirit of God was poured on all flesh, and signs and wonders, visions and dreams, were part of the essentials of their narratives. How is all this related? With the same absence of high coloring and extravagant description with which other writers notice the ordinary occurrences of the world: partly no doubt for the like reason, that they were really familiar with miracles; partly too because to them these miracles had long been contemplated only as subservient measures to the great object and business of their ministry—the salvation of men's souls. On the subject of miracles, the means to this great end, they speak in calm, unimpassioned language: on man's sins, change of heart, on hope, faith, and charity—on the objects, in short, to be effected, they exhaust all their feelings and eloquence. Their history, from the narrative of our Lord's persecutions to those of Paul, the abomination of the Jews, embraces scenes and personages which claim from the ordinary reader a continual effusion of sorrow, or wonder, or indignation. In writers who were friends of the parties, and adherents of the cause for which they did and suffered so great things, the absence of it is on ordinary grounds inconceivable. Look at the account even of the crucifixion. Not one burst of indignation or sympathy mixes with the
details of the narrative. Stephen, the first martyr, is stoned, and the account comprised in these few words, 'They stoned Stephen, calling upon God, and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit.' The varied and immense labors and sufferings of the apostles are slightly hinted at, or else related in this dry and frigid way: 'And when they had called the apostles, and beaten them, they commanded that they should not speak in the name of Jesus, and let them go.'* 'And there came thither certain Jews from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the people, and, having stoned Paul, drew him out of the city, supposing he had been dead. Howbeit, as the disciples stood round about him he rose up, and came into the city; and the next day he departed with Barnabas to Derbe.'† Had these authors no feeling? Had their mode of life bereaved them of the common sympathies and sensibilities of human nature? Read such passages as St. Paul's parting address to the elders of Miletus; the same apostle's recommendation to the offending member of the Corinthian Church to pardon; and, more than all, the occasional bursts of conflicting feeling, in which anxious apprehension for the faith and good behavior of his converts is mixed with the pleasing recollection of their conversion, and the minister and the man are alike strongly displayed; and it will be plain that Christianity exercised no benumbing influence on the heart. No: their whole soul was occupied with one object, which predominated over all the means subservient to it, however great those means might be. In the storm the pilot's eye is fixed on the headland which must be weathered; in the crisis of victory or defeat, the general sees only the position to be carried; and the dead and the instruments of death fall around him unheeded. On the salvation of men, on this one point, the witnesses of Christ and the ministers of his Spirit expended all their energy of feeling and expression. All that occurred—mischance, persecution, and miracle—were glanced at by the eye of faith only in subserviency to this mark of the prize of their high calling, as working together for good, and all exempt from the associations which would attach to such events and scenes, when contemplated by themselves, and with the short-sightedness of uninspired men.

* Acts v. 40, 41.
† Acts xiv. 19, 20.
Miracles were not to them objects of wonder, nor mischances a subject of sorrow and lamentation. They did all, they suffered all, to the glory of God."—London Review, No. ii., p. 345.


"First, as to proximity of time, every one knows that any melancholy incident is the more affecting that it is recent. Hence it is become common with story-tellers, that they make a deeper impression on the hearers, to introduce remarks like these: that the tale which they relate is not old, that it happened but lately, or in their own time, or that they are yet living who had a part in it, or were witnesses of it. Proximity of time regards not only the past but the future. An event that will probably soon happen, hath greater influence upon us than what will probably happen a long time hence. I have hitherto proceeded on the hypothesis, that the orator rouses the passions of his hearers by exhibiting some past transaction; but we must acknowledge that passion may be as strongly excited by his reasonings concerning an event yet to come. In the judiciary orations there is greater scope for the former—in the deliberative, for the latter; though in each kind there may occasionally be scope for both. All the seven circumstances enumerated are applicable, and have equal weight, whether they relate to the future or to the past. The only exception that I know of is, that probability and plausibility are scarcely distinguishable, when used in reference to events in futurity. As in these there is no access for testimony, what constitutes the principal distinction is quite excluded. In comparing the influence of the past upon our minds with that of the future, it appears in general, that if the evidence, the importance, and the distance of the objects be equal, the latter will be greater than the former. The reason, I imagine, is, we are conscious, that as every moment the future, which seems placed before us, is approaching; and the past, which lies, as it were, behind, is retiring; our nearness or relation to the one constantly increaseth as the other decreaseth. There is something like attraction in the first case, and repulsion in the second. This tends to interest us more in the future than in the past, and consequently to the present view aggrandizes the one, and diminishes the other.
"What, nevertheless, gives the past a very considerable advantage, is its being generally susceptible of much stronger evidence than the future. The lights of the mind are, if I may so express myself, in an opposite situation to the lights of the body. These discover clearly the prospect lying before us, but not the ground we have already passed. By the memory, on the contrary, that great luminary of the mind, things past are exhibited in retrospect: we have no correspondent faculty to irradiate the future; and even in matters which fall not within the reach of our memory, past events are often clearly discoverable by testimony, and by effects at present existing; whereas we have nothing equivalent to found our arguments upon in reasoning about things to come. It is for this reason that the future is considered as the province of conjecture and uncertainty.

"Local connection, the fifth in the above enumeration, hath a more powerful effect than proximity of time. Duration and space are two things (call them entities, or attributes, or what you please) in some respects the most like, and in some respects the most unlike, to one another. They resemble in continuity, divisibility, infinity, in their being deemed essential to the existence of other things, and in the doubts that have been raised as to their having a real or independent existence of their own. They differ in that the latter is permanent, whereas the very essence of the former consisteth in transitories; the parts of the one are all successive, of the other all coëxistent. The greater portions of time are all distinguished by the memorable things which have been transacted in them, the smaller portions by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies; the portions of place, great and small, (for we do not here consider the regions of the fixed stars and planets,) are distinguished by the various tracts of land and water, into which the earth is divided and subdivided; the one distinction intelligible, the other sensible; the one chiefly known to the inquisitive, the other in a great measure obvious to all.

"Hence perhaps it arises, that the latter is considered as a firmer ground of relation than the former. Who is not more curious to know the notable transactions which have happened in his own country from the earliest antiquity, than to be acquainted with those which have happened in the re-
motest regions of the globe during the century wherein he
lives? It must be owned, however, that the former circum-
stance is more frequently aided by that of personal relation
than the latter. Connection of place not only includes
vicinage, but every other local relation, such as being in a
province under the same government with us, in a State that
is in alliance with us, in a country well known to us, and the
like. Of the influence of this connection in operating on
our passions, we have daily proofs. With how much indif-
fERENCE, at least with how slight and transient emotions, do
we read in newspapers the accounts of the most deplorable
accidents in countries distant and unknown! How much, on
the contrary, are we alarmed and agitated on being informed
that any such accident hath happened in our own neighbor-
hood, and that, even though we be totally unacquainted with
the persons concerned!

"Still greater is the power of relation to the persons con-
cerned, which was the sixth circumstance mentioned, as this
tie is more direct than that which attacheth us to the scene
of action. It is the persons, not the place, that are the im-
mediate objects of the passions, love or hatred, pity or anger,
envy or contempt. Relation to the actors commonly pro-
duces an effect contrary to that produced by relation to the
sufferers, the first in extenuation, the second in aggravation,
of the crime alleged. The first makes for the apologist, the
second for the accuser. This, I say, is commonly the case;
not always. A remote relation to the actors, when the
offence is heinous, especially if the sufferers be more nearly
related, will sometimes rather aggravate than extenuate the
guilt in our estimation. But it is impossible with any pre-
cision to reduce these effects to rules; so much depending on
the different tempers and sentiments of different audiences.
Personal relations are of various kinds. Some have generally
greater influence than others; some again have greater in-
fluence with one person, others with another. They are con-
sanguinity, affinity, friendship, acquaintance, being fellow-
citizens, countrymen, of the same surname, language, reli-
gion, occupation, and innumerable others.

"But of all the connective circumstances, the most pow-

erful is interest, which is the last. Of all relations, personal
relation, by bringing the object very near, most enlivens that
sympathy, which attaches us to the concerns of others; interest in the effects brings the object, if I may say so, into contact with us, and makes the mind cling to it, as a concern of its own. Sympathy is but a reflected feeling, and therefore, in ordinary cases, must be weaker than the original. Though the mirror be ever so true, a lover will not be obliged to it for presenting him with the figure of his mistress, when he hath an opportunity of gazing on her person. Nor will the orator place his chief confidence in the assistance of the social and sympathetic affections, when he hath it in his power to arm the selfish.

"Men universally, from a just conception of the difference, have, when self is concerned, given a different name to what seems originally the same passion in a higher degree. Injury, to whomsoever offered, is to every man that observes it, and whose sense of right is not debauched by vicious practice, the natural object of indignation. Indignation always implies resentment, or a desire of retaliating on the injurious person, so far at least as to make him repent the wrong he hath committed. This indignation in the person injured is, from our knowledge of mankind, supposed to be, not indeed universally, but generally so much stronger, that it ought to be distinguished by another appellation, and is accordingly denominated revenge. In like manner, beneficence, on whomsoever exercised, is the natural object of our love; love always implies benevolence, or a desire of promoting the happiness of the beneficent person; but this passion in the person benefited is conceived to be so much greater, and to infer so strong an obligation to a return of good offices to his benefactor, that it merits to be distinguished by the title gratitude. Now by this circumstance of interest in the effects, the speaker, from engaging pity in his favor, can proceed to operate on a more powerful principle, self-preservation. The benevolence of his hearers he can work up into gratitude, their indignation into revenge.

"The two last-mentioned circumstances, personal relation and interest, are not without influence, as was hinted in the enumeration, though they regard the speaker only, and not the hearers. The reason is, a person present with us, whom we see and hear, and who by words, and looks, and gestures, gives the liveliest signs of his feelings, has the surest and
most immediate claim upon our sympathy. We become infected with his passions. We are hurried along by them, and not allowed leisure to distinguish between his relation and our relation, his interest and our interest.”—Campbell's Rhetoric, pp. 184–190. (Book I., chap. vii., § 5, Parts 4, 5, 6, 7.)


A good illustration of what has been said is supplied by the following extract from Mr. Milman's Bampton Lectures, (Lecture VI., p. 269 :) "Conceive then the apostles of Jesus Christ, the tent-maker or the fisherman, entering, as strangers, into one of the splendid cities of Syria, Asia Minor, or Greece. Conceive them, I mean, as unendowed with miraculous powers, having adopted their itinerant system of teaching from human motives and for human purposes alone. As they pass along to the remote and obscure quarter, where they expect to meet with precarious hospitality among their countrymen, they survey the strength of the established religion, which it is their avowed purpose to overthrow. Everywhere they behold temples on which the utmost extravagance of expenditure has been lavished by succeeding generations; idols of the most exquisite workmanship, to which, even if the religious feeling of adoration is enfeebled, the people are strongly attached by national or local vanity. They meet processions in which the idle find perpetual occupation, the young excitement, the voluptuous a continual stimulant to their passions. They behold a priesthood, numerous, sometimes wealthy; nor are these alone wedded by interest to the established faith; many of the trades, like those of the makers of silver shrines in Ephesus, are pledged to the support of that to which they owe their maintenance. They pass a magnificent theatre, on the splendor and success of which the popularity of the existing authorities mainly depends; and in which the serious exhibitions are essentially religious, the lighter as intimately connected with the indulgence of the baser passions. They behold another public building, where even worse feelings, the cruel and the sanguinary, are pampered by the animating contests of wild beasts and of gladiators, in which they themselves may shortly play a dreadful part,

Butchered to make a Roman holiday!
Show and spectacle are the characteristic enjoyments of the whole people, and every show and spectacle is either sacred to the religious feelings, or incentive to the lusts of the flesh —those feelings which must be entirely eradicated, those lusts which must be brought into total subjection to the law of Christ. They encounter likewise itinerant jugglers, diviners, magicians, who impose upon the credulous, and excite the contempt of the enlightened: in the first case, dangerous rivals to those who should attempt to propagate a new faith by imposture and deception; in the latter, naturally tending to prejudice the mind against all miraculous pretensions whatever: here, like Elymas, endeavoring to outdo the signs and wonders of the apostles; there, throwing suspicion on all asserted supernatural agency, by the frequency and clumsiness of their delusions. They meet philosophers, frequently itinerant like themselves; or teachers of new religions, priests of Isis and Serapis, who have brought into equal discredit what might otherwise have appeared a proof of philanthropy, the performing laborious journeys at the sacrifice of personal ease and comfort for the moral and religious improvement of mankind; or, at least, have so accustomed the public mind to similar pretensions, as to take away every attraction from their boldness or novelty. There are also the teachers of the different mysteries, which would engross all the anxiety of the inquisitive, perhaps excite, even if they did not satisfy, the hopes of the more pure and lofty-minded. Such must have been among the obstacles which would enforce themselves on the calmer moments of the most ardent; such the overpowering difficulties, of which it would be impossible to overlook the importance, or elude the force; which required no sober calculation to estimate, no laborious inquiry to discover; which met and confronted them wherever they went, and which, either in desperate presumption, or deliberate reliance on their own preternatural powers, they must have contemned and defied.

"The commencement of their labors was usually disheartening, and ill-calculated to keep alive the flame of ungrounded enthusiasm. They begin their operations in the narrow and secluded synagogue of their own countrymen. The novelty of their doctrine, and curiosity, secure them at first a patient attention; but as the more offensive tenets are developed, the
most fierce and violent passions are awakened. Scorn and hatred are seen working in the clouded brows and agitated countenances of the leaders: if here and there one is pricked to the heart, it requires considerable moral courage to acknowledge his conviction; and the new teachers are either cast forth from the indignant assembly of their own people, liable to all the punishments which they are permitted to inflict, scourged and beaten; or, if they succeed in forming a party, they give rise to furious schism; and thus appear before the heathen with the dangerous notoriety of having caused a violent tumult, and broken the public peace by their turbulent and contentious harangues; at all events, disclaimed by that very people on whose traditions they profess to build their doctrines, and to whose Scriptures they appeal in justification of their pretensions. They endure, they persevere, they continue to sustain the contest against Judaism and Paganism. It is still their deliberate, ostensible, and avowed object to overthrow all this vast system of idolatry; to tear up by the roots all ancient prejudices; to silence shrines, sanctified by the veneration of ages as oracular; to consign all those gorgeous temples to decay, and all those images to contempt; to wean the people from every barbarous and dissolute amusement.

"But in one respect it is impossible now to conceive the extent to which the apostles of the crucified Jesus shocked all the feelings of mankind. The public establishment of Christianity, the adoration of ages, the reverence of nations, has thrown around the cross of Christ an indelible and inalienable sanctity. No effort of the imagination can dissipate the illusion of dignity which has gathered round it; it has been so long dissevered from all its coarse and humilitating associations, that it cannot be cast back and desecrated into its state of opprobrium and contempt. To the most daring unbeliever among ourselves, it is the symbol, the absurd and irrational, he may conceive, but still the ancient and venerable symbol, of a powerful and influential religion: what was it to the Jew and to the heathen? the basest, the most degrading punishment of the lowest criminal! the proverbial terror of the wretched slave! it was to them what the most despicable and revolting instrument of public execution is to us. Yet to the cross of Christ, men turned from deities
in which were embodied every attitude of strength, power, and dignity; in an incredibly short space of time multitudes gave up the splendor, the pride, and the power of paganism, to adore a Being who was thus humiliated beneath the meanest of mankind, who had become, according to the literal interpretation of the prophecy, a very scorn of men, and an outcast of the people.”—Milman’s Bampton Lectures, Lect. vi., p. 279.


“Such is our yoke and our burden! Let him who has thought it too hard and too heavy to bear, be prepared to state it boldly when he shall appear side by side with the poor and mistaken Indian before the throne of God at the day of judgment. The poor heathen may come forward with his wounded limbs and wailing body, saying, ‘I thought thee an austere master, delighting in the miseries of thy creatures, and I have accordingly brought thee the torn remnants of a body which I have tortured in thy service.’ And the Christian will come forward and say, ‘I knew that thou didst die to save me from such sufferings and torments, and that thou only commandest me to keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity, and I thought it too hard for me; and I have accordingly brought thee the refuse and sweepings of a body that has been corrupted and brutalized in the service of profligacy and drunkenness—even the body which thou didst declare should be the temple of thy Holy Spirit.’ The poor Indian will, perhaps, show his hands, reeking with the blood of his children, saying, ‘I thought this was the sacrifice with which God was well pleased.’ And you, the Christian, will come forward with blood upon thy hands also—‘I knew that thou gavest thy Son for my sacrifice, and commandest me to lead my offspring in the way of everlasting life; but the command was too hard for me, to teach them thy statutes, and to set them my humble example: I have let them go the broad way to destruction, and their blood is upon my hand—and my heart—and my head.’ The Indian will come forward, and say, ‘Behold, I am come from the wood, the desert, and the wilderness, where I fled from the cheerful society of my fellow-mortals, because I thought
it was pleasing to thy sight.' And the Christian will come forward and say, 'Behold, I am come from my comfortable home and the communion of my brethren, which thou hast graciously permitted me to enjoy; but I thought it too hard to give them a share of those blessings which thou hast bestowed upon me; I thought it too hard to give them a portion of my time, my trouble, my fortune, or my interest; I thought it too hard to keep my tongue from cursing and reviling, my heart from hatred, and my hand from violence and revenge.' What will be the answer of the Judge to the poor Indian, none can presume to say. That he was sadly mistaken in the means of salvation, and that what he had done could never purchase him everlasting life, is beyond a doubt; but yet the Judge may say, 'Come unto me, thou heavy-laden, and I will give thee the rest which thou couldst not purchase for thyself.' But, to the Christian, 'Thou, who hadst my easy yoke, and my light burden; thou, for whom all was already purchased:'—Thank God! it is not yet pronounced. Begone! and fly for thy life!"—WOLFE'S Sermons, (Remains,) Sermon X., pp. 371-373.

"Suppose it were suddenly revealed to any one among you that he, and he alone of all that walk upon the face of this earth, was destined to receive the benefit of his Redeemer's atonement, and that all the rest of mankind was lost—and lost to all eternity—it is hard to say what would be the first sensation excited in that man's mind by the intelligence. It is indeed probable it would be joy—to think that all his fears respecting his eternal destiny were now no more; that all the forebodings of the mind and misgivings of the heart—all the solemn stir which we feel rising within us whenever we look forward to a dark futurity—to feel that all these had now subsided for ever—to know that he shall stand in the everlasting sunshine of the love of God! It is perhaps impossible that all this should not call forth an immediate feeling of delight; but if you wish the sensation to continue, you must go to the wilderness; you must beware how you come within sight of a human being, or within sound of a human voice; you must recollect that you are now alone upon the earth; or, if you want society, you had better look for it among the beasts of the field than among the ruined species to which you belong; unless indeed the Almighty, in pity to
your desolation, should send his angels before the appointed time, that you might learn to forget in their society the out-
est objects of your former sympathies. But to go abroad into human society—to walk amongst beings who are now no longer your fellow-creatures—to feel the charity of your com-
mon nature rising in your heart, and to have to crush it within you like a sin—to reach forth your hand to perform one of the common kindnesses of humanity, and to find it withered by the recollection, that however you may mitigate a present pang, the everlasting pang is irreversible—to turn away in despair from these children whom you have now come to bless and to save (we hope and trust both here and for ever!)—perhaps it would be too much for you; at all events, it would be hard to state a degree of exertion within the utmost range of human energy, or a degree of pain within the farthest limit of human endurance, to which you would not submit, that you might have one companion on your lonely way from this world to the mansions of happiness. But suppose, at that moment, that the angel who brought the first intelligence returns to tell you that there are beings upon this earth who may yet be saved—that he was before mis-
taken, no matter how—perhaps he was your guardian angel, and darted from the throne of grace with the intelligence of your salvation without waiting to hear the fate of the rest of mankind—no matter how—but he comes to tell you that there are beings upon the earth who are within the reach of your Redeemer’s love, and of your own—that some of them are now before you, and their everlasting destiny is placed in your hands; then, what would first occur to your mind?—privations—dangers—difficulties? No; but you would say, ‘Lord, what shall I do? Shall I traverse earth and sea, through misery and torment, that of those whom thou hast given me I may not lose one?’”—Ibid, Sermon XI., pp. 391-393.


In Dr. Campbell’s ingenious dissertation (Rhetoric, book ii., chap. 6) “on the causes that nonsense often escapes being detected, both by the writer and the reader,” he remarks, (sect. 2,) that “there are particularly three sorts of writing,
wherein we are liable to be imposed upon by words without meaning.”

“The first is; where there is an exuberance of metaphor. Nothing is more certain than that this trope, when temperately and appositely used, serves to add light to the expression, and energy to the sentiment. On the contrary, when vaguely and intemperately used, nothing can serve more effectually to cloud the sense, where there is sense, and by consequence to conceal the defect, where there is no sense to show. And this is the case, not only where there is in the same sentence a mixture of discordant metaphors, but also where the metaphoric style is too long continued, and too far pursued. [Ut modicus autem atque opportunnus translationis usus illustrat orationem; ita frequens et obscurat et tardio compleet; continuus vero in allegoriam et enigmate exit. Quint., lib. vili., c. 6.] The reason is obvious. In common speech the words are the immediate signs of the thought. But it is not so here; for when a person, instead of adopting metaphors that come naturally and opportunely in his way, rummages the whole world in quest of them, and piles them one upon another, when he cannot so properly be said to use metaphor as to talk in metaphor, or rather when from metaphor he runs into allegory, and thence into enigma, his words are not the immediate signs of his thought; they are at best but the signs of the signs of his thought. His writing may then be called, what Spenser not unjustly styled his Fairy Queen, a perpetual allegory or dark conceit. Most readers will account it much to bestowed a transient glance on the literal sense, which lies nearest, but will never think of that meaning more remote, which the figures themselves are intended to signify. It is no wonder then that this sense, for the discovery of which it is necessary to see through a double veil, should, where it is, more readily escape our observation, and that where it is wanting, we should not so quickly miss it.

“There is, in respect of the two meanings, considerable variety to be found in the tropical style. In just allegory and similitude there is always a propriety, or, if you choose to call it, congruity, in the literal sense, as well as a distinct meaning or sentiment suggested, which is called the figurative sense. Examples of this are unnecessary. Again, where the fig-
Urative sense is unexceptionable, there is sometimes an incongruity in the expression of the literal sense. This is always the case in mixed metaphor, a thing not unfrequent even in good writers. Thus, when Addison remarks that 'there is not a single view of human nature which is not sufficient to extinguish the seeds of pride,' he expresses a true sentiment somewhat incongruously; for the terms extinguish and seeds, here metaphorically used, do not suit each other. In like manner, there is something incongruous in the mixture of tropes employed in the following passage from Lord Bolingbroke: 'Nothing less than the hearts of his people will content a patriot prince, nor will he think his throne established till it is established there.' Yet the thought is excellent. But in neither of these examples does the incongruity of the expression hurt the perspicuity of the sentence. Sometimes, indeed, the literal meaning involves a direct absurdity. When this is the case, as in the quotation from The Principles of Painting given in the preceding chapter, it is natural for the reader to suppose that there must be something under it; for it is not easy to say how absurdly even just sentiments will sometimes be expressed. But when no such hidden sense can be discovered, what in the first view conveyed to our minds a glaring absurdity, is rightly on reflection denominated nonsense. We are satisfied that De Piles neither thought, nor wanted his readers to think, that Rubens was really the original performer, and God the copier. This then was not his meaning. But what he actually thought and wanted them to think, it is impossible to elicit from his words. His words then may justly be styled bold in respect of their literal import, but unmeaning in respect of the author's intention.

It may be proper here to observe, that some are apt to confound the terms absurdity and nonsense as synonymous; which they manifestly are not. An absurdity, in the strict acceptation, is a proposition either intuitively or demonstratively false. Of this kind are these: 'Three and two make seven.' 'All the angles of a triangle are greater than two right angles.' That the former is false we know by intuition; that the latter is so we are able to demonstrate. But the term is further extended to denote a notorious falsehood. If one should affirm, that 'at the vernal equinox the
sun rises in the north and sets in the south,' we should not hesitate to say that he advances an absurdity; but still what he affirms has a meaning; insomuch, that on hearing the sentence we pronounce its falsity. Now nonsense is that whereof we cannot say either that it is true, or that it is false. Thus, when the Teutonic Theosopher enounces that 'all the voices of the celestial joyfulness qualify, commix, and harmonize in the fire which was from eternity in the good quality,' I should think it equally impertinent to aver the falsity as the truth of this enunciation. For, though the words grammatically form a sentence, they exhibit to the understanding no judgment, and consequently admit neither assent nor dissent. In the former instances I say the meaning, or what they affirm, is absurd; in the last instance I say there is no meaning, and therefore properly nothing is affirmed. In popular language, I own, the terms absurdity and nonsense are not so accurately distinguished. Absurd positions are sometimes called nonsensical. It is not common, on the other hand, to say of downright nonsense, that it comprises an absurdity.

"Further, in the literal sense there may be nothing unsuitable, and yet the reader may be at a loss to find a figurative meaning, to which his expressions can with justice be applied. Writers immoderately attached to the florid, or highly figured diction, are often misled by a desire of flourishing on the several attributes of a metaphor which they have pompously ushered into the discourse, without taking the trouble to examine whether there be any qualities in the subject, to which these attributes can with justice and perspicuity be applied. 'This inmoderate use of metaphor,' Dr. Campbell observes, 'is the principal source of all the nonsense of orators and poets.'

"The second species of writing wherein we are liable to be imposed on by words without meaning, is that wherein the terms most frequently occurring denote things which are of a complicated nature, and to which the mind is not sufficiently familiarized. Many of those notions which are called by philosophers mixed modes, come under this denomination. Of these the instances are numerous in every tongue; such as government, church, state, constitution, polity, power, commerce, legislature, jurisdiction, proportion, sym-
metry, elegance. It will considerably increase the danger of our being deceived by an unmeaning use of such terms, if they are besides (as very often they are) of so indeterminate, and consequently equivocal, signification, that a writer, unobserved either by himself or by his reader, may slide from one sense of the term to another, till by degrees he fall into such applications of it as will make no sense at all. It deserves our notice also, that we are in much greater danger of terminating in this, if the different meanings of the same word have some affinity to one another, than if they have none. In the latter case, when there is no affinity, the transition from one meaning to another is taking a very wide step, and what few writers are in any danger of; it is, besides, what will not so readily escape the observation of the reader. So much for the second cause of deception, which is the chief source of all the nonsense of writers on politics and criticism.

"The third and last, and, I may add, the principal species of composition, wherein we are exposed to this illusion by the abuse of words, is that in which the terms employed are very abstract, and consequently of very extensive signification. It is an observation that plainly ariseth from the nature and structure of language, and may be deduced as a corollary from what hath been said of the use of artificial signs, that the more general any name is, as it comprehends the more individuals under it, and consequently requires the more extensive knowledge in the mind that would rightly apprehend it, the more it must have of indistinctness and obscurity. Thus the word lion is more distinctly apprehended by the mind than the word beast, beast than animal, animal than being. But there is, in what are called abstract subjects, a still greater fund of obscurity than that arising from the frequent mention of the most general terms. Names must be assigned to those qualities as considered abstractedly, which never subsist independently, or by themselves, but which constitute the generic characters and the specific differences of things. And this leads to a manner which is in many instances remote from the common use of speech, and therefore must be of more difficult conception."

(Book II., sect. 2, pp. 102, 103.)

It is truly to be regretted that an author who has written
so justly on the subject, should within a few pages so strikingly exemplify the errors he has been treating of, by indulging in a declamation against Logic, which could not even to himself have conveyed any distinct meaning. When he says that a man who has learned Logic was “qualified, without any other kind of knowledge, to defend any position whatever, however contradictory to common sense;” and that “that art observed the most absolute indifference to truth and error,” he cannot mean that a false conclusion could be logically proved from true premises; since, ignorant as he was of the subject, he was aware, and has in another place distinctly acknowledged, that this is not the case; nor could he mean merely that a false conclusion could be proved from a false premiss, since that would evidently be a nugatory and ridiculous objection. He seems to have had, in truth, no meaning at all; though, like the authors he had been so ably criticizing, he was perfectly unaware of the emptiness of what he was saying.


“Moses stretched forth his hand, and the waters were divided, and became a wall unto the children of Israel, on the right hand and on the left. Moses smote the rock with his rod, and the waters flowed withal, and the children of Israel were refreshed in the wilderness, and were saved from death. But what was there in the arm of Moses, that the sea should obey it and stand still? Or what in the rod of Moses, that it should turn the flinty rock into a living fountain? Let me freely, though reverently, speak to you of the patriarch Moses. He was indeed great, because he was indeed good, in his generation. But except in the matter of his goodness—except in his superior faith and trust in his Maker—except in his more ready obedience to the holy desires which the Spirit of the Lord inspired into his soul, he was no more than the rest of the Israelites, and the rest of men. Like them, like us, like every human being that is born of woman, he was compassed with infirmities, and tried with afflictions, and subject to error, and surrounded with sorrow. Of himself he was able to do nothing, but all the
mighty acts which he did, he did because 'it was God which worked in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure,' and because Moses did not resist the will of God, or neglect or abuse the power with which he was endued. If to the Jew God was very liberal, we have the promise of his beloved Son, that to Christians, in all spiritual and necessary things, he will be still more so. Over the world without us he will perhaps give us no power—because we are not called upon to save a people. But we are called upon to save ourselves, and he will give us a power over the rebellious world that is within us. Stretch forth but your hands in faith and sincerity to God, and surely he will separate between you and your lusts. He will divide the tumultuous sea of your passions, and open for you a way to escape from your enemies into the land of eternity. He will cause the waves thereof to stand still and harmless on your right hand and on your left, and make you to walk in safety and unhurt through the overflowings of ungodliness, which, without his controlling arm, would have drowned your souls in perdition and destruction. Be ye never so faint and weary in the wilderness of sin, yet if in humility you smite upon your breast, and say, God be merciful to me a sinner! he will melt the stony heart within you, and turning it into a fountain of piety and love—of love to man and love to your Maker—refresh you with the living waters of the comfort of the Spirit, and strengthen you by its power for your pilgrimage through life.'—Benson's First Course of Hulsean Lectures for 1820. Lect. XIV., pp. 344–346.


"For the benefit of those who are desirous of getting over their bad habits, and discharging that important part of the sacred office, the reading the Liturgy, with due decorum, I shall first enter into a minute examination of some parts of the service, and afterwards deliver the rest accompanied by such marks as will enable the reader in a short time, and with moderate pains, to make himself master of the whole.

"But first it will be necessary to explain the marks which you will hereafter see throughout the rest of this course."
They are of two kinds: one, to point out the emphatic words, for which I shall use the grave accent of the Greek ['].

"The other to point out the different pauses or stops; for which I shall use the following marks:

"For the shortest pause, making an incomplete line, thus '.

"For the second, double the time of the former, two ".

"And for the third, or full stop, three ".

"When I would mark a pause longer than any belonging to the usual stops, it shall be by two horizontal lines, as thus =.

"When I would point out a syllable that is to be dwelt on some time, I shall use this -, or a short horizontal over the syllable.

"When a syllable should be rapidly uttered, thus ' or a curve turned upwards: the usual marks of long and short in Prosody.

"The Exhortation I have often heard delivered in the following manner:

"'Dearly beloved brethren, the Scripture moveth us in sundry places to acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wickedness. And that we should not dissemble nor cloke them before the face of Almighty God our Heavenly Father, but confess them with an humble lowly penitent and obedient heart, to the end that we may obtain, forgiveness of the same, by his infinite goodness and mercy. And although we ought at all times humbly to acknowledge our sins before God, yet ought we most chiefly so to do, when we assemble and meet together. To render thanks for the great benefits we have received at his hands, to set forth his most worthy praise; to hear his most holy word, and to ask those things that are requisite and necessary, as well for the body as the soul. Wherefore I pray and beseech you, as many as are here present, to accompany me with a pure heart and humble voice to the throne of the heavenly grace, saying after me.'

"In the latter part of the first period, 'but confess them with an humble lowly penitent and obedient heart, to the end that we may obtain, forgiveness of the same, by his infinite goodness and mercy,' there are several faults committed. In
the first place, the four epithets preceding the word 'heart' are huddled together, and pronounced in a monotone, disagreeable to the ear, and enervating to the sense; whereas each word, rising in force above the other, ought to be marked by a proportional rising of the notes in the voice; and, in the last, there should be such a note used as would declare it at the same time to be the last—'with an humble lowly' penitent' and obedient heart,' etc. At first view it may appear that the words 'humble' and 'lowly' are synonymous; but the word 'lowly' certainly implies a greater degree of humiliation than the word 'humble.' The word 'penitent' that follows, is of stronger import than either; and the word 'obe-
dient,' signifying a perfect resignation to the will of God, in consequence of our humiliation and repentance, furnishes the climax. But if the climax in the words be not accompanied by a suitable climax in the notes of the voice, it cannot be made manifest. In the following part of the sentence, 'to the end that we may obtain' forgiveness of the same,' there are usually three emphases laid on the words, end, obtain, same, where there should not be any, and the only emphatic word, forgiveness, is slightly passed over; whereas it should be read—'to the end that we may obtain forgiveness of the same,' keeping the words obtain and forgiveness closely to-
gether, and not disuniting them, both to the prejudice of the sense and cadence, etc., etc.

"I shall now read the whole, in the manner I have recom-
manded; and if you will give attention to the marks, you will be reminded of the manner, when you come to practice in your private reading. 'Dearly beloved brethren!—The Scripture moveth us' in sundry places' to acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wickedness, and that we should not dissemble nor clôke them' before the face of Almighty God' our Heavenly Father'' but confess them' with an hum-
ble' lowly' penitent' and obedient heart' to the end that we may obtain forgiveness of the same' by his infinite goodness and mercy''. And although we ought at all times humbly to acknowledge our sins before God'' yet ought we most chiefly so to do when we assemble and meet together' to render thanks' for the great benefits we have received at his hands'' to set forth' his most worthy praise' to hêar' his most holy word' and to ask those things' which are requisite and necessary' as
well for the body as the soul. Wherefore I pray and beseech you as many as are here present to accompany me with a pure heart and humble voice to the throne of the heavenly grace, saying, etc.—SHERIDAN, Art of Reading Prose.

The generality of the remarks respecting the way in which each passage of the Liturgy should be read, are correct; though the mode recommended for attaining the proposed end is totally different from what is suggested in the present treatise. In some points, however, the author is mistaken as to the emphatic words: e.g., in the Lord's Prayer, he directs the following passage to be read thus: "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," with the emphasis on the words "be" and "is;" these, however, are not the emphatic words, and do not even exist in the original Greek, but are supplied by the translator; the latter of them might, indeed, be omitted altogether without any detriment to the sense: "thy will be done, as in heaven, so also on earth," which is a more literal translation, is perfectly intelligible.

A passage, again, in the second Commandment, he directs to be read, according indeed to the usual mode, both of reading and pointing it: "Visit the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me;" which mode of reading destroys the sense, by making a pause at "children," and none at "generation;" for this implies that the third and fourth generations, who suffer these judgments, are themselves such as hate the Lord, instead of being merely, as is meant to be expressed, the children of such. "Of them that hate me," is a genitive governed not by "generation," but by "children." The passage should therefore be read, (according to Sheridan's marks,) "Visit the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me;" i.e., visit the sins of the fathers who hate me, upon the third and fourth generations of their descendants.

The same sanction is given to an equally common fault in reading the fifth Commandment: "that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." The pause should evidently be at "long," not at "land." No one would say in ordinary conversation, "I hope you will find enjoyment in the garden—which you have planted." He has also strangely omitted an emphasis on the word "covet," in
the tenth Commandment. He has, however, in the negative or prohibitory commands, avoided the common fault of accenting the word "not."*

And here it may be worth while to remark, that in some cases the copula ought to be made the emphatic word; (i. e., the "is," if the proposition be affirmative, the "not," if negative;) viz., where the proposition may be considered as in opposition to its contradictory.† If, e. g., it had been a question whether we ought to steal or not, the commandment, in answer to that, would have been rightly pronounced, "Thou shalt not steal;" but the question being, what things, we are forbidden to do, the answer is, that "to steal" is one of them—"Thou shalt not steal." In such a case as this, the proposition is considered as opposed, not to its contradictory, but to one with a different predicate; the question being, not which copula (negative or affirmative) shall be employed, but what shall be affirmed or denied of the subject: e. g., "it is lawful to beg; but not to steal;" in such a case, the predicate, not the copula, will be the emphatic word.

One fault worth noticing on account of its commonness is the placing of the emphasis on "neighbor" in the ninth and tenth Commandments; as if there might be some persons precluded from the benefit of the prohibitions. One would think the man to whom our Lord addressed the parable of the good Samaritan, had been used to this mode of delivery, by his asking, "And who is my neighbor?"‡

The usual pronunciation of one part of the "Apostles' Creed," is probably founded on some misapprehension of the sense of it.§ "The Holy Catholic Church, the Communion

* Dr. Johnson, in Boswell's Life, is recorded to have sanctioned this fault, in respect at least of the ninth Commandment.
† Nor is this properly an exception to the above rule; for, in such cases, that which is expressed as the copula, is, in sense, the predicate; the question being in fact whether "true" or "false" shall be predicated of a certain assertion.
‡ I have heard again of some persons among the lower orders who, practically, lay the stress on "against;" thinking it allowable to give false evidence in any one's favor.
§ See Sir Peter (afterwards Lord) King's History of the Apostles' Creed; a work much more valuable (in proportion to its size) than most that are studied by theologians.
of Saints,” is commonly read as if these were two distinct articles; instead of the latter clause being merely an explanation of the former: “The Holy Catholic Church, [viz.,] the Communion of Saints.”


“It need hardly be observed how important it is, with a view to these objects,” (the training of children in sound and practical religious knowledge,) “to abstain carefully from the practice, still too prevalent, though much less so, we believe, than formerly, of compelling, or encouraging, or even allowing children to learn by rote, forms of prayer, catechisms, hymns, or, in short, any thing connected with morality and religion, when they attach no meaning to the words they utter.

“It is done on the plea that they will hereafter learn the meaning of what they have been thus taught, and will be able to make a practical use of it. But no attempt at economy of time can be more injudicious. Let any child whose capacity is so far matured as to enable him to comprehend an explanation, e. g., of the Lord’s Prayer, have it then put before him for the first time, and, when he is made acquainted with the meaning of it, set to learn it by heart; and can any one doubt that in less than half a day’s application he would be able to repeat it fluently? And the same would be the case with other forms. All that is learnt by rote by a child before he is competent to attach a meaning to the words he utters, would not, if all put together, amount to so much as would cost him, when able to understand it, a week’s labor to learn perfectly. But it may cost the toil—often the vain toil—of many years, to unlearn the habit of formalism: of repeating words by rote without attending to their meaning; a habit which every one conversant with education knows to be, in all subjects, most readily acquired by children, and with difficulty avoided, even with the utmost care of the teacher; but which such a plan must inevitably tend to generate.

“It is often said, and very truly, that it is important to form early habits of piety; but to train a child in one kind of habit, is not the most likely way of forming the opposite
habit; and nothing can be more contrary to true piety than the superstition (for such in fact it is) of attaching efficacy to the repetition of a certain form of words, as of a charm, independent of the understanding and of the heart."

"It is also said, with equal truth, that we ought to take advantage of the facility which children possess of learning words; but to infer from thence that Providence designs us to make such a use (or rather abuse) of this gift as we have been censuring, is as if we were to take advantage of the readiness with which a new-born babe swallows whatever is put into its mouth, to dose it with ardent spirits, instead of wholesome food and necessary medicine. The readiness with which children learn and remember words, is in truth a most important advantage, if rightly employed; viz., if applied to the acquiring of that mass of what may be called arbitrary knowledge of insulated facts, which can only be acquired and

* "We have spoken with so much commendation of the Hints on Early Education, [Mrs. Hoare's,] that we feel bound to notice incidentally a point in which we think the author, if not herself mistaken, is likely to lead her readers into a mistake: "PUBLIC WORSHIP.—Silence," says the author, "self-subjection, and a serious deportment, both in family and public worship, ought to be strictly enforced in early life, and it is better that children should not attend till they are capable of behaving in a proper manner. But a practical regard for the Sabbath, and for the services of religion, is but an effect of that reverence for every thing sacred which it is of primary importance early to establish as a habit of mind."—Pp. 172, 173.

"Now if 'reverence for things sacred' be the only habit we wish to implant, the caution here given is sufficient; but if we would form in the child the much more important habit of hearty devotion as distinguished from superstitious formalism, we should wait for his being not only 'capable of behaving' with outward decorum, but also of understanding and joining in the service.

"We would also deprecate, by the way, the practice (which this writer seems to countenance, though without any express inculcation) of strictly prohibiting children from indulging in their usual sports on the Lord's day; which has a manifest tendency to associate with that festival ideas of gloom and restraint; and also to generate the too common notion that God requires of us only one day in seven, and that scrupulous privation on that day will afford license for the rest of the week. We are speaking, be it observed, of the Christian festival of the Lord's day. Those who think themselves bound by the precepts of the Old Testament relative to the Sabbath, should remember that Saturday is the day to which those precepts apply."
APPENDIX [GG].

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retained by a mere act of memory, and which is necessary in
after-life; when the acquisision of it would both be more
troublesome, and would encroach on time that might other-
wise be better employed. Chronology, names of countries,
weights and measures, and indeed all the words of any lan-
guage, are of this description. If a child had even ten times
the ordinary degree of the faculty in question, a judicious
teacher would find abundance of useful employment for it,
without resorting to any that could possibly be detriment
to his future habits, moral, religious, or intellectual.”—Lon-
412, 413.

[GG.] Part II., Chap. i., § 1, p. 168.

“So great is the outcry which it has been the fashion
among some persons for several years past to raise against
expediency, that the very word has become almost an ill-
omened sound. It seems to be thought by many a sufficient
ground of condemnation of any legislator to say that he is
guided by views of expediency. And some seem even to be
ashamed of acknowledging that they are in any degree so
guided. I, for one, however, am content to submit to the
imputation of being a votary of expediency. And what is
more, I do not see what right any one who is not so has to
sit in Parliament, or to take any part in public affairs. Any
one who may choose to acknowledge that the measures he
opposes are expedient, or that those he recommends are in-
expedient, ought manifestly to have no seat in a deliberative
assembly, which is constituted for the express and sole pur-
pose of considering what measures are conducive to the public
good; in other words, ‘expedient.’ I say, the ‘public good,’
because, of course, by ‘expediency’ we mean, not that which
may benefit some individual, or some party or class of men,
at the expense of the public, but what conduces to the good
of the nation. Now this, it is evident, is the very object for
which deliberative assemblies are constituted. And so far is
this from being regarded, by our Church at least, as some-
thing at variance with religious duty, that we have a prayer
specially appointed to be offered up during the sitting of the
Houses of Parliament, that their consultations may be ‘di-
rected and prospered for the safety, honor, and welfare of our sovereign and her dominions.' Now, if this be not the very definition of political expediency, let any one say what is.

"But some persons are so much at variance with the doctrine of our Church on this point—and I may add, with all sound moralists—as to speak of expediency as something that is, or may be, at variance with duty. If any one really holds that it can ever be expedient to violate the injunctions of duty—that he who does so is not sacrificing a greater good to a less, (which all would admit to be inexpedient,)—that it can be really advantageous to do what is morally wrong—and will come forward and acknowledge that to be his belief, I have only to protest, for my own part, with the deepest abhorrence, against what I conceive to be so profligate a principle. It shocks all the notions of morality that I have been accustomed from childhood to entertain, to speak of expediency being possibly or conceivably opposed to rectitude.

"There are indeed many questions of expediency in which morality has no concern, one way or the other. In what way, for example, a husbandman should cultivate his field, or in what branch of trade a merchant should invest his capital, are questions of expediency in which there is usually no moral right or wrong—on either side. But where there is moral right and wrong, it can never be expedient to choose the wrong. If the husbandman or the merchant should seek to gain increased profits by defrauding his neighbor, this would be at variance with expediency, because it would be sacrificing a greater good to a less. 'For what would it profit a man if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?'

"I believe, however, that the greater part of those who raise a clamor against expediency mean, in reality, an apparent, but false and delusive expediency—that which is represented as expedient, but in truth is not so. But if this be their meaning, it would surely be better, with a view to cutting short empty declamation, and understanding clearly whatever matter is under discussion, that they should express, distinctly, and according to the ordinary use of language, what they do mean. It would be thought absurd for a man to declaim against 'virtue,' and then at length to explain that what he meant was not real virtue, but a hypo-
critical semblance of it; or to argue against the use of 'coin,' meaning all the time, not real genuine coin, but fraudulent counterfeits. And sure it is not at all more reasonable for any one to declaim against 'expediency,' if what he means be, not what is really expedient, but what is erroneously mistaken for it."—Charge of 1845.
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