Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School

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Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School
In Memory of

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(d. April 16, 1993)

and of

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The present study, though from one standpoint long in preparation, came nonetheless forth quite unlooked for. I had long felt that although there had been, and continued to be, much learned talk concerning al-Ghazâlî’s adaptation and adoption of elements of Aristotelian philosophy—the logic in particular—in such a way as to update and in modest measure to rectify some of the earlier logical, conceptual, and theoretical shortcomings of traditional Muslim theology, there had been all too little thorough and systematic study of the texts with regard to the most significant issues involved. Suggestions and assertions concerning the matter were made with greater assurance than seemed warranted by the foundations on which they rested. The primary focus of my own work was, however, concentrated in classical kalâm; al-Ghazâlî was therefore of only marginal interest and I had little inclination to take up the question of their relationship. That the relation of his theology to that of traditional Ash‘arism was at least ambiguous and required serious investigation was, however, brought acutely to my attention when, in preparing a
rather general lecture on predestination in Islam for a nearby community college in the spring of 1985, I reread Book XXXV of Ihya’ ‘ulûm al-dîn for the first time in many years. A short time later then, on reading al-Maqûd al-anâl for the first time, it became altogether clear to me that his formal commitment to Ashârîte orthodoxy was tenuous in the extreme. Accordingly, for the Paris-Penr-Dumbarton Oaks Colloquium on inheritance and borrowing in the middle ages (Héritage et emprunts culturels au Moyen Age) held in Morigny in the fall of 1986, I prepared a paper entitled “Al-Ghazâlî’s Use of Avicenna’s Philosophy” as a kind of preliminary study of one major aspect of the question. That was a beginning. Subsequently, in 1988, in the course of preparing a paper entitled “al-Ghazâlî on Taqâlîd,” my attention was drawn to further aspects of the problem of the status and location of al-Ghazâlî’s theology relative to traditional Ashârîsm and I decided that the somewhat tentative study done in two years earlier, the likelihood of whose eventual appearance seemed even more remote, had to be more fully elaborated. With the publication of Creation and the Cosmic System in 1992, my interest in al-Ghazâlî was waning rapidly. The apparent inconsistency of the things he says explicitly concerning kalâm continued, however, to trouble me and, not having examined the data of the texts with this question specifically in mind, I fancied that by making a few appropriate distinctions the matter could be laid quietly to rest on the basis of material already assembled. Alas, things are seldom so simple as they appear at a distance. Al-Ghazâlî’s explicit statements concerning kalâm and his allusions to the Ashârîte school proved inevitably to be imbedded in contexts that precluded a simple analysis within the formally restricted framework originally projected. Though the aim of the study remained essentially the same, the questions to be addressed multiplied and the web of their interrelationships became more difficult to map as they spread more widely through the fabric of al-Ghazâlî’s works. Beneath the surface of an originally rather simple question lay something more serious, and more interesting.

Al-Ghazâlî shows himself in his writing to be a very complex and problematic personality, intellectually pugnacious, yet beset by inner uncertainties and often conspicuously superficial in his treatment of important questions. Unable to achieve complete confidence in the truth of his speculative theories, he turned to sufî asceticism and...
indirectly contributed to the completion of this little book, especially to my colleague Thérèse-Anne Druart, who read the manuscript very carefully and made a number of helpful suggestions, and also to a number of others who, on various occasions, had the patience to listen as I rehearsed the problems and difficulties I was having in trying to map a coherent and consistent path through the thicket of rhetorical undergrowth that tend so often to obstruct and obscure the uneven terrain of al-Ghazālī's writing, and who commented and in a few cases exclaimed or protested as they remarked on the conspicuously revisionist track of my conclusions. I have also to express my gratitude to Professor Edward Mahoney for his encouragement and support and to the Duke University Press, particularly to the editorial staff for their patience with my unpatiently untidy habits and their help in the preparation of the text for publication. Too, I must thank my wife, Jane, for putting up with me through the whole process.

1. Introduction

The Problem

Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī (450/1058–515/1121) was one of the most renowned and influential writers in the history of Muslim religious thought. He was born in Khorasan, and his early studies were pursued chiefly in Tus, the city of his birth. Later, he studied in Nishapur under abū l-Maʿālī ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī (419/1028–478/1088), who held the chair of Shāfiʿite law in the college that had been founded expressly for him by the vizier, Nizām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), who was perhaps the most powerful man of his day. Al-Juwaynī is still esteemed as one of the greatest masters of Shāfiʿite law, but he was also the leading master of Ashʿarite kalām. His al-Shami fi nujum al-dīn was one of the most detailed and comprehensive summae of Ashʿarite theology ever written and was sufficiently popular that after his death several abridgements
wrote his autobiography, al-Mungidh min al-falâd, and completed his last major work, al-Musta'ân min 'ilm al-wsâl. Some time later he gave up teaching and retired to Tus, where he died in Jumâdâ II, 505/December, 1111.

Al-Ghazâlî's opinion concerning the value of kalâm and his relation to the traditional Ash'arite theology have been the subject of a good deal of discussion amongst scholars. The most widely held opinion has been that expressed by Gardet and Anawati, namely, that "he retains the central theses of the Ash'arites completely," even though he has made certain emendations in the way they are set forth and reasoned. More recent studies have shown that this is certainly not the case, though the exact nature and configuration of his relation to the Ash'arite school remains problematic. Al-Ghazâlî is an extremely complex figure. His writings differ greatly from one another in form and rhetoric as well as in topic and focus and in trying to trace the course of his thought and discern his commitments, one has sometimes the impression of attempting to follow the movements of a chameleon, so varied are the hues and postures he assumes from one place to another.

The general problem of al-Ghazâlî's relation to the traditional theology presents itself in two distinct, even if not everywhere separable, facets of his writing. The one, whose evidence is somewhat straightforward, is the diverse and in a few places apparently conflicting statements he makes when speaking explicitly of kalâm as the traditional speculative theology of the schools. In virtually every case the kalâm with which he is concerned in these passages is that of the Ash'arite school, which he shared with his fellows in the Shâfi'i tradition. The other is one whose evidence is more difficult to bring forward and analyze and to interpret; it is that of the relationship between the theology of al-Ghazâlî and that of the Ash'arite school. One, if not the principal source of the difficulty is that al-Ghazâlî wrote a number of very complex works that differ greatly both formally and materially, but never composed a clear, expository summary of his own dogmatic theology. In reflecting on the complexity of the evidence, Marie Bernard speaks of a "fusion of systems," and one may suggest that it is precisely because al-Ghazâlî sought, in his own way, to harmonize a number of very different (and, we should
add, in some cases incompatible) trends and schools of Muslim theological thought that he refrained from setting forth the systematic foundation of this “fusion” plainly and unambivalently.

The problem of the relation between al-Ghazâlî’s theology and that of the Ash‘arite school is manifest in two quite distinct places, the one being his two manuals of ostensibly Ash‘arite theology, al-Iṣâlah fi l-tâṣâḥhid and R. al-Qadîrîyyah, the other, the doctrinal statements, direct and indirect, concerning fundamental questions of Muslim theology scattered through his other writings. Al-Ghazâlî’s own basic theology, his psychology, cosmology, and metaphysics, we cannot and need not take up as such in the present study. We have shown in Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna that, contrary to common opinion, al-Ghazâlî holds (1) that the created universe is a closed, deterministic system of secondary causes whose operation is governed by the first created being, an “angel” (or “intellect”) associated with the outermost sphere, (2) that God cannot intervene in the operation of secondary cause, celestial or sublunary, and (3) that it is impossible that God has willed to create a universe in any respect different from this one which He has created. A number of the texts cited and examined in the course of the present study will confirm the various elements of this interpretation of his thought clearly enough as well as Davidson’s conclusions concerning his psychology. Taking this as given, then, what we shall do here is first to examine what al-Ghazâlî has to say explicitly concerning kalâm and its status as one of the religious sciences. Next we shall examine the form and the content of a number of passages of al-Iṣâlah fi l-tâṣâḥhid and of R. al-Qadîrîyyah against the background of classical Ash‘arite doctrine and of what al-Ghazâlî has to say in other works so as to get a reasonably clear view of what exactly al-Ghazâlî says and does not say and what he does and does not commit himself to, either explicitly or implicitly, in these two works. In the case of one or two passages, the discussion is quite extended because of the need to examine a number of other texts in order to supply an adequate context for the understanding of how the topic is presented and treated in variously differing contexts. Following this, we shall examine the evidence supplied by Fâyûm al-tâṣâḥhid and Iḥâh al-‘awâmîn an ‘ilm al-kalâm regarding al-Ghazâlî’s alienation from the Ash‘arite school. The question of al-Ghazâlî’s relationship to the

Ash‘arite school may appear to have only secondary importance, but when the evidence is gathered and examined it proves, as we shall see, to be a key to certain basic characteristics of the method and language of his writing and thereby to shed light on what might be called the program that governs much of the corpus of his work.

Kalâm in the Traditional View

Kalâm was commonly termed “the science of the fundamental doctrines of Islam” (‘ilm uṣûl al-dīn) and was also referred to as “the speculative science” (‘ilm al-nâṣir). The Ash‘arite muṭa-kallimûn held that their science, though ultimately guided by the revelation, is formally conceptual, logical, and critical and that it proves the truth of the basic articles of Muslim religious belief without formal appeal to any premise or thesis that is taken from religious belief as such. (A corollary to this thesis is that once it has been rationally demonstrated that Muhammad was a prophet, assent to what is presented for belief only in the revelation is also rationally justified.) Kalâm, in short, is looked on as a rational metaphysics, and the larger compendia are, in fact, topical ordered like works on metaphysics. The distinction between “science” and “opinion” (ḥikmâth and fitsâl) is made, but theology is not distinguished from philosophy. Consistently with the theses that simple acquisience to the views of others is not a valid basis for religious belief and that the basic tenets of Islam can be justified by autonomous reason, then, most of the Ash‘arites hold that rational speculation—i.e., some minimal level of rational reflection on the basic truths of the revelation—is required as a foundation of valid religious assent and under the religious law is therefore obligatory for all, though some allow for a conditioned exception in the case of simple, uneducated people. The manuals range from very short, catechetical works meant for elementary religious instruction to extremely long and complex summaries in which a panoply of theoretical problems and questions are dealt with in detail. Although a number of religious scholars, including almost all the Ḥanbalites, strongly disapproved of any form of rational or systematic theology as such, the Ash‘arite kalâm was
in fact the school theology for both Shāfi‘ites and Mālikites. Among al-Ghazālī’s immediate predecessors, thus, some of the foremost masters of Shāfi‘ite law (e.g., abū Ishāq al-Shirāzi [d. 476/1084] and abū l-Maqālī al-Juwaynī [d. 478/1086]), held, against the Harbalites, that taqlīd is not a sound basis for assent to the basic articles of the creed (al-nuqūl), and that “rational speculation” concerning the being of God is therefore obligatory, and that, in fact, the first obligation of individuals who have reached the age of reason and are of sound mind is the intention to undertake such inquiry. It is within this general context and against this background, then, that we must examine the diverse statements that al-Ghazālī makes concerning kalām and rational theology and the evidences of his conflict with the school.

2. Al-Ghazālī on the Place of Kalām Amongst the Religious Sciences

Kalām According to the Traditional Classification

Al-Ghazālī insists that those who cling to the truth and follow the Sunna have succeeded in uniting the things entailed by the revealed laws and the things that are demanded by reason (al-ta‘īyya bayna maqta‘ayāt al-sharī‘a wa ma‘āhīyāt al-nuqūl); there is no inconsistency between strict adherence to the Sunna and the study of rational theology. Against the literalists and those whom he dubs “al-ba‘thwa‘iyin,” he insists that there is no conflict between the revelation that is handed down in the Muslim community and the truth that is given to reason: al-sharī‘a l-muqā‘u wa-l-haqq l-muqā‘u. There can be, that is to say, no conflict between the mind’s critical, speculative grasp of and assent to what is truly presented in the texts of revelation and taught by the authorities of the first generations of Muslims on the one side and what has been or may be conclu-
Muslims individually and collectively (e.g., Musta'fā, pp. 6f., Iṣṭiḍād, p. 15; Ḩaqqū, p. 17, 26, and p. 18, 8f.; and Jawāhir, p. 22). The formal conception of kalām here, like that of the earlier mutakallimin, appears to be that of an extended metaphysics. Kalām is the universal religious science, whereas the other religious sciences are particular. Jurisprudence (al-fiqh) assumes the truth of the revelation; it begins with the investigation of juridical demonstrations and so depends for its foundation on kalām (Musta'fā, pp. 5f.). There are two things here which should be noted, since they will prove later to be of some importance. Formally speaking, the jurist, whether simple faqih or expert in the foundations of the law (aqīdah), will, in principle, have no authority as such to judge the truth or error of theological statements or of the correctness of theological interpretations (tawāwīl) of Koran verses or prophetic Traditions, since such judgments have to be made on theological grounds and their validity has to be justified logically. One notes also that whereas in earlier writings (e.g., Ḩaqqū, p. 23, 8f.) al-Ghazālī says that kalām studies the being of God, His attributes, and His actions, he says in Musta'fā (1, p. 6, 8f.) that it explains that “God must be one and that He is distinguished from contingent beings by attributes that belong to Him necessarily and by things that are impossible with respect to His being (haqquhu) and characteristics that may possibly belong to him, being neither necessary nor impossible and distinguishes between what is necessary, impossible, and possible respecting God’s being.” Though in this he follows a fairly common formulation,5 one notes that here al-Ghazālī does not speak explicitly of God’s actions. This may be significant, as we shall see. Elsewhere he speaks of kalām and classifies it somewhat differently.

Understood as the science of God’s being and His attributes and His actions, kalām is formally a metaphysics. It is thus that al-Ghazālī describes it, for example, in Ḩaqqū (e.g., 1, 23, 8f.). More broadly viewed, however, there are, included within kalām, a number of distinct sciences or disciplines, and accordingly al-Ghazālī says (Ḥaqqū, p. 98, 8f.) that in Iṣṭiḍād he had taken up only the basic elements of the Muslim creed (qanūn al-qaṣida) without looking into “the other matters that are studied by the mutakallimin” (gawhara min madhabihin l-mutakallimin). The study of the fundamental doctrines of Islam is the rational investigation of God’s essence and His attributes

Al-Ghazālī on the Place of Kalām

sively demonstrated by purely theoretical reasoning concerning the being of God and his attributes and the nature of man and of the world on the other. Who deny this do so simply because they have weak minds and lack intellectual insight (min dafī‘i ʾsaqāli waqūlītati l-baṣīrī) (Iṣṭiḍād, p. 1, 11). The reports which are cited by the Hanbalites and others from authorities of the first generations condemning rational theology are valid only with regard to simple-minded believers who, for whatever reason, are incapable of formal reasoning. It is “inconceivable that any one disagree” with the logical rules set out in Qiyâs once he has understood them (Fayṣal, p. 48, and Musnad, pp. 123, 129, and 126, 129). Again, the use of the formal terminology coined by the mutakallimin, albeit condemned by some, is necessary for conceptual precision and clarity, just as is that of the jurists (Ḥaqqū, p. 91, 17f., and Ḩaqqū, p. 95, 12f.). Accordingly, al-Ghazālī speaks of having insight into the truth “by means of speculative reasoning, rational inquiry and the correct elaboration of logical demonstrations” (buhf bih šikātul . . . bil-nazari wal-hadīthi wa-tahāvirī l-nārailah) (Ḥaqqū, p. 1, 12f.). It is possible to achieve a comprehensive and certain rational knowledge of God and of the truth contained in the revelation “through demonstration that has been fully carried out, whose conditions are completely fulfilled, and whose foundations and premises have been reviewed step by step and term by term until there remain no room for ambiguity and no opening for confusion” (Ḥaqqū, p. 122, 8f.).

Classifying the religious sciences in Musta'fā, al-Ghazālī says that kalām is the one that is universal (al-ilimū l-kulliyū mina l-ilimīl diniyahā) (p. 5, 9). It begins with the inquiry into that which is most universal, viz., being (al-mawjud), considers the two kinds of beings, sc., God, the eternal being, and contingent beings (ibīd., pp. 5f.), and then distinguishes the basic classes of the latter, the ḥaqqūh and accidents, and ultimately demonstrates the basic truths of the revelation and establishes the principles of the other religious sciences (pp. 6f.). The truth of what is taught by the prophets is made known by rational demonstration (turūbān al-qānīf) (Iṣṭiḍād, p. 2, 2). As such, therefore, kalām is primary (al-asbī) with respect to the other religious sciences and they are secondary or derivative (fāzhī), even though some of them, jurisprudence (fiqh), for example, may be more universally useful and, consequently, more essential to the life of the
and His actions. It studies the classes of created beings and the various subclasses and orders of accidents and their relation to animate and inanimate beings. This part of kalam corresponds to the metaphysics (al-ilm al-`alamiyyah) of the falsafah (Ihya' 1, p. 21, 8f.). Again, in Ihya' (1, p. 23, 7f.) he says that logic (al-mantiq) is an element of kalam; it is the tool of kalam (Jawahir, p. 21). The discussion of the inference forms and the conditions of their application in the traditional manuals of kalam is commonly placed under a heading of speculative reasoning (al-na`zir) or speculative science ('ilm al-na`zir), and accordingly al-Ghazali says in Tuhafut, (pp. 1s.f) that what the falsafah call logic (al-mantiq) is what "in kalam we call the book on speculative reasoning" (kitab al-na`zir).

The rules and procedures of formal reasoning, are, he says, in fact, illustrated and taught by the prophets and in the Koran (e.g., Qiitab, pp. 8f. and 27, 3f., and Fayal, pp. 40ff., with which cp. ibid., pp. 16f. and Jawahir, p. 15, 31 where he mentions disputation, al-nujudulah). He cites, moreover, a Tradition according to which the Prophet said, "When men draw near to God by means of various kinds of devotions, then draw you near with your mind (al-saqi`." and he goes on to note that "drawing near is not possible either by one's native instincts (al-qurra`oh al-`ar`ar al-qurra`) or by such knowledge as given immediately (al-`ilm al-mulla`i), but rather by that which is gained through rational inference (al-`ab al-makha`abul)." (Ihya' 3, p. 36, 35.)

The failure of formal theological reasoning to benefit some people—many, indeed—cannot be taken as evidence that conceptual understanding (al-saqi`) and rational demonstration (al-nujudulah) have little value in theology, because God does not give "the light of the mind" (al-Qurra`ooh al-`ar`a`r al-Qurra`) to all, but only to certain individuals (Iayqub, p. 10, 12f.; cp. Ihyah 1, p. 14, 17f.).

Consistently with this, then, al-Ghazali says that the truth or falsity of theological propositions may be ascertained by purely speculative reasoning (e.g., Iayqub, p. 124f., 2f.; Qiitab, p. 8, 40f.; and Ihyah, p. 112). He says, furthermore, that logic, i.e., rigorous, systematic reasoning, is required in order to clarify the texts of the Koran and the prophetic Traditions, that is, in order to know what is and what is not to be taken literally and, in the case of the latter, what proposed interpretations may be valid or true and which must be false (e.g., Fayal, pp. 43ff. and 46ff.). Indeed, it is through theoretical reason-
ciple that derives from religious belief as such. Attempts to follow autonomous reason exclusively, however, inevitably go astray, even with regard to the elementary truths, as is witnessed in the errors of the falsafa regarding the eternity of the world and God’s knowledge of particulars. Moreover, it is impossible by the sole means of rational speculation to know a number of things knowledge of which is of the greatest importance to the soul’s achievement of its highest good. Some of these have to do with future contingents; one cannot know by reasoning exactly what happens to the soul after death or what is to the soul’s benefit or harm in the next life (Iḥām, p. 87). Most important to al-Ghazālī’s mind, perhaps, is that prophetic revelation is necessary in order to know what actions and activities must be pursued or avoided in order to purify the soul and bring it to perfection (e.g., Ihya' 3, p. 16, 22ff., and Mumādīh, pp. 151, and 161f.).

Where he speaks specifically of kalām as a science that is required within the Muslim community, al-Ghazālī’s perspective is not abstract, but situated within the concrete social, intellectual, and religious context of his own time. Adherence to Islam is assumed as the rule; most people are brought up in Islam and have consequently some level of adherence to it as a norm and some degree of belief, even if by the most naive attachment to the beliefs of others. There is need for and justification of rational inquiry into the truth of the revelation or the significance or meaning of some element of it whenever it appears to be doubtful or unclear. It is for this reason that in a number of important contexts in which al-Ghazālī discusses kalām explicitly he speaks of it primarily as apologetic. Thus he says in one place that “the one benefit of kalām is to protect the faith (iḥrāsatu l-'aqlidah) . . . and to preserve it by means of all sorts of arguments against the confusions sown by heretics.” It serves to confirm and to reinforce belief (turkūd al-istiqaqah) (Ihya' 4, pp. 244ff.). Where there is little heresy kalām is not much needed and it is adequate to teach a manual such as his own Quṣūṣa to young people (Ihya' 1, p. 98, 34ff.). Against the assertion of some who cite the authorities of the first generations in order to condemn the practice of kalām as itself heretical, he replies that in the early period of Islam, when heresies were neither many nor strong, there was scant need for kalām, but in view of the wide diffusion of serious heresy it subsequently became, and remains, a necessity for the community so that its cultivation by scholars who are specialists is an obligation of the community (jardu kifāyah). God caused the rise of kalām for the good of the community (Mumadīh, p. 92). Here, kalām is portrayed as a formal, religious science or discipline in the public role by filling which it serves the religious community as such, not as the private, speculative activity carried out by individuals in quest of greater religious insight and understanding. It is in this public aspect that al-Ghazālī views kalām in contexts where he speaks of it explicitly by this designation, that is, as the discipline commonly taught in the schools as the basic theological science. That some aspects of the way it is taught in the schools may not, in al-Ghazālī’s opinion, well serve the valid and necessary function of kalām does not vitiate its legitimacy as one of the religious sciences needed by the community.

To some classes of people kalām is normally harmful. Questions concerning the truth of the revelation and the meaning of the various articles of faith do not naturally arise for simple people; they are intellectually incapable of forming, understanding, and dealing with theoretical concepts and therefore should under no circumstances be exposed to theological problems of any kind (e.g., Ihām, pp. 114ff.). For such people, kalām, the “demon of dialectic,” is an evil, since it can only result in confusion and doubt (Ihya' 1, pp. 97f., Iṣṭiṣād, pp. 9f., Qīṭāţ, pp. 47f. and Faya'wl, pp. 66f.). Where there are no genuine doubts or questions, kalām is forbidden (Faya'wl, p. 79, 1ff.).

So also the theological disputation practiced in the schools is most likely to have a deleterious effect on people who are solidly committed to some particular form of unbelief or heresy, since under the pressure of counterarguments they are more likely to become even more obstinate in their position than to alter it (e.g., Ihya', 1, p. 41, 44f., and p. 97; 3f. and 88f.; Iṣṭiṣād, p. 10; and Faya'wl, p. 70, 1ff.). In Ihya' 2 (pp. 40f. and 4, pp. 244f.) he cites his own Iṣṭiṣād as a compendium (makhtāmu) in which there is an appropriate amount and level of disputation against heretics and of counterargument to their heresy (munāzaratu l-'umādātī wa-mušmāriyādatu bīl-āšā). There are other people, however, whose questions have to be dealt with and resolved by formal theological reasoning. These are individuals who are endowed with superior mental and intellectual abilities (al-dhikā' ul-wal-fištah) and “to whom questions and doubts (shubab and shuṣāk) occur, either from things that others say or by
nature," that is, because they are naturally disposed to save inquiring minds (e.g., ʿIḥyāʾ 1, p. 16, 88f., and p. 98, 26f. and ʿIṣṭiḥāḍ, p. 11). Their pursuit of theoretically grounded knowledge and understanding (al-baṣīṭ) must be carried as far as is required in order to resolve their questions (e.g., ʿIṣṭiḥāḍ, p. 11, and ʿAṣyāʾ, p. 48, 3-6). The higher the individual’s intellectual insight, the greater need he has for formal analysis and understanding and the further he will have, therefore, to pursue his course in speculative theology. This is important, for when al-Ghazālī speaks of individuals to whom doubts and questions occur “by nature” (bī-tawāʾir) as well as because of things they have heard (bī-kalimāt) (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, p. 16, 12f.), there can be little doubt that he includes himself among them and it is thus that he speaks of the benefit he gained from kalām at the outset (Munāqid, p. 77, 9, and p. 91), even though he would later go beyond it to a higher theology. When he says (Munāqṣirī, p. 87, 1f.) that one cannot acquire the discipline of rigorous theological reasoning by himself but must have a teacher, al-Ghazālī explicitly recognizes the importance of the schools. He views the matter consistently within the social context.

Following the tradition of the Ashʿarītes, al-Ghazālī insists on the rightness of taking a middle path between the rational reductionism of the fāṣīfīs and the Muṭtazilī on the one extreme, and on the other of the simpletons (al-haḏābirīyūn) who think that one is formally obliged to hold rigidly to an uncritical acceptance of traditional authority and to adhere to a strictly literalist reading of all the theological statements of the Koran and the Sunna (Iṣṭiḥāḍ, pp. 1-3 and 23f.). He states explicitly, in fact, that the Ashʿarī school adheres to this middle path with regard to the rational interpretation of problematic descriptions of God (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, pp. 103f.; cp. ʿAṣyāʾ, pp. 44f.), though he carefully avoids identifying his own doctrine with that of any school.

Regarding the kalām of the schools, which he frequently identifies, and not altogether unreasonably, with the formal disputations that were a central element of the scholars’ academic activity, al-Ghazālī has, however, a number of very negative things to say. His polemic against the schoolmen is, in fact, often quite harsh. Most of this centers upon the kind of disputation that was favored in the schools and the cultivation of which was considered by many to be the highest scientific religious activity (cf., e.g., ʿIḥyāʾ 1, p. 80, 13f. and ʿAṣyāʾ, p. 70, 28f.). Only individuals of genuinely superior intelligence are capable of serious theological reasoning. The fact is, however, that the schoolmen are largely unable to distinguish between skill in disputation and true knowledge and insight. The kind of disputation (muṣṭaṣṣarāt, muṣṭādaleh, ḫiḍā) normally carried on in the schools al-Ghazālī condemns as rude, unseemly, and detrimental to individuals of lesser intelligence (e.g., Qīṭāt, pp. 11f.) and also as raising for less-intelligent individuals questions that they cannot deal with (ibīd., pp. 79ff.). Though there is a good form of dialectical argumentation (e.g., ʿIḥyāʾ 1, pp. 95f., Jawāhir, p. 21, and ʿAṣyāʾ, p. 95), disputation is generally bad (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, pp. 43f.). Thus, he says, that disputation which goes beyond what is in the Koran and the Traditions is to be regarded as blameworthy (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, pp. 22, 96f., and ʿAṣyāʾ, p. 95, 7f.). Much of it is concerned with searching out inconsistencies in particular school doctrines (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, p. 20, 30f., and Munāqīṣ, p. 92, 11f.) and has the effect of producing irrationally partisan attachment to the doctrines of one’s own school or master (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, p. 97, 3, and ʿAṣyāʾ, pp. 11f.), with the result that even scholars who have somewhat superior minds are corrupted by a commitment to the tradition of their schools and an uncritical attachment to the teaching of their masters (ʿIḥyāʾ 1, pp. 79-80, and Qīṭāt, p. 80). Furthermore, dialectical argumentation, however well accomplished, has little efficacy in bringing an erring or heretical opponent to alter his views; quite the contrary, in fact (e.g., ʿIḥyāʾ 1, p. 41, 3f. and pp. 96f.). For his condemnation of dialectical disputation there are precedents in the sufi tradition. Maṭrīʿī al-Karkhī (d. 200/818), for example, is reported to have said, “When God wishes good to a man He opens to him the gate of action (al-ṣamāʿ); when God wishes ill to a man He opens to him the gate of dialectic (al-jadal).”

**Essential Natures, Logic, and the Lawfulness of Secondary Causes**

Because of what he regards as the intellectual shortcomings of most of the professional theologians, al-Ghazālī is consistently at pains to set himself above the theology of the schools. Though some think that insight into the true natures of things (kātbā fu
he says, basically contained in the Koran and the Traditions (Ihya’ 1, p. 22, 28ff.); they are simple and immediately understood without recourse to formal analysis (Ihya’, p. 98, 31ff.). The arguments, in effect, rest upon premises that are granted either as given in the school tradition or by the consensus of the Muslim community or are simply accepted on the authority of the Koran and the Traditions (Munqidh, p. 92, 9–11). It is for this reason, according to al-Ghazālī, sc., because it employs mere endoxa (maqābūratā) as premises (e.g., Miḥkāk, pp. 66ff. and 71), that the reasoning of kalām is formally dialectical and that it cannot yield true intellectual insight or knowledge of the essential natures of things as they really are in themselves. Such knowledge, he holds, is achieved not through dialectical reasoning and disputation but through logical demonstration all the formal conditions of whose validity have been fulfilled (Ihya’, p. 112, 3ff.; translated on p. 8 above). Such demonstration is carried out on premises which are founded in one of five sources (‘ilm) whose truth is known conclusively: (1) sense perception, (2) experience, (3) universal report, (4) immediate intuition, or (5) a conclusion drawn on the basis of principles (1–4) (‘ilmā bil-hisā wa-‘ilmā bil-tajribāt wa-‘ilmā bil-tawāṣṣūr l-kāmilī ‘aw-bi-sa‘wāli l-nafṣī ‘aw-bi-isṭiṣā‘ī min hādhālī l-jumāli) (Qistā, p. 60). These five sources are mentioned in Munqidh (p. 123, citing Qistā) where, also following Qistā (p. 68), he says that the five are presented as such in the Koran. One notes that the list given here seems to follow Avicenna. Consistently with this, in the preface to Maqṣad al-Ghazālī vehemently rejects the conceptual and analytic tradition of kalām in favor of that of the falsafā. 

The question has been raised as to how al-Ghazālī can claim adherence to the Aristotelian logic and how he can hold that the experience of the consistent sequential relationships between entities and events can be said to constitute a valid basis for justified premises in demonstrative syllogisms if he follows the Ash’arite doctrine according to which efficient causality is not attributed to things in virtue of their natures as such. His constant insistence on the importance of knowing the true natures or essences of things (ḥaqiqiy ‘al-a‘bādī) is conspicuous enough. But does he follow the tradition of the Ash’arite school regarding natures and causation? The matter is discussed in Misyār in a passage (pp. 109ff.) which may be taken as an
example of the rhetorical maneuvers al-Ghazzālī sometimes performs when, for one reason or another, he feels obliged to address this issue explicitly.20 To illustrate the kind of certain knowledge which may be gained by experience, al-Ghazzālī, like Avicenna, often offers the example of medicine, that is, of the consistent effects of the specific properties (khawāṣīq) of herbs, drugs, and the like.21 These are things that happen in most cases ('alā l-rikhtayn) but not always and under all circumstances (Miḥakk, p. 61). In Miḥakk (pp. 199 ff.) and in Muḥtajib (1, pp. 45 ff.) he lists a number of causal effects that are known by experience, among them a fire's causing combustion, its rising upwards, eating's causing satiety, the inebriating effects of wine, the laxative effects of scatoly, and the magnet's attraction of iron, things knowledge of which has to be founded in experience, since the judgment is general (qadīyun tu l-dāmmal) and what is given to sense as such is merely the particular instance of an event.22 In fact, he says (Miḥakk, p. 80, 6–7 = Muḥtajib 1, p. 54, 14) that causes and effects (išilāb wa muqāfā, sabkab wa muqābāh, wa miṣūr wa muqāb) are concomitant one to the other (ya'qūla ya'qūla).23 When, however, the question is raised in Muṣyr (p. 109, 21 ff.) concerning the denial of efficient causality by the mutakallimīn, he does not take up the example of the properties of drugs and herbs, but gives several other examples of manifestly causal sequences (decapitation and death, eating and satiety, fire and burning) for discussion of which the reader is referred to Taḥāfūt. Here, in Muṣyr, he limits himself to noting that the relation between decapitation and death is an instance of an event in which the invariant relationship between the antecedent and the consequent is universally known through experience, and he goes on to say that the question of whether the connection between the two events is something necessary and whose alteration, therefore, is impossible absolutely (darāyirayn wa-layla fi l-ikhwān tāqīyirīn), or whether the connection between the two is simply "the normal course of God's custom (jarayyisun sunnati illāh) through the efficacy of His eternal will, which is not subject to substitution and alteration" (lā taḥtāma l-tahdīla wa-taqīyirī), does not concern the consistency of the connection between the two events, but rather the way in which they are connected. The invariance of the relationship in the example and the causal relationship when, in other cases, the effect usually, but not always, follows the antecedent: event are not in question here. For al-Ghazzālī, possibility as "to be in possibility" (fi l-ikhwān) is absolute possibility and so has to do with the possibles as essential natures and with what is necessary, possible, and impossible with regard to their instances.24 The statement concerning God's "custom" alludes to Q15,43: la-n tājdīla li-sunnati illāh tabdīlāna fa-lan tājdīla li-sunnati illāh tabdīlāna. God's invariant "custom" involves what, absolutely speaking, could be otherwise: what hypothetically God could have willed to be otherwise but which, being in fact so willed, is necessarily invariant or, depending on other factors, happens for the most part as is lawfully determined by the particular circumstances. In either case, the invariance of the connection between decapitation and death is inevitable, and the empirically founded judgment that this is always (and necessarily) the case, is fully justified. Here, in Muṣyr, al-Ghazzālī does not give any clear explanation of what exactly is meant by "the normal course of God's custom," and he gives no indication of what it means to say that it is not subject to substitution or alteration (al-tahdīla wa-taqīyirī), nor, finally, does he say on which of the two alternatives the observed invariance of the connection is based. Rhetorically, he addresses the reader in the traditional Ash'arīte language about the consistency of events in accord with God's custom while saying that, given the fact of the invariability of the relationship, there is no need to pursue the matter further in this context. The relation of the head to the living body, however, is something that has a special interest for al-Ghazzālī. There is nothing in the sublunary world, he says (Jawāhir, p. 28), that does not have its analogue in the celestial world. It is thus according to al-Ghazzālī that the soul governs the body as God governs the universe (cf. Miḥakk, p. 136, 5, translated on p. 60 below; and cp. Miḥkāl, p. 44, 10 ff.). So in Ṣawm (p. 68 ff.) he offers the relationship between the brain and the rest of the body as an analogue to the relation of the outermost sphere to the rest of the created universe,25 and there states his position clearly and unambiguously: the soul governs the body through the brain and although it is possible absolutely that man have been created such that it govern the body in some other way, what God wills He wills eternally and necessarily. It is de facto impossible that God have willed that the soul be related to the body in any other way, wherefore man is, in effect, so constituted that it is impossible that the soul govern the body other than through the
instrumentality of the brain. Here (Itjam, p. 69, 6), al-Ghazali cites Fakir (v. 43) verbatim in confirmation of his thesis: “you shall never find any substitution in the custom of God.” Returning to Mi'yar, then, not only is it al-Ghazali's position that decapitation necessarily results in the separation of the soul from the body, but also that it is not possible that God has willed that this not be the case, wherefore it is not possible either that He intervene in the nature of order so as to interrupt this sequence of events. That al-Ghazali should choose to focus on the example of decapitation is interesting, since, of the three examples of causal connections that are mentioned here in Mi'yar, it is the only one in which, according to both al-Ghazali and the falasi, the effect must inevitably follow the cause. In the language of “conditions” which al-Ghazali sometimes employs in speaking of causes and causation, one would say that with the separation of the head from the body one of the necessary conditions for the soul’s continued governance of the body is no longer present.26 Note that where traditional Ash'arite language will speak of the miracle as a break or an interruption of God's habit or custom (kharq l- 'adala: e.g., Tahrir, p. 157, 11, and Shami [81], pp. 90f.; inkhirq l- 'adala: e.g., al-Ishaf'ini, Fr. 103, and Isrād, p. 314, 11; naqiq l- 'adala: e.g., Musafrud, p. 154, 8, and Shami [69], p. 154, 8), al-Ghazali does not. He says, rather, that the custom is invariant, without alteration or change, since, following Avicenna, he conceives the miracle as the result of an unusual, a unique or anomalous conjunction of secondary causes. Cause and effect are related as concomitants and this is referred to in terms of the consistency of customs (ittiyād al- 'adāt).27 In Mi'yar (p. 109, 6) the phrase “is not subject to substitution or alteration” explicitly qualifies “God's eternal will,” but through the manifest allusion to Q35,43 the qualification is plainly extended to the “custom” which necessarily ensues from God’s “eternal and necessary will” (Itjam, p. 69, 7). Though al-Ghazali nowhere say outright that God cannot intervene in the operation of secondary causes, this is plainly implied by his asserting, for example, that there is “in possibility” no better and more perfect universe (Itjam 4, p. 252, 29ff.), and that if its order (tariq) were altered, then the whole system would be vitiated (Maqadd, p. 81, 17f.), wherefore if any given evil that occurs were to be removed, “then the good that it entails would be done away with . . . and far worse evil would occur” (ibid., p. 68, 7ff., on which see Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 66ff.). What are commonly spoken of as “causes” ( 'asāb) al-Ghazali occasionally describes as the “conditions” of the effect (e.g., Itjam 4, pp. 86f. and 249) and he states that God cannot create anything the conditions of whose existence are not fulfilled (ibid. and Maqadd, p. 123). It is for this reason that there can be “no substitution in God’s custom,” no interruption, that is, in the lawful operation of secondary causes.

The formal lexicon of al-Ghazali’s writing is very fluid, as for any given term or concept he commonly employs a number of expressions, often in order to avoid associating a given assertion, thesis, or argument with the particular school or tradition with which particular expressions may be closely identified. So for logic and for formal, systematic or speculative reasoning, there are a number of terms which he commonly prefers to use in lieu of ‘mantiq, particularly in more formally religious contexts, in order to avoid associating his own teaching explicitly with that of pagan antiquity and of the falasi. In some places he uses expressions commonly found in traditional kalâm, such as “the method of drawing inferences”: ’tariq al-’asābāt (Itjam 3, p. 17, 28) and ’tariq al-’istitāb (ibid., line 29). Elsewhere, he employs “the (right) balance”: “al-’asābāt (al-mustaqim)” (e.g., Mi'yar, p. 24, 6; Maqadd, p. 123, 10; and Qistās and Fasyal, passim), and “al-mustaqim” (ibid.),28 or simply “the ways/means of systematic reflection”: “’asāb al-’istibār (Itjam 3, p. 13, 23, and 4, p. 478, 1), ‘mihāl al-’istibār” (Fasyal, p. 488, 3-4) and “’amsābiha l-bāhtha wal-nāzir” (Istimād, p. 2, 1). Whatever the expression employed, when al-Ghazali speaks of formal, speculative reasoning (al-nāzir, al-’istibār, etc.), he means what Avicenna and the falasi call “demonstrative reasoning”; he assumes the Aristotelian logic together with Avicenna’s epistemology and the primary elements of the ontology which are associated with it.29 Though his language may vary according to context, al-Ghazali’s intention remains constant. Kalām, that is, the common theology as taught in the schools, is essentially dialectical in its reasoning, and its arguments are founded on those of the Koran, which are directed towards simple people, while the “balance” of truly demonstrative reasoning, which gives “genuine insight into the true realities of things,” is for the intellectual elite (Qistās, pp. 79f.)30 who are capable of a higher theology.
which he refers to consistently as ‘ālim al-mukāšāfi’f, i.e., that in which true insight into the essential natures of things and the universe and into God’s being as creator of every contingent entity and event, i.e., true tawḥīd, is attained.

Kalām in the Classification of the Religious
Sciences in Iḥyā’ ‘ulām al-dīn

In Iḥyā’, al-Ghazālī presents two distinctly different classifications of the sciences, the first in Book I (K. al-‘Ilm) and the second in Book XXI (K. Aḥjīb al-qalb). In neither, however, does his account of the place and role of kalām among the religious sciences correspond to what we find in al-Mustaṣfā. In K. al-‘Ilm, under the heading of sciences which are necessary for the community (farā’iṣ kifayah) but not for each individual (pp. 17ff.), he distinguishes non-religious sciences from the religious sciences and, within the latter class, those whose aim is the good of this life from those whose aim is the good of the next life. Fiqh he places in the former category, and in the latter he mentions “the science of the states of the soul and its moral characteristics, good and bad” (‘ilmu ‘umrāsī l-qalbī wa-‘adldhā bil-ma‘māmāt wāl-ma‘mūmāt), which, he notes (p. 17, 27ff.), forms the topic of the second half of Iḥyā’. Though dealing in part with moral actions, the science of the soul does not fall under the direction of the faqīh (p. 19, 3ff.). Subsequently, in offering a more detailed account of the sciences whose aim is the good of the next life, he names two (p. 20, 18ff.), sc., ‘ālim al-mukāšāfiqāf and ‘ālim l-muṣ‘alāmah. The latter he identifies with the science of the states of the soul (p. 21, 19ff.); it is the higher ethical science through which the soul seeks its ultimate perfection. The former is the higher theology which embraces the knowledge of the celestial realm, its governance of the material, sublunary world and its role in accomplishing the perfection of the human soul; he says (p. 20, 19) that it is “the science of what is hidden and this is the ultimate of the sciences” (‘ilmu l-ba‘īn, wa-l-burūn ghazyatu l-salām), and goes on (pp. 20f.) to say that it is an expression which refers to a light that appears in the soul when it is cleansed and purified of its bad characteristics (‘ifāṣsahā l-maṣālimaḥ) and from this light many things are revealed (yankahah) . . . to the point that one achieves the true knowledge (muṣ‘alāf) of God’s being and of His enduring and perfect attributes and His judgement in creating this world and the next world and the way that He ordered the next world to this world and the knowledge (muṣ‘alāf) of the word ‘angels’ . . . and how the angel becomes manifest to prophets and how revelation reaches them and the knowledge (muṣ‘alaf) of the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and how the hosts of angels and devils meet there in conflict . . . and what it means to encounter God (the Mighty, the Glorious) and to look at His gracious face and what it means to be near Him and to stop in his proximity and what it means to attain blessedness (barzahā l-sādiqūhū) through the companionship of the High Council and the company of the angels and the prophets (bi-mawṣ‘ahiti l-malā‘i l-sālihā wa-‘adghārihūti l-malā‘ikatī wa-l-ṣālihā) . . . .

To have this science is to have the authentic knowledge of God’s uniqueness as creator, the highest tawḥīd, which is the foundation of authentic trust in God (tawakkal) (Iḥyā’ 4, pp. 24ff.).

In his classification of the sciences in K. al-‘Ilm it is only after he has described this higher metaphysics with its integrated psychology and cosmology that al-Ghazālī raises the question of kalām, and then rhetorically as if in a kind of appendix to the primary topic. Why, he asks, have kalām and falsafa been omitted from this classification of the sciences and distinction of those that are good from those that are bad (fa‘īn qulta ṭimān . . . ?) (p. 22, 18ff.)? In response, he says (p. 22f.) that though it is one of the things which are necessary to the community, kalām has only restricted value and legitimacy, something which he will discuss later. Falsafa is set aside (p. 23, 19ff.) as a mix of disparate sciences, the most important of which, sc., logic and metaphysics, are also elements of kalām. The true metaphysical science, ‘ilm al-mukāšāfiqāf, cannot be attained through kalām (p. 21, 19ff.). And al-Ghazālī goes on then to say (p. 23, 20ff.) that even though the religious scholars, the mutakallimūn and the fuqahā’, may be famous for their learning and are considered by some to be the most excellent of mankind (‘Ilālihū l-khalīq), the Companions, who
pursued not law and kalām, but "the science of the next life and of the way to get there" ('ilmu l-tākhīratu wa-sułakī tārīqah), are universally recognized as being superior. What he does, in effect, is to claim the authority of the Companions for the superiority of his own higher ethics and metaphysics and concomitantly, by implication, their greater authority and their intrinsic priority with respect to the principal sciences of the religious scholars. It is important to note that within this scheme fiqh falls outside (and below) the 'ilm al-muwāṣa'ālah, even though it is essential to the life of the individual and the community and is also propaedeutic to the soul's achievement of higher perfection. Similarly, kalām falls outside and below the 'ilm al-mukāhābah, but though it may be one of the disciplines that are necessary to the community (min jumlati l-qāri'ātī l-waghbi'atī 'adlah l-kaṣāyih), its utility is restricted and its intrinsic value somewhat questionable.

In 'Aṣārīb al-qlāb, then, al-Ghazālī presents another classification of the sciences, this time on the basis of their relation to the states of the soul. Here (Ilyās 3, pp. 13ff.), he classes the sciences generally as rational ('ulūm al-qaṣiyah), i.e., those which cannot be acquired on the sole basis of authority or transmitted report (bi-taqlid wil-amsā') (pp. 15, 31, and 16, 17ff.), and the specifically religious sciences, i.e., those which have their source and foundation in the revelation (al- 'ulūm al-gharīyah, al- 'ulūm al-dīnyah). In this context al-Ghazālī classes the science of the states of the soul and "the science of God and of his attributes and actions" as rational sciences ('ilmun 'aqli), and as sciences which are, moreover, concerned with the next world ('ilmun 'uκhwatih) (p. 17, 10). The latter is clearly to be identified with higher metaphysics ('ilm al-mukāhābah).

In 'Aṣārīb al-qlāb logic and formal reasoning are discussed in a fundamentally theological context that is larded with Koran verses and Traditions and are placed within a significantly broader horizon than in Mrjār, Mihāk, Qīšāq, and Fayyāl. Here, having taken some time to explain how, according to one conception, 'heart' (al-qlāb), 'spirit' (al-rūh), 'soul' (al-nafs), and 'intellect/mind' (al- 'aql) are employed synonymously (p. 3, 10ff.; cp. ibid. 1, p. 88, 28ff., and Mihāk, p. 49, 13ff.), he goes on to take up how the "heart," sc., the soul, is the locus of cognition (mašāh al- 'ilm), and states that every intelligible (kulla mašāh) has an essence (taqlid) and that this essence has a form (qirāh) which is impressed in the soul (p. 12, 13ff.; cp. Msqad, p. 18, 10ff., Fayyāl, pp. 30ff., Mihāk, p. 77, 6ff.; Msqad, p. 151, 6ff., and Ilyās, p. 120, 91f.). He goes on to give an account of the nature of intellectual cognition in terms of the presence of an image in a mirror which by its nature is ready to have manifested in it the "essential truth in all things" (huqiqatu l-haqīq fi l-umūrī kullih) (p. 12, 30ff.). The conception of the nature and operation of the mind is fundamentally that of the fālsāfa, though al-Ghazālī here assiduously avoids the use of their language. He goes on then to list and to explain (pp. 12ff.) five impediments to the acquisition of knowledge: (1) inadequacy of mind, e.g., immaturity, (2) impurity of heart due to immoderate appetites, (3) failure to seek knowledge, (4) attachment to false opinions, and (5) ignorance of how to go about seeking knowledge. Concerning (5) he says that one who seeks to know cannot achieve knowledge of what is unknown "save by reflection on the things he does know which are directly related (taqlid) to that which he seeks to know," so that when he follows the ways of systematic reflection (tanzih al-īthār), sc., the rules of logical inference, "the essential reality of that which he seeks to know revealed to his mind" (injilāhu huqiqatu l-masāhībī l-qlābī) (p. 12, 7aff.). Because of their attachment to the teaching of their masters and the dialectical foundations of their discipline, the mutakallimīn of the schools tend, then, at the very least, to be afflicting by two of these impediments to the acquisition of higher knowledge.

Al-Ghazālī then describes the importance and nature of "the ways of systematic reflection," pleading his case for the essential role of formal logic in an extended image:

The things one seeks to know are not given innately (fitīpiyah) and cannot be caught save in the net of truths that are already achieved (al- 'ulūm l- ḥālāh). Indeed, no truth ( 'ilm) is achieved (yathul) save through two prior truths that are combined and coupled in a particular way and from whose coupling (adānāq) a third truth is achieved, just as birth comes about through the coupling of a stallion and a mare. No one who wants to bring about the birth of a thoroughbred can do this with a donkey or a wild ass or a man, but only from the male and female of a particular breed of horse and when there occurs a particular coupling between them. Thus every true cognition (kulla 'ilm) has two particular foundations ('adānāq)
and there is a way of coupling them, from which coupling of them the acquired knowledge which was sought comes about (waṣṣulu . . . al-sīmu l-mustafadu l-muttaḥī). It is ignorance of these foundations and the manner of their coupling that precludes the knowledge. (p. 11, 22–20; note the use of “al-mustafadī” here)

The failure to understand how to draw fully justified inferences, thus, is

one of the causes (‘aṣābī) which prevents minds from knowing the essential realities of things, for of its nature (bi-fīnahī) every mind is capable of knowing the essential realities (mutanfaṣu l-haqqīqa), because it is something divine and noble which is distinct from all other created beings by this particular characteristic: (tināqa wa‘īra jawa‘īra l-‘alāmi bi-badā‘īni l-khāṣṣīya). (p. 14, 1–6)

The expression here reflects again the usage of Avicenna.

Al-Ghazālī distinguishes two ways of acquiring knowledge, that of the sufis and that of “those who employ speculative reasoning” (al-muẓāhir). Referring to the former, he speaks (Ihyā‘ 3, pp. 17ff.) of attaining knowledge by inspiration (‘ilmā‘īn), that is, “by direct apprehension of the angel which bestows knowledge on the mind” (musḥaḥ-hadatu l-malaki l-mulqi fi l-qaļīb) (Ihyā‘ 3, p. 17, 31). This is achieved by purification through ascetic exercises and belongs to the saints, while the acquisition of knowledge by means of rational inference is special to the scholars (al-‘ulamā‘īn) (ibid., pp. 17ff.) It remains, in either case, that

the fact is that the mind is ready to have the essential reality of the Truth in all beings revealed to it (‘am yāqīnayānī fihi bāqīqata l-haqqī fi l-niḥāyātī kullihi) and something interferes only on account of the five causes we mentioned; they are, so to speak, a veil which comes between the mirror of the mind and the Well Guarded Tablet on which is engraved everything which God has enacted until the day of the resurrection. (3, p. 18, 1–5; cp. ibid., p. 12, 30ff.).

The “Well Guarded Tablet” here designates the angel (separated intelligence) that is associated with the outermost celestial sphere. “The essential realities of all things are spread upon the Well Guarded Tablet” (Ihyā‘ 3, p. 19, 28), which is also referred to as “the hearts

of the angels that stand nearest” (qulūb l-malā‘īkat l-muqarrabīn) (ibid.). God is the Truth (al-haqq) and when al-Ghazālī talks of the intellect’s receiving “the essence of the Truth in all things” (3, p. 12, 31, and p. 18, 2), he means that in addition to the knowledge of the essential natures of things, this higher knowledge includes (or comes to include) insight into the presence of God as the primary cause of the events that take place in the world (cf., e.g., Ihyā‘ 4, pp. 240ff.) and so into the cosmic system as the manifestation of His originating “Determination” (al-khālīq = al-taqādīr) and His “Accomplishment” (al-qadā‘ī). When he speaks, then, of God’s giving “the light of the mind” to certain individuals (Iqtīṣād, p. 10, 12, cited on p. 10 above), what he means is that it is given immediately by a secondary cause, namely, the agent intellect, upon the fulfillment of the conditions of its reception by the individual soul (sc., isti‘ādīd al-qalb). If the conditions of its reception are not fulfilled, its reception is impossible; even God cannot intervene so as to give it, since he has the power to create only that the conditions of whose coming to be are fulfilled (e.g., Ihyā‘ 4, pp. 244ff. and Maqāsid, p. 125, 96f.). The proximate conditions of the reception of this higher knowledge cannot be achieved through the science kalām.
3. Two “Ash’arite” Tracts:

al-Iqtiṣād fi l-I’tiqād and

al-Qudsiyyah

Al-Iqtiṣād

If the primary purpose of kalām is, as al-Ghazālī suggests, to defend the basic doctrines of Sunni Islam, then one should regard Tuhfât al-falāṣifah, al-Mustaṣfārī, and Faṣūl al-Iṭtiḥād as, in one sense at least, kalām works. The first two, in fact, are cited in Jawābīr (p. 21) as being such. And so too, if logic is an element of kalām, then Mīyār al-‘īlām and Mūṣaffa‘ al-nāṣir might also be considered kalām works, particularly as al-Ghazālī says that the logic of the fālāṣifā differs from that of the mutakallimūn only in its terminology (al-‘ibārāt wal-iqtiṣāḥ) and in the greater detail in which it is explained (Maqāsid i, p. 3, and Musnadī, p. 104; cp. Iḥyā‘ i, p. 23). The precise significance of these remarks of al-Ghazālī concerning logic are not altogether clear, however, since one cannot be sure that they are to be taken simply at face value. Again, Musnad, since it is a theological work involving one of the topics commonly dealt with by the mutakallimūn, might perhaps be viewed as a kalām work. While mani-

cently consistent with Iḥyā‘ and Mūṣaffa‘, for example, these works do not, however, seem to be consistent with traditional Ash’arite kalām either in language and conception or in theoretical assumptions and constructs that underlie and govern much, not to say most, of what they assert. They are, moreover, conspicuously different in these respects from Iṣṭiṣād and Qudsiyyah, which are expressly put forward as summary manuals of kalām theology, whose general pattern they follow. Where these latter works fit formally within the corpus of al-Ghazālī’s work is therefore not immediately clear. Questions, indeed, have been raised concerning their consistency with the plainly Aristotelian cast of Mīyār and other works. Impressions tend to confirm expectations, and so Iṣṭiṣād has commonly been read as an orthodox Ash’arite manual—and as one, moreover, in which al-Ghazālī sets forth his own basic teaching, including the exposition of an essentially occasionalistic account of the occurrence of all events that take place within the sublunary world.1 That in Iṣṭiṣād he should deny, for example, the efficient causation of secondary causes which he asserted earlier in Mīyār and Mūṣaffa‘ and subsequently (even if not everywhere forthrightly and unambiguously) in Iḥyā‘, Musnad, Jawābīr, Mūṣaffa‘, Arba‘in, Mustaṣfā, and Iṣṭiṣād would prima facie seem unlikely, however, unless one is willing to take it that al-Ghazālī is egregiously inconsistent either in what he believed or in what he chose to say. We have, therefore, to look briefly at several aspects of Iṣṭiṣād and also of Qudsiyyah which may help to clarify their relationship to the common Ash’arite tradition and their place in the work of al-Ghazālī.

No one who is well acquainted with the traditional Ash’arite manuals can fail to find Iṣṭiṣād a very peculiar and, in places, perplexing book. Al-Juyaynī’s R. al-Nfitamiyyah, to be sure, departs significantly from certain elements of the common school tradition and from the traditional language as well, but it is quite straightforward in what it asserts and in its language and in its reasoning. Like al-Juyaynī’s Stāmūl, the long summae composed by his students (al-Ghazālī’s fellow students), abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī and al-Kiyā‘ al-Harāshī, on the other hand, adhere closely to the classical tradition.2 In Iṣṭiṣād, however, even though the traditional theses are formally stated and ostensibly upheld and defended against the Mu’tazila and others, the arguments and explanations al-Ghazālī presents for them
are, in several important instances at least, significantly different from those almost universally found in the common manuals. In a few cases the reasoning put forth to defend the thesis explicitly rejects traditional Ash'arite doctrine. In others the reasoning offered in support of the thesis, though not so clearly contrary to traditional doctrine, is by no means straightforward in presenting al-Ghazālī's intention and seems to be governed often by unstated presuppositions and to intend constructs and theses that, with few exceptions, are never plainly indicated. The frequent, though irregular, use of Avicenna's vocabulary is itself curious enough to give one pause. Were it not that al-Ghazālī presents his doctrine with a somewhat greater degree of clarity in earlier and in later works, the problem of what he means to say and what he does not mean to say (or means not to say) and of what he avoids saying might be high insolvable. The character and purpose of Iṣḥāq, in any case, remain problematic. Some of al-Ghazālī's reservations concerning the theology of the schools are indicated already in the second preface to the work (pp. 9ff.).

At the beginning of the fourth preface to Iṣḥāq (p. 15) al-Ghazālī states that in Miḥakk al-nazar and Miṣyār al-ṣīm he had set out the rules and principles of formal reasoning in some detail, but that here he will restrict the forms of argumentation employed and avoid the discussion of more abstruse matters for the sake of brevity. At the very end of the book (p. 287) he reiterates the point, saying that he has restricted his arguments (vadilah) to those that are obvious enough that they can be understood by the majority of people (mahāram l-aḥšām), meaning, no doubt, what he takes to be the mind of the average religious scholar. Not only does this indicate that there is a more detailed and intellectually more profound level at which the questions he will treat may be studied and understood, but the reference to two works on Aristotelian logic indicates to the reader in what direction this more advanced understanding is to be pursued. Again, when al-Ghazālī presents and describes the grounds of the premises that are to be employed in the arguments he will set forth, he lists (1) the data of the senses (al-hisnayya), (2) immediate intuition (al-aqīq al-maḥf), (3) universal report (al-tawḥīd), and (4) conclusions drawn on the basis of (1)–(3). The most conspicuous difference between this list and those given earlier in Miṣyār (pp. 108ff.) and Miḥakk (p. 9ff.) and subsequently in Qātāq (p. 60) and Mustaṣfī (1, pp. 44ff.) is that "experience" is absent. The significance of this omission, however, is not immediately clear. It is very likely that he wishes to give a fundamentally traditional list and so understands this to be included somehow under sense data, though it may be also—and perhaps more likely—that he wishes to avoid the superficial introduction of the issue of the causal connection of events that are perceived to occur with universal consistency. The present list differs also from the others by the addition of two further sources, (5) the data of revelation (al-samīʿ l-vidā) and (6) propositions believed or conceded by one's opponent. Here (5) would seem quite plainly to indicate that what he has to say here is written for the average religious scholar and so on that elementary or lower intellectual level that he says elsewhere is characteristic of the theology of the schools; and this is confirmed by (6) with its unequivocal allusion to disputational dialectic. It is thus that in Ḥujj (1, pp. 97ff.) he describes Qāṭāq as a manual which is quite adequate for young people whose faith might be undermined by the disputation of heretics and speaks of Iṣḥāq as a manual which, though somewhat more detailed, similarly does not go beyond the basic tenets of Muslim belief (qanūn al-aʿqād) and says (p. 41, 2f.) that in it he has held disputation against the heretics within moderate limits. A statement made in Arbūz shines some further light on the problem. There (p. 24) he says that Iṣḥāq "contains the core of the science of the mutakallimūn but goes farther in precise argumentation (al-taḥqīq) and comes closer to knowing on the gates of true cognitive insight (al-maʿrifah) than does the superficial discourse (al-ḥalām al-nawaiḥ) which one finds in the books of the mutakallimūn." In other words, though Iṣḥāq goes somewhat beyond the limits of the traditional manuals in its reasoning and argumentation, it is by no means a work of higher speculative theology—of iʿtim al-mukālaḥafah—and one should not expect that al-Ghazālī will present here his whole theological doctrine—the metaphysical and psychological theories that underlie and order some of what he will say or suggest—or that he will make clear his fuller understanding even of the basic theses he does treat.
Moral Obligation, Against the Mu'tazila

In the First Introduction, al-Ghazzālī says, following traditional Ash'arite teaching, that formal inquiry into the question of whether God exists or not is first provoked by the claims of the prophets (pp. 6f.), but then, instead of going on to take up the question of the obligation to undertake such speculative inquiry (wujūb al-nagār) here in its usual place, he postpones it (p. 4) for later treatment. Even here, however, the interlocutor's question indicates the direction of his thinking, as he says (p. 8), "I do not object to the notion that this being aroused to inquire is from my self (al-nāṣīb al-lātalāh min nafsī), but I don't know whether it is the product of natural disposition and nature (shurūrāt wa-selūlāt) or is something required by the intellect (mugdādatā l-nafṣ) or is demanded by the revealed law." Here, we have a characteristic example of the ambivalence which al-Ghazzālī manifests toward the traditional school theology throughout Igtīdāl. The last two alternatives mean to present the Mu'tazilite and the Ash'arite positions respectively. According to the former, every adult of sound mind knows intuitively that some actions are blameworthy as such and in themselves and that anyone who voluntarily performs them deserves blame, while others are morally obligatory and that one who performs them deserves praise. Furthermore, we know, also by immediate intuition, that it is ethically necessary that one do that which is best for his ultimate good. Recognizing, then, that it is possible that the world may be created by a higher being who punishes men and rewards them in accord with the good and bad they have done, one is obliged on purely rational grounds to seek to determine whether or not in fact such a being exists. That such rational inquiry is a universal obligation is an inference based on premises that are purely rational and fully justified; and the obligation, therefore, is in principle antecedent to and altogether independent of any prophetic revelation. By contrast, the traditional Ash'arite thesis is that there is no moral obligation of any kind prior to and apart from the giving of the revealed law; what is good or is bad to do is determined solely by the command and prohibition of the law and is unrelated either to anything intrinsic to the act or its effects or to any benefit or harm that may ensue upon obedience or disobedience. The obligation to seek to know whether or not God exists derives from the law's command that men know God and worship Him; the obligation cannot be known as something obligatory prior to the recognition of the divine authority of the law. Al-Ghazzālī's first alternative, however, sc., that the obligation may be 'the product of natural disposition and nature', is peculiar in that it does not fit within the traditional problematic of the manuals and, if one supposes that al-Ghazzālī adheres to traditional Ash'arite doctrine, may be surprising, especially when taken together with the preceding phrase. Read, however, within the broader context of al-Ghazzālī's theology as set out in Ḥaḏīṯ and elsewhere, both the expression and the implied conception are not surprising in the least," as one sees immediately how he will validate all three alternatives, bringing them together as elements of his own, higher understanding of the matter. Within this context, one hears 'nafs' not as a somewhat ambivalent 'my self' but formally as 'my soul' in the sense in which 'soul' is employed by the fālsāfiya, by al-Kindī and Avicenna. And, such a reading is hardly implausible given the frequent occurrence in Igtīdāl of terms drawn from the lexicon of Avicenna and the fālsāfiya.

Later, then (pp. 180ff.), al-Ghazzālī takes up the traditional question of the obligation to seek to know that God exists and that men are rewarded or punished according to their actions and whether this obligation obtains prior to the coming of prophetic revelation. His reasoning here is founded in an earlier analysis (pp. 160ff.) of 'necessary', 'good', and 'bad' as ethical terms. He defines the ethically necessary as that which must be done rather than omitted in order to avoid some harm, real or imagined, to one's self, so that what is most properly called 'necessary' is "that in whose omission there is some manifest harm" (ma fīturūn darwashul sahar) (p. 162, 2; cf. also p. 192). When he comes to apply this to the question of the ethical necessity of the speculative inquiry into God's existence, al-Ghazzālī's application of the definition to the problem is interesting. He begins with the traditional thesis, "Had the revelation not come, men would not have to know God and to thank Him for his benefits (la-ma kāna zajibulā'īl-tabād . . . )" (p. 189, 6). His argument (pp. 192ff.), then, is that the Prophet announces dire threats against those who do not accept his message as being from God and as requiring obedience, and that under the circumstances the prudent man has to look seriously
The question of whether this inquiry is obligatory, even if only on the most elementary level, for every Muslim or only for some within the community (discussed on pp. 96f.) is not raised in the present context but is implicitly taken care of: those individuals who, because of taqlid to the religious tradition of the social group, have no doubts or questions concerning the religious belief that is proposed to them within the community have no obligation to seek any level of theoretical justification, confirmation, or understanding of their belief. (Note that, though the two are closely associated, this is a quite different question from that of the status of kalām as a science which is necessary for the community—wujūd kalām—but not for every individual.) The analysis, moreover, is fully consistent with al-Ghazālī's conception of taqlid and with the statements made in Iḥyā‘ and elsewhere concerning those for whom kalām is beneficial. Read within the broader context of his theology, however, al-Ghazālī's conception of the nature of ethical obligation basically does away also with the traditional understanding that ethical good and bad originate in and are determined by God's command alone and, having no intrinsic relationship to the beings and events they concern, cannot as such be rationalized. His rejection of the traditional ethical theory of the Ashʿarite school as based on a failure to grasp the true nature of things is explicitly signaled when he tells the reader to pay no attention to what is usually said in explanation of this thesis since it can neither cure the soul's thirst for perfection nor the mind's desire for true knowledge and insight. At the same time, he has presented a carefully reasoned rejection of the Murtazalite theses that the obligation to theological speculation is not only universal but also obtains independently of, and so prior to, the coming of prophetic revelation. Al-Ghazālī's statement (p. 191) that the origin of the Murtazalite thesis concerning the necessity of theological speculation and of their conception of God's justice with which it is allied lies in associative impressions in which God is conceived after the image of an earthly ruler is interesting (though the operation of such impressions may be more conspicuous in some Ashʿarite writings; cf., e.g., Luma‘, §§54ff., and al-Isfahānī, Fr. 506f., p. 157). Here, once again, the formulation is to be noted, as al-Ghazālī says, "the sources from which they are taken are impressions that through the normal course of events have become firmly set in their minds as similar ones are set alongside
them and which there is no way to avoid (sawáhiman ruwáhii fihiim mina l-šuútii tu’urídulâ’i sanihulâ’i wa-lâ mašâ’i minshâ’i) (p. 91, 10f.). In his conception of the nature of associative impressions (sawáhiman) and the way they function in the formation of judgments, which he outlined earlier (pp. 16ff.), al-Ghazâlî follows Avicenna. In some respects, moreover, the position he sets out is much closer to that of the Mu’tazili than to that of the Ash’arites in that (a) he holds that ethical imperatives can be fully rationalized, and (b) holds that ethical necessity in the present case is a kind of natural necessity, being founded on the obligation to avoid harm to one’s self.

Al-Ghazâlî uses the same conception of the nature and ground of ethical necessity (pp. 16ff.; cf. Qudsiyyah, p. 91, 8ff. = Isyâf 1, p. 112, 18ff.) to refute the Mu’tazilite thesis that God is morally obliged to benefit his creatures by sending prophets, etc., if not to do what is absolutely best for them, on the principle that it is impossible that God suffer harm or obtain benefit from the existence or nonexistence of any creature. The argument is essentially dialectical, however, since al-Ghazâlî in fact holds that God necessarily creates what he creates and can have created no other universe. This is indicated in the statement (Iṣfiqâd, p. 43, 3), “al-qadim” [the eternal, a description unique to God] is an expression for that which exists necessarily in all its aspects “mâ huwa wajhihi l-wajjihi fi jamii’i jihâdih.”

**Creation and Secondary Causes**

At the very beginning of Iṣfiqâd al-Ghazâlî makes a point of telling the reader that, in view of the restricted focus of the work, he will not “consider the world as it is world and body and sky and earth, but on the contrary only as it is God’s making (rasmu l-kharîm)” (p. 4, 2f.). It would seem plain that when he speaks of the world as “body and sky and earth” al-Ghazâlî is referring to what he will describe elsewhere as “the universal, fundamental, permanent, and stable causes, which are constant and unchanging.” What he is saying, in effect, is that he will not discuss cosmology and the question of the determinate operation of secondary causes in the order of the universe, but rather will view all entities and events as they are created by God. The efficient operation of secondary causes is, as we have seen, implied and alluded to in several places in Iṣfiqâd, but the matter is never formally thematized and discussed. God is the one who created the system, ordered its parts, and set it into motion. His “accomplishment” (al-qadim) was the initial creation (al-ikhâra) of the “universal causes” (al-mashâ’i l-kulliyah), and therein the creation of the more proximate, transitory causes and the conditions of the coming to be of every being and event that, following the program set down in the Well Guarded Tablet (Isyâf 3, p. 18; translated on p. 26 above), would necessarily flow from them to the end of time. Al-Ghazâlî sometimes will distinguish “khalq, yakbitsu” from “ikbâra’u, yakbitsu’u,” using the former as a synonym of “qadârân, yaqâla’Îrâ’î” (to determine) and the latter as a synonym of “mujadâ, yujdâ” (to cause to exist), though he frequently employs them equivalently as “to create.” The assertion of God’s uniqueness (al-tawhîd) is the assertion that He alone determines what shall come to be and is uniquely the originating cause of its coming to be. According to al-Ghazâlî’s usage, to create (al-khalq, al-ikhâra) is to determine the existence of an entity or event out of the indeterminate possibility of its coming to be or not coming to be, and since every event that occurs in the sublunary world results necessarily from the antecedent operation of the celestial and universal causes as originally created and ordered by God, not even the highest of the “universal and enduring causes” (sc., the Throne or outermost heaven) can be said of itself to “create,” i.e., of itself, autonomously to initiate the action of any series of causes and effects or the existence of any element in any given series. God is the one who makes the causes to function as causes (musâkhabbû l-takhâb).11 Viewed in the original determination of the contingent necessity of its coming to be as against the abstract possibility of its either coming to be or not coming to be, the existence of every being and event that comes to be within the world is effectively determined and so “created” in the initial creation (ikhâra, ighâd) of the universe, even though it actually takes place through the subsequent operation of various intermediate causes, proximate and remote. Given this understanding of the terms, the thesis that God “creates” a particular event—is uniquely the cause of its existence—does not formally deny the efficacy of secondary causes. “The omnipotent master of the heavens alone has absolute dominion” (inturrûn bi-l-jabrât jibârût...
The seventh and eighth essays in the section on God's existence are devoted to the denial of His being spatially located with respect to any point within the created universe. That al-Ghazālī should feel the need to take up this matter separately and at considerable length following thesis 4 (pp. 38f.), that God is not a javvar, and thesis 3 (pp. 39f.) that He is not a body, may at first seem curious, but it is formally required in order to counter the contrary doctrines of the Kārammiyya. The two theses are also dealt with at some length in Qudsiyya (§1, 7f., pp. 82ff. = Ibyā' 1, pp. 106f.).

Thesis 7 is that "God is not in any one of the six directions." Here, in replying to an objection based on a Tradition according to which the Prophet approved a gesture by a slave girl indicating that she believed God to be in the sky, al-Ghazālī explains his exegesis of the Tradition in part by saying that petition to God is directed upwards as a sign of submissiveness and that "submissiveness and giving glory are the act of the heart [sc. the soul] and the intellect is its instrument . . . , for the heart was created with a nature (khlaqat khilqātan) such that it is influenced by the repeated actions of the bodily members, just as the bodily members are influenced by the beliefs of the soul" (p. 45, 3ff.). He then explains at some length that one has to do here with a metaphor in which what is referred to is height of rank (rubūbat), not height of place. This interpretation is found in earlier Ashʿarīte works (e.g., Mushki, pp. 60f. and Ishārah, p. 34). One notes that the assertion that the soul is influenced or affected (mustaʿbāthārī).
by events that take place outside it implies that one contingent event has an effect (‘āthār) on another, something consistently denied in traditional Ash’ārite works. According to al-Ghazālī, devotional acts commanded by the Prophet have “properties” (khasāṣ) which act on the soul in a way analogous to the way that the properties of medicines act on the body (Munǧūd, pp. 151f. and 162). When he speaks about the bodily members’ being influenced by the beliefs (μυστάγγατατ) of the soul, what he has in mind are cognitive acts (acts of knowing, opinion, impression, imagination, etc.) which constitute motivations and as such are the causes of voluntary actions (cf. Cre·
ation and the Cosmic System, pp. 23ff.) or of their arousing one or another kind of involuntary response, as in the example presented in Iqīṣād (p. 172; translated on p. 38 above).

Al-Ghazālī goes on to offer a second interpretation of the metaphor, which is that “the storehouses of [God’s] blessings are the heavens and the wrappings of His gifts are the angels; their residence is the celestial realm (malakūs al-samatūs) and it is they who are entrusted with His gifts,” therefore, nature demands (al-tal’u yatagūdū) that in praying, one turn his face in that direction, and he concludes by saying, “this then moves (muḥarrik) the faces of those who are leaders in religious matters in the direction of the sky in conformity both to nature and the revelation (tal’u wā-ḥu-ris).”

Al-Ghazālī refrains, however, from informing the reader of exactly how he understands the place and function of these celestial intermediaries in the transmission of God’s blessings to terrestrial beings or exactly what it means to say “by nature.” Finally, he takes the thesis as an opportunity to set forth the difference between what makes sense (is mafṣūmn) and is intelligible (i.e., what the mind must asssent to) and conceivable and what cannot be imagined (pp. 49, 88ff.).

Thesis 8 (pp. 29f.) is concerned with descriptions of God’s ascending the Throne (al-istīwā’u sāla l-arš: Qṣ, S, & albi) and of His nightly “ascent” (al-masūd) to the lowest heaven. Having stated that it would take too long to deal with the expressions employed, al-Ghazālī makes a point (pp. 51f.) of noting that it is inappropriate to introduce simple people (nawǧūn i-khulq) to the exegesis of such things and cites a famous Tradition according to which Mālik b. Anas, in response to a question concerning God’s ascending the Throne, replied by saying, “The ascent is known; how it takes place (kay-

fiyyatūhū) is not known; to ask about it is heresy (bīdāh); to believe it is obligatory.” Here, says al-Ghazālī, Mālik was speaking only with regard to simple people, “because their minds are not capable of receiving the things of the intellect (al-maṣūdūt) and of comprehending lexicographical matters (al-lujhāt), nor are they capable of understanding the Arabs’ extended use of linguistic expressions in their metaphors” (p. 52, 8ff.). For the scholars, for whom it is appropriate to go into such matters, however, he will offer a brief, systematic explanation of these metaphors. Concerning “the ascent” (pp. 52ff.), al-Ghazālī states that “ascended” has to refer to a relationship of God to the Throne (the outermost heaven or sphere) and goes through a traditional kind of analysis so as to eliminate a number of possible interpretations in order to assert that here “tālīfū” must be equivalent to “istīwā’” (take possession/become master of), citing the example of the expression’s occurrence with regard to princes. This, however, does no more than suggest a precise identification of the metaphor by substituting a lexically less ambivalent word for the one in question. It does not interpret the metaphor. The failure to interpret the metaphor is consistent with al-Ghazālī’s previously stated intention not to go into questions of cosmology. Concerning “the descent” (pp. 52ff.), he offers two interpretations which he considers acceptable, the first, that it refers metaphorically to an angel (p. 57), and the second (pp. 57ff.), that it is a metaphor for God’s goodness and condescension (talātta‘u wā-sawīdū) toward His creatures. The second interpretation he explains at great length, while the first, since it involves the operation of the cosmic system, he does not elaborate at all.

In al-Ghazālī’s discussion of these two theses we have an exemplify manifestation of the complexity of Iqīṣād and of its ambivalence. The topics dealt with, al-fawqāyyah (God’s “being above”), al-istīwā’ (His “ascent”), and al-masūd (His “descent”), were the focus of heated debate and polemic in the Ash’ārites’ conflict with the Karrā‘īiya and with the Ḥanbalīs as well. This is unquestionably the primary reason for treating them separately and at this point in the book (cp., e.g., Irshād, pp. 39ff.), and in part perhaps for the relative length with which they are discussed. They are also, however, of great importance to al-Ghazālī in that, by his interpretation, they expressly involve God’s relationship to the celestial world and His
governance of the terrestrial world through celestial intermediaries and so lend the authority of God and the Prophet to his theological cosmology. It is common in the school tradition to offer multiple, alternative interpretations of the canonically authoritative names and descriptions of God that may be shown to be philologically justifiable and as theologically compatible with the basic doctrine of the school and therefore plausibly valid. Here, however, while traditional interpretations are presented in some detail, others are offered that point to concepts, constructs, and a context which are altogether foreign to the traditional Ash'arite theology, and these latter are left without elaboration or explanation. He is not trying to deceive the reader, but rather, in a way that conforms to the convention of the traditional manuals, to offer to each that which he is most apt to receive with understanding. He says nothing which, as presented, is formally incompatible with the more radical warf of his "higher" theology, for which there are ample indications for those who are attuned to it. The remarks made following the introduction of the citation of Q.2:25 that simple people should not be introduced to the formal interpretation of such verses is thus particularly pregnant in the context, as he offers interpretations which he feels that traditionally minded religious scholars may appropriately accept and understand (p. 12, 7), but withholds his own "higher" interpretation, with respect to which the scholars are simple believers (min al-awālim).

The Human Power of Voluntary Actions

The most tortuous and difficult section of Igtiṣād is perhaps that in which he talks about (and round about) the question of the human power of action (generally pp. 80ff.). Since this question was treated hastily and somewhat inadequately in Creation and the Cosmic System, it will be well to look at it in a more orderly fashion here. It must be kept in mind (a) that al-Ghazālī is here formally addressing the Mu'tazilite thesis that men originate the bein of their own acts autonomously out of the pure possibility of their coming to be or not coming to be, and (b) that he had decided at the outset that he would not take up cosmology (i.e., the determination of sub-

lunary events through the efficient causality of celestial beings), and (c) that he wishes, if not to hold closely to, at least to employ and in some way validate, the traditional Ash'arite language concerning human power and human actions. The arguments are labored and insistent, for the doctrine of the creation of human voluntary actions (khulq al-asfāl) had from the beginning been one of the principal, identifying elements of the Ash'arite doctrine in its opposition to the Mu'tazila, and for al-Ghazālī to reject or seriously to alter the traditional conception of the thesis would overtly signal his abandonment of Ash'arite orthodoxy. It is for the same reason that even in Milakhk, where already he had made a point of distancing himself from the traditional teaching of the Ash'arite school in a number of matters, he carefully sought not to give offense on the matter of human actions, lest he irrevocably alienate the audience he most wanted to attract. His own teaching is that certain sensations or cognitive states act deterministically as motivations (dānāfi) and thereby cause an act of the will, which in turn activates the power of voluntary action (al-qudrāhi) which necessarily produces the act.25

Throughout this section, al-Ghazālī's language is very carefully chosen. When he says, for example (p. 91, 11f.) that "when [God] creates (khulqahu) the motion and creates with it the [act of the human] power to do it, He is the one who autonomously creates (yastubālū al-iḥtiyāt) both the [act of the] power and its object," his use of 'creates' and 'creation' so restricts the focus to God's determinative power that any question of secondary causes is formally set aside. One notes that earlier in the discussion he had offered a general definition of the power to act (al-qudrāhi) as "that through which the object comes to actuality given the act of the will and the receptivity of the subject" (mā yahṣulu bihi l-maqādiru 'inda taḥqīqwi l-irāḍati wa-qiyāli l-muqābal) (p. 91, 5f.; cp. p. 81, 5f.). This definition is correct according to the teaching of al-Ghazālī, both with respect to human acts and God's creation, but not according to that of the Mu'tazila.26 In his ensuing argument against the Mu'tazilite thesis that the voluntary actions of human agents are truly autonomous and are not determinately caused by the antecedent states of the agent, al-Ghazālī returns to the description of the power of action as that whose act creates the event which is its object (p. 91, 5f.) and takes 'creates' in the formal sense that it has for him within the context of his own deterministic
system. Given that the Mu'tazila, on valid lexicographical grounds, allow the use of 'khalaqa, yakhlusuq' (but not 'ikhtiaru'a, yakhtiru') with a human agent as subject, the dialectical move is doubly conspicuous. (The imposition of one's own conceptions onto the terms of his opponents' formulations is a common maneuver in the dialectic of kalam.) Nor does al-Ghazzali here address the question of the role and function of the antecedent states of the agent. "In sum, the one whose power is all encompassing (al-wa'i'atu l-qudrati) is the one who has the power to create the [act of the human agent's] power to act and its object simultaneously" (p. 92, 1). Consistently, then, the Mu'tazilite concept that the human agent autonomously causes the existence of his primary acts and their claim that as an equivalent of 'quddara, yuquddara' (to do purposefully and in intended measure) 'khalaqa, yakhlusuq' can be used of human agents (cf., e.g., Mayhemi, pp. 207 and 210, and 8, pp. 106 and 285) are together rejected when al-Ghazzali goes on to identify the causation of existence with creation: "Since the noun 'creator' (al-khaliqu wal-mukhtasiru) is said of one who causes something to exist through his own power (waqada l-shaya' bi-qudratihi) and both the [human agent's] power and its object are through God's power and the object is not [created] by the human agent's power... [the latter] is not called a 'creator' and 'one who creates'... "". The human voluntary act therefore is described as a performance (ka'a), following the lexical usage of the Koran (p. 92, 2ff.). All of this sounds very much like traditional Ash'arite teaching. Had he said 'lam yaqsi' or 'lam yahsul bi-qudrati l-a'dha', it might be difficult to understand him to intend anything else, but, as it is, his intention is not fully and explicitly stated. That is, he holds that the human agent with all his faculties is created and that the acts of his faculties are the results of a complex web of present conditions and antecedent causes, interior and exterior, terrestrial and celestial, all of which follow determinately from God's original act of creation. The causal function of the faculty, however, and of its act as an element within the sequence of causes and conditions, is simply not mentioned. In short, none of the statements al-Ghazzali makes here is inconsistent with the thesis that, contrary to traditional Ash'arite teaching, God determines the necessity of the occurrence of every event in the universe through sequences of secondary efficient causes

and therefore is the primary, originating cause of the activation of the human agent's power of acting and through it of, for example, the motion of his hand. The sense of what he says is particularly nuanced if here, as sometimes in other passages, al-Ghazzali distinguishes 'khalaqa, yakhlusuq' from 'ikhtiaru'a, yakhtiru', as he does, employing the former as an equivalent of 'quddara, yuquddara' to describe God's eternal determination of the being of the universe in its every detail as opposed to the act of creating the "universal and enduring causes." The verse "To him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth" (Qs.16:4) implies that "from Him is the source of all actions and their point of reference" (al-uf'dalu jam'a'ulahu minhu maqaddaruhu wa-ma'ru'ulahu) (Jawahir, p. 45, 14).

In the following section (p. 92, 2ff.) al-Ghazzali takes up the question of the act's "taking place" (al-wa'iqqi hiqul l-hard) through the agent's power, but again constructs the argument so as neither to address the real issue nor to set forth his own position with regard to it. What he does is focus on the notion of a faculty's "relation" (ta'alluq) to its object in such a way as to offer a dialectical refutation of the claim that the agent's power is "related to its object as cause to effect" (as the sahab is to its musabbib). His reasoning is that (1) cognition and volition are also related to their respective objects so that a "relation" (al-ta'alluq) does not as such and of itself entail that its object come to be.28 He goes on then (2) to view the question on the basis of the Mu'tazilite thesis that the power to act exists in the agent prior to his performing the act. If it is really prior to the act, he says, then the relationship is not one of causing an effect, since the power exists in the absence of the occurrence of its object (p. 93, 1ff.), and this will be true also if the power is redefined (p. 94, 3) as "being ready for [commensurate to] the occurrence of its object" (mutahayyiqatun li-wa'iqiqi l-maqddir). 29 He concludes, then, by stating (p. 94, 5f.) that the Mu'tazilite position is, in effect, that "the [human agent's] power to act exists and is related to its object but the object does not occur through it" (mawjudatun muta'alliqatun bi-maqddiru wa-ma'qqadru ghayru waq'i' bi-ha), wherefore it must take place through the power of God, and we are all in agreement! The argument is essentially specious; he has not stated the Mu'tazilite thesis fully and correctly and has said only that under his own narrow
restriction of the terms and elements of the question and under his present construction of them, the human agent’s power of acting is not the originating cause of the occurrence of the act.

The ensuing argument (p. 94, 12ff.) contributes nothing and here, as in many another place, al-Ghazālī concludes the subsection by saying (p. 95, 9): “This is as much of this question as belongs in this short handbook.” What follows on the topic runs in the same vein of artful ambivalence. Much later, in an altogether different context (p. 221, 1ff.), he remarks that there are various kinds of matters to take up which would involve a study of the essential natures of things (hikmat al-umūr), knowledge of which is not really necessary, since they are not pertinent to the acquisition of the basic foundation of orthodox belief (taḥqīq al-aḥkām). As included among such things he mentions the question of “whether the human power of voluntary action (al-qudratu l-muḍātthah) has contraries as its objects or not and has as its objects different kinds of things or not and whether the human power to act may have as its object an action that lies outside the locus of the power itself.” These are precisely the questions which earlier he had declined to take up seriously and directly.

There is, in sum, no unambiguous evidence in Iḥtiṣād that al-Ghazālī subscribes to the traditional occasionalism of the Ashʿarite school. If one will distinguish the two senses of ‘qudratl’, viz., (a) an agent’s power of acting as a faculty from (b) its act or activation in producing the action which is its effect, then most of the difficulties are done away with. God creates, through a complex of secondary causes, celestial and terrestrial, the human individual with his various faculties, including the power to act, and through another series of causal events the activation of the power so as to cause the occurrence of a particular action, and accordingly, in the strictest sense, creates both the power with its act and the event which results from its act. The conspicuous difference between the reasoning in the traditional Ashʿarite manuals and the oblique arguments of Iḥtiṣād is that through so lengthy a discussion the only thing al-Ghazālī dearly commits himself to is the thesis that God creates every being and every event, though exactly what is meant here by ‘creates’ is never fully and explicitly stated. As we have seen, he nowhere unambiguously commits himself to the thesis of al-Juwainī that the action “does not take place through the created power of voluntary action, nor does [the power] have any effect on it, but is related to it as a cognition is related to its object” (Iḥtiṣār, fol. 152r, 13f.; cf. also ibid. foll. 167v f.; Shāmil [69], p. 182, 14ff., where al-Ashʿarī is cited; and al-Harāshī, fol. 18v, 16ff.). Read by itself, the section would be most perplexing. Within the broader context of Iḥtiṣād, however, where there are indications that he recognizes the efficient operation of secondary causes, his intention in this section begins to emerge.

In refuting the “Mutazalī” doctrine of tawallud, that is, of the causation of a secondary act by a primary act (pp. 95f.), al-Ghazālī goes to great length to assert that God creates the displacement of the water in order to allow for the movement which he also creates in the hand, but he carefully avoids the question of whether perhaps God uses the hand to move the water.30

God’s Essential Attributes

Al-Ghazālī’s discussion of God’s essential attributes other than power in Iḥtiṣād is, for the most part, hardly more straightforward than that involving His power. What he has to say tends, on the whole, to resemble that of the usual Ashʿarite manuals, though the matter requires further, more detailed study against the broader background of his other writings. The traditional understanding of the essential attributes as distinct from God’s essence and from one another is important to al-Ghazālī as, by so distinguishing power, knowledge, and will, it furnishes the basis for his denial of the thesis of Avicenna and the falsah that creation flows necessarily from God’s essence as such (bi-dhālān) and therefore eternally (cf., e.g., Tahāfut, pp. 214ff. and Maqṣūd, p. 145). Otherwise, however, al-Ghazālī seems to have had little interest in the matter and nowhere any desire to set forth his own formal analysis and explanation of the relationships between the commonly recognized basic attributes and their relation to the divine essence. In an earlier context (p. 43, 3) he had said to prove a point that God’s being exists necessarily in its every aspect, but the statement is not further elaborated, and when he comes to discuss the essential attributes formally and as such he makes a point of saying that they transcend human understanding, wherefore it is impossible
to deal seriously with the matter here since to do so would require so lengthy a discussion as to be beyond the scope of this book (p. 136, 8f. and cp. pp. 15f.). It will be sufficient for our present purposes to give here only a few brief indications of what he says in *Iṣṭiṣād*.

In describing God’s eternal attributes as such, he employs the traditional formula, saying that they are “distinguishable from His essence and are eternal and are subsistent in His essence” (*zā‘idatun talā‘i l-dhāt wa-qadimatun wa-qā‘imatur bil-dhāt*), though in his initial account of the ontology of these attributes (p. 111) he vehemently rejects the analysis of al-Baghlī and of al-Juwayni in *Iṣṭiḥād* and *Shābī‘* with its assertion of ontologically distinct “states,” in favor of the more common doctrine of the school and in language similar to that presented in al-Juwayni’s *R. al-Nāṣī‘iyyah* (pp. 24f.). 8 He gives, on the other hand, a definition of speech/speaking (p. 119, 1f.) which is virtually equivalent to that given by al-Mutawalli (*al-Ma‘ṣūmi*, p. 25, 21) and al-Juwayni (*Iṣṭiḥād*, p. 104, 3ff.), and his discussion of command as an example of a mode of speech (pp. 118ff.) is generally along the lines of what one finds in the tradition. Only in arguing for the eternity of God’s speaking does he make a statement which could be read as pointing to his later identification of it with God’s knowledge (cp. *Iṣṭiḥād*, p. 60, 4). So too, the very brief treatment of the attributes of hearing and seeing (pp. 109f.) appears wholly traditional, and the basic intention of his account of how Moses can be said to have heard God’s speaking directly (pp. 122ff.) and how it is valid to say that the blessed shall see God in the next life (pp. 67f.) are fundamentally compatible with what is found, for example, in Ibn Fārāk’s *Mukātk*.

**Created Beings, Material and Immaterial Material Bodies**

To what extent al-Ghazālī’s conception of the basic ontology of created beings followed the teaching of the *Ash‘arī* school is by no means clear. The way he speaks of *jawḥar* in *Iṣṭiṣād* (pp. 28ff.) would seem to indicate that he retains the school’s traditional atomism; and this would seem to be confirmed when he speaks, for example, of “the individual *jawḥar*” (*al-jawḥar al-fard*) and describes a body as being two *jawḥars* which are conjoined (pp. 24, 9ff., and 39, 7f.) and when he follows the traditional ontology in saying (p. 31, 8) that length (*al-tā‘*) “is not an accident but rather an expression for a multiplicity of *jawḥars* disposed in a single direction.” On the other hand, he closes the extended explanation of the nature of accidents (pp. 28ff.) by offering length as his example, an example which, he says, is sufficient to give a general idea of what he means (*muqarrabun li-qumrinta ‘alā l-fu‘a‘l*), even though it is not properly speaking a genuine instance of what he is talking about (p. 31, 9f.). In common parlance, this is a *nahb*, that is, the presentation of an approximate idea of a principle by means of a superficial analogy employed in elementary instruction—another indication of the level of discourse intended in *Iṣṭiṣād*. Al-Ghazālī then proceeds immediately (p. 31, 1ff.) to apologize for the disproportionate detail of his exposition on the grounds that “this going into detail and precise explanation” (*al-tadqiq wa-ta‘līq*) was required because “what has been said on the subject is neither satisfactory nor clear (*ghayrin muqarrabin wa-lā shaf‘*).” For reasons that we shall see shortly, one of his aims here might well have been to eliminate the occupation of space from the conception and definition of the *jawḥar* as such, for he says (p. 31, 3ff.), “the accident’s being specifically characterized by its substrate is not something distinct from the essence of accident as is the *jawḥar*’s being characterized by its occupation of space and this is for the reason we mentioned, sc., that the intellect knows the *jawḥar* alone and by itself and through it knows the occupation of space, but not that the intellect knows the *jawḥar* through the occupation of space.” He doesn’t tell us, however, exactly what exactly it is about the traditional conception of accidents that he finds unsatisfactory, though it is clear from what he says in *Mīṣā‘ar* (p. 177, 3ff) that he does not approve of describing as “accidents” what the fālāsīf call “substantial forms,” e.g., “of describing air and water as “accidents”.* 19 He intimates clearly enough that the traditional conception of accidents needs to be changed, qualified, or nuanced, but is unwilling to do this in plain and unambiguous terms here in *Iṣṭiṣād*, and instead offers the reader several pages of somewhat inconclusive rigmarole. In the section of *Mīṣā‘ar* devoted to the definition of motion (pp. 126ff.), on the other hand, al-Ghazālī speaks much more clearly and succinctly. He distinguishes permanent, “comitant” accidents from those that are not permanent and gives a definition of sort as such (p. 127, 16) that
superficially resembles those of the Ash'arite school: the accident is "a
contingent being whose existence requires a locus" (ḥādithin yustādī
wujūdahu mahāllan). The usual Ash'arite definitions and charac-
terizations, however, normally speak of the accident's subsisting in a
jawhar (e.g., Tāmīdīd, pp. 18, 4ff., and 105, 14, and Shāhāl al-Irshādī, fol.
47v, 19) or in a body (Inṣāfī, p. 17, 4) or in "an entity that occupies
space" (dhātan muṭāhāriyyātah) (Shāhīlī [69], p. 183, 1ff.). Al-Ghazālī's
purpose in using 'mal'ūlī here may be to allow for entities that do not
occupy space, that is, for the rational soul.25 That he conceives acci-
dents more along the lines of the fālūsā than of the mutakallimūn
does not, however, alone and of itself, necessarily indicate that he
espoused Avicenna's conception of jawhar and 'arad formally and
completely. In Mīhāk (p. 104, 1ff.) he divides attributes into three
classes, essential, concomitant, and accidental (al-ṣifātā d-dhāriyyātah
wah-lāzmātah wār-'aradīyyah). One notes, however, that neither in
Mīhāk nor in the section devoted to logic in Mūṣafātī, which closely
follows Mīhāk, often verbatim, nor in Qīṭaḥī does he present the
traditional Aristotelian list of accidents.

In the section of Mīhāk concerning the definition of motion
(pp. 158ff.) al-Ghazālī seems to speak in traditional Ash'arite terms.
Here, he describes motion and rest as specifications of the jawhar
to a given location in space (dhiyyātah l-jawhar f-l-ḥāyāt) and gives an
account based on its being in the same or different space for one or
more moments in time (dhiyyātah). Most notably, in this regard, he says
(p. 118, 16ff.) that one has here to recognize three things, the kaun,
and motion, and rest. With this he speaks of those who hold the true
doctrine ('alīsah l-baqā, a common phrase used by the Ash'arites to
describe themselves) and against al-Juwaynī, prefers the teaching of
al-Bāqillānī and abū Ishāq al-Īsāfarīnī, who recognize a kaun (a being
in a specific location in space) distinct from motion and from rest
which characterizes the jawhar at the instant of its creation (cf., e.g.,
Shāhīlī [69], p. 433, 1ff.).

The subsequent discussion in Iqṣīdah of how jawhār and acci-
dents cease to exist seems similarly to follow traditional teaching. The
jawhār, he says (p. 37, 14ff.), cease to exist in the event that neither
motion nor rest, which are the condition of their existence, are cre-
ated in them. This is one of several Ash'arite positions regarding the
question.27 Again following traditional Ash'arite tradition, he says
(p. 37, 5ff.) that accidents "cease to exist of themselves (bi-'inṣfusuhā)
and what we mean by 'of themselves' is that it is inconceivable that
their essences (dhiyātahā) have permanence of existence (baqā')." Sim-
ilarly, he says (p. 214, 1) that "accidents in our view do not have
permanence of existence (dhiyātah) . . . and what exists in each hour
is another accident." The formulations plainly imitate the traditional
language of the Ash'arite school, but what al-Ghazālī means by 'ba-
qā'īt' is not altogether clear, nor is it clear just how, within the frame-
work of his cosmology, it may come about that a material entity may
cease to be either in motion or at rest. Too, the use of 'in each hour'
(sī-‘āt) rather than the usual 'in each succeeding instant' (hūlān ba‘d‘ al-
hūl, jī kullu waqīt) is curious and seems to be a kind of hedge, for, as
we have noted, in Mīhāk he says explicitly that the definition of acci-
dents as what does not continue to exist or at that whose continuance
in existence is impossible is inadequate (mukhtali‘), noting that con-
comitant accidents endure as long as their subjects continue to exist
(p. 127, 1ff.; cf. also, e.g., ibid., pp. 25ff. and Mūṣafātī 1, p. 14, 1ff.).

Al-Ghazālī seems to follow the traditional teaching of the school
also when he says (Iqṣīdah, p. 24, 7f.), "by 'world' we mean every exis-
tent other than God and by 'every existent other than God' we mean
all bodies and their accidents," and a few pages later (p. 26, 8), "we
mean here by 'the world' simply bodies and jawhar." The statement
that the created universe consists of "bodies and their accidents" ap-
ppears problematic initially, but since he has indicated that in Iqṣīdah
he does not intend to take up the ontology of created beings for-
merly and subsequently states (p. 215) that it would be inappropriate
to discuss the soul in this work,28 it can be read as an abridged for-
mulation. Even the short manuals seldom fail to mention the jawhar
as a distinct class of entities (e.g., Tāmīdīd, pp. 17, 8ff. and 22, 4ff.,
al-Baghādādī, Īṣādī, p. 33, 14ff., Fāsālī, 81, Āṣādāb, p. 63, 4ff., and
Irshādī, p. 17, 6). Al-Bāqillānī says (Tāmīdīd, p. 22, 4ff.) that all classes of created
beings fall under two principal categories, sc., accidents and atoms.
Atoms are not mentioned in al-Īsāfarīnī's catechetical Āṣādāb (§6V,
1ff.), however, and al-Asḥārīnī in Thaqīlī (p. 66) speaks simply of "the
world and the bodies and accidents that are in it" (al-ṣālihā bi-mā
fīhā min ‘ajāsīmāh wa-‘ardāh),29 and so also the dogmatic formulati-
on of al-Ḥallālī (Akkūdī no. 15, p. 31, 2ff. = Rīdālī 1, pp. 44ff.) speaks
only of bodies and accidents. Moreover, since in Iqṣīdah al-Ghazālī
excludes formal discussion of either the rational soul as such or the immaterial entities that make up the celestial world, the statement does, in a narrow kind of way, reflect the orientation of his focus in this work. Read within the context of traditional Ash`arite manuals, which the formulations evoke, these statements would seem, in any case, to be fairly plain and unambiguous. This is to assume, of course, that by *jawhar* here he means atom as generally understood in the school. And this would seem likely to be justified, as he says, for example (*Iqtisād*, p. 77, 5), that "*jawhar* form a single class and their becoming, which are particular modes of being in places, belong to a single class" (*al-jawwāhir mutamāthilatu wa-`akwānuhā l-lāti biya khtsrfah bi-`alaynās mutamāshūlāb").

In *Ihyāʿ* and later works, however, al-Ghazālī speaks of the celestial realm (*al-malakātī, `alamūn l-ghaybi wal-malakātī*) with its angelic functionaries, each of which has its own "station" (e.g., *Ihyāʿ* 4, p. 119, 8ff.), as very different from the sublunary world (*al-mulk, `alamūn l-shahādāb*), and he says (*Mishkāh*, p. 65) that the two may be described, respectively, as "spiritual" and "corporeal" (rūḥānī and jismānī), or as "intellectual" and "sensible" (*qāfīl and ḫāṣīl*). He describes the human soul (mind, intellect) as an individual locus of intellectual cognition on which an angelic intellect impresses the forms of the essential natures of things (*Ihyāʿ* 3, p. 3, 10ff.). Is the angelic agent which gives the human intellect the true forms as a soul a body or a single *jawhar* that occupies space? If all these beings, as creatures and so as constituents of the world, are ontologically bodies or single *jawhar* with their particular accidents and differ only by their accidents, how specifically are they different as belonging to distinct realms? One has to ask, therefore, (1) if al-Ghazālī in fact conceives the *jawhar* in exactly the same way as did the Ash`arite school, if, that is, he conceives the *jawwar* as forming a single class in the sense that every *jawwar* is essentially the same as every other *jawwar*, or if (2) he recognizes several distinct subclasses, or if (3) he uses the term equivocally (cf., e.g., *Miyār*, pp. 176f. and cp. *Eludūd*, pp. 9f.). The expression *mutamāshūlāb* normally means "alike" or "the same" in the sense of being identical in all essential properties and characteristics, but when al-Ghazālī employs the expression to describe the *`akwān*, he plainly does not mean to assert that motion and rest are altogether identical, but only to say that the *`akwān* belong to one and the same class of accidents (*tatajānas*). His comments in *Miyār* on the use of "accident" by the mutakallimūn to describe what the falāṣīfà would call *jawbars* or essential forms (*swwār*) could be taken thus to indicate that he recognizes more than one kind or class of *jawhar*; or it may be that he is simply acknowledging the presence of diverse sets of formal expressions (cf. *Mishkāh*, p. 48, 12ff.) and the consequent equivocality of the word.

In categorizing beings (*Iqtisād*, p. 24, 8ff.) al-Ghazālī says, "Every existent either occupies space (*mutamāshāyīs*) or does not occupy space and if there is no composition (*`IQdīf*) in that which occupies space we call it a single *jawhar*, while if it is joined in composition to another we call it a body (*jīm*)." Similarly, in *Mishkāh* he says:

When you describe body as what occupies space (*al-mutamāshāyīs*) you find it to be coextensive, neither more extensive nor less, since every body occupies space and everything that occupies space is a body. This follows the view of those who hold that whatever occupies space is divisible.

For our part, however, we ascribe occupying space to *jawhar* and hold that what occupies space is coextensive with [*jawbar*] (p. 24, reading *al-mutamāshāyīs* for *al-mutamāshāyīs* in line 10).

Again, later in the same work (p. 106), having noted that in formal usage "existent" does not enter into essential definitions, he goes on to say:

According to what we believe (*na`tqadhabīhā*), however, *jawbar* does enter into the quiddity, since we understand it as what occupies space, i.e., as an essential reality (*baprtanīl bāwārīyā*), so that in our view the more universal class is *jawwar* and is divided into body and non-body, i.e., the single *jawbar* (*al-jawwar al-fard*). The logicians [i.e., the falāṣīfīs], however, employ *jawbar* to refer to what exists not in a substrate (*ma`wūd*) but since existence does not belong to the essence it does not become essential when 'not in a substrate' is added, since this is a pure negation, so that their terminology is valid according to their understanding and belief, though not according to our understanding and belief.

One notes, however, that nowhere in *Iqtisād*, or elsewhere that I have noted, does al-Ghazālī say of the *jawbar* that as such it has volume (*huṣām*), as does al-Juwainī, who holds that whatever occupies space has volume (e.g., *Irshād*, p. 17) and defines the *jawbar* as a vol-
Two "Ash'arite" Tracts

unce (bajm) (Shāmīl [81], p. 54, 20ff.) and only once that I have noted (Mīhāk, p. 141, 9) does al-Ghazālī employ the verb 'ṣaghāla, yah-
ghalu' so as to describe the jawhar, as is common
in the Ash'arite manuals; nor does he say explicitly that it has surface
area. In the common usage of kalām, 'hayyic' is used to mean a por-
tion of space (e.g., Shāmīl [69], p. 156, 1ff.) and is associated with the
volume of a jawhar, and 'mustahayyī' accordingly means "occupies
space" in the sense of filling a volume of space into which another
cannot intrude so long as what fills it remains there. Presumably,
this is what al-Ghazālī understands by the term. The evidence
would seem to indicate, thus, that regarding the nature of material bodies,
al-Ghazālī likely follows the basic atomism of the Ash'arite school.
Confirmation of this may perhaps be found where, in Mīhāk (p. 156;
translated on p. 60 below), the separate parts ('ṣajdāt) of the pneuma are
described as 'narwāt (pneumata)—if the argument there is not en-
tirely dialectical, which it may well be. It is notable in any event
that al-Ghazālī does not speak of matter and form in his own voice.

Returning to the formulation of Iṣṭiṣād (p. 24) concerning bodies
and jawāhir, one notes that it is not unlike what he says in Mīrār
(p. 171) concerning the usage of the mutakallimūn, that is, that "they
use 'jawhar' particularly for the single jawhar which occupies space
(mustahayyī) and is indivisible, while that which is divisible they call a
body, not a jawhar. It will, then, be the case according to al-Ghazālī
that any being which is not an accident and which, as such (as an in-
dependent being—mawjudūn ġārūman bi-najjālot) is but a single jawhar,
by definition not a body and so is, in the strict sense of the term,
corporeal (Âsh'arī yajmānū). The statement, then, that the created
universe is made up of "bodies and jawāhir" (Iṣṭiṣād, p. 26, 8) and
his division of the universe into the terrestrial, which is the corporeal
in nature, and the celestial, which is spiritual (i.e., incorporeal), may
be read as consistent one with the other if the angelic intelligences
which he ascribes to the celestial realm are understood to consist each
of but a single jawhar. That is, the formulation "bodies and jawāhir" is
consistent with the traditional terminology, in that body is a di-
visible entity and the single jawhar is not; and moreover, traditional
Ash'arite doctrine holds, against the Murtazīa, that life, cognition,
and the power of voluntary action can exist in a single jawhar (cf., e.g.,
Shāmīl [69], pp. 449ff. and Ghunayh, foll. 102v, 18ff., and 154r, 12ff.;

and cp. Mujarrad, p. 207, 10ff.). Through all of this, however, al-
Ghazālī consciously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that cre-
ated beings must either occupy space or reside in subjects that occupy
space (mamsa mustahayyīzīsan wa-whālīn fals), as does al-Juwaynī, who
argues against the notion of the rational soul and the separated intel-
ligences as beings that are not located in space (Iḥtiṣārī, fol. 206v).
On the contrary, as we noted earlier, in Iṣṭiṣād (p. 31, 9ff.) he makes a
point of eliminating "occupies space" (mustahayyīz) from the definition
of jawhar, though he avoids any discussion of inmaterial beings.

The Rational Soul

In this connection one has, however, also to consider a
later passage of Iṣṭiṣād where, discussing the resurrection and "the
punishment of the grave," al-Ghazālī makes a point of denying some-
thing he had said in an earlier work with regard to the human soul.
Here (p. 215, 1ff.), he says:

We treated this question at length in Tahāfūt, where, in refuting
their doctrine, we proceeded by affirming that the soul, which, according
to them, does not occupy space (Âsh'arī mustahayyīzīsah), continues to exist
and by positing its return to the governance of the body, whether this be
the very same body or another. This argument, however, does not con-
form to what we believe to be true, for that work was composed in order
to refute their doctrine, not in order to assert the true doctrine. Rather,
since they presume that what a man is he is with respect to the soul and
that his involvement in governing the body is like something that be-
longs to him accidentally (bāl-ḥārī ġalūn) and the body is an instrument
for him (âṭātan ṣanā'ī) we forced them to admit that, given their belief
that the soul does not die, they have to assert the resurrection, i.e., the
return of the soul to the governance of a body.

That is, as the basis of the argument in Tahāfūt (pp. 362ff.) he
accepted their theses that (a) the soul does not die, that (b) it relates to the
body which it governs does not belong to it essentially but only
temporarily, but rather (c) it uses the body as an instrument, in order
to show that one must assert that the soul returns to govern a body.
and has rational knowledge and spiritual insight” (tāla l-lattīfatu hāya ḥāṣṣāqatu l-insānī wa-hisā b-mudārusu l-sātāmu l-ṣūfī fu mīnā l-insān) (Ihyā’ 3, p. 3, 16f.). The relationship of the intellectual soul to the corporeal heart “corresponds to the relationship of accidents to bodies and of attributes to the things they qualify (al-‘urūfūf bil-mawjūdīfū), or to the relationship of what uses an instrument to the instrument, or to the relationship of what is in a place (al-mutamakkin) to the place,” but al-Ghazālī refuses to detail his thought on this, saying that it is a matter belonging properly to the higher speculative sciences (‘ulūmu l-mukāfāfū) while this is a work on practical (sc., ethical) sciences (‘ulūmu l-ma‘āmulū) (p. 3, 18ff.). Later, he remarks that led by imagination and impressions formed on sense experience (al-takhayyayn wa-l-wa‘am), people get confused when they try to think about the intellectual soul in terms of javawr and accidents; a special kind of enlightenment, one of a higher level than ordinary intellectual perception, is required in order to understand it (Ihyā’ 4, p. 112, 19ff.). Death may occur through proximate causes that are either interior to the body or exterior, but in either case it takes place “through causes that are determined in God’s knowledge and are ordered with respect to one another” (ba‘ṣa‘batun maqaddaratin fi ‘iltimā Sahālīna marzā‘at). (Ihyā’ 4, p. 112, 19ff.). “What is meant by ‘death’ is a man’s being taken away from his possessions and thrust into another world which is not homologous with this world” (tāla ‘alāmin i‘sharār l-ya‘nāsī‘ū baddīl l-‘ālam) (Ihyā’ 4, p. 478, 2ff.) The death of a man is not the same as that of an animal. Concerning the former, he says (ibid., p. 477f.),

Some people think that by death he ceases to exist and so long as he remains in the grave neither suffers pain through any punishment nor experiences delight in any reward until he is brought back on the day of the assembly. Others think that the spirit continues to exist (bāqiyyah) and does not pass out of existence through death and that it is spirits alone which undergo reward and punishment, not bodies, as these are neither raised up nor summoned together at all. These are all views which are incorrect and deviate from the truth. On the contrary, what is testified to by means of logical reasoning (turūg al-zīhār) and by the verses of Scripture and the Prophetic Traditions is that the meaning of death is simply a change of state (naṣḥaynayn bā‘il) and that the spirit continues to exist after its separation from the body. . . . The meaning of its being separated
from the body is the termination of its use of the body by the body's ceasing to be obedient to it. . . . The spirit has cognition of itself without any instrument (bi-nafsib min ghayri 'ilah) and for this reason it may of itself suffer the pain of various kinds of misery, affliction, and grief and experience the pleasure of various kinds of delight and joy. . . . Nor is it implausible that the spirit be returned to the body in the grave . . .

Al-Ghazālī seems to consider the soul to be a single jawhar. In speaking of the possibility of the reported "punishment of the grave," he says (Ibnā 4, p. 487, 9–12):

The intellect . . . has neither length nor breadth; indeed [this being] which in itself is indivisible is what apprehends beings (al-mudrīk ilās-sālīk); if a man's bodily members were all dispersed and there remained only the perceptive particle which has no parts and is indivisible, man, who is endowed with intellect (al-'insān ilā-dā'ir), would yet sub sist and continue to exist in his entirety (bi-kamālīhī) and it is thus that he is after death, for death does not reside in this particle nor does non-existence befall it.

The terms he uses here to speak of the rational soul are those employed traditionally in the Ash'arīte school to speak of the atoms: it is a particle that is not constituted of smaller particles and therefore is indivisible (al-jauwū ' . . . al-ladīr lā yaṭaṣṣiru 'a wā-llā yaṣṣiru) though one in which death (an accident in the traditional analysis) does not reside or inhere (lā yaḥbūlūla). And the verb he uses in saying that nonexistence does not befall this particle, 'tara'a yaṭaṣṣiru', is commonly employed in traditional kalām to speak of one accident's supplanting its contrary in the atom which is its subject or substrate (cp. Mihakk, p. 107). So too, the soul seems to be spoken of as an atom or particle in Ibnār (4, p. 299, 27–28), where he says, "the heart [i.e., the rational soul] is distinct from all the other parts of the body (mursūfīqun li-sāvin 'rajārī l-ladām) by virtue of an attribute by which it apprehends (yaṭaṣṣiru) meanings which are neither imaginable nor perceptible, such as the apprehension of the creation of the world or of its need for a creator . . . ." What seems to be implied here is stated explicitly in Jawālib (p. 11), where Al-Ghazālī says that the rational soul is one of the elemental parts that make up the totality of the human individual (min jamali qirārī l-ādām). According to these descriptions, the rational soul will be incorporeal by definition, in that it is a single jawhar, not a conglomerate of two or more jawharas ('rajārī) that are joined through a formal bonding or conjunction ('itālī; ta'alī). Nor is it so bound to any of the elemental parts that make up formally and as such the body which it inhabits. On the other hand, it is not immediately clear what al-Ghazālī means when he says (Ibnār 3, p. 3) that the relationship of the rational soul to the corporeal heart is analogous to that of "accidents to bodies and of attributes to the things they qualify." He explicitly acknowledges the problematic nature of this characterization (Ibnār 4, p. 112), however, and this description of the soul's relation to the body would appear to be a kind of elementary taqlī, as al-Mustawall (p. 57, 3f.), for example, speaks of the pneuma as "an attribute which subsists in the body" (siṭāta taqlīma fī-l-jimm), since it is the pneuma which causes the body to be alive (mujīhun lil-bayḍī). Though, as we have seen, he says that it governs the body through the brain, al-Ghazālī nonetheless formally and explicitly associates the soul with the heart, as he says in Ibnār (3, p. 3) that the soul has a connection (ta'allāq) with the bodily heart and that it is "in the heart" (Ibnār 3, p. 3, and Miskhāl, p. 41), even though some of the operations of its faculties may take place in other organs, as, for example, imagination (al-takhrīyīn) resides in the brain (e.g., Miskhāl, p. 27, 4ff., and Mustaqlī, p. 34, 2ff.), as does the estimative faculty as well (Mustaqlī, p. 40, 13). We should note here a passage in Miskhāl (pp. 22f., repeated in Mustaqlī, p. 34) in which al-Ghazālī says that in addition to imagination and wa'lim, "there is a third, noble faculty here by which man is distinguished from the animals, which is named 'intellect' and whose locus (maḥdīl) is either in the brain or the heart; those who consider the soul to be an independent being that does not occupy space (jawharan qirīman bi-dhālīhī ghyryn mustaqlīyīn) say that the locus (maḥdīl) of the intellect is the soul." The passage is somewhat curious. The initial statement seems, on first reading, to be that of the author, as he asserts, seemingly in his own voice, that the locus of the intellect is either in the heart or the brain. The doctrine indicated is manifestly that of the mutakkallimīn, for whom intellect (al-nājī) is an accident which subsists in a material subject. (Note, however, that al-Ghazālī here terms it a "power/faculty": qawwāl.) Later in Miskhāl, however, he makes his intention clear when he takes
up the question of the nature of life and the pneuma and the soul (pp. 12ff.), something he will decline to do in Ḥiqāyāt, written only a short time later. Here in Muhākk he sets forth several views of the ontology of life in the living human individual. The first is that God creates sense, volition, the power to act, etc., in the body and, given these attributes, it is said to be alive or, according to others, that God creates in the body an attribute called life which is the condition of the reception of sensation, the power to act, etc. He does not bother to say that these views are those of various mutakallimūn, but notes simply that they are inadequate. The second view, which follows the doctrines of the physicians, is that in addition to the accidental, life there must be something else, namely, “the pneuma which is an invisible body in the heart and the brain and which flows to the other parts of the body through the arteries. As for ‘soul’, however, it has no proper referent.” The third view, held by some, is that in addition to life and the pneuma there is something else, “an independent entity (mawjūdun qārīmān bi-nafisīh) which does not occupy space.” Subsequently, he details this third view (pp. 136f.), stating that there is a third party who recognize the existence of the pneuma, but go on to say,

this pneuma, however, is in the body and there is here another entity, referred to as the soul, which is such that it is an independent being (qārīmān bi-nafisīh) that does not occupy space and whose relation to the body is that of God to the world, neither within the world nor outside of it. They point out that the pneuma is a divisible body and that its parts resemble one another, so that if it were that which is man governs and has mental perception, this would belong to each of the many individual pneumas and it would be possible that there be in its parts (‘ajūz’ūla) both the knowledge of something (and ignorance of it) and it would both know it and not know it. Accordingly, there must be something that is throughout [the whole body] and is indivisible. But every body is divisible. (They claim that a body which is not divisible into parts is logically impossible.) Along with this they raise the question of how the pneuma could go free and remain in place during sleep. If it were to leave the body during sleep, [the body] would be dead, not alive. And, since imaginings and knowledge that are not accessible by way of ordinary sight are true (ṣabīhāh), they claim that no body that is separable from the sleeper leaves him, for were it to return to him it would, since bodies don’t interpenetrate one another, enter some aperture and if the sleeper’s mouth and nose were held fast shut and then he were awakened, he would wake up. In this connection, they take innumerable things into consideration. They say also that if there were only the body and the pneuma, the Prophet would have said so. An invisible body is something that is readily understood (maḥfūzān); the only thing that is not readily understood [p. 175] is an entity (mawjūdā) that is neither inside the body nor outside it. The first group [sc., the mutakallimūn] say this is logically impossible, since the negation is the assertion of a contingent entity that is neither inside nor outside the body, something that is logically impossible. This is the order of their reasoning. If you ask what position is in fact true in this matter, know that those who are asked concerning the spirit neither know nor do not know, in which case no clear answer is possible, or they do know and so are not allowed to go into the matter, for the spirit is God’s mystery (ṣirr Allāh), just as being eternal is God’s mystery and God’s Apostle (prayer and peace be upon him) did not grant permission to go into an explanation of it. . . . Anyone who is ignorant of the spirit does not know himself, so how can he think that he knows God and His angels and grasps the knowledge of the first people and the last, not having come to know himself.

Here, as often elsewhere in Muhākk as well as in other works, al-Ghazālī presents several distinct views on the topic, but this time, though explicitly rejecting none of the three, he nonetheless gives a fairly clear indication of where his own preference lies. He knows but is not free to divulge the truth of the matter explicitly. The soul does not occupy space; it is an immaterial entity. Later, he will be more explicit, in Muhākkā (p. 44.), when he says that one cannot talk of the soul as of bodies in terms of near and far, compares it to “God’s light,” and cites the Tradition, “God created Adam in his own form (‘āla ǧirātīh).” 158 In this section of Muhākk, al-Ghazālī does not name either the fālāsifa or those of the mutakallimūn who hold the other two views that he mentions. (The physicians are named, but only as those whose science is the origin of the position regarding life held by the great majority of the orthodox school theologians. It is not altogether implausible that al-Ghazālī takes the trouble to name them at all in order obliquely to call the attention of his readers to the fact
that certain of their commonly accepted doctrines originate in pagan antiquity (cp. *Munjidh*, pp. 102f.). In an earlier passage, however, where he treats the question of how knowledge of the conclusion follows from that of the premises (*Mishak*, pp. 77f. and *Mustafa* 1, pp. 54ff.), he explicitly associates the various positions mentioned with those who hold them, namely, the Murtaza'is, the Ash'arites ("our fellows"), and the falsafis. The position of the latter, he says, is that it takes place through "the mind's having been made ready through the presence of the premises together with this understanding for the emanation of the conclusion from the giver of intelligible forms, which is the agent intellect." Here, the indication al-Ghazali gives of his own position is somewhat less direct than in his discussion of life and the soul. He notes that neither the theses of "our fellows" nor that of the falsafis make the achievement of the knowledge of the conclusion an effect caused directly by the human agent's own power of acting, apparently thus rejecting the position of the Murtaza', and he concludes by telling the reader that he ought not to concern himself with the usual and generally accepted doctrines but rather with those that clearly convey the truth (lā yanbughi 'an yakūna singhulska il-kalami l-mu'tasadi l-mustāhir, bāl bi-kalami l-mufdi l-mu'dih) (*Mishak*, p. 77f., cp. *Mustafa* 1, pp. 54f.).

When al-Ghazali says that the soul of itself has cognition without any instrument (*tawālima l-ushyra bi-nafsihā mun ghanir yilāb*) (*Ihya* 4, p. 478f., cp. *Mishak*, p. 44f., stf), he obviously does not mean that it has this knowledge per se, since its knowledge is received passively from the angel which serves as the agent intellect. He means rather that it is itself the immediate recipient and locus (*mašāli*) of the intellectual perception that it is given. He does not speak of intellectual perception (al-`irāk) or cognition (al-`ism, al-marjīfah) explicitly as an "accident," but following his description of the soul as a *jawhar*, this would not be inconsistent. Life, on the other hand, is the condition of cognition (e.g., *Ihya* 4, p. 87f., 4f.). Al-Ghazali does not say that life is present as an accident in the rational soul. The assertions that after the death of the body, the soul continues in existence (inšiqā) as a perceiving and knowing subject and does not die and that death does not reside in it, do not necessarily imply that of and in itself as such it has life and is immortal, but this is nevertheless almost certainly what he means. When, following the usage of the

Ash'arite theologians, he says in *Iṣqāq* that accidents endure only for a time, he is speaking specifically in terms of the body, not of the soul. In *Mishak* (e.g., pp. 3f.f.), *Mustafa* (e.g., 1, p. 13), and elsewhere, as we have seen, he speaks of attributes (ṣifātah) which, though not elements of the essences of their subjects, belong to them, nonetheless, as concomitant properties (inawizm) and are, therefore, permanent in them so long as they exist. It would seem likely that it is thus that he considers life to be in the rational soul, though he may well consider it an essential attribute.

When al-Ghazali speaks in his own voice (*Ihya* 4, p. 478f.) of the soul's using (taqarruṣi) the body and says (*Ihya* 3, p. 3) that it employs (*istāmašla*) the body as a tool or instrument (*ṣilāh*) (cf. also *Mishak*, p. 79f., stf.), it is clear enough that he is in fundamental agreement with the position presented as that of the falsafī in *Iṣqāq* (p. 215, 3f.), wherefore one must ask exactly why in this passage he does not merely refuse to go into the question of "the spirit and the soul and life and their essential natures" but apologizes for having accepted the doctrine of the falsafī as the basis of an argument against them in *Tahāfest*.

We have, then, to look more closely at the whole discussion of the possibility of the resurrection in *Iṣqāq*. He begins (p. 213) by saying that God has the power to create anew a being He once created but which has ceased to exist as such. To a question as to whether the *jāwhars* and accidents are both re-created or only the accidents, he says that in principle either is possible, but he examines only the latter case. The body, he says, "continues to exist having the form (ṣīrat) of dust, for example, while life, color, dampness, composition (turqīb) and disposition (ḥarṣ) and a whole set of other accidents cease to exist in it," and that what is meant by creating anew (al-`idādat) is that either these very same accidents or accidents identical to them are created, "for life in our view is an accident and accidents do not have permanence of existence, but what exists in each hour is another accident." In the resurrection, then, the individual lives again with the restoration of life, and the other requisite accidents, to the original material constituents of the earthly body. Concerning the other alternative, i.e., that the original body, too, is created anew, al-Ghazali draws out the distinction between creating an identically similar body and creating anew the very same body, but says that it
would take too long to go into the issue here. It is at this point that he offers his apology for having adopted the position of the fālāsifah in his counterargument in Tahāfut. One facet of the problem is clear enough. Al-Ghazālī here presents the traditional conception of the question of the resurrection, according to which man is conceived as a body having a particular structure and configuration (e.g., Muṣaṣṣar, pp. 146, 4ff., and 201, off., and Tarmid, §§290 and the individual is identified with the body (or more narrowly as every particle in which there is life; e.g., Ghusn, fol. 136, 17), wherefore it must be in some way that the very same body comes to exist again at the last judgment (e.g., Muṣaṣṣar, p. 146, 15ff.). In Iṣṭiḥād, however, he is not concerned to go into the complexities of this view. (The restoration of the “accident” of life will involve the reintegration of the pneuma, etc.) in the traditional school theology, the nafs is not the individual human subject, the locus of cognition, volition, experience, etc. 64 so that the acceptance in Tahāfut of the thesis that the soul continues to exist as such and that the possibility of the resurrection is given with the possibility of its being restored to “a body” (badānul minna l-ḥabādīn), that is, to whatever body that can be appropriately governed by the soul, is inconsistent and incompatible with traditional school doctrine. That, given the doctrine of the immortality of the rational soul, the question of having or not having the exact same body becomes to some extent, if not essentially, irrelevant is important in this context. Moreover, the Neoplatonic view of the soul espoused by the fālāsifah is attacked by al-Anṣārī in his Ghusn (fol. 315v), and this, certainly, is not irrelevant in the background and context of al-Ghazālī’s relation to the school. The studied apology for the procedure of Tahāfut and his overtly distancing himself from a conception of the rational soul which he in fact holds to be true would seem to indicate that there had been some direct and explicit criticism of this part of Tahāfut. Criticism concerning what he said or may have implied concerning the resurrection would be a particularly serious matter, because the doctrine of the resurrection is one of the primary articles of faith (one of the raṣūl al-dīn) about which diversity of interpretation is, in principle, not allowed. In this connection one notes with what care he formulates his conclusions concerning the punishment of the grave in Iṣṭiḥād (4, pp. 484f.), where he says:

There are three levels of assent to things such as this. The first is the most obvious and the soundest and the safest (al-‘aṣbūr wa-l-qawāṣṣf wa-l-ta‘lūm),65 namely that you assent to the proposition that [these snakes] exist and bite the deceased. You can’t really see this, however, because this (bodily) eye cannot see the things of the immaterial world (al-rumūr al-mala‘ākīyāh) and everything pertaining to the next life belongs to the immaterial world (‘ālūm l-mala‘āt). . . . The second is that you reflect on the case of one who is asleep and that during sleep he sometimes sees a snake which bites him and because of this sense pain to the point that you see his forehead sweat. . . . The third is that you know that snakes themselves do not cause pain, but rather what you feel that is from them is the poison and the poison, furthermore, is not the pain; your suffering is, rather, the effect (al-rā‘b) which takes place in you as a result of the poison. If this effect were to take place without the actual presence of the poison the suffering might even be greater. The fact is that it is impossible to make this sort of suffering known except by ascribing it to that which customarily brings it about. . . . My advice is neither to do a lot of speculation concerning the detail of this nor to procris yourself with knowing it; procris yourself rather with avoiding the punishment in whatever way it may occur.66

The circumspection of this statement is paralleled already at the beginning of Iṣṭiḥād (1, pp. 20f.) where, speaking about knowledge of the immaterial world, the means of whose attainment he intends to present, he outlines various stages (maṣā‘mat) that people reach and occupy with respect to their understanding and conception of the nature of things such as the punishment of the grave, the next life, etc., once they have assented to the basic truths of the revelation. Here again, al-Ghazālī goes on to say (p. 21, 15f.) that “the knowledge of these things (biḥḍātī l-sulīm) is not written down in books and those whom God has blessed with some part of it communicate it only to those who are worthy of it (‘ulūhū).” That he speaks of “three levels of assent” and implies that each of the three has its own mode of validity is important. His treatment of this topic here in Iṣṭiḥād may be a key to understanding his apparent denial in Iṣṭiḥād (p. 215) of something that manifestly he believes. He insists there on bodily resurrection in the same body, but does he really mean this
is to be taken in a strictly literal sense? To judge by how he treats the punishment of the grave in the passage we have just examined, one would suspect not. The statement made in *Iṣtiṣād* (p. 215) that this is not the place to discuss “the pneuma and the soul and life and their essential natures” might easily be taken as referring the reader to the section of *Mihakk* “Concerning the Definition of Life” (pp. 132ff), where all three are discussed, particularly in view of the fact that he has explicitly referred to *Mihakk* already in the fourth preface of *Iṣtiṣād* (p. 15).

To return to our original question, then, al-Ghazālī plainly recognizes several classes of *jawhar*, that is, of contingent independent entities, the most basic division being between those which are material and occupy space and those which are immaterial and do not occupy space. In *Mihakk* his description of the rational soul as ‘*jawhar*un ḍarrun bi-nafisīn ḍāyirun muta‘allayisz‘ iṣla‘izada’ is contextually presented in such a way as to suggest that the language of the formulation may not be his own. Elsewhere, however, he seems to describe the soul (or intellect) as a *jawhar* while speaking plainly in his own voice (e.g., *Ihyā‘* 4, p. 487; cited on p. 98 above). His tendency not to employ “*jawhar*” so commonly as a general equivalent of “*nafsuydun qūrnum bi-nafisīh” may well be due to the fact that he wishes to avoid gratuitous usage of the terminology of the ḡalāsīs. As we have seen, al-Ghazālī also employs “*matnā*” of the rational soul, but this is a very neutral expression having a very general sense of “thing” without any direct connotation that its referent is an entity, strictly speaking.68 He also refers to the soul by “*sāye*”, a word which is often employed by the Ashʿarīs in the sense of an individual existent entity69 and as an equivalent of “*dhi‘a*” and “*nafṣ*” and by the ḡalāsīs as an equivalent of “*jawhar*”. Al-Ghazālī several times describes the rational soul by “*jen*” (and “*jen‘un la yathannaza‘*”), an expression which in traditional kāmil designates the material atom as such. Used of the soul by al-Ghazālī, however, “*jen*” plainly means an indivisible entity which, as such, is a discrete element of the living human composite. Al-Ghazālī’s characterizations of bodies, on the other hand, consistently reflect the Ashʿarīte usage and seem plausibly to indicate the traditional atomism. In presenting his own views in his own voice he does not speak in the correlative terms of “matter” and “form.” The statement in

*Miṣyār* (p. 171) that the mutakallimūn “use *jawhar* particularly for the single *jawhar* that occupies space and is indivisible” could be read as indicating that he recognizes the material atom and holds that bodies are not infinitely divisible. This does not, however, seem to have been a topic al-Ghazālī considered to be of central importance to his theology, and because of his tendency to employ traditional language wherever convenient, the evidence remains to some extent inconclusive. That he recognizes the existence of indivisible smallest parts of material bodies does not necessarily mean that he will reject the use of “*jawhar*” to describe a composite body or the idea that bodies (some bodies, at least) have natures (ḥāṣa‘īn or khawāṣ) or “forms”.70 “*Jawhar*” is equivocal.

The Rational Evidence of Prophecy

In *Iṣtiṣād* al-Ghazālī says that the truth of the Prophet’s message is not self-evident but is manifest through miracles (p. 105, 2f.), and he goes on (p. 198; cp. *Qudsiyah*, p. 92, §10 = *Ihyā‘* 1, p. 113, 1ff.) to give the usual kāmil arguments that the miracles worked on behalf of prophets are distinguishable from magic and things merely imagined. Elsewhere, however, he says, e.g., (Qīṭāb, p. 66f. and *Munjīd*, pp. 146f.) that the evidential value of miracles is ambivalent, not to say conclusive. He understands prophecy (al-‘alāmūwāb) to be a level or mode of understanding which transcends that of ordinary experience and of conceptual reasoning, in which the soul comes to know things knowledge of which cannot be attained by any other means.71 The fact of prophecy, he says, is evidenced in the occurrence of such phenomena as dreams in which remote or future events are presented either as such or in symbolic form (*Munjīd*, pp. 146f.), and, similarly, the original discovery of the particulars of medicine and astrology must have been prophetic (*Munjīd*, pp. 146f. and 16ff.). Miracles are analogous insofar as they are manifest and publicly witnessed phenomena. The fact and truth of all other proper characteristics (khawāṣ) of prophecy, however, can be known only through one’s own interior experience (al-‘alāmūw) that is had by following the methods of the sufi way (*Munjīd*, p. 147, 16ff.). That is,
given one's own experience of direct spiritual enlightenment, he is able
to recognize the presence of such enlightenment in another, just as
one trained in medicine or law is able to recognize and distinguish
an expert from one who is not; such knowledge is given in direct
intuition (it is darrīr) and is not subject to rational doubt (Qitās,
p. 66f.) and Munqādah, pp. 147ff. and 161ff.). It is only in this way, that
is, by being able to recognize the states of the soul (al-nurūd) which
are characteristic of prophecy, that one can be absolutely certain that a
given individual is truly a prophet; and in confirmation of his thesis,
al-Ghazzāl cites a Tradition (Qitās, p. 67, 3f.) according to which the
Prophet said, “You shall not know the truth through the man; know,
rather, the truth and you shall recognize the one who has it.” This
al-Ghazzāl does not bring up in Iṣṭiḍād, since it would be alien to
the literary form and conventions of the kalām manual and also be-
cause the audience to which he considers such works to be properly
addressed neither possess nor seek such higher levels of spiritual or
intellectual perfection. What he says concerning prophecy here is of
considerable significance for our understanding of al-Ghazzāl’s the-
ology in that it is an explicit acknowledgment of the particular kind
of nonrational foundation that underlies his often pretentious claims
to rationally justified knowledge.

Al-Qudsiyyah

Regarding al-Qudsiyyah, it is important to keep in mind that when
al-Ghazzāl incorporates the work into the second book of Iṣyā’-ṣulām al-dīn, he has notified the reader already in Book I
e.g., pp. 20f. and 36f.) and again in Book II (p. 98, 28f.) that higher
knowledge of the true meaning of the revelation concerning cre-
ation, cosmology, the soul, etc., can be imparted only to those who
are spiritually and intellectually prepared to receive it, and presum-
ably the reader is not so prepared until he has fully absorbed what
is contained in the first twenty books of the work, following which
he will be introduced to an understanding of basic theological truths
that is very different in form and conception from that set out in al-
Qudsiyyah. It should be recalled here that, as we saw earlier, al-Ghazzāl
makes a point of disparaging kalām in a number of places in Books I
and II of Iṣyā’.

In reading R. al-Qudsiyyah we find no such difficulties as we do in
Iṣtiḍād. The entire work is written in very traditional language, but
in such a way that there is no conflict with the psychological, cosmo-
logical, and metaphysical doctrines that will follow it in Iṣyā’. The
discussion of the human agent's power of acting and its relation to the
occurrence of his “performance” (kāhib) is formulated in very tradi-
tional terms (pp. 87ff. = Iṣyā’ 1, p. 110, 111f.). God creates (iskhārā‘a)
the action and also the act of the agent's power of voluntary action
(gudrāb), the choice and the thing chosen, wherefore it is God's act in
its being created and is the human agent's performance in its coming
to be as the object of his power of voluntary action. The formulation
is that of the classical Ashʿarite manuals and so expressly evokes their
doctrine. If, however, 'create' is understood in the formal sense in
which al-Ghazzāl employs it later in Iṣyā’, then the thesis asserted is
altogether different from that intended by similarly formulated state-
ments found in the traditional manuals.2 Later, in discussing how it
was that Muhammad saw the angel Gabriel and heard his speaking
while his companions did not, al-Ghazzāl says (p. 92, ult. = Iṣyā’ 1,
111, 22; cp. Iṣtiḍād, p. 217), that they failed to perceive this “since God
did not create hearing and sight for them” (‘ādhā lam yakhṣū‘ulahummu
l-sawāfa wa-l-manāqib). Given the language and tone of the tract, this
sounds very much as if he is speaking of an occasionalistic alteration
of the usual course of events, but in view of al-Ghazzāl's formal use of
‘khalqa, yakhṣū‘a’ it need not, and should not, be so understood.”

When he comes to treat of the resurrection in Qudsiyyah (p. 89,
3ff. = Iṣyā’ 1, p. 111, 14ff.), the discussion is simple and apparently
straightforward. Nothing is said that might raise the question of the
inmateriality of the soul or its continued existence after the death of
the body. He says simply that God has the power to restore some-
thing after causing it to cease to exist (ba‘da la-‘īfā‘ah), without saying
what it is that ceases to exist or, indeed, saying whether the soul or
the pneuma do or do not in fact cease to exist. Following this he
takes up the dogma of the interrogation of the deceased by the angels
Munkar and Nakir, and presents essentially the same argument for
its possibility that he had in Iṣtiḍād (p. 217). This is possible, he says,
“since the only thing that is required is that life be restored to one
of the parts (ṣaw'um mina l-nasīr) in which there is understanding of spoken discourse.”

In traditional Ash'arite doctrine, life is an accident whose presence in the subject is the condition of perception. Al-Ghazâlî does not say here, however, exactly what he means by the restoration of life to one of the original particles. When, then, he raises the question of the punishment of the grave for someone the parts of whose body have been dispersed in the bellies of predators and the claws of scavenging birds, he says (p. 93, st. = Ḥiyâ 1, p. 116, 46.), “That of animals which perceives pain are special particles to which God has the power to restore perception” (ṣaw'um makhlûṣutuṣu yanḏīra ilāhu ‘alâ l-nasīr l-nasīrī l-nasīrī hâkîma). It may be that by specifying “of animals” rather than “of men” (ṣaw'um l-tawāṣîl) al-Ghazâlî’s aim is one of avoiding the question of the intellectual soul as distinguishable from its lower faculties that may be associated with the pneuma or animal spirit. Again, note that the argument of Qudsiyyah does not formally assert that it is the pneuma of the individual which, as such, undergoes the punishment of the grave, but only that God has the power to restore perception to some “part” (or parts) of the individual after it has become altogether separated from the body. The sole aim of the argument was to assert that it lies in God’s power to cause the deceased to undergo a kind of (corporal) punishment. In the school tradition, the pneuma is a recognized component of the living human organism as such, whence to focus the argument on it raises no questions. More importantly, however, one notes with regard to the context in which Qudsiyyah is to be read and interpreted that later in Ḥiyâ (4, p. 487; cited on p. 56 above) al-Ghazâlî will refer to the intellect (i.e., the rational soul) as a “part” or “particle” which is immortal; already in Book I (p. 54, 24; cited above, chap. 3, n. 56) he describes it as something divine or holy (‘ilâhî) that is more noble than visible bodies. So again, as earlier in Iṣṭiḥâd, al-Ghazâlî has seemingly upheld the traditional thesis without formally and unambiguously committing himself to its usual interpretation.

Summary

Al-Ghazâlî composed Iṣṭiḥâd as a theological handbook, and this within the tradition of the Ash’arite school. This was the theological tradition in which he as well as the majority of the scholars who made up the better part of his prospective and intended audience had been formed. In addition, however, the work was conceived and written within the broader, implicit context of his higher theology with its cosmological determinism of secondary causes, proximate and remote. Accordingly, Iṣṭiḥâd is to be viewed as an attempt to bring the traditional school theology somehow into harmony with his own thinking—to recast it in such a way that it could be given a legitimate place within the wider context of his own theology. It sets forth, explains, and justifies the basic doctrines of Islam (al-asârîd) in a manner he deems to be appropriate for the schools, that is, in a form similar to that in which the religious scholars and theologians were trained and which is therefore accessible to them and adequate to their needs and intellectual abilities. It is thus “the proper mean” (al-ṣaw’ah) between the level on which doctrine should be presented to ordinary people who are not scholars and that which is accessible only to those who have reached the threshold of the highest religious understanding and insight. The higher-level theoretical understanding of what is discussed is taken into account and, in a sense, governs the theology of Iṣṭiḥâd. Not only does al-Ghazâlî say nothing which, most formally and strictly interpreted, would be inconsistent with this more advanced theology (though hairs here and there must be split with a microscope), but the presence of elements of the latter is hinted at more or less directly in several places, as we have seen. Viewed on a superficial level, the traditional theses are retained and set out against the usual collection of countertheses, while the language is, so to speak, updated by an admixture of Aristotelian and, in some cases, expressly Avicennian terms and concepts, a procedure justified on one level because of the growing interest in the teaching of the fâlâsîf, whose influence is evident already in al-Juwâniyy’s R. al-Nâṣîmîyyah. As we have seen, however, the matter is much more complex than this. Traditional arguments are retained where convenient (where there is no serious difference between the traditional
argument as commonly understood and al-Ghazālī's understanding of the argument and its implications concerning the thesis) and are modified or nuanced or judged where suitable or necessary.

In its basic conception and structure, the proof given in Ḥaḍīth for the contingency of the world and the existence of God is the traditional one based on bodies and accidents, even though al-Ghazālī considers it formally imperfect and inadequate. It is adequate, however, and suitable within the intellectual context of the school tradition, where its ontological presuppositions are well known. Al-Ghazālī expressly points the reader toward the Avicennan ontology, which he considers the proper conceptual foundation for a truly demonstrative proof, by inserting it at the end of the general statement of the argument (pp. 25ff.), before he sets out to prove the several premises. Thus, at the end of the paragraph he says (p. 26, 1), “wa-naḥmu la nuriu bi-sababi ‘illa l-munajja,” Here, the language is purely that of Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī's own preference for it is evident from the emphasis marked by ‘naḥmu’ as the formal subject of the sentence. He will, of course, have to go beyond this argument for the contingency of the world in order to argue that the world has existed for only a finite period of time.

Similarly, al-Ghazālī retains the traditional argument for the divine origin and authority of the revelation on the basis of miracles, even though he considers it to be imperfect, for miracles constitute the only evidence that is formally appropriate to a tract of this kind and intellectually accessible to its presumed audience. In the proof for the possibility of the resurrection, he offers, as we have seen, an apology for the implied presuppositions of his earlier argument in Tadhāf, but stops short of making clear his own thought on the subject, although his mention of “the soul, the spirit, and life” not only indicates that there is something more to be considered but constitutes a clear cross-reference to the discussion of Miḥāk (pp. 196f., 199), where his views are more or less clearly indicated. The question of secondary causes and the universality of God's action intimately involves that of the cosmological role of celestial agents and their determination of the activity of sublunary causes and discussion of these matters he had expressly excluded at the outset when he stated (p. 4) that he would here consider the world only as it is created by God (only as “God's making”: sura 112), with the result that in a number of places the discussion seems full of earnest inconclusiveness. Concerning the ground of ethical judgments and the thesis that God is not subject to ethical obligation, he offers definitions that as stated can be superficially harmonized with traditional definitions, but whose basic conception, since he holds that both God's acts and His commands can be fully rationalized, is not compatible with traditional teaching. The overall incompatibility of al-Ghazālī's intention with the traditional theology only becomes manifest, however, when the reader to whom Ḥaḍīth is ostensibly addressed is not presumed to possess this broader context, wherefore it is kept just beyond the explicit horizon of the text.

As we have noted, religious scholars who were thoroughly acquainted with the traditions of the schools could hardly have failed to perceive that Ḥaḍīth is by no means an ordinary manual of traditional Ash'arite theology and that in a number of important respects al-Ghazālī modifies or sets aside the traditional teaching of the school either directly or indirectly. The direction of his thought had to be altogether obvious to anyone who had read Miṣyār and Miḥāk, to which the reader is referred at the outset (p. 15). In reply to questions regarding the orthodoxy of his thought, he attaches as an appendix to Ḥaḍīth a chapter (pp. 246ff.) concerning the juridical conditions under which accusations of unbelief (ḥif) may validly be made. Here, he insists that assertions which do not in fact formally reject the teaching of the Koran or of the Prophet cannot serve as the basis for such an accusation, however they may be viewed by people who do not fully understand them. Belief is assent to what is authentically taught in the Koran and in the prophetic Traditions, and unbelief is the intentional rejection of it as false. One has, however, here to distinguish the fundamental articles of faith (the āqād al-šin) from secondary teachings (the fiqh). The former are given plainly and unambiguously in the Koran and the Traditions; to assent to them is Belief, and to assent the contrary of any of them is unbelief. It is for this reason that al-Ghazālī is so sensitive to criticism regarding what he had previously said concerning the resurrection. The latter, by contrast, are subject to dispute so that falsity of interpretation does not entail unbelief, since there can be incomplete or erroneous notions, learned or unlearned, of the ultimate sense of what is taught
that remain nonetheless compatible with the 'usul and so represent a,esent to them (pp. 246f.). The elaborate and inconclusive discussion of the human power of voluntary action and the patently tendentious treatment of the question of iawnahud are due to the fact that these are passionately contested topics in the Ash'arite opposition to the Mu'tazila. Iqtiṣād is composed as an Ash'arite manual, and the refutation of these theses is formally required. Al-Ghazālī does not seek unnecessary conflict with the school, but rather, if possible, to lead them in the direction of his own point of view. That the Ḥanbalīs would accuse him of unbelief was a foregone conclusion; they would have done so even if he had written an altogether traditional handbook, such as al-Jувaynī's Ibrāhīd or al-Mutawallī's Muṣannā. Their opposition can only have been of minor concern to him. The appendix concerning taḥfīz addresses doubtless not only opposition to elements of Taḥfīzīt but the argument concerning the resurrection, but likely looks also to criticism, present or anticipated by members of his own school whose agreement he plainly hoped to gain, to things in Miḥkāk and Miḥyāʾ as well as to things he intended to say in Iḥyāʾ.

With Qudsiyyah we have a second summary of apparently Ash'arite theology, though on a simpler and much more elementary scale than Iqtiṣād. Here, however, in conspicuous contrast to Iqtiṣād, al-Ghazālī adheres closely to the traditional language and argumentation of the school. Because the work is restricted to a very elementary level and by virtue of the care with which all assertions are formulated, he is able to carry this off without making any statements that are formally inconsistent with his higher theology. What we have in Qudsiyyah is, in effect, an elementary catechism of manifestly Ash'arite form. The subsequent placement of Qudsiyyah as a doctrinal summary in the second book of Iḥyāʾ, then, can be seen from two angles which give complementary views of its significance within the context Qudsiyyah is, as al-Ghazālī states in the immediately preceding context (Iḥyāʾ 1, pp. 97f.), basically a catechetical manual, suitable for young people to protect them from the influence of heretical disputations. Accordingly, it stands as an element of Book II, at the beginning of Iḥyāʾ, in order to set forth the basic level of religious assent required to form the ground starting from which the reader is to undertake the culti-
Fayṣal al-tasfīqah and al-Munqidh min al-ḍālīl

Iḥyā‘ was followed by Maqṣūd and Mūshābakh, in both of which the formal teaching of traditional Ashʿarite kāfam is rejected outright and the central elements, psychological, metaphysical, and cosmological, of al-Ghazālī’s higher theology presented plainly and without circumlocation. The traditional form and content of Qudayya and its placement at the beginning of Iḥyā‘ could hardly have been expected to assure all of al-Ghazālī’s readers of his orthodoxy and there ensued a strong reaction on the part of some against his theological teaching because of its departure from the traditional theology of the schools. This is made clear in the opening of Fayṣal (pp. 5f.), where al-Ghazālī speaks of “a party of those who are envious of one of our books which treats of the essential truths concerning religious duties and practices (tasrīru mu‘āmalātī l-dīn) and who believe that there are things in it which are contrary to the teaching of the earlier fellows of the school and the professors of theology (al-‘aṣījih al-mutaqqaddimīn wa-mushābīkhi l-mutanallīmīn) and that to deviate from the teaching of al-Ashʿarī even by so much as a span is unbelief.”

Al-Ghazālī was very much stung by this condemnation, for there follows (pp. 7ff.) a vehement polemic in which, through the introduction of a series of verses from the Koran, he depicts his own situation as he suffers the attacks of his opponents as equivalent to that of the Prophet who had to face the opposition of the pagan unbelievers of Mecca. Their opposition is oppressive, but if God so willed He would give all of them right guidance (Qs. 33). They will accept no evidence of the truth of the message (Qs. 35, 6, 7) and even were angels to be sent down to them and the dead to speak to them, they will still not believe unless God wills; most of them are ignorant of the truth (Qs. 35, 11). Indicating the formal topic of the book, al-Ghazālī goes on to say that the knowledge of the true nature of unbelief (kufr) and belief (‘imān) and of error and truth are not revealed to minds that are polluted by the quest for status and wealth, but only to those that are purified by rigorous ascetic and intellectual discipline so as to become like polished mirrors (cp. Iḥyā‘ 3, p. 12, cited on p. 26 above) and to shine like the lamp mentioned in surat al-Nāṣr (Qs. 35, 2). “How, he asks, can the fundamental truths concerning the immaterial realm (tasrīru al-mala’ikā) be revealed to people who are inspired by their lower appetites, whose idol (ma‘bīdhum) is their sultans, whose orientation for prayer is in the direction of their dīhāmān and their dinārs, whose sacred law is their own intellectual triviality, whose desire is their status . . .” (pp. 9f.). The preface concludes (p. 10) with a citation of God’s address to the Prophet in Qs. 35, 7: “Keep your distance from those who turn away from our reminder (dīhāmān) and desire only the goods of this world; this is as far as their knowledge reaches; your Lord knows well who wanders astray from the path and He knows well those who follow the way of truth.”

What al-Ghazālī sets himself to do, then, is to return to the question of the formal criteria for determining the status of individuals as believers or unbelievers—members of the Muslim community or aliens—and this specifically with regard to the nonliteral interpretation (ta‘wil) of descriptions of God presented in the Koran and in canonically authentic Traditions. This is of particular importance,
since al-Ghazâlî will confirm and legitimate his higher theology not merely as a valid interpretation of the Koran and Tradition, but as the intellectually most thorough and exact conceptual exposition of their deeper meaning. Although he holds the discussion to a very general plane—for he has no intention of explicitly taking up and arguing the particular questions that provoked the controversy—the ta‘wîl with which he is chiefly concerned would appear to be that involving his conception of the operation of the cosmic system in the determinate causation of events, including the voluntary actions of human agents, in the sublunar world. This would seem to be indicated plainly enough at the outset by his remark to the effect that scholars and theologians whose minds are concentrated primarily on worldly status and wealth cannot know the hidden truths concerning the immaterial realm and to be confirmed where, in the discussion (pp. 37ff.) of interpretation and exegesis on the basis of the five modes or levels of the presence of existence (dârânîyya al-wujûd), he cites as examples of the "intellectual level" (al-wujûd al-‘âqiîl) the interpretation of statements that mention God’s “hand” as referring to “a spiritual and intellectual hand,” which is to say, to the intermediary agency of angels (p. 40, 10ff.), just as the Tradition according to which “the first thing God created was the intellect” is to be interpreted as referring to “an angel which is called an intellect insofar as it has intellectual cognition of things through its own being and essence without any need to learn” (pp. 40ff.).

Subsequently (pp. 46ff.), al-Ghazâlî insists that it is obvious, in some cases even to the Hanbalites, that nonliteral interpretation is absolutely necessary wherever the literal sense of the text makes no rational sense and insists (pp. 49ff.) that the validity of the logical rules which he had presented in Qiyās cannot conceivably be denied by anyone who understands them (cp. Iqtidâl, pp. 17ff.). Moreover, since a valid charge of unbelief has to be based on a denial of one of the fundamental tenets of Islam to which every believer is obliged to assent (al-‘a‘lîl), no one can be so accused on the basis of assertions concerning secondary matters (fûrû‘); disagreement is allowed, that is to say, concerning matters which are not elements of the primary articles of faith (p. 56). Though he does not explicitly draw the conclusion, al-Ghazâlî plainly means to imply that since he asserts that

God wills and “creates” every contingent entity and every event that occurs in the celestial and the sublunary worlds, his views concerning the operation of secondary causes, celestial and sublunar, cannot constitute the basis of a juridically valid charge of unbelief, even on the principles of scholars who are ignorant of the true conformity of his theology with the revelation. Before going into further detail concerning the bases of valid charges of unbelief, he introduces a generalized polemic against the school theologians and their pretentiousness (pp. 67–72), repeating much of what he had said in the first and second books of Iḥyâ’. Here, however, he attacks the thesis that some minimal level of speculative reflection (nazar) is required in order to ground a sound and stable assent to the truth of the revelation. The reasoning of the Ash’arite masters who hold this thesis is turned against them when al-Ghazâlî says (p. 71) that religious belief founded in the reasoning and demonstrations of the ِmutakallimûn is weak and readily subject to lapse when confronted by any counter-argument (shubûh). This is precisely the language employed by the Ash’arites to argue the necessity of at least some minimal level of rational speculation as the foundation of sound religious assent and therefore that speculative inquiry is a universal obligation.

The question of accusations of unbelief is raised also in a discussion of the doctrine of the falsâsfa concerning the divine attributes in Munqiddâ (pp. 107ff.), where, although Fâyûlî is cited, nothing is said that would precisely identify the particular grounds for such accusations as he has in mind. In the ensuing discussion of the metaphysics of the falsâsfa (pp. 112ff.), he goes on to inveigh against those who think that anything which is found in their works is to be rejected out of hand, and remarks that “a party of those whose minds are not solidly grounded in the sciences (lam tasallûkâm fi l-salsal) and whose intellectual vision has not been opened to the ultimate limits of the doctrines of the various schools (‘azâqa, ghayîyi ‘l-madâhîn) have challenged certain statements on the deeper truths of the religious sciences (‘arwîrin ‘išārât l-din) and they allege that these statements derive from the ancients.” He goes on to say that some of these things are products of [his own] intuition (muwwalûdât al-khawâriz), while others are found in Muslim religious books (al-kutub al-sharî‘iyyah), and most are to be found in the works of the sufis. The “deeper truths of the religious sciences” would seem to point to Iḥyâ’ which was also
Iljām al-‘awāmm ‘an ‘ilm al-kalām

Al-Ghazālī’s break with the school tradition—his isolation from scholars in the tradition in which he had been formed—seems to have preoccupied him, for Iljām, written at the very end of his life, appears to be another response, albeit from a somewhat different angle, to the challenge he had confronted in Fāyād. The work is presented (pp. 51f.) as a reply to a request for guidance concerning “Traditions that give the rabble and the ignorant amongst errant religious simpletons (al-ma‘āru wal-juhālīnu mana l-nabīwiyat l-dīnīllāl) the impression that the pious ancestors understood descriptions of God which speak, for example, of His shape, His hard, His foot, His descending, moving, sitting on the throne, etc., literally.” In response, then, al-Ghazālī proposes (p. 52) to do three things, (1) set forth what was in fact the teaching of the pious ancestors (al-salāf) with regard to what should be the conduct of simple believers with regard to such Traditions, (2) to demonstrate the true correctness of their teaching on this matter, and (3) to explain several other worthwhile matters that are pertinent to the topic. It will be sufficient for our present needs to look only at a few of the major themes, these, and arguments, without going into the polemical and often redundant detail of al-Ghazālī’s exposition.

Under the first heading, al-Ghazālī says (pp. 53f.) that the first generations of Muslims held that in these matters simple believers (al-‘awāmm) are to cultivate seven habits and attitudes. The first is that they are to avoid literalism altogether, since all bozos that consist of different members are created entities and to worship a created being is to reject the consensus of the first generations in favor of idolatry (p. 51; see also pp. 77, 100ff.; et alīh). They are to recognize that apparently anthropomorphic descriptions of God do have a meaning that is compatible with the expressions employed and that also befits God’s glory and majesty, even if one may not know what it is (p. 58). The second is that they must understand that these descriptions “are meant to address the understanding of a unique audience, namely, the saints and those who have profound religious knowledge and do in fact understand (ta‘fīrin muḥānu ‘alāhu wa-humnu l-‘awāmmu wal-rāśibānu fi l-‘ilm)” (p. 60). The third is that they acknowledge that for their part they don’t know the real meaning of these descriptions (pp. 60ff.).

The fourth is that the simple believer is to refrain from raising any questions about these Traditions, either to himself alone or to another (pp. 69f.). The fifth is that he is to let stand the wording of the text without attempting any exegetical paraphrase (ta‘fīr) or interpretation (ta‘wil) of the problematic expressions (pp. 64ff.). The sixth is that he is not to attempt to think these problems through for himself and is to shun the formal reasoning of the mutakallimūn and the cultivation of scholastic disputation as well (pp. 77ff.). The seventh is to “leave the matter in the hands of those who really know” (al-ta‘fīrin li-‘alāhi l-ma‘rifah); recognizing that “the sense of these expressions and their deeper meaning (ma‘ānī hidnīni l-zawā‘irī wa-aswārāhā) were not hidden from the Prophet and abū Bakr, or from the leading Companions, nor from the saints and those scholars who have profound religious knowledge (al-rāśifānu fi l-‘ilm)” (p. 84, if.).

Under the second heading (pp. 87ff.), al-Ghazālī explains that the ultimate good of human action, since it involves the next life, cannot be known either by experience or by reasoning, but only by prophetic enlightenment (bi nāri l-fahwah). The Prophet and the Companions, moreover, though rejecting anthropomorphic conceptions of God, did not recommend “inquiry, investigation, exegesis and interpretation” (al-bā‘īlnu wal-ta‘fīlnu wal-ta‘fīrinu wal-ta‘wiln), but rather the seven habits set out above (pp. 88f.). For this reason, simple believers are obliged to shun ta‘wil, and the scholars are forbidden to share it with them; for either of them to do so is a blameworthy innovation (bī‘atun madīninān); pp. 90 and 93), and so also are the various forms of scholastic disputation (muṣīādāth), since they too violate the authoritative teaching of the first generations (p. 93).

In the third of the major sections of the book al-Ghazālī returns initially to the question of the metaphorical descriptions of God that are found in the Koran and the Tradition. Here (pp. 97ff.), his thesis is that in speaking of God, the Prophet used metaphorical language...
but sparingly¹¹ and that when these metaphorical expressions are viewed each in its full context, both verbal and historical, it is manifest to any reasonable person that they are not to be taken literally. The Prophet employed metaphors to say certain things because the Arabic lexicon has no words by means of which the meanings intended can be represented directly (pp. 100f.). Moreover, he employed anthropomorphic metaphors, since to attempt to inform ordinary people concerning the transcendental unity of God’s being would have caused misunderstandings which were even more difficult to counter (pp. 103f.). It is impossible that God have intended to mislead or to deceive; the problem is simply that some people are created obtrusively (pp. 103ff.).

In the second section (pp. 105ff.) al-Ghazâlî returns to the theme that those who lack the privilege of higher knowledge must refrain from raising questions concerning the meaning of problematic traditions, but this time in order to take up the tradition according to which the Koran is “eternal and uncreated.” Here, for the sake of his presumptive reader, “an insightful individual who asks the question for the purpose of gaining understanding of the true realities” (dīnākyyum muttafa‘īnun li falsami l-huqā’iyyi‘), he treats the matter formally and at some length (pp. 107f.). What he does is to distinguish four degrees of being and the presence of being (being in the entity itself, being in the mind, being in speech, and being on the written page) in order to give an ontological explanation as justification of the traditional Ash’arite distinction between the recitation (al-qirā’ah, al-tīlāwah) and what is recited (al-maqrī‘, al-matā‘un).¹² Once again, he insists (pp. 110f.) that the pious ancestors of the first generations knew all of this, but refrained from talking about it openly.

Finally, then, al-Ghazâlî attacks the common Ash’arite thesis of the universal obligation to undertake some elementary theological inquiry in order to found religious assent to the basic doctrines, distinguishing six levels of assent. Of these, only the highest is based on properly justified knowledge; the belief of the school theologians is that of the second level, being based on impressionistic proofs (ṣadillastan walmīyyah) that are accepted on the basis of publicly recognized authority.

The attention of Iyām is, as stated in the introduction, directly focused not so much on kalām as such as on a number of problem-
It is worth noting that when al-Ghazālī says that the failure of some to see the truth is an element of "[God's] custom (ṣunnah) which is inalterable" (p. 105, 4), he alludes in effect to Q 25:41 (lan nafa'da i-l-sunnati lāhī tabīllāh), which he had cited earlier in his exposition of the determinist governance of the world through the angel of the outermost sphere (pp. 68ff.).

Al-Ghazālī's main point in all this is that the religious scholars have to acknowledge to themselves that they do not and cannot know and understand the true (allegorical) meaning of these metaphors and that they must therefore refrain altogether from questioning the truth of the interpretation of them by those to whom such knowledge is given. Here, as elsewhere, he associates with "those who have higher religious knowledge" and "those who are deeply rooted in science" (al-rāāhkhīnā fi l-šīl) also the sufi s (here, al-suwarīs), but his ta'wīl of "ascends the throne" (pp. 68ff.) and his explanation of the degrees of being (pp. 107ff.) make it clear that it is not the claims of mystical experience that are in question, but rather his own theoretical cosmology and ontology. The sciences of exegesis (tafsīr) and law (fuṣūl) are not, properly and as such, concerned with metaphysics (al-sunūr al-ḥalīyyah) and ta'wīl, and therefore it is with the mutakallimīn as such that al-Ghazālī has difficulties. Accordingly, he insists that the reasoning and the arguments of the school theology are not truly rigorous and scientific, but on the contrary are based on superficial sense impressions in such a way as to "confuse the minds of simple people" (tashawwruṭuḥ qaṣāūs l-ṣawā'im) (p. 79, 3f.), amongst whom he includes the traditionists, the exegetes, and the jurists. The understanding of the truth of al-Ghazālī's allegorical interpretations, is, therefore, beyond the capacities of the religious scholars and he is not obliged to attempt to demonstrate its validity to them. Since they do not and, in fact, cannot understand his higher theology, he would have, in order to argue with them, to descend to their level and to indulge in scholastic disputation. Such matters, indeed, are formally excluded from the competence of the mutakallimīn, since their science extends only to the basic dogmas (cp. Jawāhir, p. 21). Accordingly, al-Ghazālī cites the authority of Mālik b. Anas against interpreting God's ascent of the Throne (pp. 60f. and 103) and that of 'Umar (pp. 65f.) against discussing God's qadar.}

Al-Ghazālī's claim that the meaning of the words used in these traditions together with their inner meaning (va'ārā'ahā)—which is to say, his theological interpretation of them—was not hidden from the Prophet and abū Bakr and the principal Companions, and from the saints and the learned who have truly profound knowledge (wa-qā'ān l-ṣawā'im wa-l-šamāls l-rūāḥānī) (p. 84, 1ff.) is somewhat tendentious, to say the very least, but his reiterated claim, the proof of which occupies the second major section of the work, that having such knowledge the Companions and the pious ancestors taught that "simple people" (al-ṣawā'im) were to recognize that knowledge of such things is given to "those who know" (ahl al-maṣrifāt) without themselves either inquiring into their interpretation or doubting the truth of it is of considerable importance. Evidently he did not feel that the thesis set forth in Fayāḥ to the effect that according to the revealed law it is forbidden to charge a Muslim with unbelief because of his interpretation of the metaphorical descriptions of God that are found in the Koran and the hadith was a sufficient response to his critics, so he carries the juridical attack one step further in Iṭjam. The prophet, the Companions, and the authorities of the first generations legislated the seven rules set out in the first part of the book: it is forbidden by law that religious scholars who are not endowed with superior theological insight make any attempt to interpret such things for themselves or under any circumstances question the interpretation of them by those who possess superior insight. For al-Ghazālī to attempt to explain and justify his interpretation to his opponents would itself be a violation of law.
5. Conclusions

The Rhetoric of Harmonization

Several things would seem clear enough. One, that there is a basic, integrated theoretical system that underlies al-Ghazālī's logical and theological writings, orders them, and gives them consistency. In different works, various elements of the broader system surface in different ways, here more, there less explicitly. In most of his writings, primary elements are brought into clear conceptual focus in at least a few places and in some works more or less regularly throughout. In many places, however, one or another of them may be deliberately suppressed or obscured or held scarcely discernible just beneath the articulated surface of the text. This occurs sometimes—most conspicuously in Ihyā‘—even when the particular thesis may be quite clearly presented elsewhere in the same work. The form, cast, and scope of the particular work or passage determine in almost all cases the language, formal or figurative, technical or religious, in which any given theological thesis is presented, the mode and level,
in short, in which al-Ghazālī states or alludes to or hints at his understanding of it or may simply dodge the issue altogether. Where he presents his thought in unambiguous conceptual terms, the basic character and structure of the system is clear to see and once grasped is readily discerned as governing what is said and, occasionally, what is not said when, though operatively present, it is not so presented. One has to do here not with the esoteric doctrine of any given school, but with a diversity of presentations of al-Ghazālī's own thought and of apology against those religious scholars who came to oppose or to condemn it. Although al-Ghazālī came more and more to view the schoolmen who became his opponents and detractors as belonging to a religious and intellectual lower class who were incapable of grasping the truth of his higher theology, one should not try to separate his works (or parts of his works) into esoteric and exoteric, as if some were addressed to the religious scholars at large and others, containing his “real position,” to some elite fraternity. His works are, rather, to be viewed together as the essentially consistent, albeit rhetorically modulated, address to his fellow Shāfi‘ites and to the ‘ulamā‘ at large. Though some of his writings, certainly—Qūṣūṣ, for example—might well be classed as “popular” works, it would be erroneous to suppose that Miftāḥ and Mishkār were aimed at an altogether different audience than were Quḍayyūn and Lṣā‘ī. Where al-Ghazālī speaks less than forthrightly in expressing his views, his original and primary aim was not so much to withhold his teaching from the religious scholars as to lead the hesitant among them toward it. That one seek rhetorically to avoid needless antagonism and fruitless confrontation while cultivating an audience is a quite different matter from his trying simply to deceive them.¹

It is clear as well that al-Ghazālī's basic theological system is fundamentally incompatible with the traditional teaching of the Ash‘arite school. His rejection of kālim as a simplistic discipline that is inadequate either to the achievement of genuine intellectual understanding or to the attainment of higher religious insight is obvious from the outset. Already in Miftāḥ he makes his opinion of the school theology of the mutakallimīn clear. In their conceptualization of dogmatic theses most of the mutakallimīn do no more than accept the teaching of their masters uncritically (p. 56). Moreover, the premises and the arguments they employ are accepted on the same
basis of commonly accepted opinions (maslhhārū), and because of
this, al-Ghazālī finds, “their syllogisms yield inconsistent conclusions
(naṭāṣīṣu mustanāqīdāh) about which they are themselves at a loss and
their minds are befuddled as they attempt to get them right” (pp.
66f.). Their writings are “stuffed” with lengthy discourse in language
that lacks precision and clarity, while true enlightenment (al-kashf)
is achieved only by the path that he, al-Ghazālī, has chosen to take.
Exploiting the equivocities of the word ‘al-kalām’, he therefore counsels
the reader that he ought not to occupy himself with the usual
discourse (the usual teaching of the schools: al-kalām al-mustāṣīd)
but only with that which gives true benefit and insight (al-kalām
l-musīlīl l-miṣrīd) (p. 77). The appendix on definitions (op. 188f.)
emends, corrects, and, in substance, rejects a number of basic traditional
conceptions. Such remarks are not altogether lacking even in
Iqṣāṣīd, as he remarks (p. 91) that what the mutakallimūn have had to
say regarding accidents is neither adequate nor clear and later advises
the reader (p. 195) with regard to the origin of the moral obligation
to know God that what is usually said on the topic (al-kalām al-
mustāṣīd) can neither satisfy intellectual thirst nor eliminate ambiguity.
Following Miḥākk, then, kalām is much more explicitly rejected in
Iṣlāh, as its many deficiencies and the intellectual shortcomings of
the mutakallimūn are set out at length in the first two books and, in the
classification of the religious sciences, it is initially set aside in Book II
and subsequently ignored altogether in Book XXI where he begins
to bring the structure and substance of his own theology more and
more to the fore.

Al-Ghazālī’s aim was to work out and to present a global theo-

logical vision that in its higher metaphysics and ethics embraces all
the sciences, disciplines, and practices proper to or recognized by
Islam—all levels of Muslim experience, knowledge, belief, and ac-
activity—within an integrated whole. To carry this off—and particu-
larly if it were to gain broader acceptance among religious scholars—
he had in some way to bring his own metaphysics and his essentially
Avicennian conception of the nature of the rational soul and its place
within the cosmic system into some kind of positive relationship with
the traditional teaching of the Ashʿarite school. Since the two are
fundamentally incompatible, one of the things he did was to attempt
a kind of harmonization at the level of language. Often, as we have

seen, he succeeds in using (or misusing) characteristic Ashʿarite ex-
pressions and formulations without meaning to assert what they nor-
manly mean in their own, proper contexts, but rather to express very
different intentions of his own. The most conspicuous examples of
this are his formally restricted uses of ‘create’ (khālaṣqa, yakhlīlqa) and
‘obtain’ (yaqṭirqa, yakṭarqa) and of ‘the course of God’s custom’ (jarāyān
l-ṣālīh). Similarly, there is a whole set of Koran verses and Traditions
that he commonly employs as statements or confirmations of his own
teaching as, for example, he cites the Tradition, “To your Lord in
the time allotted to your lives belong difussions of His mercy; will
you not open yourselves to them?” (e.g., Miṣām, p. 10; Maqṣūd, p. 83;
Maṣādīl, p. 87), as implying the action of the agent intellect on the
mind that is ready to receive its output. Nor ought we to imagine
that al-Ghazālī’s using the Tradition in this way necessarily repre-
sents a kind of sly and deliberate misappropriation of its “original
meaning,” for under the assumptions of al-Ghazālī’s conception of
the nature of the rational soul and its relation to the agency of the
celestial intelligences within the cosmic system, this is what (or one
aspect of what) this hadith obviously must mean. Clear indications
of al-Ghazālī’s doctrine are abundant enough that only the dullest
of his contemporaries would have mistaken his intention in using such
language. His usage is rhetorical, his aim to give a familiar and tra-
ditional tone to what he says and so make it palatable to those who
would reject it outright were it set in other, more formal terms. He
commonly mixes vocabularies in order to avoid associating what he
has to say with any one tradition or school.

Often al-Ghazālī will avoid presenting his position, either fu-
dging the issue, sometimes in a fog of traditional language, or dodg-
ing it altogether as for one or another reason inappropriate to the im-
mediate context or occasionally as not to be divulged. The several
questions concerning which he sometimes or usually avoids express-
ing his views in unambiguous terms had not all the same importance
within the school, and this is often reflected in how he treats them.
Simple relationships of cause and effect in everyday events he ordi-
narily asserts as self-evident, without hesitation or circumlocution.
When, however, the question of causal relationships is brought up
in association with the Ashʿarites’ denial of secondary causation, he
feels obliged to finesse the issue. We saw this, for example, in Miṣār
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(p. 109), where he dodges the issue by giving a contextually ambivalent reply: he makes an appropriate distinction, but in language whose intention the reader is likely to misconstrue, and then drops the matter without having made his position clear. Similarly, in the later books of *Ihyā* and in *Maqāsid*, where his understanding of the lawful necessity of a number of causal sequences is set forth at length, he sometimes recasts his assertions about efficient causes in terms of “conditions”, as if to qualify them so as to show their conformity with Ash'arite usage and teaching. “Condition”, however, proves on examination to be but another term in his lexicon of harmonization, its meaning adapted and adjusted to the rhetoric of his address to the religious scholars. So too, because the word ‘‘awwal’’ located one of the Mu'tazilite theses the denial of which was an identifying criterion of traditional Ash'arite doctrine, al-Ghazālī will sometimes deny that one thing “produces” (awwala) another, even though elsewhere he employs the verb in precisely this sense while asserting his own teaching in his own voice (e.g., *Qiṣṣā*, pp. 21f. and 24). The question of the immediate efficient cause of human primary acts holds an analogous place in the disputes between the Ash'ārites and the Mu'tazilis, so that when the nature and efficacy of “the created power of voluntary action” (al-qudratu b-sālihīn, qudratu l-'abd) is raised explicitly, al-Ghazālī tends to weasel, as in the inconclusive discussion of *Miṣbāḥ* (pp. 88f.). When he is formally obliged to deal with the question in *Iqtiṣād*, he buries the real issue under a cloud of dialectical obfuscation. So too, while he speaks plainly of the human agent's power of acting as the immediate cause of the occurrence of the voluntary act in various places in *Ihyā*, he occasionally retreats, in the very same sections, into the ambivalence of ‘‘qudrāt’’ as naming both the faculty and its act and into talking about the power of voluntary action as a “condition” of the act's occurrence. Here, as in most other places, al-Ghazālī's intention is clear enough. His condescension to the Ash'ārite school is on the level of language, not of substance. These questions, however important one's treatment of them may be as a criterion of orthodoxy within the Ash'ārite school, are, strictly speaking, secondary (fīrā) in that they involve matters deviant opinions concerning which may be heresy (ḥarb) but not unbelief (kufri), at least according to most of al-Ghazālī's Shāfi'i colleagues and fellows. By contrast, the question of the resurrection and the next life, together with those of the punishment of the grave and the interrogation by the angels, Munkar and Nakīr, etc., involves basic Muslim doctrine the denial of which formally constitutes unbelief. How the truth of these dogmas is to be, or may be, consistently affirmed is intimately connected to how one conceives the nature of human life and for al-Ghazālī, therefore, is directly associated with the conception of the rational soul. We have seen how in several different works he avoids expressing his own views plainly and outright by listing a number of divergent opinions and either indicating his own obliquely or simply leaving the reader to infer what it may be from what he says or suggests in other contexts. His understanding of the essential nature of the human soul, however, is never really in doubt; it is more or less plainly suggested in *Miṣbāḥ* and is set forth in detail in both *Ihyā* and *Miṣbāḥ*. But this is not, in and of itself, properly a matter of basic dogma either, wherefore his occasional pretense of fudging his position is basically a rhetorical move. His views concerning the resurrection and the next life, however, remain problematic, for it could not be easily argued that this is a negotiable question and there was a level of conflict with the scholars which he hoped to avoid. It is notable that the only instance we have seen in which al-Ghazālī seems manifestly to deny what he in fact believes occurs in the discussion of the resurrection in *Iqtiṣād*.

Al-Ghazālī's Relation to the Ash'ārite School as Reflected in the Chronological Sequence of His Writings

It would be extremely difficult to discern any notable theoretical development or evolution in al-Ghazālī's theology—if any, indeed, there be—from *Maqāsid* to *Ihyā*. This is due in part to the great diversity of his works in form and focus alike, but most of all it is because of his language, which for all the polish and eloquence it so often has, and sometimes because of them, tends in many places to
important theological works in terms of his rejection of Ash’arite orthodoxy and his alienation from the school may prove interesting, at least for the purposes of the present study.\footnote{\textit{Magāți} is a completely neutral work. Al-Ghazālī presents it (1, p. 2) as a preface to \textit{Takaḫfūt}: a general outline of the teachings of the fālāsīfa, some of whose errors he will subsequently refute in the latter work. In the general presentation of their teaching, however, al-Ghazālī gives no indication as to what doctrines he may agree with and which not. In \textit{Takaḫfūt}, then, he twice (pp. 130ff. and 179ff.) goes to some length to insist that he intends here to assert or defend the truth of no proposition, but only to refute the claims of the fālāsīfa to have demonstrated the truth of a number of their theses, three of which entail unbelief and the rest, heresy. One might infer that the doctrine presented in \textit{Magāți}, purged of the twenty theses refuted in \textit{Takaḫfūt}, represents generally the valid teaching of those whom al-Ghazālī will subsequently refer to (\textit{Miṣdān}, p. 12, 8) as “the fālāsīfa who believe generally in God and the last day.” No indication is given in \textit{Takaḫfūt}, however, of precisely what other elements of their teaching beyond the twenty theses al-Ghazālī may also reject or may accept.\footnote{\textit{Miṣyār}, then, is presented almost as a kind of appendix to \textit{Takaḫfūt}. Though it contains a general introduction “to the methods of reflection and speculative thinking . . . and syllogistic forms and terminology (\textit{al-ibār}),” al-Ghazālī says at the beginning that his primary purpose in writing is to aid the reader’s understanding of \textit{Takaḫfūt} by introducing him formally to the logic and the technical lexicon (\textit{iqtišād}) of the fālāsīfa. Accordingly, the long section on definitions (pp. 130ff.) formally presents the definitions of the fālāsīfa, which in a number of places are explicitly contrasted with those of the mutakallumīn. There is, thus, a certain ambivalence—or potential of ambivalence—in various places in \textit{Miṣyār}, as one cannot be everywhere certain whether or not al-Ghazālī is speaking in his own voice or whether, when he cites the fālāsīfa explicitly or the mutakallumīn, he agrees or disagrees with what he says they say. When, for example, he says (p. 195, 4f.) that the being which is necessary in itself (\textit{al-wujūd l-maṣūd bi-dhātī}) has to be necessary in every aspect (\textit{min kulli jihādī}), is he reporting the doctrine of the fālāsīfa or speaking in his own voice?\footnote{He ends the book, however, by saying (p. 195) that}}
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It was not written in order to explain things in detail, but in order to show "the way to come to the knowledge of the essential natures of things and to explain the rules of systematic reasoning" (li-hayati sariqat ta'arrufu haqiqati l-rumari wa-tamaddun ganiyyin l-naqar). What, thus, at the outset was stated to be the primary purpose of the book is ignored, as he seems to imply that most of what he has presented he agrees with. This impression is reinforced as he concludes by saying that since happiness in this life and the next is not to be attained save by knowledge and action, he intends to compose a book on the balance for weighing actions (miza'am al-sanad), just as he has here on the measure for knowledge (mizā'ir al-islam).

With Mishak, written almost simultaneously with Masyar and on materially the same subject, we encounter a significant shift in al-Ghazālī's manner of address, for where in the latter work he had presented the logical teaching of the falsafāta as such and in their terminology, throughout Mishak he speaks plainly in his own voice. In order that the reader may better understand (i.e., accept) the universal validity of what he has to say, he has chosen to avoid the formal terminology of either the fuqahā' or the mutakallimūn or the falsafāta and to make up (ikhtirā'at) a neutral vocabulary of his own (p. 48, 13ff.). And it is here that we encounter the first overt statements on the intellectual inadequacy and inferiority of the traditional school theology, along with the presentation, even if somewhat oblique, of al-Ghazālī's own views on, for example, the nature of the rational soul (pp. 16ff.; cited on pp. 60ff. above) and God's governance of the universe through the agency of "a single celestial cause" by means of a complex sequence of intermediary causes (p. 82, 12ff., cited in chap. 3, n. 59 above). It is also in Mishak that we first find al-Ghazālī saying that those who really know the truth about religious matters are not permitted to talk openly about it (p. 137, cited on p. 61 above). Numerous examples taken from questions of law indicate the audience to whom the book is primarily addressed, viz., his colleagues, the religious scholars. Mishak can thus be seen as marking an important moment in al-Ghazālī's career, as it represents a public manifestation of his sense of his own intellectual independence from the school tradition and his determination to set forth on the path of his own theology in his own terms. Seen within the institutional framework of the Niẓāmiyya college and its relationship to the Ash'arite theological tradition, this is no trivial event.

Mizā'am seems to have been written shortly, if not immediately, before al-Ghazālī's retreat from the Niẓāmiyya and Baghdad in 488/1095. Though we cannot determine whether it was completed before Iqtiṣād or after, it will be more convenient to deal with it first, for reasons that will become apparent. The work is focused entirely on the perfection of the rational soul and accordingly a number of the most basic themes and elements that are to appear throughout al-Ghazālī's later works are presented quite explicitly. "The happiness of the soul and its perfection consist in its being engraved with the essences of the divine things (haqiqatun l-rumārūn l-ūlāyyah) and its becoming one with them so that it seem to be they" (p. 26, 4ff.; cp. p. 12, 10ff. et alii). This "engraving" is received "from without, and the without here is the Well Guarded Tablet and the souls of the angels, for [all] essential knowledge (al-ṣulūm al-haqqiyah) is engraved upon them in an engraving which is in act" (p. 29, 4ff.; cp. p. 17, 13ff., cited in chap. 2, n. 37, above; also p. 24, 7ff.). The best way to achieve this "is to be content with the way of the sufis, i.e., to persevere in worship and to cut off worldly ties, because the search for rational knowledge (al-bahthu 'ani l-ṣulūm l-ka'bīyyah) in order to achieve a permanent habitus in the soul is extremely difficult" (p. 29, 10ff.). If, however, one's worldly ties are terminated, "mercy flows down upon him and the hidden truth of the celestial world (zirru l-malakāt) is revealed to him and the essential natures become manifest to him; he need only be prepared" (p. 26, 15ff.). "If one strives with his soul, he enters the horizon of the angels" (p. 24, 14). Consistently with this, al-Ghazālī appears to agree with the thesis, here attributed to "the sufis and the metaphysicians amongst the falsafīs," that at death the soul becomes permanently separated from the body: the pleasures and pains of the next life are purely intellectual, those depicted in the revelation being only images for what cannot be imagined (pp. 5f.; cp. Ibhyā 4, pp. 484ff., translated on p. 65 above). That al-Ghazālī cites the falsafīs thus in Mizā'am is not surprising in that he associates their ethical teaching with that of the sufis, from whom he claims it was taken (Munāqīd, p. 109). It is, moreover, consistent with the pattern of Masyar, at the end of which Mizā'am is anticipated and which is cited in
it a number of times (e.g., pp. 17 and 33). His association of teachings of "the metaphysicians," "the falsafīa who believe generally in God and the last day" (p. 12, 8f.), with those of the sufis is too transparent a fiction, however, for even al-Ghazālī to have expected it to legitimize his obvious commitment to the psychology and metaphysics of the falsafīa in the eyes of his fellow Shāfī‘īs.

At the very end of Mīzān (pp. 124ff.) al-Ghazālī raises the question of the nature of doctrinal systems (malākhāhād) and of how the diverse systems of the sufis, of the Ash‘arite school, and of certain individual murakallimūn, cited in the course of the work, are related. Since understanding seeks a single, integrated system, where is the truth in relation to these divergent systems? He replies that for most people there is only one system, that which they were taught—Ash‘arite, Murtazalite, Karrāmīte, or whatever—and to which they are totally committed (p. 126, 4ff.). For some, however, there are really three systems (p. 124, 11ff.): (1), that to which the individual gives his allegiance in contests and disputations, (2) that which he imparts in teaching and instruction, and (3) "that which he believes privately concerning the theoretical matters that have been revealed to him" (mn nakhshu‘a la‘n mina l-nazarayrīt). The first two derive from the social and religious milieu in which he was raised and trained; he is an Ash‘arite or a Murtazalite, a Shāfī‘ite or a Hanbalite. They represent two levels of his activity as a fellow of a particular school, the first in his institutional interaction with fellows of other schools and the followers of other masters than his own, and the second in his routine teaching of his students within the school. (You cannot tell simple people that God is neither within the world nor outside it nor contiguous to it but must insist to them that God is on the Throne: p. 125, 10ff.) 10 The third system is a private matter between the individual and God, something to be divulged only to those who by nature and disposition and by virtue of their advanced learning and insight are capable of receiving it. The reader is advised to seek the truth through systematic reflection (al-nazar) so as to become himself the master of a system (nabhī malākhāh). The first two of these belong to the ordinary school discipline of kalām, a science instructed to protect the normative beliefs of the orthodox community against heresy and unbelief; and the third is what in Ḥiyā‘ he will call ‘īm al-mukāshafāh, a higher theoretical science which embraces the understanding of

the grounds of the higher practical science, ‘īm al-mu‘āmalah. Here, thus, we find in Mīzān the program of al-Ghazālī’s later writing, as it presents some of the most important elements of his theology and at the same time informs us clearly of his attitude toward the school traditions and how basically he understands and classifies the various levels of discourse and rhetoric that are employed in his writing. 11 It seems, however, that al-Ghazālī may very well have felt that his espousal of the doctrines of the falsafīa in Mīzān had been somewhat imprudent in being so openly presented as to provoke unnecessary conflict, for he nowhere cites the work in any of his later writings. It is for this reason that we have drawn but sparingly on Mīzān in the earlier sections of the present study.

Though completed only a year or so after Mīyār and Mīhāh, shortly before his departure from Baghdad, Ḥiyā‘ may appear at first glance to betoken a kind of retrogression in the direction of traditional Ash‘arite teaching. Its manifest character and form are, however, fully explained and justified in terms of the doctrine set out at the end of Mīzān concerning the simultaneous adherence to three distinct "systems," each of which has its own proper function and validity as employed by the religious and intellectual elite. Ḥiyā‘ seems to be anticipated in Tahāfūṣ (p. 78), where he says that he intends to write a work entitled Qawwālī al-‘aqādíd in which, instead of merely refuting the errors of the falsafīa, he will set out the true doctrine (al-malākhāhād al-ḥaqq). The matter is problematic, however, since the announced title appears only later with the publication of B. al-Quṣayyab al-maqāsid fī qawwālī al-‘aqādíd (for the title of which, see Iḥyā‘ 1, p. 104, 14). On the other hand, he does say in Iḥyā‘ (1, p. 98, 3f.) that Ḥiyā‘ is devoted exclusively to the foundational tenets of Islam (qawwālī al-‘aqādíd). 12 It is thus contextually associated with Qudṣiyah as belonging to that elementary or introductory level of belief that is to be surpassed as the reader, continuing through Iḥyā‘, assimilates Aṣīrī al-qalā‘ (Book XXI) and progresses through the rest of the work. Ḥiyā‘ is, moreover, formally associated with Tahāfūṣ in that later, in Jawāhir al-Qur‘ān (p. 21), al-Ghazālī refers to both along with Mūṭḥazīrī as being kalām works, without mentioning Qudṣiyāh. Taking these three together, then, one sees that the counterpositions which were not normally treated in the traditional manuals (counter-
positions which were topically of far greater importance at the time) had been dealt with in Tahāfūt and Mustaṣḥilī, and that in Iqtiṣād we have a third kalām work, this time following the traditional form of the manuals in setting forth the basic tenets of Islam as construed and understood within the Ash'arite school (madhhabu l-fiqq for disputation and for routine teaching) and defending them against the countertheses of the school's traditional opponents. Against the traditional adversaries, chiefly the Murtaḍīs, it was altogether fitting and proper to employ something like the traditional dialectic, whereas in writing against the fālāsīfā and the Bāṭinīs, al-Ghazālī had deemed it appropriate to employ quite different terms and arguments. In any case, it is evident from the reference to Mīyār and Alīkhānī in the preface to Iqtiṣād (p. 15) that the latter is in no way to be read as a repudiation of what he had said in the former two works, but rather as extending the context in which they are to be understood, that is, as evidencing their compatibility, at least on one level, with the general doctrine and practice of the Ash'arite school. It is thus, so to speak, a public gesture on al-Ghazālī's part, i.e., a concrete acknowledgment of the place and function of the school theology within the religious community. At the same time, however, he deplores the theoretical worthlessness of ordinary kalām—its inherent failure to grasp the "true natures of things"—several times in very pointed terms (e.g., pp. 136 and 193); and together with this he seasons his arguments with expressions taken from the lexicon of the fālāsīfā and unambiguously indicates his own adherence to at least some elements of their psychology (e.g., pp. 45, 168ff., and 172ff.). These things are elements of the upgraded, intellectually higher level kalām he claims (Arba'īn, p. 24; cited on p. 31 above) to have presented here. But, superior though it may be to the common kalām of the schools, it is still kalām and so remains at a level on which it is inappropriate to delve seriously into intellectual problems, something he is careful to point out (e.g., pp. 136 and 211). In all of this al-Ghazālī plainly is telling the reader there is a higher level of theological understanding, if not urging him to move in that direction.

Whatever may have been the originally projected form of the Qawā'id al-ṣaṣṣīrīd announced in Tahāfūt, it is not altogether unlikely that Iqtiṣād was ultimately composed with an eye to opposition that al-Ghazālī was encountering on the part of some of his colleagues.

This would seem to be a part of the reason for his somewhat heavy-handed (though genuinely insightful) account (pp. 168ff.) of the way in which the common run of school theologians—Ash'arite and Murtaḍīs alike—are mindlessly committed to the teachings of their masters and so unable to give any serious attention or consideration to other views, however reasonable. And so also it would seem to be the only plausible explanation for his abrupt repudiation of what he says some had inferred to be implied by his argument concerning the resurrection in Tahāfūt. The reference to Tahāfūt may, in fact, be a rhetorical smoke screen, as he would not likely have wished to refer to his discussion of life, the pneuma, and the soul in Ḡūmāk, and certainly not to Mīyār either, if the latter had been published before the completion of Iqtiṣād or if the contents of its first chapters were already known to some of his colleagues in the Niẓāmīya.14

In Iqtiṣād, in sum, al-Ghazālī's aim is to present what for him is a first- or a second-level system, his "madhhab for scholastic disputations" or his "madhhab for public teaching." It conforms at least superficially to the traditional Ash'arite system, for this is the madhhab to which he was in principle committed by virtue of his training under al-Juwaynī and by his position in the Niẓāmīya, just as his madhhab in law was that of al-Sha'īrī. His association with the school—his status as a recognized master of Shāfi'ite law—was important to him. For the sake of his own understanding of the completeness of his religious and theological vision, he needed to demonstrate his formal bond to the Ash'arite school in terms that would not conflict with his private or interior madhhab. The presence of various scattered indications that there is a higher-level madhhab that one may attain is integral to the intended character of the book and its place within the corpus of his writings. The appendix on the criteria for validating charges of unbelief can be seen to suit this context on several levels.

The task that lay before al-Ghazālī following his nervous collapse and departure from Baghdad, then, was to communicate his theology more completely and in ways that would make it more readily acceptable to his fellows. As we have seen, he had already begun to move in this direction in writing Ḡūmāk. The more properly metaphysical and theological elements of the system (including his Neoplatonizing psychology) had now to be represented in language and in forms
that were more integrally associated with the religious tradition as such so as more easily to display it as an all-encompassing theoretical vision of the underlying truths of the revelation. Given the circumstances and the stress he had been under, it is not surprising that al-Ghazālī began with Qudsiyyah, an Ash'arite catechism. Following this elementary exercise in traditional catechetics, however, he produced his grand synthesis, Iḥyāʾ ‘alām al-dīn, 12 which was almost immediately received with as great and as wide acclaim as he might reasonably have hoped for. This done, he proceeded to set out many of the most important elements of his theology more explicitly in conceptual terms in al-Magṣūl al-anṣārī, K. al-Arkātīn, and Ṣūkrul ‘al-anwār.

Al-Ghazālī was evidently satisfied that with the publication of this series of works he had presented the core of his theological teaching in appropriate form and in ample detail. With Qudsiyyah, then, he returns to a more popular level work, at a time when most likely he was already thinking about coming out of retirement. Nor is it mere coincidence that Fuyūṣ, an apologetic work in which he defends the validity of his departures from traditional Ash'arite orthodoxy, was written at the time of his return to teaching at Nishāpūr (499/1106). And Fuyūṣ is followed by his autobiography, al-Munāfijīn al-dā’alā‘, itself an essentially apologetic work, in which, while taking a somewhat conciliatory stance toward the mutakallimin, he parades his exceptional intellectual endowments and insists both on the profound sincerity of his quest for knowledge of “the essential natures of things” and on his ultimate achievement, through the assiduous practice of ṣūfī asceticism, of a level of religious insight and cognitive certitude that cannot be communicated to ordinary scholars. The subject of his last major work, Mustafā, is the fundamental principles of religious law, but here too, one notes his general program continues, as he intends, by the verbatim introduction of extensive portions of Miḥākk into its prefatory sections, to draw ʿulū al-fiqh more fully and explicitly within the compass of his overall theological system. Conflicts with the school theologians, however, were not to be resolved, and after his final retirement from teaching he gave full vent to his animosity against the mutakallimin in the polemic of Iḥyāʾ.

Al-Ghazālī never composed a complete, systematic summary of his theology in formally conceptual terms. His theology is, in some respects, at least, rather superficial; the general structure is there, but in a number of places seems incomplete. There are several quite basic questions concerning which the texts offer us little or no clear indication of what al-Ghazālī’s views might have been. Whether he was fully aware of their importance and had thought them through is, in fact, questionable. 13 These, however, are matters that need not concern us here, as the facts regarding the primary subject of our present study would seem to be clear enough. Al-Ghazālī was an Ash'arite in the sense that it was their school (madhhab) that he associated himself with as regards teaching and instruction of religious doctrine on a general or elementary level. This is unambiguously evidenced in Qudsiyyah. There is no evidence, on the other hand, that he held the traditional doctrine of the school as his own, personal madhhab, “the theoretical matters that had been revealed to him and that as such he privately believed” (Miḥākk, p. 124, 13f.). It is the dialectical interplay of these several levels, in many works and in many ways, that has caused difficulties for students of al-Ghazālī’s works and given some the impression of gross inconsistency.

The focus of our study has been narrow, and even within these limits there are many things that remain to be clarified. The general pattern, however, would seem to be well-enough substantiated on the evidence of the texts to offer a useful basis for further investigation.
Preface

1. Publication of the acts of this meeting foundered on a shoal of inaction and indifference. The contributions having to do with Islam were eventually published in Revue des études islamiques 55–57 (1987–89), which appeared only in the latter part of 1992 and then without the contributors' ever having been given an opportunity to read the proofs.

1. Introduction

1 The one, Ilkhan, has been known for some time now; the other, contained in the untitled manuscript, Escorial no. 1650 (copied 1551/1552), has not hitherto been identified.

2 The work has been translated a number of times. The best (though not altogether satisfactory) in English are those of W. M. Watt, Faith and Practice of Ghazali (London, 1951), and R. McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment (Boston, 1980).
2. Al-Ghazālī on the Place of Kalām Amongst the Religious Sciences

1 Iṣṭiṣād, p. 1, 98ff; so, also, paralleling the last phrase, we find in Qudṣiyya, 79, 5 ( = Ḥayyāʾ 1, p. 104, 15), nātīj al-aʿqūl wa-qādiyyah al-İshār al-masāqīl. For a detailed discussion, see our "Al-Ghazālī on Taʾlīf," ZIGAW 7 (1992), pp. 20ff.

2 Cf., e.g., Iṣṭiṣād, pp. 1-3 and 108, 2; Ḥayyāʾ 3, p. 17, 2f. and cp. Qudṣiyya, p. 79, 4ff. ( = Ḥayyāʾ 1, p. 104, 10ff.);

3 I have preferred to leave 'jawābāt' (pl. jawābār) untranslated here and in most places in what follows, since what al-Ghazālī means by the word is somewhat problematic, as we shall see. In the translation literature and in the usage of the fāsīḥa, it is employed as an equivalent of Greek 'obōrio' (though the concept has a very different place in Avicenna's metaphysics from that to which it holds in Aristotle's). In the lexicon of classical kalām it is a categorical term used to name or refer to the atom or indivisible particle (al-juz), which is an independent entity (qāʾīmūn bi-nafsīhī), as distinguished from the "accident," which is not.

4 Makdisi translates a portion of this passage of Mustaṭfa ("The Juridical Theology of Shāfiʿī"). Studia Islamica 39 (1981a), pp. 25ff, but seems neither to recognize the formal basis of the distinction al-Ghazālī makes between kalām and jurisprudence nor to take seriously the assertions he makes concerning the nature of kalām as a religious science. See also the remarks in n. 8 below concerning Qutbī, p. 68, 5.

5 The section concerning God and His attributes in al-Juwainī's R. al-Nizāmīyyah (pp. 20-42), for example, is ordered under these three topics. 6 Generally speaking, "necessary knowledge" (tām darʾīr) is defined as any knowledge (true cognition) which is not and cannot be the direct result of something we choose to do or choose not to do, i.e., which is not the result of a rational inference, and which, therefore, we cannot choose to call into question by questioning the premises on which it is based, cf., e.g., Masjūr, p. 248, 10f., Shāmī (81), pp. 35ff. and Kāfīyah, 57ff, pp. 9ff. Included under al-ḥulul al-darʾīrīyyah, therefore, are four of the five grounds of properly justified knowledge mentioned in Qutbī, p. 60 (on which see p. 17 below). Included also will be the insights which come about as the result of asceticism, cf., e.g., Aţārh al-galīt (Rūbih, Book XXI). Concerning "acquired knowledge" (tām mawtūr), see the references in chap. 2, n. 27.

7 As used here and in "al-muṣāra al-dīnīyyah" (Qutbī, p. 68, 4), "al-muṣāra" is a general term for religious knowledge, though with al-Ghazālī, as with the sūfis, it very often has the connotation of higher, direct religious insight and so is often opposed to scientific or scholarly knowledge (al-ulum).
curious in any case; the order is notably different from that of `Ithāʾ 1, p. 23, and Munqūdah, pp. 105f. Al-Ghazzālī's downgrading of applied fīqh as opposed to 'al-`ulūm al-fīq̄ah causèd a hostile reaction in some quarters; see Ernsts, Theoloy in Islamic Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1984), p. 99. In Munqūdah, p. 163, 1ff., concerning the healing properties of devotional acts, al-Ghazzālī speaks of "al-`ulūm al-`ash-`arīyyah." What he means by this is that while the specific characteristics (khawāṣ) of devotional acts by virtue of which they are efficacious in promoting the soul's advancement in perfection derive from the nature of the soul and its relation to the body; knowledge of this is originally accessible only through prophetic revelation (see p. 67 below), where they are presented in the form of legislative commands.

9 Cf. Tâhâfût, p. 12, and al-Qâdîyuh, p. 79 (= `Ithāʾ 1, p. 104, 16ff.), and see our "Al-Ghazzālī on Ta’lîf," pp. 24ff. What is for one's ultimate good is known by revelation and so cannot be known through ordinary experience of the material world or through speculative reasoning (e.g., Munqūdah, and p. 152 and 16ff., Munqūdah, pp. 6ff.).

10 `Ithāʾ 1, p. 23, 1 and 1ff., pp. 40ff., and p. 97, 12ff.; Jawāhib, p. 21, and Munqūdah, p. 91, 4ff.

11 `Ithāʾ 1, p. 23, 1ff., and p. 98, 12ff.; cf. Jawāhib, pp. 23 and 34; cf. also `Iqţūd, p. 11, Munqūdah, pp. 9ff., and Faryād, p. 71, 6ff.

12 Mahdīs ("Al-Ghazzālī, disciple d'al-Shāfī`ī en droit et en théologie," pp. 48ff.) cites this example concerning al-Ghazzālī's position with regard to rational theology and the validity of nonliterary interpretation (`awāl′), but, having failed to see the rationality of al-Ghazzālī's own theology and its `awāl′, misconstrues the evidence. The assertion (p. 48) that the `Iqţūd "ne représente pas les croyances dogmatiques dont Ghazzālī fut convaincu" is simply gratuitous in that no serious evidence is offered as to what al-Ghazzālī's genuine dogmatic beliefs might plausibly be. Statements such as that concerning the inflexibility of the Hanbalites (e.g., in `Ithāʾ 1, p. 103, 4) are ignored, while al-Ghazzālī's consistent insistence (e.g., `Ithāʾ 1, pp. 105, 16ff., and in Faryād and Iftām, on which see p. 70ff. below) on recognizing the presence of metaphor (istībāḥ, less often, maṣāḥ) in the formal analysis and interpretation of many descriptions of God found in the Koran and prophetic Traditions is ignored along with the radically rationalizing `awāl′ that he often suggests and sometimes presents.

13 Note that while he never explicitly identifies himself with the Ashʿarite school, he does speak (Iqtisād, p. 166, 1, and Mīhābkh, p. 76, 15, and p. 77, 1) of "our fellows" in contexts in which the Shāfīʿites adherents of the school are unambiguously referred to, as also, while giving characteristic Ashʿarite formulations, he speaks (Iqtisād, p. 106, 12ff., and Mīhābkh, p. 141, 2) of those who
hold the true doctrine (tabl al-ḥaq). Cf. also “al-‘aḥāb al-mustaqaddimīn” in Faysal, pp. 13f., discussed on pp. 76ff. below in connection with al-Ghazālī’s later conflict with the school.

14 E.g., Ḥayāt 1, p. 79, tf., where kālim is identified with disputant (al-jadāl al-munāẓaratī) and distinguished from science/knowledge (al-‘ilm). Kālim is also identified with disputant in Jawāhir, pp. 21 and 23. Note that in this he includes the legal scholars too (Ḥayāt 1, p. 30, tf., and Faysal, p. 70, stf.), though the disputational habits of the mutakallimūn are worse (Ḥayāt 1, p. 40).

15 Sulami, p. 87, and Ḥājīyāya 8, p. 301; so also abī Bakr ibn abī Saʿdān condemns disputant (al-munāẓaratī), Sulami, p. 422. If. Given al-Ghazālī’s generally low opinion of the religious scholars as a class, it is plain that his general disapproval of scholastic dialectic is neither founded in nor directly akin to the dogmatic views of the Hanbalites.

16 Many of the mutakallimūn are prevented from attaining deeper insight because of their ṣaḥīḥ to the opinions of their masters; cf., e.g., Ḥayāt 1, p. 13, tf., and generally our “Al-Ghazālī on ṣaḥīḥ,” pp. 25ff. Concerning al-Ghazālī’s understanding of walsum (Avicenna’s “rei aestimativa”), cf. ibid., pp. 25ff.; Ḥayāt, pp. 62ff. and 71; and Musțaṭa 1, pp. 46ff. and 93ff. Ir Faysal (pp. 60, 99, and 70, stf.) and Ḥayāt (p. 79, 5) al-Ghazālī speaks contemptuously of the arguments of the mutakallimūn as walsum. It would seem likely that in al-Ghazālī’s use of ‘roman’ here and in analogous contexts, the word does not have the formal sense that it carries in the logic of the falsafī but more that which is found in such contexts in which it is opposed to ṣaḥīḥ to describe something as mere appearance rather than reality; cf., e.g., Sulami, p. 188, 9, and p. 182, 12. Elsewhere, however, he plainly uses ‘roman’ in the formal sense it has for Avicenna, e.g., Ḥayāt, p. 103, 15.

17 This is true of the reasoning of fiqh too (cf., e.g., Musțaṭa 1, p. 48ff. and Ḥayāt, pp. 67ff.), but in fiqh this is acceptable, since legal conclusions are merely probable opinions (zunn; cf. ibid., pp. 43, 44, and 67).

18 Cf. the list in Mīṣāḥ, pp. 108ff. Earlier (Qātāla, p. 21), he had described “primary knowledge that is not based on inference” as “acquired either from sense and experience or the basic disposition of the mind” (rimma muna l-falai wujūd taḥsālah ‘an-ghururīs l-ṣayl). In Ḥayāt 1 (p. 19, 6ff.), following a traditional formula, he says that the primary sources of knowledge are two, viz., the senses and formal reasoning (al-ḥunayq el-‘ilāh). The list of the four kinds of primary knowledge, like that of the five sources, would seem most likely derived from Avicenna (cf., e.g., Ishatī, pp. 33ff., and Burhān, pp. 91ff.). In Ḥayāt, pp. 57ff., and Musțaṭa 1, pp. 44ff. he presents seven sources of knowledge and judgment; here, direct perception is divided into the immediate experiences of one’s interior states and external senses and two further kinds of judgment are added, namely, those based on impressions (al-walamsiyāt) and those based on common opinion (al-m三个月). The addition of these two sources of judgment is not merely for the sake of completeness, but also no doubt in order to add justification and clarity to his attacks on the intellectual weakness of the religious scholars in general and the mutakallimūn in particular.

19 See Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 10ff. Similarly, he rejects the concept of “states” (nafs al-lū‘) held by al-Baqillānī and al-Juwaynī as confused (Mīṣāḥ, pp. 20ff.) and implausible (Musṭaṭa 1, p. 35, stf.). Why, however, and in exactly what respect the concept is confused, he does not say.


21 Cf. e.g., Ḥayāt 1, p. 17, 41., and Ḥayāt, p. 87, 6ff. Al-Ghazālī’s position here is plainly opposed to the common doctrine of the Ash’arīte school and of al-Juwaynī. It is to be noted that al-Anṣārī presents a lengthy attack on the thesis of the causality of the Aristotelian elements, of natures, proper accidents (al-ṣurūd al-lā‘īm), and essential properties (khāṣṣiyat al-dhāt) in Ghunayy, fol. 149v ff. Al-Ghazālī employs khāṣṣiyat often as a general term for a thing’s nature; cf., e.g., Mīṣāḥ, p. 79, 12, where he speaks of the khāṣṣiyat of the “perceptive spirit,” which is a part of the soul, and Musṭaṭa 1, p. 32, 6ff., where he says that the true nature (ḥaqqiyat) of each being is its khāṣṣiyat, which belongs to it and not to any other. It is in this sense that al-Anṣārī speaks of “khāṣṣiyatu l-lū‘ūsī” (Ghunayy, fol. 38r, 22rf). Some earlier Ash’arītes too speak of the “properties” (khāṣṣiyat) or “natures” (tabl al-lū‘ūsī) of bodies (e.g., al-Baqillānī, Ḥaqqiyā, foll. 27v, 88r, and 18t, tf.), but exactly how this is to be understood within the generally occasionalist system is not clear.

22 Cf. also Musṭaṭa 1, p. 32, 13ff. In Ḥayāt 1, p. 30, 6ff., al-Ghazālī speaks of the astrologer’s predictions based on astronomical observations and the physician’s prediction of the course of an illness from his observations of the patient’s symptoms as inferences founded on causes (‘aḥāb) grounded in the knowledge of “the usual courses of God’s custom and habit” (marjī’un bi-majāt al-sunnat al-lā‘īm al-ma‘āṣalātīs), which he holds to be invariant. Thus, according to al-Fārābī too, fire’s causing combustion is something that happens in most cases but not always and necessarily, since the state of the receiving subject is a condition for the occurrence of the effect (Nuktan, pp. 107ff., §§ 86f.); the relation is what al-Ghazālī speaks of as a “conjunction” (qīnārān). The effect follows, given the usual circumstances.

23 Note that al-Kiyāʾ al-Harāṣī, a fellow student of al-Ghazālī’s under al-

24 "That whose alteration is not in possibility" is that which cannot conceivably be otherwise under any circumstances: what God could not have willed to be otherwise. One notes, thus, that the opening sentence of Book XVII of Tuhfet al-Hikmat is ambivalent as al-Ghazālī says, "The connection between what is commonly believed to be a cause and what is commonly believed to be an effect is not a necessary (darāri) in our opinion." If one takes darāri in the sense it has in this passage of Miftāḥ, then the statement is seen to have a very precise meaning and one, moreover, that is almost banal in the context. This is even more true if one understates here mā al-mauwṣūf fī dhālī rather than al-mauwṣūf fī dhālī, so as to render "the connection between some things that are commonly believed..." All-Ghazālī's conception of the necessary and the possible follows that of Avicenna (cf., e.g., Muṣnad, p. 137, 9ff., translated in Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 63). Concerning his conception of the possible as essences that are unoriginated and given to God's knowledge as such, see ibid., pp. 24ff.

25 This passage of Ḥikmat is translated and discussed in Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 75f. Note that not only is the concept of the soul found here altogether alien to the Ashʿarite theology ("soul" has no referent). Miḥāb, p. 133, translated below, chap. 5, p. 63), but the idea that something intrinsic to man should govern the body so as to be the cause of any of its acts is incompatible with their traditional occasionalism (cf., e.g., al-Isfārārī, Fr. no. 48, p. 15).

26 In Miḥāb, p. 144 also, al-Ghazālī talks about decapitation and death alongside eating and satiety, being struck a blow and suffering pain, and drugs and healing, as causes and effects. Here, however, he omits decapitation and death when he comes to explain that the actual production of the effect, since it may depend upon the state of the object, does not necessarily follow the usual cause in every case. One should note also that in contrast with the earlier context (p. 196) in which he had suggested that the soul governs the body as God governs the universe, the larger context of the discussion of "causes" at p. 144 is strictly one of law (fIQ), one that is, which belongs to the second category of doctrinal systems mentioned in Miḥāb (see chap. 5, p. 96) wherefore any talk about the soul is formally preceded.

27 Miḥāb, p. 61, 6f. (reading astwīr for at̑wīr in line 7); cf. ibid., p. 80, 6; cited on p. 18 above. The vocabulary here is not unique to al-Ghazālī, for the Ashʿarites too commonly speak of the regularity or consistency (ṣīrād, istimār) of "God's custom" (e.g., Irshād, p. 180, 9, and Shīmīl [69], p. 284, 6f.) and of its stability (muṣaquq, e.g., Šīmīl, pp. 489, 8, and 495, 15f.), but where they talk of interruptions or breaks in occasionally usual sequences of events, al-Ghazālī leans heavily on the emphatic future of Q35, 42: "you shall never find (lan taṣāda) any subtration..."

28 In traditional usage and commonly with al-Ghazālī, ilmunn muskuṭaḥ ("ilmunn kītabī, al-'ilm al-kabīr") is knowledge (any true cognition) that is based on inference following reflection and reasoning (cf., e.g., Majarrad, p. 247, 190f., and Shīmīl [81], pp. 660f.) and concerning which doubts may be raised by calling into question one or both of the premises on which its justification is proposed. "Ilmunn kītabī is, therefore, synonymous with ilmunn muṣaquq ("speculative knowledge"); cf., e.g., Shirāzī, Aqīdah, §15, p. 67, and Mīrān, p. 29, translated below, chap. 5, p. 95. Irshīdī and Irshīdī are interchanged, e.g., in Ḥikmat, p. 17, 26f. Though some scholars, misled perhaps by the terminology and mistranslation of kalām, have tended to find the expressions ilmunn muskuṭaḥ and ilmunn darāri (on which, see chap. 2, n. 6 above) unclear and the meaning confused, the concepts are, in fact, quite straightforward and the basic distinction is altogether sound.

29 On the background of these names for logic, see Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, 1988), pp. 20ff.

30 Thus, for example, the degrees (ruttah) or levels (darāsāt) of existence and of the presence/presentation of existence, on which, see below, chap. 4, p. 78.

31 Earlier in the same work he insists that the use of logic is illustrated and taught in the Koran (p. 8, cf. Munāqīdī, p. 131), and in arguing for the validity of drawing a conclusion from two premises he cites Q6, 81 as confirming the use of logical reasoning by Abraham (cf., e.g., pp. 18 and 27); this is traditional within the school (cf., e.g., Lūmat, §11, and Shīrāzī, pp. 18, 2–3).

32 One should keep in mind that the forward references in the first two books of Ḥikmat to the second half of the work are important for understanding how the often traditional language of Books I and II is to be taken.

33 Al-muṣāmaḥāt is common among the sufis as a term for the fulfillment of moral duties and devotional practices; al-Sulami, e.g. (p. 299), reports of abūl-Ḥusayn al-Warrāq that kāna 'ulāman bi-'ulāman i-Ẓahīrī wa-nataktalamu fī ḥaqqiyyu 'ulāman il-muṣāmaḥāt il-wa-niyyih fī-ṣālihh fī-ṣālihh;' see also ibid., pp. 158, 3f., 310, 17f., and 351, 12f. and 433, 10ff., and 45f. (Concerning al-Ghazālī's association of the ethics of the falsafīs with the teaching of the sufis in Miḥāb and Munāqīdī, see chap. 5, p. 95 below.) On the common use of the term in other contexts, cf. Marie Bernard, art. "Muṣāma," Elf.

34 Angels here refers to separated celestial intelligences. The devils are metaphorically explained in terms of the appetites and the lower powers of the soul and the material mixture (māṣāriq) of the individual's body (e.g., Ḥikmat}
to imagination, sense, etc., grasps pure abstractions, cf. also, e.g., Mustafï, p. 35, and Mustâlî, p. 79,5.
38 Cp. Mîyâr, p. 106, 4ff, where he says "when [the premises] are present in the brain in a special order the soul is ready for the knowledge of the conclusion to come to be in it from God" (Bidâq bidaari f-i-dinâmi "alî dîn-tikîn makhtûsîn intir-fudattî l-nafzi l-an yâlûska fîhâ l-ilmi bi-nâtrjati min 'indî lihâ). Marsden ("Al-Ghazâlî on Demonstrative Science"). p. 194 interprets this as implying that God creates the knowledge of the conclusion in the soul directly, not through the intermediate causality of an angel (a celestial intelligence which functions as an agent intellect). He therefore reads 'jâsîd' as passive of the causative stem of the verb (yukdâsit); this seems to me much less likely than the active of the intransitive, given the "from God" (min âlî lâli) that follows. There is, moreover, no question of any causal agency here in Mîyâr, but only of the soul's readiness (intir-fudâl) to receive the cognition (cp. the 'intir-fudâl' of Ihyâ', loc. cit.). Upon the achievement of actuality of proximate aptitude, in any case, the knowledge is passively received, wherefore to read the passive makes no difference to the proper sense of the statement, since "from God" may not be read as expressing the agent, but as indicating the source in God's original Ordainment of the universal system. In Mîyân (p. 17, 4ff.) al-Ghazâlî speaks of knowledge that is received from "the angels that are entrusted with human souls," and goes on to say that "this knowledge occurs in them from God only through an intermediary (innamâ yâlûska lâli lâli bî-urâdâ). He says, 'it is not man's that God speaks to him save by revelation or from behind a veil or by sending a messenger' (Qâzî, 3)). On the operation of this, see also references in chap. 2, n. 41, below. In one respect this is not radically different from the conception of the Ash'ârites, for whom knowledge 'sâmi' follows reasoning (al-nâzur) but is not mutawwâlid; see also chap. 3, n. 60, below, and see the references in our "The Science of Kalâm," p. 10, n. 5. Concerning how the conclusion which is contained in the premises "in potency" comes to actuality, al-Ghazâlî mentions in Mustafâq (1, p. 53) the Mu'tazilite thesis alongside several Ash'ârite theses and his own (attributed to the fâlûsfa), but concludes by saying that to go into the truth of the matter is "not appropriate to our present context." In any event, for the Ash'ârites and al-Ghazâlî both, as well as for al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, the agent intellect acts biopeters. One notes here that in contrast to the doctrine of Aristotle and the Christian thinkers of the Latin West, none of the fâlûsfa holds that the rational soul or intellect is or possesses as an element or aspect of its own being the active power of its own act; rather, the human intellect receives its proper actuality through the action of an external, celestial agent. With Avicenna and al-Ghazâlî, however, the passivity of the rational soul is absolute, since the internal acts which bring about the conditions for
the soul's reception of the forms from the agent intellect are the determinate effects, direct or indirect, of external causes.

39 The image here is founded on the connotations of 'al-nafsālī' (the conclusion of a syllogism), which is derived from the verb 'nastān, nastsafī', the base meaning of which is to give birth, generally of animals. Al-Ghazālī makes an elaborate play on the connotations of the word in Ṣafām, pp. 68f., concerning which see Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 70, n. 10c.

40 The transliteration and translation work activity ('samad') of the scholars and the sages is "to acquire the sciences as such and to impart them to the mind" (škrānu naftaī t‘ulāmā‘ī wa-jilābulu‘l ‘ulā t-qalibī) (Ipshār, p. 20f.); note the use of škrānu here: as distinguished from the knowledge of the 'saints', the metaphysical knowledge of the scholars and the sages is conceptual and is acquired through rational inference. Note too that 'sages (al-hukmā‘ī) is commonly employed to designate the falsafā.

41 See the remarks in our Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 45, and the references there in n. 8 and concerning the Throne (identified with the Well Guarded Tablet) as the first created intellect associated with the outermost sphere; see also Ipshār, p. 20, ff., cited in chap. 4, n. 14. below. Al-Ghazālī's usage of these expressions is not everywhere consistent, as often, following traditional understanding of the word, he takes 'Throne' to refer to the outermost sphere as such. For the image of engraving, cf., e.g., Mīsad, p. 26, etc., cited on p. 91 below. The agent intellect is referred to in Ipshār, p. 16, ff., as a pen (qalam) with which God writes on the intellect, "one of God's creations which He has made the cause of the actual engraving of true cognitions on human hearts" (khalq of min khalq ilāh yā‘alalūn sababun li-baṣalīl naqshī t‘ulāmī fī qulūbī t-husnā). That the reception occurs automatically once the human intellect is "ready" (musta‘allā) is plainly implied by Ipshār, p. 19, 27f.; cf. also Mīsad, p. 18, ff.

42 On this cf. Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 46f. and 76. The angel of the "Throne" is named an 'intellect' according to Fawād (p. 42, where it is also said to be referred to metaphorically in scriptural references to God's "hand").

43 In Maqāsid and elsewhere Al-Ghazālī associates or identifies God's nāqādī (his original appointing creation according to order and measure) with His knowledge and will, His judgment (ḥukm), and His wisdom. With note, however, the wording of Ipshār, p. 11a, 12f. (translated in chap. 4, p. 7, below), where he speaks of "mustabān naqddarastān fī ‘ummi lādī." God's Accomplishment (al-naqādī), following the use of the verb in Q41,12, Al-Ghazālī associates with His creating (škrānu) and bringing the universe (the primary, "universal and permanent causes") to actual existence (‘īshād) and so with his general providence and liberality (e.g., Maqāsid, p. 98, and Ipshār, p. 94, 8f. and cp. Najīd, p. 102, 10f.).

3. Two "Ashurite" Tracts

1 This problem has been most sharply raised by Prof. Murmura in several articles. He understands al-Ghazālī to follow the basic doctrine of the Ashurite school against "[Avicenna's] concept of a necessitating God" ("Al-Ghazālī's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic," in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani [Albany, N.Y., 1975], p. 107); and to hold, for example, that every occurrence in the world is the direct creation of God ("Ghazālī and Demonstrative Science," p. 189) and accordingly suggests that one should read "the causal language used in the Mīṣā'ir in occasionalist terms" (ibid., p. 193). Later, while still asserting that according to al-Ghazālī "divine power can intervene in the natural order" ("Al-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in Tabafust and the ʿIṣbā‘āt," Alī ‘Ayar Journal of Islamic Thought 2 [1986], p. 47), and interpreting references to the consistent order of natural events by expressions such as "[God's] causing things to occur in consistent patterns" (yījār al-‘ilāmah) as implying that the patterns are governed by no intrinsic principles or natural laws but occasionally by God's immediate activity (ibid., p. 53), he concludes (pp. 59f.) to al-Ghazālī's putting forward a "modified Aristotelian theory" which recognizes the presence in some things of natural properties by which they are capable of specific kinds of action and passion, but one that is premised on the Ashurite notion that the divine act is voluntary and concludes that this modified Aristotelian system is introduced into Tabafust, not as a theory which al-Ghazālī himself subscribes to, but simply for the sake of argument (ibid., pp. 59 and 65). Abramovitch ("Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality," p. 91) takes it that al-Ghazālī is deliberately inconsistent "in order to conceal his true doctrine."

2 Al-Ansārī follows the teaching of al-Junayd for the most part very closely; this is not entirely the case with al-Harākī, whose Usūl al-dīn deserves serious study. One should note here that al-Ansārī (Chūnuyah, foll. 130r and 142v) accuses al-Junayd of inconsistency because of the differences of what he had said regarding the creation of human acts in Niẓāmīyyah and in his major kalām works.

3 The Karrāniyya are reported (e.g., Farq, p. 222, and Mīlād, p. 192) to have held a position on this analogous to that of the Murtazāya. Only the Murtazāya are mentioned, however, when the topic is taken up in Mustānfa‘ī (1, p. 18f.).
4 By ‘being around’ (indēdāb), he means the response that, given the prior psychological state of the subject, is caused deterministically by some power of the soul either because of the act of another power or by some external stimulus. The word is used in the same sense elsewhere in Iṣṭiṣād, e.g., at p. 173, translated in chap. 1, p. 38; cf. also the references and the discussion in Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 26, n. 30, and generally pp. 22ff. His use of ‘shamānuš’ (fruit, product) in the present passage is to be understood within the same context of psychological determinism in which he will speak of human actions as the “products of moral character”; see Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 76, n. 160.

5 References to nature are not infrequent in Iṣṭiṣād: pp. 8 (cited on p. 32 above), 47, 68f., 117f., and 193 (cited on p. 54 above).

6 Al-Ghazālī’s definition of the ethically obligatory or necessary super- feically resembles one of the traditional definitions, e.g., that the ethically obligatory is that for omission of which there is the threat of God’s punishment (for the definitions, cf. Kaffāl, pp. 188ff., cited in our “Moral Obligation,” p. 208, n. 15), but in the context is differently understood; on this cf. Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 67ff. Al-Ghazālī’s analysis of other ethical terms (‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘pointless’: Iṣṭiṣād, pp. 160ff., and see also Qudsiyyah, p. 90, 188f. = Ḥayā’ 1, p. 112, ff., and generally Muṣṭaṣāf, 1, p. 188f.) is analogously rationalizing and, albeit squarely contrary to the intuitionist deontology of the Muʿtazila, is nonetheless incompatible with the traditional Ashʿarite doctrine which grounds them exclusively in God’s gratuitous command and prohibition. For al-Ghazālī (as also for the Muʿtazila), the reason (or cause) of an act’s (or omission’s) being good or bad or obligatory (necessary) has its foundation in the natural good of the agent, so that ethical “causes” (dalʿ) can be fully rationalized, directly or indirectly, in terms of the nature of the agent and the causal relationships which obtain between actions and their results. He cannot, thus, consistently make the radical separation between juridical “causes” and the commonly observed sequences of events as is stated, for example, by al-Ḥarāris (see our “Moral Obligation,” pp. 208ff.). Al-Ghazālī’s revised conception of moral obligation and necessity is presented already in Miḥṣāk (pp. 14ff.).

7 On this see our “Al-Ghazālī on Taqīd,” pp. 25ff., and the references there cited. Note also the appeal to natural disposition and nature in the reply to the Muṣṭaṣāf in Iṣṭiṣād, pp. 171ff.

8 Essentially, the same statement is made in Miḥṣāk (p. 191). There, one might be inclined to discount it or not to take it altogether literally on the grounds that the stated purpose of the work is to set out the terminology and logic of the falsaṣ. When it occurs in Iṣṭiṣād, however, one has to take more serious account of its implications for al-Ghazālī’s theology; that God’s will to create this universe is included under this necessity is spelled out in Iṣām (pp. 68ff.). The statement at the opening of this section (Iṣṭiṣād, p. 174, 11) is also to be noted, in that he says “ṣajā’iṣ li llähī ‘an la yakahaqilu l-khulāṣ” (it is permissible for God that he not create mankind), as it plainly addresses the question of ethical necessity which is under discussion. He does not say “ṣajā’iṣ ‘an la yakahaqilu l-lähī . . .” which might be taken to assert or imply that it is concretely possible that God not have created mankind. Though the statement does not and is not meant to assert that God necessarily creates from eternity, the theological significance of it is nonetheless considerable; see Creation and the Cosmic System, §§44ff.

9 Maqād, p. 98; cf. Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 42, n. 72. The nature of the human soul and its activities, however, belong (at least in part and in this life) to the sublunary realm and so are alluded to in a number of places in Iṣṭiṣād, even though al-Ghazālī refuses to go into the matter as such (e.g., p. 211, discussed on p. 56 below).

10 Using the terms in this way, then, the one (‘khulāṣ, yakahaqilu”) is used of God’s “creation” in the sense of the original determination of the universe in God’s knowledge, wisdom, and will and the other of “creation” as the original ordering of the universe in which all future events are determined. On these terms and their association with God’s attributes, see chap. 2, n. 43.

11 Cf., e.g., Ḥayā’ 1, p. 52, 23 et alibi pass.; concerning the expression, which occurs also in Avicenna (e.g., Idrisīyyah, p. 4, 16), see Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 18, n. 18. The idea that one has to avoid being distracted by various opportunities, advantages, and means of livelihood (simṭ) in order to live in the immediate presence of God, the one who presents them as such (al-muṣābīb), is not uncommon with the earlier sufis (c.f., e.g., al-Sulami, pp. 294, 535, 424f., and 449, ff.), but al-Ghazālī’s intention in using the expression is plainly that of Avicenna. Here again, we have an example of al-Ghazālī’s taking a location employed in religious contexts and adapting it to his own formal system within the context of which it takes on a quite different meaning. Cf. also the definition of taqavād cited from al-Junayd (Risālah a, p. 421: “yan ta’lam’ an naa‘ quadra lānī bī l-‘aṣya‘ī l-lālā mīkāwà wā-saw‘wà bī-l-‘aṣya‘ī bī-l-lālā wā-saw‘wà bī-l-‘aṣya‘ī bī-l-lālā wā-saw‘wà.”). Thus, in speaking of the proof of the existence of the necessary existent from the contingency of the world, al-Ghazālī speaks (Miḥṣāk, p. 93, if.) of effects not being validly attributable to contingent entities (talāda mana bi-l-ta‘ālī bi-l-ta‘ālī bi-l-ta‘ālī), but this is not the same as saying they have no effect or causality whatsoever (bī l-ta‘ālī bi-l-ta‘ālī bi-l-ta‘ālī), as do the traditional Ashʿarites (e.g., Irshiād, p. 210, ff., and below, chap. 1, n. 28 and 50).

12 There is a variant for bi-jabarīt here which reads bi-malakāt, but since the latter in al-Ghazālī’s use is a synonym for the celestial realm and all sub-
lunary events flow determinately from above, the sense remains essentially the same.

13 So also he says that the soul uses (itumna) the body; see chap. 2, n. 25, above and the discussion of the soul below on pp. 55–63. For the use of *nakhabn*, *nakhabbir* (reflecting the wording of Q13:21, 16, 14 et alibi pass.), cp., e.g., Avicenna, *Aqīm*, pp. 117f.

14 Note with regard to this passage that the relationships and interactions between the faculties of the human agent and their physiological effects (through the functioning of the pneuma) do not immediately involve the cosmic system and so are more or less clearly alluded to in a number of places in *Iṣṭidāq*, as when he refers to nature in the passage immediately above. Nor, since they are not subject to human volition, does allusion to them directly raise the question of efficient causality in the voluntary acts of human agents.


16 He similarly bows out of stating his position clearly and completely in a number of places in *Iṣṭidāq*, as he does also in other works.

17 Thesis 6 (p. 40), that God is not an “accident,” stands as an article normally included here in the traditional manuals in order to exclude God from both the two most general classes of created beings.

18 Cf. also *Iyyār* 3, p. 16, 22ff., and *Mūtāfik* 1, pp. 41f., cited above in chap. 2, p. 18, and chap. 2, n. 8.

19 This, like so much of al-Ghazālī’s usage, also reflects the elements of traditional religious language, as, for example, the “storehouses of the spirits” (*khazānatin al-arwāḥ*) are said to be in the sky also in *Masūb*, p. 197f., if it is only when such locutions are heard within the broader context of al-Ghazālī’s thought that their formal implications surface.

20 With “both by nature and the revelation,” cp. the “qālān wa-sharā‘an” of Avicenna’s *al-Nafūṣ al-nāzītāq*, pp. 106, 11f., and p. 197, 1.

21 Cited also in *Iltām*, pp. 6ff. A rationalization of why, for the good of simple people, the Prophet occasionally spoke in language that has to be interpreted metaphorically or allegorically is given in *Iltām*, pp. 97ff., on which see chap. 4 below.

22 Most Ash’arī authorities do not accept the equivalence of ‘istāḥā’ for *izīrant*. In *Qudūs* (p. 83, 18 = *Iyyār* 1, p. 197, 14) al-Ghazālī offers ‘istāḥā’ as an interpretation also for expressions that speak of God being on high. Al-Ghazālī’s *ta’wil* of the metaphor will be presented without ambivalence in *Iltām* (pp. 68f.) where he states that it refers to God’s necessary governance of the universe through the outermost sphere.

23 Though both interpretations are to be found in Ash’arī exegetics (e.g., *Mukhāl*, pp. 75f.), the angel is there interpreted as bringing “suggestions” (cp. *Tayrāf*, p. 62, and *Riḍālah* 4, p. 101, 22ff.). Abū ‘Umar al-Ghazālī’s first interpretation offered by al-Ghazālī (al-Mu‘āzam, p. 51ff., §50c) is interesting to compare al-Ghazālī’s interpretation of “ascends the Throne” with that offered by al-Amārī in *Shāhār al-Ishārāt* (fol. 144v, 17ff.), where he says, “this has to refer either to height and majesty or to the meaning of ‘mastering’ (al-qubr) or it intends some action and the reason it is particular with respect to the Throne, is that [the Throne] is the most immense of created beings; ‘ascending the throne’ may be an expression for the order (isināq) of the heavens and the earth and everything between them, for kings in our world are able to ascend the throne only when the affairs of the kingdom are subject to their ordering.” This finds analogies in al-Ghazālī’s exegetics, but does not mention the angel of the Throne or in any way suggest that it has the role of universal intellect of the falsāfah.

24 He notes in *Fāṣal* (pp. 31ff.) that the Hanbalites accuse the Ash’arīs of unbelief because of their interpretation of texts which assert God’s ‘iṣā‘iyah and His ‘iṣā‘iyyah (cp. al-Mu‘āzam, p. 54, 44f., §89 and p. 57, §91); the thesis that ‘iṣā‘iyyah is equivalent to ‘iṣā‘iyyah is condemned as a Muʿtazilite interpretation in al-Mu‘āzam, p. 15, §89).

25 Cf., e.g., *Iyyār* 4, pp. 241–50, portions of which are translated and discussed in *Creation and the Cosmic System*, pp. 21ff.

26 Al-Ghazālī, as we have noted, holds that the act of the will is the proximate efficient cause of the activation of the power to act and so of the occurrence of the act (e.g., *Iyyār* 4, p. 244, 24), the act of the will being itself caused necessarily by the occurrence of the antecedent motivation, etc. Al-Ghazālī’s formulation here in *Iṣṭidāq* somewhat resembles that of al-Ash’arī, although his intention is altogether different. Al-Ash’arī (unlike the masters of the following generations) consistently speaks of the human act as “occurring by virtue of” the human agent’s power (*waqtu ‘ilāh*) (see *Lamār*, p. 42, 1, *Mujarrad* p. 92, 5ff., p. 94, 7ff., and p. 119, 7ff.), and he often says that there must be a concomitant act of the will (e.g., *Mujarrad*, p. 93, 7ff.), he speaks also of the human agent’s power as having an “effect” (tādi’ah) on the event. For al-Ash’arī, however, “occur” (*waqtu ‘ilāh*) is an equivocal expression (cf. *Mujarrad*, p. 93, 7ff.). All the real properties and attributes of the human act (*jamatu ‘alākhāmin wa-sālah*) are the immediate effects of God’s causing it to exist (*Mujarrad*, p. 94, 7ff.), and God does not cause the existence of the event through or by means of the human agent’s power (*Mujarrad*, p. 119, 9ff.). It is because of its correlation (tādil) to the individual instance of created power that the given event is described as a human act or “performance” (*ikhsā‘*; *Mujarrad*, p. 93, 14–15); i.e., it is because of the simultaneous pres-
ence of the particular instance of the created power that the event occurs as a performance of the human agent (ibid., p. 92, sf.). Since his power has no real effect (cf. Shami [69], p. 182, 14sf.), i.e., no effect on the coming to be (jussīdāt) or existence of the event or on any of its real properties or characteristics, its only "effect" is on the status of the event in relation to the human subject in which God creates it. This is what al-Bāqillānī accounts for as the "state" (bal) of the act which is effected by the agent's power (cf., e.g., Ghannāyib, fol. 153v, 12sf.) in a theory which al-Ghazālī considers implausible and confused (see chap. 2, n. 10). Al-Shār'i's "nāqīt ibīsā" is, thus, by no means equivalent to the "nāqīt ibīsā" of al-Ghazālī, since he holds the definition in which the phrase occurs as valid both for God's power and man's. Again, in contrast to al-Ghazālī's description of their doctrine, the Mu'tazila hold that volition is itself a free and autonomous act which takes place through the agent's power to act by reason of a motivation; the motivation is insofar as it presents the agent with a reason for acting, but it is not the determinant cause of his acting; even strong motivation may occur without the act's ensuing. Similarly, volition may occur without the ensuing occurrence of the act; see our "The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the Teaching of 'Abd al-Gabbār, "Le Mouvement 91 (1982), pp. 131ff. It is important to keep in mind that al-Ghazālī employs 'al-qudrāt' to name both the faculty (the power to act) and the act of the faculty when it moves as he does 'al-'irādāt' both for the will as a faculty and for the individual volition which is its act. In the traditional analysis of the Ash'arites, one cannot properly speak of faculties or powers at all in the usual sense, since will and qudrāt are formally conceived as "accidents" and so are occurrences that are created occasionalistically and cease to exist in the moment succeeding that of their creation. Al-Ghazālī, by contrast, speaks of "the powers of the soul" (zawād 'i maqā'id) in Iḥtiyāk (p. 172, translated in chap. 2, p. 38, above) and describes the intellect as a "noble power" (Mibāhak, pp. 21sf.), and so also will speak of will and the power of voluntary action plainly as faculties (e.g., Ibnāšīb, 34, pp. 148sf. and p. 122, 15sf.)

27 The text in the edition of Čuğanuş and Arat (p. 92, 3) reads simply lam yakeenu l-maqā'idu bi-qudrātli 'alad' her, without mukātirati 'an, and no variant is reported. The word does occur, however, in the editions of Cairo (1973), Beirut (1981), and Cairo (Mubāḥal Commercial Press, 1322, and 1974); the context is plainly to be understood. Note also that one has to read wul-maqādīr for wul-imādīr at the beginning of line 3.

28 According to the Mu'tazila, all volitions do not result in the occurrence of an action. Al-Ghazālī's statement here recalls the assertion found in many Ash'arite manuals (e.g., Iḥtiyāk, p. 37, 12sf.; al-Muṭawallī, p. 37, 11; Iḥtiyāk, p. 210, 8sf.; Shami [81], p. 93, 8sf. and Iḥtiyāk, fol. 171v, 15sf.) that the power of the human agent has no effect on its object (lā wukmbar lādhi, lā twāka'tibā' fīhu) but is related to it as cognition is related to its object; in other words, as related to mutaṣallī bi' its object, the human power of voluntary action has no effect on it (Iḥtiyāk, fol. 127v, 14sf. and 120r, 21sf.). Nowhere, however, does he unabashedly state such a thesis, much less assert it. Later in Iḥtiyāk (pp. 181sf.), using language that he employs in setting forth his own teaching in Iḥtiyāk, al-Ghazālī says that according to the Mu'tazila volition is, along with other things, a condition for the activation of the power to act. The statement is not correct, at least not for the leading masters of the Basrian school of the Mu'tazila, and it may be that al-Ghazālī did not rightly understand the thesis, but on the other hand it is not implausible that he found it more convenient to misrepresent it and so have to deal only with a straw man.

29 Note that al-Ghazālī's phrasing here has 'lī-maqā'id' rather than 'lī-jussī' (to cause it to occur). The expression 'taḥayyurā lī' is somewhat ambivalent in the present context. Al-Ghazālī had earlier in the discussion used it of the action with respect to the agent: "al-qudrāt" in ordinary language is an expression for the attribute by virtue of which the act is suitable or ready for the agent (bihā yataḥayyur'u l-falā' lil-fallāh) and through which it occurs" (p. 81, 5sf.). It can be used also of God's knowledge with respect to its objects as fully capable of apprehending them (e.g., Ghunayib, fol. 30r, 21) so that the broader interpretation which al-Ghazālī puts on 'al-aʿāla' is to be understood with 'taḥayyur' too.

30 Subsequently (p. 98, 4sf.), he indulges in a rather silly cavil, by taking the verb in its primitive sense in ordinary Arabic as to generate or produce, he says that it is absurd to think that one act issues from within another. In contrast to the dialectical arguments of this section of Iḥtiyāk, al-Ghazālī in fact employs the verb in precisely the same sense as the Mu'tazila, e.g., Mubāhak, p. 101, 5.

31 E.g., Iḥtiyāk, p. 5, 4sf. and pp. 182, 3, and 121, 7. That he scarcely discusses the attribute of life at all is conspicuous.

32 For his rejection of the analysis of al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, cf. also Mibāhak, p. 221, and Muṭawallī i, p. 35, 9, cited in chap. 2, n. 10. The statement (Iḥtiyāk, p. 139, 1sf.) that God's essential attributes may be said to be other than His essence, just as an accident is other than the jawhar which is its subject, seems bizarre, to say the least; the qualification that what is meant is that the essence can be conceived without the attributes may be intended to render the statement harmless, but it can hardly be thought to succeed. The statement may perhaps reflect al-Ghazālī's contempt for the traditional kalām of the Ash'arites, who employ 'qīmāman bi' both in speaking of accidents as "subsisting" in their substrates and of God's eternal attributes as "subsisting"
In his essence, though they are always careful to insist that God's existence or essence (ṣufī/dīdāt = waṣūd) without His eternal attributes is inconceivable (though not identical to His essence, they may not be said to be "other than He") and would never say that they are, or are analogous to, "accidents" (waṭāf), though marṣū' is used of both. One would think that given his tendency to espouse the logic and ontology of Avicenna, al-Ghazālī would somehow feel constrained to make a number of distinctions and to discuss the subject seriously, even if not in detail. He doesn't.

33 So also in the discussion in Qudūsīyāb (pp. 8 ff. = Iḫṣār 1, p. 107, 14 ff.) he says that this seeing is "a kind of unveiling and knowing, only clearer than [the usual kind] of knowing" (na[w]u kāla-su bi-ṣālim dīlā ilā bi-dāla-su mina l-ʾīlim); cf. also Iḫṣār 4, p. 214, and generally pp. 554 ff.

34 Essentially, the same definition is given in Qudūsīyāb (p. 81, Iḥṣār = Iḫṣār 1, p. 106, 17 ff.), in Ṣāḥib, pp. 46 f., and 117, 156 f., and in Ṣutūrta, l, pp. 59 ff., he gives taṭlīf (composition; being properly composed) as the proper character of bodies. Concerning this definition in traditional Ashʿarite teaching, see our "Bodies and Atoms: The Ashʿarite Analysis," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. M. Marmura (Albany, N.Y., 1984), pp. 46 ff. (where note that "are formally strict"

35 For the traditional description of water and air, see, e.g., Ḥusaynī, fol. 339, 9 ff. The remarks of al-ʿĀṣarī in Ṣuḥaylī, fol. 14, 9 ff. (where note that they are not the usual kind) are quoted by the printer following "predicates" in the second line of p. 49.

36 Al-Ghazālī never that I have noted speaks of the individual instance of an accident as a "particle" (ḥakīm), but it is the mark of the akhūlākīrīm (e.g., Shāmī, p. 112, 10 ff., and Gūnayn, p. 18 ff. 22 ff.

37 See, e.g., Ḥusaynī, p. 140. Differences of opinion on this question are in large part based on whether or not one holds, with al-ʾĀṣarī and al-Ifṣāri, that, since 'continues to exist' is not implied by 'exists' or 'an x', perdurance or permanence of existence (al-ḥaqq) must be a distinct accident created by God (thus, e.g., al-Ifṣāri, 'Aqīdah, šIV, p. 140, and Fr., p. 148 = Shāmī [66], pp. 177 ff.); or, with al-Jayyānī and most authorities after al-Baqillānī, that it is simply that what exists continues to exist (ṣaynār al-waṣūd). Al-ʾĀṣarī's position is, thus, that the atom ceases to exist when continuation of existence (baḥqā) is not created in it (e.g., Ṣutūrta, pp. 24 ff. and generally ʿArār al-Ifṣārī, fol. 105, 2 ff.). Al-Ghazālī cites two ʾĀṣarīite positions in Tāhāṣīf, pp. 88 f.; for detail on the question, see Ikhtisār, fol. 72 v ff., and Sharḥ al-Ifṣārī, fol. 124 ff.

38 The focus on the elements of traditional dogma against the usual oppo-

nents of traditional manuals likewise excludes any mention or discussion of immaterial beings; see p. 56 below.


40 Again here, he seems to state traditional Ashʿarite teaching, but whether by ʿudwānī he means the whole traditional set (i.e., including contingency, conjunction, etc.) or only rest and motion and the ʿānānī (see footnote 2) that is unique to the jawhar in the first moment it is created, as would seem most likely, is not clear from the evidence of the text. If he includes only the latter three, then he need not be committed to the traditional atomism in its every detail. The ʿānānī will, in any case, entail having position in space.

41 Motions are said to be mutawwaddān in Qudūsīyāb, p. 87, 22 f. = Iḫṣār 1, p. 110, 8 ff. For the usual use of the word, c.f., e.g., Muṣarrat, pp. 220 ff.

42 He goes on to say that as such this accident does not occupy space but requires a locus. God neither occupies space nor requires a locus: Iṣṭīddā, p. 24; cf. Mīḥakk, p. 40, 10 ff.

43 Reading mauwūdī for mauwūdī in lines 12 ff. Note that by 'al-jim al-ʿaʾmm' in line 10, he does not mean the most universal of all classes, but only a more universal class; he employs ʿimār l-ʿaʾnim of body on the previous page and of jawhar in Mūṣarrāt, p. 14, 11. (Note that al-Ghazālī normally follows the usage of kalām, employing 'imār for class' in general rather than following the usage of the falsāfīs and distinguishing now as 'genus' and 'species'. See, however, Mīḥakk, p. 105, where he explains the use of 'jim al-ʿaʾnim'.

44 C.f., e.g., Tamābīd, p. 78, 10 f. and Shāmī (69), p. 141, 8, and p. 159, 1 ff. Some Ashʿarites define the atom in terms of ṣabqīḥābī hāsim (Shāmī, p. 142, 10 ff., and Gūnayn, fol. 144, 1 ff., and 187, 10; some surface area is a property of whatever occupies space and has volume ( ... lahu muḥāṣtan wa-bāḥdā bukumu kulli muṣālaqayīna ādī juttatibna wa-būjram) (Gūnayn, fol. 144, 1 ff., and, thus, the atom occupies the space (ṣabqīḥābī hāsim) in which it resides) (e.g., Muṣarrat, p. 207, 12) and may be said to fill a place as such and of itself (yamāla ʿa ʾl-habīb hāsimā) (Gūnayn, fol. 99, 1 ff., etc.), the essential characteristic (al-ṣabqīḥābī) of the jawhar is to be a volume (al-ḥayyātayn) (Gūnayn fol. 60, 10). Whatever the definitions among the masters, it is taken as axiomatic that every existing jawhar is muṣālaqīna (e.g., Shāmī, p. 149, 15 ff.). According to the traditional conception, thus, bāṣīya is characteristic of the jawhar as opposed to the accident (Shāmī, p. 151, 1 ff., and the latter has place (muṣāla) but not position in space (ṣabqīḥa) (Gūnayn, fol. 32 v, 21).

45 This is the normal sense of the word; c.f., e.g., Shāmī (69), p. 141. Al-
Ghazâlî does speak of “occupying locations in space” (al-shaghâla li-l-adâra) in Tâhâfûs (p. 61, ff.), where he asks whether or not God could reduce the dimensions of the universe and whether, if He were to do so, the portion of the whole (al-mi‘âr) “and the occupation of spaces” that no longer existed would be greater with two cubits missing than with only one. Here, however, he is not talking about the jâwarî but of the Whole, the dimensions and volume of the universe. In Qudârâyah (p. 83, 11 = Ihtâjî I, p. 107, 4) he seems to employ ‘position’ (jihâd) as an equivalent of ‘hour’ (sâ‘î) (cp. p. 79, 11 = Ihtâjî I, p. 104, 25, with p. 82, 4 = 1, p. 106, 13) and says that to have a particular position (mu‘âasa wan-li-jihâd) is to have a particular location in space (sâ‘î), as does a jâwarî. He intends ‘position’, more narrowly elsewhere, however, (ibid., pp. 82 ff. = Ihtâjî I, p. 106, 1)24 when he takes it as a location in space relative to a human observer, as above, below, etc.; for the term ‘position’ (sâ‘î) generally, see note on Ihtâjî I, p. 79, 11. Then of course, however, with the conception of body as essentially mu‘allâf. Previously in the same chapter (p. 190) al-Ghazâlî had defined body as “a finite continuum which is measurable in three dimensions” (mu‘âsatan mi‘adinan mawâṣa‘atun fi-lar akhârin thuâribîhun), a definition which would seem to have its immediate source in Avicenna (cf. Hудâd, p. 87; note the contrasting definition of Tâhâfûs, p. 61, where, against the mutakallimûn, Avicenna defines body, saying that it is “a single, continuous substance and it is not composed of indivisible parts”).

40 That he speaks of divinity here and not of “composition” (‘il‘âd, tâ’lîf) follows the lexical program of Mîrîrâ. It is not inconsistent, however, with the conception of body as essentially mu‘allâf. Previously in the same chapter (p. 170) al-Ghazâlî had defined body as “a finite continuum which is measurable in three dimensions” (mu‘âsatan mi‘adinan mawâṣa‘atun fi-lar akhârin thuâribîhun), a definition which would seem to have its immediate source in Avicenna (cf. Hудâd, p. 87; note the contrasting definition of Tâhâfûs, p. 61, where, against the mutakallimûn, Avicenna defines body, saying that it is “a single, continuous substance and it is not composed of indivisible parts”). Al-Ghazâlî does not explicitly raise the question of whether bodies are or are not infinitely divisible in Mîrîrâ (or, for that matter, elsewhere that I have noted), but his speaking of particles (‘il‘âd) in some passages would seem to indicate that they are not, so that one could take the two definitions as equivalent insofar as the being composed (mu‘allâf) of the forms is understood as equivalent to the being continuous or contiguous (mu‘âsat) of the latter. In Qudârâyah (p. 82, 12 ff. = Ihtâjî I, p. 106, 10 ff.), al-Ghazâlî says that bodies always have perceptible characteristics and dimensions (kayyâd and mîqdar).

41 This is, of course, the title of the book, but in the context it stands as al-Ghazâlî’s description of the elements of Muslim orthodoxy as presented in the school (mu‘âasa wan-li-jihâd) with which he associates himself (cf. Mi‘ân, pp. 134 ff., discussed below, pp. 96-97); cp. the occurrence in Ghazâlî’s writing (see, e.g., n. 48 immediately below), as a redundant term equivalent to ‘soul’ or whether he means by it the physical pneuma. That it is the pneuma he means here is, however, clear, from the discussion in Mi‘ân, pp. 134 ff., on which see pp. 59-61 below.

48 Here ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ do not designate two distinct beings or components or aspects of the essential reality of man but are merely two synonyms for the same being, as is clear from the singular subject and predicate of the following phrase. If the soul/spirit is a jâwarî, and all jâwarîs are located in space, then it could cease to exist only if God withdrew the ‘âkhras which are the condition of its existence; cf. Ihtâjî, pp. 56, 1ff., and 17, 1ff. In Jâwarî (p. 16, 1) he describes the body metaphorically as the soul’s ship.

49 On the operation of the pneuma, see Ihtâjî, pp. 11ff. and more generally concerning the related physiology v. ibid., pp. 110ff.; also cp. Mîrîrâ, pp. 135ff. It is plain that here in Ihtâjî (as he does more explicitly, e.g., in Mîrîrâ, p. 115, and Muta‘â%î, p. 34, discussed below, p. 90) al-Ghazâlî wishes to assert the existence of another spirit distinct from that recognized by the Ash’arite mutakallimûn, namely, from the “subtle bodies” (i.e., invisible fluid) associated with corporeal life. According to the traditional doctrine of the school, life is, strictly speaking, an accident which is created in the atoms or particles that make up the pneuma. The life of the visible body (the jâwarî) is associated with the presence of the pneuma which circulates in it. Interpretations of their relationship vary somewhat; cf., e.g., Muta‘â%î, pp. 357; al-Mutawallî, pp. 112, Rûdâ, p. 106; Latâ‘îf, 4, p. 19 (as 127,65); Ihtâjî, p. 377; and generally Ghunayn, fols. 1277 ff. and cp. al-Muta‘â%î, pp. 94ff. Some thus identify life with the pneuma (e.g., al-Baqillâni, cited in Ghunayn, loc. cit.); life belongs to the pneuma (to each of its individual particles or atoms) as an accident, and by its presence in the body the pneuma (mu‘âsût) the body to be alive (al-Mutawallî, p. 37, where omit the sâ‘î in front of ‘îdâh in line 2). That is, the pneuma is the living component in a material composite that is described by ‘alive’. Angels and jinn are also spoken of as having invisible bodies (al-Mutawallî, p. 37).

50 P. 3, 14ff., see generally, al-Mutawallî, pp. 3f. and cp., e.g., ‘b‘alîl l-l‘imâna’ yawmu bâdilin šifikatun kamalîn wa-bî‘iyta l-basti ya‘yibura ‘unsurul târâsrat b‘l-nâ’s wa-târarat b‘l-râshî wa-târarat b‘l-nâ’s l-l‘imâna’ (Mîkâkhû, p. 43, 1ff.; cp. also ibid., p. 77, 6ff. Regarding the various terms al-Ghazâlî employs to refer to the “heart” or rational soul, cf. also Ihtâjî 4, p. 299, 24ff., where he says that it is variously called “the divine light” and “the intellect” and “intellectual insight” (al-hâznatul l-ḥizânat), and “the light of belief and certainty” (nurul l-l‘imâna wal-nagîn), and goes on to say that one should not be concerned about names since formal terms (iqlîsûhû) vary.

51 Muta‘â%î, which I have rendered “distinct”, might equally be translated “separable” or “separate”.

52 This statement would seem to exclude one’s reading Ihtâjî in the previous passage simply as “all” and to confirm its having its proper and more common meaning as we have rendered it. In the formal vocabulary of kalâm,
'jau' normally designates a part as a discrete element in a set of parts, all of which are identical, while 'bīd' is used of a part which is one of a set of disparate parts. (Cp. Avicenna's use where he speaks of the 'bīd' of the brain: de Anima, p. 267, l.) Al-Ghazālī uses 'jau' elsewhere, however, simply in the sense of "part" or "component" (e.g., Miḥākh, p. 38, l. and ult.). Concerning the use of the verb "aṭrūhū, āṭrūhū" here, cp. ʿIṣrāʾ, p. 300, 2fff., where al-Ghazālī divides the "perceptibles" (al-mudākhrāt) into those which can be objects of imagination, such as colored bodies, and those which cannot, "such as God's being and whatever is not corporeal, such as cognition, the power to act, volition, etc."

51 Note that he says that it subsists "fi ʿašūr," nor "baʿn ʿašūr"; it does not, that is, subsist in the body in the way that an accident subsists in its substrate.

54 Here too he follows the tradition of the falsāfa. Avicenna says that the first or primary connection (daʿwa ʿalam ʿalā ʿilāma) of the soul is to the heart (de Anima, pp. 265ff.), while the acts of some of its faculties (e.g., al-taʿawwur and al-taḥdhib) are carried out in the brain (pp. 265ff.).

55 Note that it is the intellect whose mutashābīh is the soul, the soul is an independent entity (a jawwūb) and does not reside in a subject. Thus Avicenna insists (al-Naṣf al-nuṣūṣ, p. 198, 8f.) that the body is not the locus (mutashābīh) of the soul but rather something that receives it (qabīḥ). Al-Ghazālī makes his conception of the rational soul clear enough in Miḥākh, but for reasons that we shall present later we have preferred to make but limited use of the evidence of that work in our present analysis.

56 He uses 'spirit' (al-ruḥ) here instead of 'soul' in order to allude to Qurʾ, 8:7; "They will ask you about the ruḥ; say, 'the ruḥ is a matter of my Lord's and you have been given but little knowledge.'" (Cp. the discussion of the rational soul in Miḥākh, p. 14, 12ff., where the same verse is cited along with Qurʾ, 20:29 = 38,72.) There are a number of ways to read (and render) the verse; some exegetes, e.g., al-Qushayri, an ʿAdārī, understand the reference to be to the pneuma (cf. Luṭfī: ad loc.). That by ruḥ here al-Ghazālī does not mean the pneuma but rather the soul is clear from the context and also from the discussion of ʿIṣrāʾ, p. 14, 22ff., where the verse is quoted and the spirit/heart is described as "something divine" (akmar ʿālākī); cp. also Miḥākh, p. 14, 12ff.

57 Here, playing on the expression 'naḥf,' hearing both "self" and "soul." With the assertion that those who know are not allowed to divulge their knowledge publicly, cp. ʿIṣrāʾ, p. 31, 12ff. (cited below, p. 61), pp. 36f., p. 99, 28ff., et alibi. We may note here that parallel to the doctrines contrasted in this passage, he notes in Miṭyār, p. 164, that whereas the mutashābīhūn hold angels to be "subtle bodies," the falsāfa say that they are immaterial (ḥayyū mutashābīhūn), but go on to say that since the correct interpretation of this dispute requires rigorous, that is to say, logical demonstration (al-tārīq al-burhān) he cannot go into the matter here.

58 In Miḥākh (p. 123) he offers the thesis that God "is not in any place, neither in the world nor outside it nor contiguous to it" as something that most people would misunderstand and refuse to accept.

59 Regarding the ultimate "giver of forms/agent intellect" (which al-Ghazālī often refers to as "the Throne," "the Well Guarded Table", etc.), note that he says a few pages later in Miḥākh (p. 82) that it is not implausible that in the marvels of God's creation there be a single celestial cause (fi l-taḥdīb l-samāwîyin ayat al-bahthu naḥīd) which through the determinate operation of God's custom is "the cause of life in the members and organs of animals and of their various configurations and of the causes of the multiplicity of clouds and of the causes of the mutual emissions between men, which are the causes of battles, which are the causes of bloodshed. The only people who reject such knowledge are the ignorant who have no knowledge at all of the marvels of God's creating and the scope of His power." (The last sentence here—where note again the formal sense of 'creates'—refers to examples of drawing correct conclusions regarding the characteristics of animals and men on the basis of physiognomy, whose causal implications elicit the final statement regarding "a single celestial cause").

60 That is to say, the act of combining the terms of the syllogism and understanding their formal relation is the cause of the knowledge of the conclusion. In Qītiqī (pp. 21f. 23) al-Ghazālī states that the conclusion is "mustawālid," but he does not mean what the Muťazila mean in using the same expression. For al-Ghazālī, rather, the act of combining the terms and understanding their formal relation is the occasion given which the knowledge of the conclusion becomes available and is imparted by an extrinsic agent intellect. It should also be noted that al-Ghazālī's former schoolmate, al-ʿĀndārī, attacks the doctrine of the falsāfa concerning the role of the agent intellect in his Ghanvāy (fol. 114v, 12ff.).

61 The angelic intelligence of the outermost sphere, however, knows through its own being and essence (bi-jaʿbārīhī wa-ḥaṭālīhī) (Fayyūl, p. 41, 4; cf. also Miṭyār, p. 24, 12ff.).

62 Note that, following Avicenna, al-Ghazālī considers existence to be an accident; cf. Miṭyār, p. 27, 12ff., and Miḥākh, pp. 10ff.

63 So, too, the phrase "kam al-ārdī kalīb" in his presentation of the position of the falsāfa in Qītiqī, p. 215, precisely reflects al-Ghazālī's own position; its relation to the body is like an accident. For the sense of the ʿārdī as an enduring property or accident which is apparently permanent in its subject but without which the subject can exist, cf., e.g., Miḥākh, p. 26, 9ff., and Muṭṣafūt, p. 11ff.
64 With this, cp. Ghunyaf, fol. 120v, 2ff.

65 The soul (nafs, pl. most often nafsū), as opposed to the "self" or essence: 

nafs, pl. "nafsū"). It is not a formal element of the conception of man in classical kalām; cf., e.g., Mawlākī, p. 11f. and al-Bayhaqī, Amīrān, p. 286, 2ff., and the thesis mentioned by al-Ghazālī in Aḥābat (p. 11), according to which 'soul' has no distinct, proper referent. 'Nafs' is sometimes used to name the seat of the emotions (cf., e.g., Hāfiẓ, fol. 110v, 2-4, and 138v, 1ff. and Ḫiyārī, p. 4, 2ff.). In traditional religious language the "heart" is the focus of mental acts, and following Q32,11 bad thoughts and actions are often attributed to the nafs, while good thoughts and actions are attributed to the rhū (e.g., al-Sulāmī, p. 408, 2ff., Ṭabīb al-Dīn, p. 10ff., and Lāṭāfī, p. 39, ad Q37, 8f. and 6, p. 11, ad Q40,9,12). (The language here originates in Christian usage; cp., e.g., the use of 'soūra' and 'muḥāsara' in I Cor. 10:13–15). In some such contexts it is often unclear whether 'nafs' is used in this sense or whether he self is meant; cf., e.g., al-Sulāmī, p. 131, 4f. and 14. 

66 The terms here are wonderfully ambivalent, as one might easily hear "the most literal and the most true and the most Muslim" as well as a number of more nuanced readings of the separate expressions and the combination of the three. With "al-ilmām" here, cp. "iśā'itā l-kāfī 'ṣurūtu l-thābātā tātā l-īslāmāh" al-Murtuqī, p. 13, 21.

67 An analogous set of three positions is presented concerning the beatitude of the next life in Māmah, pp. 5f., and concluding with the same advice (pp. 7ff.; cp. Muṣṭafā, p. 148, 21–33), though there al-Ghazālī indicates somewhat more clearly his preference for the third alternative, which he attributes to "the sufis and the metaphysicians among the šalāfīs" (i.e., "those šalāfīs who believe in God and the last day"; p. 12, 8ff.)

68 The word is employed by the Ashʿarītes in a formal sense to refer to God's attributes as distinct from his essence (dhāt) and to refer to the accidents of corporeal beings, but it is clear that it is not so used by al-Ghazālī here (Ḫiyārī, p. 4, 478, translated above, p. 36).

69 "Alayn" properly designates "al-šay'īn l-maṣyājādī l-šābātī l-kāfīn" (Ghunyaf, fol. 121, 1ff.; cp. Fāṣar, p. 323, 5) and as such is employed also of God (e.g., Mawlākī, pp. 110ff.).

70 It will be fanciful, however, to suggest that because of al-Ghazālī's recognition of the equivocity of 'jawhar', what he really means when, for example, he defines a body as "a composite of two jawhar which occupy space" (Iqṭīṣād, p. 39) is a composite of matter and form. By "jawharayn mutaḥāriyyayn" he clearly means two independent, contingent entities "substances," (if you wish), each of which occupies space.

71 Cf., e.g., Mawāṣil, pp. 147 and 150, and concerning the levels of consciousness or intuition, cp. Mīshkāb, pp. 8ff. True visions (al-rūya l-saḥāb) are given as one of the "forty-six parts of prophecy"; Jawāhir, p. 20, 1, citing a hadith reported by ibn Ḥanbal and al-Bukhārī and transmitted also by abū 'All al-Thaqafi, according to al-Sulāmī (pp. 36ff.).

72 Al-Ghazālī's discussion of human acts in Māmah, pp. 88f., is similarly inconclusive.

73 Al-Ghazālī will no doubt explain this along the same lines as does Avicenna (e.g., in Ishbīlān, pp. 214ff.), "fiḥma l-dhātiyya fi māḥālī t-lātāfī l-aṭṭābān maṣlāmāt" (ibid., p. 209, 1ff.; see, generally, pp. 209ff.) For the traditional Ashʿarī view, cf., e.g., Mustaʿṣar, p. 263, 9ff.

74 P. 92, 18ff. = Ḫiyārī, p. 113, 2ff.; a similar statement is made in Iqṭīṣād, p. 127. Note that he does not suggest here whether this involves merely the restoration of the pneuma to a part of the body or the presence of the rational soul. The question here differs from that of the following section of the work, since the body is presumed to be present so that "life" (in the context, presumably the pneuma) can be present in at least some part of the body at the time of the interrogation. Again, the only assertion al-Ghazālī formally claims to make is that it is theoretically possible that this take place under these circumstances. He in no way commits himself regarding how he conceives the interrogation in fact to take place. The notion of the restoration of the pneuma for the interrogation is traditional; cf., e.g., al-Barbahārī, cited in Tadhkira al-Fikhrātābāh, p. 26.

75 Note that, although for obvious reasons he does not do so here, al-Ghazālī elsewhere carefully distinguishes what lies absolutely in God's power and is therefore hypothetically possible from what is concretely possible given the essential natures of things and God's wisdom and liberality; cf. chap. 2, n. 24.

76 In this connection too, for example, the use of the expressions "in act" and "in potency" in speaking of God (p. 61, 3). That al-Ghazālī views the traditional proof for the existence of God as unsatisfactory, see Ijām, pp. 7ff., where it is described as namlīyyah. Al-Ghazālī does not say explicitly that a fully adequate demonstration of the existence of God must follow that given, e.g., in Iḥāṣāt, pp. 20ff., and Ishbīlān, pp. 118ff., but that this is his position is indicated in Qādāt, pp. 24ff., and its basic terms are formally presented in Maqād, p. 137 (cited in chap. 2, n. 24).

77 Cp. the dogmatic introductions to al-Qushayrī's Riṣālah and al-Kallābādī's Taṣarat, which likewise serve as a kind of preliminary apologetic.

78 So, too, his accusation against the scholars and theologians as being more often interested in highly endowed and prestigious chairs is contextually appropriate in that these "impediments to knowledge" violate the canons of the perfection of religious action that he will lay down as the foundation
of higher religious insight (falsa 'ilm al-baqa'iyya, al-ma'rifatu bis-sal). He will say over and again that "this ain't a book on higher speculative theology ('ilm al-makāṣīfah), . . ." 

4. Open Conflict with the Ash'arite School 

1 Later (p. 67), he speaks of the ignorance of "those who hasten to charge anyone who disagrees with al-Ash'ari or someone else with unbelief." Al-Ghazâlî's intimation that his opponents are moved by envy of his Iṣâṣ is basically polemical and need not be taken as evidence that it was Iṣâṣ alone which provoked the accusations against him. (Hostile reaction to Iṣâṣ, certainly, was ample, as it was condemned in Spain during al-Ghazâlî's lifetime, though the anecdote of al-Jâzârî concerning Iṣâṣ, quoted by Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought, p. 111, would seem likely to be based on Fāyāṣ. For a list of early opponents to Iṣâṣ, see Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought, pp. 91). In his detailed study, The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy (Leiden, 1989), Isa Belo failed to see that al-Ghazâlî composed Fāyāṣ primarily as an apologetic for his own theology and its tawâfi. Al-Ghazâlî did write a work in which he responded more directly to objections against what he says in Iṣâṣ, namely, al-Imâmî bi al-khâtâbat al-Iṣâṣî. This, however, has not been available to me, concerning the contents of the work and the state of the text, see Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought, pp. 75–81. It might be appropriate to suggest here that in view of al-Ghazâlî's assurance of the superiority of his own theological insight and so of the status of his tawâfi, it would seem likely that the title of his work on the divine names should be revised maghâl instead of the usual maghâl, i.e., it is the place one aims to reach, not the aiming at it.

2 In Mawsûdî (p. 114, 71) al-Ghazâlî speaks, in connection with his own case, of "turning away from status and wealth and [worldly] distractions and attachments." This claim may, however, be a trifle disingenuous; see Joseph van Ess, "Quelques remarques surom al-Mawṣûdi min ad-dalâlî," in Ghazâlî, la raison et le mirâj, pp. 57–60.

3 The rhetoric of this passage is remarkable; note, e.g., the use of "Inspire" ('alûkhana). The reference to the sultans and other men of power who endowed and controlled the schools is a mark of al-Ghazâlî's alienation from his erstwhile colleagues. Note too, the resonant connotations acquired by "dirkhdunî" within the context. In Mawsûdî (pp. 115f) al-Ghazâlî says that he came finally to examine his worldly attachments and realized that he was more devoted to status and fame than to God and was called to break these connections. It is clear from the opening of Fāyāṣ, however, as also from a number of other works written after his crisis, that modesty was not one of the virtues he came to cultivate.

4 Concerning this, recall that in the section of Iṣâṣîdî (pp. 45–60) in which he treats the anthropomorphic descriptions of God, al-Ghazâlî presents the traditional interpretations at relatively disproportionate length while offering only oblique allusions to his own exegesis of them.

5 The five levels (presented pp. 34ff.) are the essential (al-dhâhî), the sensible (al-haṣî), the imaginary (al-mawâźî), the intellectual (al-šâfi), and the symbolic or figurative (al-dhâlî). Elsewhere, al-Ghazâlî offers somewhat variant lists of the "degrees of existence," see chap. 4, n. 14.

6 The implications of this exegesis within the context of al-Ghazâlî's theology is spelled out, e.g., in Iṣâṣî 4, p. 246, 8ff. Also see our Creation and the Cosmic System, p. 45; the same Tradition is cited in Mustâfa t. p. 83, 6ff., and in al-Naqqâl al-nâzâfî, p. 190. Al-Ghazâlî's interpretation of God's 'hand' here is conspicuously different from the traditional Ash'ârite interpretations; cf., e.g., Mawâlî, pp. 113ff. and 234, 1ff.; al-Ṭawâfi, fol. 13r f.; al-Masâ'ûsî, pp. 88f. and Muḥarrar, p. 241, 1ff. (Note that abû Ya'qî from al-Mawâlî, p. 52, 11ff., 886) condemns two of the common Ash'ârite interpretations, but not that according to which 'hand' refers to God's Self or essence; cf., e.g., Mawâlî and al-Bayhâqî, locc. cit.). Al-Ghazâlî associates God's hand with the angel of the first sphere in Iṣâṣî 4, p. 246, 8ff.

7 It is noteworthy that in this apologetic context he cites Qâdî, a work in which he had presented Aristotelian logic in a form and language so adapted as to make it acceptable to the 'ulama', and not Mawâlî, in which he presented it using the lexicon of the falsâfîs, and Midsâkkî, in which the elements are presented in his own language but in a way that is openly critical of the school tradition.

8 For the language, cf., e.g., al-Isfârâ'în, 'aṣâdîf, pp. 15f., translated in our "Knowledge and Taqîdî, pp. 50ff. Al-Ghazâlî will claim, however, to speak from a superior vantage point, since he holds (Mawsûdî, pp. 94f.) that the mutakallimûn are incapable of presenting an adequate apologetic against the falsâfîs (and this may be one reason that he offers none in Iṣâṣîdî). Note also, however, that his polemic ignores the basic position of the school, in that for them the reasoning presented in the Koran and Tradition are sufficient for most ordinary people.

9 Concerning "the deeper truths of the religious sciences" and "the ultimate limits of doctrinal systems," see Midsâkkî, pp. 124ff., discussed on pp. 96–97 below. The phrase "whose minds are not solidly grounded in the sciences" is clearly a paraphrase for "those who are not vishibinâ bi-l-'ilm." . . .

10 There are in the Koran symbolic metaphors (ustârâr râmiyyah) for those who are able to see them: Jawâhir, p. 28.
11 “Nür al-nahwawah” means a special kind of direct inspiration by the agent intellect. In a later context (p. 102, 1) this prophetic light is distinguished from the intellectual light (nūr al-‘aql) which comes about after long years of intellectual research (baḥš). In Miskhāḥ (pp. 97 and 77) the former is termed “the holy, prophetic spirit” (al-nūr al-‘adiliyyah l-madīnah) and the latter “the intellectual spirit” (al-nūr l-‘aql).

12 He makes an exception (p. 95) for disputation (al-manāzirāt) as a form of research in juridical matters, citing Qudūrāt al-‘aqrā’id. Does his constant condemnation of academic disputation on theological matters indicate perhaps that al-Ghazālī had suffered some unpleasant experiences in this regard?

13 In Jawāhir, where he had no apologetic aims, al-Ghazālī says (pp. 298f.) that there are many rumās in the Koran and the Traditions and (p. 31) that the truth is presented in the Koran “in the form of imaginative metaphors” (fi qulub l-‘anwihi l-khājiyyah); the interpretation of such figures (al-tawwīl) is analogous to dream interpretation (ibid., p. 31, 1-3).

14 The same four degrees of being are presented also in Musṭafā 1, pp. 21f.; the first three are mentioned also in Mṣūr (pp. 38f.) and briefly again in Mṣūr (p. 18), where the same expressions are used: al-nūrād fī l-`uṣūm, al-nūrād fī l-bādhah, al-nūrād fī l-`aql; in the same work (pp. 106f.) he speaks of the various rūḥān fī ṣurahs of beings as ranks or levels of beings (munawwirāt), specifically of the sensible and intelligible, with implicit allusion to Q40,13. In Ḥyār 3, p. 20, 39f., he distinguishes four levels or modes of existence (tawwāsirun ṣurahs fī`l nūrād) belonging to the universe; according to this classification, the highest level is contained in the Well Guarded Tablet, the first created intellect. Differences in the lists presented are due to the aims and requirements of the various contexts. Al-Ghazālī’s intention here in Ḥjūm would appear to be, in part at least, to escape the Hambalite condemnation of the distinction between al-qirābād and al-maqāri as traditionally it was formulated (cf., e.g., al-Mustanad, pp. 88f. and 92f., 1ff.). In Ḥjūm (pp. 216ff.), as is to be expected in view of the context, he simply presents the usual distinction in its usual terms.

15 He mentions, thus, God’s “form” (pp. 96 and 98), His “bandis” (pp. 59 and 109), “the descent” (pp. 15f.), His “being above” (pp. 38 and 68), and “ascending the Throne” (pp. 65, 68f. and 77), though he offers his interpretation only of the last (pp. 68f.).

16 Note, however, that the attack on the obligation to rational inquiry and a presentation of the different levels of religious assent do occur also in Fāsīl (pp. 60f.).

17 The argument concerning “eternal and uncreated” certainly avoids the reasoning of abū Yaḥyā against the traditional Ash‘arī stance (Mus’tanad, §§156, pp. 88f.), but this is secondary to al-Ghazālī’s purpose of setting the distinction within the context of a broader ontology than that current in the schools. So too, the remarks about collecting such Traditions (p. 75f.; cp. p. 97, 14ff.) may, as the editor suggests, be directed against ibn Khuzayma. He and al-Sibghī are explicitly attacked by ibn Fārik (Muskāḥ, pp. 18ff., 188ff., and 216ff.). Abī Yaḥyā condemns the distinction between al-qirābād and al-maqāri (al-ṭilwah and al-mašūn) (al-Mustanad, pp. 88 and 92, 4ff.), identifying those who hold it as “al-ḥaṣīmii” (p. 267, 8) and calling them unbelievers. “The lafitjīyyah” is an old epithet originally applied by the Hambalites and some other traditionalists to those who held that the voice (laft) of the Koran in recitation was something created and therefore distinct from God’s eternal speaking; it continued in use as a pejorative for any who made the equivalent distinction, whatever the terminology. See our “Elements in the Development of the Teaching of al-‘Ashʿari,” Le Musée 104 (1991), pp. 177 and 179f. and the references there cited.

18 Cf. also the passage in which he says that, if need be, in order to take one’s mind off the question of what these metaphors mean, one should take up reading the Koran or the study of lexicography or of grammar or calligraphy or medicine or religious law (fiqh), and goes on to say that it is better to distract one’s self even with play and fun than to attempt to interpret them (p. 77).

19 Cp. Ḥyār 1, p. 99, 59f., where he says that kalām is good for apologetic, “but there is no key for ending difficulties and for the disclosure of the essential realities and the knowledge of things as they really are and the perception of the primary truths which are presented in translation in the literal sense of the expressions of the Muslim creed (al-turūq l-`ulūl yustārīmuqahāb al-`arūf bhihi l-`uṣūm)` except rigorous campaigning, the suppression of the appetites . . . and holding fast to thought that is free of the contaminations of disputation. . . .” On turning “the face towards God,” cf. p. 60, translated in Landolt, “al-Ghazālī,” p. 61.

20 They are ṣawmāyā (pp. 79, 3, and 106, 2) and waḥmāyāt (p. 112, 8). The reasoning of the mutakallimān, like that of the fiqhā, employs premises that are founded simply in commonly accepted opinions (maqāriṣ): Miskhāḥ, p. 56, and Musṭafā 1, p. 48 ult.; cp. Fāsīl, pp. 69, 6f., 70, 1ff.; see chap. 3, n. 18, above.

21 Some people on hearing the tawwīl of “spiritual meanings involving the immaterial realm (al-maṣūn l-ṭilwah) and al-madākaqīyāt)” set forth in ordinary language become so confused that their basic assent to the truth is corrupted; they do not believe the elementary truth and not only fail to gain spiritual insight but lose even simple belief (‘inānā w-l-`aqlīn) (Jawāhir, p. 90).

22 As we have seen, “al-ṣawmā” for al-Ghazālī designates God’s governance
of the universe through the outermost sphere; al-qadar he associates with the
determinant occurrence of subluminary events through the operation of
the "universal, enduring causes," celestial and terrestrial; cf. Ilahi 4, p. 94; 8;
Magad, p. 98, 14ff; and Arba'in, p. 11.
23 Much of what al-Ghazâlî says in all of this is paralleled in Ilahiyyat, pp.
443ff. (= Najâh, p. 305).

5. Conclusions

1 The sufis' habitual caution in speaking about their experience, which al-
Ghazâlî occasionally claims as a precedent for his own rather frequent refusal to
state his position forthrightly, is really somewhat different in that theirs
has to do with the individual's claim to have achieved union with the divine
essence, while al-Ghazâlî's has to do with his claims for theological truth and
insight into the ultimate nature of things and the order of the universe.
2 The ambivalence of the passage when the work was first published
would have been extremely misleading, for, while anyone who has read Ilahi 4,
Magad, and Mi'kâb, for example, will know at once exactly what al-Ghazâlî means
by "the usual course of God's custom," the works published before
Mi'yar supply no such clear context of interpretation.
3 Cf., e.g., Ilahi 4, p. 86f. and 240ff. (translated in our Creation and the
Cosmic System, pp. 25ff). The statements are subtly nuanced, as he insists that
"conditions" do not "cause existence," where "cause existence" (al-'ludd) is
identified with "create" (al-'ikthirâ'), whose formal sense in al-Ghazâlî's usage
has been noted on p. 17 and chap. 2, n. 43.
4 Concerning the chronology of his works, see G. F. Hourani, "A Revised
5 That there are other theses that he rejects as in some way subordinate to
those he refutes, cf., e.g., Munâqad, p. 106f.
6 See chap. 3, n. 8, above; for the formulation, cp. Ilahiyyat, p. 404, 14ff.
(= Najâh, p. 276, 2).
7 Earlier (e.g., pp. 16 and 88ff), where he claimed to "make up" his own
formal terms, one finds that they are the same as those of Avicenna.
8 For the date of the work, see W. Madelung, "Ar-Râghî al-Ishârî's Die
Ethik al-Ghazâlî's, in İslamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Festschrift zum
sechzigsten Geburtstag, ed. R. Gramlich (Wiesbaden, 1974), pp. 112ff. (reprinted
in W. Madelung, Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam [London, 1981]),
and Hourani, "A Revised Chronology," pp. 294ff. Relative to the dating of
Mi'yar, it is not insignificant perhaps that in it al-Ghazâlî speaks several times
of the necessity of terminating all worldly connections (e.g., p. 26); cp. Mun-
9 By "a permanent habitus in the soul" (malakhatun thabatingan fi l-nafs) al-
Ghazâlî apparently means a state in which one's certitude concerning God's
creation and governance of the world no longer requires that he constantly
avert to the demonstration and its terms. This is a different level of certitude
from that which is not separable from the demonstration and is different in
kind from the certitude derived from contemplative vision. It is analo-
gous to the "a'yin al-naqif" of the sufis (cf., e.g., Rûshâb, 2, pp. 99ff.). See our
"Al-Ghazâlî on Taqlid," pp. 28ff. and the references there cited.
10 It is interesting to note that the thesis that God is neither within the
world nor outside it is a standard thesis with the Ash'arites, cf., e.g., al-
Istâfâ'î's, Fr. 20, pp. 150f.
11 The three levels of ascent to the traditional descriptions of the "punish-
ment of the grave" put forth in Ilahi 4, p. 483ff. are basically analogous to
the three levels of discourse presented in Mi'yar.
12 The title of the second book of Ilahi is also Qawâ'id al-'aqîd, but
it seems altogether implausible that this has been the work envisioned in
Tafsîr.
13 Mustâzhâ'î, written against the claims of the Bârîniyya concerning the
necessity of an infallible imam, was evidently composed between Mi'yar and Ilahi 4,
and Ilahi 4, see Hourani, "A Revised Chronology," p. 169.
14 It may be that al-Ghazâlî came later to feel that he might have gone
a bit too far in what he had implied or seemed to imply concerning the
resurrection in Mi'yar and Mi'yar, for he seems later to back off somewhat
in the general direction of a more traditional position; cf., e.g., Munâqad,
pp. 100ff. along with Ilahi 4, pp. 47ff. and 483ff., cited above, pp. 28ff.
and 66f. Did he, in fact, ever come to a definitive conclusion on the matter?
15 It is to be noted that Ilahi 4 can be seen as taking up, in a vastly
extended manner, the topic of Mi'yar, as he states over and again throughout
the work that it is properly and most strictly concerned with "the sciences of
action" (al-aswâ' al-mu'âmalah). Again, where earlier Mi'yar and Mi'yar
had served, so to speak, as the logical prelude to Mi'yar, logic is men-
tioned in Book II of Ilahi 4 as a science common to falsafa and kalâm, and
with them is summarily set aside to be taken up more substantially only later
in Book XXI in connection with the "science of the states of the soul," where
its importance is argued rhetorically through metaphor and in strongly reli-
gious language. Logic, thus, is viewed as the key for the soul's initial access to
the immaterial world and the perception of the true realities or essences
of things (baq'î'q al-'a'dir). It is worth remarking that although it was
extremely common for the leading scholars to produce short manuals of elementary doctrine (e.g., the 'aqīdah of al-Ishārātī, the Faciel of al-Qushayrī, the Lumaq of al-Junayrī). Qudūsyyah takes on a peculiar interest of its own because of its placement within the larger context of Iḥyā'.

16 One of the most important of these is that of the ontological origin of the "essential natures of things." He must have been aware of the problem, since it is dealt with, even if only superficially, by the earlier Ash'arites (see our Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 12ff.); he says nothing on the topic, however, not even to acknowledge that there may be such a question.

References

Primary Sources

'Aqīdah


Aqsām


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